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ANTIOUE BUST 



; Iniinnj-Wanllf. !:■ -Minor Slnil 



HISTORY 



OF THE 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR 



TRANSLATED FROM THE GREEK 



OF 



THUCYDIDES. 



BY WILLIAM SMITH, A. M. 

RECTOR OF THE HOLT TRINITY IN CHESTER, AND CHAFLA.IN TO THE RIGHT BON. THE EARL OF OERBT. 



A NEW EDITION, CORRECTED AND REVISED. 



PHILADELPHIA: 
PUBLISHED BY THOMAS WARDLE. 

STEREOTTFED BT L. JOHNSON. 

18 4 0. 









T. K. & P. a. C0LLIN3, PRINTERS, PHILA. 









fc 



SOME ACCOUNT 

O F 

THE LIFE AND WRITINGS 

O F 

DR SMITH, 

BY THE REV. THOMAS CRANE OF CHESTER. 



William Smith, son of the Rev. Richard Smith, Rector of the church of all Saints, 
and Minister of St Andrews, in the city of Worcester, was born in the parish of St 
Peter's Church in that city, on the 30th day of May, in the year 1711. He was educated 
in grammar-learning at the College-School in his native city, where he made great 
proficiency in his studies. In January 1725-6, it pleased God to deprive him of his 
father. On the 27th day of November, 1728, he was matriculated at New College in 
Oxford ; where he took the degree of Bachelor of Arts, in June, 1732 ; and that of 
Master, in July, 1737. 

Soon after he had taken his bachelor's degree, his merit caused him to be recom- 
mended to the Right Hon. James Earl of Derby, that great patron of arts and sciences : 
and he was retained three years in his lordship's house, in the office of Reader to his 
lordship. His connections with my lord of Derby introduced him to the honour of being 
known to several other persons of fortune and quahty ; which was of singular service to 
him in his progress through hfe. 

A gentleman by birth, blessed with an excellent capacity and education, and having 
ready and easy intercourse with the great and good, it is no wonder that he was adorned 
with manners most polite, with literary accomplishments most splendid and solid, and 
with morals becoming a faithful servant of the holy Jesus. Well qualified for the work 
of the ministry, he took deacon's orders at Grosvenor Chapel in Westminster, on 
Sunday the first of June, 1735, from Benjamin, Bishop of Winchester. On the 10th 
of September following, he was presented by his patron, James Earl of Derby, to the 
Rectory of Trinity Church in Chester. On the 14th of the same month he took priest's 
orders in the Cathedral Church of Chester, from Samuel, the bishop of that See : was 
instituted the same day, and inducted the next. 

Mr Smith's first publication was * " Dionysius Longinus on the sublime ; translated 
from the Greek, with Notes and Observations, and some Account of the Life, Writings 
and Character of the Author: " in one volume 8vo. ; inscribed to the Right Hon. the 

*Thc fourth is the best edition of Longinus. The Dean corrected two copies of the third 
edition; the one for the printer to follow, the other for himself to keep; the Dean's copy I 
possess. I showed the Dean Mr Toup's criticism of his translation. The Dean, knowing Toup 
to be in the wrong, thought him not worth answering: he said, "I followed Pearce, and Pearco 
is the best. I shall take no notice of Toup." The frontispiece to Longinus describes the power 
of eloquence : it was delineated, not by a professed limner, but by Dr Wall of Worcester, an 
eminent physician. 



17 LIFE OF DR SMITH. 

Earl of Macclesfield. The anonymous author of "the History of the Works of the 
Learned," for May, 1739, says of this work : — " The Translation of Longinus is, accord- 
ing to the most impartial judgment I can frame of it, after a comparison with others, 
the most elegant version that has been made of that author into the English tongue. 
The Preliminary Discourse excels that of the celebrated Boileau , which he has prefixed 
to his edition." Father Philips in " A Letter to a Student at a foreign University," 
published 1756, recommending, among other books, Longinus on the sublime, says ; — 
" A late English translation of the Greek critic, with notes and observations by Mr 
Smith, is a credit to the author, and reflects lustre on Longinus himself. As conver- 
sant as you are in the original language, you cannot but be highly pleased with this 
performance." In the " Weekly Miscellany," by Richard Hooker, of the Temple, Esq. 
No. 363, dated Saturday, December 8, 1739, we read : — Mr Smith, Rector of Trinity in 
Chester, *' justly deserves the notice and thanks of the public for his version of Lon- 
ginus on the sublime. Though the learned will not be satisfied without tasting the 
beauties of the original, which cannot be translated in all their perfection, yet they 
may reap benefit and pleasure from the judicious sentiments and ingenuity of the 
Translator, in his account of his author, and from the notes wiiich help to illustrate the 
text, and discover the excellency of the rules. To the unlearned also it may be of use, 
and give pleasure. It will enable him to read with more satisfaction, when he can 
read with more judgment, and distinguish the perfections and faults of a writer. He 
will be the better able to bear his part in a rational conversation, and appear with cred- 
it, when his observations are just and natural. Such compositions, while they form 
the understanding to a true taste, kindle an inclination to literature, and excite an 
emulation in mankind to distinguish themselves by such excellencies as distinguish 
men from brutes. Athens and Rome were even the glory of the whole world, when 
they were the universities of the whole world ; and those were reckoned the most ac- 
complished gentlemen, who were the greatest scholars, the deepest philosophers, the 
most eloquent orators, and the best moralists. England — would I could goon with- 
out reproaching my country." Mr Hooker sent a copy of his Miscellany to Mr Smith 
with the following letter : 

" Rev. Sir, 

«' Though I have not the happiness of being known to you, yet as I perceive, 
by your public writings, that you are a gentleman of learning and parts, I take the 
liberty of desiring your assistance in the public design * committed to my care. 
Though it is the common concern of every one who wishes well to religion and the 
(Ilhurch of England, yet I find the observation strictly verified, that what is every body's 
business is nobody's business ; and whilst it is generally presumed that I have a great 
deal of help, I have in fact little or none, though I stand much in need of it. I hope 
you will excuse the notice I have taken of you in my paper. In hopes of your cor- 
respondence, I am, Sir, with respect, your very humble servant, R. HOOKER." 

On a state fast, the 4th of February, 1740, our Author preached in Trinity Church on 
Prov. xiv. 34. " Righteousness exalteth a nation, but sin is a reproach to any people." 
This sermon was printed at the request of his parishioners, and inscribed to them. The 
Flight lion. Edward Earl of Derby had succeeded that nobleman who presented Mr 
Smith to Trinity Church . but Mr Smith still continued to be esteemed at Knowslcy 

* Mr Smith did not comply with this request respecting the Weekly Miscellany. 



LIFE OF DR SMITH. v 

notwithstanding Knowsley had changed its master. He, who had been long considered 
as the Earl of Derby's Chaplain, was constituted in form, by letters patent, the 2d day 
of August, 1743. On the 31st of July, 1746, our Author preached an Assize-Sermoji at 
Lancaster, on St John viii. 32. " Ye shall know the truth, and the truth shall make 
you free." This Sermon is inscribed to the High Sheriff and grand Jury, being " pub- 
lished at their command." 

In the year 1748, the Grammar-school of Brentwood, in the parish of South "Weald, 
in the county of Essex, being vacant, was suffered by Lord and Lady Strange to 
lapse to the Bishop of London, who, at their recommendation, appointed Mr Smith 
schoolmaster there for life, by letters patent bearing date 15th day of February, and by 
license dated the 17th of the same month. He held this school only one year, as he 
did in no wise relish the laborious life of a schoolmaster. On the 8th of June, 1753, 
he was licensed as one of the ministers of St George's Church in Liverpool, on the 
nomination of the corporation there. 

In the year 1753, Mr Smith published in two volumes 4to. dedicated to his Royal 
Highness the Prince of Wales, " The History of the Peloponnesian War, translated 
from the Greek of Thucydides." The Translator has added three Preliminary Discour- 
ses : on the Life of Thucydides ; on his Qualifications as an historian ; and a Survey of 
his History. In these discourses, as well as in the life of Longinus, he has abundantly 
proved his own excellence in original composition. This work has been several times 
reprinted in 8vo. and was highly recommended by the reviewers and others on its first 
publication, and since that period. 

In January, 1758, the Deanry of Chester became vacant by the decease of the Rev. 
Thomas Brooke, LL. D. There were many candidates for this dignity : But Mr Smith 
was so well supported by several of his illustrious friends, especially by his noble patron 
the Earl of Derby, whose interest was powerful at Court, and who prevailed on the 
Right Hon. Earl Granville, then Lord President of the Council, and on his Grace the 
Duke of Newcastle, to unite with him in recommending Mr Smith; that his Majesty 
King George the Second presented him to the Deanry. He now took the degree of Dr 
in Divinity. On the 28th of July, Dr Smith received institution, and was installed the 
same day by that learned and accomplished preacher, the Rev. Mr Mapletoft, Vice-dean. 
On the 30th day of April, 1766 the Dean was instituted to the Rectory of Handly near 
Chester, on the presentation of the Dean and Chapter. 

Dr Smith had, since he left the University, if we except short excursions, chiefly re- 
sided first with my Lord of Derby, afterwards at the Rectory of Trinity in Chester, 
then one year in Essex, and of late at St George's in Liverpool, from whence he went 
occasionally to Chester Cathedral. But about the beginning of the year 1767, he re- 
solved to resign St George's Church, and wrote a letter to that effect to the body cor- 
porate ; which letter produced the following resolution : — 

^' At a council held this fourth day of February y 1767. 

" On Mr Dean Smith's Letter this day to the Council, intimating his desire of resign- 
ing his Chaplainship of St George's Church into the hands of the common council; 
therefore it is ordered, that this council do immediately after such his resignation make 
him a compliment of one hundred and fifty guineas, for his eminent and good servi- 
ces in the said Church." 

In July the same year, he came to the Deanry-house in Chester, with intent to pass 

the rest of his days there. The favourable reception of his Thucydides induced the 

a2 



vi LIFE OF DR SMITH. 

Dean, in this healthy and pleasant retreat, to finish his translation of " Xenophon's His- 
tory of the Affairs of Greece :" which he published in one volume 4to. in the year 
1770: this translation appeared without any dedication. To form a judgment of its 
merit we may only quote the words of the title page, that it is '* by the Translator 
of Thucydides." 

When the Dean retired within the precincts of his Cathedral, he had resigned St 
George's, and held with the Deanry the parish churches of Handley and Trinity only . 
till the Rectory of West Kirkby, in the Hundred of Wirrall in Cheshire, became vacant 
by the decease of that excellent magistrate and persuasive preacher, the Rev. Mr 
Mainwaring, Prebendary of Chester. The Dean was instituted to this Rectory on 
the 4th of October, 1780. This is a valuable living in the patronage of the Dean and 
Chapter. At this time the Dean resigned the Rectqry of Trinity. 

Dr Smith was now Dean of Chester, Rector of Handley, and West Kirkby ; but hia 
best parochial preferment happened late in life; he was advanced into his seventieth year, 
and began to feel the infirmities ever attendant on age and a delicate constitution. He 
had hitherto been a constant and powerful preacher : he began now to preach less fre- 
quently, as every exertion fatigued him exceedingly. But when he could no longer 
preach from the pulpit, he preached from the press, by publishing in 8vo. *'Nine 
Discourses on the Beatitudes," in the year 1782.^ 

From this time, the Dean's friends saw, with infinite concern, his health gradually 
declining. In the year 1786, he was exceedingly indisposed. In November, he was 
confined to his room ; in December, to his bed. 

About eight, on Friday morning, the 12th of January, 1787, the Dean meekly re- 
signed his spirit into the hands of a merciful Redeemer. On the Friday following, 
the funeral procession passed the nearest way to the Cathedral : the Bishop and five 
Prebendaries were pall-bearers. The body reposeth on the south side of the holy table. 
The Dean's name appears over his grave. 

In the broad aisle, at the great pillar on your right hand, as you retire from the choir, 
an elegant and costly monument^ is erected to his memory by Mrs Smith, w^ho was a 
Miss Heber, of Essex. He only once married. 

The Dean never was a stipendiary curate. The moment he was ordained a priest, 
he became a rector ; and enjoyed ever after an income which far exceeded his expenses. 
An enemy to ostentatious legacies, he bequeathed the chief of his fortune, which was 
very considerable, to his widow and his nephew, for he had no children. He gave one 
hundred pounds to the Chester Infirmary, and one hundred pounds to the fund for 
widowsofclergymeninthearchdeaconry of Chester; these he esteemed useful charities. 
The Dean was tall and genteel : his voice was strong, clear, and melodious. He spoke 
Latin fluently, and was complete master not only of the Greek, but Hebrew language. 
His mind was so replete with knowledge, that he w^as a living library. His manner of 
address was graceful, engaging, delightful. His sermons were pleasing, informing, 
convincing. His memory, even in age, was wonderfully retentive ; and his conversa- 
tion was polite, afiable, and in the highest degree improving. 

1 The good and learned Doctor Lowth, late Bishop of London, highly commends these Ser- 
mons, in a letter to the Dean, dated at Fulham, July 8th, 1782. Bishop Lowth and Dean 
Smith were contemporaries at Oxford : where an intimate friendship commenced between them, 
which continued till that year in which these two luminaries of the church of Christ were 
♦'snatched — so Heaven decreed 1 — away." 

2 See the next page. 



SACEED TO THE MEMORY OF 

WILLIAM SMITH, D. D. 

DEATJ OF THIS CATHEDRAL, AND 

EECTOR OF WEST KIRKBY AND HANDLEY IN THIS COVNTT, 

WHO DIED THE Xllth. OF JANVARY M,DCC,LXXXVII, 

IN THE LXXVIth. YEAR OF HIS AGE. 
» 
AS A SCHOLAR, HIS REPVTATION IS PERPETVATED 

BY HIS VALVABLE PVBLICATIONS, 

PARTICVLARLY HIS CORRECT AND ELEGANT 

TRANSLATIONS OF LONGINVS, THVCYDIDES, AND XENOPHON. 

AS A PREACHER, HE WAS ADMIRED AND 

ESTEEMED BY HIS RESPECTIVE AVDITORIES. 

AND AS A MAN, HIS MEMORY REMAINS INSCRIBED 

ON THE HEARTS OF HIS FRIENDS. 

THIS MONVMENT WAS ERECTED 
BY HIS AFFECTIONATE WIDOW. 



TO 
HIS ROYAL HIGHNESS 

THE PRINCE OF WALES. 

Sir, 

The History of Thucydides hath been studiously read and admired by the greatest 
princes, and may therefore presume to lay some claim to the protection of your Royal 
Highness. Great Britain, of all the states now existing in the world, most nearly 
resembleth what Athens was at the time when the war, which is the subject of it, 
broke out in Greece, A love of liberty, which hath erroneously been supposed to 
thrive and flourish best in a democratical government, was then warm and active in 
every Athenian. Athens, it is true, had thus been raised to a great height of maritime 
power, and was become a very formidable state : but faction disjointed a noble plan, and 
at length brought on the loss of her sovereignty at sea. The Athenians soon ceased to 
be great, when they deviated from those salutary maxims, which their worthiest patri- 
ots and most consummate statesmen had recommended to their constant observance. 

The maritime power of Great Britain is more substantially founded, and hath ever 
been more steadily supported, than was that of Athens. The most complete and most 
lasting form of government that man can invent, happily subsists in this realm under 
your Royal Grandfather. The British constitution hath long been, and may it long 
continue to be, the envy of other nations! For the future support of it, the public 
hopes and expectations are fixed upon your Royal Highness. Long may his Majesty 
your Royal Grandfather live to secure the freedom and happiness of his people, that 
your Royal Highness may become equal, in every respect, to the same great and glo- 
rious charge ! 

I have a heart duly sensible of the great honour conferred upon me, by being thu» 
permitted to profess myself, 

Your Royal Highness's 

most devoted and 

most humble Servant, 

WILLIAM SMITH. 
London, 1753. 



PREFACE. 



It was not from a private choice, but from deference to what was judged a public 
call, that the following Translation of Thucydides was first undertaken. To explain 
the motive more largely, might perhaps incur the imputation of impertinence or vanity. 
The performance, upon the whole, must justify the undertaking. In what manner it is 
done and not why it was done, will be the point of public arbitration. 

It will be also needless to tell the English reader, how many versions have been 
made of Thucydides into Latin. Their design was to bring the author more under 
the observation of what is generally styled the learned world ; as the translations of 
him into modern languages have aimed at introducing him into general acquaintance 
as an historian capable of innocently amusing most ranks of men, but of usefully in- 
structing the persons, who from duty and from passion would guard the rights or se- 
cure the welfare of public communities. The grand business of history is to make 
men wiser in themselves and better members of society. For this purpose it recals 
past ages to their view ; and thus opens a more extensive scope to reflection than any 
personal experience can offer. To be well versed in a similarity of cases prepares 
men better for counsel or action on present contingencies. The statesman, the pa- 
triot, the friend to liberty and reason, will be better enabled to plan and. to regulate his 
own measures, when he can see the tendency and consequence of such as were fol- 
lowed on parallel occasions, and adjust the degrees in which they were either preju- 
dicial or serviceable to public good. 

All men have neither the turn of mind, nor the leisure, to make themselvss profi- 
cients in the dead and learned languages. Such as have are certainly honestly, perhaps 
beneficently, employed, in holding out light to others. The Greek historians, as they 
take a precedency in time, lay further a strong claim to precedency in merit. Thucy- 
dides is the most instructive of these ; and, since the restoration of letters in the wes- 
tern world, each nation, that hath piqued itself at all about humanity or politeness, as 
his manner was soon found to be excellent, have given thanks to those who have en- 
deavoured to investigate his matter and lay it open to public view. 

It is to the honour of the French, that they took the lead. The first translation af 

Thucydides into French, published at Paris in 1527, was that of Claude de Seyssel, 

bishop of Marseilles. However performed , it went within the space of little more than 

thirty years, through four impressions. It is said to have been done at the command of 

Francis I. king of France ; and, to have been carried about with him in his wars, and 

diligently studied by the emperor Charles V. The Germans had also a translation of 

him soon afterwards in the year 1533. In 1545 Francis di Soldo Strozzi published an 

Italian translation dedicated to Cosmo di Medicis. The first English translation made 

its appearance in London in 1550 ; but, in fact, was only the translation of a translation, 

since it was intitled a version from the French of Claude de Seyssel. In 1564 he was 

published in Spanish. A second translation by Louis Jonsaud d'Usez was 
2 



X PREFACE. 

published at Geneva in 1600. The second into English, by the famous Mr Hobbes of 
Malmsbury, was first published in the year 1628, about which it will be necessary im- 
mediately to enlarge. A third French translation, by the Sieur d'Ablancourt, was pub- 
lished at Paris in 1662, and hath since gone through four editions. There is also a 
Danish translation, which closeth the list given of them in the Bibliotheca Graeca of 
Fabricius. 

Mr Hobbes declares in his Preface, that " the virtues of this author so took his affec- 
tion, that they begot in him a desire to communicate him further." He considered 
also that " he was exceedingly esteemed of the Italians and French in their own 
tongues, notwithstanding that he be not very much beholding for it to his interpreters." 
He says afterwards, that, by the first translation of Nicholls from the French of Seyssel, 
" he became at length traduced rather than translated into our language ;" alluding 
perhaps to the Italian sarcasm on translators, Traduttore traditore. He then resolved 
himself *' to take him immediately from the Greek — knowing, that when with diligence 
and leisure I should have done it, though some errors might remain, yet they would 
be errors but of one descent; of which nevertheless (says he) I can discover none, 
and hope they be not many." 

Hobbes, however sorry and mischievous a philosopher, was undoubtedly a very learn- 
ed man. He hath shown it beyond dispute in his translation of Thucydides. He is an 
excellent help, for any one who consults him, to find out the meaning and adjust the 
sense. But, though his translation hath now passed through three editions, and hath 
profitably been read by many, yet (I speak not from my own private judgment) 
he cannot now be read with any competent degree of pleasure. He is faithful, but 
most servilely so, to the letter of his author. Even in the orations, he merely acts 
the interpreter, and hath quite forgot the orator. He translates literally through- 
out, and numbers rather than weighs the words of Thucydides. By this means the 
construction is very often intricate and confused, the thoughts pregnant with sense 
are not sufficiently opened, nor the glowing ideas of the author or his orators trans- 
fused with proper degrees of warmth and light. Too scrupulous an attachment to the 
letter of the original hath made the copy quite flat and heavy, the spirit is evap- 
orated, the lofty and majestic air hath entirely disappeared. Too many low and 
vulgar expressions are used, which Thucydides ever studiously avoided. Such fre- 
quently occur in the midst of some grand circumstance, which they throw into a kind 
of burlesque, and may excite a reader's laughter. The English language hath gone 
through a great variation, hath been highly polished, since Mr Hobbes wrote. Hence, 
though his terms be in general very intelligible, yet they have not that neatness, preci- 
sion, and dignity, to which the polite and refined writers within the last century have 
habituated our ears. And, after all, I am inclined to think, that, Mr Hobbes either exe- 
cuted in great haste, or performed his revisals in a very cursory and negligent manner. 
I am inclined to think so from the very many passages, necessary and emphatical pe- 
riods, nay sometimes in the very speeches, which to my great surprise I have found 
omitted in his translation. A particle, an epithet, or even a comma, may with the 
greatest attention sometimes be dropped in a long work. But the omissions in Mr 
Hobbes are too numerous and important, to be excused in any tolerable consistence 
with repeated care and circumspection. 

Monsieur Bayle hath ascribed the translation of Thucydides by Mr Hobbes to a mo- 
tive of which he hath not left the least hint himself in his preface : — " in order to show 



PREFACE. xi 

the English, in the history of the Athenians, the disorders and confusions of a democra- 
tical government." Mr Hobbes could not possibly, so long before they happened, fore- 
see the strange revolutions that were soon to take place in the government of his coun- 
try. The very actors in them could not possibly discern the consequence of their own 
embroilments. Some violent encroachments had indeed been made on the liberty and 
property of Englishmen, and a spirit of discontent began to spread throughout the nation. 
But it cannot be supposed, that the plan of a commonwealth was formed at that time, 
or for several years after. The History of Thucydides abundantly shows, how danger- 
ous and destructive is faction in a state ; that severe or wanton power may make men 
desperate ; and that liberty abused may make them insolent and mutinous. It detects and 
exposeth venal orators and false patriots ; but it exhibits men, who are studious and elo- 
quent in behalf of pubhc welfare, and active in support of liberty and honest power, in 
full beauty and proportion. And his lessons He not so apposite and ready for the appli- 
cation of any state now existing in the world, as for that of Great Britain. 

The reader may by this time have caught a glimpse of several reasons, for which the 
present translation of Thucydides was finished and is now made public. No care hath 
been omitted to make it as correct as possible. It hath been attentively reviewed : the 
narrative part, more than once ; the oratorial part, with repeated endeavours to reach 
the spirit and energy of the original. In the former, the author hath been followed step 
by step : bold deviations here might imperceptibly have misrepresented or distorted the 
facts, and quite banished the peculiar style and manner of the author. In the latter, it 
hath been often judged necessary to dilate the expression, in order fully to include the 
primary idea ; though, where it seemed possible the studied conciseness of the author 
hath been imitated, provided the thought could be clearly expressed, and the senten- 
tious maxim adequately conveyed. The turns and figures of expression have been ev- 
ery where diligently noted, and an endeavour constantly made at imitation. This was 
judged a point of duty ; or a point at least, where, though something may be permitted 
to a translator's discretion or to the genius of modern language, yet he must not indulge 
himself in too wide a scope, lest, when what ought to be a copy is exhibited, the prime 
distinctions of the original be lost, and little or no resemblance be left behind. 

It is very just and true what Mr Hobbes hath observed, that " this author so carrieth 
with him his own light throughout, that the reader may continually see his way before 
him, and by that which goeth before expect what is to follow." And he, who applies to 
any commentator but Thucydides himself for an explanationof his own meaning, must 
exceedingly often get quite wide of the sense. The writers of Scholia and the notes of 
verbal critics put us frequently on a wrong scent, and more frequently leave us utterly 
in the dark. But, if we will be patient at a dead lift, something will soon occur in the 
author himself to help us out, the obscurity will vanish, and light beam in upon us. 
Though sometimes we may be forced to divine his meaning, since in many cases it is 
vain to apply to the aids of Grammar to develop the construction, yet the context at 
length will show whether we have succeeded, or help us to ascertain the sense. This, 
however, demands repeated and attentive revisals. The present translator hath not been 
frugal of his time or labour in these points. And whether he hath generally succeeded in 
ascertaining the thought and properly expressing it in another language, must be left to 
the decision, not of men of no learning, nor of mere learning, but to that class of judges 
who are well acquainted with the state of Athens at the time of the history, and are really 
Attic both in taste and judgment. This class, it may be thought, will be small : it is larger 



xii PREFACE. 

however, and higher seated in this our community, than the generahty have either 
opportunity enough to discover or good-nature enough to own. 

The complaints so often made by the most able translators are indeed alarming. Their 
performances (they say) may very much disgrace, but can never commend them. The 
praise of all that is clear, and bright, and pleasing, and instructive, is reflected back up- 
on the original author: but every appearance of a different nature is laid with severity 
of censure at the door of the translator. If it be so, we know the terms beforehand on 
which, either able or unable, we engage, and must patiently acquiesce in the issue. But 
candour is always expected, nay, ever will be had, from persons of good sense and sound 
judgment. Few but such may be pleased with Thucydides either in his old native 
Greek, or in a modern English garb ; and, if such confer the honour of their applause, 
the clamour of some will not terrify, nor the silence of others mortify at all. The book- 
seller, it is true, forms his own judgment, and then dictates to the judgment of others 
from the sale. And it must be owned, that every original writer, as well as every copy- 
ist, is heartily glad to receive that mark of public approbation. 

The present translation of Thucydides is accompanied with a few notes, and three 
preliminary Discourses. Concerning these something must be added. 

The notes are only designed for the English reader, to give him light into that anti- 
quity, with which he may be Httle acquainted: and therefore the first time that any 
thing relating to the constitution or forms of the Athenian republic, or peculiar to their 
fleets and land armies, occurs, I have endeavoured in a note to give him a competent 
perception of it. I have done the same, in regard to the characters of the chief person- 
ages in the history, which seemed to need a farther opening than what Thucydides hath 
given them. The persons were well known when he wrote : but a modern reader may 
not be displeased to be regularly introduced, and early to be made acquainted, with the 
characters of the principal agents in these busy and important scenes. In notes of ver- 
bal criticism or mere learning, I have been very sparing, judging they would never 
be read with patience. 

Of the preliminary discourses the two first were due , by the rules of decorum observ- 
ed by editors and translators, to the author. In the last, I have thrown into one contin- 
ued discourse what might have been broke into pieces, and interspersed occasionally 
by way of notes. The method obsftrvpd nppparpd most eligible, as it will give the 
reader a clear prospect of the whole history ; preparing him for or inciting him to a close 
and attentive perusal of it ; or enabling him, after he hath perused it, to recollect the 
most instructive passages and most material occurrences. By this means, also, a 
more lively and succinct account could be given of the speakers and the speeches, 
than could have been done by way of set and formal arguments. 

I think the English reader can want nothing more, to enable him to read Thucy- 
dides with pleasure and profit; especially if he be at all acquainted with the Grecian 
history, of which few that ever read can now be ignorant, since Mr Stanyan's History 
of Greece and the Universal History are in so many hands. I dismiss the work with 
some hope, but more terror, about its success. That hope is encouraged and sup- 
ported by the list of my Subscribers. There are names that do me honour indeed ; 
and which, whether the work may suit the generality or not, will preserve me frona 
ever repenting, that I have bestowed so much time on translating Thucydides. 



THREE DISCOURSES. 



I. ON THE LIFE OF THUCYDIDES. 
II. ON HIS QUALIFICATIONS AS AN HISTORIAN. 
III. A SURVEY OF THE HISTORY. 



B 



DISCOURSE I. 



ON 



THE LIFE OF THUCYDIDES. 



It is a natural piece of curiosity, either when we have read a book we like, or hear one 
commended, to inquire after the author. We acquiesce not in his bare name ; we 
immediately seek farther information. The stranger shows an inclination to form some 
acquaintance with him ; the reader to improve what he already hath. We at length 
grow inquisitive about all that concerns him, and are eager to be let into the particulars. 

Some claim of this kind will no doubt be made in regard to Thucydides. He who 
endeavours to introduce him to general notice, ought at least to have something to say 
about him, and something rather tending perhaps to give favourable impressions. All 
his editors and translators have reckoned this a point of duty incumbent upon them : 
but it hath been generally performed in a very imperfect and slovenly manner. His 
life wrote by Marcellinus, a crude incoherent morsel, hath been prefixed to all the 
Greek editions. That by Suidas is an unsatisfactory mere dictionary-account. A third 
inGrreek, by an anonymous author, is also but a very slight and shapeless sketch, and 
seems the work of a grammarian, who hath read indeed, but very superficially read his 
history. Some incidental escapes from his own pen are the marks, which should be 
always kept in view by him who would give any tolerable account of Thucydides. 
Writers of a better age and class will contribute now and then a little assistance. And 
the laborious care of a late author,* in adjusting the chronology and clearing away 
rubbish, will enable one now to give at least a coherent, though by no means an ac- 
curate, account of him, 

Thucydides, an Athenian, by borough a Halymusian, was born in the year before 
Christ four hundred and seventy-one ; twenty-five years after Hellanicus, thirteen after 
Herodotus, according to Aulus Gellius ; and about three years before Socrates, as the 
birth of the latter is settled by Laertius. He was descended of a very splendid and 
noble family, though perhaps not so honourable as many others, since it was not purely 
Attic. Its splendour can no longer be doubted, when it is known to be the family of 
Miltiades. Miltiades the elder, born a citizen of Athens, had reigned over the Dolonci, 
a people in Thrace ; and left vast possessions in that country to his descendants : and 
Miltiades the younger had married Hegesipyle the daughter of Olorus, a Thracian king.f 
Yet foreign blood, though royal, was always thought to debase the Athenian. The 
firm republicans of Athens had an hereditary aversion to every circumstance of royalty ; 

* Vitae Thucydidis Synopsis chronologica, ab Henrico Dodwell. 
t Herodotus in Erato. 

15 



xvi ON THE LIFE 

and the polite inhabitants of it abhorred all connexions with Barbarians, the scornful 
title they gave to all the rest of the world, except their countrymen of Greece. Iphi- 
crates, a famous Athenian in later times, was the son of an Athenian shoemaker and a 
Thracian princess. Yet, being aisked to which of his parents he thought himself most 
obliged, he replied haughtily — " To my mother. She did all she could to make me an 
Athenian ; my father would have made me a Barbarian." The younger Miltiades 
whom wars had obliged to quit his hold in Thrace, commanded the troops of Athens in 
the famous field of Marathon. He died afterwards in a jail, unable to pay a large fine 
6et upon him by the people of Athens. His son Cimon contrived afterwards to pay it. 
The family for a time had been in poverty and distress, but emerged again in Cimon. 
Cimon the same day gained a victory both by land and sea over the Persians at 
Mycale. By his conduct he very much enlarged the power of Athens, and put 
it in a train of much greater advancement. In civil affairs he clashed with Pericles, 
who was leader of the popular party: Cimon always sided with the noble or the few; 
as were the party-distinctions in vogue at Athens. 

The proofs that Thucydides was of this family are strong and convincing. Plutarch 
directly asserts it in the life of Cimon. His father, in grateful at least if not honour- 
able remembrance of the Thracian king, whose daughter Miltiades had married, bore 
the name of Olorus. His mother also was another Hegesipyle. He inherited rich 
possessions in Thrace; particularly some mines of gold. A monument of him was to be 
seen for many ages after, in the Coele at Athens, amongst the Cimonian, or those 
belonging to the family of Cimon; and stood next, according to Plutarch, to that of 
Elpinice, Cimon's own sister. His father's name in the inscription on this monument, 
at least some latter grammarians have averred it, was Olorus. Thucydides himself, in 
the fourth book of his history, calls it Orolus. Can we want stronger authority? 
Whether any stress ought to be laid on the variation, or whence the mistake, though a 
very minute one, might proceed, are points too obscure and trifling to take up any 
attention. 

Such was the family of which Thucydides was descended. His pedigree might be 
fetched from the gods ; since that of Miltiades is traced down from jEacus. But, like 
my author, I should choose to keep as clear of the fabulous as possible. Cicero says 
of him, " Though he had never written a history, his name would still have been 
extant, he was so honourable and noble."* I quote this, merely as a testimony to the 
splendour of his birth, since it may be questioned whether the historian, in the pre- 
sent instance, hath not entirely preserved his memory, and been solely instrumental 
in ennobling and perpetuating the man. 

His education no doubt was such as might be expected from the splendour of his 
birth, the opulence of his family, and the good taste then prevailing in Athens, the 
politest city that then existed, or ever yet existed in the world. It is impossible 
however to give any detail of it. The very little to be found about it in writers of any 
class whatever, seems merely of a presumptuous though probable kind. It is said 
Anaxagoras was his preceptor in philosophy, because the name of Anaxagoras was 
great at this period of time. Anaxagoras, the preceptor of Euripides, of Pericles, and 
of Socrates, is named also by Marcellinus for the preceptor of Thucydides. And he 
adds, quoting Antyllus for an evidence, that *' it was whispered about that Thucydides 
was atheistical, because he was so fond of the theory of Anaxagoras, who was generally 

* In the Orator. 



OF THUCYDIDES. xvii 

• 

reputed and styled an atheist." The solution of an eclipse from natural causes ac- 
counting for appearances from the laws of motion, and investigating the course of na- 
ture, were sufficient proofs of atheism amongst a people so superstitious as the Athe- 
nians. Thucydides, possibly, might be well acquainted with the philosophy of Anax- 
agoras, without having personally attended his^ket-ures. However that be, his own 
history abundantly shows that he was no atheist ; it may be added, and no polytheist. 
By his manner of speaking of the oracles and predictions tossed about in his own time, 
it is plain he looked upon them as equivocal, or rather insinuates them to be mere for- 
geries. " And yet," says Mr Hobbes,* " he confirms an assertion of his own touch- 
ing the time this war lasted, by the oracle's prediction. "The passage occurs in the 
fifth book of this history. But whoever considers it, will find it only an argumentum ad 
hominem, to stop the mouths of such as believed in oracles, from contesting his own 
computation of the whole time the Peloponnesian war lasted. I can only say, that he 
was undoubtedly a serious man, and of a large fund of solid sense, which deriving 
originally from the bounty of nature, he had most certainly improved by a regular and 
sound education. 

For a reason of much less weight, Antipho is assigned for his master in rhetoric — 
because bespeaks handsomely of him in the eighth book. He there indeed pays due 
acknowledgement to the merit of Antipho as a speaker; but it cannot be inferred from 
hence, that he had ever any connection with him. Others have made Antipho a scholar 
of Thucydides,f with full as little reason. Thucydides certainly was never a teacher by 
profession. It is pity to waste so much time on uncertainties. It is certain Thucydides 
had a liberal education, though the particular progress of it cannot now be traced. 

But, to show the peculiar bent of his genius, and a remarkable prognostic what sort 
of person he would prove, the following story is recorded by several authors, and dated 
by Mr Dodwell in the fifteenth year of his age. — His father carried him to the Olympic 
games. He there heard Herodotus read his history to the great crowd of Grecians as- 
sembled at that solemnity. He heard him -with fixed attention; and, at length, burst out 
into tears. " Tears childish indeed," it hath been remarked; but however such as few 
children would have shed, and highly expressive of his inward spirit. The active as- 
piring mind of Themistocles was not stronger shown, when the trophy of Miltiades 
would not let him be at rest; nor the genius of the lad at Westminster-school, when he 
could not sleep for the colours in Westminster-hall. Herodotus is said to have observed 
it, and to have complimented Olorus on his having a son, that had so violent a bent to 
letters. A similar passage in any person's life would always be called to mind, when 
he was the subject of conversation. 

In about tw^o years more, Thucydides was obliged by the laws to take his exercise 
in the study of arms, and to begin to share in the defence of his country. Every 
citizen of Athens was also a soldier. They served at first within the walls, or on 
great emergencies marched, though to no great distance from home. As years and 
skill advanced, they were called upon to join in more distant and foreign expeditions. 
We are quite in the dark about the particular services in which he might thus be em- 
ployed. We are sure at least he much improved in the theory of arms. He quali- 
fied himself for the great trust of heading the forces of the state; and, in the sequel, we 
shall see him invested with a command. 

The anonymous author of his life relates, that Thucydides was one of the number, 

* Of the Life and History of Thucydides. t Plutarch's Lives of the ten Orators. 

3 b2 



xviii ON THE LIFE 

whom the Athenians sent to found a colony at Thuria in Italy. Lampo and Xenocritus 
were the leaders of this colony, and Herodotus is said to have been associated in it. 
If Tliucydides went the voyage (and the strange inconsistencies of him who relates it 
render his whole account suspicious,) he must have been about twenty-seven years of 
age. One thing is pretty certain; his stay at Thuria could have been of no very longcon- 
tinuance. This is not to be inferred from the ostracism, which the same writer says 
he soon after suffered; a mistake incurred, it is highly probable, by confounding him 
with Thucydides the son of Milesias, who was of the same family, and being a leader 
in the oligarchical party at Athens, had the ostracism thrown upon him by the interest and 
popularity of Pericles. But the quarrel between the Corey reans and Corinthians about 
Epidamnus broke out soon after this. The enemies of Athens were now scheming the 
demolition of its growing power. Thucydides writes all the preparatory transactions, 
marks all the defensive measures of the Athenians, as a person who was privy to eve- 
ry one of them. And there should be very strong and very positive proofs of the con- 
trary, before any reader of his history doubts of his having been all the time at Athens. 

His own Introduction, of itself in a great measure establishes the fact. He perceived 
the storm was gathering; he knew the jealousies of the states which composed the La- 
cedemonian league; he also knew the real strength of Athens, and heard all the pre- 
ventive measures recommended by Pericles to put his countrymen in a proper pos- 
ture of defence. He himself seems to have been alert for the contention, and ready 
both with lance and pen, not only to bear his share in the events, but also to perpetuate 
the memory of them. His own words [iK^'<rxg and Tsx/««.eoA.£^o;) seem to denote the 
great earnestness and attention of his mind to the wide field of matter which was now 
going to be opened. He longed to become an historian; he saw a fine subject for history 
fast approaching; he immediately set about noting all occurrences, began at once to 
collect materials; and was resolved to write the History of the Peloponnesian War before 
it was actually on foot. 

Can we doubt then of his residence during this portion of time at Athens'? He was ar- 
rived, at the breaking out of this war, to the full vigour and ripeness of his years and 
understanding, according to his chronologist, Mr Dodwell, was just forty years old. We 
learn from himself,* that he knew personally the whole series of things; he was ever 
present at the transactions of one or other of the contending parties; more, after his 
exile at those of the Peloponnesians; and consequently, before his exile, at those of the 
Athenians. He speaks of Pericleis, as one who was an eye-witness of his conduct; aa 
one who heard him harangue in the assembly of the people, convincing that a war there 
would necessarily be, and for that reason they ought not to weaken themselves by ill- 
judged concessions, but gallantly to exert that naval power which had made Athens 
envied and dreaded, and which alone, as it had made, could keep her great. He must 
regularly have taken his post upon the walls, and seen the Peloponnesians, in the first 
year of the war, lay all the adjacent country waste. He must have marched under 
Pericles to retaliate on the territories of Megara, since the whole force of the state was 
obliged to take the field on this occasion. He must have assisted at the public funeral 
solemnized in the winter for the first victims of this war, and heard Pericles speak in 
honour of the dead and the living, and make his countrymen enamoured of their own 
laws and constitution. The plague broke out immediately after this; we are absolutely 
certain he was then in Athens. He himself assures us of it. He was an eye-witness 

*Book the fifth. 



OF THUCYDIDES. xix 

to all that horrid scene. He had the plague himself; and hath given a circumstantial 
detail of it. 

The war proceeds with vigour, and through a great variety of events. Thucydides 
must have borne his share in the service; the particulars he hath not recorded. No 
man was ever less guilty of egotism; he never mentions himself but when it is absolute- 
ly necessary. His next six years were certainly em ployed in fighting and in writing; the 
latter was his passion, and the former his duty. In the forty-seventh year of his age, he 
was joined in the command of an Athenian squadron and land-force on the coasts of 
Thrace. He might be assigned to this particular station, on account of his possessions 
and interest in this part of the world. It was judged at Athens, that he was best 
qualified to serve his country in this department. The Lacedemonian commander in 
Thrace dreaded his opposition. Let us wait a little for the event: it is the most im- 
portant passage in the life of Thucydides. 

It was entirely on the authority of Plutarch, that Thucydides was asserted above to 
be a descendant from Miltiades, and in the mode of consanguinity to have inherited his 
fine estate in this part of the world. Marcellinus, who is forever jumbling and con- 
founding facts, hath also made him marry a Thracian lady, who brought him his gold- 
mines for her fortune. Mr Hobbes is willing to reconcile the facts, and solves all the 
difficulty in a very plausible manner. " In Thrace," says he, " lay also the possessionsof 
Thucydides and his wealthy mines of gold, as he himself professeth in his fourth book. 
And although those riches might come to him by a wife, (as is also by some affirmed,) 
which he married in Scapte-syle, a city of Thrace; yet even by that marriage it ap- 
peareth that his affairs had a relation to that country, and that his nobility was not there 
unknown." I cannot believe that Thucydides ever married a lady that was not purely 
Attic. He seems to have been high-spirited in this respect, and proud of his country. 
Miltiades indeed had married a Thracian princess; and nothing, but the vast estate 
brought into the family by this match, could have made his descendants easy with such 
a blemish in their pedigree: for a blemish undoubtedly it must have been thought at 
Athens. Letusseehow Thucydides himself drops his sentiment of such another match. 
The passage I have in view occurs in the sixth book. He is speaking of Hippias, the 
son of Pisistratus, tyrant of Athens. " To jEantidas the son of Hippoclus tyrant of 
Lampsacus — to aLampsacene, though he himself was an Athenian — he married his 
daughter Archedice." I cannot think, that he, who let such a sarcasm fall from his 
own serious pen, could ever condescend to marry a Barbarian, let her fortune be ever 
so great. The reader, if it be worth his while to think at all about it, may determine 
for himself. — This digression was caused by the express mention Thucydides hath made 
of his mines, the very moment he is going to enter the lists against the most gallant and 
active commander at this time in the armies of the Lacedemonian league. 

It was Brasidas the Spartan, who was now at the head of the Peloponnesian troops in 
Thrace. He had made a forced march thither through Thessaly and Macedonia. By 
hisfinedeportment and his persuasive address joined to uncommon vigilance and activ- 
ity, he had hitherto carried all before him. He at length endeavoured to get possession 
by surprise of the important city of Amphipolis: he had very nearly succeeded. Eucles 
commanded there for the Athenians. Thucydides was at this time in the isle of Thasus, 
about half a day's sail from Amphipolis, A messenger was despatched to him, to hasten 
him up for the defence of that city. He put to sea immediately with a small squadron 
of seven ships. Brasidas, knowing he was coming, opened a negotiation with the Am- 
phipolitans, and gained admission for his troops. Thucydides stood up the Strymon in 



XX ON THE LIFE 

the evening, but too late, since Brasidas had got fast possession of Amphipohs. The 
city of £ion is situated also upon the river Strymon lower down, and about two miles 
and a half from Amphipolis. Thucydides put in here, and secured the place. "JBrasi- 
das (in his own words)' had designed that very night to seize Eion also. And, unless 
this squadron had come in thus critically to its defence, at break of day it had been lost." 
Thucydides, without losing a moment, provided for its defence. Brasidas, with armed 
boats, fell down the river from Amphipolis, and made two attempts upon it, but was re- 
pulsed in both: upon which, he gave up the scheme, and returned back. 

One would imagine that Thucydides had done all that could be done on this occasion, 
and deserved to be thanked instead of punished. The people of Athens made a differ- 
ent determination. Cleon was now the demagogue of greatest influence there, and is 
generally supposed to have exasperated them against the man who had not wrought 
impossibilities in saving their valuable town of Amphipolis. It is certain their fury 
rose so high against him, that they stripped Thucydides of his command, and passed 
the sentence of banishment upon him. It is himself who tells us,^ *' It was his lot to 
suffer a twenty years' exile from his country after the affair of Amphipolis." 

We have thus lost Thucydides the commander to secure more fast Thucydides the 
historian. Though sadly treated, he scorned to be angry with his country. His com- 
plexion was not at all choleric or resentful; there appears not the least sign of any gall 
in his constitution. Discharged of all duties and free from all public avocations, he was 
left without any attachments but to simple truth, and proceeded to qualify himself for 
commemorating exploits, in which he could have no share. He was now eight and 
forty years old, and entirely at leisure to attend to the grand point of his ambition, that 
of writing the history of the present war; a calm spectator of facts, and dispassionate 
observer of the events he was determined to record. 

To judge of him from his history (and we have no other help to form our opinion 
about him), he was so nobly complexioned as to be all judgment and no passion. No 
murmur or complaint hath escaped him upon account of his severe undeserved treat- 
ment from his country. Great souls are congenial; their thoughts are always of a sim- 
ilar cast. 

Sweet are the uses of adversity, 

Which, like the toad, ugly and venomous, 

Bears yet a precious jewel in his head. 

Shakspeare has thus expressed what Thucydides, as it is highly probable, must have 
thought. "Exile, according to Plutarch,^ wasa blessing which the muses bestowed up- 
on their favourites. By this means they enabled them to complete their most beauti- 
ful and noble compositions." He then quotes our author for the first proof of his obser- 
vation — " Thucydides the Athenian compiled his history of thePeloponnesian war at 
Scaptesyle in Thrace." At that place he fixed his residence. It lay convenient for taking 
care of his private affairs and overlooking his mines: they lay not within the dominions 
of Athens; for then they would have been forfeited to the state. Hence he made ex- 
cursions at proper seasons to observe transactions, and pick up intelligence. He was now 
more conversant in person on the Pcloponnesian side. Some private correspondences he 
might still carry on with Athenians. And he had money to purchase all proper materi- 
als, was ready, and knew how to lay it out. This was his employment till the very end 
of the war; and it is certain he collected materials for carrying down his history to 

1 Book the fourth. 2 Book the fifth. 3 Of Banishment. 



OF THUCYDIDES. xxi 

that period of time *' when (in his own words'* ) the Lacedemonians and their allies put 
an end to the empire of Athens, and became masters of the Long Wall and the Piraeus." 
But whoever reads it, will be inclined to think, that he drew it not up in that accurate 
and elaborate manner in which it now appears, till the war was finished. He might 
keep every thing by him in the form of annals; he might goon altering or correcting, 
as he saw better reason or gained more light. His complete well-connected history, 
though the first thing in his intention, was the last in execution. 

His exile lasted twenty years. It commenced in the eighth year of the war, in the 
year before Christ four hundred twenty-three. Consequently, he was restored the year 
before Christ four hundred and three, being at that time sixty-eight years old. In that 
very year an amnesty was published at Athens, in the archonship of Euclides, after the 
demolition of the thirty tyrants by Thrasybulus. 

Thucydides was now at liberty, if he pleased, to return and pass the remainder of his 
days at Athens. Whether he did so or not, is left quite in the dark. He lived twelve years 
after, and died in the year before Christ three hundred ninety-one, being then about 
fourscore years old. He was constantly employed in giving coherence and dignity to 
this History; — with what accuracy, what severity, what toil, the reader may judge, 
since he will find that after all he left it imperfect. The first seven books are indeed fully 
and exactly finished. The eighth, though moulded into due form, hath plainly not had 
a final revisal, and breaks off abruptly. The whole work is said to have fallen into 
Xenophon's possession, who at the time of the death of Thucydides, was exiled from 
Athens : and Xenophon is also said to have made it public. This carries a great air of 
probability with it, since Xenophon became the continuator of Thucydides, not in so 
lofty and majestic, but in a sweeter and more popular style. There is a chasm indeed 
between the time the History of Thucydides breaks off, and the Grecian History of 
Xenophon begins. There is no accounting for this but by conjecture. May I venture to 
offer one, I believe, entirely new, but which, for that reason, I shall readily give up to 
the first person of judgment, who thinks it hath no foundation'! It is this — That Thu- 
cydides left somewhat more behind him than now appears. How it came to be suppres- 
sed or lost, I will not pretend to guess. It is natural to imagine, that his acknowledg- 
ed continuator resumed the subject at the very spot where his predecessor had left off. 
Nearly two years are however wanting, in which several important incidents took 
place. It is pity; but we have no redress. General historians are by other means 
enabled to supply the deficiency; but the loss of any thing from so masterly a hand is 
still to be regretted. 

The place of the death and interment of Thucydides was most probably Scaptesyle 
in Thrace. Long habitude might have made him fond of a spot where he had passed 
so many years in studious and calm retirement. The hurry and bustle and engagements 
of Athens could not have been much to the relish of so grave, and now so old a man. 
His monument there among the Cimonian confirms this opinion, since most writers 
agree, it had the mark upon it which showed it to be a cenotaph, and the words, ' Here 
lieth,' were not in the inscription.^ I have nothing to add about his family. It is said 
he left a son; but the very name of that son is merely conjectural. I have collected 
every thing that carries any consistency with it about the Man; I shall proceed with 
more pleasure to view him in a clearer and more steady light, and mark the charac- 
ter in which it was his ambition to be distinguished, that of an Historian. 

4 Book the fifth. 5 Marcellinus. 



DISCOURSE II. 



ON HIS 



QUALIFICATIONS AS AN HISTORIAN. 



It is now to be considered, how well qualified Thucydides was, to undertake that nice 
and arduous task of writing history. — No one certainly was ever better fitted for it by 
outward circumstances; and very few so enabled to perform it well by the inward abili- 
ties of genius and understanding. 

Lucian, in his celebrated treatise " How a History ought to be written," is generally 
supposed to have had his eye fixed on Thucydides. And every person of judgment, 
who loves a sincere relation of things, would be glad, if it were possible, to have the 
writer of them abstracted from all kind of connection with persons or things that are 
the subject-matter; to be of no country, no party; clear of all passions; indepen- 
dent in every light; entirely unconcerned who is pleased or displeased with what he 
writes; the servant only of reason and truth. 

Sift Thucydides carefully, and we shall find his qualifications in all these respects 
very nearly, if not quite, complete. 

No connection with, no favouring or malevolent bias towards, any one person in the 
world, can be fixed upon him. Nevermansoentirely detached, or proceeded so far (if 
I may use the expression) in annihilating himself. He had afather indeed, whose name 
was Olorus; he was an Athenian born; — but, who are his relations'? who were his asso- 
ciates? what, rival or competitor doth he sneerl what friend doth he commend? or, 
what enemy doth he reproach? — Brasidas was the immediate occasion of his disgrace 
and exile. Yet, how doth he describe him? He makes the most candid acknowledg- 
ments of his personal merit, and doth justice to all his shining and superior abilities. 
Cleonisgenerally supposed to have irritated the people against him, and to have got him 
most severely punished, when he merited much better returns from his country. Doth 
he show the least grudge or resentment against this Cleon? He represents him indeed 
in his real character of a factious demagogue, an incendiary, a bully, and of course an 
arrant coward. And how do ^ill other writers? how doth Aristophanes paint this worth- 
less man, this false bellowing patriot? I would never call Aristophanes for an evidence 
to character, but in cases where every other writer accorded fully with him, on the 
same foundation of truth though not with the same superstructure of bitterness and 
abuse. He should not be a voucher in regard to Socrates, or Pericles; but certainly may 

be heard about an Hyperbolus or a Cleon. Thucydides never mentions himself as op- 

XX ii 



HIS QUALIFICATIONS. xxiii 

posed to any man but Brasidas; and never so much as drops an insinuation that he 
was hurt by Cleon. And thus, by general consent, he hath gained immortal honour 
by giving fair and true representations of men, wliom he never felt to be such, but 
whom succeeding writers have assured us to have actually been his enemies. — As to 
things; though in the first seven years of the war he must in some measure have had 
employment, yet he was soon disentangled from all business whatever, in a manner 
which bore hard upon his reputation. He hath stated the fact; and then with the great- 
est calmness and unconcern, he hath left the decision to posterity. 

He was henceforth of no country at all. Cut off from the republic of Athens, he 
never sought after or desired a naturalization in any other state of Greece. He was 
now only to choose out and fix a proper spot of observation, from whence, like a 
person securely posted on a promontory, he could look calmly on the storm that was 
raging or the battle that was fighting below, could note every incident, distinguish 
every turn, and with a philosophical tranquility enjoy it all. In short, he now was, 
and continued all the rest of the Peloponnesian war, a citizen of the world at large, 
as much as any man ever actually was. 

But before this separation from the community, whilst yet he continued at Athens, 
where liberty opened the field to all passionate chases after power, where consequently 
competitions were ever fermenting, and party was always alive and active, — can we find 
him associated with any particular set of menl can we find him dabbling in political in- 
trigue! a leader of, or led by, any party! or, can we assuredly find out his principles? or 
even guess at his real thoughts about the form of government under which he had liv- 
ed! His biographers indeed, though ever parading his candour and impartiality, are of- 
ten tracing out signs and marks of party-zeal and personal prejudices from the very 
characters in his history. Marcellinus says, " he described Cleon as a madman because 
he hated him;" forgetful what Cleon really was, and of the concurrent testimonies to the 
truth of the character. The anonymous writer says, " he opposed Pericles at Athens, 
got the better of him, and became the first man in the republic." A ridiculous story! 
void of all manner of support. According to this writer's way of arguing in other places, 
whosays, " he cajoled the Lacedemonians, and inveighed against the tyrannic all-grasp- 
ing temper of the Athenians, in his history, because he had no opportunity to rail at 
them in any other shape ," — he should have left a far different character of Pericles be- 
hind him, than he had actually left. But these are strange compilers of patch-work, 
and deserve no regard. From what the former hath said about him, a reader might be 
tempted to judge him of the oligarchical, from what the latter hath said of him, of the 
democratical principle. Mr Hobbes imagines he hath dived to the bottom of his real 
principles, and avers him a tight and sound royalist. He is sure, that he least of all 
liked the democracy: as sure, he was not at all fond of an oligarchy. He founds this 
assurance on a passage in the eighth book — " They decreed the supreme power to be 
vested in the five thousand, which number to consist of all such citizens as were enrol- 
led for the heavy armour, and that no one should receive a salary." — Thucydides just 
after pronounceth this, in his own opinion," a good modelling of their government, a fine 
temper between the few and the many, and which enabled Athens from the low estate 
into which her affairs were plunged to re-erect her head." If this passage proves any 
thing of the author's principles, it certainly proves them in a pretty strong degree republi- 
can. Mr Hobbes however sets out from hence to prove him a royalist. " For," says he, 
** he commendeth the government of Athens more, both when Pisistratus reigned 
(saving that it was an usurped power,) and when in the beginning of this war it 



xxiv HIS QUALIFICATIONS. 

was democratical in name, but in effect, monarchical under Pericles." He praiseth, it is 
true, the administration at both these periods; and he also praiseth the good effects re- 
sulting from an administration lodged in the hands of five thousand men. Under Peri- 
cles it was lodged in more, but the extraordinary abilities and influence of the man had 
taught all their voices to follow the dictates of his heart. Yet Pericles was all the time 
a strong republican, and owned his masters. Plutarch says, he never harangued them 
without praying beforehand, that " not a word might sUp out of his mouth, that was 
not pertinent to the business in hand;" and that he never put on his armour to lead them 
out into the field, without saying to himself — "Remember, Pericles, you are going to 
command free men and Grecians." I leave it to the reader, whether the principles of 
Thucydides can thus be discovered. It appears only, that he was always candid to a 
good administration, and might possibly think of government, as Mr Pope has wrote: 

For modes of government let fools contest, 
That which is best administer'd is best. 

That studied obscurity in which he hath veiled himself, will not let us discover, 
whether on instant and critical occasions he ever suffered himself to be actuated by any 
of the darker passions, or too fondly indulged those of a brighter cast. But it cannot be 
found from what he writes, that he hath praised any man from fondness, or even from 
gratitude, degraded any one though envy, or reproached any one with malice and ill- 
nature. The same will hold in regard to states or whole communities. Doth he ever 
censure the Athenians in the wrong place] or commend the Lacedemonians but in the 
rightl Were his name expunged from the beginning of the whole work and the conclu- 
sions of the years, could any one guess to what state he had ever belonged, whether he 
was a Lacedemonian, a Corinthian, an Athenian, or a Sicilian, except from the purity 
of the Attic dialect in which he writes] In that dialect he was cradled ; he could not pos- 
sibly swerve from it; without it he could neither write nor speak. Could he have 
thought that this might yield suspicion of an impassioned or prejudiced spirit, he might 
perhaps have endeavoured to write in the Doric or Ionic idiom. 

Independent, further, he certainly must have been, since he had no great man to 
cajole, and no prince to dread or flatter. The powers of Greece or the monarch of 
Persia could affect him no more, than the Germanic body or the grand monarch- of 
France the quiet and contented refugee, who lives on the sunny side of a hill in Swit- 
zerland. The circumjacent powers had no more, perhaps not so much influence at 
Scaptesyle, than the neighbouring kingdoms can have at Lausanne. The stales of 
Greece had garrisons on the coasts, but were not masters of Thrace. Th^ce was full of 
little communities and petty principalities. Thucydides had credit enough amongst 
them to insure his personal safety and guard his retirement. He could disoblige those 
about whom he wrote, without fear of their resentment, and could praise without be- 
ing in the reach of a requital. Human nature will not admit of a stricter independence. 

His unconcern about the opinions of a present generation, is strong and clear. It 
looks as if he thought they would scarce give him a reading, so little care had he taken 
to soothe or to amuse them. He had a greater aim than to be the author in vogue for a 
year. He hated contention, and scorned short-lived temporary applause. He threw 
himself on posterity. He appealed to the future world for the value of the present he 
had made them. The judgment of succeeding ages hathapproved the compliment he 
thus made to their understandings. So long as there are truly groat princes, able 
statesmen, sound politicians, politicians that do not rend asunder politics from good 



AS AN HISTORIAN. xxv 

order and general happiness, he will meet with candid and grateful acknowledg- 
ments of his merit. 

Other historians have sooner pleased, have more diffusively entertained. They have 
aimed more directly at the passions, have more artificially and successfully struck at 
the imagination. Truth in its severity, and reason in its robust and manly state, are 
all the Muses and Graces to which Thucydides hath done obedience. Can we won- 
der, that he hath not been more generally read and admiredl or, could we wonder, 
if he had not been so much? A great work planned under such circumstances and 
with such qualifications as I have been describing, cool serious judgment will always 
commend as a noble design, even though executed it may prove too cheerless to the 
more lively passions, its relish not sufficiently quick for the popular taste, or piquant 
enough to keep the appetite sharp and eager. 

But to proceed, Thucydides hath been censured in regard to the choice of his subject. 
It hath occasioned the solidity of his judgmentand excellenceof his taste to be called irt 
question. Dionysius of Halicarnassus hath exerted himself much on his account; hath 
tried him by laws which have poetry rather than history for their object; and censures 
him for not delighting, when his profession was only to instruct. Mr Hobbes has gal- 
lantly defended his author, and shown all the arguments of Dionysius to be imperti- 
nent, and to proceed from partiality and envy. I shall not repeat, it will suffice to refer 
the curious reader to what Mr Hobbes hath written upon this topic. Homer hath cele- 
brated the Trojan war, and intermingled in his poems all the historic strokes of that and 
of preceding ages, enlivening and exalting everything he touched. That splendid part 
of the Grecian history, in which his countrymen resisted and triumphed over the very 
formidable arms of the Persian monarch, had already been recorded by Herodotus. 
Should Thucydides plunge back into dark and fabulous ages, and turn a mere legen- 
dary and romantic writer] He had, he could have, no subject equal to his ambition and 
his abilities, but the war which broke out in hi&<bwn days, which he foresaw would prove 
extensive and important, when the efforts of her enemies would be vigorously exerted 
to pull down the power of Athens, to demolish that naval strength which gave her the 
sovereignty of the sea, and made her the dread and envy of her neighbours. Coolly 
therefore with my reason as an examiner of things, and warmly with my passion as an 
Englishman, I cannot but applaud his choice, who hath projected the soundest ana 
best system of English politics, so long before the constitution had existence; and hath 
left us fine lessons, such as his factious countrymen would not observe, how to support 
the dominion of the sea on which our glory is built, and on which our welfare entirely 
depends. In this light it is a most instructive and interesting history, and we may fe- 
licitate ourselves on the choice of Thucydides. I must not anticipate; Thucydides 
would have his readers pick out their own instructions. I can only add, that Thucy- 
dides is a favourite historian with the statesmen and patriots of Great Britain: this fits bin 
also to be an historian for the people. Other nations have admired him, and I hope wil 
continue to admire him, gratis: we are bound to thank him, and never to lose sight of thai 
grand political scheme, formed by a Themistocles, and warmly and successfully pur- 
sued by an Aristides, aCimon,and a Pericles; the swerving from whichat Athens drew 
after it the loss of the sovereignty at sea, then sunk her into a petty state, and made her 
end at last in a mere academy, though most excellent in its kind. 

From such considerations it will also follow^ that the history of Thucydides is more 
useful than that of Livy; at least, that we have more reason to applaud the choice of the 
former. I design no comparison between these two historians. The performance of 
4 C 



xxvi. ON HIS QUALIFICATIONS 

the Jesuit Rapia on that point is in general reading. Livy's history is certainly more 
august, more splendid, more amazing: I only insist that it is not more useful. And, 
though Livy be happier in his subject, this ought not to degrade Thucydides, who 
seized the only fine subject that could offer itself to him: in regard to him, it was 
either this or none at all. The parallel should be only drawn in regard to execution, 
where much hath been said on both sides, and the superiority still remains undecided. 
This brings me to the inward abilities of genius and understanding, which capacita- 
ted my author to execute his work. His genius was certainly of the highest order: it 
was truly sublime. Here the critics unanimously applaud. In the arrangement of his 
matter he emulated Homer. In the grandeur of his thoughts and loftiness of his sense 
he copied Pindar. He is ever stately and majestic; his stateliness perhaps too formal, 
his majesty too severe. He wrote, as he thought, far beyond an ordinary person. He 
thinks faster than he can utter: his sentences are full-stored with meaning; and his ve- 
ry words are sentences. Hence comes his obscurity. Where pure thought is the object, 
he connects too fast, nor is enough dilated for common apprehension. Eut this is not 
the case with the narrative part of his history, which is pithy, nervous, and succinct, 
yet plain, striking, and manly. He never flourishes, never plays upon words, never 
ginks into puerilities, never swells into bombast. It is a relation from the mouth of a ve- 
ry great man, whose chief characteristic is gravity. Others talk more ingenuously; 
others utter themselves with a more cheerful air; yet every one must attend to Thucy- 
dides, must hearken with serious and fixed attention, lest they lose a word, a weighty 
and important word, by which the whole story would be spoiled. It is in liis Orations, 
that he is most remarkably obscure. He might not be so in so high a degree to the ap- 
prehensions of mankind, when his history was first made public. The world was then 
used to hear continual harangues: no business of a public nature could be carried on 
without them. In his time, the speakers aimed entirely at strength and brevity. If 
they were not exceeding quick, the apprehensions of the Athenians would outstrip, 
or at least affect to outstrip, their utterance. They must think much, and yet leave 
much of what they had thought to the ready conception of the audience. An orator in 
the following history* calls them*' Spectators of speeches." They affected to discern at 
the first glance; and without waiting for formal deduction and solemn inference, to be 
mastersof the point as it were by intuition. The more copious and diffusive eloquence 
was the improvement of the next generation. But the most forcible orator that even 
Athens ever boasted, improved, if he did not quite learn, his peculiar manner from 
Thucydides. It was Demosthenes, who copied him in the close energy of his sen- 
tences, and the abrupt rapidity of his thoughts. Demosthenes is said to have transcrib- 
ed him eight times over with his own hand: so diligently did he persevere to form an in- 
timate acquaintance with him, and habituate himself tohisquickmannerof conception, 
and to his close and rapid delivery. Cicero says however,f that *'no rhetorician of 
Greece drew any thing from Thucydides. He hath indeed been praised by all; I own 
it; but, as a man who wasanexplainerof facts with prudence, severity, and gravity: not 
as a speaker at the bar, but an historical relater of wars. And therefore he was never 
numbered amongst the orators." Cicero learned nothing from him: he could not, nei- 
ther in his own words "would he if he could." His talents were diff»^rent; he was 
quite in all respects accomplished; he was eloquence itself. But Demosthenes — and 
can there be higher praise] — Demosthenes certainly loved and studied Thucydides; 

♦ Cleon's speech in book the third. t In the Orator 



AS AN HISTORIAN. xxvii 

for whose perfection I am not arguing; I would only establish his character of lofti- 
ness and sublimity. Longinus* proposeth him as the model of true grandeur and 
exaltation in writing history. 

And now, I have mentioned this princely and most judicious critic, let us call Thu- 
cydides to take a trial at his bar, and see whether he hath all the genuine constitu- 
ents of the true sublime. For elevation of thought, for his power in alarming and 
interesting the passions, for his bold and frequent use of figures, his character will 
soon be established. Even Dionysius of Halicarnassus bears testimony here, who lov- 
ed him not, and would have been glad to degrade him. Plutarch calls him the most pa- 
thetic, and a writer of the greatest energy and variety that ever was. The scenes in his 
history are strong, most expressive paintings. Jle makes the past to be present; he 
makes hearing sight. In the very words of Plutarchf — '' His readers are thrown inta 
the same astonishment and hurry of passion, as the eye-witnesses to every scene 
must have felt. Demosthenes drawing up his men on the craggy shore of Pylus — Brasi- 
das calling out on his pilot to run the vessel ashore, getting himself on the stairs, then 
wounded, fainting, falling down on the gunnel; here, the Spartans fighting a land battle 
from the water, the Athenians a naval battle from the shore; — and again, in the Sicilian 
war, the land armies of both parties on the beach, whilst a naval engagement is yet un- 
der decision on the water, sympathising in all the contest, adjusting themselves to all 
the various turns of battle, by new attitudes, quick contortions of the body; — All these 
things are set before the readers in actual representation, in all the disposition, all the 
expression and perspicuity, of picture." Though the whole course of the history, a 
battle either at land or sea is an object clear and distinct. The writer is never confound- 
ed himself, nor throws confusion on his reader. That reader sees the whole, from the 
psean of attack to the erecting of the trophy; he discerns the whole train of fight, and 
beholds exactly the loss or gain of the victory. He further assists at the assemblies of 
the people, and all important consultations. He learns the state of affairs from the 
managers themselves; he hears the debates, is let into the tempers of the assembly, 
pries into all the politics, and preconceives the resolution. Where the politics are 
bad, he will own no other could be expected from those who recommend them. Where 
they are sound and good, nor wilfully severed from duty to their country, and in 
moral consistence with the welfare of their fellow-creatures, the reader will applaud, 
and think he hath been himself discovering the fine maxims which the author hath 
been teaching, who never appears in person, never puffs hisown integrity and discern- 
ment, and without digressing into comments or setting up for a poHtician, is found 
upon reflection the best of the kind that ever wrote. 

To quote passages for the truth of his subhme thought or his pathetic address, would 
be to transcribe the greater part of the following history. They will be observed in the 
orations of these two different casts, and the incidents of the work. His figures are 
thickset; the figures that regard both the sentiment and the diction. His metaphors 
are strong and uncommon; his hyperboles far but not overstretched, the tone is still 
preserved, they flow out from a warm pathetic in the midstof some grand circumstance. 
The figures in which he most dehghts, are the Interrogation; the Change of number and 
time; the Hyperbaton, or transposing and inverting the order of things which seem 
naturally united and inseparable; and above all, the Antithesis. This last he hath 
fondly used, almost to satiety. Term is not only opposed to term, but thought to 

* On the Sublime. Section 14. t De gloria Atheniensium. 



xxviii ON HIS QUALIFICATIONS 

thought, sentence to sentence, and sometimes whole orations to one another even 
where the latter speaker cannot possibly be supposed to have heard the former. A 
constant adherence to this method carries with it the danger of glutting the reader. 
I am sensible there should have been more variety to make the whole quite beauti- 
ful and graceful. 

As the fourth constituent of sublimity, which according to Longinus is noble and 
graceful expression, our author's claim cannot be so well established. Noble un- 
doubtedly he is, but as for the graceful — the reader may wish he had been more careful 
in this particular, and I am sure his translator wishes it from his heart. For fear of being 
vulgar, he is too set and solemn; and from the passion to be always great, he hath lost the 
air of ease and genteelness. Dionysius of Ilalicarnassus says he studiously affected 
hard and obsolete words. But yet the same writer sets him up as the standard of Attic 
purity; nay, hath frequently strengthened his own style by using the hard and obsolete 
words of Thucydides. However this be, it is certain Thucydides hath in this respect 
fallen half-way short: and more so, in the fifth constituent of sublimity, composition or 
structure of his periods. He hath no harmony , hath given little or no proof of having 
a good ear. He is rough, austere; hisperiods are sometimes a mile long, in which he la- 
bours himself both out of tune and time. I acknowledge his imperfections, and beg 
the reader would weigh them and set them in the balance with his excellencies: he may 
judge if the latter do not greatly preponderate. He thinks nobly, affects surprisingly; 
his expression is noble, but not graceful; his final colouring is neither bright nor cheer- 
ful. But, though his pieces are not so completely finished as to stand every test, 
yet they are certainly high-wrought in his own peculiar style, and for greatness of 
design and strength of expression are beyond every other hand. 

I think no fair comparison can be made of him, except with the historians who are 
his countrymen, who like himself are original in their own way, and the first in their 
manner. These are only two, Herodotus and Xenophon. In point of life, Thucy- 
dides was junior a little to the former, and senior to the latter. In stateliness, gran- 
deur, and majesty, he far surpasseh them both. The manner of Herodotus is grace- 
ful and manly; his address is engaging; he loves to tell a story; and, however fabulous 
or trifling that story, he will be heard with pleasure. The course of his history is 
clear and smooth, and yields a most cheerful prospect: that of Thucydides is deep, 
rapid, impetuous, and therefore very apt to be rough and muddy. You may clearly 
perceive the bottom of the one: but it is very hard to div^e to the bottom of the other. 
Herodotus, like a master on the horn, can wind a lofty air, and without any harshness 
sink down into the lowest and mellowest notes. Thucydides sounds the trumpet; 
his blasts are sonorous and piercing, and they are all of the martial strain.* Xenophon 
never pretends to grandeur; his character is a beautiful simplicity; he is sweeter than 
honey; he charms every ear; the Muses themselves could not sing sweeter than he 
hath wrote. Each beats and is beaten by the others in some particular points. Each 
hath his particular excellence: that of Herodotus is gracefulness; that of Thucydides, 
grandeur; and that of Xenophon, sweetness itself. If generals, and admirals, and 
Btatesmen, were to award the first rank, it would undoubtedly be given for Thucy- 
dides; if the calmer and more polite gentry, it would go for Herodotus; if all in gen- 
eral who can read or hear, Xenophon hath it all to nothing. 
As to the Roman historians, who saw what these mighty originals had done before 

• Canil quodammodo beUicum. Cicero in the Orator. 



AS AN HISTORIAN. xxix 

them, I cannot judge it fair to form decisive parallels. Time had enabled them to 
judge maturely about defects and excellencies of their Greek predecessors. Yet 
every Roman historian shows plainly he is a Roman himself; he stood not so aloof from 
his subject as Thucydides. The loss of a Peloponnesian writer is never regretted in 
regard to the latter: the loss of Carthaginian and historians of other nations is highly 
regretted in regard to the former. National partiality will admit no comparison here, 
though excellence of composition may admit a great deal. Sallust is the only one 
who seems to have had our Author ever in his eye, and to have been his professed 
imitator. Sallust frequently translates his political maxims, copies him exactly in 
the conciseness and laboured energy of his phrase; and Sallust, for that reason, is 
like him very often obscure. It is entirely in his manner, that he draws up his ora- 
tions, contrasts his speakers, and fights his battles. Sallust hath many, hath deserv- 
edly many admirers: and I hope, if I am so fortunate as to bring Thucydides into more 
general acquaintance, that the admirers of the one will bestow regard upon the other, 
and pay due honour to his historic progenitor. 

I shall wind up this essay on Thucydides as an historian with a passage from the 
Critic on the Subhme,* only desiring the reader to keep Thucydides in remembrance, 
as Longinus extended his view to writers both in poetry and prose — 

" I readily allow, that writers of a lofty and towering genius are by no means pure 
and correct, since whatever is neat and accurate throughout, must be exceedingly lia- 
ble to flatness. In the Subhme, as in great affluence of fortune, some minuter articles 
will unavoidably escape observation. But it is almost impossible for a low and grovel- 
ling genius to be guilty of error, since he neverendangershimself by soaring on high, or 
aiming at eminence, but still goes on in the same uniform secure track, whilst its 
very height and grandeur exposes the Sublime to sudden falls. Nor am I ignorant in- 
deed of another thing, which will no doubt be urged, that in passing our judgment 
upon the works of an author, we always muster his imperfections, so that the remem- 
brance of his faults sticks indelibly fast in the mind, whereas that of his excellencies 
is quickly worn out. For my part, I have taken notice of no inconsiderable number 
of faults in Homer, and some other of the greatest authors, and cannot by any means 
be bhnd or partial to them; however, I judge them not to be voluntary faults, so much 
as accidental slips incurred though inadvertence: such as, when the mind is intent 
upon things of a higher nature, will creep insensibly into compositions. And for 
this reason 1 gave it as my real opinion, that the great and noble flights, though they 
cannot every where boast an equality of perfection, yet ought to carry off the prize 
by the sole merit of their own intrinsic grandeur." 

* Longinus, Section 33. 

^ .'.■ 

C2 



DISCOURSE III. 



SURVEY OF THE HISTORY. 



In the preceding discourse we have examined into the capacity and qualifications of 
our author for writing history, and settled his character. Let us now take a view of 
the work itself; first casting our eyes upon and noting the general disposition of the 
whole; and then surveying it more distinctly in its parts. 

The disposition of the whole is most elaborately exact. Order is scrupulously 
observed; and every incident so faithfully arranged in its proper time, that some have 
doubted whether annals were not a more proper title for it than history. If we should 
call it annals, it must be owned at the same time that annals were never composed with 
so much majesty and spirit; and never was history more accurately distinguished by the 
punctuality of dates so nicely interwoven. Thucydides states every occurrence in 
just place and time. But he is forced for this purpose to make frequent transitions, 
and to drop a particular narration, perhaps the very moment a reader's attention may be 
most fixed upon and most eager for the event. If they cannot bear a disappointment 
here, the remedy is ready at hand. By turning over a few leaves, they will find it 
regularly resumed in due place and time; and they at once may satisfy their own cu- 
riosity, without disarranging the author's scheme, or perplexing that work which he 
was determined to keep quite clear and unembarrassed. They will afterwards for- 
give, perhaps applaud him, for his great care to prevent confusion, and to give a neat 
and precise conception of all that passeth. He constantly gives notice, when he is 
necessitated, by the method he laid down for himself, to make such transitions; and, 
when we have been amused with what looks like a ramble from an engaging part of his- 
tory, but is really a coincidence of events not to pass unheeded; when we have been 
60 long at it, that we are convinced it lies in the road, and is no excursion at all; yet 
we are glad to see him re-connect, and land us on a spot, where we are already well 
acquainted. He shows a steady and inviolable attachment to chronology, a necessary 
attendant upon history But the chronology of Thucydides is like a herald, that ex- 
actly marshals along stately procession, adjusts the rank, clears the way, and preserves 
every step distinct and unincumbered. 

No writer had done this before him. No settled era was yet in use, not even the 
famous one of the Olympiad. The several states of Greece computed time by a method 
of their own. It was not easy to make those methods coincide with one another. The 
Athenians reckoned by their annual archons; the Lacedemonians by their ephori; the 
Argives by the years of the priestess of Juno. The seasons of the year, when the two 

former entered on their offices, were fixed, but did not suit together in point of time; 

zxx 



A SURVEY OF THE HISTORY. 



XXXI 



the beginning of the years of the latter was variable, since it depended on the death 
or removal of a predecessor. Thucydides, to avoid confusion, left all these artificial 
jarring rules, and adhered to the course of nature. He divided the natural year into 
halves, into a summer and winter. His summer includes the spring, and reaches 
from the vernal to the autumnal equinox; the other half-year is comprehended inhi?? 
winter. He always records eclipses, as strange events, and proper concomitants for 
the horrors of this war. I must not be so sanguine as to imagine, that he supposed 
such appearances might some time or other be reduced to exact calculation, and as- 
tronomy be made the faithful guide of chronology. 

Book I. — The First Book of Thucydides is introductory to the rest. It is a compre- 
hensive elaborate work of itself. It clears away rubbish, opens a view from the 
earhest ages, strikes out hght from obscurity, and truth from fable; that the reader may 
enter upon the Peloponnesian war with a perfect insight into the state of Greece, and the 
schemes, interest, and strength, of the contending parties. The author unfolds his 
design in writing, magnifies his subject, complains of the ignorance and credulity of 
mankind, rectifies their mistakes, removes all prejudice, and furnishes us with the 
knowledge of everything proper to be known, to enable us to look at the contention 
with judgment and discernment, when the point contended for is no less than the 
sovereignty of the sea, which that of the land must necessarily follow. 

He begins at the source, and traces the original of the Greek communities from 
certain and indisputable facts; and the growth of Attica in particular, from the natural 
barrenness of the soil, which tempted no invasions; and from the shelter its inhabitants 
gave to all who would settle amongst them, and share their polity. — He shows the 
invention of shipping to have been exceedingly mischievous at first. It filled the sea 
with pirates, to whom it gave a ready conveyance from coast to coast, enabling them 
suddenly to seize, and at leisure to carry off and secure their booty. No considerable 
commerce, or rather none at all, could be carried on, till the shore was cleared of such 
annoyance. And when few durst venture to settle on the coasts, no marts could be 
opened for traflic, and no ports were yet secure. A ship was merely the instrument of 
ready conveyance from place to place: it was not yet become an engine of attack and 
defence on the water. Minos king of Crete made the first attempt with success to 
obtain a naval strength,* by which he cleared the isles of the pirates, who had settled 
upon them toset out readier from thence on their plundering excursions. — The grand 
fleet that carried such a numerous army to Troy, was a mere collection of transports. 
Thucydides gives us a just and clear idea of that famous expedition. After this cele- 
brated era,f the Corinthians were the first people of Greece, who became in reality a 
maritime power. Their peculiar situation gave them an inclination and opportunity 
for commerce; and commerce must have strength to guard and support it. They first 
improved a vessel of burden into a ship of war,J and set power afloat as well as wealth. 

Their neighbours in the isle of Corcyra soon followed their example, and, though 
originally a colony of their own, became a rival power at sea. They fought on their 
own darling element for superiority.]] This was the most ancient sea-fight, but it was 
not decisive. They continued for two centuries more to be rival and jarring powers; 
till a third, that of Athens, grew up, which politically joined with one to gain the 
ascendant over them both, and to assert the empire of the sea for itself. 



L 



* Years before Christ 1006. 
it Before Christ 6D7. 



^ Before Christ 904. 
II Before Christ 657. 



xxxii SURVEY OF 

The claim both of Corcyra and Corinth to the town of Epidamnus had occasioned 
their most recent embroihnent,* and a hot war, in which the Corcyreans apphed for 
the alHance and aid of Athens. On this was afterwards grounded the first pretext 
for the Peloponnesian war, and therefore our author opens the affair at large. Athens 
held the balance of power in her hands; how she came to be possessed of it, will 
soon give room for as pertinent a digression as Thucydides could have wished. 
Ambassadors from both parties are soon at Athens; one, to negotiate alliance and aid; 
the other, to traverse their negotiation. The people of Athens, in whom the supreme 
power was vested, admitted them both to audience, and orations of course must 
follow. Our grave historian is now retired, to make way for statesmen and orators to 
mount the stage, who are very well worth hearing. 

The Corcyreans, who take the lead, recognize " the necessity of alliances, which, 
though sometimes entanglements, are generally security and defence. Wronged as 
they now are, they sue for alliance as the means of redress. In granting it to them, 
the Athenians would show honour and virtue, and at the same time promote their own 
private interest. The accession of the naval strength of Corcyra to their own was very 
well worth the gaining; in the end, it might preserve their state. — They open the nature 
of colonies, show the original contract between them and the mother-country; obedi- 
ence and protection are reciprocal, and imply one another. — They prove that Athens 
may grant them alliance, in consistence with all other engagements; by doing it, may 
secure herself in time against the envy and attack of the Peloponnesians; since the 
naval strength of Corinth, joined to all the efforts of the latter in a future war, will 
be weak and ineffectual against the combined fleets of Corcyra and Athens." 

The Corinthians, in their answer, inveigh highly against the Corcyreans. They 
describe them as " a very designing iniquitous set of men, and a colony in the high- 
est degree undutiful to its mother-state. They endeavour to prove it unjust, and 
ungrateful too, in the Athenians, to take them into alliance, and abet their criminal 
behaviour. They maintain, that true honour points out another conduct; and schemes 
of interest should never supersede the laws of equity and good faith. What may 
happen should be less regarded, than what on present occasions is strictly right. 
They entreat at last, though with a menacing air; and close with warmly adjuring 
the Athenians to stand neutral in the quarrel." 

The Athenians however resolve to enter into a defensive alliance with Corcyra. 
The war is renewed; and the Athenians send the Corcyreans a petty aid, which they 
afterwards reinforce. Corcyra is secured, and all the projects of the Corinthians are 
baffled, who are highly exasperated against the Athenians, and never will forgive them. 

Another affair soon happens to embroil them more, and to make the second pretext 
for a general war. Potidaea, a town in the isthmus of the Pallene, was a Corinthian 
colony, but at this time tributary to the Athenians. Its situation between two bays, 
and amongst the Athenian colonies on the coast to Thrace and Macedonia, would 
enable it to gall the Athenians sorely in case of a rupture. They order it therefore 
to be dismantled. The Potidaeans refuse obedience, and revolt. A war ensues. The 
Athenians attempt to reduce Potidaea; and the Corinthians to support the revolt. It 
is at length besieged by the former. The siege runs out into a great length of time, 
and at last becomes one of the considerable events of the Peloponnesian war. 
The Corinthians, after this repeated provocation, are full of resentments, and leave no 

♦Before Christ 438. 



THE HISTORY. xxxiii 

stone unturned to stir up a general war in Greece. They were parties themselves in 
the Peloponnesian league, of which the Lacedemonians were the head. The Corin- 
thians never set up for a leading state. They were ever content with the secondary 
rank, though the first in that rank. Their turn was always more to commerce than war. 
Commerce had long since made them rich; riches had made them luxurious; and, 
though they often produced great and excellent soldiers, yet they never piqued them- 
selves on being a martial or formidable people. Athens indeed they hated: Athens had 
rivalled them in trade, and very much abridged the extent of their commerce. One of 
the gulfs on which Corinth is seated, thatof Sarone,wasnow entirely in the jurisdiction 
of the Athenians, who had also begun to curb and straiten them much in the gulf of 
Crissa. They were consequently bent on the demolition of this all-grasping rival, but 
were unable to effect it by their own strength. They solicit all the confederates to re- 
pair to Lacedemon, all full of complaint and remonstrance against the Athenians. The 
Corinthians reserve themselves for the finishing charge; and our author repeats (or 
makes for them) their most inveigling and alarming speech on this occasion. 

" They address the Lacedemonians with an artful mixture of commendation and 
reproach; of commendation, for their strict adherence to good faith; of reproach, for 
their indolence and sloth. They had suffered the state of Athens to grow too migh- 
ty for her neighbours. Though the acknowledged deliverers of Greece, they had 
now for a length of time taken no notice of the encroachments of the Athenians; 
but, through wilful ignorance and habitual supineness, had let them grow too big, 
and able now to enslave them all. — They do all they can to irritate and provoke them. 
They draw an admirable parallel between them and the Athenians; invidious and 
reproachful, but directly tending to exasperate those whom they want to exasper- 
ate. — Then, they warmly renew their applications to the pride of the Lacedemonians; 
they alarm their fears; they flatter and reproach their foibles. They even threaten to 
abandon their league, unless they exert themselves in defence of their friends; they 
endeavour to prove the necessity of active and vigorous measures; and end with a 
very artful stroke of insinuating and persuasive address." 

An Athenian embassy, now residing at Lacedemon, being informed of these loud 
and bitter outcries against their masters, beg an immediate audience. Accordingly, 
they are admitted; not indeed to plead before Lacedemonians, as their judges or su- 
periors — Athenians scorn such self-debasement; but to vindicate their state from mis- 
representations, to clear her reputation, and justify her power. 

" With this view, they run over the great services they had done to Greece, in the 
time of the Persian invasions: they had ever been the most strenuous, most disinterest- 
ed, and most gallant, champions for liberty. They pompously detail their battles of 
Marathon and Salamis: their evacuating Athens on the last occasion: and when they 
had no polity of their own subsisting, fighting ardently and successfully for the other 
communities of Greece. Their power had been nobly earned ; and must they forego it, 
because it was envied] They had honourably gained, and justly used it; much more 
justly, than the Lacedemonians had it either in will or ability to have done. They are 
calumniated merely from that spite and discontent so common to mankind, who ever 
hate and abuse their superiors, and ever repine at subjection though to the most gentle 
masters. — Lacedemonians have neither skill nor judgment for large command, and 
thotigh most eagerly grasping at it, are unable to manage it withany measure of dexteri- 
ty and address. They should reflect again and again, before they ventured upon war: it 
might last longer, and involve them in more calamities, than they seemed willing to ap- 



xxxiv SURVEY OF 

prehend. They had better submit their complaints to fair arbitration: if not, the 
Athenians invoke the gods to witness their readiness to defend themselves, whenev- 
er and however their enemies shall attack them." 

All parties now withdraw; and the Lacedemonians go to counsel amongst them 
selves. Exasperated by the Corinthians, and mortified by the speech of the Atheni- 
ans, the majority are for an immediate declaration of war. Archidamus one of their 
kings, rose up to temper their fury. And the speech of his Spartan majesty on this 
occasion carries all the marks of a good king, an able statesman, and a thorough patriot: 
it does honour both to his heart and head. A Spartan king never made a royal figure 
but at the head of an army: then he reigned indeed. And yet, Archidamus retains no 
selfish considerations; they are lost in his regard for the public welfare. 

He tells them, " he is not fond of war himself; raw unexperienced youth alone is li- 
able to such weakness. The war now under consideration is a most important point. It 
may run out into a great length of time. It is against Athenians — a remote people — a na- 
val power — abounding in wealth — excellently provided in all respects. He demands, 
in every single article, whether they can presume to become a match for such antago- 
nists'? They should remember the high spirit, the habits of activity and perseverance so 
natural to these Athenians, who are not to be dejected at the first loss, nor frightened at 
big words or haughty threats. Insults indeed must not be brooked; but adequate pre- 
parations should be made to avenge them, and time be gained to make such prepara- 
tions. It would be most prudent to begin a negotiation, to spin it out into length. If 
affairs can be amicably adjusted, it would deserve their choice; — if not, when they are 
competently enabled, it will be soon enough to act offensively. He dreads not war him- 
self, yet war cannot be carried on without money. Ample funds must be provided, a 
work of time and deliberation. Circumspection is no real reproach; precipitation draws 
positive mischiefs after it. Lacedemonians are used to be calm and considerate; they 
should not now be cajoled or exasperatedout of their judgment. The Athenians are a 
wise and dextrous people. The Lacedemonians should keep that in remembrance, and 
support their own character of calmness of spirit and true manly resolution: they should 
begin with caution, proceed with temper, end all things amicably if they can; if not, 
when duly prepared and adequately provided, they might trust the decision to arms.'* 

The kings of Sparta were ever jostled on their thrones by the haughty overbearing 
Ephori. Sthenelaidas, one of that college, answers Archidamus in a short, blunt, 
properly Laconic speech. "Heisse\^ere upon the Athenians, sneers Archidamus, 
and avers that Lacedemonians should not deliberate upon, but instantly take the 
field and avenge their wrongs." He then put the question — whether the peace was 
broken] — divided the council; told the votes; and declared, in the English style, that 
the Ays had it. 

The confederates were now called in, and acquainted with the resolution. Yet, 
it seems the advice of Archidamus had carried some weight, and actual war was to 
be deferred, till all the parties in the Lacedemonian league had ripened their mea- 
sures, and were ready to act with unanimity and vigour. 

Here the author again makes his aj)pparance, and assures us the true motive of the 
determination for a war at Sparta, was a jealousy of the Athenian power, now very 
great, and a dread of its more extensive growth; the latter of which they were deter- 
mined to prevent, and to reduce the former within less distasteful and terrific bounds. 

Then follows a most pertinent digression, in which Thucydides points out the steps 
by which the Athenians had so highly exalted their state. In a close and succinct man- 



THE HISTORY. xxxv 

nerhe runs over the history of Athens for fifty years, from the invasion of Xerxes to 
the breaking out of the Peloponnesian war. He arranges all the incidents in due 
place and time. Herodotus hath related the splendid passages of the Grecian history 
during that invasion; hath exhibited Themistoclesinall the lustre of his command at the 
battle of Salamis, where the Athenians, who had abandoned their all, fought, and, 
through the address of Themistocles obliged all parties to fight, for liberty against 
Xerxes. On this day they ear-ned a greater title than that of citizens of Athens; they 
were afterwards acknowledged the sovereigns of the sea. The Lacedemonians be- 
came mortified at it; but the Athenians had gloriously deserved it. Themistocles was 
the very life and soul of Greece on this occasion. In the midst of difficulties he formed 
a most extensive plan for his beloved Athens, whic] he began to execute at once. 
Thucydides describes his address and foresight. He soon sets the city beyond the 
reach of envy and jealousy. And though soon after he losthis country, through the mal- 
ice of his personal enemies and the enemies of his country in conjunction with them, 
yet the statesmen and patriots left behind pursued his plan of naval power; and the 
steps of its progress and advancement are mutually traced out by our historian. 

Themistocles had made all safe and secure at home. The Long Walls were built; 
the Piraeus, aspacious harbour, opened and fortified, a magazine for traffic, and an arsen- 
al for war. Aristides, as true a patriot as ever lived, made all secure abroad. Through 
his honest management, all Greece submitted to an annual tax, for the guard of their 
common liberty against future invasions; and the leaders at sea were made collectors 
and treasurers of this naval fund. The isle of Delos was the place, at first, of lodging 
this fund; but it was soon after removed to Athens; — a shrewd political step, yet capa- 
ble however of an ample, if not full, justification. The war is briskly carried on against 
the Persian monarch; the isles and seas are cleared of the common enemy; the cities on 
the coast are regained or conquered. Cimon also performs his part nobly; he earns two 
victories the same day, by sea and land, on the coast of Ionia, from the Persians. 
He completed a negotiation with the petty maritime states, confederate with Athens, 
who were tired of incessant warfare, for accepting sums of money instead of ships 
and personal attendance. By this means the shipping of those states soon mould- 
ered away, and their money was by their own agreement sent thither, to increase and 
strengthen the maritime power of Athens. In spite of all the opposition, which the 
Corinthians and Boeotians gave them at home, whose rancour to them was never to 
be appeased, in the course of no large number of years they had established a very 
extensive and formidable empire indeed. The isles and coasts of the ^gean sea 
were mostly their own. The bay of Sarone was entirely in their own jurisdiction: 
and, by being masters of Naupactus, they considerably awed the bay of Crissa. 
Their squadrons cruised round and quite awed the coasts of Peloponnesus. Their 
interest at Cephallene, and the new alliance which gained them the accession of the 
naval strength of Corcyra, rendered them masters of the Ionian, and they had colo- 
nies to extend their traffic and influence both in Italy and Sicily. 

These points are opened step by step in this digression by Thucydides, till jealou- 
sy in the Lacedemonians and malice in the Corinthians irritated all the Peloponnesi- 
an states and their allies against them, and ended in the determination for war. The 
Corinthians had now carried their point, and hoped soon to gratify all their resentments. 
Accordingly, at the second grand congress at Sparta, when all the rest of the states 
had declared their minds, they warmly encourage them to enter at once upon an 
oifensive war, in a very studied and elaborate speech. 



xxxvi SURVEY OF 

" They set out with handsome cornpHments to the Lacedemonians. They animate 
the land states of Peloponnesus to join effectually with those on the coasts. A firm 
and lasting peace can only be obtained by a vigorous war; and the power of Athens 
must needs be reduced. — They open a plan — for establishing funds — for weakening 
the marine of Athens, and consequently for improving and strengthening the marine 
of her enemies — for effectuating the revolts of her dependents — and raising fortifi- 
cations in Attica itself. Independence can never be earned at too great a price; it 
costs as much to be voluntary and obedient slaves. A single state should never be 
suffered to play the tyrant in Greece. Their own reputation, their dignity, their lib- 
erty, their welfare, a most righteous cause, nay, the very gods themselves, summon 
them to action. They close w'.*h a very warm and pathetic recapitulation, sounding 
as it were the alarm for the destruction of Athens." 

Now war is a second time resolved upon by ballot. All are ordered to get ready, with 
the utmost despatch, to begin its operations. In the mean time the Athenians are to be 
amused with embassies and negotiations, merely to gain time and save appearances. 
Frivolous they really are, but our author minutely details them, as they give him an 
opportunity of introducing some notable passages relating toCymon, Pausanias, and 
Themistocles. He then shifts the scene to Athens; and introduces Pericles, the most 
commanding orator, the greatest general, the most consummate statesmen, and at this 
time prime minister of the republic — introduces Pericles, I say, in the assembly of the 
people, to give them an insight into the schemes of their enemies, and a plan for their own 
conduct; to encourage them to a brave and steady resistance, in strict adherence to 
such methods, as in the end will infallibly not barely secure but aggrandise their state. 
The thoughts in this speech of Pericles are so grand, so nervous, so emphatically and 
concisely just, that if the reader be not immediately struck into an adequate conception 
of them, I know no method of opening his eyes or enlarging his understanding. He 
says but little, but says every thing in that little. He demolishes all the assertions of 
the Corinthians in their last speech at Sparta, as if he had heard them speak. Perhaps 
Thucydides here hath not sufficiently concealed his art in writing. But the speech is 
entirely in character, completely suited to the heart and head and mouth of Pericles. 
Pericles, I observe it with pleasure, is an Englishman both in heart and judgment. 
England hath adhered and will adhere to the lessons which Athens neglected and forgot. 
— " Of vast consequence indeed," says this enlightened statesman, *' is the dominion 
of the sea. But consider it with attention. For, were we seated on an island," as the 
force of his argument evidently implies, " we could never be subdued. And now you 
ought to think, thatour present situation is as nearly as possible the same, and so to evac- 
uate your houses and lands in Attica, and to confine your defence to the sea. If this can 
need a comment, Xenophon will give it in his Polity of the Athenians. — •' In one point," 
says he, " the Athenians are deficient. For if, beside their being sovereigns of the sea, 
they were seated on an island, it would be ever in their power to ravage others at pleas- 
ure, and yet they could not be ravaged themselves so long as they held the mastery at 
sea; their lands could never be laid waste, no enemy could post themselves upon them. 
But now, the occupiers of lands and the wealthy Athenians fly before invaders; whilst 
the people in general, conscious they have nothing to be burnt and nothing to be 
plundered, live exempt from fear nor fly before an invader. The expedient used on such 
occasions is, that the former deposit their most valuable effects in the isles, and trusting 
to their superiority at sea, slight all the devastations an enemy can make in Attica," 
England is complete where Athens was deficient. And how fond must both Periclea 



THE HISTORY. xxxvii 

and Xenophon have been of the island and maritime power of Great Britain! I will not 
pretend to anticipate the reader's pleasure by descending into more particularities. 
It may suffice to add, that the final answer of the Athenians is drawn up by the ad- 
vice of Pericles, that " they will do nothing by command; they had already offered 
to refer all disputes to a fair judicial decision: so far only, but no farther, compliance 
must be expected from Athens." — Here all negotiation comes to an end,- and the war 
will very soon commence. 

Thus I have endeavoured to give some idea of the first book of Thucydides. It 
is a grand piece of work beyond all denial. But Rapin thinks our author hath over- 
done it " out of a desire of prefixing a too stately portal to his history." Could the 
portal have been thought too stately, if the whole fabric had been completely finished"? 
To form a right judgment here, we should examine the design and not the execution: 
the latter is imperfect, is broke off. So, look at it from the Park, the Banqueting-house 
at Whitehall is too big for what stands near if. But hath it that appearance in the 
original plan of Inigo Jones for the magnificent palace once designed to be erected? 
Something of this nature may justly be pleaded in favour of Thucydides, and teach 
us not to judge too hastily of a whole, when we cannotsurvey all the parts, because 
they never were finished. Moved by decorum, I would gladly justify ^y ^i^^^^o^j 
but I by no means pretend to decide the point. 

Book II. — The second book opens with the first act of hostility. The Thebans 
march by night, and enter by surprise the city of Plataea. This city and petty state, 
though just within Boeotia, was not comprised in the union, of which all the other 
cities of Bceotia were constituents, with Thebes at their head; but had ever been 
firmly attached, even in the worst of times, to the common liberty of Greece, and was 
under the protection of, and in fast alliance with Athens. This surprise of Plataea 
our author describes in all its turns, till its enemies are driven out or slaughtered, 
and a place is secured for the Athenians. 

A rupture hath now been made, and the war is going to be general. Thucydides 
sounds the charge in all the disposition and spirit of Homer. He catalogues the al- 
lies on both sides. He awakens our expectation; and fast engages our attention. All 
mankind are concerned in the important point now going to be decided. Endeavours 
are made to disclose futurity. Heaven itself is interested in the dispute. The earth tot- 
ters, and nature seems to labour with the great event. This is his solemn and sublime 
manner of setting out. Thus he magnifies a war between two, asRapinstyles them petty 
states; and thus artfully he supports a little subject by treating it in a great and noble 
method. 

Writers who have been long contemplating the vast gigantic size of the Roman 
empirejif they cast their eyes on the state of Athens even at the present juncture, are 
apt to form alow idea of it. Athens,itis true, was at this time in the highest meridian 
of her power. Yet, why ever to be pitching upon the most disadvantageous and incon- 
gruous parallels? His subject was certainly the greatest that to his day had occurred 
in the world: and ought Thucydides to be degraded, or even lessened at all, because, 
he was not born in the same age with Livy? As much amusement at least accompanies 
and as much instruction flows from reading carefully the history of Athens, as from 
that of Rome. Wonder may be more raised by the latter, and the wonder may end in 
detestation of a people who became enormously great by the miseries and destruction 
of their fellow-creatures. The Romans were but brute-like men; they were not tol- 
erably humanized till they had conquered Greece, Greece reconquered them, and 

D 



xxxviii SURVEY OF 

established a better, more lasting triumph over mind, than the others over body. 

Graecia capta ferum victorem cepit. — Hor. 
Who then best deserves the applause of the heart; the citizens of Athens, or the citizens 
of Rome) I am not at all in doubt, how men of a calm and considerate spirit will 
decide the question. Or, let such as judge only by numbers, consider a little more 
sedately, whether Athens at this time was that diminutive and petty state, which could 
be magnified and ennobled only by artifice. The first army, that invaded her territo- 
ries in this war, consisted (according to Plutarch) of sixty thousand men. This is an 
object big enough to fill the eye. The state of her revenue, when the value of mon- 
ey is adjusted, will turn out by no means trifling. They were possessed, at the breaking 
out of the war, of three hundred triremes fit for sea. Two hundred and fifty of 
them were at one time in commission, in the fourth year of the war; consequently, 
at two hundred men a ship, the number of seamen employed must have been fifty 
thousand. If the reader be not yet convinced, that Athens was not a petty state, 
nothing can get the better of his prejudice. It would be pity, any one should set 
down to Thucydides with such low prepossessions against his subject. 

The confederate army of Peloponnesians is now assembled, and ready to march* 
into Attica, ifnder the command of Archidamus. Like an able and cautious general 
he harangues his troops, " encourages them with a sight of their own numbers, but 
guards them from catching at that sight a contempt of their foes. The strict obser- 
vation of discipline is always necessary to armies, be they ever So large. No enemy 
ought ever to be despised, much less Athenians. Though an enemy, he speaks in 
high commendation of the latter, and establishes the dignity of their characters. He 
ends with an exhortation to his troops, to observe rules, conform to discipline, and 
bravely to execute orders; and, Spartan-like, concludes w-ith an encomium on the 
beauty and strength of strict military obedience." 

He then sends a messenger to Athens, to try if a war were yet to be avoided. The 
Athenians are as determined as ever to make no submissions. The messenger is con- 
ducted out of their territories, and parts from his escort with apathetic prediction of 
the miseries in which all Greece is going to be involved. Attica soon after is invaded. 
The mischief done by the invaders is described; and the sense at Athens of their suffer- 
ings and distresses represented at large. The reader, on this occasion, will be let into 
the form and constitution of the Athenian polity. He will see, how they began to 
be moulded into one community by the prudence of Theseus, one of their earliest 
kings. Other historians expatiate on the method, by which, from being under a regal, 
they had varied gradually into a purely republican form. I shall only mention an ob- 
servation.* that, contrary to most other nations, they had abolished the regal govern- 
ment, not from distaste but reverence to kings. Codrus, the last of their kings, had de- 
voted himself for his country, and was so worthy a man, that they resolved no mortal 
should afterwards wear that title amongst them. They declared Jupiter king of Athens, 
about the same time that the Jews rebelled against theocracy, and would have a man 
to reign over them. Archons for life succeeded; whose term was afterwards abridged 
to ten years; then, to a single year. All general histories point out the variations, 
till they came to the popular form which now prevailed. 

The enemy, after heavy depredations, at length evacuated Attica; and the Athenians 
take the field to retaliate upon^them. Their squadron had been all the time at sea, 
cruising upon and infesting the coasts of Peloponnesus. But, in the winter, we are 

* TourreiPs Preface Historique. 



THE HISTORY. xxxix 

called to Athens to see the public funeral of those who were killed in the first campaign. 
Here, the first time it occurs, our author describes this solemnity, and Pericles makes 
the funeral oration. 

I shall make no reflections on this celebrated performance. Should the readernot 
think it deserving of its high reputation, I fear the translator will be sadly to blame. 
It is hard to give such noble ideas their proper energy, and such refined ones their 
due exactness. The great orators of Athens were always glad to display their abil- 
ities on the same occasion. Plato hath entered the lists with a high spirit of emula- 
tion, and with a high degree of success: and a great master * this way hath lately 
made him English. If Thucydides suffers by a comparison, which now the unlearn- 
ed but judicious reader is empowered to make, the latter must be entreated to observe, 
that the eloquence of Plato was beyond dispute more smooth and fluent, more accom- 
plished in all that is beautiful and sweet, than the eloquence of Thucydides, but an ad- 
judged inferiority in any other respect must be laid at the door of his translator. 

After such an exhilarating and enlivening piece, for such it must have been to all who 
heard it, and must have determined every Athenian to suffer anything with intrepidity 
and patience in the causeof his country, a very mournful scene immediately succeeds, 
which lays them under such a heavy load of affliction and distress, as no arguments, no 
philosophy, can alleviate. The plague breaks out at Athens; and the reader must be 
ready to feel very sharp emotions in behalf of his fellow-creatures, and in behalf of mo- 
rahty and virtue too. Amidst their accumulated distresses, Pericles is the only support 
of the community; and, like the greatest benefactors to ungrateful men, is cursed for be- 
ing their support, and reproached for being steadily wise and in the right. At last he 
convenes them, and addresses them with such an air of ingenuity , such spirit, and con 
scious dignity, and firm reliance on a good cause , as only two orators that I know of have 
ever equalled on parallel occasions. Those I mean are Demosthenes and St Paul. AH 
the world of letters and good taste are well acquainted with the oration of the former 
against iEschines about the crown; and every class of readers is surely well versed in the 
Second Epistle of Paul to the Corinthians. I can but hint these resemblances, since 
now I must attend on Pericles, who sooths or thunders his countrymen out of all their 
discontent and malice, and sends them home convinced and ashamed. But domestic 
distress soon effaceth any other impressions; their passions are again inflamed by in- 
wardly corroding anguish; and Pericles after all must be fined, and turned out of his 
employments. Yet people are not always mad; good-sense and conviction return upon 
them; and he is begged, because most worthy, again to accept the sole administration. 
He enjoys it but a httle time, before he is carried off by the plague. Athens then 
lost her ablest, honestest statesman. He was able to have sat at the helm of govern- 
ment, to have steered the republic safe through every storm, and to have insured her 
not bare security but open triumph. His successors were very alert at catching hold 
of that helm; but none of them could hold it long; and the vessel, through their mu- 
tual quarrels, must needs run aground or founder at last. 

But the next remarkable passage in the history, is the march of the Peloponnesians to 
invest Platsea, and the solemn parley held at their approach. Archidamus js at the 
iiead of this ungenerous enterprise. The malice of the Thebans must be gratified, since 
the alliance of Bceotia in this war is of mighty consequence, and to be purchased at any 
rate. Archidamus indeed struggles hard for the Platseans; he would fain spare them, 
could he persuade them to a neutrality. But the Plataeans have too much honour and 

* Mi Wesr. 



xl SURVEY OF 

gratitude to be neutral, when Athens, their faithful guardian and ally, is principally 
struck at. They remonstrate in vain from the topics of honour, justice, gratitude, 
the glory and sanction of the great progenitors on either side. The siege is formed, 
and strenuously plied, though without success. Our author always shines in exact 
description; no method of annoyance or defence is omitted. It is at length turned 
into a blockade; and a sufficient body of troops left behind to carry it on, when the 
main army marcheth off. 

The war grows warm in more remote quarters; in Thrace; and in Acarnania. An 
Athenian squadron, stationed at Naupactus in the bay of Crissa, awed all the motions 
of the Corinthians and allies on their own coasts; and it was determined , to clear away this 
annoyance. Accordingly they launch out against it with more than double the number 
of vessels. The Athenians, at one exertion of skill, drive them all on aheap, defeat 
them, and make prizes of twelve. The Lacedemonians, excellent land men, but 
very awkward seamen, think this an unaccountable event. They send down their 
most active commanders to refit and reinforce the fleet, and to try their fortune again 
at sea. Much artifice is employed on both sides. The short harangues of the admi- 
rals let us into all the views and designs of either party. Phormio at length is snared; 
the enemy blunders; then Phormio extricates himself, and gives them a second de- 
feat. The reader sees every tack, and the motion of every vessel. 

Disconcerted here, they form a bold project indeed to surprise the Piraeus by night, 
and to finish the war in a moment. The project is described, and the probability of 
success established. But the very grandeur of the attempt deters the undertakers. 
Athens indeed is alarmed, and thrown into great consternation; but the project total- 
ly miscarries, and the Piraeus is better secured for the future. 

All Thrace is now arming under Sitalces against Perdiccas king of Macedonia. A 
vast army of Barbarians is assembled, marches over a great length of country, strikes 
a general panic, effectuates no real service, and soon disperses or moulders away. 
Such bulky unwieldy armies make an awkward figure, compared with the regular- 
ity, exact discipline, and personal bravery, of the diminutive armies of Greece. 

Thucydides gives us once more a sight of Phormio and his gallant squadron; and 
then closeth the book, and the history of the third year of the war. " Never history," 
says Rapin, " comprised so much matter in so little room, nor so much action in so few 
words. If any thing can be found fault with, it is that the exploits are too closely 
crowded with one another, so that the coherence seems somewhat intricate and con- 
fused, and the multiplying of objects tends only to dissipate the attention of the reader." 
Anhistorianhowever is to take his incidents in their natural order, as they subsist in 
fact. He is not so much to dispose, as to describe them. If he does the latter perti- 
nently, accurately, and with due attention to their importance, he hath acquitted him- 
self of his duty. The poet or writer of fiction must pick out and heighten his incidentSi 
witha view to fill up properly, and give to every distinct object its needful splendour: 
he is to exert his choice, and by exerting it judiciously to gain applause. The his- 
torian is not to pick, but to make the best use of his materials. He may give them 
indeed all possible lustre; but, if they crowd too thick upon one another, the reader 
may be embarrassed with the number, yet nobody can be justly blamed. 

Book III. The Third Book is no less full of matter than the preceding. The inci- 
dents crowd fast upon one another, and politics and oratory are in full employ. The 
revolt of Lesbos is the first occurrence of importance. The people of that isle had 
been long in the Athenian league: but the members of this league were dependents 



THE HISTORY. ' xU 

rather than confederates. Thucydides always employs the same Greek word (TvnfL»xo') 
for the members of either league: the idea it gives is that of companions in war 
But there is great difference between such as accompany, because they choose it; and 
such as accompany, because they are summoned and cannot help it. The former was 
in general the case of those who sided with Sparta; the latter, of those who sided 
with Athens. The least thought of compulsion is grating to any state, which thinks 
it ought, and is able to be quite independent. This was the case with the Lesbians, 
a people considerable in many respects, but especially for their naval strength. It 
is well worth the while of the Lacedemonians to gain such confederates; it must be 
a sad blow to the Athenians to lose such dependents. The fact was, all the cities 
of Lesbos, except Methymne, declare a revolt. The Athenians lose no time, but are 
at once with a powerful squadron before Mitylene, and block it up. The Mitylene- 
ans had sent ambassadors to beg immediate aid from the Lacedemonians. They had 
an audience from them and the rest of their league at Olympia, so soon as the games 
were ended. The speech they make on this occasion is very artful, very insinua- 
ting, and nicely adapted to carry tVieir point. 

'* They open the nature of a revolt, and the cases in which it merits protection and 
succour from others. They have been ill used by the Athenians; have been made 
their tools in enslaving their compatriots of Greece; have been long caressed indeed , but 
are well assured what their own fate would soon have been. Every state hath a 
natural right to take preventive measures against the loss of their liberty, and to stand 
on their defence. They had revolted sooner, would the Lacedemonians have coun- 
tenanced the measure: they had declared it on the first invitation of the Bceotians, 
It was a noble revolt; it had disengaged them from a combination to enslave the rest 
of Greece; it had associated them in the cause of honour and liberty. It had been made 
indeed with too much precipitation; but this should make others more zealous and 
active in their protection, who would reap a great accession of strength by it; an ac 
cession of maritime strength; whilst the Athenians would be weakened in point of 
shipping, and in point of revenue. It would be a signal of revolt to others, and 
assurance to them that they might do it safely. It would reflect abundant honour 
on the Lacedemonians to succour the distressed, to save men whose preservation 
would give them glory and strength, and prove them those hearty friends to liberty, 
which all Greece with united praises acknowledged them to be." 

Interest without rhetoric was strong enough to insure their success. But the lat- 
ter helped to gain them a prompt reception from the Lacedemonians, who resolve on 
sending them a succour, and making diversions on the Athenians, in order to oblige 
them to raise the siege of Mitylene. 

The blockade of Plataea by the Peloponnesians still continuing, our author relates 
the bold project, and bold execution of the project, of a party of Plataeans, in ma- 
king their escape over all the works of the besiegers. It is a most circumstantia\ 
and a most clear and intelligible relation. 

Mitylene isnow forced to surrender at discretion. The principal agents in the revolt 

are sent prisoners to Athens, where the people vote that '< not they only but all the Mi- 

tyleneans in general be put to death; and an order is immediately despatched to their 

commander at Mitylene to execute his part of the sentence. This bloody decree was 

carried by Cleon, a furious demagogue. It was he who worked up the people of Athens 

to such a pitch of inhumanity; which, however, instantly subsided. Thevare struck 
6 d2 



xlii SURVEY OF 

with horror at their own resolution, and will have it again debated. We shall hear 
the two speakers on each side of the question, Cleon and Diodotus. 

" Cleon sets out with all the fury and fire of a man who hath a bad heart. He hath 
abjured humanity to show himself a most zealous patriot. Eloquent he is acknowledged 
to have been, and so appears in his invectives against his own masters and hisown tools, 
the people, for their foolish commiseration, for theirbeing the eternaldupes of orators, of 
subtle and venal speakers. For his own part, he loves his country; and hates her 
enemies. Guilt shall never find an advocate in him; he calls out for vengeance on the 
Mityleneans; none but their pensioners, none but men who are bribed and corrupted 
can offer a plea in their behalf. He bids his audience throw away all foolish pity, all 
womanish forbearance; to fix their attention on the crimes of the guilty, and not on 
the horrors of their punishment: and give this proof to their dependents, that death 
shall inevitably be the portion of all revolters, that their arms may be henceforth employ- 
ed in opposing their public enemies, and not in chastising their own subjects." 

Diodotus replies in a speech that shows him a real patriot, and who thought good 
manners, a calm considerate temper, and a regard to humanity, to be very consistent 
with the true patriot spirit. " He there defends the re-committing of their former re- 
solution, since repeated consultations cannot be prejudicial to the public welfare. It is 
a base and odious method, to lavish the charge of ignorance and venality on men who 
differ in sentiment; it robs the public of its ablest counsellors and sincerest friends. 
Strict justice, in the present instance, may be with Cleon; but the future and lasting 
welfare of their country is the object now apt to be kept in view. The punishment of 
deathhathnever effectually awed the tempers of mankind. To make men desperate is 
very impolitic; to extirpate their dependents is lopping off their own limbs, and ruining 
their own revenue. Men should be retained in their duty by mild discretionary precau- 
tions; severe and sanguinary proceedings never answer the purpose. And what cruelty, 
to doom a whole people to destruction! to involve the innocent with the guilty! to mur- 
der even such as had been their friends and benefactors! He advises them not to give 
too large a scope to mercy, but to punish the guilty, and the guilty alone. This will 
sufficiently intimidate others; will secure their interest in Lesbos better for the future; 
and convince the world how soundly Athenians can deliberate upon all their concerns." 
Diodotus carries his point. The Athenians, cruel only in fits of choler, but habitually 
humane, repeal the bloody sentence; and despatch a vessel with all haste to stop exe- 
cution, which arrives at Mitylene but just time enough to prevent the massacre. 

The next event of importance contrasts the Lacedemonian character with that of the 
Athenians. The author takes no pains to point it out; but it lies too ready and obvious 
to pass unobserved. — Plataea, after a tedious blockade, isobliged by famine tosurrender. 
They surrender however to the Lacedemonians, on condition of being brought to a ju- 
dicial trial, and only if found guilty of unjust behaviour, to be put to death. Some dele- 
gates arrive from Sparta to preside in this court of mere inquisition, since the whole pro- 
cess is confined to a single question — " Whether they had done any positive service to 
the Lacedemonians and allies" — that is, to their declared and determined enemies — •* in 
the present warV The question plainly manifested a deliberate resolution toputthem all 
to death. And all the favour they obtain is, to be suffered to make a kind of dying 
epeech before men who were styled indeed judges, but in fact were, butchers. It was 
a case of great commiseration, and the speaker lays it open with all ihat natural elo- 
quence which flows from an inward and keen sensibility. If men were not deaf to per- 



THE HISTORY. xliii 

suasion, it must have persuaded. Tiie cause was most alarming, and a more pathet- 
ic plea hath never been exhibited. 

" They insist that on a fair and explicit condition they had surrendered to the Lace- 
demonians, whereas now they were prejudged and precondemned to gratify their unre- 
lenting foes the Thebans. The insidious question left them no plea at all. They 
could not answer it, and must not be silent. Since life is at stake, something must 
be said even by men who despair of persuading. Their quarrel with the Thebans 
had been just and hondurable; quarrel with the Lacedemonians they never had any. 
Nay, merely at the desire of the latter, had they cultivated Athenian friendship, that 
unpardonable crime for which they were now doomed to destruction. They expati- 
ate with truth and energy on the great services they had done to the liberty of Greece. 
All Greece was bound in honour, in gratitude, in deference to positive and solemn- 
oaths, to preserve the Plataeans. Ought every tie to be rent asunder, generosity to be 
quite expunged, and all benevolence thrown aside, to serve a private turn) Ought Platae- 
ans to be thus basely reduced, as theyreally had been, either to be starved or to be butch- 
eredl The Lacedemonians should entreat the Thebans for them, should beg them to save 
the lives of friends and benefactors; at least, should replace them within their walls, 
and leave them to the fate of war. They apply to their generosity, to their human- 
ity; to strive to give them some emotions of pity; they represent the hableness of 
mankind to calamity; how brutal it is to be deliberately hard-hearted; how sinful it 
is to be resolutely ungrateful! They call upon heaven and earth -to interpose in their 
behalf; they run over every pathetic and persuasive topic; till they can add no more, 
and yet dare not end; and again entreat the Lacedemonians to save those worthy, 
patriots to whom all Greece is indebted for her liberty and independence." 

The Thebans, who were afraid the Lacedemonians had a higher sense of honour 
and gratitude than they really had, demand also to be heard. 

In the speech they made on this occasion, *' they first accuse the Plataeans of slander 
and invective. They endeavour to palliate the reproach on themselves for deserting the 
cause of Hberty and joining the arms of Persia. The Plataeans had been active ever 
since to betray it to the Athenians; that wicked scheme, which with all their power the 
Thebans had ever opposed. By such iniquitous conduct the Plataeans had extinguish- 
ed their former glory, and effaced all their former merits. Nobody was bound to re- 
dress or pity them, but their friends the Athenians. Their temper had been always 
bad; always bent on violence and mischief; always addicted to tyranny in Greece, 
provided Athenians were the tyrants. They then endeavour to throw an anti-pathet- 
ic into their own representations. They paint the death of their countrymen slain 
at the surprise of Plataea in a mournful light, as put to death contrary to every law, 
and murdered in the very act of stretching out their hands and pleading a promise 
of life. The lives therefore of such butchers are forfeited to justice; and they insist 
the forfeit shall be taken: the Lacedemonians are bound in honour to take it. They 
beg them therefore to be deaf to vain complaints and entreaties, to revenge the injur- 
ed, and to punish the guilty; to regard what bad men have done, and not what they 
have said; to defy eloquence, and heed only simple unsophisticated truth; by which 
alone men, who preside in judgment, can satisfy their conscience and their duty." 

An alliance with Thebes is necessary in this war to the Lacedemonians, and 
they purchase it at a mighty price indeed. The wretched Plataeans, by all man- 
kind abandoned, are butchered one after another, to the number of two hun- 
dre^i their wives are sold for slaves; their city is rooted up from its foundation. 



xliv SURVEY OF 

Thucydides soon after describes the sedition of Corcyra, the horrors of which are 
scarcely to be paralleled in story. He paints all the dreadful consequences of faction 
in a community. And what pity it is, that a warm, generous and innate love of hberty, 
when carried to excess, should be the source of so much misery to reasonable creatures ! 
Our author, contrary to his custom, runs out here into many grave and judicious re- 
flections, in the interest of no party, a champion for no particular form, but as a friend 
to man, and a friend to virtue. It is the lust of power, that throws embroilments and 
confusions into all communities. In governments strictly republican, the ambitious are 
eager to obtain more than an equal share. In an oligarchical form, the few in power 
want ever to retain and often to enlarge their share; and the cry of liberty is shouted 
loudest by those who want most to overthrow it. But yet; was the matter ever mended, 
or the miseries of mankind prevented, by setting up a single tyranti Communities 
have suffered more, for the caprice, for the support of the nominal glory of such a 
head, than they have done by a number of popular seditions. The reader will cer- 
tainly all along reflect on the fine model of government established in his own coun- 
try; and own that a community may be governed and yet be happy, that the power 
of the one and of the few and of the many may be tempered into an apt and lasting 
consistence; and, as it hath been for ages in a train of improvement, keep it but un- 
hurt by intestine faction, may last to the dissolution of this great globe itself. 

After this tragical business of Corcyra, Thucydides enters upon the affairs of Sicily. 
The seeds of war are sowing in that island, which will afterwards grow into a mighty 
harvest. — He relates other incidents, till he comes to a remarkable scene of war in 
jEtolia, where Demosthenes the Athenian commander is totally defeated. — He de- 
scribes the purification of the isle of Delos by the Athenians; and hath found the art 
to make it a cheerful and entertaining piece, for the relief of the reader, after he hath 
been engaged in so many scenes of horror and destruction, and is soon going to be 
engaged in more. — The battles of Olpe and Idomene are sufficiently stored with 
slaughter, to glut any reader who delights in blood. The armies in this history have 
been often thought not to be sufficiently numerous. They made no havoc ; they do 
not knock one another on the head fast enough to preserve attention. But these old 
Greeks were men, and not brutes. And it is pity, that the history of men should be 
so much a history of the destruction of the human species. 

Book IV. — In the Fourth Book, the Athenians and Lacedaemonians, principals in 
the war, are matched directly against one another. Demosthenes, a wise and brave 
commander, had seized and fortified Pylus in the territories of the latter, had placed 
such a garrison in it as annoyed the whole country, and in the end might wound 
the very vitals o-f that state. The Lacedaemonians slight it at first, as if their bare 
appearance would remedy all. But upon trial, their land armies and their squadrons 
are unable to dislodge the enemy. It is with the true martial spirit of an experienced 
and gallant commander, that Demosthenes harangues his small body of Athenians, 
when he draws them up on the beach of the sea, to beat off" the ships of the enemy. 
Thucydides shines on these occasions; in him the addresses are always made, and 
pertinently made, to the soldiers who are present; they interest and animate, but 
never run into declamation and common-place. — The turns of war at Pylus are 
sudden and engage attention. They fight by land, and fight by sea; nay, what is 
more, land battles are fought from the water, and naval battles fought from off* the 
shore. The eye will distinctly view these strange occurrences; they are painted 
strong ; the groupes are not mere heaps of confusion, and the principal figures are 



THE HISTORY. xlv 

eminently distinguished. The body of Spartans intercepted in the isle of Sphacteria, 
who must either starve, or, what to Lacedaemonians is full as bad, must surrender 
their persons and their arms, is a point that exceedingly alarms that martial commu 
nity. Things had long since gone against them ; but now, their hereditary honour 
and military glory, on which, and which alone, they piqued themselves, are in dan- 
ger of being miserably tarnished. Their proud spirits condescend to beg a truce, that 
they may send an embassy to Athens to solicit an accommodation. 

It must have afforded a high degree of spiteful joy at Athens, to find the Lacedae- 
monians lengthening their monosyllables and petitioning for peace. It is curious to 
hear in what manner they solicit, when admitted to audience. They declare them- 
selves sent, " in behalf of their countrymen, to propose an expedient very much for 
the honour of Athens, and which would extricate themselves from difficulties that 
now bore hard upon them. Athens never had so fine an opportunity of raising her 
credit, securing her acquisitions, and carrying her glory to the highest pitch. They 
should not be puffed up,but reflect on the strange vicissitude of human affairs. Who 
could expect, the Lacedaemonians should ever be sunk so low, as to sue for peace "? 
Yet what was the lot of Sparta might possibly become, sometime or other, the lot of 
Athens. The latter should be moderate now, should accept of offered friendship, 
should cheerfully receive submission, made only to prevent desperation in great and 
gallant souls, and open a field for mutual benevolence. The rival states may now 
be reconciled ; and only now, before things are brought to extremities, and disgrace 
hath rendered one party desperate. At this crisis, the Athenians may confer on 
Greece the blessing of a firm and lasting peace, and reap all the honour and advantage 
of it, since all the credit of it will be their own. Lacedaemonians may be obliged, 
but will not be compelled. At length they propose their expedient, not explicitly, 
but with a shrewd insinuation; that would the Athenians strike up a bargain with 
them, they might jointly lord it over Greece for the future, beyond control." 

Had Pericles been now alive, we may easily guess how readily he would have laid 
hold on this opportunity to end aburthensome and distressful war, which on the side 
of Athens had at first been necessitated and merely defensive. But success had elevated 
Athens quite too high ; and no real friend to the state had at present so much influence 
as Cleon, that loud and boisterous demagogue. Hence it comes, that such terms are 
insisted upon as the Lacedaemonians cannot in honour accept. The truce expires ; 
and all the attention of Greece is fixed on the important scene of contention at Pylus. 

The author here interposeth an account of what was now doing in Sicily, and then 
returns to Pylus. The Spartans in the isle seem as far off a surrender as ever. The 
people of Athens murmur at the slowness of their troops, and begin to think that after 
all they shall not carry the point. Cleon amuses them with lies, and exasperates them 
by slanders. In short, though quite undesigning it, he bullies himself into the com- 
mand ; and, at the head of a reinforcement, joins Demosthenes at Pylus. The author 
describes the event with so much state and dignity, that he raises it into another Ther- 
mopylae. There three hundred Spartans stopped for a long time the whole numerous 
army of Xerxes, and perished in the service. About the same number of them strug- 
gle here as long as they can against the troops of Athens; but, to the disappointment 
of all Greece, they at last surrender prisoners of war, and are carried, nay, are carried 
by Cleon, in triumph to Athens. The territories of Corinth are invaded soon after by 
the Athenians under Nicias, the consequence of which is the battle of Solygia. We 
are then recalled to view the last acts of the tragical sedition at Corcyra, quite of a 
piece with, or rather in cruelty and horror transcending, the preceding. 



xlvi SURVEY OF 

In the eighth year of the war, the Athenians proceed with success. The conquest 
of the isle of Cy thera by Nicias is another sad blow to the Lacedaemonians. They are 
quite dispirited ; and dare no longer face in the field these active and lively, and now 
more so because successful enemies. 

Our author repasseth to Sicily. The Athenians had been hovering with a squadron 
on that coast, on pretence of aiding the Egesteans, but in fact to excite a war and 
embroil the states of that island. Syracuse, the leading state, perceived all their 
schemes, and endeavoured to prevent them. They first obtain a suspension of arms 
amongst all the parties at war ; and prevail on the Sicilians to hold a general congress 
at Gela, for the amicable adjustment of all their quarrels, and a perfect re-union 
against foreign enemies. Hermocrates, the plenipotentiary from Syracuse, opens the 
true interest of Sicily on this occasion. The warrior must now give place to the 
politician, who shows himself a master in the business. 

♦' He is here," he tells them, " as representative of the greatest of the Sicilian states. 
As such, he cannot speak from pusillanimity or a sense of fear, though he declares 
himself averse to war. It is difficult to enlighten ignorance, and difficult to check 
ambition. But there is a prudence, which all ought to learn ; a prudence, which 
points out the proper season for every pursuit. It was separate interest, that first 
kindled the flames of war in Sicily; but separate interest should always be hushed, 
when the general welfare is at stake. The Athenians have been busy amongst them, 
to inflame their mutual resentments, to note their indiscretions, and turn them to their 
own advantage ; that, when the Sicilians have warred one another down, they may 
seize the whole island for themselves. The great passion of these Athenians is conquest ; 
they regard no ties of consanguinity ; they aim at acquiring vassals, no matter who. 
He blames them not; he can never blame men, who are desirous of command ; but 
he must blame such as are ready and willing to put on their chains. The Athenians 
have no strength in Sicily, but in the divisions of its states. Let those states but once 
re-unite, and Athenians must get them gone; and may depart with a face of success, 
as if they had uni-ted whom they really wanted to disunite, and had effectually re- 
settled peace, when their latent design was war." — He touches every topic in a suc- 
cinct but masterly manner. He hath recourse often to figures; renders his addresses 
emphatical, by making his own community speak from his mouth. He applies the first 
person and the singular number with great energy and weight. He useth those figures 
in the same manner as Saint Paul does in the Epistle to the Romans. He presseth 
harmony and cordial re-union amongst them in a manner best fitted to persuade. The 
whole speech, in a word, is a very interesting and persuasive piece of oratory. 

The consequence is, a peace is settled in Sicily to general satisfaction ; and the 
Athenian commanders are obliged to return to Athens with their squadrons, to be 
punished there for what they could not possibly prevent. 

The war continues hot through the remainder of this book. The Athenians take 
their turn in being checked and vanquished. Their attempt on Megara is related at 
large ; and this piece of narration is by far the most intricate of the kind to be met 
with in Thucydides. The matter is quite too much crowded, when he endeavours 
to comprehend in a few terms the various incidents of this struggle for Megara, the 
fluctuation of events, the views and motives of the parties engaged. Brasidas at last 
secures the city, and quite disconcerts the main project of the Athenians. — The latter 
also had another great scheme in agitation for a total revolution in Bceotia. Arms and 
intrigues were at once to act, both without and within. The whole force of Athens 



THE HISTORY. xlvii 

takes the field on this occasion, under the command of Hippocrates. The famous 
battle of Delium ensues, before which the generals harangue their troops. Pagondas 
the Theban is an excellent speaker on this occasion. The Boeotians are not repre- 
sented in this history, as that gross and stupid people, which was their character from 
the succeeding wits of Athens. The Athenian general begins also to harangue his 
troops, but is cut short by the attack of the enemy. The battle is finely described, 
and the dispute afterwards about the dead. The Athenians have received a dreadful 
blow, which will soon make them begin to accuse their own judgments, in refusing 
the accommodation lately offered from Sparta. 

In other quarters also the balance of war begins to incline in favour of the enemy. 
Erasidas, that active and accomplished Spartan, had now completed a march, at the 
head of a small army, through Thessaly and Macedonia into Chalcidic Thrace. His 
bravery prevails much, but his conduct more. He disjoins Perdiccas king of Mace- 
donia from the Athenian league. Whenever he fights, he conquers ; and whenever 
he harangues, he effectually persuades. His speech to the Acanthians, is strong, 
pertinent, laconic. He says all that can be said in favour of his countrymen, in re- 
commendation of the cause of liberty. There is that air of sincerity and good faith 
in it, which were constantly approved and verified by his personal deportment. The 
towns revolt to him as fast as he has opportunities to address them. The reader will 
fallow him with pleasure through his many and great exploits, and acknowledge he 
wears his laurels deservedly, and with peculiar grace. 

Book V. In Book the Fifth, Cleon appears again upon the stage to stop the rapid 
conquests of Brasidas. The former had been laughed into a general, and is now grown 
so conceited that he wants to enter the lists against that truly heroic Spartan. He 
accordingly arrives in Thrace, at the head of a squadron and a fine body of land forces. 
He retakes a town or two ; is confident he shall soon recover the important city of 
Amphipolis; and though contemned by his own soldiers, he endeavours to brave the 
enemy. Brasidas having harangued his men with his usual spirit, throws open the 
gates, sallies out of Amphipolis and routs him in an instant. Cleon falls a victim to 
his own cowardice, and Brasidas also drops a victim to his own valour. The latter 
lives long enough to know his own side had conquered, and then expires, admired 
by all that knew him, and most highly regretted by the allies of his country. 

Their riddance from Cleon diminished the loss of Athens in this defeat, and the 
Lacedaemonians had dearly purchased the victory with the loss of their hero. As the 
principal states were now pretty nearly balanced, and sadly tired of the war, a truce 
is concluded for a year, and a peace soon after settled by the management chiefly of 
Nicias. Thucydides hath given us the forms of negotiating and drawing up treaties. 
They are curious morsels of antiquity, and the reader will see with admiration, how 
solemn, how concise, and yet how guarded, they are. The peace turns, out to be 
merely nominal. The Corinthians, who cannot relish it at all, set their invention to 
work in order to embroil Greece afresh, and to rekindle a general w-ar. Several wars 
break out, in which the Athenians and Lacedaemonians are concerned as auxiliaries. 
And another state in Greece, which hitherto had been neutral and saving its strength 
entire, endeavours now to seize the primary of Greece for itself. We shall be made 
privy to all her negotiations for carrying on the plan, and see it all blasted by one 
battle at Mantinea. This state was the republic of Argos in Peloponnesus, which had 
been in long alliance with, but in no dependence at all upon, Athens, and had been 
a long time also at peace with Sparta, by means of truces of thirty years. Young 



xlviii SURVEY OF 

Alcibiades doth all he can to promote the quarrel, till at length the troops of Sparta 
and Argos come to an engagement near the city of Mantinea. Thucy dides introd uceih 
the battle with all the spirit and precision of Homer. The auxiliaries are marshalled 
and animated by such exhortations, as are best suited to the peculiar circumstances 
of each. The Spartans are exhibited at last in all their glory. Trained up for a 
camp and the day of battle, we shall view them in their dicipline and actual exertion 
Oi" their personal bravery. They were excellent combatants indeed; and the reader 
will judge whether Thucydides did not love good soldiers, and take a pleasure in 
doing them justice. It was the greatest battle, which for many years had been 
fought in Greece. The Spartans, on this occasion, wiped off all the imputations that 
had lately been thrown on their bravery, because they had not been always success- 
ful: and the aspiring state of Argos is compelled to acquiesce in her usual rank, and 
still leave the contention of supremacy to the leading states of Athens and Sparta. 

This book affords but one incident more, of consequence enough to be particularly 
distinguished; and that is the conquest of the isle of Melos by the Athenians, which fell 
out in the sixteenth year of the war. When the Athenians were landed and encamped 
on that island, they summon the Mehans to a conference, of which Thucydides hath 
drawn out the particulars. It is really an uncommon one, and had sadly puzzled the 
critics, whether they should praise or condemn it. But is there any thing more unna- 
tural in reciting what was said at it, than in holding a conference"? It is my business 
only to look at the management of it, and not draw a veil over the Athenian politics, as 
they are avowed on this occasion, since my author was too impartial to do it. Nothing 
could tempt him to make palliating representations, or to suppress the truth. 

"The Athenians, on this occasion, avow without a blush that principle on which 
conquerors and tyrants have always acted, and yet have been ashamed to own: they 
are ever hunting for colourings and pretexts, and would fain give to greedy power a 
little of the air of equity: but here, without the least shame or remorse, the Athenians 
assert their right to enslave another community, because it suits their own interest, and 
because thej^have power to do it. This is the principle from which they argue; and, 
how scandalous soever it be, they argue strongly from it. They represent the politics 
of their own state, of the Lacedemonian state, nay of all mankind, as encroaching, 
oppressive, rapacious, and totally estranged from humanity, good faith, and the least 
tincture of morality. The whole conference yields perhaps a just representation of 
human nature in the gross; but then, the representation is distasteful to a mind that is 
cool and disengaged. Such a mind must interest itself on the side of the Melians and be 
sorry that the Athenians have not more equity and honour to qualify their power; or, 
that the Melians, with the regard they show to honour and justice, should not have 
had more power, or been able to interest at least one ally in defence of their liberties 
and rights. In short, through the whole course of this history, the Athenians never 
made so scandalous a figure as on this occasion." 

Book VI. In the Sixth Book, a spacious theatre is opened for a renewal of the war. 
The scene is going to shift from Greece to Sicily. The Athenians, who have so bravely 
resisted all their enemies in Greece, are now going to do for those enemies what they 
could not do themselves. No patriot, no statesman, no orator, is able to dissuade them 
from lavishing their strength on the projects of sanguine ambition and foreign con- 
quests. Their enemies, in the mean time, are at leisure to note their indiscretions, 
and improve them all to their own advantage, till the great name of Athens is quite 



THE HISTORY. xlix 

eclipsed, and an end is put to that empire of the sea, which she had maintained for 
seventy years with great lustre and reputation. 

The Sicilian war, which some critics* are inclined to think hath no connection with 
thesubjectof Thucydides and to be mere digression, whatever it may appear at first, 
the reader will at length be satisfied, was an essential part of the Peloponnesian war, 
and hastened its decision. But, supposing it remote from the principal subject, it must 
however be acknowledged, that it is the history of a war nobly related, well connected, 
very closely followed, and full of incidents to engage attention, to alarm and interest 
the passions. Thucydides in the course of it, which takes up the two following 
books, will display the excellencies of the poet and the painter as well as of the histori- 
an. Let his merit be regulated from this portion of his work, it is presumed that, with- 
out a negative, he will be allowed the master of history. 

He begins with describing the theatre, on which two mighty Slates are going to 
enter the lists. — The geography and antiquities of Sicily could not in their nature be 
very entertaining, and therefore they are drawn up in the concisest manner. — Th« 
soaring enterprising genius of Alcibiades hath formed a superb plan for the aggran- 
dizement of himself and his country. Alcibiades could plan with all the magnificence 
and wild ambition of an Alexander; but a citizen of Athens could not have the means 
of executing in so imperial a manner as the monarch of Macedonia and captain-gen- 
eral of Greece. He was able soon to convince the younger and more numerous part of 
the Athenian community, that the enterprise was most inviting, and carried with it 
such a probability of success as overbalanced all expense and hazard. It was long 
the subject of general conversation; it gradually inflamed the public ardour; and at 
length engrossed all their hopes and wishes. In a word, the expedition to Sicily is 
formally proposed and decreed in the assembly of the people. A second assembly is 
convened on ways and means. On this occasion a grand debate ensued, the managers 
of which are Nicias and Alcibiades. 

Nicias declares himself "totally averse to the expedition; but doth it with that diffi- 
dence, which was a principal foible in his character. The honour conferred upon him- 
self in his nomination to the command, shall not suppress his real sentiments. He is 
neither fond, nor prodigal, of his life; but he loves his country, and would advise 
them to give up the expedition. — He next runs over the political topics, and shows 
it to be in every light an undesirable and ill-judged project. And then, without 
naming him, strikes at Alcibiades; proves him not qualified in any respect for so im- 
portant a command ; he reflects with some severity on his life and behaviour ; and 
though owning himself afraid he shall be out-voted, yet he would fain have the ques- 
tion put again, whether the expedition shall proceed." 

Beside all the natural vivacity and fire of his temper, Alcibiades was now provoked 
by the personalities that Nicias had thrown out against him. He had been a constant 
opposer of the latter, who was beloved at Athens for his amiable qualities. For, though 
Nicias had not spirit enough to lead the people; yet he had influence enough often- 
times to check and restrain the aspiring busy Alcibiades. The reply he makes on this 
occasion strongly marks the character and complexion of Alcibiades; and, delivered 
with that life and grace, and pretty lisp, for which he was remarkable, must have en- 
gaged all the attention of his hearers, and drawn their approbation perhaps in spite of 
their judgment. 

"Censured and provoked by Nicias, he begins with a vindication of himself. He 

*See Rapin's Comparison of Thucydides and Livy. 

7 E 



I SURVEY OF 

maintains his right to the command. He hints at the splendour of his birth, his pub 
He spirit, the generosity of his heart. lie recites, with a haughty and exulting air, hia 
victories at the Olympic games, his magnificence at home, and his capacity for polit- 
ical intrigue already and successfully exerted. He then justifies the wisdom of the de- 
cree for the Sicilian expedition. He shows all the political topics in a different light 
from Nicias. He insinuates the advice of the latter to proceed from indolence and a 
desire to sow dissensions amongst them. He exhorts to union, and to the observa- 
tion of order. So Athens rose; so Athens may yet be much higher exalted. The 
fire of youth, the temper of the middle-aged, and the experience of the old, should ever 
duly accord and act together. Sloth ruins a community ; practice enables it to go 
through every conflict, and to triumph over all opposition." 

Such an address could not but effect, such arguments could not but be persuasive 
with the people of Athens; the expeditions must go forwards. But Nicias makes a 
second effort, if possible to divert them from it. 

He begins with "a prayer for its success; and a desire, that the preparations may be 
adequate to the ends proposed. He states the nature, the power and strength, of the 
people they are going to invade. He then, in general terms, gives in a bulky roll of 
necessary articles for those who invade them. He hopes to frighten and deter his 
audience by the vast expense, which he shows must necessarily be incurred on this 
occasion. The Athenians must provide every thing themselves, and trust nothing 
to the careandfidelity of Sicilian allies. The public welfare, and thesafety of all whoare 
to be employed in this expedition, demand all manner of previous foresight and care." 

This speech had a different effect to what Nicias designed. Instead of discourag- 
ing, it animated his countrymen more than ever for execution. Accordingly a de- 
cree was soon passed, investing himself and his colleagues, who were Alcibiades and 
Lamachus, with full power to provide every thing needful for the service. 

All hands now were soon at work. The quotas from the dependents were deman- 
ded; the fleet was equipped and manned ; the levies went on briskly, since all men came 
into the service with alacrity ; and every thing was soon ready for the expedition. 

At this juncture, some drunken frolics, in which Alcibiades was engaged, threw 
Athens into consternation. They were soon construed by his enemies into a plot to 
bring about a revolution in the government. Informers came in, and he was directly- 
accused of being a party. He avowed his innocence, insisted on an immediate trial, 
which he was sure would end in his justification. The plot, which in fact was a plot 
against Alcibiades, was not yet ripe enough to ruin him ; and therefore, by a strange 
preposterous stroke of cunning, he is ordered to proceed in the expedition, and take 
his trial at his return. 

Our author next describes the departure of the grand armament in all its solemnity, 
and with all the medley of hopes and fears shown by the whole people of Athens on 
this occasion. He lays open to our view the very hearts of the spectators. The prime 
flower of their strength, nay, Athens itself, is now sailing out of the Pirneus, never 
again to return. They make the best of their way to Corcyra, where they are left for 
a time, that we may be made privy to the consultations and defensive measures of 
Sicily. The scene is now removed to Syracuse, the most powerful state in that is- 
land, inhabited by Grecians, and if indeed inferior, yet second at this time to no other 
state in Greece but Athens alone. It had frequently been harassed by seditions, had 
often been plagued with tyrants, but was at present under a democratic constitution. 

Advice had been received there of the intended invasion. The people are convened 



THE HISTORY. li 

about it. Harangues are made; and the temper of mankind, when party is fermen- 
ting, justly exemplified. Some are incredulous ; others magisterially pronounce it all a 
falsehood. At length Hermocrates riseth up, and gives them his own sense of the affair. 

He assures them, "his country is eminently endangered, and neither incredulity 
nor ridicule shall awe him into silence. To his certain knowledge, the Athenians 
are already at sea, fully bent on the conquest of Sicily. The Syracusans ought to be- 
lieve it, and to prepare for their defence. Fear will unite all Sicily against the invaders. 
Athens will only reap disgrace, but Syracuse abundant glory on this occasion. Large 
armaments are seldom successful ; they moulder away for want of supplies or are 
ruined for want of conduct. They should therefore prepare for gallant resistance, 
by getting everything in readiness at home, and strengthening themselves by foreign 
aUiances. They should do more; they should at once put out to sea, and dispute their 
very passage with the enemy. A defeat, or even delay thus given them might oblige 
them to give up the project. He supports his advice by many strong and judicious 
arguments ; and ends with warm exhortations to his countrymen to be lively and ac- 
tive, by no means to despise the enemy except in action, but vigorously and with all 
their foresight to prepare for resistance, since their enemies are undoubtedly at sea 
and only not arrived on their coasts." 

Such advice was now given to the people of Syracuse by Hermocrates. That 
community, it is evident, was full of cabal and faction, since this worthy patriot was 
regarded as a party-tool and a public incendiary. Athenagoras, the blustering dem- 
agogue who replies, treats him in this light. His virulence shows that he regarded 
Hermocrates, as one who wanted by any means whatever to force himself into em- 
ployment. He seems more alarmed for the lucrative posts of the state than for the 
welfare of his country. He throws out a deal of good sense, but in a very imperti- 
nent and scurrilous manner. Such are the persons, who study popularity more than 
duty, and sacrifice all their talents to ambition or private lucre. 

He affirms, that " none but cowards and traitors wish the Athenians might not in- 
vade them, and so infallibly meet their destruction: but the whole account is a glaring 
falsehood, the glory of a factious cabal. He appeals to his audience whether it carries 
the least probability with it. Athenians invade them! The Athenians esteem themselves 
happy they are not invaded by the Syracusans. Yet, supposing them so mad, nothing 
but their own disgrace and ruin can be the consequence. But it is all a fiction; a 
scheme to dishearten the friends of the people, and seize the government of the state. 
Some men have ever been, and ever will be, dabbling in such vile machinations. 
But let them not hope to escape detection. The intention is plain already, and ought 
to be punished like open treason. He then exhorts the people or the many to sup- 
port their friends, and entirely to disarm the malice of their domestic foes; and in- 
veighs severely against the few, or the party whom he supposeth to be bent on the 
overthrow of the democracy at Syracuse." 

This speech of Athenagoras was so full of ill-timed choler and party animosity, that, 
had the debate proceeded, dissentions might have run very high at a season when 
unanimity was so needful in all the members of that community. A general of great 
eminence and weight thinks it high time to interpose; who, in a short speech repri- 
mands Athenagoras, recalls the general attention to their own preservation from the 
imminent danger, and adjourns the assembly. 

The grand fleet of Athens is now putting to sea from Corcyra. The historian takes 
a review of the whole, and gives a short account of its numbers and strength. They 



^ 



lii SURVEY OF 

arrive on the coast of Italy, where they are refused a reception. Every thing yields 
them a discouraging and gloomy aspect. They soon find they had been grossly deluded 
by their Sicilian friends, who instigated them chiefly to the expedition. The trick, 
which the Egestians had put on their ambassadors, is particularly recited. The com- 
manders at a council of war, differ highly in opinion, and at last come to no sound re- 
solution, They hover about the coast of Sicily, and parade in sight of Syracuse. Al- 
cibiades endeavours to persuade the Cataneans to join with and receive them, but a 
mere accident accomplishes what his eloquence could not. The command of Alcibi- 
ades came here to an end. One of the state-vessels arrives, and summons him to Ath- 
ens, to take his trial for the late frolics and irregularities committed there. That city, 
ever since the departure of the fleet, had been filled with confusion and horror. A 
plot there was, or rather a plot it was determined there must be, to set up a tyrant, that 
most odious sound to Attic ears. Recollection of the most dismal things they had heard 
about the tyranny of the Pisistratidse increased their fears, and drove them into furious 
and desperate proceedings. Thucydides here digresseth to settle some facts relating to 
that set of tyrants, and their demolition; particularly the affair of Harmodius and Aris- 
togiton, one of the most famous incidents in the annals of Athens. He differs indeed 
from most other writers, and the moderns have not thought proper to rest the point up- 
on his authority, great as it is; though no man ever traced out facts, or made his in- 
quiries, with more sedateness and impartiality. 

But to return to Alcibiades; he was obliged to quit the command, and he seemed 
quietly to submit to the orders of the state. But, determined not to face his country- 
men in their present mood nor to hazard a trial, he gave them who were sent for him 
the slip, and sheltered himself in Peloponnesus. He became instantly a most violent 
and dangerous enemy to his country. He is gone to pave the way for the ruin of 
Athens; of Athens, which he loved better than any thing except the parade of his 
own personal importance, and the gratification of private caprice. 

Nicias and Lamachus, who now remained in the command of the fleet, by help 
of a stratagem, land at Syracuse without opposition, and seize a strong post for their 
encampment. The Syracusans determine on a battle to dislodge them. Both sides 
form in order. Nicias encourages his men by a short, but spirited and forcible, ha- 
rangue. Thucydides paints the battle with the exactness, perspicuity, and ardour, 
of Homer. The Athenians had the better; yet not so decisively, as to think proper 
to continue in their post, since they re-embark, and sail back to Catana. 

The winter, it is true, was approaching, which both sides spend in negotiations for 
the acquisition of allies. That atCamarina, where ambassadors from both the warring 
parties are at the same time admitted to an audience, is particularly recited. — Hermo- 
crates, in behalf of Syracuse, makes the first address. " It is masterly, like all that Her- 
mocrates performs. It is designed to convince the Camarineans, how insidious and 
how vile the schemes of the Athenians had ever been, and still continue to be. He 
arraigns all their politics and their conduct since the Persian invasion; and gives that 
artful turn to his remarks, which might well deter others from entering into any con- 
nexion or alliance with them. His strokes are severe and cutting. He makes use of 
the figures, which give force and energy to discourse. No person better understood 
the common welfare of Sicily; and no person could better explain it. He unfolds the 
political scheme at present in agitation; declares the consequence in case the Atheni- 
ans prevail, to alarm the concern of the Camarineans for their country, and further to 
alarm their fears fpr themselves, He even threatens them with a severe revenge, in 



THE HISTORY. liii 

case the Syracusans, without their aid, get the better of the invaders." In short, if 
the Camarineans had been good Sicihans, his arguments must have prevailed. 

Euphemus, who is the mouth of the Athenian embassy on this occasion, makes a 
bold and spirited defence for his country. *' He at once briskly attacks Hermocrates 
for the bitter imputations he had cast upon Athens, He asserts her fair reputation, 
and justifies her series of politics ever since the invasion of Xerxes. Liberty had been 
the object of all her care and all her conduct. The Athenians had guarded, had 
established it in Greece ; and were come to support and secure it in Sicily. He 
throws back the charge of enslaving-projects on the Syracusans, who now are eager 
to deprive the rest of Sicily of their best defence, by raising distaste towards the 
Athenians. He spares no artifice, omits no topic that is likely to effect. He proves 
a notable advocate for his Athens, pompously celebrates her passion and her care for 
liberty, and most ingeniously strives to conceal her present ambition under a veil 
of most generous and disinterested principles." 

The issue is, that the orators have just counterpoised one another's arguments, 
and the Camarineans declare a neutrality. 

The embassies from Syracuse succeed much better in Peloponnesus. The Corinthians 
are zealous and active in their behalf; and they have now got an advocate to rouse up 
and inflame the phlegmatic Spartans, who was born to be of every party, and to be the 
best support of whatever party he by times espoused. It is the exiled Alcibiades who 
pleads most effectually in their behalf at a grand consultation at Sparta. His speech on 
this occasion is a masterpiece. " He insinuates himself into the favour and confidence 
of men who had feared and hated him. Whilst he is making his own personal justi- 
fication, he praiseth and magnifieth himself. He betrays all the schemes of Athens, 
discloseth all her plan, points out her weak and unguarded parts, directs towards them 
the attack of her foes; and, full as he is of resentment against, and skilful to annoy 
her, she totters whilst he speaks." Syracuse and Sparta are now to grow famous by 
the debasement of this mighty and imperial republic. Her glory hath reached its 
summit : it immediately will begin to sink, and her laurels will fade away apace. 

In the summer of the eighteenth year of this war, the Athenians stand away from 
Catana, and land by night at Syracuse. They instantly march, and seize Epipolae, a 
strong post that commanded the city. The Syracusans fight, but without success, to 
beat them from it. The siege now commenceth in form. It is clearly represented in the 
whole of its progress, in all its forms. Every skirmish is a distinct and lively picture. 
In one of them old Lamachus is killed, and Nicias of course left singly in the whole 
command. He carries on the siege with vigour and success for a short space of time ; 
but Grylippus from Sparta, and the Peloponnesian aids, are now only not arrived. 

Book VII. " If you would read truly great things," said a Spartan to Augustus Csesar, 
" read the Seventh Book of Thucydides." Thither we have now brought this cursory 
survey. The reader of it will undoubtedly own, that no historian ever executed so 
closely, so strongly, so clearly, and so pathetically, as Thucydides. *' No fleet but that 
of the Athenians," it is the observation of Cicero,* " was ever able to enter the harbour 
of Syracuse. The fleet was only able to achieve it by the mighty force and number 
of three hundred ships. But here first was the power of Athens defeated, lessened, 
depressed. In this harbour the fame, the empire, the glory of Athens, are judged to 
have suffered a total wreck." Schemes projected and actions conducted by Hermo- 
crates and GvHddus the Spartan prove too hard for Nicias, whose phlegm and natural 

* Orat. quinta in Verrem. 
£2 



liv SURVEY OF 

difBdence are no match against such vigilance and activity. The besieging party 
soon becomes as it were the besieged. The letter of Nicias to the people of Athens, 
represents all the diflSiculties to which he finds himself reduced. No man ever wrote 
so precisely and perspicuously about military aflfairs. The reader of it wants no light, 
no dictionary of arts, or an adept in war, to explain the terms; and can judge, as 
could the meanest citizen of Athens to whom it was read, what was proper to be done. 
Secure in the consciousness of his own integrity, he neatly reprimands his country- 
men for the great foible in their behaviour, justifies his own conduct, and begs to be 
recalled. In short, Nicias is finely characterized by his own pen in this epistle. 

The Athenians are too high-spirited to recall their troops, and have too good an 
opinion of Nicias to dismiss him from the command. Though Attica was now invaded 
by the Peloponnesians, and a fortress raised by them within sight of Athens itself for 
their lasting annoyance, they send a powerful reinforcement to Nicias under the 
command of Demosthenes. They empty Athens of the residue of her strength, so 
highly wanted for domestic support. The Syracusans, when advised of this rein- 
forcement, redouble their alacrity, and hope to finish the war before it could arrive. 
They had had a career of success against Nicias, had just beat him both by land and 
sea, when Demosthenes steered into the harbour of Syracuse. The sight caused a 
strange alternative of elevating hope and dreadful apprehensions in the contending 
parties. The Syracusans again become the besieged ; and Demosthenes is intent to 
put an end to the seige, if possible, by vigorous and daring measures. 

His attempt to retake Epipolae is, in our author's description of it, as fine a night- 
piece as can possibly be drawn, and no pencil could express it stronger. The moon 
shines just bright enough, to show us the Athenians gaining the ascent, and to give 
a glimpse of the approaches of the armies and their first struggles with one another. 
The whole soon becomes gloomy confusion and horrid tumult. What a medley of 
singing their paeans, of conflict, of flight, of pursuit ! friends and countrymen routing 
one another, till numbers come tumbling down the precipices, and perish in the fall! 
The hope of the Athenians is blasted : Syracuse erects her trophies fast. 

Demosthenes is now convinced the most prudent step they could take is to raise 
the siege, and Nicias at last complies. The very moment they are going to embark 
their troops, the moon is eclipsed. Who but must pity the weakness of Nicias at so 
dangerous a crisis 1 who but be sorry indeed, that so good and amiable a man should 
stop an army from a principle of superstition, and detain them for so long a time on 
a spot of ground, where nothing but ruin and destruction could befal theml Men 
60 dispirited can make but faint opposition against an always high-spirited and now 
successful enemy. They soon lose another battle, and the decisive engagement is 
fast approaching. 

But before it is fought, Thucydides, animated with more than historic spirit, emulates 
his admired Homer, reviews the parties concerned, and catalogues the troops now war- 
ring against and in defence of Syracuse. This catalogue is far from being a mere muster- 
roll of names. It is full of such strokes as must imprint many useful and moral reflec- 
tions in the mind. His little incidental sketches represent mankind in a true light, as 
Homer's do the world of nature. Homer paints the soil, and Thucydides the people. 

The mouth of the harbour is now barred up by the enemy. The Athenians must 
fight their way out ; or, burn all their ships, and march off by land. It is determined to 
attempt the former ; and the consequence is the battle within the harbour of Syracuse. 
A more striking, more astonishing battle-piece was never exhibited ; and a masterly 



THE HISTORY. W 

pencil, though none but a masterly one, might exactly delineate it from this description 
The present temper of the combatants on both sides is stronglymarked in the harangues 
before the engagement. Nicias then said all, and the Athenians in action did their best ; 
but all was unavailing. I shall say no mere about it, since the reader hath nothing to do 
but turn his eye towards it, and distinctly view it through the whole of its process, till the 
Syracusans sail in triumph to their city, and raise the most glorious of all their trophies. 

The wretched perplexities of the Athenians, the raising of the siege, the mournful 
decampment, the good heart of Nicias sympathising in all their distress, and endea- 
vouring to cheer a little their desponding minds, their laborious marches whilst the 
enemy is harassing them both in front and in rear and on all sides, the surrender of 
the column under Demosthenes, the carnage in the river Asinarus of the troops 
under Nicias, his surrender too, the butchery of the generals, and the miseries of the 
captivated residue of once so flourishing and gallant an army — these are the several 
incidents of this book, for which an attentive reader will give the highest commen- 
dation to the historian, when he hath read them through : he will have no leisure 
till then to think of Thucydides. 

Book VIII. The catastrophe hath now taken place in this history, and the reader is 
assured how all will end. The wings of this soaring republic of Athens are clipped, 
never to reach their full growth again : yet, like an eagle in the same situation, she 
will struggle hard a long time (as it were) with beak and talons, and would yet repulse 
her assailants, did she not grow sick at heart. Intestine faction will assist her enemies 
to finish her ruin, as a state imperial and commercial A regular deduction of such 
incidents as these is the subject of the eighth and last book of Thucydides. As a 
writer, he now performs in a more faint and less engaging manner, compared with 
what hath gone before. He hath but drawn his lines, but just sketches his pieces : but 
the drawings and sketches will still manifest the master's hand. We will give them 
a cursory view : the reader will give them a more exact and deliberate perusal. 

He sets out in his usual grave and solemn manner, to describe the people of Athens, 
dispirited and distressed as they are by the overthrow in Sicily. All the passions and 
emotions of the human nature take their train. They are incredulous; they are an- 
gry ; they are convinced ; and then, they despond ; they pluck up their spirits again, 
and are resolved to stand it out, nor abandon their own preservation. They now cast 
their thoughts towards every resource, and prepare again for war with spirit and 
resolution. All the rest of Greece is ready to concur with the victorious party ; all 
are eagerly running in to share the glory and the spoil. Their own dependents are 
meditating revolts, and some make them at once without premeditation. The Lace- 
daemonians, amidst the many applications made to them, are puzzled which of the 
revolting states they shall first countenance and assist. Alcibiades is busy at Sparta, 
advising proper measures, and guiding their counsels. Even the Persian monarch, 
by his lieutenants, enters into league against them ; and some of their finest islands 
are immediately rent asunder from subjection to the Athenians. 

The various turns of the war at Chios, and on the coast of Ionia, are distinctly but 
concisely related; till Alcibiades appears in action, and exerts his busy and intriguing 
genius. Suspected at length, and hated by the Lacedaemonians, he became again their 
enemy, and turned all his projects on accomplishing his return to Athens, and saving 
his country from impending ruin. His partizans, in the fleet and troops of Athens now 
lying at Samos, cabal in his favour. A change of government is judged a necessary 
measure to bring about his recalment. It is the scheme of Alcibiades himself; but it is 



Ivi SURVEY OF THE HISTORY. 

opposed and disconcerted by Phrynichus ; by Phrynichus, who soon after turns out a 
violent enemy to the democracy, whilst Alcibiades is active and zealous in its support. 

None but our author's pen could have so clearly unfolded that series of caballing, that 
fluctuation both in principle and conduct, and that horrid embroilment of the leading 
members of the Athenian stale amongst themselves, which brought on seditions amongst 
the troops abroad, and a revolution of government in the city of Athens. The demo- 
cracy is at length overturned ; and an oligarchy, consisting of four hundred persons, 
erected in its stead. The Athenians at Samos, where the project was jfirst laid , declare 
against the Athenians at Athens. Alcibiades is grown again a hearty republican ; and 
Thrasybulus alone manifests throughout a sincere love and regard for his country. 
Parties newly formed are broke again into divisions ; and Athens was indebted to 
nothing but the indolence of the Lacedtemonians, that she did not fall immediately 
into their hands, through the violence of her own intestine seditions. But the new 
administration proved of short continuance ; the democracy, though on a model 
somewhat varied, is again established ; and Athens thus obtains a respite. 

Full of matter as this part of the history is, Thucydides hath kept his narration clear 
and unembarrassed. But then, it is a simple unadorned narration, and never re- 
ceived the finishing hand. There are scattered occasionally throughout it some short 
accounts, in what manner the principal agents delivered their sentiments at important 
junctures. They seem to have been memorials, laid down as the ground-work, for 
regular and full orations. The reader will be sorry the author was hindered, by what 
accidents can only be guessed, from drawing out some of them at least into full pro- 
portion ; particularly that of the deputation from the army at Samos to Athens, in 
which " the people are persuaded to part with their darling democracy ;" of Thrasy- 
bulus to the troops at Samos, when they mutiny in favour of the democracy, in which 
*' he must pathetically have expatiated on the revolt of Athens from liberty and her 
choicest patriots, who might now form another Athens at Samos, and preserve her 
empire, though they had lost the city; that of Alcibiades further, when on his recal- 
ment he harangues the army at Samos which recalled him, where " he deplores the 
malignity of his fate, magnifies his ability yet to serve his country, and again shines 
in the character of an able statesman, a subtle politician, and a zealous patriot." 

Upon the whole. One point more must be particularly distinguished in honour of the 
Athenians. The characters of them and of the Lacedaemonians are strongly contrasted 
through the whole course of this history, and highly to the credit of the former. Their 
spirits rise with difficulties, and patriotism starts out of mutiny and faction. The Lace- 
daemonians are indolent in success, and show neither alacrity nor address in promoting 
that cause of liberty, which was the grand pretext of engaging in this destructive war. 
They seem at last more intent on pocketing the royal subsidies, than doing their duty, 
as leaders and champions of Greece. They have not yet learned to make a figure at sea. 
The last view we have of them is at the battle of Cynos-sema, where they receive a 
signal defeat from those very men, whose ruin they judged as well nigh completed. 
When Athens is totally to be vanquished, as heV doom is fast approaching, she must aid 
her own conquerors and tyrants, in demolishing her own trophies, and trampling under 
foot her liberties and rights. Her own factions will help to accomplish, what without 
them no foreign enemy could have done. Whatever is human nmst decay. The best 
constituted state in the world may be undermined by its own members, when they 
could not be conquered, and at length be rendered an easy prey to foreign powers 
May Great Britain prove an exception to this affecting but just observation ! 



THE 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



BOOK I. 



Introduction, containing the Author's reasons for writing this History, upon a review of the affairs of Greece 
from the earliest times. — The true reason of the Peloponnesian war was a jealousy of the Athenian power. 
Those pretended were, I. The affair of Epidamnus, which is opened at large; II. The revolt of Potidjea, the 
circumstances of which are exactly related. Consultations held at Sparta by the members of the Lacedae- 
monian league, where at length war is decreed, but the rupture protracted for a year. The Lacedjemonians act 
from a dread of the growing power of Athens. A digression showing how that power arose, which gives the 
author opportunity to relate the history of fifty years between the retreat of Xerxes, and the breaking out of 
this war. Embassies accusing and recriminating are sent to and fro, in theaccount of which are interwove the 
stories of Cylon, Pausanias, and Themistorles. The Lacedaemonians send a final demand to Athens; and the 
Athenians, at the persuasion of Pericles, return a resolute answer, upon which all negotiations are ended, and 
an open rupture ensuetb. 



Thuctdides an Athenian hath compiled the 
history of the war between the Peloponnesians 
and the Athenians, as managed by each of the 
contending parties. He began to write upon 
its first breaking out, from an expectation that 
it would prove important, and the most deserv- 
ing regard of any that had ever happened. He 
grounded his conjecture on the earnestness of 
both the flourishing parties to make all neces- 
sary preparations for it; and he saw that all 
the rest of Greece was engaged on one side or 
the other, some joining immediately, and others 
intending soon to do it ; for this was the great- 
est commotion that ever happened amongst the 
Grecians, since in it some Barbarians, and it 
may be said the greatest part of mankind, were 
concerned. The actions of an earlier date, 
and those still more ancient, cannot possibly, 
through length of time, be adequately known ; 
yet, from all the lights which a search into the 
remotest times hath afforded me, I cannot think 
they were of any great importance, either in re- 
gard to the wars themselves, or any other con- 
siderations. 
8 



It is certain, that the region now known by 
the name of Greece was not formerly possessed 
by any fixed inhabitants, but was subject to 
frequent transmigrations, as constantly every 
distinct people easily yielded up their seats to 
the violence of a larger supervening number. 
For, as to commerce there was none, and mu- 
tual fear prevented intercourse both by sea and 
land, as then the only view of culture was to 
earn a penurious subsistence, and superfluous 
wealth was a thing unknown, as planting was 
not their employment, it being uncertain how 
soon an invader might come and dislodge them 
from their unfortified habitations, and as they 
thought they might every where find their daily 
necessary support, they hesitated but little 
about shifting their seats : and for this reason 
they never flourished in the greatness of their 
cities or any other circumstance of power. 
But the richest tracts of country ever were more 
particularly liable to this frequent change of in- 
habitants, such as that which is now called Thes- 
saly, and Bceotia, and Peloponnesus mostly ex- 
cept Arcadia, and in general every the most 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book I. 



fertile part of Greece. For the natural wealth 
of their soil increasinij the power of some 
amongst them, that power raised civil dissen- 
tions, which ended in their ruin, and at the 
same time exposed them more to foreign at- 
tacks. It was only the barrenness of the soil 
that preserved Attica through the longest 
space of time, quiet and undisturbed, in one 
uninterrupted series of possessors. One, and 
not the least convincing, proof of this is, that 
other parts of Greece, because of the fluctuat- 
ing condition of the inhabitants, could by no 
means in their growth keep pace with Attica. 
The most powerful of those who were driven 
from the other parts of Greece by war or sedi- 
tion, betook themselves to the Athenians for 
secure refuge, and as thej' obtained the privi- 
leges of citizens,' have constantly, from re- 
motest time, continued to enlarge that city 
with fresh accessions of inhabitants, insomuch 
that at last, Attica being insuflUcient to support 
the number, they then sent over colonies into 
Ionia. 

There is another, and to me a most convinc- 
ing proof of the weakness of the ancients. 
Before the affairs of Troy, it doth not appear 
that Greece (or Hellas) was ever united in one 
common undertaking ; nor had the whole coun- 
try that one general appellation ; not indeed 
did the same subsist at all before the time of 
Hellen, the son of Deucalion ; the several na- 
tions taking their distinguishing names from 
their own selves, and Pelasgicum being that of 
the greatest tract. But when Hellen and his 
sons had acquired power in Pthiotis, and led 
out their dependents by way of aid to other 
cities, conversation made the use of this name 
become much more frequent among the several 
people, though it was long before it so prevail- 
ed as to become the general appellation of 
them all. For this Homer is my principal 
authority, who, though bom a long time after 
the Trojan war, hath no where mentioned 

1 They were admitted tothesnmo privileges with free- 
born native Atlienians. But this was practised only in 
the infancy and early crowth of that slate. It was 
afterwards an honour very seldom and with difTicnlty 
granted. Those who came from other places to settle 
at Athens are distinguished from rroxirai citizens, hy 
the name of m'toixoi sojourners, who had taken up their 
residence and cohabited with them. They performed 
several duties as Buljects to the state which pave them 
protection, but never I ecame .Athenians, or citizens of 
Athens, in the emphatical sense of those terms. The 
English reader will please to rememher this, as the dis- 
tinction often occurs in the sequel of our history. 



them all in this general style, but hath appro- 
priated it to those who came with Achilles 
from Pthiotis, and were the first that bore this 
name of Grecians (or Hellenes). In his poems 
Danaans, and Argives, and Achsans are their 
distinguishing titles. Nor hath he farther once 
mentioned the Barbarians, for this plain rea- 
son in my opinion, because Grecians were not 
yet distinguished by this one comprehensive 
name in contradistinction to that other. These 
Grecians therefore whatever, whether so apart 
in their different cities, or united by mutual 
converse, or at length comprehended in one ge- 
neral name, for want of strength and correspon- 
dence, never acted together in joint confede- 
racy before the war of Troy: nor was it till 
the use of the sea had opened free communi- 
cation amongst them that they engaged to- 
gether in that expedition. 

For Minos is the earliest person whom we 
know from tradition to have been master of a 
navy, and to have been chiefly lord of the sea 
which is called the Grecian. To him were 
the isles of the Cycladcs subject; nay, most 
of them he planted himself with colonies, hav- 
ing expelled the Carians, and substituted his 
own sons in the different commands. And 
then of course he exerted his utmost power to 
clear that sea of pirates, for the more secure 
conveyance of his own tributes. 

The Grecians formerly, as well as those 
Barbarians who, though seated on the conti- 
nent, lived upon the coast, and all the islanders, 
when once they had learned the method of pass- 
ing to and fro in their vessels, soon took up 
the business of piracy under the command of 
persons of the greatest ability amongst them, 
for the sake of enriching such adventurers and 
subsisting their poor. They landed, and plun- 
dered by surprise unfortified places and scat- 
tered villages, and from hence they principally 
gained a subsistence. This was by no means 
at that time an employment of reproach, but 
rather an instrument of glory. Some people 
of the continent are even to this day a proof 
of this, who still attribute honour to such ex- 
ploits if genteelly performed :'^ so also are the 
ancient poets, in whom those that sail along 
the coasts are every where equally accosted 

' " With due respect, with humanity," as the scho- 
liast explains it. For then they never m;ide booty of, 
or carried away hy stealth, tl;e lahourint; cattle; they 
never made their attacks by night, nor committed any 
murder. 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



Xnrith this question, Whether they are pirates ; 
as if neither they to whom the question was 
put would disown their employment, nor they 
who are desirous to be informed would reproach 
them with it. The people of the continent 
also exercised robberies upon one another: 
and to this very day many people of Greece 
are supported by the same practices: for in- 
stance, the Ozolian Locrians, and ^tolians, 
and Acarnanians, and their neighbours on the 
continent; and the custom of wearing their 
weapons, introduced by this old life of rapine, 
is still retained amongst them. 

The custom of wearing weapons once pre- 
vailed all over Greece, as their houses had no 
manner of defence, as travelling was full of 
hazard, and their whole lives were passed in 
armour, like Barbarians. A proof of this is 
the continuance still in some parts of Greece 
of those manners, which were once with uni- 
formity general to all. The Athenians were 
the first who discontinued the custom of wearing 
their swords, and who passed from the disso- 
lute life into more polite and elegant manners. 
And it is not a long time since those amongst 
the rich, who were advanced in years and stu- 
died their ease, left off wearing the linen garments 
and fastening the hair of their head behind with 
grasshoppers of gold ;^ though the aged amongst 
the lonians have constantly persevered in the use 
of those ornaments as marks of their affinity. 
That modest uniformity of dress, which is still 
in vogue, was first introduced by the Lacede- 
monians ; amongst whom in other points also 
there was the greatest equality of dress and 
diet observed, both in the highest and meanest 
ranks. They also were the first who performed 
their exercises naked, stripping themselves in 
public and anointing with oil before they en- 
tered the lists ; though, before, the custom 
had prevailed at the Olympic games for the 
champions to wear scarfs about their loins : 
and it is only a few years since these were 
quite disused.'* But even yet, amongst some 
Barbarians, more especially those of Asia, 
where the matches of boxing and wrestling are 
in repute, the combatants engage with scarfs 



» To intimate their being the original possessors and 
pure natives of the soil, as much as the very grasshop- 
pers, which tliey supposed to be a natural and sponta- 
neous production of the earth. They regarded them- 
selves as cotemporary with the insect^. 

* See Mr West's Dissertation on the Olympic Games, 
p. 50. 



round their loins. Many other arguments 
might with ease be alleged to prove that an- 
cient Greece had forms and modes of living 
quite similar to those of the present Barbarian 
world. k 

As for cities, so many as are of a later foun- 
dation, are better placed for the increase of 
wealth, since the improvement of naval skill ; 
all these have been built on the sea-shore, and 
walled about, and are situated upon necks of 
land jutting out into the sea, for the sake of 
traffic and greater security from the insults of 
neighboring people. But those of an earlier 
date, having been more subject to piratical de- 
predations, are situated at a great distance from 
the sea, not only on islands, but also upon the 
main. For even those who lived upon the 
coast, though inexpert at sea, were used to 
make excursions up into the country for the 
sake of plunder: and such inland settlements 
are discernible to this very day. 

But the people of the islands, that is, the 
Carians and the Phcenicians, were by much the 
most expert at these piratical adventures : for 
by them the greatest part of the isles was in- 
habited. This is proved from the expiation 
solemnized at Delos in the course of this war ; 
on which occasion all the sepulchres of the dead 
in that island being broken open, more than 
half of the number appeared to be Carians, 
known to be such from the weapons found in 
their graves and a particularity of interment 
still used amongst them.^ It was not till 
after the equipment of fleets by Minos, that a 
communication was opened at sea. For by him 
the mischievous banditti were ejected from the 
islands, and many colonies of his own planted 
there in their stead. And from this period it 
was that the maritime people, grown more in- 
tent on the acquisition of wealth, became more 
fond of settled habitations : and such of them 
as then surpassed in wealth, strengthened their 
settlements by walling them about. And this 
their passion for gain continuing to increase, 
the poorer hired out their services to those who 
had aflluence ; and the great, who had all nced- 



*The Carians first invented the boss of shields and 
the crest of helmets. In remembrance of this, a small 
shield and a crest were always buried with them. By 
this means were the Carians knovvn. The PhaMiicians 
were distinguished by the manner of their interment: 
for, whereas other nations Inid the faces of their dead 
towards the east, the Phanicians reversed the posture, 
and laid them to the west. Scholiast 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book I. 



ful supplies at hand, reduced less powerful 
cities into their own subjection. And their 
power by these methods gradually advancing, 
they were enabled in process of time to under- 
take the Trojan expedition. 

It is farther my opinion, that the assemblage 
of that armament by Agamemnon was not owing 
so much to the attendance of the suitors of 
Helen in pursuance of the oaths they had sworn 
to Tyndarus, as to his own superior pawer. It 
is related by those who received from their an- 
cestors the most certain memorials of the Pelo- 
ponnesian affairs, that Pelops, arriving there 
from Asia with abundance of wealth, soon 
gained so great an influence over those needy 
people, that, though a foreigner, he had the 
honor to have the country called after his own 
name ; and that the power thus gained by him 
was successively enlarged by his posterity. 
Eurystheus, indeed, whose mother was the sister 
of Atreus, perished in Attica by means of the 
Heraclidse ; and Eurystheus, when he departed 
on that expedition, left the government of My- 
cenae and his kingdom, because of his affinity, 
in the care of Atreus, who then resided with 
him, having fled from his father upon the mur- 
der of Chrysippus. When therefore the return 
of Eurystheus was prevented by death, and the 
Myceneans from a dread of the Heraclidae were 
well inclined to Atreus, as a person of great 
abilities and deep in the affections of the people, 
he easily obtained the kingdom of Mycenae and 
all the territories which had belonged to Eu- 
rystheus ; and from hence the family of Pelops 
quite overpowered the family of Perseus. To 
these enlargements of power Agamemnon suc- 
ceeding, and being also superior to the rest of 
his countrymen in naval strength, he was enabled 
in my opinion to form that expedition more from 
awe than favour. It is plain that he equipped 
out the largest number of ships himself, besides 
those he lent to the Arcadians. Homer is my 
witness here, if his testimony have any force ; 
who hath farther, at the delivery of the sceptre, 
styled him, 

" Of many isles, and of all Argos, king." 

And a king who lived upon the continent could 
not possibly be lord of islands, except such as 
were adjacent, the number of which must needs 
be small, unless he had a competent strength 
at sea : but from this armament we have good 
light afforded to guess at the preceding. 

What though Myccnaj was a small city, or 



though any place at that time remarkable ap- 
pear at present inconsiderable to usi yet, no 
one ought on these motives prematurely to im- 
agine that armament to have been less consider- 
able than it is described by the poets and re- 
ported by tradition. Supposing the city of 
Lacedcmon to be now in a ruinated condition, 
nothing left but the temples and the pavements 
of the mass, I fancy, in process of time, pos- 
terity could not easily be induced to believe 
that their power had ever been proportioned 
to their glory. Of the five divisions of Pelo- 
ponnesus' they are actually possessed of two, 
having the command of the whole, and of many 
confederate states without : yet, as the city is 
neither closely built, as the temples and public 
edifices are by no means sumptuous, and the 
houses detached from one another, after the 
old mode of Greece, it would suffer disparage- 
ment from such a view. If we farther sup- 
pose the Athenians in the same reverse of for- 
tune, from the view the city then would afford, 
it might be guessed that once it had double the 
strength which it really hath. We ought not 
therefore to be incredulous, nor so much to 
regard the appearance of cities as their power ; 
and of course, to conclude the armament 
against Troy to have been greater than ever 
was known before, but inferior to those of our 
age. And whatever credit be given to the 
poetry of Homer in this respect, who no doubt 
as a poet hath set it off with all possible en- 
largement, yet even according to his account it 
appeareth inferior. For he hath made it to 
consist of twelve hundred ships ; those of the 
Boeotians carrying each one hundred and twen- 
ty men, those of Philoctctes fifty ; pointing 
out, as I imagine, the largest and the smallest 
rates; for of the rate of other ships he hath 
not made the least mention in his catalogue, 
though he hath expressly informed us that 
every person of the crews belonging to the 
ships of Philoctctes were both mariners and 
soldiers, since he hath made all who plied at 
the oar to be expert at the bow. It is not pro- 
bable that any ships carried supernumeraries, 
excepting kings or persons in command, espe- 
cially as their point was a mere transportation 
with all the necessary habiliments of war, as 
their ships were not decked, but built entirely 



> These were Lnronin, Arradin, Argolira, Messenia, 
and Elis. The Lacedemonians were possessed of La- 
conia and Messenia. — Scholiast. 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



in the fashion of the old piratical cruisers. If 
therefore a mean be taken between the largest 
and smallest rates, the number of the whole 
will turn out of small account for quotas sent 
in general from the whole of Greece.' The 
reason of this was not so much a scarcity of 
men as want of money. They adjusted the 
number of men to the slender store of provi- 
sions they already had, and the probability of 
procuring a competent subsistence in the course 
of the war. On their first landing they got 
the better in fight ; the proof is, that they could 
not otherwise have fortified their camp with a 
wall. Neither doth it appear that they exerted 
all their strength at once, numbers being de- 
tached for supplies of provisions, to till the 
Chersonesus, and to forage at large. Thus 
divided as they were, the Trojans were better 
able to make a ten years' resistance, being 
equal in force to those who were at any time 
left to carry on the siege. For had the stores 
of provision at the first landing been ample 
enough for the whole number of men they 
brought, and had they been able to prosecute 
the war free from the avocations of foraging 
and tillage, their superiority in the field must 
have given them an easy and expeditious con- 
quest. But in fact they did not ply the work 
with all their number, but only with a part 
constantly reserved for the purpose : had they 
formed the siege with their whole force, in 
less time and with less difficulty they must 
have taken Troy. Through want of money 
it was that expeditions prior to this, and even 
this the most celebrated of all that ever hap- 
pened, are plainly found to have been less in 
reality than they are in fame or current esti- 
mation at present through poetical assistance. 

Nor did the prosperous event of the Trojan 
expedition put an end to the unsettled and 
fluctuating state of Greece, or secure that tran- 
quility so necessary to advancement. The re- 
turn of the Grecians from Ilium, after so long 
an absence, gave rise to many innovations. Se- 
ditions were excited in almost every city ; and 
those who were forced to withdraw, built cities 
for themselves in other places. The present 



1 Thucydides makes it of small acrount, in rej,'ard to 
the war which is his subject. But the number of men 
employed in the expedition against Troy was 102,000. 
For the mean between 120 and 50 is 85, and 85 X ^Y 
1,200 = 102,000. 



Boeotians, for instance, being driven out of 
Arne by the Thessalians, sixty years after the 
taking of Troy, planted themselves in the coun- 
try now called Boeotia, though before that time 
Cadmeis : but a body of them had already 
seated themselves there, of whom were those 
who went in the expedition against Troy : and 
eighty years after it, the Dorians with the 
Heraclidse took possession of Peloponnesus. 
It was not without much ado and length of 
time, that Greece, quiet and settled at home, 
had opportunity to send colonies abroad. Then 
the Athenians planted Ionia and most of the 
islands ; the Peloponnesians the greatest part 
of Italy and Sicily, and even some colonies in 
the different tracts of Greece. But all these 
transactions are of a later date than the Tro- 
jan war. 

But when once the state of Greece was 
grown more robust, and an increase of wealth 
became their study more than ever before, as the 
public revenues grew apace, in many places 
tyrannies started up : for before this, kingdoms 
were hereditary and with limited authority. 
Now Greece throughout was employed in 
building navies, and became addicted to naval 
affairs with unusual application. The Corin- 
thians are said to have been the first, who, by 
varying the make of their ships, brought them 
to that model which is now in use, and Co- 
rinth to be the first place of Greece where tri- 
remes^ were built. It is a known fact, that 
Aminocles, a ship-carpenter from Corinth, 
built four ships for the Samians; now, from 
the arrival of Aminocles at Samos to the con- 
clusion of the war which is now my subject, 
there passed at most but three hundred years. 
The oldest sea-fight we know any thing of 
was that of the Corinthians against the Cor- 
cyreans: but the distance between that and 
the same period is not more than two hundred 
and sixty. For the city of the Corinthians, 
being seated on the isthmus, hath ever been a 
place of trade, as formerly the Grecians both 
within and without Peloponnesus, more ac- 



3 The triremes were the ships of war, of the palley 
kind, and take their name from the three l)anks of oars 
with which they were furnished. They were also 
masted and carried sails; but they generally lowered 
the sails when they came to action, and relied chiefly on 
their oars, that they might be more able to tack about, 
or to run down upon the enemy with more force and 
steadiness. See Potter's Archieologia, vol. ii, c. 14. 



6 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book I. 



customed to land than sea, could have no 
traffic with one another vvitliout passing through 
their territory. They were also remarkable 
for wealth, as clearly approveth from the an- 
cient poets, who have given that city the epi- 
thet of rich. And, when once navigation was 
practised in Greece, they lost no time in their 
own equipments; tliey cleared the sea of pi- 
rates; and, opening their town as a public 
mart, both by land and sea, made Corinth 
powerful by the increase of its revenue. The 
lonians had no naval force till a long time after 
this, in the reign of Cyrus first king of the 
Persians, and his son Cambyses; and, waging 
war with Cyrus, they were for a time masters 
of the sea which lieth upon their own coasts. 
Polycrates, also, who was tyrant of Samos, in 
the reign of Cambyses, having a powerful navy, 
subdued many of the islands, and among the rest 
Rhenea, which as soon as conquered he con- 
secrated to Delian Apollo. The Phoceans 
also, when planting their colony at Marseilles, 
had a successful engagement at sea against the 
Carthaginians. 

These were the most remarkable equip- 
ments of a naval force; and these, though 
beyond contest many generations later than 
the war of Troy, had a very small number of 
triremes, but consisted chiefly of vessels of 
fifty oars and barges of the more ancient model. 
And it was but a little while before the Me- 
dian war and the death of Darius, who suc- 
ceeded Cambyses in the kingdom of Persia, 
that the tyrants of Sicily and the Corcyreans 
became masters of any considerable number of 
triremes. For these last were the only in- 
stances of a na-val strength in Greece, before 
the invasion of it by Xerxes, that deserve par- 
ticular mention. The vessels of the ^ginetae, 
of the Athenians, and some others, were few 
in number, and most of them but of fifty oars. 
It was not till later times, when the Athenians 
had war with the ^EginetaB and also expected 
the approach of Xerxes, that at the persuasion 
of Thcmistocles they built those ships with 
which they fought successfully against the Bar- 
barians; and even these were not yet com- 
pletely decked over. 

Such therefore were the navies of Greece, 
both of an earlier and later date. And the 
states to which they belonged gained by them 
considerable strength, through an increase of 
their revenue and the enlargement of their do- 
minions. Embarkations grown more frequent, 



especially to those who were pent up in a nar- 
row soil, occasioned the reduction of the isles; 
but for a land war, and, in consequence of that, 
an accession of power, none such was at that 
time known. All conflicts of that sort which 
ever happened, were disputes of boundaries 
between contiguous states. The Grecians had 
not yet launched forth into distant expeditions, 
nor aimed ambitiously at foreign conquests. 
There were no dependent cities, which fur- 
nished quotas at the will of others who gave 
them law ; nor did those who were upon equa- 
lity concur in any joint undertaking; each 
petty state took up arms occasionally in its own 
defence against the encroachments of its neigh- 
bours. At most, the greatest division of Greece 
that ever happened was in the old rupture be- 
tween the Chalcideans and Eretrians, when 
leagues were formed in favour of both. 

By these means was the growth of many 
states prevented, and that of the lonians by a 
different cause — the great and surprising growth 
of the Persian power. For Cyrus, after he had 
completed the conquest of Croesus, and all the 
country which lieth between the river Halys 
and the sea, invaded them and enslaved their 
towns upon the continent; and Darius after- 
wards, victorious by the strength of a Phoeni- 
cian fleet, did the same by the islands. 

As for those tyrants who had any where 
usurped the government of Grecian cities, — 
their whole application being confined to their 
own private concerns, to the guard of their 
persons, or aggrandizement of their families— 
they resided in their own cities so far as was 
consistent with their own security. Nothing 
worthy of remembrance was achieved by them, 
unless we take into account the frequent broils 
between them and their neighbours. Not but 
that the tyrants in Sicily had advanced their 
power to a great height. But Greece, in 
general, was thus withheld for a long course of 
time from performing any remarkable exploit, 
by the strength of her united, or the adventu- 
rous cflbrts of her separate states. 

But after that the tyrants of Athens, and all 
the tyrants of other parts of Greece, generally, 
and of old, subject to these violent encroach- 
ments, notwithstanding their number and the 
fresh vigour of the last, were all (except those 
of Sicily) demolished by the liaeedcmonians. 
— For Lacedemon, ever since it came into the 
hands of the Dorians, in whose possession it 
still continucth, though harassed with seditions 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



the longest of any place we know, yet hath 
ever been happy in a well regulated govern- 
ment, and hath always been exempt from ty- 
rants ; for, reckoning to the conclusion of this 
present war, it is somewhat more than four 
hundred years that the Lacedemonians have 
enjoyed the same polity. On this basis was 
their power at home founded, and this enabled 
them to exert it in regulating other states. — 
But, after that the tyrants were by them extir- 
pated from Greece, not many years intervened 
before the battle of Marathon was fought by 
the Medcs against the A.thenians ; and in the 
tenth year after that, the Barbarian (Xerxes) 
again, with a vast armament, invaded Greece 
in order to enslave it. Hanging then on the 
v^ry brink of ruin, the Lacedemonians, on ac- 
count of their pre-eminent power, took the 
command of all the Greeks combined together 
in their own defence; whilst the Athenians, 
on the approach of the Medes, having already 
determined to abandon their city, and laid in 
their necessary stores, went on board their 
ships, and made head against him by sea. 
Having thus by their common efforts repulsed 
the Barbarian, the Grecians, not only those 
who revolted from the king, but those also 
who had combined together against him, were 
soon after divided among themselves, siding 
either in the Athenian, or in the Lacedemo- 
nian league ; for the mastery appeared plainly 
to be in their hands, since these were the most 
powerful by land and those by sea. The agree- 
ment between the Athenians and Lacedemo- 
nians was but of short continuance ; variance 
ensued ; and they entered the lists of war 
one against another, each with the additional 
strength of their own respective allies : and 
hence, if any other Grecians quarrelled, they 
went over in parties to these as their principals. 
Insomuch that from the invasion of the Medes 
quite down to the breaking out of this war, 
one while striking up truces, another while at 
open war, either with one another or the con- 
federates revolting from either league, they had 
provided themselves with all military stores, 
and much improved their skill by constant 
practice exercised in dangers. 

As for the Lacedemonians, they gave law to 
their confederates without the heavy imposition 
of tributes. Their study was only to keep 
them well affected to themselves, by introduc- 
ing the oligarchy among them. But the Athe- 
nians lorded it over theirs, having got in course 



of time the ships of all those who might op • 
pose them, into their own hands, excepting the 
Chians and the Lesbians, and imposed on them 
a certain payment of tribute. And their own 
particular preparations for the present war 
were more ample than former times had known, 
even during the greatest vigour of their state 
and the most perfect harmony between them 
and their allies. 

Such are the discoveries I have made con- 
cerning the ancient state of Greece; which, 
though drawn from a regular series of proofs, 
will not easily be credited ; for it is the cus- 
tom of mankind, nay, even where their own 
country is concerned, to acquiesce with ready 
credulity in the traditions of former ages, with- 
out subjecting them to the test of sedate ex- 
amination. Thus, for instance, it is yet a 
received opinion' amongst the bulk of the 
Athenian people, that Hipparchus was the ty- 
rant, and therefore slain by Harmodius and 
Aristogiton ; and they have not yet discovered, 
that Hippias then governed by virtue of his 
being the eldest of the sons of Pisistratus, 
and that Hipparchus and Thessalus were his 
brothers. Harmodius and Aristogiton, on the 
very day appointed, and just at the crisis, 
suspecting that information had been given to 
Hippias by some who were privy to the design, 
made no attempt upon him, as put already on 
his guard. Yet willing, before they were ap- 
prehended, to show their resolution and con- 
tempt of danger, they accidentally found Hip- 
parchus at the Leocorium superintending the 
Panathenaical procession,* and immediately 
slew him. There are many other things of a 
more recent date, and of memory not yet in- 
validated by time, about which the other Gre- 
cians are very wrong in their notions ; such as, 
that the Lacedemonian kings had each of them 
a double and not a single vote in public ques- 
tions ; and that amongst them the Pittanate 
was a military band, which never yet existed. 
So easy a task to numbers is the search of 

* Til is proression was made at the great Panathensea, 
which festival was celebrated once in five years in com- 
memoration of the union of all the people of Attica by 
Theseus. The lesser Panathenjea was celebrated every 
third year, some say every year, and was lengthened out 
by public games. These were also used at the great 
Panathenaea, in which the greatest splendour and mag 
nificenre were employed, and the procession added, 
here mentioned by Thucydides, and of which the cu 
rious reader may see a particular account in Potter's Ar- 
cbsologia, vol. i. p. 421. 



8 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book 



I. 



truth ; so eager are they to catch at whatever 
lieth next at hand ! 

But, from the testimonies alleged in support 
of what I have hitherto advanced, any one 
may depend on my account of things, with- 
out danger of false opinions. Let him with- 
hold his credit from the songs of poets, whose 
profession it is to give all possible enlarge- 
ments to their subjects ; let him do so 
farther, by the writers of prose,^ who study 
more that artful composition which captivateth 
the ear than the plain and simple recital of 
truth, where proper attestations are never to 
be found, and many things through length of 
time have incredibly sallied out into mere 
fable ; and then he will be convinced upon the 
plainest proofs, that the state of ancient Greece 
was very nearly the same as I have described it. 
And this present war, when considered in all 
its operations, notwithstanding the propensity 
of mankind to imagine that war in which they 
are personally engaged, to be the greatest that 
ever happened, and so soon as it is over to re- 
place their admiration upon others more an- 
cient, will easily be owned to have been the 
most important of all. 

As to the speeches of particular persons either 
at the commencement or at the prosecution of 
the war, whether such as I heard myself or 
such as were repeated to me by others, I will 
not pretend to recite them in all their exact- 
ness. It hath been my method to consider 
principally what might be pertinently said upon 
every occasion to the points in debate, and 
to keep as near as possible to what would 
pass for genuine by universal consent. And as 
for the actions performed in the course of this 
war, I have not presumed to describe them 
from casual narratives or my own conjectures, 
but either from certainty, where I myself was 
a spectator, or from the most exact informa- 
tions I have been able to collect from others. 
This indeed was a work of no little difficulty, 
because even such as were present at those 
actions disagreed in their accounts about them, 
according as affection to either side or memory 
prevailed. 

My relation, because quite clear of fable, 
may prove less delightful to the ears. But it 
will afibrd sufficient scope to those who love a 



• Thufydides is here supposed to glance at Herodotus; 
and attain a little aTter lie justly thinks, that /cftonand 
fable ought to have noplace in history. 



sincere account of past transactions, of such as 
in the ordinary vicissitudes of human affairs 
may fully occur, at least be resembled again. 
I give it to the public as an everlasting posses- 
sion, and not as a contentious instrument of 
temporary applause. 

Of former transactions the greatest was that 
against the Modes, which however, by two en- 
gagements on sea and as many at land, was 
brought to a speedy conclusion. But the con- 
tinuance of this war ran out into a much great- 
er length ; and Greece in the course of it was 
plunged into such calamities as were never 
known before in an equal space. Never had 
so many cities been made desolate by victories, 
some by Barbarians and some by the violence 
of intestine feuds ; to say nothing of those 
where captivity made room for new possessors ; 
never so many instances of banishment ; never 
so many scenes of slaughter either in battles or 
seditions. Such calamities, farther, as were 
known only by report, but had rarely been felt 
in fact, now gained credit from experience; 
earthquakes, for instance, which affected the 
largest part of the habitable globe, and shook it 
with the utmost violence : eclipses of the sun, 
which happened more frequently than former 
times had remembered : great droughts in some 
places, the consequence of which was famine ; 
and, what made not the least ravage, but did its 
share of destruction, the noisome pestilence. 
For all these things ensued in the sequel of this 
war, which was carried on between the Athe- 
nians and Peloponnesians, after breaking the 
thirty years' truce concluded between them 
upon the reduction of Euboea. 

The reasons for which this truce was broke, 
and their course of variance, I have in the first 
place thought proper to write, that none may 
be at a loss about the origin of so momentous 
a war among the Grecians. The growth of 
the Athenian power I conceive to have been 
the truest occasion of it, though never openly 
avowed ; the jealousy struck by it into the 
Lacedaimonians made the contest necessary. 
But the pretences, publicly alleged on cither 
side for breaking the truce and declaring open 
war, shall now be related. 

Epidamnus is a city on the right hand as 
you sail into the Ionian gulf: adjoining to h 
live the Barbarian Taulantii, a people of Illyria. 
The Corcyreans settled a Colony here, the lead- 
er of which was Phalius the son of Heratocli- 
des, a Corinthian by birth, of the lineage of 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



9 



Hercules, invited to the office out of the mo- 
ther-city, according to the custom of ancient 
times : and beside this, some Corinthians and 
others of Doric descent joined themselves to 
this colony. In process of time, the city of 
the Epidamnians became great and populous. 
Yet, having been afterwards harassed with se- 
ditions of many years' continuance, they were 
brought very low (according to report) by 
war waged against them by the neighbour- 
ing Barbarians, and were deprived of the 
greatest share of their power. But the most 
recent event at Epidamnus before the present 
war was, that the people there had driven the 
nobles out of the city. These sheltering them- 
selves amongst the Barbarians, began depreda- 
tions on those who remained behind, both by 
land and sea. The Epidamnians of the place, 
suffering vastly from these depredations, des- 
patched ambassadors to Corcyra as their mother- 
city, beseeching them, " Not to behold their de- 
struction with eyes imconcerned, but to 'recon- 
cile their exiles to them, and to deliver them 
from this Barbarian war." The ambassadors, 
sitting down submissively in the temple of Ju- 
no, offered these supplications. But the Corcy- 
reans refusing to receive them, sent them home 
again without effect. The Epidamnians, thus 
convinced that no redress could be had from 
Corcyra, and ignorant how to proceed in their 
present perplexities, sent to Delphos to inquire 
of the god, " Whether they should surrender 
their city to the Corinthians as their founders, 
and should seek security from their protection^" 
He answered, that " they should surrender and 
take them for their leaders." The Epidam- 
nians, in pursuance of this oracle, arriving at 
Corinth, make there a tender of the colony, re- 
presenting that " the leader of it had been at 
Corinth," and communicating the oracle; and 
farther entreated them " not to look on with 
eyes of unconcern till their destruction was 
completed, but to undertake their redress." 
The Corinthians granted them their protection 
from a regard to justice, imagining themselves 
to be no less interested in their colony than the 
Corcyreans. But they were also actuated by 
a hatred of the Corcyreans, from whom, though 
a colony of their own, they had received some 
contemptuous treatment : for they neither paid 
them the usual honour on their public solem- 
nities, nor began with a Corinthian in the 
distribution of the sacrifices, which is always 
done by other colonies. This their contempt 
9 



was founded as well on the sufficiency of their 
own wealth, in which at that time they equal- 
led the richest of the Greeks, as on the supe- 
riority of their military force. Their insolence 
became greater in time with the enlargement 
of their navy, and they assumed glory to them- 
selves in a naval character as succeeding the 
Phseacians in the possession of Corcyra. This 
was their chief incentive to furnish themselves 
with a naval strength, and in it they were by no 
means inconsiderable : for they were masters of 
a hundred and twenty triremes, when they be- 
gan this war. Upon all these reasons the re- 
sentments of the Corinthians rising high against 
them, they undertook with pleasure the relief 
of Epidamnus ; encouraging all who were so 
disposed, to go and settle there, and sending 
thither a garrison of Ambraciots and Leuca- 
nians and their own people. These marched 
by land to Apollonia, which is a colony of the 
Corinthians, from a dread of the Corcyreans, 
lest they should have hindered their passage 
had they attempted it by sea. 

As soon as the Corcyreans heard that the 
new inhabitants and garrison were got to Epi- 
damnus, and that the colony was delivered in- 
to the hands of the Corinthians, they grew hot 
with indignation : and putting out immediately 
with twenty -five ships which were soon follow- 
ed by another equipment, they command them 
" at their peril to receive their exiles ; — for those 
who had been driven out of Epidamnus had al- 
ready been at Corcyra, where, pointing to the 
sepulchres, and claiming the rights of consan- 
guinity, they had entreated them to undertake 
their restoration : — " and to send away the gar- 
rison and new inhabitants which they had receiv- 
ed from Corinth." The Epidamnians were quite 
deaf to these haughty commands. And upon 
this the Corcyreans, with a squadron of forty 
ships, accompanied by the exiles whom they 
pretended to restore, and an aid of lUyrians, 
began hostilities. Having blocked up the city, 
they made proclamation, " that all Epidamnians 
who were willing and the strangers might de- 
part without molestation, or otherwise they 
should be treated as enemies." But this ha- 
ving no effect, the Corcyreans beset the place, 
which is situated upon an isthmus, on all sides, 
in regular siege. 

The Corinthians, upon the arrival of messen- 
gers from Epidamnus with an account of the 
siege, draw their forces together. They also 
gave public notice, « that a new colony was 
j2 



10 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[hook I. 



going to Epidamnus, into which all that would 
enter should have equal and like privileges with 
their predecessors; that, if any one was un- 
willing to set out immediately, and yet chose to 
have the benefit of the colony, he might depo- 
sit fifty Corinthian drachmas, and be excused 
his personal attendance." The number of 
those who entered for immediate transporta- 
tion, and of those who deposited their money, 
was large. They sent farther to the Mcgare- 
ans, requesting a number of ships to enlarge 
their convoy, that their passage might not be 
obstructed by the Corcyreans, from whom they 
received a suppl}^ of eight, and four more from 
Pale of the Cephallenians. The same request 
was made to the Epidaurians, who sent five. 
A single ship joined them from Hermione ; two 
from Trcezene ; ten from the Leucadians ; and 
eight from the Ambraciots. Of the Thebans 
and Phliasians they requested money ; of the 
Eleans, empty ships and money. And the num- 
ber of ships fitted out by themselves amounted 
to thirty and three thousand heavy-armed. 

When the Corcyreans were informed of 
these preparations, they went to Corinth, pur- 
posely accompanied by ambassadors from La- 
cedemon and Sicyon. There they charged the 
Corinthians <' to fetch away their garrison and 
new settlement from Epidamnus, as having no 
manner of pretensions there: that, if they had 
any thing to allege to the contrar}^, they were 
willing to submit to a fair trial in Peloponne- 
sus before such states as both sides should ap- 
prove ; and to whichever party the colony 
should be adjudged, by them it should be held." 
They also intimated " their readiness to refer 
the point in dispute to the oracle at Delphos ; 
— war, in their own inclinations, they were 
quite against : but if it must be so, on their 
sides, (they said) mere necessity would pre- 
scribe the measure ; and if thus compelled to 
do it, they should for assistance have recourse 
to friends not eligible indeed, but better able 
to serve them than such as they already had." 
The Corinthians answered, that " if they would 
withdraw their fleet and their Barbarians <rom 
before Epidamnus, they would then treat of an 
accommodation : but, till this was done, their 
honour would not suffer them to su])mit to a 
reference, whilst their friends were undergoing 
the miseries of a siege." The Corcyreans re- 
plied, that " if they would recall their people 
from Epidamnus, themselves also would do 
the like ; but were ready further to agree, that 



both parties should remain in their present sit- 
uation, under a suspension of arms, till the af- 
fair could be judicially determined." 

The Corinthians were not only deaf to every 
proposal, but so soon as ever they had manned 
their ships and their allies were come up, des- 
patching a herald beforehand to declare war 
against the Corcyreans, and then weighing an- 
chor with a force of seventy-five ships and two 
thousand heavy-armed, they stretched away for 
Epidamnus to make head against the Corcy- 
reans. The commanders of this fleet were 
Aristeus the son of Pellicas, Callicrates the 
son of Callias, and Timanor the son of Timan- 
thes; those of the land forces were Archo- 
timus the son of Eurytimus, and Isarchidas the 
son of Isarchus. 

When they were come up as far as Actium 
in the district of Anactorium, where standeth 
the temple of Apollo, in the mouth of the 
gulf of Ambracia, they were met by a herald 
despatched expressly in a row-boat by the Cor- 
cyreans, forbidding them " at their peril to pro- 
ceed." But at the same time the Corcyreans 
were busied at home in manning their own 
ships, repairing such as were old to make them 
fit for service, and equipping the rest with the 
utmost expedition. When the herald brought 
back nothing pacific from the Corinthians, and 
their squadron was now completed to eighty 
ships (for they had had forty employed in the 
siege of Epidamnus), they sailed in quest of 
the enemy, and drawing up against them came 
to an engagement. The victory fell beyond 
dispute to the side of the Corcyreans, and fif- 
teen ships of the Corinthians were utterly de- 
stroyed. 

Their good fortune was such that on the ve- 
ry same day Epidamnus was surrendered to the 
besiegers upon a capitulation, by which "all 
the strangers in the place were to be sold for 
slaves, but the Corinthians to be detained pris- 
oners at discretion." 

After the engagement at sea, the Corcyreans 
having erected a trophy' upon Leucimna a pro- 



> This was constantly done by the Grerians ui>on a vic- 
tory. Nay, when the victory was chiinioti on both sides, 
botlj sides erected tropliics, of wliich several instances 
occur in Tliucydides. Tlie trophies for a victory at land 
were decided out witli tlie arms they had taken ; those 
for a victory at soa, with arms also and the sliattcrs of 
the enemy's ships. "To demolish atrophy was looked 
on as unlawful, and a kind of sacrilege, because they 
were ail coiisecrated to some deity ; nor was it less a 
crime to pay divine adoration before thcui,orto repair 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



II 



montory of Corey ra, put to death all the pri- 
soners they had taken, except the Cormthians 
whom they kept in chains. And after this, as 
the Corinthians and allies having been vanquish- 
ed in fight were forced to retire within their 
own harbours, they were quite masters of all 
the adjacent sea ; and, sailing first to Leucas, 
a colony of the Corinthians, they laid its terri- 
tory waste ; and then burned Cyllene, a dock 
of the E leans, because they had supplied the 
Corinthians with ships and money. In this 
manner they continued masters of the sea a 
long time after their naval victory, and in their 
cruises very much annoyed the allies of the 
Corinthians. It was not until the beginning 
of the summer, that a check was given them 
by a fleet and land army, who were commis- 
sioned, in order to relieve their harassed allies, 
to station themselves at Actium and round the 
Chimerium of Thesprotis. There they lay, 
to cover Leucus and other places which were 
in friendship with them from the ravage of the 
enemy. The Corey reans, upon this, with a 
naval and land force stationed themselves over- 
against them at Leucimna. But, neither party 
venturing out to attack the other, they lay quiet 
in their opposite stations the whole summer ; 
and, on the approach of winter, both sides 
withdrew to their respective homes. 

During the remainder of the year, after the 
engagement at sea, and all the following, the 
Corinthians, whose indignation was raised in 
this their war against the Corcyreans, were 
building new ships, and sparing neither labour 
nor cost to get a strong armament ready for sea, 
and sent throughout Peloponnesus and the 
other parts of Greece to hire marines into their 
service. The Corcyreans, hearing of these 
great preparations, were terribly alarmed, and 
with reason ; for at that time they were in no 
alliance with any of the Grecians, nor compre- 
hended either in the Athenian or Lacedsemo- 
nian league. And hence, they thought it quite 
expedient to go and sue for the alliance of the 
Athenians, and endeavour to obtain some suc- 
cour from them. The Corinthians gaining in- 



them when decayed, as may be likewise observed of the 
Roman triumphal arclies; this being the means to re- 
vive the memory of forfrotten quarrels, and engage pos- 
terity to revenge the disgrace of their ancestors; for 
the same reason, those Grecians, who first introduced 
the custom of erecting pillars for trophies, incurred a se- 
vere censure from the ages they lived in." — Potter''s 
Archaologia, vol. ii. c. 12. 



telligence of their design, despatched an embas- 
sy at the same time to Athens, instructed by 
any means to prevent the junction of the Athe- 
nians to the naval strength of the Corcyreans, 
which might hinder them from bringing this 
war to a successful issue. The Athenians be- 
ing met in general assembly,^ both embassies 
rose up to plead their own cause ; and the 
Corcyrean spoke as follows : 

" It is quite proper, Athenians, that those 
who address themselves to a neighbouring 
power imploring their succour, which is now 
our case, without being able to plead the merit 
of prior good services or an old alliance in their 



3 The £xxx>)<r** or assembly of the people. In this the 
sovereignty was vested ; and it is proper the English 
reader should grow acquainted with this particular form 
in the Athenian democracy. 

The people of Athens were divided into ten tribes, 
which presided by rotation. The year was divided into 
ten courses, and each tribe presided about five weeks. 
The tribe in course elected fifty persons to manage by 
their authority and in their name: these were called 
Prytanes. These being too large a number for business 
they were subdivided into tens, each of these divisions 
presiding for a week ; and these were called Proedri, 
One of the Proedri presided or was in the chair for a 
day, and was styled Epistates. For that day, and he 
never enjoyed this pre-eminence a second time in his 
life, he was invested with the highest trust in the go- 
vernment. He kept the public seal and the keys of the 
citadel and treasury. In the assembly of the people he 
ordered all the proclamations, regulated proceedings, 
put the question, and declared the majority. 

The assemblies of the people were of two kinds, ordi- 
nary and extraordinary. Of the first kind, four were 
regularly held during each presidency of the tribes, and 
at the third of them ambassadors from foreign states 
had public audience. The latter were occasionally con- 
vened by the presidents in courses or by tlie general of 
the state. Some days beforehand, notice was publicly 
given by the senate or council of five hundred upon 
what subjects they were to deliberate ; but this could 
not be observed upon sudden emergencies. 

They met early in the morning, generally, in the 
Pnyx, at the summons of the public crier. At the se- 
cond summons they were obliged to attend at their peril. 
For then the proper officers ran along the forum with a 
rope stretched across and rubiied over with vermilion, 
and all upon whom a mark was found were fined ; but 
those who attended early and regularly, received half 
a drachma each for attendnnre. The number which 
attended generally amounted to five or six thousand. 

The assembly opened with the sacrifice of a young 
pig to Ceres, and the blood was sprinkled round by way 
of purification. Then a prayer was pronounced aloud 
by the rrier for the prosperity of the commonwealth of 
Athens; which ended, a curse was next pronounced 
on every citizen wbo did any thing to the prejudice of 
his country. Then the presidents of th» week opened 
the points upon which they were convened, and the 
I assembly proceeded to business. 



12 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book I. 



own behalf, should previously convince them, i 
chiefly, that a compliance with such requests 
must turn to their advantage ; at least, that it 
will cause no manner of inconvenience ; and 
then, that the favor will be returned with ef- 
fectual gratitude. If they are unable to give 
satisfactory conviction in any of these particu- 
lars, they can have no reason to be angry if 
their suit be rejected. The Corcyreans, confi- 
dent that they can clear up these points beyond 
the reach of scruple, have sent us hither to re- 
quest your alliance. 

" The method, indeed, which hitherto we 
have fondly observed, hath proved in fact ab- 
surd towards you in this our exigency, and pre- 
judicial to our own affairs in our present situa- 
tion. In preceding times, we never chose to 
grant our alliance to any, yet now are we come 
to sue for alliance from others, being through our 
own maxims quite destitute of friends in this our 
war against the Corinthians : and that which be- 
fore appeared the conduct of refined prudence, to 
keep clear of danger by shunning the entangle- 
ments of a foreign alliance, we now find by the 
event to have been both impolitic and weak. 

« Once already we have engaged the Corin- 
thians at sea, and repulsed them merely by our 
own strength. But since, with a greater force 
collected from Peloponnesus and the rest of 
Greece, they are again preparing to attack us ; 
since we perceive ourselves unable to resist 
them merely with our own domestic strength ; 
since further with our subjection the danger 
will spread abroad ; we are necessitated to ap- 
ply to you and everywhere else for succour ; 
and though now emboldened to act in opposi- 
tion to our former inactive maxims, yet we 
deserve your pardon, as they were not the re- 
sult of bad designs, but of mistaken judgments : 
and could we but obtain redress from you, this 
incidental necessity of ours will turn out high- 
ly to your honour upon several accounts. 

" In the first place, you will favour those with 
your assistance who have felt but never com- 
mitted injustice. In the next place, by protect- 
ing those whose lives and liberties are at stake, 
you will confer so vast an obligation that the 
memory of it can never be abolished. We are 
now masters of the greatest naval force except 
your own. Consider therefore how fair an 
occasion, very seldom to be met with, of the 
greatest advantage to yourselves, of the greatest 
vexation to your enemies, now lieth before 
you ; when that very power, the accession of 



which you would readily have purchased with 
ample sums of money and a weight of obliga- 
tion, Cometh here to invite your acceptance 
and make a tender of itself without any danger 
or expense to you ; nay, what is more, enabling 
you to gain the praise of the world, the grate- 
ful acknowledgments of those you defend, and 
an increase of power to yourselves. Few peo- 
ple, in preceding ages, have ever had at any 
one time so many fine opportunities within 
their reach. And few there are, who, suing 
for alliance, do it not rather from a view of re- 
ceiving than conferring security and reputation 
by their suit. 

" If there be any one amongst you, who 
imagineth that war will never happen in which 
we may do you service, in such imagination he 
is quite mistaken. He doth not penetrate the 
designs of the Lacedemonians, who, alarmed 
at your power, are intent on war ; nor those of 
the Corinthians, who, powerful of themselves, 
and your enemies, have begun with us to open 
the way for attacking you ; that, united by com- 
mon resentments, we might not stand up in our 
mutual defence against their violence ; nor they 
be disappointed at least in one of their views, 
either effectually to humble us, or securely to 
establish their own power. It is your interest 
to prevent them, by accepting that alliance 
which we offer, and rather to anticipate their 
designs than counterplot them when ripening 
into act. 

" If farther, they tax with a breach of justice 
your presuming to interfere with their colonies ; 
let them learn, that every colony, whilst used 
in the proper manner, payeth honour and regard 
to its mother-state, but, when treated with inju- 
ry and violence; is become an alien. They are 
not sent out to be the slaves, but to be the equals, 
of those who remain behind. Their violence 
and injustice require no proofs. For, invited 
by us to submit the business of Epidamnus to 
a judicial trial, they chose rather to prosecute 
their claims at war than at equity. And let 
such behaviour towards us their relations put 
you timely on your guard, that you may not 
be over-reached by their collusions, nor hesitate 
one moment to grant our petitions. For he 
who findeth the least room to repent of having 
gratified his enemies, is most likely to persevere 
in uninterrupted security. 

" You will not break your treaty with tho 
Lacedemonians by our admission, who are 
allied to neither of you. By that treaty it is 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



13 



expressly stipulated, that " If any of the states 
of Greece be not at present in alliance with 
either of the contracting parties, permission is 
given them to go into either league, at their 
own discretion." — And terrible indeed it is, if 
they must be at liberty to man their fleets out 
of places in their alliance, nay, more than that, 
out of Greece at large, and to small amount, 
even out of your dependents : and we must be 
debarred not only your most inviting alliance, 
but every possible expedient of succour : then 
after all, they must raise a cry of injustice, if 
we offer our requests to you and have them 
granted. But much greater reasons of com- 
plaint will lie with us, if we cannot prevail 
upon you. For then you will throw at a dis- 
tance those who are beset with dangers, and 
never were your enemies ; you will not only not 
restrijin the encroachments of enemies and in- 
vaders, but will behold them through your ne- 
gligence assuming strength out of your domin- 
ions, which you ought never to endure. You 
ought either to hinder them from seducing 
your subjects into their pay, or send an imme- 
diate succour to us, in what manner you may 
be persuaded is the most expedient; but the 
course you ought principally to take is, to 
form with us a defensive alliance, and to act 
immediately. 

" The advantage of such a measure, as we 
premised at first, we are clearly proving. But 
that which carrieth the greatest weight is this, 
that our enemies are enemies also to you (a 
point too clear to require proof), and enemies 
by no means despicable, but able to make re- 
volters feel their vengeance. The bad conse- 
quences of rejecting a land cannot be equal to 
those of rejecting a naval alliance, especially to 
you, who should exert your utmost efforts to let 
none be masters of a fleet beside yourselves ; or, 
if that be not feasible, to make the most power- 
ful in that respect your fast allies. And who- 
soever, allowing the plain advantage of these 
our arguments, may yet dread a rupture if their 
influence prevail, — let such a one know, that 
the event he feareth, accompanied by strength, 
will strike greater dread into all your enemies, 
but that the zeal of him who would have us 
now rejected, since it is founded on a weak 
presumption of their strength, must the sooner 
encourage those enemies to attack you. The 
present consultation is not confined to Corcyra, 
but very nearly concerneth Athens also : — 
let him therefore be assured, that he doth not 



provide the best for the welfare of Athens, 
when, directly foreseeing a war fast approach- 
ing and only not on foot, he hesitateth the 
least about gaining a people provided with all 
the necessary means of being a most serviceable 
friend or a most prejudicial foe ; — a people op- 
portunely situated in the course to Italy and 
Sicily, so capable to hinder the accession of 
any naval force from thence to the Pelopon- 
nesians, and to secure a passage from hence to 
any of those coasts, not to mention the com- 
modiousness of it in many other respects. 

" To reduce the whole to one short point, 
wherein all and every individual of you is con- 
cerned, learn from hence that we are not to be 
abandoned : there are but three naval powers 
amongst the Grecians of any consideration, 
your own, our own, and that of the Corintlii- 
ans. If you indolently suffer two of these to 
be incorporated, by leaving us a prey to the 
Corinthians, you must for the future make 
head against the Corcyreans and Peloponnesi- 
ans both : but, if you grant your alliance to us, 
the contest will lie against them alone, and 
your own naval strength be considerably aug- 
mented." 

In this manner the Corcyreans spoke : and 
when they had concluded, the Corinthians took 
their turn as followeth : — 

" Since these Corcyreans have not confined 
their discourse merely to solicit the favour of 
your alliance, but have enlarged it with invec- 
tives against our injustice in making war upon 
them, we also lie under a necessity to make some 
previous observations on both of those points, 
before we proceed to other matters. By this 
means you will perceive your own great secu- 
rity in complying with our demands, and what 
weighty reasons you have to reject their im- 
portunate solicitations. 

" They allege it as a maxim of prudence 
that they have been hitherto averse to any fo- 
reign alliance : but their motives in this were 
founded upon malice, and not upon virtue. 
They would have no ally to be a witness of 
the wrongs they do ; they declined the society 
of such as might put them to the blush. Their 
very island farther, which is finely situated for 
such arbitrary tempers, suffereth them alone to 
judge those outrages they themselves commit : 
exempting them from fair and equitable trials, 
because they seldom go abroad to visit their 
neighbours, as their harbours are the constant 
and necessary resort of others. Here then 



14 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book I. 



lietli the modesty of tlieir unassociating max- 
im ; it was designed to prevent their having 
any partners in violence, that they might have 
it all to themselves ; that, when they were su- 
perior, they might oppress without control, 
when there was none to watch them they 
might engross the spoil, and might enjoy their 
rapine without danger of a blush. Had they 
been those virtuous souls they proclaim them- 
selves, then, clear of every bad imputation from 
their neighbours, they had a fine opportunity to 
manifest their integrity to the world by doing 
and by submitting to justice. 

" But such neither we nor any other people 
have in fact experienced them. For, though 
planted by us, they have ever disowned their 
allegiance to us, and now wage open war 
against us, pleading that they were not sent 
abroad to be maltreated and oppressed. We 
also aver in our own behalf, that neither did 
we send them to receive their injurious re- 
quitals, but to retain them in lawful depen- 
dence, and to be honoured and reverenced by 
them. Such dutiful returns the rest of our 
colonies punctually make us, and by such no 
otlipr people are so well respected as ourselves. 
From the great satisfaction therefore we give 
to all the rest, it plainly appeareth, that we 
afford no reasonable disgust to these alone, 
and that without some glaring injury, we should 
have had no inclination to declare war against 
them. But, though we had actually trans- 
gressed, it would have been quite decent on 
their part to have shown condescension when 
we were angry ; and then it would have been 
base in us to have pressed too far on such 
moderation. To their pride and the insolence 
of wealth their many transgressions against us 
are justly to be ascribed. Hence it was, that 
they laid no claim to Epidamnus, which be- 
longeth to us, whilst harassed with intestine 
feuds; but when we came to its redress, then 
by force they seize and detain it. And now 
they pretend that previous to that they were 
willing to have submitted to a fair arbitration, 
— Such pleas are not to be regarded, when of- 
fered by men who are already masters in pos- 
session, and on that security make appeal to 
justice : they are only of weight, when facts 
and words are equitably to be judged, before 
the point hath been decided by arms. And it 
was not before they had besieged that city, but 
when they thought that we were intent on sav- 
ing it, that they had recourse to the specious 



pretence of a fair arbitration. And here they 
are at present, by no means content with the 
wrongs they have there committed, presuming 
to ask conjunction from you, not in league but 
in violence, and on the merit of being rebels 
against us to beg your protection. Then was 
tlie proper time for such an address to you, 
when their affairs securely flourished ; not now 
when we have been outraged \fy them, and they 
are beset with dangers ; not when you, who 
have shared no benefit from their former power, 
are to relieve their distress, and by no means 
their accomplices in crimes are to come in for 
an equality of censure from us. A prior con- 
j unction of force justlj' entitleth to a share of 
what may be the event : but those who had no 
participation in the guilt ought to be exempted 
from the consequences of it. — And thus we 
have clearly shown, that we have addressed 
ourselves before you with all the requisites of 
a rightful cause, and that their proceedings are 
violent and rapacious. 

" It is now incumbent upon us to convince 
you, that you cannot with justice receive them 
into alliance. For, granting it to be expressly 
stipulated in the treaty that any of the states 
not particularly mentioned may go into either 
league at their own discretion, yet the intent 
of the stipulation reacheth not to those who 
join one party to the prejudice of another, but 
to such as having withdrawn from neither side 
are in need of protection — to such as bring not 
war instead of peace to those who receive 
them, — if they know their interest. And yet 
the latter must be your portion, if our argu- 
ments lose their influence: for you will not 
only become auxiliaries to them, but enemies 
also to us who are your allies by treaty. Of 
nccessit}', if you join with them, our vengeance 
must be levelled at them without separating 
you. Right above all things it would be for 
you to keep yourselves at a distance from us 
both ; — if that will not please, to reverse your 
proceedings, and join with us in opposition to 
them. For, to the Corinthians you arc bound 
by firm and lasting treaties, with the Corcy- 
reans you have never yet transacted even for a 
truce, and by no means to establisli a new law 
for receiving revolters from the other league. 
We ourselves did not, upon the Samian revolt, 
give our suffrage against you, when the rest of 
the Pcloponncsians were divided upon the 
question — whether they ought to be supported : 
but wo openly maintained, that every state had 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



15 



a right to proceed against its own dependents, j sent plausibilities, and enlarge it through a 
For if you receive and undertake the defence series of dangers. Our present circumstances 
of those who have behaved amiss, the event [ resemble those concerning which we explicitly 



will show that the greater number will come 
over to our side, and that you establish a law 
prejudicial to yourselves much more than to us. 
" The points of justice we have thus sufficient- 
ly cleared up to you, according to the general 
laws of Greece. We have only to add a word 
of advice and the claim of a favour, such a one 
as we now affirm upon a principle of gratitude 
ought not to be denied us, who are neither 
your enemies so far as to hurt you, nor ever 
were your friends so far as to burden you. 
When formerly before the invasion of the 
Medes, you were in want of long ships in your 
war against the ^ginetse, you were supplied by 
the Corinthians with twenty. The service 
which we then did you, and that other more re- 
cent about the Samians, when we prevented 
their receiving any support from the Pelopon- 
nesians, enabled you in their turns to vanquish 
the ^ginetse and to chastise the Samians. And 
these services were done you at a season when 
the human attention, fixed entirely on war, re- 
gardeth nothing but what tendeth to victory. 
Whoever forwardeth this, men esteem their 
friend, though he was before their foe ; and him 
who checketh it, their foe, though perhaps he 
may be their real friend. For even domestic 
affairs are sorrily conducted at a time when the 
mind is inflamed by contention. 

" Recollect these things. Let the young man 
learn the truth of them from his elders, and ac- 
knowledge that we ought to be properly requit- 
ed. Let him not entertain the thought, that 
what we say is agreeable to equity, but that in 
case of a war interest inclineth another way : 
for interest is most surely to be found there 
where the least injustice is committed. The 
contingency of that war, from the dread of 
which the Corcyreans encourage you to act un- 
justly, lieth yet in obscurity, and ought not to 
inflame you into open and immediate hostilities 
against the Corinthians. It would be prudent, 
farther, to lessen that jealousy we have already 
conceived from the proceedings at Megara. 
For a later obligation, by the favour of time, 
though of less weight in itself, is able to cancel 

a charge of greater moment. Neither suffer , .embly. From them they expected no sound instruc- 
yoursolves to be allured with the promise of a tion, no disinterested advice. If any such offered to 
powerful conjunction of naval force : for never i ^pei>k, the presidents of the assembly immcdintely en- 

to act unjustly against equals is a firmer gg- J°J"f*^ ''^^"^ '*'*^"''''" °''' '^ ^'^^^ ^^'^""^ ''^'"'••''^^^^y' °''^'''"- 
.^ r ^1 X 1 , 1 ^" -"6"" offirers to pull them down and turn them out 

cunty of power than to be elevated upon pre- | of the assembly. 



declared at Lacedemon, that every state had a 
right to proceed against its own dependents : 
and now we beg that liberty from you ; and 
that you, who have reaped the benefit of such 
a suffrage from us, would not prejudice us by 
yours. Render us for it the just requital ; 
remembering that this is the critical season, in 
which he who aideth is the best of friends, and 
he that opposeth the greatest foe. And, as 
for these Corcyreans, take them not into your 
alliance in despite of us, nor abet them in the 
injuries the}^ have done us. By acting in this 
manner you will discharge the obligations in- 
cumbent upon you, and will take those mea- 
sures which are most for your own advantage." 
This is the substance of what was said by the 
Corinthians. 

The Athenians having heard both parties, 
' met twice in full assembly on this occasion. 
At the first meeting they thought there was 
validity in the arguments of the Corinthians ; 
but, at the second, they came to a different re- 
solution — not indeed to form such an alliance 
with the Corcyreans as to have the same ene- 
mies and the same friends (for then, if the 
Corcyreans should summon them to join in an 



1 Here the English reader should he informed, in 
what manner business went on when difficulties, diver- 
sities of opinion, and consequently debates ensued. 

When it appeared that the point proposed would not 
passunanimoiisly, the crier, at the command of the pre- 
sident in the chair, proclaimed aloud, " What citizen 
above fifty years of age hath a mind to speak?" When 
such had been heard, the crier made a second proclama- 
tion,t hat "any Athenian whatever had liberty to speak." 
The debate being ended, the president in the chair bade 
the crier put the question. It was decided by holding 
up of hands. The chairman distinguished the numbers 
in the affirmative and negative, and declared the major- 
ity. Then the resolution or decree was drawn up in 
form: and the Archon's name who gave title to the 
year, the diiy of the month, and the name of the presid- 
ing tribe, were prefixed. 

The public decorum of the Athenians is worthy ob- 
servation. The sentiments of age and experience were 
first to be heard, ai.d then the spirit and resolution of 
the younger were called in to assist at the public con- 
sultation. Nay, they carried it farther ; no person con- 
victed of profaneness, debauchery, cowardice, or pub- 
lic misdemeanour, was suffered to speak in this as- 



16 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book I. 



expedition against Corinth, their treaty with 
the Peloponnesians would be broke ;) but an 
alliance merely defensive, for the reciprocal 
succour of one another, if either Corcyra 
or Athens, or any of their respective allies 
should be assaulted. A war with the Pelo- 
ponnesians seemed to them unavoidable ; and 
they had no mind to leave Corcyra, which 
had so great a naval force, for a prey to the 
Corinthians; but, to break them to the utmost 
of their power against one another, that upon 
occasion they might be the better able to war 
with the Corinthians, thus weakened to their 
hands, though joined by other states of Greece 
which had power at sea. At the same time 
that island appeared to them most conveniently 
situated in the passage to Italy and Sicily. 
Upon these motives the Athenians received 
the Corcyreans into their alliance: and, not 
long after the departure of the Corinthians, 
sent ten ships to their aid under the command 
of Lacedemonius the son of Cimon, Diotimus 
the son of Strombichus, and Proteas the son 
of Epicles. Their orders were, " by no means 
to engage the Corinthians, unless they stood 
against and endeavoured to make a descent at 
Corcyra, or any of its dependent places ; if 
they did so, to resist them with all their efTorts." 
These orders were given with a view of not 
infringing the treaty: and this their aid of 
shipping arriveth at Corcyra. 

The Corinthians, when they had completed 
their preparations, set sail for Corcyra with a 
fleet of one hundred and fifty ships. Of these, 
ten belonged to the Eleans, twelve to the Me- 
gareans, ten to the Leucadians, twenty-seven 
to the Ambraciots, one to the Anactorians, and 
the other ninety were their own. The quotas 
from the allied cities had each of them their 
respective commanders; but the Corinthian 
squadron was commanded by Xenoclides the 
son of Euthycles, with four colleagues. So 
soon as they were all assembled at that part of 
the continent which looks towards Corcyra, 
they set sail from Leucas, and arrive at the 
Chimerium in Thesprotis. A harbour open- 
eth itself here, and above it is the city of 
Ephyre, at a distance from the sea, in Eleatis, 
a district of Thesprotis : near it is the outlet 
into the sea of the lake of Acherusia, into 
which the river Acheron, having run through 
Thesprotis, is at last recoivod ; from which also 
it deriveth its name. The river Thyamis also 
ninncth here, dividing Thesprotis from Ccs- 



trine, and between these two rivers ariseth the 
cape of Chimerium. The Corinthians there- 
fore arrive at this part of the continent, and fix 
their station there. But the Corcyreans so 
soon as ever advised of their sailing, having 
manned a hundred and ten ships under the 
command of Miciades, JEsimides, and Eury- 
batus, took their station at one of those isles 
which are called the Sybota, accompanied by 
the ten Athenian ships. Their land-force was 
left at the promontory of Leucimna, with an 
aid of a thousand heavy-armed Zacynlhians. 
The Corinthians had also ready upon the con- 
tinent a numerous aid of barbarians : for the 
people on that coast ever continued their 
friends. When every thing was in order among 
the Corinthians, taking in provisions for three 
days, they weigh by night from Chimerium 
with a design to fight ; and having sailed along 
till break of day, they discover the ships of the 
Corcyreans already out at sea, and advancing 
against them. When thus they had got a view 
of each other, both sides form into the order 
of battle. In the right wing of the Corcyreans 
were the Athenian ships ; the rest of the fleet 
was all their own, ranged into three squadrons, 
each of which was respectively under the orders 
of the three commanders : in this manner was 
the order of the Corcyreans formed. In the 
right of the Corinthians were the ships of the 
Megareans and Ambraciots ; in the centre the 
other allies in their several arrangements ; the 
Corinthians formed the left wing themselves, 
as their ships were the best sailers, to oppose 
the Athenians and the right of the Corcyreans. 
When' the signal flags were hoisted on both 



1 To give the En<;lish reader, once for all, a proper 
lislit info tbeir method of beginning an engasoment, I 
shall quote the followinji paragraph from arclil ishop 
Potter's Archtpologia, vol. ii. c. 21. 

" Before they joined battle, both parties invoked the 
gods to their assistance by prayers and sacrifices ; and 
the admirals, going from ship to ship in some of the 
lighter vessels, exhorted their soldiers in a set oration to 
behave themselves like men ; then all thin!;? 1 ring in 
readiness, the signal wr.s given by hanging out of the 
admiral's galley a gilded shield, as we read in Plutarch, 
or a red gnrment or banner, which was termed aiput 
<ry.,uitx. During the elevation of thisthe fight continued, 
and by its depression or inclination towards the right or 
left, the rest of the ships were directed in what manner 
to attack their enemies. or retreat from them. To this 
was added the sound of trumpets, which was bejjun in 
the admiral's galley, and continued round the whole na- 
vy ; it was likewise usual for the soldiers l>efore the fight 
to sing a piran or hymn to Mars, and after the fight 
another to Apollo." 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



17 



sides, they ran together and began the engage- 
ment; both sides having stowed their decks 
with bodies of heavy-armed, with many further 
that drew the bow or tossed the javelin. 
Their preparations still retained something of 
the awkward manner of antiquity. The engage- 
ment was sharply carried on, yet without exer- 
tions of skill, and very much resembling a 
battle upon land. When they had laid one 
another close, they were not easily separated 
again, because of the number and hurry of the 
vessels. The greatest hope of victory was 
placed in the heavy-armed fighting on the decks, 
who fixed to their post engaged hand to hand, 
whilst their ships continued without any mo- 
tion. They had no opportunity to make their 
charges and tacks, but fought it out by dint of 
strength and courage without any dexterity. 
The tumult was great on all sides, and the 
whole action full of disorder: in which the 
Athenian ships relieved the Corcyrean where- 
ever they were pressed too hard, and did what 
they could to intimidate the enemy ; but their 
commanders refrained from any direct attack, 
remembering with awe the orders of the Athe- 
nians. The right wing of the Corinthians suf- 
fered the most ; for the Corey reans with twenty 
ships, having put them to flight, chased them 
when dispersed to the continent, and continu- 
ing the pursuit to their very camp, landed imme- 
diately, where they set fire to their abandoned 
tents and carried ofF all the baggage : in this 
part therefore the Corinthians and their allies 
were vanquished, and the Corey reans were 
plainly superior. But in the left, where the 
Corinthians personally engaged, they easily 
prevailed, as twenty ships of the Corcyreans, 
and those too from a number at first inferior, 
were gone ofT in the pursuit. But the Athe- 
nians, seeing the Corcyreans thus distressed, 
now came up to their support more openly than 
before, having hitherto refrained from any direct 
attack. And when the chase was clearly be- 
gun, and the Corinthians followed their success, 
then every one amongst them applied himself 
to action. There was no longer any time for 
discretion: Corinthians and Athenians were 
forced by absolute necessity to engage one an- 
other. 

The chase being thus begun, the Corinthians 
towed not after them the hulks of the vessels 
they had sunk, but turned all their attention 
to the men who were floating about, and cruiz- 
ed at large more to slaughter than take alive. 
10 



And, having not yet discovered the defeat of their 
right, they slaughtered through ignorance their 
own friends. For the number of ships being large 
on either side, and covering a wide extent of sea, 
after the first confusion of the engagement they 
were not able easily to distinguish which were 
the victors or which the vanquished : since Gre- 
cians against Grecians had never at any time be- 
fore engaged at sea with so large a number of 
vessels. But after the Corinthians had pursued 
the Corcyreans to land, they returned to look 
after their shattered vessels and their own 
dead. And most of these they took up and 
carried to Sybota, where also lay the land-force 
of their barbarian auxiliaries : this Sybota is a 
desert haven in Thesprotis. Having performed 
this duty, they gathered together again into a 
body and went in quest of the Corcyreans, who 
with those damaged vessels that yet could 
swim, and with all that had no damage, to- 
gether with the Athenians, came out to meet 
them, fearing lest they might attempt to land 
upon their shore. It was now late in the day, 
and they had sung their paean as going to at- 
tack, when on a sudden the Corinthians* 
slackened their course, having descried a rein- 
forcement of tweaty sail coming up from 
Athens. This second squadron the Athe- 
nians had sent away to support the former ten, 
fearing (what really happened) lest the Corcy- 
reans might be vanquished, and their own ten 
ships be too few for their support. The Co- 
rinthians, therefore, having got a view of them, 
and suspecting they came from Athens, and 
in a larger number than they yet discovered, 
began gradually to fall away. They were not 
yet descried by the Corcyreans (for the course 
kept them more out of their ken), who were 
surprised to see the Corinthians thus slacken 
their course, till some, who had gained a view, 
informed them that such ships are coming up, 
and then they also fell back themselves : for 
now it began to be dark, and the Corinthians 
being turned about had dissolved their order. 
In this manner they were separated from one 
another : and the naval engagement ended with 
the night. 

The Corcyreans having recovered their sta- 



» The original is 7rfu,«v«v sKfooovTo.they knocked the 
hind deck, a phrase elegantly applied by Tiiucydidefl 
to those that retreat fighting, and still facing their ene- 
mies. It was done by running their ships backwards 
upon their hind decks in order to tack about. See Pot- 
ter's ArchsBOlogia, vol. ii. c. 20. 



G 



18 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book I. 



tion at Leucymna, those twenty ships from | 
Athens, under the command of Glauco the I 
son of Leager, and Andocides the son of Leo- 
goras, having passed through floating carcases 
and wrecks, came up to the station, not long 
after they had been descried. Yet the Cor- 
cyreans (for now it was night) were in great 
consternation lest they should be enemies : 
but they were soon known, and then came to 
an anchor. 

Next morning the thirty Athenian ships, 
accompanied by such of the Corcyrcans as were 
fit for sea, weighed away and made over for 
the haven at Sybota where the Corinthians 
lay, designing to try whether or no they would 
engage again. The Corinthians, putting their 
ships from off the shore and drawing up into 
order in the deeper water, remained there with- 
out advancing. They had no design or in- 
clination to begin another engagement, as they 
were sensible of the junction of the fresh 
Athenian ships, and of the numerous difficul- 
ties with which they were beset, about the 
custody of the prisoners whom they had on 
board, and the want of necessary materials to 
repair their ships upon this desert coast. Their 
thoughts were more employed upon their re- 
turn home, and the method to accomplish it, 
from the apprehension lest the Athenians, 
judging the league to be broke as they had come 
to blows, might obstruct their passage. For 
this reason they determined beforehand to des- 
patch a boat with proper persons, though with- 
out the solemn protection of a herald, and so 
to sound their intentions. The message to be 
delivered was this : 

" You are guilty of injustice, ye men of 
Athens, in beginning war and violating treaties : 
for you hinder us from taking due vengeance 
upon our enemies, by lifting up your arms 
against us. If you are certainly determined to 
hinder our course, either against Corcyra or 
any other place whither we are willing to go, 
and so violate treaties, take us first who are 
here in your power, and treat us as enemies." 

The persons sent thus delivered their mes- 
sage : and the whole company of the Corcyrc- 
ans who heard it, shouted out immediately to 
« apprehend and put them to death." But the 
Athenians returned this answer. 

" We neither begin war, ye men of Pelo- 
ponnesus, nor violate treaties. We arc come 
hither auxiliaries to these Corcyrcans our al- 
lies. If therefore you are desirous to sail to 



any other place, we hinder you not. But, if 
you go against Corcyra or any other place be- 
longing to it, we shall endeavor to oppose you, 
to the utmost of our power." 

Upon receiving this answer from the Athe- 
nians, the Corinthians prepared for their return 
home, and erected a trophy at Sybota on the 
continent. But the Corcyrcans were employed 
in picking up the wrecks and bodies of the 
dead, driving towards them by favour of the 
tide and the wind, which blowing fresh the 
night before had scattered them all about ; and, 
as if they too had the victory, erected an op- 
posite trophy at Sybota in the island. The 
reasons upon which each side thus claimed the 
victory, were these. The Corinthians erected 
a trophy, because they had the better of the 
engagement till night, and so were enabled to 
pick up most of the shatters and the dead ; 
they had, further, taken a number of prisoners, 
not less than a thousand, and had disabled about 
seventy ships of the enemy. — The Corcyrcans 
did the same : because they also had disabled 
about thirty ; and, upon the coming up of the 
Athenians, had recovered all the wreck and 
dead bodies driving towards them ; and because 
the Corinthians tacking about had retired from 
them the night before, so soon as they descried 
the Athenian ships ; and when they came to 
offer them battle at Sybota, durst not come out 
against them. In this manner did both sides 
account themselves victorious. 

The Corinthians, in their passage home- 
wards, by stratagem seized Anactorium, which 
lieth in the mouth of the gulf of Ambracia. 
It belonged in common to the Corcyrcans and 
themselves. They put it entirely into the 
hands of the Corinthian inhabitants, and then 
retired to their own home. Eight hundred of 
their Corcyrean prisoners who were slaves, 
they sold at public sale. Two hundred and 
fifty thev reserved in safe custody, and treated 
them with extraordinary good usage, that after 
their ransom they might serve them in their 
design of gaining Corcyra : for the majority of 
them were persons of the greatest authority in 
that state. Thus, therefore, is Corcyra pre- 
served in the war of the Coiinthians ; and the 
ships of the Athenians after such service left 
them. But this was the first ground of war 
to the Corinthians against the Athenians, be- 
cause they had assisted the Corcyrcans in a 
naval engagement against themselves, who 
were in treaty with them. 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



19 



Immediately after this transaction, other 
misunderstandings also happened between the 
Athenians and Peloponnesians, tending to a 
war. For all the schemes of the Corinthi- 
ans aiming at revenge, the Athenians, jealous 
of their enmity, sent an order to the inhabi- 
tants of Potidaea situated upon the isthmus 
of Pallene, (and, though a Corinthian colony, 
yet allied with and tributary to them,) " to 
demolish that part of their wall which faceth 
the Pallene, to give them hostages, to send 
away the epidemiurgi, and not to receive those 
magistrates for the future, who were annually 
sent them from Corinth." They were appre- 
hensive of a revolt at the instigation of Perdic- 
cas and the Corinthians, and their seducing 
into the same defection the other dependents 
of Athens in Thrace. These steps the Athe- 
nians thought proper to take with the people 
of Potidaea, immediately after the sea-fight of 
Corcyra. For the Corinthians were manifestly 
at variance with them, and Perdiccas the son 
of Alexander king of the Macedonians was 
now become their enemy, who before had been 
their ally and friend. His enmity was occa- 
sioned by an alliance the Athenians had form- 
ed with his brother Philip and Derdas, who 
were jointly in opposition against him. Alarm- 
ed at this, he sent proper persons to Lacedemon 
to stir up against them a Peloponnesian war, 
and to draw over the Corinthians into his in- 
terest, in order to bring about the revolt of 
Potidaea. He had also been tampering with 
the Chalcideans of Thrace and the Bottiaeans 
to persuade them to revolt at the same time ; 
concluding, that if he could bring about a junc- 
tion of the adjacent people, he might venture a 
war against them with greater probability of 
success. The Athenians perceived his scheme, 
and were desirous to prevent the revolt of the 
cities. They had begun an expedition against 
his territories with a fleet of thirty ships and a 
thousand heavy-armed, under the command of 
Archestratus the son of Lycomedes associated 
with ten others in this service. They gave 
particular orders to the commanders to take 
hostages from the Potidaeans and to demolish 
their walls, and to keep a watchful eye over 
the neighbouring cities that they might not 
revolt. The Potidaeans had already sent am- 
bassadors to the Athenians, to dissuade them 
if possible from the execution of ' any new 
designs against them : and had at the same 
time despatched an embassy to Lacedemon 



along with the Corinthians, instructed to pro- 
cure a promise of redress if there should be oc- 
casion. But, when their long negotiation at 
Athens proved quite ineffectual, and the fleet 
was gone out to sea both against Macedonia 
and themselves ; when, farther, the regency at 
Lacedemon had given a promise to make an 
irruption into Attica, if the Athenians should 
attempt any thing against Potidaea ; upon this 
encouragement, without loss of time, they revolt 
in conjunction with the Chalcideans and Bot- 
tia>ans, all combined by an oath of mutual de- 
fence and support. Perdiccas, farther, prevail- 
eth with the Chalcideans to abandon and de- 
molish all their towns upon the sea-coast, and 
then to remove to Olynthus and fortify that 
town by a junction of all their strength. And 
to these people, thus abandoning their own 
homes, he made a cession of that part of Myg- 
donia which lieth round the lake of Bolbe, for 
their subsistence during the war with the 
Athenians. Having thus demolished their own 
cities, they went to another place of residence, 
and were employed in preparations for the war. 

The thirty ships of the Athenians, arriving 
on the coasts of Thrace, find Potidaea and the 
other cities already revolted. The comman- 
ders, judging it impossible with their present 
strength to act against Perdiccas and the re- 
volted cities both, turn their course towards 
Macedonia, pursuing the first design of the ex- 
pedition. Landing there they joined in the 
war with Philip and the brothers of Derdas, 
who with an army had made an irruption from 
the inland country. 

In the mean time, Potidaea being now in 
revolt and the Athenian fleet on the Macedo- 
nian coasts, the Corinthians, anxious for the 
security of that place, and making the danger 
their own, despatched thither some volunteers 
of their own people and other Peloponnesians 
taken into their pay, in all sixteen hundred 
heavy-armed^ and four hundred light-armed. 
The command of this body of men was given 
to Aristeus the son of Adamantus; since, out 
of their own private affection to him who had 

* The heavy-armed wore a complete suit of armour» 
and engaged with broad shields and long spears. They 
were the flower and strength of the Grecian armies, and 
had the highest rank of military honour. The light- 
armed were designed for skirmishes and fighting at a 
distance : their weapons were arrows, darts, or slings. 
The targeteers mentioned often in this history, were a 
middle sort of soldiery, armed witli targets or narrow 
shields and spears, neither large nor heavy. 



20 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[UOOK I. 



ever been a steady friend to Potida;a, most of 
the volunteers from Corinth had undertaken 
the service; and the time of their arrival in 
Thrace was the fortieth day after the revolt of 
Potidsea. 

An express soon arrived at Athens with the 
news of the revolt of the cities, and when after- 
wards they heard of the arrival of that body 
under Aristeus, they send away two thousand 
of their heavy armed, and forty ships under the 
command of Callias the son of Calliades, and 
four colleagues, to reduce the revolted. These, 
arriving first of all in Macedonia, find the 
former thousand employed in besieging Pydne, 
having a little before got possession of Ther- 
me. They sat down with them for a time to 
carry on the siege of Pydne ; but afterwards, 
making with Perdiccas a composition and alli- 
ance the best they could in their present exi- 
gency, since Potidsea and the arrival of Aris- 
teus were very urgent points, they evacuate 
Macedonia. They marched next to Beraea ; 
and turning from thence, after having first 
made an unsuccessful attempt upon the place, 
they marched by land towards Potidsea. Their 
army consisted of three thousand heavy-armed 
of their own, without including a large body of 
auxiliaries, and six hundred Macedonian horse, 
who had served with Philip and Pausanias; 
seventy ships at the same time sailed along the 
coast. And thus, by moderate marches, they 
came up in three days to Gigonus, and there 
encamped. 

The Potidaeans, with the body of Pelopon- 
nesians commanded by Aristeus, excepting the 
Athenians, had formed a camp near Olynthus, 
within the isthmus, and had a market kept for 
them without the city. The command of the 
infantry had been given to Aristeus by the 
voice of the confederates, and that of the 
cavalry to Perdiccas; for now again he had 
abruptly broken with the Athenians and joined 
the Potidaeans, deputing lolaus to command in 
his absence. It was the design of Aristeus, 
by encamping the body under his own com- 
mand within the isthmus, to observe the 
motions of the Athenians if they advanced, 
whilst without the isthmus, the Chalcideans 
and allies, and two hundred horse belonging to 
Perdiccas, should continue at Olynthus, who, 
when the Athenians came forwards against 
them, were to throw themselves in their rear, 
and thus shut up the enemy between the two 
bodies. But Callias, the general of the Athe- 



nians, in concert with his colleagues, detaches 
the Macedonian horse, and a few of their allies, 
to Olynthus, to prevent any sally from thence ; 
and then, breaking up their camp, they marched 
directly for Potidaea. But, when they were 
advanced as far as the isthmus, and saw their 
enemies drawn up in order to fight, they also 
formed ; and in a little time they came to an 
action. The wing under Aristeus, Corin- 
thians and the very flower of their strength, 
who engaged with him, soon compelled their 
enemies to turn their backs, and pursued exe- 
cution to a great distance ; but the rest of the 
army, composed of Potidaeans and Pelopon- 
nesians, were defeated by the Athenians, amd 
chased to the very walls of Potidaea. Aristeus, 
returning from his pursuit, perceived the rout 
of the rest of the army, and knew not whither, 
with the least hazard, to retreat, whether to 
Olynthus or Potidaea. But, at last, he deter- 
mined to embody together those he had about 
him, and, as Potidaea lay at the smallest dis- 
tance, to throw himself into it with all possible 
speed. This, with difficulty, he eflfected, by 
plunging into the water near the abutments of 
the pier, amidst a shower of missive weapons, 
with the loss, indeed, of some of his men, but 
the safety of the larger number. 

Those who should have come to succour the 
Potideans from Olynthus, which is at no 
greater distance than sixty stadia,' and situ- 
ated in view, at the beginning of the battle, 
when the colours were elevated,^ advanced, 
indeed, a little way, as designing to do it, and 
the Macedonian horse drew up against them 
as designing to stop them. But, as the vic- 
tory was quickly gained by the Athenians, and 
the colours were dropped, they retired agadn 
within the walls, and the Macedonians marched 
away to the Athenians : so that the cavalry of 
neither side had any share in the action. After 
the battle the Athenians erected a trophy, and 
granted a suspension of arms to the Potida'ans 
for fetching off their dead. There were killed 
of the Potidaeans and allies very near three 

» About six miles. 

a Tlie elevation of the colours or ensiens, was the 
siKnal of joiniiiR liattle, and they were kept up during 
the whole rontinuanre of it : tlic depression of them, 
was a signal to desist, or the consequence of a defeat. 
Tiie depression of the colours in this instance, wiis a 
proof to the Macedonian cavalry, that all was over. 
The Athenians in their colours hore an owl, as sacred to 
Minerva, the tutelary Roddess of Athens. Sec rotter's 
ArchecologiaGrsca, vol. ii. c.9. 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



2^1 



hundred, and of the Athenians one hundred 
and fifty, with Callias their general. 

The Athenians without loss of time, throw- 
ing up a work against the wall which faceth the 
isthmus, blockaded the place on that side, but 
the wall towards the Pallene they left as they 
found it. For they thought their number was 
by no means sufficient to keep the guard 
within the isthmus, and to pass over to the 
Pallene side, and block it up also there. They 
were apprehensive, that thus divided, the Poti- 
dseans and their allies might fall upon them. 
And the Athenians at home, hearing there was 
no work on the Pallene side, sent thither a 
thousand and six hundred heavy-armed of 
their own people, under the command of Phor- 
mio the son of Asophius, who arriving upon 
the Pallene, and having landed his men at 
Aphytis, marched forward to Potidaea, advan- 
cing slowly and laying waste the country as he 
moved along. And, as nobody ventured out to 
give him opposition, he also threw up a work 
against that side of the wall which faceth the 
Pallene. By these methods was Potidaea close- 
ly blocked up on either side, and also by the 
ships which lay before it at sea. 

The blockade being thus perfected, Aristeus, 
destitute of any means of saving the place, un- 
less some relief should arrive from Pelopon- 
nesus, or some miracle should happen, proposed 
it as his advice, that " all excepting five hun- 
dred men should lay hold of the first favourable 
wind to quit the place, that the provisions 
might for a longer time support the rest;" 
declaring his own readiness to be one of 
those who staid behind." Though he could 
not prevail with them, yet willing in this 
plunge to do what could be done, and to 
manage affairs abroad in the best manner he 
was able, he made his escape by sea undis- 
covered by the Athenian guard. Continuing 
now amongst the Chalcideans, he made what 
military efforts he could, and killed many of 
the inhabitants of Sermyle by an ambuscade 
he formed before that city ; and endeavoured 
to prevail with the Peloponnesians to send up 
a timely relief. Phormio, also, after com- 
pleting the works round Potidsea, with his 
sixteen hundred men ravaged Chalcidica and 
Bottiaea ; and some fortresses he took by storm. 

These were the reciprocal causes of dissen- 
tion between the Athenians and Pelopon- 
nesians. The Corinthians were enraged at 
the blockade of Potidaea, a colony of their 



own, in which were shut up both Corinthians 
and other Peloponnesians. The Athenians 
resented the proceedings of the Peloponnesians, 
in seducing to a revolt a city in alliance with 
and tributary to them, and siding openly, by a 
voluntary expedition, with the warring rebels 
of Potidaea. Yet a war, open and avowed, 
had not yet broke out between them ; hostilities 
were suspended for a time. Hitherto it was 
merely a private quarrel of the Corinthians. 

But when once the blockade of Potidaea 
was formed, the Corinthians could hold no 
longer. In it their own people were shut up, 
and they were at the same time in anxiety 
about the place. They summoned their allies 
to repair immediately to Lacedemon, and 
thither they went themselves, with loud ac- 
cusations against the Athenians, "that they 
had violated the treaty, and injured Pelopon- 
nesus." The ^ginetae, indeed, from a dread 
of the Athenians, did not openly despatch their 
embassy ; but underhand they had a great share 
in fomenting the war, asserting, that <' they 
were restrained in the privilege of governing 
themselves, which had been allowed them by 
the treaty." 

The Lacedemonians, summoning to appear 
before them, not barely their allies, but who- 
ever had any manner of charge to prefer against 
the Athenians, assembled in grand council, as 
usual, and commanded them to speak ; others 
who were present laid open their respective 
complaints, but the Megareans preferred the 
largest accusations, in particular, that, " they 
had been prohibited the use of all the harbours 
in the Athenian dominions, and the market of 
Athens, contrary to the treaty." The Corin- 
thians were the last who stood forth. Having 
first allowed sufficient time to others to exaspe- 
rate the Lacedemonians, they preferred their 
own charge as followeth : — 

" That faith, ye Lacedemonians, which ever 
both in public conduct and in private life, you 
so punctually observe, rendereth what others, 
what we ourselves, may have to say, more 
difficult to be believed. By it you have gained 
indeed the reputation of probity, but contract 
a prejudicial ignorance in regard to remote 
occurrences. For, though we have frequently 
suggested to you, what wrongs we were appre- 
hensive of receiving from the Athenians, yet 
have you not deigned to make inquiry into the 
grounds of those suggestions, but rather have 
suspected our ingenuity as speaking from selfish 
o2 



22 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book I. 



views and private resentments. And it is not 
to prevent our sufferings, but now, when we 
already feel their weight, that you convene 
these confederates together ; before whom, we 
ought to be indulged in a larger share of dis- 
course, as we have by much the largest share 
of complaints to utter; wronged as we have 
been by the Athenians, and by you neglected. 

" If indeed by treachery, lurking and unob- 
served, they had violated the peace of Greece, 
those who had not discerned it might justly 
have demanded expUcit proofs. But now, 
what need can there be of multiplying words, 
when some you already see enslaved ; against 
others, and those not the meanest of your allies, 
the same fate intended; and the aggressors 
fully prepared to receive you, if at length a war 
should be declared] With other views, they 
had not clandestinely laid hands on Corcyra 
and forcibly detained it from us, nor had they 
dared to block up Potidaea; of which places, 
this latter lieth the most convenient for ex- 
tending our power in Thrace, the former could 
supply Peloponnesus with the greatest navy. 
But to your account these events are to be 
charged, who after the invasion of the Medes 
first suffered the strength of Athens to be in- 
creased, and afterwards their long walls to be 
erected. Ever since you have connived at 
liberty overthrown, not only in whatever com- 
munities they have proceeded to enslave, but 
now where even your own confederates are 
concerned. For not to the men who rivet on 
the chains of slavery, but to such as, though 
able, yet neglect to prevent it, ought the sad 
event with truth to be imputed ; especially 
when assuming superior virtue they boast them- 
selves the deliverers of Greece. 

" With much ado we are now met together 
in council, but not even now upon the plain 
and obvious points. We ought not to be any 
longer debating whether we have been injured, 
but by what measures we should avenge our- 
selves. The aggressors, having long since 
planned out their proceedings, are not about to 
make, but are actually making attacks upon 
those, who are yet come to no resolution. Nor 
are we unexperienced by what steps, what 
gradual advances, the Athenians break in upon 
their neighbours. Imagining themselves to be 
still undiscovered, they show themselves the 
less audacious because you are insensible. But 
when once they know you alarmed and on your 
guard, they will press more resolutely forwards. 



For you, Lacedaemonians, are the only people 
of Greece, who sit indolently at ease, protecting 
not with present but with promised succour : 
you alone pull down, not the commencing but 
the redoubled strength of your foes. You have 
indeed enjoyed the reputation of being steady, 
but are indebted for it more to report than 
fact. We ourselves know, that the Persian 
had advanced from the ends of the earth quite 
into Peloponnesus, before you exerted your 
dignity in resistance. Now also you take no 
notice of the Athenians, not remote as he was 
but seated near you ; and, instead of invading 
them, choose rather to lie upon your defence 
against their invasions ; and, to expose your- 
selves more to the hazards of war, against a 
grown augmented power. And all this while 
you know, that the Barbarian was guilty of 
many errors in his conduct: and the very 
Athenians frequently, in their contests with 
us, have been defeated more through their own 
blunders than the vigour of your resistance; 
for their confidence in you hath caused the 
destruction of some, who upon that very confi- 
dence were taken unprepared. 

" Let no one in this assembly imagine, that 
we speak more from malice than just grounds 
of complaint. Complaint is just towards 
friends who have failed in their duty ; accusa- 
tion is against enemies guilty of injustice. And 
surely, if any people ever had, we have good 
reason to think we have ample cause to throw 
blame upon our neighbours ; especially, when 
such great embroilments have arose, of which 
you seem to have no manner of feeling, nor 
ever once to have reflected, in regard to the 
Athenians, with what sort of people, how far, 
and how in every point unlike yourselves, you 
must soon contend. They are a people fond 
of innovations, quick not only to contrive, but 
to put their schemes into effectual execution : 
your method is, to preserve what you already 
have, to know nothing further, and when in 
action to leave something needful ever unfin- 
ished. They again are daring beyond their 
strength, adventurous beyond the bounds of 
judgment, and in extremities full of hope : 
your method is, in action to drop below your 
power, never resolutely to follow the dictates 
of your judgment, and in the pressure of a 
calamity to despair of a deliverance. Ever 
active as they are, they stand against you who 
are habitually indolent : ever roaming abroad, 
against you who think it misery to lose sight 



PELOPONNE^IAN WAR. 



23 



of your liomes. Their view in shifting place is 
to enlarge their possessions : you imagine, that 
in foreign attempts you may lose your present 
domestic enjoyments. They, when once they 
have gained superiority over enemies, push 
forward as far as they can go ; and if defeated, 
are dispirited the least of all men. More than 
this, they are as lavish of their lives in the 
public service, as if those lives were not their 
own, whilst their resolution is ever in their 
power, ever ready to be exerted in the cause of 
their country. Whenever in their schemes 
they meet with disappointments, they reckon 
they have lost a share of their property : when 
those schemes are successful, the acquisition 
seemeth small in comparison with what they 
have farther in design : if they are baffled in 
executing a project, invigorated by reviving 
hope, they catch at fresh expedients to repair 
the damage. They are the only people who 
instantaneously project, and hope, and acquire ; 
so expeditious are they in executing whatever 
they determine. Thus, through toils and 
dangers they labour forwards so long as life 
continueth, never at leisure to enjoy what they 
already have, through a constant eagerness to 
acquire more. They have no other notion of 
a festival, than of a day whereon some needful 
point should be accomplished ; and inactive 
rest is more a torment to them than laborious 
employment. In short, if any one, abridging 
their characters, should say, they are formed 
by nature never to be at quiet themselves, nor 
to Bufler others to be so, he describeth them 
justly. 

" When such a state hath taken the lists of 
opposition against you, do ye dally, O Lacede- 
monians'? do you imagine that those people 
will not continue longest in the enjoyment of 
peace, who timely prepare to vindicate them- 
selves, and manifest a settled resolution to do 
themselves right whenever they are wronged] 
You, indeed, are so far observers of equity, as 
never to molest others, and stand on your 
guard merely to repel damage from yourselves ; 
— points you would not without difficulty se- 
cure, though this neighbouring state were 
governed by the same principles as you are; 
but now, as we have already shown 3'ou, your 
customs, compared with them, are quite obso- 
lete •, whereas, those which progressively im- 
prove, must, like all the works of art, be ever 
the best. Were, indeed, the continuance of 
peace ensured, unvarying manners would cer- 



tainly be preferable; but such people as are 
liable to frequent vicissitudes of foreign con- 
test, have need of great address to vary and 
refine their conduct. For this cause, the man- 
ners of the Athenians, improved by a long 
tract of experience, are formed in respect of 
yours upon a model entirely new. Here, there- 
fore, be the period fixed to that slow-moving 
policy you have hitherto observed. Hasten to 
the relief of others, to that of the Potidaeans, 
as by contract you are bound. Invade Attica 
without loss of time, that you may not leave 
your friends and your relations in the mercy of 
their most inveterate foes, and constrain us, 
through your sloth, to seek redress from a new 
alliance. Such a step, if taken by us, could 
neither scandalize the gods who take cognizance 
of solemn oaths, nor men who own their obli- 
gation ; for treaties are not violated by those 
who, left destitute by some, have recourse to 
others, but by such as, being sworn to give it, 
withhold their assistance in the time of need. 
Yet, if you are willing and ready to perform 
your parts, with you we firmly abide. lu 
changing then, we should be guilty of impiety ; 
and we never shall find others so nicely suited 
to the disposition of our own hearts. Upon 
these points form proper resolutions ; and exert 
yourselves, that the honour of Peloponnesus be 
not impaired under your guidance, who have 
received from your ancestors this great preem- 
inence." 

To this effect the Corinthians spoke. And it 
happened, that at this very juncture an Athenian 
embassy was at Lacedcmon, negotiating some 
other points ; who, so soon as they were ad- 
vertised of what had been said, judged it 
proper to demand an audience of the Lacede- 
monians. It was not their design to make the 
least reply to the accusations preferred against 
them by the complainant states, but in general 
to convince them, that " they ought not to 
form any sudden resolutions, but to consider 
matters with sedate deliberation." They were 
further desirous " to represent before them, 
the extensive power of their own state, to 
excite in the minds of the elder a recollection 
of those points they already knew, and to give 
the younger information in those of which 
they were ignorant ;" concluding, that " such a 
representation might turn their attention more 
to pacific measures than military operations." 
Addressing themselves, therefore, to the Lace- 
demonians, they expressed their desire to speak 



24 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book I. 



in the present assembly, if leave could be ob- 
tained. An order of admittance being imme- 
diately sent them, they approached, and deliv- 
ered themselves as followelh : 

<' It was not the design of this our embassy 
to enter into disputations with your confe- 
derates, but to negotiate the points for which 
our state hath employed us. Yet, having been 
advertised of the great ovitcry raised against us, 
hither we have repaired : not to throw in our 
plea against the accusations of the complainant 
states ; for you are not the judges before whom 
either we or they are bound to plead : but, to 
prevent your forming rash and prejudicial re- 
solutions, upon concerns of high importance, 
through the instigation of these your confede- 
rates. Our view is, farther, to convince you, 
notwithstanding the long comprehensive charge 
exhibited against us, that we possess with cre- 
dit what we have hitherto obtained, and that 
the state of Athens is deserving of honour and 
regard. 

" And what need is there here to go back 
to remote antiquity, where hearsay tradition 
must establish those facts to which the eyes of 
the audience are utter strangers'? This we 
shall wave ; and call forth first to your review 
the Persian invasions, and those incidents of 
which you are conscious, without regarding 
that chagrin which the remembrance of them 
will constantly excite in you. Our achieve- 
ments there were attended with the utmost 
danger : the consequence was public benefit, of 
which you received a substantial share: and 
though the glory of that acquisition may not 
be all our own, yet of a beneficial share we 
ought not to be deprived. This shall boldly 
be averred ; not with a view of soothing you, 
but doing justice to ourselves, and giving you 
to know against what a state, if your resolu- 
tions now are not discreetly taken, you are 
going to engage. For we aver, that we alone 
adventured to engage the barbarian in that most 
dangerous field of Marathon. And when, upon 
the second invasion, we were not able to make 
head by land, we threw ourselves on shipboard 
with all our people, to fight in conjunction 
with you by sea, at Salamis ; which prevented 
his sailing along the coasts of Peloponnesus, 
and destroying one by one your cities, unable 
to succour one another against that formidable 
fleet. The truth of this, the barbarian himself 
hath undeniably proved : for, thus defeated at 
sea, and unable to gather together again so 



large a force, he hastily retired with the greatest 
part of his army. In this so wonderful an 
event, where beyond dispute the preservation 
of Greece was achieved at sea, the three most 
advantageous instruments were contributed by 
us — the largest number of shipping — a person 
of the greatest abilities to command — and the 
most intrepid courage. For the number of 
ships, amounting in all to four hundred, very 
nearly two-thirds were our own. Themistocles 
was the commander, to whom principally it 
was owing that the battle was fought in the 
straits, which was undeniably the means of 
that great deliverance : and you yourselves paid 
him extraordinary honour on that very account,* 
more than ever to any stranger who hath ap- 
peared amongst you. We ourselves showed 
further, on this occasion, the most daring 
courage; since, though none before marched 
up to our succour, and every state already en- 
slaved had opened the road against us, we 
bravely determined to abandon even Athens, 
to destroy our own effects, nor, like the gene- 
rality of those who were yet undemolished, to 
desert the common cause, or dispersing our- 
selves to become useless to our allies, but — to 
embark at once, to face the urgent danger, 
without the least resentment against you for 



» Herodotus relates, that after the creat victory at 
Salamis, "the Grecians sailed to the Isthmus, to hestow 
the prize upon him who had deserved best of Greece, 
by his behaviour in tlie war. But upon their arrival, 
when the commanders gave in their billets on tiie altar 
of Neptune, in which they had wrote the name of hira 
who had behavrd best, and of him who was second, 
each of them had given the preference to his own self, 
but most of them asreed in awarding the second place 
to Themistocle?. Thus, while each competitor was 
only honoured with his own single voice for the first 
place, Themistocles was clearly adjudired to deserve 
the second. Envy prevented the Grecians from procee- 
ding to a just declaration, and they broke up and de- 
parted, leaving the point undecided. Themistocles, 
however, was celebrated and honoured as the man 
who in prudence far surpassed all the Grecians then 
alive. Thus denied the honour due to him, for having 
undoubtedly excelled them all in the alfair of Salamis, 
he immediately repaired to Lacedemon, desirous to have 
justice done him there. The Lacedemonians received 
him nobly, and honoured him abundantly. They gave, 
indeed, to EurPiiades the crown of olive.as first in valour; 
but for wisdom and dexterity they bestowed a second 
crown of olive on Themlatorlcs. They presented him 
further with the first chariot in Sparta. And after so 
much applause, he was conducted, in his return, to the 
frontier of Teiiea, by three hundred picked Spartans, 
who composed the royal guard. He was the only per- 
son ever known to have received such a compliment 
from the Spartang." Herodotus in Urania. 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



25 



your preceding backwardness of aid. So that 
we aver the service we then did you, to be no 
less than what we afterwards received. For 
to our aid, indeed, at last you came, from 
cities yet inhabited, from cities you ever de- 
signed should still be inhabited, when once 
you were alarmed for your own safety much 
more than for ours. So long as we were 
safe, your presence was in vain expected : but 
we, launching forth from a city no longer our 
own, and hazarding our all for a place we al- 
most despaired of recovering, effected our own 
preservation, and with it in a great measure 
yours. Had we, overcome with fear, gone 
over early to the Mede, as others did, to save 
our lands ; had we afterwards not dared, as 
men undone beyond recovery, to throw our- 
selves on board ; you had never been obliged 
to fight at sea, as not having sufficient strength 
to do it ; but the invader without a struggle 
would have leisurely determined the fate of 
Greece. 

*' Do we then deserve, Lacedemonians, that 
violence of envy with which the Grecians be- 
hold us, for the courage we manifested then, 
for our judicious resolution, and the superior 
power we now enjoy 1 That power, superior 
as it is, was by no means the effect of violent 
encroachments. You would not abide with 
us to glean away the relics of the Barbarian 
war. To us the associated states were obliged 
to have recourse, and entreat us to lead them 
to its completion. Thus, by the necessary 
exigence of affairs, obliged to be in action, we 
have advanced our power to what it now is : 
at first, from a principle of fear ; then from 
the principle of honour ; and at length, from 
that of interest. When envied by many, when 
obliged to reduce to their obedience some who 
had revolted, when you, no longer well dis- 
posed towards us, were actuated by jealousy 
and malice ; we thought it not consistent with 
our security to endanger our welfare by giving 
up our power, since every revolt from us was 
an accession of strength to you. No part of 
mankind will fix any reproach on men who try 
every expedient to ward off extremities of dan- 
ger. Nay, it is your own method also, Lace- 
dajmonians, to manage the states of Pelopon- 
nesus as suits your own interest best, and to 
prescribe them law. And, had you abided 
with us, and persevered in that invidious su- 
periority as we have done, we are well con- 
vinced that you would soon have grown no less 
11 



odious to your allies ; and so obliged either to 
have ruled with rigour, or to have risked the 
loss of your all. It followeth, therefore, that we 
have done nothing to raise surprise, nothing 
to disappoint the human expectation, in ac- 
cepting a superiority voluntarily assured, in 
firmly maintaining it thus accepted, upon those 
most prevailing principles of honour, and fear, 
and interest. 

« The maxim by which we have acted was 
not first broached by us, since it hath been ever 
allowed, that inferiors should be controlled by 
their superiors. To be the latter we thought 
ourselves deserving : you thought so till now, 
when private interests engaging your attention, 
you begin to crj'" out for justice, which no people 
ever yet so studiously practised, as, when able 
to carry a point by strength, to check their in- 
clination and let it drop. And worthy, farther, 
are they of applause, who pursuing the dictates 
of human nature, in gaining rule over others, 
observe justice more steadily than their scope 
of power require th from them. And so far 
we have reason to conclude, that were our 
power lodged in other hands, plain evidence 
would soon decide with what peculiar modera- 
tion we use it : though, so hard indeed is our 
lot, that calumny and not applause hath been 
the consequence of such our lenity. In suits 
of contract against our dependents we are often 
worsted ; and though ever submitting to fair 
and impartial trials in our own courts, we arc 
charged with litigiousness. Not one of them 
reflecteth, that those who are absolute in other 
places, and treat not their dependents with that 
moderation which we observe, are for that very 
reason exempted from reproach : for, where 
lawless violence is practised there can be no 
room for appeals to justice. But our depen- 
dents, accustomed to contest with us upon 
equal footing, if they suffer never so little 
damage where they fancy equity to be along 
with them, either by a judicial sentence or 
the decision of reigning power, express no 
gratitude for the greater share of poverty 
they yet enjoy, but resent with higher cha- 
grin the loss of such a pittance, than if at 
first we had set law aside, and seized their all 
with open violence ; even in this case, they 
could not presume to deny, that inferiors ought 
to submit to their superiors. But mankind, 
it seemeth, resent the acts of injustice more 
deeply than the acts of violence ; those, coming 
from an equal, are looked upon as rapines : 



2G 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[cook I. 



these, coming from a superior, are complied with 
as necessities. The far more grievous oppres- 
sion of the Mede they bore with patience, but 
our government they look upon as severe ; it 
may be so ; for to subjects the present is always 
grievous. If you therefore by our overthrow 
should gain the ascendant over them, you 
would soon perceive that good disposition 
tow^ards you, which a dread of us hath occasion- 
ed, to be vanishing away ; especially should 
you exert your superiority according to the 
specimens you gave during your short com- 
mand against the Mede. For the institutions 
established here amongst yourselves have no 
affinity with those of other places : and more 
than this, not one Spartan amongst you, when 
delegated to a foreign charge, either knoweth 
how to apply his own, or make use of those of 
the rest of Greece. 

" Form your resolutions therefore with great 
deliberation, as on points of no small import- 
ance. Hearken not so far to the opinions and 
calumnies of foreign states as to embroil your 
own domestic tranquility. Reflect in time on 
the great uncertainty of war, before you engage 
in it. Protracted into long continuance, it is 
generally used to end in calamities, from which 
we are now at an equal distance ; and to the 
lot of which of us they will fall, lieth yet to be 
determined by the hazardous event. Men 
who run eagerly to arms are first of all intent 
on doing some exploits, which ought in point 
of time to be second to something more impor- 
tant ; and when smarting with distress, they 
have recourse to reason. But since we are by 
no means guilty of such rashness ourselves, nor 
as yet perceive it in you, we exhort you, 
whilst healing measures arc in the election of 
us both, not to break the treaty, not to violate 
your oaths, but to submit the points in contest 
to fair arbitration, according to the articles sub- 
sisting between us. If not, we here invoke 
the gods, who take cognizance of oaths, to 
bear us witness, that we shall endeavour to 
revenge ourselves upon the authors of a war, 
by whatever methods yourselves shall set us an 
example." 

These things were said by the Athenian 
embassy. And when the Lacedemonians had 
thus heard the accusations of their allies against 
tlie Athenians, and what the Athenians had 
urged in their turn, ordering all parties to with- 
draw, they proceeded to serious consultation 
amongst themselves. The majority agreed in 



the opinion, that " the Athenians were already 
guilty of injustice, and that a war ought to be 
immediately declared." But Archidamus their 
king, esteemed a man of good understanding 
and temper, standing forth, expressed his owa 
sentiments thus : 

" I have learned myself by the experience of 
many wars, and I see many of you, ye Lace- 
demonians, as great proficients in years as I 
am, that no one should be fond of an enterprise 
because it is new, which is a vulgar weakness, 
judging it thence both advisable and safe. 
The war, which is at present the subject of 
your consultation, you will find, if examined 
discreetly, to bode a very long continuance. 
Against Peloponnesians, it is true, and borderers 
upon ourselves, we have ever a competent force 
in readiness, and by expeditious steps can ad- 
vance against any of them. But against a 
people whose territories are far remote, who 
are further most expert in naval skill, who with 
all the expedients of war are most excellently 
provided, with wealth both private and pubhc, 
with shipping, with horses, with arms, and 
Avith men, far beyond what any other state 
in Greece can singly pretend to ; who, more 
than this, have numerous dependent states 
upon whom they levy tribute — where is the 
necessity sanguinely to wish for war against 
such a people ] and wherein is our dependence, 
if thus unprepared we should declare it against 
them 1 Is it on our naval force 1 But in that 
we are inferior : and if to this we shall apply 
our care, and advance ourselves to an equality 
with them, why this will be a work of time. 
Or, is it on our wealth 1 In this we are yet 
much more deficient ; and neither have it in any 
public fund, nor can readily raise it from pri- 
vate purses. But the confidence of some may 
perhaps be buoyed up with our superiority in 
arms and numbers, so that we may easily march 
into their territory and lay it waste : yet other 
territories, and of large extent, are subject to 
their power, and by sea they will import all 
necessary supplies. If, further, we tempt their 
dependents to a revolt, we shall want a naval 
strength to support them in it, as the majority 
of them are seated upon islands. What there- 
fore will be the event of this our war 1 For 
if we are unable either to overpower them at 
sea, or divert those revenues by wliich their 
navy is supported, we shall only by acting pre- 
judice ourselves. And in such a situation 
to be forced to give it up will be a blemish 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



27 



bn our honour ; especially if we shall be thought 
to have been the authors of the breach. 
For let us not be puffed up with idle hope 
that this war must soon be over, if we can lay 
their territory waste ; I have reason on better 
grounds to apprehend, that we shall leave it 
behind as a legacy to our children. It is by no 
means consistent with the spirit of Athenians 
either to be slaves to their soil, or, like unprac- 
tised so'diers, to shudder at a war. Nor again, 
on the other hand, am I so void of sensibility 
as to advise you to give up your confederates 
to their outrage, or wilfully to connive at their 
encroachments ; but only not yet to have re- 
course to arms, to send ambassadors to prefer 
our complaints, without betraying too great an 
eagerness for war, or any tokens of pusilla- 
nimity. By pausing thus, we may get our own 
affairs in readiness, by augmenting our strength 
through an accession of allies, either Grecian 
or Barbarian, wheresoever we can procure sup- 
plies of ships or money. And the least room 
there cannot be for censure, when a people in 
the state we are in at present, exposed to all 
the guiles of the Athenians, endeavour to save 
themselves not merely by Grecian but even by 
Barbarian aid. And at the same time let us 
Omit no resource within the reach of our own 
ability. 

" If, indeed, upon our sending an embassy, 
they will hearken to reason, that will be the 
happiest for us all. If not ; after two or three 
years' delay, then better provided, we may, if 
it be thought expedient, take the field against 
them. But in good time, perhaps, when they 
see our preparations and the intent of them 
clearly explained by our own declarations, they 
may make each requisite concession, before 
their territory is destroyed by ravage, and whilst 
yet they may save their property from utter 
devastation. Regard their territory, I beseech 
you, in no other light than as a hostage for 
their good behaviour, and the more firmly such 
the better may be its culture. Of this we 
ought to be sparing as long as possible, that 
we drive them not into desperate fury, and 
render more unpracticable their defeat. For 
if, thus unprovided as we are, and worked up 
to anger by the instigations of our confeder- 
' ates, we at once begin this ravage, reflect 
whether we shall not taint its reputation, and 
the more embroil Peloponnesus; since accu- 
sations as well of states as private persons it is 
possible to clear away ; but in a war, begun by 



general concurrence for the sake of a single 
party, which it is impossible to see how far it 
will extend, we cannot at pleasure desist, and 
preserve our honour. 

" Let no one think it a mark of pusillani- 
mity, that many as we are we do not rush imme- 
diately upon one single state. That state has 
as large a number of dependants who contri- 
bute to its support : and a war is not so much 
of arms as of money, by which arms are ren- 
dered of service; and the more so, when a 
landed power is contending against a naval. 
Be it therefore our earliest endeavour to pro- 
vide amply for this, nor let us prematurely be 
too much fermented by the harangues of our 
allies. Let us, to whose account the event, 
whatever it be, will be principally charged — 
let us, with sedate deliberation, endeavour in 
some degree to foresee it ; and be not in the 
least ashamed of that slow and dilatory temper 
for which the Corinthians so highly reproach 
you. For through too great precipitancy you 
will come more slowly to an end, because you 
set out without proper preparations. The 
state of which we are the constituents, hath 
ever been free and most celebrated by fame : 
and that reproach can at most be nothing but 
the inborn sedateness of our minds. By this 
we are distinguished, as the only people who 
never grow insolent with success, and who 
never are abject in adversity. And when again 
they invite us to hazardous attempts by utter- 
ing our praise, the delight of hearing must not 
raise our spirits above our judgment. If any, 
farther, endeavour to exasperate us by a flow 
of invective, we are not by that to be provoked 
the sooner to compliance. From tempers 
evenly balanced it is, that we are warm in the 
field of battle, and cool in the hours of debate : 
the former, because a sense of duty hath the 
greatest influence over a sedate disposition, 
and magnanimity the keenest sense of shame : 
and good we are at debate, as our education 
is not polite enough to teach us a contempt 
of laws, and by its severity giveth us so much 
good sense as never to disregard them. We 
are not a people so impertinently wise, as to 
invalidate the preparations of our enemies by a 
plausible harangue, and then absurdly proceed 
to a contest ; but we reckon the thoughts of 
our neighbours to be of a similar cast with 
our own, and that hazardous contingencies 
are not to be determined by a speech. We 
always presume that the projects of our ene- 



28 



PELOPONiNESIAN WAR. 



[book I. 



mies are judiciously planned, and then seri- 
ously prepare to defeat them. For we ought 
not to found our success upon the hope that 
they will certainly blunder in their conduct, hut 
that we have omitted no proper step for our own 
security. We ought not to imagine, there is so 
mighty diflerence between man and man ; but 
that he is the most accomplished who hath been 
regularly trained through a course of needful 
industry and toil. 

" Such is the discipline which our fathers 
have handed down to us ; and by adhering to 
it, we have reaped considerable advantages. 
Let us not forego it now, nor in a small por- 
tion of only one day precipitately determine a 
point wherein so many lives, so vast an expense, 
so many states, and so much honour, are at 
stake. But let us more leisurely proceed, which 
our power will warrant us in doing more easily 
than others. Despatch ambassadors to the 
Athenians concerning Potidaea ; despatch them 
concerning the complaints our allies exhibit 
against them ; and the sooner, as they have 
declared a readiness to submit to fair decisions. 
Against men who offer this we ought not to 
march before they are convicted of injustice. 
But, during this interval, get every thing in 
readiness for war. Your resolutions thus will 
be most wisely formed, and strike into your en- 
emies the greatest dread." 

Archidamus spoke thus. But Sthenelaidas, 
at that time one of the ephori, standing forth 
the last on this occasion, gave his opinion as 
foUoweth : 

" The many words of the Athenians, for my 
part, I do not understand. They have been ex- 
ceeding large in the praise of themselves ; but 
as to the charge against them, that they injure 
our allies and Peloponnesus, they have made no 
reply. If, in truth, they were formerly good 
against the Medes, but are now bad towards 
us, they deserve to be doubly punished ; be- 
cause, ceasing to be good, they are grown very 
bad. We continue the same persons both then 
and now ; and shall not, if we are wise, pass 
over the injuries done to our allies, nor wait 
any longer to revenge them, since they are past 
waiting for their sufferings. But — other peo- 
ple, forsooth, have a great deal of wealth, and 
ships, and horses — we too have gallant allies, 
whom we ought not to betray to the Athenians, 
nor refer them to law and pleadings, since it 
was not by pleadings they were injured : but 
we ought, with all expedition and with all our 



strength, to seek revenge. How we ought to 
deliberate when we have been wronged, let no 
man pretend to inform me : it would have bet- 
ter become those who designed to commit such 
wrongs, to have deliberated a long time ago. 
Vote then the war, Lacedaemonians, with a 
spirit becoming Sparta. And neither suffer the 
Athenians to grow still greater, nor let us be- 
tray our own confederates ; but, with the gods 
on our side, march out against these authors of 
injustice." 

Plaving spoke thus, by virtue of his office as 
presiding in "the college of ephori,' he put the 
question in the Lacedaemonian council. But, 
as they vote by voice and not by ballot, he said, 
" he could not amidst the shout distinguish the 
majority ;" and, being desirous that each of 
them, by plainly declaring his opinion, might 
show they were more inclined to war, he pro- 
ceeded thus — " To whomsoever of you, Lace- 
daemonians, the treaty appeareth broke, and the 
Athenians to be in the wrong, let him rise up 
and go thither," pointing out to them a certain 
place : " but whoever is of a contrary opinion, 
let him go yonder." They rose up and were 
divided ; but a great majority was on that side 
which voted the treaty broke. 

Upon this, calling in their confederates, they 
told them, " They had come to a resolution that 
the Athenians were guilty of injustice ; but 
they were desirous to put it again to the vote in 
a general assembly of all their confederates, 
that by taking their measures in concert, they 
might briskly ply the war, if determined by com- 
mon consent." 

Matters being brought to this point, they 
departed to their respective homes, and the 
Athenian ambassadors, having ended their ne- 
gotiations, staid not long behind. This decree of 
the Lacedaemonian council that " the treaty was 
broke," was passed in the fourteenth year of 
the treaty concluded for thirty years after the 
conquest of Euboea. But the Lacedaemonians 
voted this treaty broke and a war necessary 
not so much out of regard to the arguments 

1 The college of Ephori (or inspectors) at Spnrta con- 
sisted of five. They were nnimally elected liy the peo- 
ple from their own I ody,and wercdesi^ined to be checks 
upon the rcpal power. They never forpot the end of 
their institution, ni)d in fact quite lurdcd it over th« 
kiiins. In a word, the whole administration was lodg- 
ed in their hands, and tlio kiiiiis were never sovereigns 
hut in the field at the head of their troops. One of the 
Ephori had the honour to i;ive its style to the year, iii 
the same manner as the first arcbon did at Atlieus, 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



29 



urged by their allies, as from their own jea- 
lousy of the growing power of the Athenians. 
They dreaded the advancement of that power, 
as they saw the greatest part of Greece was al- 
ready in subjection to them. 

Now the method by which the Athenians 
had advanced their power to this invidious 
height was this.' 

After that the Medes, defeated by the Gre- 
cians both at land and sea, had evacuated Eu- 
rope, and such of them, as escaped by sea, were 
utterly ruined at Mycale, Leotychides king of 
the Lacedaemonians, who commanded the Gre- 
cians at Mycale, returned home, drawing away 
with him all the confederates of Peloponnesus. 
But the Athenians, with the confederates of 
Ionia, and the Hellespont, who are now revolt- 
ed from the King, continuing in those parts, 
laid siege to Sestus then held by the Medes ; 
and pressing it during the winter season, the 
Barbarians at length abandoned the place. Af- 
ter this they separated, sailing away from the 
Hellespont, every people to their own respec- 
tive countries. 

But the Athenian community, when the 
Barbarians had evacuated their territory, im- 
mediately brought back again from their places 
of refuge their wives and children and all their 
remaining effects, and vigorously applied them- 
selves to rebuild the city of Athens and the 
walls : for but a small part of these had been 
left standing ; and their houses, most of them, 
had been demolished, and but a few preserved 
by way of lodgings for the Persian nobles. The 
Lacedsemonians, informed of their design, came 
in embassy to prevent it; partly, to gratify 
themselves, as they would behold with pleasure 
every city in Greece unwalled like Sparta ; 
but more to gratify their confederates, inviting 
them to such a step from the jealousy of the 
naval power of the Athenians, now greater 
than at any time before, and of the courage 
they had so bravely exerted in the war against 
the Medes. They required them to desist 

The series of history on which Thucydides now 
enters, though not strictly within the compass of his 
subject, yet most needful to give it liirht, and to show 
liow present events are connected with, and how far 
they resulted from, precedins, is excellent in its kind. 
He states important facts in the clearest and and most 
orderly manner; he opens before us the source of the 
Athenian power; and by a neat and concise enumer- 
ation of notable events, conducts it to that height, which 
excited the jealousy of other states, and was the true 
political cause of the succeeding war. 



from building their walls, and rather to join 
with them in levelling every fortification what- 
ever without Peloponnesus. Their true mean- 
ing and their inward jealousy they endeavoured 
to conceal from the Athenians by the pretence 
that " then the Barbarian, should he again in- 
vade them, would find no stronghold from 
whence to assault them, as in the last instance 
he had done from Thebes ;" alleging farther, 
that " Peloponnesus was a place of secure re- 
treat and certain resource for all." To these 
representations of the Lacedsemonians, the 
Athenians, by the advice of Thenastocles, 
made this reply, that " they would send 
ambassadors to them to debate this affair ;" 
and so without further explanation dismissed 
them. Themistocles next advised, that "he 
himself "might be despatched forthwith to 
Lacedsemon, and by no means hastily to send 
away the others who were to be joined in the 
commission with him, but to detain them till 
the walls were carried up to a height necessary 
at least for a defence ; that the work should 
be expedited by the joint labour of all the in- 
habitants without exception of themselves, 
their wives, and their children, sparing neither 
public nor private edifice from whence any pro- 
per materials could be had, but demolishing 
all." Having thus advised them, and suggested 
farther what conduct he designed to observe, 
he sets out for Lacedsemon. Upon his arrival 
there, he demanded no public audience, he pro- 
tracted matters and studied evasions. When- 
ever any person in the public administration 
demanded the reason why he asked not an audi- 
ence, his answer was, that " he waited for 
the arrival of his colleagues, who were detained 
by urgent business : he expected that they 
would speedily be with him, and was surprised 
they are not yet come." As they had a good 
opinion of Themistocles, they easily acquiesced 
in such an answer. But other persons after- 
wards arriving and making clear affirmation that 
" the wall is carrying on, and already built up to 
a considerable height," they had it no longer in 
their power to be incredulous. Themistocles, 
knowing this, exhorts them, " not rashly to be 
biased by rumours, but rather to send away 
some trusty persons of their own body, who 
from a view might report the truth." With 
this proposal they comply ; and Themistocles 
sendeth secret instructions to the Athenians 
how to behave to these delegates : — " to de- 
tain them, though with as little appearance 
H 



30 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book I. 



of design as possible, and by no means to ] 
dismiss them before tliey received again their 
own ambassadors : for his colleagues were by 
this arrived, Abronychus the son of Ly sides, 
and Aristides the son of Lysimachus, who 
brought him an assurance that the wall was 
sufllcicntly completed. His fear was, that the 
Lacedaemonians, when they had discovered the 
truth, would put them under arrest. The 
Athenians therefore detained the delegates ac- 
cording to instruction. And Themistocles, 
going to an audience of the Lacedaemonians, 
there openly declared, " that Athens was now 
so far walled, as to be strong enough for the 
defence of its inhabitants : for the future, when 
the Lacedaemonians or confederates sent am- 
bassadors thither, they must address themselves 
to them as to a people who perfectly knew 
their own interest and the interest of Greece ; 
since, when they judged it most advisable to 
abandon their city and go on ship-board, they 
asserted their native courage without Lacedoe- 
monian support ; and, in all subsequent mea- 
sures taken in conjunction, had shown them- 
selves not at all inferior in the cabinet or the 
field : at present therefore they judge it most 
expedient to have Athens defended by a wall, 
and thus to render it a place of greater security 
for their own members and for all their allies : 
it would not be possible, with strength inferior 
to that of a rival power, equally to preserve and 
evenly to balance the public welfare of Greece." 
—From hence he inferred, that " either all 
cities of the states which formed the Lacedae- 
monian league should be dismantled, or it be 
allowed that the things now done at Athens 
were just and proper." The Lacedaemonians, 
upon hearing this, curbed indeed all appearance 
of resentment against the Athenians : — they 
had not sent their embassy directly to prohibit, 
but to advise them to desist upon motives of 
general good : at that time also, they had a 
great regard for the Athenians, becaixse of the 
public spirit they had shown against the Mode : 
— but however, thus baffled as they were in 
their political views, they were inwardly pro- 
voked ; and the ambassadors on each side re- 
turned home without farther embroilments. 

By this conduct the Athenians in a small 
space of time walled their city around : and 
the very face of the structure showcth plainly 
to this day that it was built in haste. The 
foundations arc laid with stones of every kind, 
in some places not hewn so as properly to fit, 



but piled on at random. Many pillars also 
from sepulchral monuments and carved stones 
were blended promiscuously in the work. For 
the circuit of it was every where enlarged be- 
yond the compass of the city, and for this reason 
collecting the materials from every place with- 
out distinction, they lost no time. 

Themistocles also persuaded them to finish 
the Pirffius ; for it was begun before this, dur- 
ing that year in which he himself was chief 
magistrate at Athens.' He judged the place 
to be ver}' commodious, as formed by nature 
into three harbours ; and that the Athenians, 
grown more than ever intent on their marine, 
might render it highly conducive to an en- 
largement of their power. For he was the 
first person who durst tell them, that they 
ought to grasp at the sovereignty of the sea, 
and immediately beg!in to put the plan into 
execution. And by his direction it was, that 
they built the wall round the Piraeus of that 
thickness which is visible to this day. For 
two carts carrying the stone passed along it by 
one another : within was neither mortar nor 
mud ; but the entire structure was one pile of 
large stones, hewn square to close their angles 
exactly, and grappled firmly together on the 
outside with iron and lead : though in height it 
was not carried up above half so far as he intend- 
ed. He contrived it to be, both in height and 
breadth, an impregnable rampart against hostile 
assaults ; and he designed, that a few, and those 
the least able of the people, might be sufficient 
to man it, whilst the rest should be employed 
on board the fleet. His intention was chiefly 
confined to a navy ; plainly discerning, in my 
opinion, that the forces of the king had a much 
easier way to annoy them by sea than bj- land. 
He thence judged the Pirteus to be a place of 
much greater importance than the upper city. 
And this piece of advice he frequently gave 
the Athenians, that " if ever they were pressed 
hard by land, they should retire down thither, 
and with their naval force make head against 
all opponents." In this manner the Athe- 

» The number of the Archons or Rulers was nine. 
They were annuiilly elected by lot, and were rcqjiircd to 
l^e of noble birtli,of a pure Attic descent, irreproach- 
able both in moral and political cliaracter, dutiful to 
their parents, and perfectly sound in body. The first 
of the nine cnve its style to the year, and was there- 
fore called Eponymus or the Nanier: the second was 
styled Kinp: the third Polemarch; the other six in com- 
mon TliosniothcifT. All the civil and religious atTaira 
of the slate belonged to tlicir apartment. 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



31 



nians, without losing time, after the retreat 
of the Medes, fortified their city, and pre- 
pared all the necessary means for their own se- 
curity. 

Paasanias the son of Chembrotus was sent 
out from Lacedsemon, as commander-in-chief 
of the Grecians, with twenty sail of ships from 
Peloponnesus, joined by thirty Athenian and 
a number of other allies. They bent their 
course against Cyprus, and reduced most of 
the towns there. From thence they proceeded 
to Byzantium, garrisoned by the Medes, and 
blockaded and carried the place under his di- 
rections. 

But, having now grown quite turbulent in 
command, the other Grecians, especially the 
lonians and all who had lately repovered their 
liberty from the royal yoke, were highly cha- 
grined. They addressed themselves to the 
Athenians, requesting them " from the tie of 
consanguinity to undertake their protection, 
and not to leave them thus largely exposed to 
the violence of Pausanias." This request 
was favourably heard by the Athenians, who 
expressed their willingness to put a stop to their 
grievances, and to re-settle the general order, 
to the best of their power. — But during this, 
the Lacedaemonians recalled Pausanias, that 
he might answer what was laid to his charge. 
Many of the Grecians had carried to them ac- 
cusations against him for an unjust abuse of 
his power, since in his behaviour he resembled 
more a tyrant than a general. And it so fell 
out, that he was recalled just at the time when 
the confederates, out of hatred to him, had 
ranged themselves under the Athenian orders, 
excepting those troops which were of Pelopon- 
nesus. Upon his return to Lacedaemon, he 
was convicted upon trial of misdemeanours to- 
wards particulars, but of the heaviest part of 
the charge he is acquitted ; for the principal 
accusation against him was an attachment to 
the Medish interest ; and it might be judged 
too clear to stand in need of proof. Him 
therefore they no longer intrust with the public 
command, but appoint in his stead Dorcis with 
some colleagues to command what little force 
of their own remained. To these the confede- 
rates would no longer yield the supreme com- 
mand ; which so soon as they perceived, they 
returned home. And here the Lacedsemonians 
desisted from commissioning any others to 
take upon them that post ; fearing, lest those 
who should be sent might by their behaviour 



still more prejudice the Lacedaemonian interest, 
a case they had reason to dread from the be- 
haviour of Pausanias. They were now grown 
desirous to rid themselves of the Medish 
war : they acknowledged the Athenians had 
good pretensions to enjoy the command, and 
at that time were well affected towards them. 

The Athenians having in this manner ob- 
tained the supreme command, by the voluntary 
tender of the whole confederacy in consequence 
of their aversion to Pausanias : they fixed by 
their own authority the quotas whether of ships 
or money which each state was to furnish 
against the Barbarian. The colour pretended 
was " to revenge the calamities they had 
hitherto suffered, by carrying hostilities into the 
dominions of the king." This gave its first 
rise to the Athenian office of General Receiv- 
ers of Greece,^ whose business it was to col- 
lect this tribute : for the contribution of this 
money was called by that title. The first tri- 
bute levied in consequence of this amounted 
to four hundred and sixty talents. Delos was 
appointed to be their treasury ; and the sittings 
were held in the temple there. 

Their command was thus at first over free 
and independent confederates, who sat with 
them at council, and had a vote in public revo- 
lutions. The enlargement of their author- 
ity was the result of wars, and their own 
political management during the interval be- 
tween the invasion of the Medes and the 
present war, when the contests were against 
the Barbarian, or their own allies endeavour- 
ing at a change, or those of the Peloponne- 
sians who interfered on every occasion on pur- 
pose to molest them. Of these I have sub- 
joined a particular detail, and have ventured a 
digression from my subject, because this piece 
of history hath been omitted by all preceding 
writers. They have either confined their ac- 
counts to the affairs of Greece prior in time, 



1 This nice and difficult point was adjusted by Aris- 
tides, to. the general satisfaction of all parties concern- 
ed. Greece conferred upon him this most important 
trust, he was called to this delicate commission by the 
united voice of hiscountry; " Poor (says Plutarch) when 
he set about it, but poorer when he had finished it." 
The Athenian state was now furnished with a large 
annual fund, by which it was enabled not only to annoy 
the foreign enemies of Greece, but even those Greeks 
who should at any time presume to oppose the mea- 
sures of Athens. They soon found out that their own 
city was a more convenient place for keeping this 
treasure tbafi the isle of Delos, and accordingly took 
caro to remove it thither. 



32 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book I. 



or to the invasions of the Medes. Hellanicus 
is the only one of them, who hath touched it 
in his Attic history ; though his memorials are 
short, and not accurately distinguished by pro- 
per dates. But this, at the same time, will 
most clearly show the method in which the 
Athenian empire was erected. 

In the first place, under the command of 
Cimon son of Miltiades,' they laid siege to 
Eion a town upon the Strymon possessed by 
the Medes, which they carried, and sold all 
found within it for slaves. — They afterwards 
did the same by Scyros an island in the Egean 
Sea, inhabited by the Dolopes, and placed in 
it a colony of their own people. — They had, 
farther, a war with the Carysthians singly, in 
which the rest of the Euboeans were uncon- 
cerned, who at length submitted to them upon 
terms. — After this they made war upon the 
Naxians who had revolted, and reduced them 
by a siege. This was the first confederate 
state, which was enslaved to gratify their as- 
piring ambition ; though afterwards all the rest, 
as opportunity occurred, had the same fate. 

The occasions of such revolts were various ; 
though the principal were deficiencies in their 
quotas of tribute and shipping, and refusal 
of common service. For the Athenians ex- 
erted their authority with exactness and rigour, 
and laid heavy loads upon men, who had 
neither been accustomed nor were willing to 
bear oppression. Their method of command 
was soon perverted ; they no longer cared to 
make it agreeable, and in general service dis- 
allowed an equality, as it was now more than 
ever in their power to force revolters to sub- 
mission. But these points the confederates had 
highly facilitated by their own proceedings. For, 
through a reluctancy of mingling in frequent ex- 
peditions, a majority of them, to redeem their 
personal attendance, were rated at certain sums 
of money, equivalent to the expense of the ships 
they ought to have furnished. The sums paid 

» Cimon was a great peneral,a worthy patriot, brave, 
open, and ingenious, upriglit in his politiral rondiict 
like Aristides, and though an aMc polilirian, yet not so 
misrliicvously refined as to discard honesty and sincer- 
ity from public measures. His fattier Miltiados, after 
performing most signal services to his country, was 
heavily fined, thrown into prison, lecause unable to 
pay, and there ended his days. Cimon afterwards 
paid the fine, is now going also to perform great servi- 
ces to the state, is afterwards banished, but recalled, 
and asain employed in foreign commands, dyini; at last 
in the service of liis country, highly regretted not on- 
ly at Athens, but tbroughout Greece. 



on these occasions to the Athenians, were em- 
ployed by them to increase their own naval 
force ; and the tributaries thus drained, when- 
ever they presumed to revolt, had parted with 
the needful expedients of war, and were with- 
out resource. 

After these things it happened, that the 
Athenians and their confederates fought against 
the Medes, both by land and sea, at the river 
Eurjmedon in Pamphylia. Cimon, the son 
of Miltiades commanded ; and the Athenians 
were victorious the very same day in both 
elements. They took and destroyed the ships 
of the Phoenicians, in the whole about two 
hundred. 

Later in tim.e than this, happened a revolt 
of the Thasians, arising from disputes about 
places of trade on the opposite coasts of Thrace, 
and the mines which they possessed there. 
The Athenians with a sufficient force sailed 
against Thasus ; and, after gaining a victory 
by sea, landed upon the island. — About the 
same time, they had sent a colony, consisting 
of about ten thousand of their own and con- 
federate people, towards the Strymon, who 
were to settle in a place called the Nine-ways, 
but now Amphipolis. They became masters 
of the Nine-ways, by dispossessing the Edo- 
nians. But advancing farther into the mid- 
land parts of Thrace, they were all cut oflf at 
Drabescus of Edonia, by the united force of 
the Thracians, who were all enemies to this 
new settlement now forming at the Nine-ways. 
— But the Thasians, defeated in a battle and 
besieged, implored the succour of the Laceda;- 
monians, and exhorted them to make a diver- 
sion in their favour by breaking into Attica. 
This they promised unknown to the Athenians, 
and were intent on the performance, but were 
prevented by the shock of an earthquake. The 
Helots,^ farther, had seized this opportunity, 



i> Helots was the name given in general to the slaves 
of the Lacedaemonians. The first of the kind were the 
inhabitants of Ilelos in Messenia, who were co' quered 
and enslaved by the Lacedirmonians; and all It eirslaves 
in succeeding times had the same denomination. The 
tillace of tlie ground, the exerciseof trades, all manual 
lalour, and every kind of drudgery, was thrown upon 
them. They were always treated by their Spartan 
masters with great severity, and oOen with the utmost 
barbarity; at their caprice, or sometimes for reasons of 
state, they were wantonly put to death or in):unianly 
bulcliered. There is a remarkable instanceof tl c latter, 
in the fourth book of this liistory. .\crording to Plu- 
tarch, it was a common saying in Greece, "That a 



ELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



33 



in concert with the neighbouring Thuriatse and 
Etheans, to revolt and seize Ithome. Most of 
the Plelots were descendants of the ancient 
Messenians, then reduced to slavery, and on 
this account all of them in general were called 
Messenians. This war against the revolters 
in Ithome, gave full employ to the Lacedaemo- 
nians. And the Thasians, after holding out 
three years' blockade, were forced to surrender 
upon terms to the Athenians : — They were " to 
level their walls, to give up their shipping, to 
pay the whole arrear of their tribute, to advance 
it punctually for the future, and to quit all pre- 
tensions to the continent and the mines." 

The Lacedaemonians, as their war against 
the rebels in Ithome ran out into a length of 
time, demanded the assistance of their allies, 
and amongst others of the Athenians. No 
small number of these were sent to their aid, 
under the command of Cimon. The demand 
of assistance from them, was principally owing 
to the reputation they then were in for their 
superior skill in the methods of approaching and 
attacking walls. The long continuance of the 
siege convinced them of the necessity of such 
methods, though they would fain have taken 
it by storm. The first open enmity between 
the Lacedaemonians and Athenians broke out 
from this expedition. For the Lacedaemonians, 
when the place could not be carried by storm, 
growing jealous of the daring and innovating 
temper of the Athenians, and regarding them 
as aliens, lest by a longer stay they might be 
tampering with the rebels in Ithome, and so 
raise them fresh embarrassments, gave a dis- 
mission to them alone of their allies. They 
strove, indeed, to conceal their suspicions, by 
alleging, " they have no longer any need of 
their assistance." The Athenians were con- 
vinced, that their dismission was not owing to 
this more plausible colour, but to some latent 
jealousy. They reckoned themselves aggrieved ; 
and thinking they had merited better usage 



freeman at Sparta was tlie freest, and a slave the great- 
est slave in the world." — Thus miseral)ly oppressed, 
no wonder they seized an opportunity of revolt. The 
earthquake here mentioned was so violent, that (ac- 
cording to Plutarch) it demolished all the houses in 
Sparta, except five. The Helots rose at once effectually 
to demolish those Spartans too, who were not buried in 
the ruins. But Archidamus had already, by way of 
precaution, sounded an alarm, and jrot them tojrelher in 
a body. The Helots thus prevented, marched off, and 
seized Ithome, where they made a long and obstinate 
resistance. 
12 



from the hands of the Lacedaemonians, were 
scarcely withdrawn, than in open disregard to 
the league subsisting between them against 
the Mede, they clapped up an alliance with 
their old enemies, the Argives; and in the 
same oaths and in the same alliance, the Thes- 
salians were also comprehended with them 
both. 

The rebels in Ithome, in the tenth year of 
the siege, unable to hold out any longer, sur- 
rendered to the Lacedaemonians on the follow- 
ing conditions — that " a term of security be 
allowed them to quit Peloponnesus, into which 
they shall never return again ; that if any one 
of them be ever found there, he should be 
made the slave of whoever apprehended him." 
The Pythian oracle had already warned the 
Lacedaemonians " to let go the suppliants of Ju- 
piter Ithometes." The men therefore, with their 
wives and children, went out of Ithome, and 
gained a reception from the Athenians, who 
acted now in enmity to the Lacedaemonians, 
and assigned them Naupactus for their resi- 
dence, which they had lately taken from the 
Locrians of Ozoli. 

The Megareans also deserted the Lacedaemo- 
nians, and went over to the Athenian alliance, 
because the Corinthians had warred upon them 
in pursuance of a dispute about settling their 
frontier. Megara and Pegae were put into 
the hands of the Athenians, who built up for 
the Megareans the long walls that reach down 
from Megara to Nisaea, and took their guard 
upon themselves. This was by no means the 
least occasion of that violent enmity now be- 
ginning to arise between the Corinthians and 
Athenians. 

Inarus the son of Psammetichus, a Libyan, 
and king of the Libyans, bordering upon Egypt, 
taking his route from Marasa, a city beyond 
the Pharos, had seduced the greatest part of 
Egypt into a revolt from king Artaxerxes. 
He himself was constituted their leader, and 
he brought over the Athenians to associate in 
the enterprise. They happened at that time 
to be employed in an expedition against Cyprus, 
with a fleet of two hundred ships of their own 
and their allies : but relinquishing Cyprus, 
they went upon this new design. Being arriv- 
ed on that coast, and sailed up the Nile, they 
were masters of that river, and two thirds of 
the city of Memphis, and were making their 
attack upon the remaining part, which is called 
the white wall. It was defended by the Per- 
h2 



34* 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book I. 



sians and Medes who had resorted thither for 
refuge, and by those Egj'ptians who had stood 
out in the general defection. 

The Athenians, further, having made a de- 
scent at Haliae, a battle ensued against the Co- 
rinthians and Epidaurians, in which the victory 
was on the Corinthian side. — And afterwards 
the Athenians engaged at sea near Cecryphelea 
with a fleet of Peloponnesians, and completely 
gained the victory. — A war also breaking out 
after this between the ^ginetae and Athenians, 
a great battle was fought at sea by these two 
contending parties near .^gina. Both sides 
were joined by their respective confederates ; 
but the victory remained with the Athenians ; 
who having taken seventy of their ships, landed 
upon their territory, and laid siege to the city, 
under the command of Leocrates the son of 
Stroebus. The Peloponnesians, then desirous 
to relieve the ^^ginetae, transported over to 
-Egina, three hundred heavy-armed, who be- 
fore were auxiliaries to the Corinthians and 
Epidaurians. In the next place they secured 
the promontory of Geranea. The Corinthians 
now with their allies made an incursion into 
the district of Megara, judging it impossible 
for the Athenians to march to the relief of the 
Megareans, as they had so large a force already 
abroad in -^gina and in Egypt ; or, if they 
were intent on giving them relief, they must 
of necessity raise their siege from ^^gina. 
The Athenians however recalled not their 
army from JGgina, but marched away all the 
old and young that were left in Athens to the 
aid of Megara, under the command of Myro- 
nides : and having fought a drawn battle against 
the Corinthians, both sides retired, and both 
sides looked upon themselves as not worsted 
in the action. The Athenians, however, upon 
the departure of the Corinthians, as being at 
least so far victorious, erected a trophy. The 
Corinthians at their return heard nothing but 
reproaches from the seniors in Corinth ; so, 
after bestowing an interval of about twelve 
days to recruit, they came back again ; and, to 
lay their claim also to the victory, set about 
erecting a trophy of opposition. Upon this, 
the Athenians sallying with a shout out of 
Megara, put those who were busy in ererting 
this trophy to the sword, and routed all who 
endeavoured to oppose them. The vanquished 
Corinthians were forced to fly ; and no small 
part of their number, being closely pursued 



and driven from any certain route, were chased 
into the ground of a private person, which 
happened to be encompassed with a ditch so 
deep as to be quite impassable, and there was 
no getting out. The Athenians, perceiving 
this, drew up all their hea^•y-armed to front 
them, and then forming their light-armed in a 
circle round them, stoned everj' man of them 
to death. This was a calamitous event to the 
Corinthians ; but the bulk of their force got 
home safe again from this unhappy expedition. 

About this time also, the Athenians began to 
build the long walls reaching down to the sea, 
both towards the Phalerus, and towards the 
PirsBus. 

The Phocians were now embroiled with the 
Dorians, from whom the Lacedaemonians are 
descended. Having made some attempts on 
Bceon, and Cytinium, and Erineus, and taken 
one of those places, the Lacedaemonians march- 
ed out to succour the Dorians with fifteen hun- 
dred heavy-armed of their natives, and ten 
thousand of their allies, commanded by Ni- 
comedes the son of Cleombrotus in the right 
of Pleistionax son of Pausanias their king, who 
was yet a minor ; and having forced the Pho- 
cians to surrender upon terms the town they 
had taken, were preparing for their return. 
Now, in case they attempted it by passing over 
the sea in the gulf of Crissa, the Athenians 
having got round with a squadron were ready 
to obstruct it. Nor did they judge it safe to 
attempt it by way of Geranea, as Megara and 
Pegae were in the hands of the Athenians ; for 
the pass of Geranea is ever difficult, and now 
was constantly guarded by the Athenians ; and 
should they venture this route, they perceived 
that the Athenians were there also ready to 
intercept them. They determined at last to 
halt for a time in Ba?otia, and watch for an 
opportunity to march away unmolested. Some 
citizens of Athens were now clandestinely 
practising with them, to obtain their concur- 
rence in putting a stop to the democracy and the 
building of the long walls. But the whole 
body of the Athenian people rushed out into 
the field against them, with a thousand Argivea 
and the respective quotas of their allies, in the 
whole amounting to fourteen thousand. They 
judged them quite at a loss about the means of 
a retreat ; and the design also to overthrow their 
popular government began to be suspected. 
Some Thessalian horsemen came also up to 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



35 



join the Athenians, in pursuance of treaty, who 
afterwards in the heat of action revolted to the 
Lacedaemonians. 

They fought at Tanagra of Boeotia, and the 
victory rested vrith the Lacedaemonians and 
allies : but the slaughter was great on both 
sides. The Lacedaemonians afterwards took 
their route through the district of Megara ; 
and having cut down the woods, returned to 
their own home through Geranea and the Isth- 
mus. 

On the sixty-second day after the battle of 
Tanagra, the Athenians had taken the field 
against the Boeotians, under the command of 
Myronides.' They engaged them, and gained 
a complete victory at Oenophyta ;^ in conse- 
quence of which, they seized all the territories 
of Bceotia and Phocis, and levelled the walls 
of Tanagra. They took from the Locrians of 
Opus one hundred of their richest persons for 
hostages ; and had now completed their own 
long walls at Athens. 

Soon after, the ^ginetae surrendered to the 
Athenians upon terms. They " demolished 
their fortifications, gave up their shipping, and 
submitted to pay an annual tribute for the fu- 
ture." 

The Athenians, farther, in a cruize infested 
the coast of Peloponnesus, under the command 
of Tolmidas, the son of Tolmaeus. They 
burnt a dock of the Lacedaemonians, took 
Chalcis, a city belonging to the Corinthians, 
and landing their men, engaged with and de- 
feated the Sicyonians. 

During all this interval, the army of Athe- 
nians and allies continued in Egypt, amidst 
various incidents and events of war. — At first, 

» Plutarch in bis Apot^pjrm relntes, that when My- 
ronides was putting himself at the head of the Athe- 
nians on this occasion, his offirers told him "they were 
not all come out yet into tlie field:" he replied hriskly, 
"All are come out that will fight," and marched off. 

^ This battle is represented hy some as more glorious 
to the Athenians than even those of Marathon or Pla- 
taea. In the latter they fought, accompanied by their 
allies, against Bar'arians; but here with their own sin- 
gle force, they defeated a far more numerous body of 
the choicest and best-disciplined troops in Greece. 
Plato hath marked it in Ills Funeral Oration, and told 
us those who fell in this battle were the first who were 
honoured with a public interment in the Ceramicus. 
" These brave men, (says he, as translated by Mr West) 
having fought against Grecians for the liberties of 
Grecians, and de'iverod those whose cause they had 
undertaken to defend, were the first after the Persian 
war upon whom the commonwealth conferred the hon- 
our of being buried in this public cemetery." 



the Athenians had the better of it in Egypt. 
Upon this, the king^ dcspatcheth to Lacedse- 
mon Megabazus, a Persian noble, furnished 
with great sums of money, in order to prevail 
upon the Lacedaemonians to make an incursion 
into Attica, and force the Athenians to recall 
their troops from Egypt: when Megabazus 
could not prevail, and some money had been 
spent to no manner of purpose, he carried back 
what was yet unexpended with him into Asia. 
He then sendeth Megabazus, the son of Zopy- 
rus, a Persian noble, against them with a nu- 
merous army, who marching by land, fought 
with and defeated the Egyptians and their al- 
lies ; then drove the Grecians out of Memphis ; 
and at last shut them up in the isle of Proso- 
pis. Here he kept them blocked up for a 
year and six months ; till having drained the 
channel by turning the water into a different 
course, he stranded all their ships, and rendered 
the island almost continent. He then marched 
his troops across, and took the place by a land 
assault. And thus a war, which had employed 
the Grecians for six continued years, ended in 
their destruction. Few only of the numbers 
sent thither, by taking the route of Libya, got 
safe away to Gyrene ; the far greater part were 
entirely cut off. Egypt was now again reduced 
to the obedience of the king : Amyrteus alone 
held out, who reigned in the fenny parts. The 
large extent of the fens prevented his reduc- 
tion ; and besides, the Egyptians of the fens 
are the most remarkable of all for military 
valour. Inarus king of the Libyans, the au- 
thor of all these commotions in Egypt, was 
betrayed by treachery, and fastened to a cross. 
Besides this, fifty triremes from Athens and 
the rest of the alliance, arriving upon the coast 
of Egypt to relieve the former, were come up 
to Medasium, a mouth of the Nile, quite igno- 
rant of their fate. These, some forces assault- 
ed from the land, whilst a squadron of Phoeni- 
cians attacked them by sea. Many of the ves«iels 
were by this means destroyed, but some few 
had the good fortune to get away. And thus 
the great expedition of the Athenians and al- 
lies into Egypt was brought to a conclusion. 

But farther, Orestes, son of Echecratidas 
king of the Thessalians, being driven from 
Thessaly, persuaded the Athenians to under- 
take his restoration. The Athenians, in con- 
junction with the Boeotians and Phocians now 

* Alexander Longimaous. 



36 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book I. 



their allies, marched up to Pharsalus of Thes- 
saly. They became masters of the adjacent 
country, so far as they could be whilst keeping 
in a body ; for the Thessalian cavalry prevented 
any detachments. They took not that city, 
neither carried any one point intended by the 
expedition, but were obliged to withdraw, and 
carry Orestes back again with them, totally un- 
successful. 

Not long after this, a thousand Athenians 
going on board their ships which lay at Pegae, 
for Pegfe was now in their possession, steered 
away against Sicyon, under the command of 
Pericles' the son of Xantippus. They made 
a descent, and in a battle defeated those of the 
Sicyonians who endeavoured to make head 
against them. From thence they strengthened 
themselves by taking in some Achseans; and 
stretching across the gulf, landed in a district 
of Acarnania, and laid siege to Oenias ; yet, 
unable to carry it, they soon quitted, and with- 
drew to their own homes. 

Three years after this, a peace to continue 
for five years was clapped up between the Pe- 
loponnesians and Athenians. Upon this, the 
Athenians, now at leisure from any war in 
Greece, engaged in an expedition against Cy- 
prus, with a fleet of two hundred ships of their 
own and allies, commanded by Cimon. Sixty 
of these were afterwards detached to Egypt, at 
the request of Amyrtaeus king of the fenny 
part ; but the rest of them blocked up Citium. 
Yet, by the death of Cimon, and a violent fa- 
mine, they were compelled to quit the blockade 



« Here the name of Pericles first occurs, and a hint 
should he given to those who are not well acquainted 
with him, to mark a person that was a true patriot, a 
consummate'statesmiin, ajrood general, and a most sub- 
lime speaker. He wns tiorn of one of the most illustri- 
ous families in Athens. He was educated in the best 
manner, and learned his philosophy or the knowledge 
of nature from Anaxairoras, whose doctrines agreed so 
little with the superstitious practices and tempers of 
the Athenians, that the mrsterand all his disciples were 
charged with atheism, for which many of them were 
prosecuted, and the divine Socrates most injuriously put 
to death. [Ic engaged early in puhlic affairs, gained the 
ascendant over all his competitors, became at length, 
and continued to his death, master of the affections and 
liberties too of the Athenian people, and though master, 
yet guardian and incrcaser of the latter. In short, accor- 
ding to writers of the best authority and the pravest his- 
torians, he was one of the most aHe and most disinteres 
ted ministers that Athens ever had, Athena the most de- 
mocrnticnl state that ever existed, so fertile in every thing 
great and elorious, and so overrun at the same time with 
faction, licentiousness, and wild tumultuary caprice. 



of Citium ; and being cwne up to the height 
of Salamis in Cyprus, they engaged at one time 
an united force of Phoenicians, and Cyprians, 
and Cilicians both by land and sea. They 
gained the victory in both engagements ; and 
being rejoined by the detachment they had sent 
to Egypt, they returned home. 

After this, the Lacedaemonians engaged in 
that which is known by the name of the holy 
war ; and having recovered the temple at Del- 
phi, delivered it up to the Delphians. But no 
sooner were they withdrawn, than the Atheni- 
ans marched out in their turn, retook it, and 
delivered it into the hands of the Phocians. 

At no great interval of time from hence, the 
Athenians took the field against the Boeotian 
exiles, who had seized Orchomenus and Chae- 
ronaea, and some other cities of Bceotia. Their 
force, sent out upon this service, consisted of 
a thousand heavy-armed of their own with pro- 
portional quotas from their allies, and was 
commanded by Tolmidas the son of Tolmaeus. 
Having taken and enslaved Chserona^a, they 
placed a fresh garrison in it, and so withdrew. 
But upon their march, they are attacked at 
Coronea by a body of men, consisting of the 
Boeotian exiles sallying out of Orchomenus, 
joined by Locrians, and the exiles from Euboea 
and others of their partizans. After a battle, 
the victory remained with the latter, who made 
great slaughter of the Athenians, and took 
many prisoners. Upon this, the Athenians 
evacuated Boeotia, and, to get the prisoners re- 
leased, consented to a peace. The Boeotian 
exiles, and all others in the same circumstances, 
were by this resettled in their old habitations, 
and recovered their former liberty and rights. 

It was not a great while after these last oc- 
currences that Euboea revolted from the Athe- 
nians. And Pericles was no sooner landed 
upon that island with an Athenian army to 
chastise them, than news was brought him that 
" Mogara also had revolted ; that the Pelopon- 
nesians were going to make an incursion into 
Attica ; that the Athenian garrison had been 
put to the sword by the Magarcans,^ excepting 



« This revolt of Megara, a little republic almost sur- 
rounded by the dominions of Athens, leasued closely 
with her, and under her protection, cave rise to that 
decree which excluded the Mcgarcans from the porta 
and markets of Athens. Others add, that they slew an 
Athenian herald, who was sent to expostulate with 
them on this account. Could such outrages he po-keted 
by Athenians? could Pericles dissuade the people of 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



37 



those who had thrown themselves into Nisaea ; 
and that the Megareans had effected this revolt 
by a junction of Corinthians, and Sicyonians, 
and Epidaurians." Upon hearing this, Peri- 
cles re-embarked with the utmost expedition, 
and brought back his army from Eubcea. And 
soon after, the Peloponnesians, marching into 
Attica, as far as Eleusis and Thria, laid the 
country waste, under the command of Pleis- 
tionax,'' the son of Pausanias king of Sparta : 
and then, without extending the ravage any 
farther, they withdrew to their own homes. 
Now, again the Athenians transported a mili- 
tary force into Euboea, under the command of 
Pericles, and soon completed its reduction. 
The tranquility of the rest of the island was 
re-established upon certain conditions ; but they 
wholly ejected all the inhabitants of Hestisea, 
and re-peopled it with a colony of their own. 
— And not long after their return from Euboea, 
they concluded a peace for thirty years, with 
the Lacedaemonians and their allies, in pur- 
suance of which they restored them Nisaea and 
Chalcis, and Pegae and Traezene ; all which 
places, though belonging to the Peloponnesians, 
were in the hands of the Athenians. 

In the sixth year of this peace"* a war broke 



Athens from showing resentment? They decreed far- 
ther, though not explicitly mentioned by Thucydides, 
that the generals of the state should swear at their elec- 
tion, to make an incursion twice a year into the Megaris. 
We shall soon see that the Peloponnesians made it a 
pretext for the ensuing war, and that Pericles justified 
the decree, and persuaded the Athenians to hazard a 
war rather than repeal it. This is the true history of 
the point, though comedy, and raillery, and libelling, 
strangely vary the account. 

s As Pleistionax on this occasion evacuated Attica on 
a sudden, he was banished from Sparta, as having been 
bribed by the Athenians, to quit their territory. Dio- 
dorus Sipulus relates, that he did it by the advice of 
Cleandridas his guardian, who attended him in the field 
on account of his youth; and that Pericles, afterwards 
passing his accounts at Athens, charged " ten talents 
properly laid out for the service of the state," which 
passed without farther explanation or exception. 

* Pericles here performed a great and signal service 
to his country. The motives to this war are, according 
to our historian, sufficiently strong, upon the scheme 
now carrying on by Pericles, to extend the sovereignty 
of Athens by sea. Yet the comic poets, and writers of 
memoirs and private history, give another account of 
the affair, which it is surprising to find the authors of 
the Universal History, inclined to think as well founded 
as what is given by Thucydides, that" Pericles engaged 
the republic in this war, merely to gratify the resent- 
ment of Aspasia, who was a native of Miletus, against 
the Samians." As this Aspasia had all the honour of 
Pericles's merit imputed to herself, and he bath suffered 



out between the Samians and Milesians about 
Priene. The Milesians, having the worst in 
the dispute, had recourse to the Athenians, to 
whom they bitterly exclaimed against the 
Samians. Nay, even some private citizens of 
Samos joined with them in this outcry, whose 
scheme it was to work a change in the govern- 
ment. The Athenians, therefore, putting to 
sea with a fleet of forty sail, landed upon 
Samos, where they set up a democracy ; and 
exacted from them fifty boys and as many 
grown men for hostages, whom they deposited 
at Lemnos. They had farther, at their de- 
parture, left a garrison behind to secure that 
island. But a body of Samians, who would 
not submit to the new form of government, 
and therefore had refuged themselves upon the 
continent, having gained the correspondence of 
the most powerful persons abiding in Samos, 
and the alliance of Pissuthnes, son of Hys- 
taspes, at that time governor at Sardis, and 
collected a body of seven hundred auxiliaries, 
passed over by night into Samos. They first 
exerted their efforts against the popular party, 
and got a majority of them into their power : 
in the next place, they conveyed away the 
hostages from Lemnos by stealth ; they openly 
declared a revolt ; and delivered up the Athe- 
nian garrison, with their officers whom they 
had seized, to Pissuthnes; and then imme- 
diately prepared to renew their war against 
Miletus. The Byzantines farther joined with 
them in the revolt. 



a weight of reproach in her behalf, the reader will ac- 
cept a short account of this famous lady. She is allow- 
ed on all hands to have been a woman of the greatest 
beauty, and the first genius; but averred by some to have 
been a libertine, a prostitute, a bawd, nay, every thing 
scandalous and vile. Pericles was dotingly fond of her, 
and got divorced from a wife whom he did not love, to 
marry her. She taught him, it is said, his refined max- 
ims of policy, his lofty imperial eloquence; nay, even 
composed the speeches on which so great a share of his 
reputation was founded. The best men in Athens fre- 
quented her house, and brought their wives to receive 
lessons from her of economy and right deportment. 
Socrates himself was her pupil in eloquence, and gives 
her the honour of that funeral oration which he delivers 
in the Menexenus of Plato. There must have been 
some ground even for complimenting her in this extra- 
ordinary manner. And after every abatement, what 
must we think of a lady who was in such high esteem 
with the greatest men that ever lived at Athens, who 
taught force to orators, grace to philosophers, and con- 
duct to ministers of state; in a word, who had Pericles 
for her lover, and Socrates for her encomijisl? See 
Bayle's Dictionary under Pericles, and Universal His- 
tory, vol. vi. p. 415, note. 



38 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book I. 



No sooner were the Athenians informed of 
this, than they put out against Samos, with 
sixty sail, though sixteen of them were de- 
tached for other services. Some of the latter 
were stationed upon the coast of Caria, to 
observe the motions of a Phoenician fleet, and 
the rest were ordered to Chios and Lesbos, to 
give there a summons of aid. The remaining 
forty-four, commanded by Pericles' and nine 
colleagues, engaged near the isle of Tragia 
with the Samian fleet, consisting of seventy 
sail, twenty of which had land soldiers on 
board, and the whole was now on the return 
from Miletus ; and here the Athenians gained 
a signal victory. Afterwards forty sail arriv- 
ed from Athens to reinforce them, and twenty 
five from the Chians and Lesbians. With 
this accession of force they landed upon the 
island, overthrew the Samians in battle, invest- 
ed their city with a triple wall, and at the same 
time blocked it up by sea. 

But Pericles, drawing off sixty of the ships 
from this service, steered away with all pos- 
sible expedition towards Caunus and Caria, 
upon receiving advice that " a Phoenician 
fleet is coming up against them." Stesagoras 
also and others had before been sent from 
Samos with five ships to meet that fleet. In 
this interval, the Samians launched out in a 
sudden sally, fell upon the unfortified^ station 



» The Athenians in the assembly of the people chose 
ten generals every year, according to tie number of 
their tribes. They were sometimes, as in the present in- 
stance, all sent out in the same employ. They rolled, 
and each in his turn was general of the day. Thucy- 
dides seldom gives more than the name of one, whom 
we may conclude to have been the person of the greatest 
weiglitand influence amongst them, in fact a general in 
chief. Philip of Macedon was used to joke upon this 
multiplicity of generals. " For my part (said he) I have 
never had the good fortune to find more than one general 
in all my life; and yet the Athenians find ten fresh ones 
every year." Not but that these generals were often re- 
elected, and continued years in commission, Pericles, 
'tis plain, did so; and in latter times Phocion is said to 
have been elected five and forty times. Their power 
was great not only in the field, hut at Athens. Every 
point that had relation to war came under their de- 
partment. Pericles in a foreign employ was always 
first of the generals, and within the walls of Athens 
was the first or rather absolute minister of state. 

» When the Grecians continued long on a station, or 
were apprehensive of being attacked by an enemy, they 
fortified their naval station and camp towards the land 
with a ditch and rampart, and towards the sea with a 
palisade. At other times a number of their s'lips lay 
out more to sea, by way of guard or watrli to the rest, 
whi'-h wereu'cnerally draL'ged ashore, whilst ttcso'diers 
Iny round them in their tents. Sometimes tliey were 
Oiily moored to the sliore, or rode at anchor, that they 



of the Athenians, sunk the vessels moored at a 
distance by way of guard, and engaging those 
who put out against them, victoriously execut- 
ed their purpose, were masters of their own 
seas for fourteen days' continuance, and made 
whatever importations or exportations they 
pleased : but, as Pericles then returned, they 
were again blocked up by sea.^ He after- 
wards received fresh supplies from Athens, 
forty ships under Thucydides, and Agnon, and 
Phormio, and twenty under Tlepoiemus and 
Anticles, besides thirty others from Chios and 
Lesbos. And though after this the Samians 
ventured a short engagement at sea, yet they 
now found all farther resistance impracticable, 
so that in the ninth month of the siege they 
surrendered on the following terms — " To de- 
molish their wall ; to give hostages ; to de- 
liver up their shipping: and to reimburse 
by stated payments the expenses of the 
war.""* — The Byzantines also came in, upon 
the engagement of being held only to such 
obedience as had formerly been required of 
them. 

Not many years intervened between this 
period of time, and the rise of those differences 
above recited concerning Corcyra and Potidaea, 
and all occurrences whatever, on which the pre- 
tences of this Peloponnesian war were ground- 
ed. All these transactions in general, whether 
of Grecians against Grecians, or against the 
Barbarian, fell out in the compass of fifty 
years, between the retreat of Xerxes and the 
commencement of this present war; during 
which period the Athenians had established 

might be ready upon an alarm. See Potter's Archao- 
lofria. Vol. II. c. 20. 

3 The manner of doing this, " was to environ the 
walls and harbour with ships, ranged in order from one 
side of the shore to the other, and so closely joined to- 
gether by chains and bridges, on wliich armed men 
were placed, that without breaking their order there 
could be no passage from the town to the sea." — Pot- 
ter's Archanloiria. 

* Samos thus reduced, which in maritime power vied 
with Athens herself, and had well nigh defeated her 
grand plan of being mistress of the sea, Pericles was re- 
ceived upon his return with all the honours a grateful 
people could give him. and was pitched upon to make 
the funeral oration for those slain in the war. He per- 
formed his part with high applause. The ladies in par- 
ticular were loud in their acclamaiion.s, and were eager- 
ly employed in caressing and crowning him with gar- 
lands. But for a smart p'ece of raillery from one of 
them, on this occasion, and his smarter repartee, the rea- 
der may consult the Universal History, vol. vi. p. 429, 
the note. In the latter part of that note, the authors 
seem willing loth to deny and to allow Pericles the merit 
of having served his country in the reduction of Samoa. 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



39 



their dominion on a solid basis, and had rose to 
a high exaltation of power. The Lacedaemo- 
nians were sensible of it, yet never opposed 
them, except by some transient efforts ; and 
for the most part of the time were quite easy 
and indifferent about it. That people had never 
been known in a hurry to run to arms ; their 
wars were indispensably necessary ; and some- 
times they were entangled in domestic broils. 
Thus they looked on with indolent unconcern 
till the Athenian power was manifestly estab- 
lished, and encroachments were m.ade upon 
their own alliance. Then indeed they deter- 
mined to be no longer patient ; they resolved 
upon a war, in which their utmost force should 
be exerted, and the Athenian power, if possible, 
demolished. 

On these motives was formed the public re- 
solution of the Lacedaemonians — that " the 
treaty was violated, and the Athenians were 
guilty of injustice." They had also sent to 
Delphi, to inquire of the god, " Whether 
their war would be successful V He is repor- 
ted to have returned this answer, that " if they 
warred with all their might, they should at last 
be triumphant, and he himself would fight on 
their side, invoked or uninvoked." 

They had now again summoned their con- 
federates to attend, and designed to put it to a 
general ballot, " Whether the war should be 
undertaken V The ambassadors from the se- 
veral constituents of their alliance arrived, and 
assembled in one general council. Others 
made what declarations they pleased, the majo- 
rity inveighing against the Athenians, and in- 
sisting upon war ; but the Corinthians (who 
had beforehand requested every state apart to 
ballot for war), alarmed for Potidsea, lest for 
want of some speedy relief it might be utterly 
destroyed, being present also at this council, 
stood forth the last of all, and spoke to this 
effect : 

" We can no longer, ye confederates, have 
any room to complain of the Lacedaemonians, 
since their own resolution is already engaged 
for war, and they have summoned us hither 
to give our concurrence. For it is the duty of 
a governor and leading state, as in private con- 
cerns they obi^ferve the equitable conduct, so 
ever to keep their view intent upon the general 
welfare, suitably to that superior degree of hon- 
our and regard, which in many points they pre- 
eminently receive. 

« For our parts, so many of us as have 



quitted Athenian friendship for this better as- 
sociation, we require no farther trials to 
awaken our apprehensions. But those amongst 
us, who are seated up in the inland parts, at a 
distance from the coast, should now be con- 
vinced, that unless they combine in the defence 
of such as are in lower situations, they will 
soon be obstructed in carrying out the fruits of 
the lands, and again in fetching in those neces- 
sary supplies wliich the sea bestoweth upon an 
inland country. Let them by no means judge 
erroneously of what we urge, as not in the 
least affecting them ; but looking upon it as a 
certainty, that if they abandon the guard of the 
maritime situations, the danger will soon ad- 
vance quite upon them, and they of course no 
less than we are concerned in the issue of our 
present determinations. For this reason they 
ought, without the least hesitation, to make 
the timely exchange of peace for war. 

" It is indeed the duty of the prudent, so 
long as they are not injured, to be fond of 
peace. But it is the duty of the brave, when 
injured, to throw up peace, and to have re- 
course to arms : and, when in these successful, 
to lay them down again in peaceful composition; 
thus never to be elevated above measure by 
military success, nor delighted with the sweets 
of peace to suffer insults. For he who, appre- 
hensive of losing this delight, sits indolently at 
ease, will soon be deprived of the enjoyment 
of that delight which interesteth his fears ; and 
he whose passions are inflamed by military suc- 
cess, elevated too high by a treacherous con- 
fidence, hears no longer the dictates of his 
judgment. Many are the schemes which, 
though unadvisedly planned, through the more 
unreasonable conduct of an enemy turn out 
successful ; but yet more numerous are those 
which, though seemingly founded on mature 
counsel, draw after them a disgraceful and op- 
posite event. This proceeds from that great 
inequality of spirit, with which an exploit is 
projected, and with which it is put into actual 
execution. For in council we resolve, surround- 
ed with security; in execution we faint, through 
the prevalence of fear. 

" We now, having been grossly injured, and 
in abundant instances aggrieved, are taking up 
arms ; and, when we have avenged ourselves on 
the Athenians, shall at a proper time lay them 
down again. Success, upon many considera- 
tions, we may promise ourselves ; in the first 
place, as we are superior in numbers and mill 



40 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book 



tary skill ; in the next, as we all advance with 
uniformity to accomplish our designs. A na- 
val force, equal to that in which their strength 
consists, we shall be enabled to equip, from 
competent stores we separately possess, and 
the funds laid up at Delphi and Olympia.' 
If we take up those upon interest for im- 
mediate service, we are able, by enlarging their 
pay, to draw away all the foreigners who 
man their fleets. The Athenian power is not 
supported by a natural but a purchased strength. 
And our own is less liable to be injured by the 
same method, as we are strong in our persons 
more than in our wealth. Should we gain the 
victory but in one single engagement at sea, 
in all probability we have done their business ; 
or, in case they continue the struggle, we shall 
then have a longer space to improve our naval 
practice : and when once we have gained an 
equality of skill, our natural courage will soon 
secure us the triumph. For that valiant spirit 
which we enjoy by nature, it is impossible for 
them to acquire by rules : but that superiority 
with which at present their skill invites them, 
we may easily learn to overmatch by practice. 

" Those sums of money by which these 
points are chiefly to be compassed, we will re- 
spectively contribute. For would it not in real- 
ity be a grievous case, when their dependents are 
never backward to send in those sums which 
rivet slavery on themselves, if we, who want 
to be revenged on our foes, and at the same 
time to secure our own preservation — if we 
should refuse to submit to expenses, and 
should store up our wealth to be plundered by 
them, to purchase oppressions and miseries for 
ourselves 1 

" We have other expedients within our reach 
to support this war, — a revolt of their depend- 
ents ; and, in consequence of that, a diminution 
of their revenue, the essence of their strength ; 
erecting forts within their territory ; and many 
others not yet to be foreseen. For war by no 
means yields to t'he direction of a pre-deter- 
mincd plan ; but of itself, in every present exi- 
gence, confines and methodizcth its own course. 
In war, who moves along with a temper in 
proper command, hath got the firmest support ; 

« In the temple of Apollo at Delphi, and that of Ju- 
piter at Olympia. The wealth rcposited in these places 
must have heen very lartre, ronsidcrinj the preat vene- 
ration Jinivcrsally paid these doilies, and the numerous 
and valuahle olTeriiigs sent unnuully to tlieso fuiiious 
temples. 



but he who hath lost his temper is, for that 
reason, more liable to miscarry. 

" Let us remember, that if any one single 
state amongst us had a contest with its foes 
about a frontier, there would be need of perse- 
verance. But now, the Athenians are a match 
for us all united, and quite too strong for any 
of us separately to resist : so that unless we 
support one another with our collective forces, 
unless every nation and every state unanimous- 
ly combine to give a check to their ambition, 
they will oppress us, apart and disunited, with- 
out a struggle. Such a triumph, how grating 
soever the bare mention of it may be to any 
of your ears, yet, be it known, can end in 
nothing else but plain and open slavery. To 
hint in mere words so base a doubt, that so 
many states may be enslaved by one, is disgrace 
to Peloponnesus. In such a plunge we should • 
either be thought justly to have deserved it, or 
through cowardice to suffer it, the degenerate 
offspring of those ancestors who were the de- 
liverers of Greece. And yet we have not 
spirit enough remaining to defend our own 
liberty. We suflfer one single state to erect 
itself into a tyrant, whilst we claim the glory 
of pulling down monarchs in particular socie- 
ties. We know not by what methods to ex- 
tricate ourselves from these three, the greatest 
of calamities, from folly, or cowardice, or sloth. 
For exempt from these in fact you are not, by 
taking up the plea of contempt of your enemies, 
for which such numbers have suffered. The 
many misfortunes arising from this have chang- 
ed the sense of the word, and caused it to stand 
for arrant folly. 

" But on the past what necessity is there to 
enlarge 1 or to blame any farther than may be 
necessary for the present 1 To prevent worse 
events for the future we ought by immediate 
efforts, with toil and perseverance, to seek for 
redress. Through toil to acquire virtues, is 
hereditary to Peloponnesians. This custom 
is not to be dropped, though now in wealth 
and power you have made some petty advance- 
ments : for it never can become you to let go 
in affluence what was gained in want. It bo- 
comes you rather, upon many accounts, with 
manly confidence, to declare for war. The 
oracle of a god prescribeth it; — that god 
himself hath promised his assistance; — and 
the rest of Greece is ready to join you in the 
contest, some from a principle of fear, and 
some from a principle of interest. Neither on 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



41 



you will the first breach of the peace be charged. 
The god who adviseth war plainly judgeth that 
to be already broke : you will only act to re- 
dress its violation. For the breach is not to be 
charged on those who arm to revenge it ; but 
on those who were the first aggressors. 

« Since then war, considered in every light, 
appears honourable in regard to you, ye Lace- 
dsemonians ; since we, with united voices, en- 
courage you to it, as most strongly requisite 
for our general and separate interests, — defer 
no longer to succour the Potidceans, Dorians 
by descent, and besieged by lonians, (the re- 
verse was formerly the case,) and to fetch 
again the liberty of others. The business will 
admit of no longer delay, when some already 
feel the blow ; and others, if it once be known 
that we met here together, and durst not un- 
dertake our own defence, will in a very little 
time be sensible of the same. Reflect within 
yourselves, confederates, that affairs are come 
to extremities, that we have suggested the most 
advisable measures, and give your ballot for war. 
Be not terrified at its immediate dangers ; but 
animate yourselves with the hope of a long last- 
ing peace- to be procured by it. For a peace 
produced by war is ever the most firm; but 
from tranquility and ease to be averse to war, 
can by no means abate or dissipate our danger. 
With this certain conclusion, that a state in 
Greece is started up into a tyrant, and aims 
indifferently at the liberty of us all, her arbi- 
trary plan being partly executed and partly in 
agitation, let us rush against and at once pull 
her down. Then shall we pass the remainder 
of our lives exempt from dangers, and shall 
immediately recover liberty for those Grecians 
who are already enslaved." 

In this manner the Corinthians spoke : and 
the Lacedaemonians, when they had heard them 
all deliver their several opinions, gave out the 
ballots to all the confederates that were pre- 
sent, in regular order, both to the greater and 
lesser states : and the greatest part of them 
balloted for war. But, though thus decreed, 
it was impossible for them, as they were quite 
unprepared, immediately to undertake it. It 
was agreed, therefore, that " every state should 
get in readiness their several contingents, and 
no time to be lost." However in less than a 
year, every thing needful was amply provided : 
and, before its expiration, an irruption was 
made into Attica, and the war openly on foot. 
But even this interval was employed in send- 
13 



ing embassies to Athens, charged with accu- 
sations, that reasons strong as possible for mak- 
ing war might appear on their side, if those 
should meet with disregard. 

By the first ambassadors therefore whom the 
Lacedaemonians sent, they required the Athe- 
nians " To drive away the pollution of the god- 
dess." And the pollution was this : 

There was one Cylon an Athenian, who had 
been victor at the Olympic games, a person of 
noble descent, and of great consequence in 
his own person. He married a daughter of 
Theagenes, a Mcgarean, who in those days 
was tyrant of Megara. This Cylon, asking 
advice at Delphi about a scheme he had pro- 
jected, was directed by the god " To seize 
the citadel of Athens upon the greatest festival 
of Jupiter." In pursuance of this, being sup- 
plied by a party of men by Theagenes, and 
having obtained the concurrence of his own 
friends, upon the day of the Peloponnesian 
Olympics, he seized the citadel as instrumental 
to his tyranny. He imagined that to be the 
greatest festival of Jupiter, and to bear a par- 
ticular relation to himself, who had been an 
Olympic victor. But whether the greatest 
festival meant was to be held in Attica, or any 
other place, he had never considered, nor had 
the oracle declared. There is a festival of 
Jove observed by the Athenians, which is 
called the greatest festival of Jupiter the pro- 
pitious. This is celebrated without the city, 
in full concourse of the people, where many 
sacrifices are offered, not of real victims, but 
of artificial images of creatures peculiar to the 
country. Concluding, however, that he had 
the true sense of the oracle, he put his enter- 
prise in execution. The Athenians, taking the 
alarm, ran out of the country in one general 
confluence to put a stop to these attempts, and 
investing the citadel, quite blocked them up. 
But in process of time, being wearied out with 
the tediousness of the blockade, many of them 
departed, leaving the care of it to the nine 
archons, with a full power of " acting in what- 
ever manner they should judge most expe- 
dient :" for at that time most parts of the 
public administration were in the management 
of the archons. The party with Cylon, thus 
closely invested, were reduced very low through 
scarcity of bread and water. Cylon, therefore, 
and his brother privately escape. But the 
rest, reduced to extremities, and some of them 
had already perished by famine, sit themselves 
I 



42 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book r. 



down as suppliants by the altar in the citadel. 
The Athenian guard, having ordered them to 
arise, as they saw them just ready to expire in 
the temple, to avoid the guilt of profanation, 
led them out and slew them. But some of the 
number, who had seated themselves at the 
venerable goddesses, at the very altars, they 
jnurdered in' the act of removal. And for this 
action, not only the persons concerned in it, 
but their descendants also, were called the sa- 
crilegious and accursed of the goddess. The 
Athenians, indeed, banished those sacrilegious 
persons out of the city ; Cleomenes, the Lace- 
daemonian, drove them out again, when he was 
at Athens, on account of a sedition ; nay, on 
this occasion they not only drove away the 
living, but even dug up the bones of the dead, 
and cast them out ; yet, in process of time, 
they returned again, and some of their posterity 
are still in Athens. 

This was the pollution which the Lacedaj- 
raonians required them to drive away ; with a 
face, indeed, of piety, as vindicating the honour 
of the gods ; but knovv'ing, at the same time, 
that Pericles, the son of Xantippus, was tainted 
with it by the side of his mother ; and thence 
concluding, that if he could be removed, the 
Athenians would more easily be brought to an 
accommodation with them. They could not 
carry their hopes so far as actually to effect his 
banishment, but to raise against him the public 
odium, as if the war was partly owing to the 
misfortune they suffered in him. For, carrying 
with him the greatest sway of any Athenian 
then alive, and presiding entirely in the ad- 
ministration, he was most steady in opposition 
to theLacedfemonians, dissuading the Athenians 
from any concession, and exciting them to war. 

The Athenians, in return, required the La- 
cedaemonians " to drive away the pollution 
contracted at Tainarus ;" for the Lacedemo- 
nians, some time ago, having caused their sup- 
plicant Helots to rise out of Neptune's temple 
at Tffinarus, and led them aside, and slew them. 
And to this action they themselves impute the 

» Wlien these suppliants were ordered to come out, 
they tied a strin!» round the altar in tl:e ritadcl, and 
keeping hold of it, were come as far as the altars of 
the vencrahle goddesses. Just there tlie strings happen- 
ed to break, upon which the archons rushed in to seize 
tiicm, as if Minerva had thrown tlieni out of her pro- 
tection. Pome of the number sat instantly down for 
fresh protection at the altars of the venerable goddess- 
es; it was an unavailing resource, and thoy were imme- 
diately slain upon the spot. Plutarch in Solon. 



great earthquake which happened afterwards at 
Sparta. 

They further required them " to drive away 
the pollution of the Chalciaecan Pallas," the 
nature of which was this ; 

When Pausanias, the Lacediemonian, upon 
his being first recalled by the Spartans from his 
command in the Hellespont, and brought to his 
trial before them, was acquitted of the charge 
of mal-adrainistration, but was no longer in- 
trusted with the public commission ; fitting out 
a Hermionian trireme on his own private ac- 
count, he arriveth in Hellespont, without any 
authority from the Lacedsemonians. He gave 
out that he did it for the service of the Gre- 
cian war ; but his intention was to carry on his 
negotiations with the king, which, aspiring to 
the monarchy of Greece, he had begun before. 
He had formerly conferred an obligation upon 
the king, from which the whole of his project 
took its date. When, after the return from 
Cyprus, during his first appearance there, he 
took Byzantium, which was possessed by the 
Medes, and in it some favourites and relations 
of the king were made his prisoners, he releas- 
eth them all, to ingratiate himself with the king, 
without the privity of the other confederates, 
giving it out in public that they had made their 
escape. He transacted this affair by means of 
Gongylus, the Eretrian, to whose keeping he 
had intrusted Byzantium and the prisoners. 
He also despatched Gongylus to him with a 
letter, the contents of which, as was afterwards 
discovered, were these : 

" Pausanias, general of Sparta, desirous to 
oblige you, sends away these his prisoners of 
war. And by it I express my inclination, if 
you approve, to take your daughter in marriage, 
and to put Sparta and the rest of Greece into 
your subjection. I think I have power suffi- 
cient to effectuate these points, could my scheme 
be communicated with you. If therefore any 
of these proposals receive your approbation, 
send down to the coast some trusty person, 
through whom for the future we may hold a 
correspondence." 

Thus much was contained in the letter ; and, 
on the reception of it, Xerxes was delighted, 
and sends away Artabazus the son of Phama- 
cus, down to the coast, with an order to take 
upon him the government of Dascylis, having 
first dismissed Megabctes who was the gover- 
nor. To him he intrusted a letter for Pausa- 
nias at Byzantium, with an injunction to for- 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



43 



ward it with all possible expedition, and to let 
him see his signet; and that, if Pausanias 
should charge him with any affairs, he should 
execute them with all possible diligence and 
fidelity. Artabazus being arrived, obeyed all 
the other injunctions with exactness, and 
forwarded the letter, which brought this an- 
swer ; 

" Thus saith king Xerxes to Pausanias. — 
The kindness done me in those persons whom 
from Byzantium you delivered safe on the 
other side the sea, shall be placed to your ac- 
count in our family, eternally recorded : and 
with the other contents of your letter I am de- 
lighted. Let neither night nor day relax your 
earnest endeavours to effectuate those points 
you promise me : nor stop at any expense of 
gold or silver, or greatness of military force, if 
such aid be any where requisite. But confer 
boldly with Artabazus, a trusty person, whom 
I have sent to you, about mine and your own 
concerns, that they may be accompUshed in 
the most honourable and most advantageous 
manner for us both." 

Upon the receipt of this letter, Pausanias, 
who before had been in high credit with the 
Grecians, through the lustre of his command 
at Platsea, was elevated much more than ever, 
and could no longer adjust his demeanour by 
the modes and customs of his native country. 
He immediately dressed himself up in Per- 
sian attire, and, quitting Byzantium, travelled 
through Thrace, attended with Persian and 
Egyptian guards, and refined his table into 
Persian elegance. His ambition he was un- 
able any longer to conceal, but by short sketches 
manifested too soon, what greater schemes he 
had formed in his mind for future accomplish- 
ment. He then showed himself difficult of 
access, and let his anger loose so violently and 
so indiscriminately upon all men, that no one 
could approach him. And this was not the 
least motive to the confederacy for going over 
to the Athenians. But the Lacedaemonians, 
informed of this, recalled him the first time 
upon the account of such behaviour ; and, when 
he was returned again in the Hermionian ves- 
sel without their permission, he plainly ap- 
peared to have re-assumed again his former 
practices. And when forced to remove from 
Byzantium by the opposition raised against 
him by the Athenians, he went not back to 
Sparta ; but withdrawing to Colonae of Troas, 
information was given that " he was negotiating 



with the Barbarians, and had fixed his residence 
there for very bad designs." Upon this they 
could no longer be patient, but the ephori 
despatched him a herald and the Scytale,' with 
an order " Not to stay behind the herald ; if 
he did, war was proclaimed against him by the 
Spartans." And he, desirous to clear himself 
as much as possible from suspicion, and confi- 
dent that with money he could baffle any accu- 
sation, returned the second time to Sparta. 
The first treatment he met with there was, to 
be thrown into prison by order of the ephori : 
for the ephori have so large an authority, even 
over a king. But afterwards, by some private 
management, he procured his enlargement, and 
offers to submit to a trial against any who were 
willing to accuse him. The Spartans indeed 
had no positive evidence against him, not even 
his private enemies, nor the general community 
— none, to support them in proceeding capitally 
against a person of the royal descent, and at 
that time invested with the regal dignity : for, 
being uncle to Pleistarchus the son of Leoni- 
das, their king, though yet in minority, he was 
regent guardian. But, by his disregard of the 
laws, and his affectation of the Barbarian man- 
ners, he afforded them strong reasons to sus- 
pect, that he would never conform to the equal- 
ity then in vogue. They called to remem- 
brance those other passages of his behaviour, 
in which he had at any time deviated from the 
institutions of his country ; and that further 
upon the tripod at Delphi, which the Grecians 
offered as the choicest part of the Persian 
spoils, he had formerly presumed, by his own 
authority, to place this inscription : 

» The Scytale is a famous instrument peculiar to the 
Lacedaemonians, and used by them for the close convey- 
ance of orders to their ministers abroad. It was a long 
black stick, and the contrivance was this — " When the 
magistrates gave commission to any general or admiral, 
they took two round pieces of wood exactly equal to one 
another; one of these they kept, and the other was de- 
livered to the commander; to whom when they had any 
thing of moment to communicate, they cut a long nar- 
now scroll of parchment, and rolling it about their own 
staff, one fold close upon another, they rt'rote their busi- 
ness upon it; then taking it off, despatched it away to 
the commander, who applying it to his own staff, the 
folds exactly fell in one with another, as at the writint?" 
and the characters, which, before it was wrapped up, 
were confusedly disjoined and unintelligible, appeared 
very plain." Potter's Archaologia, vol. ii. c, 13. 

If it be asked (says the Scholiast^ how Pausanias 
came to have the Scytale with him now, as he was 
abroad without the public commission? the answer is, 
He bad kept it ever since his former employments. 



44 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book I. 



For Persia's hosts o'crthrown, and Grtecia freed, 
To PhcbbusTHis Pausanias hath decreed, 
Who led the Grecians in the glorious deed. 

These verses indeed the Lacedxmonians im- 
mediately defaced from the tripod, and placed in 
their stead the names of the several states 
which had joined in the overthrow of the Bar- 
barian, and in making this oblation. This 
therefore was now recollected to the prejudice 
of Pausanias ; and, in his present situation, it 
was interpreted, from the circumstances of his 
late behaviour, as an argument that he had been 
equally guilty long before. They had more- 
over got an information that he was tampering 
with the Helots, which in fact was true : for 
he promised them their liberty and the privilege 
of citizens of Sparta, if they would rise at his 
command and co-operate with him in the whole 
of his project. But even this would not pre- 
vail : they disdained to place so much confi- 
dence in the informations given by Helots, as 
to run into irregularities to punish him. They 
adhered to the custom ever observed amongst 
them, never to be hasty in forming a sentence 
never to be recalled against a citizen of Sparta, 
without unquestionable evidence. At length, 
they obtained the fullest conviction, as it is 
said, by means of an Argyllian, an old minion 
of his, and the person most in his confidence, 
who was to convey to Artabazus the last letter 
he wrote to the king. This man, alarmed by 
the recollection that no person sent on these 
errands before him had ever returned again, hav- 
ing already counterfeited the seal, to the end 
that if he was deceived in his suspicions, or 
Pausanias should demand them again to make 
any alteration, he might avoid discovery, breaks 
open the letters. He f(?und by them, that he 
was going on the errand his fears foreboded, 
and that his own murder was expressly enjoin- 
ed. He carried upon this the packet to the 
ephori, who were now more than ever con- 
vinced, but still were desirous to hear them- 
selves from the mouth of Pausanias, an ac- 
knowledgment of the truth. They therefore 
contrived, that this person should go to sanc- 
tuary at Tsenarus as a suppliant, and refuge in 
a cell built double by a partition. In the 
inner part of this cell he hid some of the 
ephori : and, Pausanias coming to him and 
demanding the reason of his supplication, they 
heard distinctly all that passed. The man 
complained bitterly to him about the clause in 



the letters relating to himself, and expos- 
tulated with him about every particular — 
" why he, who had been so trusty to him dur- 
ing the whole course of his negotiations with 
the king, should now be so highly honoured, 
as to be murdered upon an equal rank with 
the meanest of lus tools 1" Pausanias con- 
fessed the truth of all that he alleged ; begged 
him, " not to be exasperated with what at 
present appeared ;" assured him, " he should 
not be hurt if he would leave his sanctuary ;" 
and earnestly entreated him, " with all pos- 
sible speed to go the journey, and not to ob- 
struct the schemes that were then in agitation." 
The ephori, having exactly heard him, with- 
drew : and now, beyond a scruple convinced, 
they determined to apprehend him in the city. 
But it is reported, that at the instant fixed for 
his arrest, as he was walking along, and beheld 
the countenance of one of the ephori, ap- 
proaching towards him, he immediately dis- 
covered his business : and another of them out 
of kindness intimating the matter by a nod, he 
took to his heels, and fled away faster than 
they could pursue him. The Chalcisecan hap- 
pened to be near, and into a little house within 
the verge of that temple he betook himself, 
and sat quietly down to avoid the inclemency 
of the outward air. They, who had lost the 
start, came too late in the pursuit. But after- 
wards, they stripped the house of its roof and 
doors ; and, watching their opportunity when 
he was within, they encompassed him round 
about,* immured him within, and placing a 
constant guard around, kept him beset that he 
might perish with hunger. When he was 
ready to expire, and they found in how bad 
a state he lay within the house, they led him 
out of the verge, yet breathing a little ; and, 
being thus brought out, he immediately died. 
They next intended to cast his body into the 
Canada, where they are used to throw their 
malefactors ; but afterwards changed their 
minds, and put him into the ground, some- 
where thereabouts. But the god at Delphi 
warned the Lacedaemonians, afterwards by an 
oracle, " to remove his body to the place where 
he died :" — And now it lies in the area, before 
the temple, as the inscription on the pillars 
showeth : — " and, as in what they had done 

> Alcithca, the mother of PausanLis, is said to bare 
brought the first stone on this occasion: such was the 
Bpirit of the ladieeat Lacodn;mon. 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



45 



they had violated the laws of sanctuary, to re- 
store two bodies to the Chalciaecan for that one." 
To this they so far conformed, as to dedicate 
there two statues of brass, as atonements for 
Pausanias. 

(The Athenians, upon the principle that the 
god himself had judged this a pollution, required 
of the Lacedaemonians, by way of retahation, to 
clear themselves of it.) 

The Lacedaemonians, at that time sent am- 
bassadors to Athens, to accuse Themistocles 
also of carrying on the same treasonable cor- 
respondence with the Mede, as Pausanias, 
which they had discovered from the papers, 
which had been evidence against Pausanias, 
and demanded that " he should be equally 
punished for it." The Athenians complied 
with this demand. But, as he then happened 
to be under the ostracism,^ and residing chiefly 
at Argos, though he frequently visited other 
parts of Peloponnesus, they send a party along 
with the Lacedaemonians, who readily joined 
in his pursuit, with orders to seize him, where- 
ever they could find him. Themistocles, ad- 
vised in time, flieth out of Peloponnesus into 
Corcyra, to which people he had done a signal 
kindness.^ The Corcyreans expressing their 

1 The ostracism was a compliment of an extraordinary 
kind paid by the people of Athens to superior merit. 
When a person had done them great services, and they 
grew apprehensive they might possibly show him too 
much gratitude, to the prejudice of their own liberties, 
they banished him for ten years. On some particular 
day each citizen gave in the name of a person, wrote 
upon an ostracum (a shell, or piece of tile), who he de- 
sired sbould be sent into retirement. Six thousand of 
these votes carried the point; and he, who had thus a 
legal number of votes, was obliged to quit Athens with- 
in ten days. The most disinterested patriot, and most 
successful commander, received, for the most part, this 
public acknowledgement of their services. At length, 
a scoundrel fellow, one Hyperbolas, was thus honour- 
ably distinguished by the public voice. The Athenians 
thought afterwards they had profaned the ostracism by 
treating him like a Themistocles, an Aristides, or a Ci- 
mon, and therefore abolished this strange injurious 
privilege, by which wanton liberty was enabled to tri- 
umph over its best friend, public spirit. Other republics 
in Greece had something of the same nature amongst 
them. Authors vary much about the circumstances 
of the ostracism; I have mentioned those points only 
which are universally agreed. 

a At the time of the Persian invasion, the Corcyreans 
had refused to join in the common cause of Greece. 
The Grecians, therefore, had afterwards a design to fall 
upon and destroy them. But Themistocles interposed, 
and saved them by remonstrating, that by such pro- 
ceedings Greece would be plunged into greater calam- 
ities, than it would have suffered under the despotic 
power of Xerxes. 



fear of giving him refuge, lest it might expose 
them to the resentment both of Lacedaemonians 
and Athenians, he is conveyed away by them 
to the opposite continent. Now, pursued by 
those who were appointed to do it, and who 
had by inquiry discovered his route, he is com- 
pelled, by mere distress, to turn in to Admetus 
king of the Molossians,' who was by no means 
his friend. It happened that Admetus was 
not at home ; and Themistocles, the suppliant, 
addressing himself to the wife, is by her di- 
rected to take their child in his hand, and sit 
himself down upon the hearth. Admetus re- 
turning soon after, he tells him who he was, 
and conjures him — " though he had formerly 
opposed him in a suit he had preferred to the 
people of Athens, not to take revenge upon 
an exile ; to make him suffer now, would be 
taking those advantages over a man in distress, 
which he ought to disdain ; the point of honour 
consisted in equals revenging themselves upon 
equal terms ; he had, it is true, stood in op- 
position to him, but merely in a point of 
interest, and not where life was at stake ; but 
if he now gave him up" (telUng him by whom, 
and why, he was persecuted) " he deprives him 
of the only resource he had left to preserve his 
life." Admetus, having heard him, bids him 
rise, together with the child whom he held as 
he sat down ; for this was the most pathetic 
form of supplication. And when, not long 
after, the Lacedaemonians and Athenians ar- 
rived, and pressed him earnestly to do it, he 
refuseth to give him up, and sends him under 
a guard, as he had declared his intention to go 
to the king, to the other sea, by a journey over 
land, as far as Pydne, a town belonging to 
Alexander. He here met with a trading 
vessel bound to Ionia ; and going on board, 
is driven by a storm into the Athenian fleet, 
which then lay before Naxos. Alarmed at his 
danger, he discovereth himself to the master, 
for not one person on board suspected who he 
was, and telleth him the occasion of his flight ; 
and unless he will undertake his preservation, 
threatens '< to inform against him, as one who 
had been bribed to further his escape : — pre- 
served he still might be, provided no person 
was suffered, during the voyage, to stir out of 
the vessel ; — if he would comply, the favour 



» Admetus had formerly negotiated an alliance at 
Athens, but was rejected by the influence of Th^ 
mistocles. 
i8 



46 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book I. 



should be acknowledged with effectual grati- 
tude." — The master of the vessel promiseth 
his service, and keeping out at sea a day and a 
night to windward of the fleet, he afterwards 
landeth him at Epliesus. Themistocles, to 
recompense his care, made him a handsome 
present in money, for there he received those 
sums which he had ordered secretly to be con- 
veyed thither from his friends at Athens, and 
from Argos ; and, travelling upwards from 
thence, in company with a Persian of the 
maritime provinces, he gets a letter to be de- 
livered to king Artaxerxes, the son of Xerxes, 
who had lately mounted the throne, the pur- 
port of which was this : 

" I Themistocles am coming to you, who of 
all the Grecians have done the greatest mis- 
chiefs to your family, so long as I was obliged 
by necessity to resist the invasion of your 
father. Yet the good services I did him were 
much more numerous, when my own preserva- 
tion was secured, and his retreat became full 
of hazards. My former generosity calls for a 
requital ;" (here he inserted the message he 
had sent to Xerxes about the retreat from 
Salamis ; and that, out of regard to him, he 
had prevented the breaking down of the bridges, 
which was mere fiction ;) " and now, able to 
perform great services for you, I am near at 
hand, having been persecuted by the Grecians 
for my friendship to you. I beg only a year's 
respite, that I may notify to you in person, 
those points which are the subject of my 
journey hither." 

The king, it is said, was surprised at the 
spirit of the man,^ and ordered him to act as he 
desired. The time of respite he had thus ob- 
tained, he spent in making all possible progress 

1 The boldness and intrepidity of Themistocles hath 
been the subject of admiration, in throwing himself on 
the protection of the Persian monarch, who had fixed a 
price on his licud. And yet he was so high in his esteem, 
that the nif,'ht after first giving him audience, he cried 
aloud thrice in liis sleep. " I have pot Themistocles the 
Athenian." He afterwards acknowledged liimsclf two 
hundred talents (near 40,000/. sterling) in liisdebt; " for 
60 much I promised the man that brou<j;ht you to me.'' 
Themistocles soon gave him a specimen of his fine un- 
derstanding. He was desired by the king to speak his 
mind freely in relation to the affairs of Greece: he an- 
swered by Ills interpreter, that '• discourse, like a Per- 
sian carpet, had in it a variety of figures, which never 
appeared to advantage unless it was quite unfolded, 
but were not to be ajiprehendcd, when wrapped up in 
the piece." By this Insonioua plon, lie obtained a 
year's respite to learn the Persian language, that he 
might be enabled to deliver explicitly iiis own scnti- 



in the Persian language, and in learning the 
manners of the country. When the year was 
elapsed, appearing at court, he became a 
favourite with the king, "a greater than any 
Greek had ever been before, as well on ac- 
count of the former lustre of his life, as the 
hope he suggested to him of enslaving Greece; 
but above all by the specimens he gave of his 
fine understanding ; for in Themistocles, the 
strength of nature was most vigorously shown ; 
and by it he was so highly distinguished above 
the bulk of mankind, as to deserve the great- 
est admiration. By the mere force of his 
natural genius, without any improvement from 
study, either in his youth or more advanced 
age, he could give the best advice upon sudden 
emergencies with the least hesitation, and was 
happy in his conjectures about the events of 
the future. Whatever he undertook, he was 
able to accomplish ; and wherein he was quite 
unexperienced, he had so prompt a discernment 
that he never was mistaken. In a matter of 
ambiguity, he foresaw with extraordinary acute- 
ncss the better and the worse side of the 
question. Upon the whole, by the force of 
natural genius, he was most quick at all ex- 
pedients, and at the same time excellent, be- 
yond competition, at declaring instantly the 
most advisable measures of acting upon every 
occurrence. — But, being seized with a fit of 
sickness, his life is at an end. Some, indeed, 
report, that he put an end to his own life by 
taking poison, when he judged it impossible to 
perform what he had promised the king. His 
monument, however, is at Magnesia in Asia, 
in the forum. Of this province he was gover- 
nor through the bounty of the king, who 
assigned him Magnesia, (which yielded him 
^fifty talents yearly,) for his bread, Lampsa- 
cus, for his wine, (which place was in the 
greatest repute for wine,) and ]\Iyus for his 



mcnfs to the king, in his own words and method He 
became afterwards so great a favourite, that the most 
enzaging promise, in future times, that the Persian 
monarch could make to a Greek, whom he had n mind 
to inveigle into his service, was, " that he should live 
with him as Themistocles did with Artaxerxes." And 
yet no attachment to his royal friend, ever made him an 
enemy to his country; nor did his disinterested patriot- 
ism, of which never man had more, ever render him 
ungrateful to his benefactor. Through liis bounty, he 
lived the remainder of bis life in pomp and affluence, 
and was used to say humorously to his cliildren, " We 
liad been undone, my cliildren, if we had not been 
undone." 
« 9C8T/. 10». sterling. 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



47 



meat. His bones are said to have been con- 
veyed home by his relations, in pursuance of 
his own desire, and to have been interred in 
Attica without the privity of the Athenians. 
For it was against law to bury him there, as 
he had been outlawed for treason.^ 

Such an end had the lives of Pausanias the 
Lacedaemonian, and Themistocles the Athe- 
nian, who in their own age made the greatest 
figure of any Grecians. 

The Lacedaemonians, by their first embassy, 
had enjoined, what was as amply, in turn, re- 
quired of them, to do as hath been above 
recited, concerning the expulsion of the sacri- 
legious. But, coming a second time to the 
Athenians, they commanded them "to quit 
the blockade of Potidaea ;" and " to permit 
^gina to govern itself at its own discretion ;" 
and, above all other points, insist upon this, 
declaring most expressly, that in this case war 
should not be made — '<■ If they would revoke 
their decree concerning the Megareans, in 
which they had been prohibited from entering 
any harbour whatever in the dominion of 
Athens, and from the Attic markets. 

But the Athenians listened to none of these 
demands, nor would revoke the decree, hut 
reproached the Megareans for tilling land that 
was sacred, land not marked out for culture, 
and for giving shelter to runaway slaves. 

At last, the final ambassadors arrived from 
Lacedsemon, namely, Ramphias, and Melesip- 
pus, and Agesander, who, waving all other 



« Some authors have related, that his countrymen 
afterwards honoured him with a cenotaph in the Pirae- 
us. Plutarch, however, disbelieves the fact, and thinks 
it merely a presumption, formed on the following ver- 
ses of Plato the comic poet: 

To thee, Themistocles, a tomb is due, 

Placed in the most conspicuous point of view ; 

Merchants from every port, with just acclaim. 

Should shout thy honour, and confess thy fame ; 

Each fleet returned, or setting out, should join 

la ownin? all the naval glory thine ; 

It should command, high raised, yon watery plain. 

And point that fight which gave us all the main. 

I cannot end this note about Themistocles, without 
begging the reader to accept a translation of an epigram 
in the Anthologia, which appears to have been written 
with a spirit worthy of this illustrious Athenian: 

Be Greece the monument ; and crown the height 
With all the trophies of the naval fight. 
Let Persia's Mars and Xerxes swell the base ; 
Such forms alone Themistocles can grace. 
Next, like a column of majestic size. 
His acts inscribed, let Salamis arise. 
Swell every part, and give the hero room, 
For nothing small should scandalize the tomb. 



points which they had formerly required, said 
thus : — " The Lacedsemonians are desirous of 
peace, and peace there may be, if you will per- 
mit the Grecians to govern themselves at their 
own discretion." 

The Athenians summoned an assembly, 
where every one was invited to deliver his 
opinion. They determined, after deliberate 
consultation on all the points in contest, to 
return one definitive answer. Several others 
spoke on this occasion, and were divided in 
their sentiments ; some insisting on the neces- 
sity of a war ; others, that peace should not be 
obstructed by that decree, which ought to be 
repealed. At length Pericles, the son of 
Xantippus, standing forth, who was at that 
time the leading man at Athens, and a person 
of the greatest abilities both for action and de- 
bate, advised them thus : 

" I firmly persevere, Athenians, in the same 
opinion that I have ever avowed — to make no 
concessions to the Lacedaemonians — though at 
the same time sensible, that men never exe- 
cute a war with that warmth of spirit through 
which they are at first impelled to undertake 
it, but sink in their ardour as diificulties in- 
crease. I perceive it, however, incumbent 
upon me, to persist in the same uniform ad- 
vice ; and I require those amongst you who 
are influenced by it, as they concur in the mea- 
sures, either to unite their efforts for redress, 
if any sinister event should follow ; or else, 
upon a series of success, to make no parade of 
their own discernment. It is usually enough 
for accidents, unforeseen, to baffle the best con- 
certed schemes ; since human intentions are 
by nature fallible. And hence it comes to pass, 
that whatever falls out contrary to our expec- 
tations, we are accustomed to throw all the 
blame upon fortune. 

'< The treacherous designs of the Lacedae- 
monians, formerly, against 'us, were visible to 
all ; nor are they, this very moment, less clear 
than ever. For, notwithstanding that express 
stipulation, that, upon controversies between 
us, we should reciprocally do, and submit to 
justice, each party remaining in their present 
possessions ; yet, they have never demanded 
justice, nor accept the offer of it from us 
Their allegations against us they are deter 
mined to support by arms, and not by evidence . 
and here they come no longer to remonstrate^, 
but actually to give us law. They commanci 
us to quit the blockade of Potidaea, to permit 



48 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book 



^gina to govern itself by its own model, and 
to repeal the decree against the Megareans ; 
nay, this their last and peremptory embassy, 
authoritatively enjoins us to restore the Gre- 
cians to their former independence. But, let 
not one of you imagine, that we excite a war 
for a trifling concern, if we refuse to repeal 
that decree against the Megareans. The stress 
tliey lay upon it, that, if it be repealed, a 
war shall not ensue, is nothing but a colour ; 
nor think there will be any ground for self- 
accusation, though for so trifling a concern you 
have recourse to arms; since that concern, 
trifling as it is, includes within it the full proof 
and demonstration of Athenian spirit. If, for 
instance, you condescend to this demand, you 
will immediately be enjoined some other con- 
descension of greater consequence, as if this 
your compliance was owing to the prevalence 
of your fear. But, if at once you strenuously 
refuse to hearken to them, you will convince 
them in a manner clearly to be understood, 
that they must treat with you for the future as 
with men who are their equals. 

" From the present crisis I exhort you 
therefore to form a resolution, either timely 
to make your submission before you begin to 
suffer ; or, if we shall determine for war (which 
to me seemeth most expedient), without re- 
garding the pretext of it, be it important or be 
it trifling, to refuse every the least concession, 
nor to render the tenure of what we now pos- 
sess precarious and uncertain. For not only 
the greatest, but the most inconsiderable de- 
mand, if authoritatively enjoined by equals 
upon their neighbours, before justice hath de- 
cided the point, hath the very same tendency 
to make them slaves. But, from the posture 
in which the affairs of both parties are at pre- 
sent, that we may risk a war with a prospect 
of success as fine and as inviting as our rivals 
can — suffer me distinctly to set the reasons 
before you, and be convinced of their weight. 
" The Peloponnesians are a people, who 
subsist by their bodily labour, without wealth 
either in the purses of individuals, or in any 
public fund. Again, in wars of long continu- 
ance, or wars by sea, they are quite unprac- 
tised ; since the hostilities in which they have 
been embroiled with one another have been 
short and transient, in consequence of their 
poverty. Such people can neither completely 
man out a fleet, nor frequently march land- 
irmies abroad, abandoning the care of their 



domestic concerns, even whilst from these 
they must answer a large expense, and, more 
than this, are excluded the benefit of the sea. 
Funds of money are a much surer support of 
war, than contributions exacted by force. And 
men who subsist by the labour of their hands, 
are more ready to advance a service with their 
bodies than with their money ; since the former, 
though exposed, they strongly presume will 
survive the danger, but the latter they appre- 
hend must be too speedily exhausted, especially 
if the war run out into a greater length than 
they expect, which will probably be the case. 
In a single battle, it is true, the Peloponne- 
sians and their confederates are able to make 
head against united Greece ; but they are not 
able to support a war of continuance against an 
enemy, in all respects provided better than 
themselves ; since by one general council they 
are not guided, but execute their momentary 
schemes in sudden and hasty efforts : since 
farther, having all of them an equality of suf- 
frage, and being of different descents, each of 
them is intent on the advancement of a separate 
interest. In such circumstances no grand de- 
sign can ever be accomplished. Some of them 
are eager to obtain a speedy vengeance on a 
foe; others are chiefly intent on preserving 
their substance from unnecessary waste. It 
is long before they can meet together to con- 
sult ; and then, with great precipitancy, they 
form their public determinations, as the largest 
part of their time is devoted to domestic con- 
cerns. Each thinks it impossible, that the 
public welfare can be prejudiced by his own 
particular negligence, but that others are intent 
on watching for himself to share the benefit ; 
and, whilst this error universally prevaileth 
amongst all the several members, the general 
welfare insensibly drops to ruin. But the 
greatest obstruction to them will be a scarcity 
of money, which as they can but slowly raise, 
their steps must needs be dilatory ; and the 
urgent occasions of war can never tarry. 

" As for any forts they can erect within our 
territory, or their application to a navy, it is 
beneath us to form any apprehensions from 
thence. To effectuate tlie former, would be 
difficult for a people of equal strength, in a 
season of tranquility : much more so must it 
be, upon the lands of an open enemy, and when 
we are empowered to put the same expedients 
in execution against them. And, if they should 
fix a garrison in Attica, they might by excur- 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



49 



sions or desertions from us annoy some part of 
our territory ; but, whatever works they can 
raise will be insufficient to block us up, to 
prevent our descents upon their coasts, and 
making reprisals upon them by our fleets, 
wherein we are superior. For we are better 
qualified for land-service by the experience we 
have gained in that of the sea, than they for 
service at sea by the experience at land. To 
learn the naval skill they will find to be by 
no means an easy task. For even you, who 
have been in constant exercise ever since 
the Persian invasion, have not yet attained 
to a mastery in the science. How then shall 
men, brought up to tillage and strangers to 
the sea, whose practice farther will be ever 
interrupted by us, through the continual annoy- 
ance which our larger number of shipping 
will give them, effect any point of eclat 1 
Against small squadrons they might indeed 
be sometimes adventurous, emboldening their 
want of skill by multiplying their numbers : 
but, when awed by superior force, they will 
of necessity desist; and so, by practice in- 
terrupted, the growth of their skill will be 
checked, and in consequence of it their fears 
be increased. The naval, like other sciences, 
is the effect of art. It cannot be learned by 
accident, nor usefully exercised at starts; or 
rather, there is nothing which so much requir- 
eth an uninterrupted application. 

" If, farther, they should secrete the funds 
laid up at Olympia and Delphi, and endeavour, 
by an increase of pay, to seduce from our ser- 
vice the foreigners who are on board our fleets ; 
— in case we were not their equals in strength, 
and they themselves and such foreigners could 
entirely apply themselves to the work — this 
then might be terrible indeed. But nought 
would it avail them now, whilst — what is our 
peculiar advantage — we have commanders Athe- 
nian born and seamen to man our fleets, in 
larger number and of greater skill than all 
the rest of Greece together. Besides, in so 
dangerous a crisis, not one of these foreigners 
would think of bartering an exile from his own 
settlement, and a desertion to that side where 
the prospect of victory is not near so inviting, 
for an enlargement of his pay of few days' con- 
tinuance. 

"The state of the Peloponnesians I judge 
to be such, or very nearly such, as I have des- 
cribed it; whereas, our own is exempt from 
14 



those defects which I have pointed out in them, 
and enjoys other great advantages far beyond 
their competition. Grant, that they may in- 
vade our territories by land : we too shall make 
descents upon theirs. And — whether is the 
greatest damage, only some part of Peloponne- 
sus, or all Attica put to fire and sword — will 
admit of no comparison. In the former case, 
they will have no other land to repair the 
damage, but what they must earn by dint of 
arms : whilst we have large tracts already in 
our power, both in the islands and on the main. 
— Of vast consequence indeed is the dominion 
of the sea. But — consider it with attention. 
For, were we seated upon an island, which of 
us would be subdued with greater difficulty 1 
— And now, you ought to think, that our pre- 
sent situation is as nearly as possible the same ; 
and so, to evacuate your lands and houses here, 
to confine your defence to the sea, and to 
Athens itself; and not, exasperated against 
the Peloponnesians for the sake of those, to 
hazard a battle against superior numbers. 
Should we be thus victorious, we must fight it 
over again with another body not inferior ; and 
should we be vanquished, at that instant we 
lose all our dependents, the very essence of 
our strength. For the moment we cease to be 
able to awe them by our forces, they will be 
no longer obedient to our commands. We 
ought not to wail and lament for the loss of 
our houses or our lands, but for the lives of 
our people: because lands and houses can 
never acquire men, but are by men acquired. 

" Durst I presume on a power to persuade, 
I would exhort you to march out yourselves, 
with your own hands to execute the Avaste, 
and let the Peloponnesians see that for things 
of such value you will never think of compli- 
ance. I have many other inducements to hope 
for victory, if, intending this war alone, you 
will forbear the ambition of enlarging your do- 
minions, and not plunge into voluntary super- 
fluous hazards. For, in truth, I am more 
afraid of our own indiscretions than the schemes 
of the enemy. But the explanation of what at 
present I only hint at, shall be reserved till 
due occasions offer in the course of action. 
Let us now dismiss the ambassadors with the 
following answer : 

*< That we will open our market and har- 
bours to the Megareans, provided the Lacedae- 
monians, in their prohibition of foreigners, ex- 



50 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book I. 



cept us and our confederates : for neither was 
that act in us, nor will this act in them be con- 
trary to treaty. 

" That we will suffer the states to govern 
themselves at their own discretion, if they 
were possessed of that right when the treaty 
was made, and so soon as ever they relax the 
necessity they lay upon the states in their own 
league of governing themselves by that model 
which suits best the Lacedtemonian interest, 
and allow them the choice of their own polity. 

" That, farther, we are willing to submit to 
a judicial determination according to treaty. 

" That a war shall not begin, but will retali- 
ate upon those that do. 

" Such an answer is agreeable to justice, and 
becomes the dignity of the Athenian state. 
But you ought to be informed, that a war un- 
avoidably there will be; that the greater ala- 
crity we show for it, the more shall we damp 
the spirits of our enemies in their attacks ; and, 
that tlie greatest dangers are ever the source 
of the greatest honours to communities as well 
as individuals. It was thus that our fathers 
withstood the Medes, and rushing to arras with 
resources far inferior to ours, nay abandoning 
all their substance, by resolution more than 
fortune, by courage more than real strength, 
beat back the Barbarian, and advanced this state 
to its present summit of grandeur. From them 
we ought not to degenerate, but by every effort 
within our ability avenge it on our foes, and 
deliver it down to posterity, unblemished and 
unimpaired." 

In this manner Pericles spoke; and the 
Athenians, judging that what he had advised 
was most for their interest, decreed in confor- 
mity to his exhortation. They returned a par- 
ticular answer to the Lacedaemonians, according 
to his directions, nay in the very words of his 
motion ; and in fine concluded — that " they 
would do nothing upon command, but were 
ready to submit the points in contest to a judi- 
cial determination, according to treaty, upon a 
fair and equal footing." Upon this, the am- 
bassadors departed; and here all negotiations 
came to a conclusion. 

Such were the pretexts and dissensions on 
both sides previous to the war, and which took 
their first rise from the business of Epidamnus 
and Corcyra. These however never inter- 
rupted their commercial dealings nor mutual 
intercourse, which still were carried on without 
the intervention of heralds, but not without 



suspicions. For such incidents manifestly 
tended to a rupture, and must infaUibly end in 
war.' 



1 As the Athenians were a free people, they made use 
of their liberty on all occasions to asperse, calumniate, 
and ridicule the great men amongst them. They were 
at this time exhibited on the stage by name; and Aris- 
tophanes, whose plays were acted during the Pelopon- 
nesian war, hath ridiculed the cotemporary statesmen 
and commanders with the utmost petulancy and viru- 
lence. The Athenians afterwards thought proper to 
restrain this licentiousness of their comic poets; but it 
may not be umiss in the course of the notes to quote oo 
casionally some passages from him, to show my coun- 
trymen how much writing libels differs from writing 
history; and that where litierty is al)used, no public 
merit nor private worth can defend its owners from the 
malice of faction or the petulance of buffoons. 

Our historian h.ath laid open the true and pretended 
causes of the Peloponnesian war. Let us now see, how 
affairs were represented on the stage of Athens. His 
comedy of The Acharnians was exhibited by Aristo- 
phanes at Athens in the sixth year of this war, after 
the death of Pericles. The decree against Megara is 
the ground-work of it: one Dicffiopolis of the borough 
of AcharniE is the droll of the play, and amply ridi- 
cules it to a set of his neigbours. 

"Do not be angry," says he, "if though a beggar I 
presume to talk to Athenians about affairs of state, and 
for once play tragedian. It the province of tragedy 
to give a just representation of things; and I am going 
to speak in a just manner of very sad things indeed. 
Cleon will not be able to catch me this bout, for tradu- 
cing my countrymen in the hearing of strangers. We 
are here by ourselves, and to-day is the festival of Bac- 
chus. The strangers are not yet come, nor the tributes, 
nor the confederates from other states: we are here snug 
by ourselves, all of us true-blooded Athenians. Those 
odd creatures the sojourners, 1 look upon as the chaff of 
Athens. And now to speak sincerely, I hate the Lace- 
daemonians from the bottom of my soul; and I heartily 
wish that Neptune, the god adored at Taenarus, would 
give them an earthquake, and tumble down all their 
houses upon their heads. They have made sad work 
with me, all my vineyards are quite destroyed by the 
rogues. Bui, my dear friends and countrymen here pre- 
sent, why do we blame the Lacedxmonians for this? 
And mind. Sirs, I cast no aspersion on our own state; 
I aim at nobody employed in the affairs of the admini- 
stration, but at a parcel of sad rascals, scurvy, low, in- 
famous scoundrels, who are eternally bringing informa- 
tions against a Megarean pair of paniers. If they once 
set eye but on a cucumber, a leveret, a sucking-pig, a 
sprig of parsley, or a grain of salt, they swear at once 
they belonged to Megareans, and were sold that very 
day. These things, however, though the general prac- 
tice, are of small signification. A parcel of jolly fellows, 
deep in their cups, had stole away from Megara that 
jade Simiptha. The Megareans, exasperated at the loss 
of their wench, made reprisals by carrying off a brace 
of strumpets that belonged to Aspasia. And thus this 
cursed war, which plagues all Greece, took its rise from 
three strumpets. Ay, on account of three wborcs, 
Olympian Pericles began to storm, he lightened, be 
thundered, roused all Greece to arms; he made new 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



51 



laws as fast as so many ballads, that the poor dogs of 
Megara must be found neither in the fields, nor the 
markets, nor by sea, nor by land. Upon this, being just 
ready to starve, away they go to Lacedaemon, to get 
the decree reversed which had been made on account 
of three whores. It would not do, embassy after em- 
bassy had no avail, and then immediately rose all this 
clattering of shields." 

Calumny hath a dart always left in her quiver, and 
in another comedy of Aristophanes we find another 
let fly at Pericles. This was, his being an accomplice 
with Phidias in secreting some of the gold issued from 
the public treasury for the statue of Minerva in the cit- 
adel, the workmanship of that celebrated artist. In 
his comedy called The Peace, Mercury says—" Ye wise 
husbandmen, attend to ray words, if you have a mind 
to know how things came into this sad confusion. Phi- 
dias was the first cause of it by cheating the public. 
Then Pericles helped it forward, for fear he should 
share the fate of Phidias. He stood in awe of your 
tempers; he was afraid of falling under your censure; 
60, to prevent hie own personal danger, he set the 
whole community in a flame, by lighting up first that 
little spark of the decree against Megara. He then 
blew up that spark into this mighty war, the smoke of 
which bath fetched tears from all the eyes of Greece, 
from Grecians on both sides." 

Pericles had employed Phidias in adorning Athens. 
The fine taste of the patron and fine execution of the 
artist have been universally acknowledged. An accu- 
cation however was preferred against Phidiafi by one 



of his workmen, that he had secreted some gold. By 
the advice of Pericles he had laid it on so artfully, that 
it might 1)6 taken off without prejudicing the statue. 
The trial accordingly was made, and the gold found to 
answer weight. It seems however that Phidias was 
banished; because, as the enemies of Pericles attacked 
him at the same time, for impiety, in the person3 of his 
beloved Aspasia and his preceptor in philosophy Anax- 
agoras, and for a cheat in that of his favourite artist, 
he had only influence enough to save the former, by 
pleading earnestly for her, and softening his plea with 
abundant tears. 

Both Plutarch and Cornelius Nepos have recorded a 
third story of Pericles in relation to this war. It is this 
— Alcibiades, then a youth, saw him in a very pensive 
and melancholy mood, and demanded the reason of it. 
Pericles told him, " great sums of public money had 
passed through his hands, and he knew not how to 
make up his accounts." "Contrive then," replied Al- 
cibiades, " to give no account at all." And in pursu- 
ance of this advice he is said to have involved the state 
in the Peloponnesian war. But is not Thucydides more 
to be depended upon than a whole host of writers of 
scandal, memoirs, private history, and satire? If we 
listen to the latter, there never was and never will be 
any truth in history; there never was, nor is there this 
moment, any true worth or merit in the world. A 
buffoon can degrade a hero, a spiteful satirist cloud 
every good quality in others, and the ears and hearts 
of men will be filled with nothing but detraction and 
slander. 



THE 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



BOOK II. 



Year I. Hostilities begin. The Thebans by night surprise PlatsEa, but arc afterwards repulsed and slaughtered. 
The Peloponnesians invade Attica: the Athenians in their turn cruise and make descents on the coast of 
Peloponnesus. A public fuaeral solemnized at Athens, for those who fell in the first campaign, and the ora- 
tion spoke on that occasion by Pericles, — II. Early the next year Attica again invaded. The plague breaka 
out in Athens. Its symptoms, progress, and mortality described. The Athenians being greatly dejected, 
murmur against Pericles ; his justification. The Ambraciots war against the Amphilochians. The surrender 
of Potidaea. — III. In the beginning of the third year the Peloponnesians appear before Platjea ; a parley 
without efllect: the siege is begun and carried on with great industry and art. The Peloponnesians beatea 
at sea by Phormio in the gulf of Crissa ; and when reinforced beaten by him a second time before Naupactus. 
A project to seize the Pirceus quite disconcerted. War between Thracians and Macedonians. Motions ia 
Acarnania, with an account of that country. 



Hej^e instantly commenceth the war between 
the Peloponnesians and Athenians,'' and the 
confederates on both sides— during which they 
had no kind of intercourse with one another 
without the herald ; and now once engaged, 
carried it on without intermission. The parti- 
cular incidents of it are orderly related by the 
Summer and the Winter. 

The thirty-years peace, which was made af- 
ter the conquest of Euboea, had now lasted 
fourteen : but in the fifteenth year, when Chry- 
sis had been forty-eight years priestess at Ar- 
gos, when ^nesias was Ephorus at Sparta, 
and Pythodorus ten months Archon at Athens, 
in the sixth month after the battle at Potidsea, 
and in the very beginning of the spring — a 
body of Thebans, somewhat above three hun- 
dred, under the command of Pythangelus the 
son of Phylidas, and Diemporus the son of 
Onetoridas, two of the rulers of Bceotia, about 
the first sleep, got into Plataea^ of Bceotia with 

i Before Christ 431. 

a Plataea was a city and petty state in Bceotia, on the 
confines of Attica. The inhabitants of it had ever been 
so firmly attached to the liberties of Greece, that it 
drew upon them the lasting rancour of the Thebans, 
who had joined the Persians when they invaded Greece, 
and persuaded them to burn down Platsa. The Platte- 



their arms, which place was then in alliance 
with the Athenians. They were induced to 
this attempt, and had the gates opened to them, 
by Nauclides and associates, citizens of Platsea, 
who had formed a design for the sake of ag- 
grandizing themselves, to destroy all their fel- 
low-citizens averse to their schemes, and to 
gain the city for the Thebans. But the aflaii 
was managed by Eurymachus, the son of Le- 
ontiades, a person of the greatest authority 
among the Thebans. For the Thebans, fore- 
seeing a war unavoidable, had, even now while 
peace was actually subsisting and the war not 
yet declared, a strong desire to get possession 
of Plataea, which had been at eternal enmity 
with them. No regular watch was as yet kept 
in it, which was a means of facilitating their 
entrance. When they had gained admission, 
they drew themselves up in order of battle on 
the public forum, contrary to the scheme pro- 
posed by the conspirators, of marching imme- 



ans engaged with the Athenians on the side of Greece, 
in the famous battle fought within their own territory. 
The Athenians, to show their gratitude, gave them a 
place in the fine battle-piece painted in the Paecile in 
honour of the victory, made them all citizens of Athrns, 
and ever after concluded their religious solcmniliaa 
with a prayer for the prosperity of the Plata-ans, 
K 53 



54 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book n. 



diately to the houses of their enemies, and put- 
ting them to the sword. Their own design 
was, pubUcly to offer some fair proposals, and 
gain the city by an amicable composition. 
With this view, their herald proclaimed aloud, 
that — " All who were willing to enter into 
league, according to the ancient custom of all 
Boeotians,* should come and join their arms 
with them." By this method they thought 
the city would easily be brought to an accom- 
modation. 

The Plataeans, when they found that the The- 
bans were already got in and had surprised the 
lown, being in great consternation, and thinking 
the enemy more numerous than they really were, 
for the night prevented a view of thcm,came soon 
to a composition ; and accepting what terms they 
offered, made no resistance ; especially as they 
found that violence was offered to no man. 
Yet, by means of the parley, they had disco- 
vered that the Thebans were few in number ; 
and judged, should they venture an attack, 
they might easily overpower them : — for the 
bulk of the Plataeans had not the least inclina- 
tion to revolt from the Athenians. It was at 
length concluded, that this point should be at- 
tempted, after having conferred together, by 
digging through the partition walls of one an- 
other's houses, to avoid the suspicion which 
going through the streets might have occasion- 
ed. Then along the streets they arranged car- 
riages without the oxen, to serve them instead 
of a rampart, and made a proper disposition 
for every thing necessary for immediate exe- 
cution. When they had got every thing ready 
in the best manner they were able, watching 
till night began to vanish and the first dawn ap- 
pear, they marched from their houses towards 
the Thebans, that they might fall upon them 
before the full light should embolden their re- 
sistance, and give them equal advantages in the 
fight, and that they might be more intimidated 
by being charged in the dark, and sensible of 
disadvantage from their ignorance of the city. 

1 Bototia was one large republic formed by tlie union 
of several little states. The sovereignty (as Thucydidcs 
informs ue, Iwok the fifth) was lo(!s;ed in four councils, 
composed of deputies sent from every city in the union. 
These wore the states general, and sat at Thehes, the 
principal city of Bo-otia. The executive and military 
were lod|>ed in eleven persons, chosen annually, and 
styled Rulersof BoBotia, in whose election each city had 
n. share. They rolled, and at the haltic of Delhim, Pa- 
{(ondas was in this chief command, in right of Thehes. 
■Platma had no share in this union, hut was closely allied 
with and under the protection of Athens. 



The attack was immediately begun, and both 
sides soon came to action. The Thebans, 
when they found themselves thus circumvented, 
threw themselves into an oval, and wherever 
assaulted, prevented impression. Twice or 
thrice they beat them back with success ; and 
when the assaults were again with a loud noise 
repeated, when the very women and menial 
servants were shouting and screaming from the 
houses all around, and throwing stones and 
tiles amongst them, incommoded further by the 
rain which had fallen plentiful that night, they 
were seized with fear, and abandoning their 
defence, ficd in confusion about the city. The 
greatest part of them running in the dark and 
the dirt, knew not any of the passages by 
which ihcy could get out, (for this affair hap- 
pened upon the change of the moon,) and were 
pursued by men who, knowing them all, preven- 
ted their escape, so that many of them perished. 
The gates by which they entered, and which 
only had been opened, one of the Plataeans had 
barred fast by thrusting the point of a spear 
into the staple instead of a bolt, so that they 
could not possibly get out there. Thus pursu- 
ed about the city, some of them got upon the 
walls, and threw themselves over, but most of 
these were killed by the fall : some of them 
found a gate unguarded, and a woman supply- 
ing them with a hatchet, they cut the bolt in 
pieces unperceived, though few only escaped 
by this means, for they were soon discovered. 
Others were separately slain in the different 
quarters of the city. But the greatest part, 
and chiefly those who had kept in a body, threw 
themselves into a great house contiguous to the 
walls, the doors of which happened to be open, 
imagining the doors of this house to be the ci- 
ty gates and a certain passage to a place of 
safety. When the Plataeans saw them thus 
shut up, they consulted together, whether they 
should fire the house and burn them all in their 
inclosure, or reserve them for some other pun- 
ishment. But at last these, and all the other 
Thebans yet surviving, who were scattered a- 
bout the city, agreed to give up their arms, and 
surrender themselves to the Plataeans prisoners 
at discretion. Such was the issue of this at- 
tempt on Plataea. 

The other Thebans, who ought during night 
to have come up with all their strength, to rein- 
force the first body in case they miscarried, and 
were still upon the march, when the news of 
this defeat met them, advanced with all possi- 



TEAS I.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



55 



ble expedition. Platea is distant from Thebes i 
about 'seventy stadia, and the rain which fell : 
that night had retarded their march ; for the ; 
river Asopus was so much swelled by it that 
it was not easily fordable. It was owing to 
the march in such a rain and the difficulty of 
passing this river, that they came not up till 
their men were either slain or made prisoners. 
When the Thebans were convinced of that 
event, they cast their attention towards the 
Plataeans who were still without ; for the peo- 
ple of Plataea were scattered about the adjacent 
country with their implements of husbandry, 
because annoyance in time of peace was quite 
unexpected. They were desirous to catch 
some of these as exchange for their own people 
within the city, if any *were yet living and 
prisoners there. On this they were fully bent ; 
but in the midst of their project the Plataeans, 
who suspected the probability of some such de- 
sign, and were anxious for their people yet 
without, despatched a herald to the Thebans 
representing to them " the injustice of the at- 
tempt already made ; since, treaties subsisting, 
they had endeavoured to surprise the city;" 
and then warned them "to desist from any 
violence to those without. If not, they posi- 
tively declared they would put all the prisoners 
yet alive to the sword ; whereas, in case they re- 
tired peaceably out of their territory, they would 
deliver them up unhurt." This account the 
Thebans give, and say farther it was sworn to. 
The Plataeans disown the promise of an im- 
mediate discharge of the prisoners, which was 
reserved for terms to be agreed on in a subse- 
quent treaty, and flatly deny that they swore. 
The Thebans however retired out of their terri- 
tory, without committing any violence. But 
the Plataeans, when they had with expedition 
fetched into the city all their effects of value 
that were out in the fields, immediately put all 
their prisoners to the sword. The number of 
those that were taken was one hundred and 
eighty. Eurymachus was amongst them, with 
whom the traitors had concerted the surprise. 
And this done, they despatched a messenger to 
Athens : and restored to the Thebans their dead 
under truce. And then they regulated the af- 
fairs of the city in the manner most suitable to 
their present situation. 

The news of the surprisal of Plataea had 
soon reached the Athenians, who immediately 

> About seven English miles. 



apprehended all the Boeotians then in Attica, 
and despatched a herald to Plataea with orders 
"to proceed no farther against the Theban 
prisoners, till they should send their determi- 
nation about them ;" for they were not yet in- 
formed of their having been actually put to 
death. The first messenger had been sent 
away immediately upon the irruption of the 
Thebans — the second so soon as they were 
defeated and made prisoners — as to what hap- 
pened afterwards, they were utterly in the 
dark. Thus ignorant of what had since been 
done, the Athenians despatched away their he- 
rald, who upon his arrival found them all de- 
stroyed. Yet after this, the Athenians march- 
ing a body of troops to Plataea, carried thither 
all necessary provisions, left a garrison in the 
place, and brought away all the hands that 
would be useless in a siege, with the women 
and children. 

After this business of Plataea, and so mani- 
fest a breach of peace, the Athenians made all 
necessary preparations for immediate war. The 
Lacedaemonians also and their confederates took 
the same measures. Nay, both sides were in- 
tent on despatching^ embassies to the king,' and 
to several other Barbarian powers, wherever 
they had hope of forming some effectual inter- 
est for themselves, and spared no pains to win 
those states over to their alliance, which had 
hitherto been independent. In the Lacedae- 
monian league, besides the ships already fur- 
nished out for them in Italy and Sicily, the 
confederates there were ordered to prepare a 
new quota, proportioned to the abilities of the 
several states, that the whole number of their 
shipping might be mounted to five hundred. — 
They were farther to get a certain sum of money 

2 By this means the intestine quarrels of Greece were 
going to throw a power into the hands of the Persian 
monarch, which he could not obtain by force. Each 
partly could cringe to the common enemy, in order to 
obtain subsidies from him toenable them to distress each 
other. And thus the balance of power rested at last in 
his hands, and he became for a time supreme arbiter of 
Greece. Aristophanes, in his comedy of The Achar- 
nians, hath described these embassies and the Persian 
monarch too, with excessive buffoonery, but quite too 
low and ridiculous to quote. He bears hard upon the 
Athenian ambassadors for lengthening out the time of 
their employ as much as possible, for the lucre of the sa- 
lary paid them by the state, which is there mentioned 
at two drachmas a day. Was it either avarice or pub- 
lic rapine — this exorbitant salary of 15^d. a day to an 
ambassador from the republic of Athens to the great 
king of Persia? 
I 3 Artaxerxes Longimanus. 



56 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book II. 



in readiness; but in other respects to remain qui- 
et, and till their preparations could be completed, 
never to admit more than one Athenian vessel 
at a time within their ports. — The Athenians 
made a careful survey of the strength of their 
own alliance, and sent pressing embassies to 
the places round about Peloponnesus, to Cor- 
cyra, to Cephallene, to the Acarnanians, and 
to Zacynthus ; plainly seeing, that if these were 
in their interest, they might securely attack 
Peloponnesus on all sides. — The minds of 
both parties were not a little elated, but were 
eager after and big with war. For it is natu- 
ral to man in the commencement of every im- 
portant enterprise, to be more than usually 
alert. The young men, who were at this time 
numerous in Peloponnesus, numerous also at 
Athens, were for want of experience quite fond 
of the rupture. And all the rest of Greece 
stood attentively at gaze on this contention 
between the two principal states. Many ora- 
cles were tossed about, the soothsayers sung 
abundance of predictions, amongst those who 
were upon the point to break, and even in the 
cities that were yet neutral. Nay, Delos had 
been lately shook with an earthquake, which it 
had never been before in the memory of the 
Greeks. It was said, and indeed believed, that 
J this was a prognostic of something extraordi- 
I nary to happen : and all other accidents of an 
\ uncommon nature whatever were sure to be 
wrested to the same meaning. 

The generality of Greece was indeed at this 
time much the best affected to the Laceda:mo- 
nians, who gave out the specious pretence, that 
" they were going to recover the liberty of 
Greece." Every one made it both his private 
passion and his public care, to give them all 
possible succour both in word and act ; and 
every one thought that the business certainly 
flagged in those places where he himself was 
not present to invigorate proceedings. So ge- 
neral an invasion was there at this time formed 
against the Athenians, when some were passion- 
ately desirous to throw off their yoke, and 
others apprehensive of falling under their sub- 
jection. — With such preparations and such dis- 
positions did they run into the war. 

The states in league with either party, upon 
the breaking out of the war, were these. — In 
confederacy with the Lacedsemonians, were all 
Peloponnesians within the Isthmus, except the 
Argivcs and Achaians, for these had treaties 
subsisting with both 'parties. But of the 



Achaeans the Pellenians singly were the first 
who went over, though they were afterwards 
joined by all the rest. Without Peloponnesus 
were the Megareans, Locrians, Boeotians, Pho- 
cians, Ambraciots, Leucadians, Anactorians. 
Of these they were supplied with shipping by 
the Corinthians, Megareans, Sicyonians, Pel- 
lenians, Eleans, Ambraciots, Leucadians; with 
horse by the Boeotians, Phocians, Locrians ; 
and the other states furnished them with foot. 
This was the confederacy of the Lacedeemoni- 
ans. — With the Athenians were the Chians, 
Lesbians, Plataeans, the Messenians of Nau- 
pactus, most of the Acarnanians, the Corcyre- 
ans, Zacynthians, and other states tributary to 
them in so many nations : namely, the maritime 
people of Caria, the Dorians' that border upon 
the Carians, Ionia, Hellespont, the cities on 
the coast of Thrace, all the islands situated to 
the east between Peloponnesus and Crete, and 
all the Cyclades, except Melos and Thera. Of 
these, they were supplied with shipping by the 
Chians, Lesbians, Corcyreans; the rest sup- 
plied them with foot and with money. This 
was the alliance on both sides, and the ability 
for the war. 

The Lacedsemonians, immediately after the 
attempt on Platsea, sent circular orders to the 
states both within and without Peloponnesus, 
to draw their quotas of aid together, and get 
every thing in readiness for a foreign expedi- 
tion, as intending to invade Attica. W^hen all 
was ready, they assembled on the day appoint- 
ed, with two-thirds of the force of every state, 
at the Isthmus. When the whole army was 
thus^ drawn together, Archidamus king of the 
Lacedaemonians, who commanded in the expe- 
dition, convened the commanders from all the 
auxiliary states, with all those that were in au- 
thority, and most fitting to be present, and ad- 
dressed them as follows : 

" Peloponnesians and allies, many are the 
expeditions in which our fathers have been 
engaged both within and without Peloponnesus. 
Even some of us, who are more advanced in 
years, are by no means unexperienced in the 
business of war. Yet, never before did we take 
the field with a force so great as the present. 
But,nuraerou8 and formidable in arms as we may 



« These were the Dorians, who were seated in the 
islands of Rhodes, Cos, and Cnidus, according to the 
scholiast. 

"* Plutarch infornas us that the number amounted to 
■izty thousand men. 



YEAR I.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



57 



now appear, we are however marching against a 
most powerful state. Thus it is incumbent upon 
us to show ourselves not inferior in valour to our 
fathers, nor to sink below the expectations of 
the world. The eyes of all Greece are fixed 
attentively on our motions. — Their good will 
to us, their hatred of the Athenians, make 
them wish for our success in all our undertak- 
ings. It is therefore our business, without 
placing too great confidence in superior num- 
bers, or trusting to the presumption that our 
enemies dare not come out to fight us — for no 
reasons like these, to relax our discipline, or 
break the regularity of our march — but, the 
commander of every confederate body and eveiy 
private soldier ought to keep within himself the 
constant expectation of being engaged in action. 
Uncertain are the turns of war ; great events 
start up from a small beginning, and assaults 
are given from indignation. Nay, frequently 
an inferior number engaging with caution hath 
proved too hard for a more numerous body, 
whom contempt of their enemy exposeth to at- 
tacks for which they are not prepared. Upon 
hostile ground, it is always the duty of soldiers 
to be resolutely bold, and to keep ready for action 
with proper circumspection. Thus will they be 
always ready to attack with spirit, and be most 
firmly secured against a surprise. 

« We are not marching against a people who 
are unable to defend themselves, but excellently 
well qualified for it in every respect ; so that 
we may certainly depend upon their advancing 
against us to give us battle; — nor yet perhaps 
in motion, so long as no enemy appears ; but 
most assuredly so when once they see us in 
their territory, wasting and destroying their 
substance. All men must kindle into wrath, 
when uncommon injuries are unexpectedly 
done them, when manifest outrage glares be- 
fore them. Reflection then may indeed have 
lost its power, but resentment most strongly 
impels them to resistance. Something like 
this may more reasonably be looked for from 
Athenians than from other people. They es- 
teem themselves worthy to command others, 
and their spirit is more turned to make than to 
suffer depredations. Against so formidable a 
people are we now to march ; and by the event, 
whatever it be, shall we acquire the greatest 
glory or disgrace, for our ancestors and our- 
selves. — Let it therefore be the business of 
every man to follow his commander, observant 
in every point of discipline and the rules of 
]5 



war, and obeying with expedition the orders you 
receive. The finest spectacle and the strongest 
defence is the uniform observation of discipline 
by a numerous army." 

When Archidamus had finished his oration 
and disn issed the assembly, the first thing he 
did was sending to Athens Melesippus a Spar- 
tan, the son of Diacritus, to try whether the 
Athenians were grown any thing more pliant, 
since they found an army upon the march 
against them. But they would not allow him 
to come into the city, nor grant him a public 
audience. For the advice of Pericles had be- 
fore this gained the general assent, that " no 
herald or embassy should be received from the 
Lacedaemonians so long as they were in the 
field against them." They send him back 
therefore unheard, and ordered him " to quit 
their territories that very day ; that farther, the 
Lacedsemonians should retire within their own 
frontier ; and then, if they had any thing to 
transact with them, should send their ambassa- 
dors for the purpose." They even commission 
some persons to guard Melesippus back, that 
he might have no conference with any person 
whatever. When he was brought to the borders, 
and received his dismission, he parted from 
them with these words, " This day is the be- 
ginning of great woes to the Grecians." Upon 
his return to the camp, Archidamus was con- 
vinced that the Athenians were inflexible as 
ever, so that he immediately dislodged and ad- 
vanced with his army into their territories. — 
The Boeotians sent their quota of foot and 
their horse to join the Peloponnesians in this 
expedition, but with the rest of their forces they 
marched towards Plataea, and laid the country 
waste. 

Whilst the Peloponnesians were yet assem- 
bling at the Isthmus, or yet on the march, be- 
fore they had entered Attica, Pericles the son 
of Xantippus, who with nine others had been 
appointed to command the Athenian forces, 
when he saw an irruption from the Peloponne- 
sians unavoidable, had conceived a suspicion 
that Archidamus, whom the hospitable' inter- 



1 The tie of hospitality was sacred and inviolable 
amongst the anrients. It was a necessary exertion of 
humanity at first from the want of inns and lodging- 
houses, and was frequently improved into friendship 
and endearment. This between Pericles and Archi- 
damus was merely of a private nature, between the 
royal family of Sparta and a principal one in tiie repub- 
lic of Athens. The family of Alcibiades was the public 
host of the Spartan state, and entertained their arabas- 
k2 



58 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[hook II. 



course had made his friend, from a principle of 
good-nature willing to oblige him, would leave 
his lands untouched, or, might be ordered to do 
so by the policy of the Lacedsemonians, as they 
had already demanded an excommunication on 
his account ; by which means he must certainly 
incur the public jealousy. He declared there- 
fore to the Athenians, in a general assembly of 
the people — that " though Archidamus was his 
friend, he should not be so to the prejudice of the 
state ; and that if the enemy spared his lands 
and houses in the general ravage, he made a 
free donation of them to the public ; so that 
for any accident of that nature he ought not to 
fall under their censure." He then exhorted 
all who were present, as he had done before — 
" to prepare vigorously for war, and to with- 
draw all their effects from out of the country, 
— by no means to march out against the enemy, 
but keep within the walls and mind the defence 
of the city ; — to fit out their navy, in which 
their strength principally consisted, and keep a 
tight rein over all their dependents. By the 
large tributes levied upon these, he said, their 
power was chiefly to be supported, since suc- 
cess in war was a constant result from prudent 
measures and plentiful supplies. — ' He exhorted 
them by no means to let their spirits droop, 
since, besides their certain revenue, six hun- 
dred talents were annually paid them by their 
tributary states, and they had still in the citadel 
six thousand talents of silver coined." Their 
primary fund was nine thousand seven hundred 
talents, out of which had been taken what de- 
frayed the expense of refitting the gates of the 
citadel, of other public works, and the exigen- 



gadors and public ministers. The state of Athens had 
likewise in all places a public host who lodged their 
ministers. Yet amongst private persons it was a frank 
disinterested tie; when once they had eat salt together, 
or sat at the snme table, they regarded tlieinselves as 
under mutual obligations, which small point sought not 
to ahoiisii. They who swerved from thisliuidable cus- 
tom through caprice or ingra'itude were looked upon 
as infamous execrable persons. 

» Tlie account here uiven showeth Alliens at tliistime 
to have been a very opulent state. Reduced to English 
money it stands thus — 'I'he tribute paid them annu.illy 
amounted to L 1 lf),2r)0 sterling. The fund ycl remain- 
ing in the citadel was Al,lG2,r)00 sterling. They had 
expended lately on their public works ;},700 talents, 
which is equal to L71G,875 sterling. The weight of the 
gold on the statue of Minerva was 40 talents, which, 
computing the talent only at O.llli. Troy, to avoid frac- 
tiotiH, and the gold at 1. 4 sterling an ounce, nmounts in 
value to Z.124,800 sterling. 



cics of Potidsea.^" That, besides this, they 
had gold and silver uncoined, both in public and 
private repositories, many valuable vases des- 
tined for religious uses and their public solem- 
nities, and the Persian spoils, the whole value 
of which would not amount to less than five 
hundred talents." — He mentioned further, " the 
great wealth that was stored up in other tem- 
ples, which they had a right to use ; and if this 
right should be denied them, they might have 
recourse to the golden ornaments of the goddess 
herself." He declared " that her image had 
about it to the weight of forty talents of gold 
without alloy, all which might be taken off 
from the statue. — That, for the preservation of 
their country it might lawfully be employed ;" 
but added, " that it ought afterwards to be am- 
ply replaced." In this manner did he render 
them confident that their sums of money would 
suffice. — He told them further, that <' they had 
thirteen thousand men that wore heavy armour, 
exclusive of those that were in garrisons, and 
the sixteen thousand on the guard of the city ;" 
— for so large a number, draughted from the 
youngest and oldest citizens and sojourners, 
who wore the heavy armour, was employed 
in this service upon the first invasion of their 
enemies. For the length of the Phalerian 
wall to the place where it joined the circle of 
the city was ^thirty -five stadia, and that part of 
the circular wall which was guarded was ^forty- 
three in length ; but that which lay between 
the long wall and the Phalerian had no guard. 
The long walls continued down to the Piraeus 
are ""forty stadia, but the outermost of them 
only was guarded. The whole compass of the 
Piraeus, including Munichia, is ^sixty stadia, 
but then only one half of this had a guard.^ — 
He then assured them, that " they had, includ- 
ing the archers, that were mounted, twelve 
hundred horsemen, sixteen hundred archers, 
and three hundred triremes fit for sea." — So 
great in general, and no less in any one article, 
were the military' provisions of the Athenians, 
when the Peloponnesians had formed the de- 
sign of invading them, and both sides began the 
war. — These, and such like arguments, was 



a About m English miles. » Above 4 miles. 

« About 4 English miles. » About Enclish miles. 

« The whole compass of the walls of Athene was 178 
stadia, or above 22 .Attic miles. Put. according to Dr 
Arbutiinot, the Attic mile consisted of but ?05 paces, 
whereas the English is 1056. Hence, the (ompnss of 
Athens appears to have been about 17 English miles. 



YEAR I.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



59 



Pericles continually employing, to convince 
them that they were well able to carry on a 
successful war. 

The Athenians heard him with attention, 
and followed his advice. They withdrew from 
the country their children, their wives, all the 
furniture of their houses there, pulling down 
with their own hands the timber of which they 
were built. Their flocks and their labouring- 
cattle they sent over into Euboea and the adja- 
cent islands. But this removal was 9. very grie- 
vous business to them, since it had been the 
ancient custom of many of the Athenians to 
reside at large in the country. 

This method of living had been more habit- 
ual to the Athenians than to any other Greeks, 
from their first commencement as a people. 
From the time of Cecrops and their first series 
of kings down to Thesus, Attica had been in- 
habited in several distinct towns, each of which 
had its own archons • and its own prytaneum ; 
and, unless in times of danger, had seldom re- 
course to the regal authority, since justice was 
administered in every separate borough, and 
each had a council of its own. Sometimes 
they even warred against one another ; for in- 
stance, the Eleusmians, when they sided with 
Eumolpus against Erectheus. But when the 
regal power devolved upon Theseus, a man of 
an extensive understanding, and who knew how 
to govern, in several respects he improved the 
whole territory ; and besides, dissolving all the 
councils and magistracies of the petty boroughs,^ 
he removed them to the metropolis, as it is at 
present, and constituting one grand senate 
and prytaneum, made it the point of union in 
which all concentred. Their private properties 
he left to ihem entire, but made them rest 
contented with Athens alone for their city : 
which when all its subjects were now jointly 
contributing to its support, was quickly enlarg- 
ed, and delivered so by Theseus to the suc- 
ceeding kings. In memory of this, from the 
days of Theseus quite down to the present 
time, the Athenians have held an anniversa- 
ry solemnity to the goddess, which they call 
Synoecia or Cohabitation. Before this, that 
which is now the citadel, and that part which 
lies on the south side of the citadel, was all the 

1 That is — Masistrates of its own, and a common hall, 
in which tliose majiistiates performed the duties of their 
office in administerino; justice, and offering sacrifSces, 
and where they liad their diet at the public expense. 

9 The nuinlier of the boroughs in Attica was one hun- 
dred seventy four. 



city. The temples built either within the cita- 
del or without sufficiently show it. For in the 
south part of the city, particularly, stand the 
temples of the Olympian Jove, of the Pythian 
Apollo, of Terra, and of Bacchus in Limnse, 
in honour of whom the old Bacchanalian 
feasts are celebrated on the twelfth day of 
the month Anthesterion :^ which custom is 
still retained to this day by the lonians of Attic 
descent. All the other ancient temples are 
seated in the same quarter. Near it also is 
the fountain now called the Enneakrounos or 
rviine-pipe, from the manner in which it was 
embellished by the tyrants ;'* but formerly, when 
all the springs were open, called Callirrhoe ; 
and which, as near at hand, they perferred on 
the most solemn occasions. And that ancient 
custom is to this day preserved, by making use 



3 The English reader may perhaps call this a hard 
word, but I hope will not be frightened. The names of 
other Attic months will occur in the sequel, wliich I 
shall leave as T find them, because no exact correspon- 
dence hath been found out between the Attic months, 
wiiich were lunar, and those now in use. Monsieur 
Toureil, the celebrated French translator of Demos- 
thenes, hath made it a very serious point. " I have long 
doubted (says he) whether in my translation I should 
give the months their old Greek names, or such as they 
have in our language. The reason that made me balance 
is the impossibility of computing the months so tiiat tbey 
shall answer exactly to our French. — My first determi- 
nation was to date in our own manner: I chose to be 
less exact, rather than frighten the greatest part of my 
readers by words to which they are not accustomed. 
For what French ears would not be appalled at the 
words, Thergolion, Boedromion, Elapheholian?" &c. 
He then gives rensons for retaining Greek ones, and 
adds, "I declare then once for all, that I am far from 
pedantically affecting the terms of an old calendar con- 
ceived iti a language barbarous to numbers of 1 eople, 
who, shocked at the sound, would perhaps impute to 
me a taste which, thank God, I have not. I protest that 
to my ear, no less than to theirs, the French name of 
the word would be more pleasing and would sound bet- 
ter. But neither false delicacy nor vicious complaisance 
hath been able to prevail with me to expose myself to 
reproaches, for knowingly leading others into mistake, 
and using words appropriated to Roman and solar 
months, which have no correspondence with the lunar 
or Attic." He says a deal on the subject so little affec- 
ting his countrymen, that since his death, they have 
again thrown all the Greek terms into the maruMn,and 
placed in the text the incongruous modern ones for the 
sake of familiar sounds. If the English reader be as 
delicate, he may read April or May at his option. The 
ablest chronologers are unable to exchange them into 
currency with 'any tolerable exactness. A great deal 
of learning might be also displayed about the days of the 
month and the Grecian method of counting them: but 
as it is exceeding easy to translate these right, learning 
may be excused in a point where no light is wanting. 

♦ The PisistratldJB. 



CO 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book II. 



of the same water in connubial and many other 
religious rites. And further, it is owing to 
such their ancient residence in the citadel, that 
it is eminently called by the Athenians to this 
very day. The City. 

In the manner above-mentioned, were the 
Athenians for a long scries of time scattered 
about the country, in towns and communities 
at their own discretion. And as not only the 
more ancient, but even the latter Athenians 
quite down to the present war, had still retained 
the custom of dwelling about the c "untry with 
their families, the general removals into the 
city, after they were formed into one body, 
were attended with no small embarrassment ; 
and particularly now, when they had been re- 
fitting their houses, and resettling themselves 
after the Persian invasion. It gave them a very 
sensible grief and concern to think, that they 
must forsake their habitations and temples, 
which, from long antiquity, it had been their 
forefathers' and their own religious care to 
frequent ; that they must quite alter their scene 
of life, and each abandon as it were his native 
home. When they were come into the city, 
some icw had houses ready for their reception, 
or sheltered tliemselves with their friends and 
relations. The greater part were forced to 
settle in the less frequented quarters of the 
city, in all the buildings sacred to the gods and 
heroes, except those in the citadel, the Eleusi- 
nian, and any other from whence they were 
excluded by religious awe. There was indeed 
a spot of ground below the citadel, called the 
Pelasgic, which to turn into a dwelling-place, 
had not only been thought profaneness, but was 
expressly forbid by the close of a line in a Py- 
thian oracle, which said, 

" Best is Pelasgic empty." 



Yet this sudden urgent necessity constrained 
them to convert it to such a use. To me, I 
own, that oracle seems to have carried a difler- 
ent meaning from what they gave it. For the 
calamities of Athens did not flow from the 
profane habitation of this place, but from the 
war which laid them under the necessity of 
employing it in such a manner. The oracle 
makes no mention of the war, but only hints 
that its being some time inhalnted would be 
attended with public misfortune. Many of 
them, further, were forced to lodge themselves 
within the turrets of the walls, or wherever 
they could find a vacant corner. The city was 



not able to receive so large a conflux of people. 
But afterwards, the long walls, and a great part 
of the Piraeus, were portioned out to them for 
little dwellings. At the same time they were 
busied in the military preparations, gathering 
together the confederate forces, and fitting out 
a fleet of one hundred ships to infest Pelopon- 
nesus. In affairs of such great importance 
were the Athenians engaged. 

The Peloponnesian army, advancing for- 
wards, came up first to Oenoe, through which 
they designed to break into Attica. Encamp- 
ing before it, they made ready their engines, 
and all other necessaries for battering the walls. 
For Oenoe, being a frontier-town between 
Attica and Boeotia, was walled about, since the 
Athenians were used, upon the breaking out 
of war, to throw a garrison into it. The enemy 
made great preparations for assaulting it, and 
by this and other means spent no little time 
before it. 

This delay was the occasion of drawing very 
heavy censures on Archidamus. He had be- 
fore this been thought too dilatory in gathering 
together the confederate army, and too much 
attached to the Athenians, because he never 
declared warmly for the war. But after the 
army was drawn together, his long stay at the 
Isthmus, and the slow marches he had made 
from thence, exposed him to calumny, which 
was still heightened by the lengtli of the siege 
of Oenoe : for, in this interval of delay, the 
Athenians had without molestation withdrawn 
all their effects from the country, though it 
was the general opinion, that, had the Pelopo- 
ponnesians advanced with expedition, they 
might undoubtedly have seized them, were it not 
for these dilatory proceedings of Archidamus. 
Under such a weight of resentment did Archi- 
damus still lie with his army before Oenoe. 
His remissness was said to be owing to his pre- 
sumption, that the Athenians, if their territory 
was spared, would make some concessions, 
and that they dreaded nothing more than to see 
it destroyed. But after this assault on Oenoe, 
and the successive miscarriage of all the me- 
thods employed to take it, the Athenians still 
resolutely refraining from the least show of 
submission, they broke up the siege and march- 
ed into Attica, in the height of summer, when 
the harvest was ripe, about eighty days after 
the Thebans had miscarried in the surprise of 
Platffia. They were still commanded by Ai^ 
chidamus son of Zeuxidamus, king of the La- 



YEAR I.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



61 



cedaemonians, and having formed their camp 
began their devastations. They first of all 
ravaged Eleusis and the plain of Thriasia. 
Near Rheiti they encountered and put to flight 
a party of Athenian horse. Then they advan- 
ced farther into the country through Cecropia, 
leaving mount ^galeon on their right, till they 
came to Acharnae, the greatest of all those 
which are called the boroughs of Athens. 
They sat dowrn before it, and having fortified 
their camp, continued a long time there, laying 
all the adjacent country waste. 

The design of Archidamus in stopping thus 
before Acharnae, keeping there his army ready 
for battle, and not marching down there this 
first campaign into the plains, is said to be this. 
— He presumed that the Athenians, who 
flourished at that time in a numerous j^outh, 
and who never before had been so well pre- 
pared for war, would probably march out 
against him, and would not sit quiet whilst 
their lands were ravaged before their eyes. 
But when he had advanced to Eleusis and the 
plain of Thriasia without any resistance, he 
had a mind to try whether laying siege to 
AcharnsB would provoke them to come out. 
This place seemed further to him a convenient 
spot for a long encampment. Besides, he 
could not persuade himself, that the Acharni- 
ans, so considerable a body amongst the citi- 
zens of Athens (for three thousand of them 
now wore the heavy armour), could see with 
patience their own properties ruined by hos- 
tile devastation, without inciting all their fel- 
low-citizens to rush out to battle. And if the 
Athenians would not come out against them 
this campaign, he might another campaign with 
gfreatcr security extend his devastation even to 
the very walls of Athens. He thought it not 
likely that the Acharnians, when all their lands 
had been ruined in this manner, would cheer- 
fully run into hazards to prevent the losses of 
others, and that hence' much dissention might 



1 Aristophanes wrote hiscomedj' of The Acharnians 
upon this plan, and abundantly ridiculed the public con- 
duct as injurious to the citizens of Athens. Thoush it 
was not brought upon the stage till the sixth year of the 
war, it amply sliovvs us, how the Acharnians resented 
their being thus exposed to the ravage of the enemy; 
and how the wits, that lived upon the public passions, 
helped still more to exasperate them, and misrepresent- 
ed the measures of the ablest politirians, and who per- 
fectly well understood and aimed at the general welfare 
of the whole ron)munlty, as weak, corrupt, and mischie- 
vous. No care to redress, and no commiseration for the 
AcbarnianB as Dicneopolis hints, who was one of that 



be kindled up amongst them. Of these imagi- 
nary schemes was Archidamus full, whilst ho 
lay before Acharnae. 

The Athenians, so long as the enemy remain- 
ed about Eleusis and the plain of Thriasia, 
conceived some hopes that they would advance 
no farther. They put one another in mind, 
that Pleistoanax son of Pausanias king of the 
Lacedaemonians, when fourteen years before 
this war he invaded Attica with an army of 
Peloponnesians, came only as far as to Eleusis 
and Thrias, and then retreated without pene- 
trating any farther — that upon this account he 
had been banished Sparta, because it looked as 
if he had been bribed to such an unseasonable 
retreat. But when they saw the enemy ad- 
vanced to Acharnae, which was distant but 
sixty^ stadia from Athens, they thought their 
incursions were no longer to be endured. It 
appeared, as it reasonably might, a heavy 
grievance, to have all their lands thus ravaged 
within their sight; — a scene like this the 
younger sort never had beheld, nor the elder 
but once — in the Persian war. The bulk of 
the people, but especially the younger part, 
were for sallying out and fighting, and not to 
stand tamely looking upon the insult. Num- 
bers of them assembled together in a tumul- 
tuous manner, which was the rise of great 
confusion, some loudly demanding to march 
out against the enemy, and others restrain- 
ing them from it. The soothsayers gave out 
all manner of predictions, which every hearer 
interpreted by the key of his own passions. 
The Acharnians, regarding themselves as no 
contemptible part of the Athenian body, be- 
cause their lands had been wasted, in a most 
earnest manner insisted upon a sally. The 
whole city was in a ferment, and all their re- 
sentments centred on Pericles. They quite 

borough — " And what? it will be said, Can this possibly 
be helped? Be helped, do you say? why not? Tell me, 
if you can. Suppose only, that a Lacedoemonian had 
stood across in his skitf to Seriphus. and after killing 
a favourite lap-dog got off again safe: — Would ye now 
lathis case sit still? Quite the contrary. You would 
immediately be putting out to sea with three hundred 
sail of ships; Athens would roar with the tumult of 
soldiers; the captains of vessels would be shouting, pay 
delivering, and our gold flying about. What a bustle 
would there he in the long portico! what distributing 
of provisions, skins, thongs, casks full of olives, onions 
in nets, &c. &,c. &c. ! All the decks would be crowded 
with seamen. What a dashing of oars, music sounding, 
boatswains bawling; nothing but hurry and confusion. 
Such, I am well assured, would then be the case,' 
9 About six English miles. 



62 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book II. 



forgot the prudent conduct he had formerly 
planned out for them. — They reproached him 
as a general that durst not head them against 
their enemies, and regarded him as author of all 
the miseries which their city endured. 

Pericles seeing their minds thus chagrined 
by the present slate of their alTairs, and in con- 
sequence of this, intent upon unadvisable mea- 
sures, but assured within himself of the pru- 
dence of his own conduct in thus restraining 
them from action, called no general assembly 
of the people, nor held any public consultation, 
lest passion which was more alive than judg- 
ment, should throw them into indiscretions. 
He kept strict guard in the city, and endeav- 
oured as much as possible to preserve the pub- 
lic quiet. Yet he was always sending out small 
parties of horse, to prevent any damage that 
might be done near the city, by adventurous 
stragglers from the army. By this means, there 
happened once at Phrygii a skirmish between 
one troop of the Athenian horse accompanied 
by some Thcssalians, and the horsemen of Boe- 
otia, in which the Athenians and Thessalians 
maintained their ground, till some heavy-armed 
foot reinforced the Boeotian horse. Then they 
were forced to turn about, and some few both 
Thessalians and Athenians, were slain. How- 
ever, they fetched off their bodies the same day 
without the enemy's leave, and the next day 
the Peloponnesians erected a trophy. — The aid 
sent now by the Thessalians was in consequence 
of an ancient alliance between them and the 
Athenians. These auxiliaries consisted of La- 
risseans, Pharsalians, Parasians, Cranonians, 
Peirasians, Gyrtonians, Pheraeans. Those from 
Larissa were commanded by Polymedes and 
Aristonous, each heading those of this own fic- 
tion ; those from Pharsalus by Menon ; and 
those from the rest of the cities had their res- 
pective commanders. 

The Peloponnesians, when the Athenians 
made no show of coming out against them, 
broke up from Acharnre, and laid waste some 
other of the Athenian boroughs, which lay be- 
tween the mountains Parnethus and Brilissus. 

During the time of these incursions, the 
Athenians sent out the hundred ships they had 
already equipped, and which had on board a 
thousand heavy-armed soldiers and four hun- 
dred archers, to infest the coast of Peloponne- 
sus. The commanders in the expedition were 
Carcinus son of Xcnotimus, Proteas son of Ep- 
icled, and Socrates son of Antigenes. Under 



their orders, the fleet so furnished out, weighed 
anchor and sailed away. 

The Peloponnesians, continuing in Attica 
till provisions began to fail them, retired not by 
the same route they came in, but marched away 
through Bceotia. And passing by Oropus, they 
wasted the tract of ground called Piraice, which 
was occupied by the Oropians, who were sub- 
ject to Athens. On their return into Pelopon- 
nesus, the army was dispersed into their seve- 
ral cities. 

After their departure, the Athenians settled 
the proper stations for their guards both by land 
and sea, in the same disposition as they were 
to continue to the end of the war. They also 
made a decree, that " a thousand talents should 
be taken from the fund of the treasure in the 
citadel, and laid up by itself; that this sum 
should not be touched, but the expense of the 
war be defrayed from the remainder — and, that 
if any one moved or voted for converting this 
money to any other use than the necessary de- 
fence of the city, in case the enemy attacked it 
by sea, he should suffer the penalty of death." 
Besides this, they selected constantly every year 
an hundred of their best triremes, with the due 
number of able commanders. These also they 
made it capital to use upon any other occasion, 
than that extremity for which the reserve of 
money was destined. 

The Athenians on board the fleet of one 
hundred sail on the coasts of Peloponnesus, 
being joined by the Corcyreans in fifty ships 
and by some other of their confederates in 
those parts, hovered for a time and infested 
the coast, and at length made a descent and as- 
saulted Methone, a town of Laconia, whose 
walls were but weak and poorly manned. It 
happened that Brasidas' the son of Tellis a 
Spartan had then the command of a garrison 



» Here the name of Brnsidas first orriirs, and I must 
he:? the reader to note him as one who is to make no or- 
dinary fignre in tlie s«iuel. Trained up through the 
reguhir and severe discipline of Sparta, he was lirave, 
viirilant and active. lie was second to none of his 
countrymen, in tliose cood qualities whidi did iionour 
to tiic Spartans; and was free from n!l tlie lilcniishes 
which tlieir peculiarity of education was apt to throw 
upon them, such as hau;;htinP8s of carriage, ferocity of 
temper, and an arro<iance which studied no defc^retice 
or condescension to others. He serves his country 
much hy liis valour and military cotiduct, and more l.y 
his Rcntlc. humane, and encaging behaviour. In a 
word, the distinguishing excellencies hotli of the Spar- 
tan and Athenian cliuracters scctu to Imve been united 
in this Orasidas. 



YEAR I.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



G3 



somewhere near Metlione. He was sensible 
of the danger he was in, and set forwards with 
one hundred heavy-armed to its reUef. The 
Athenian army was then scattered about the 
country, and their attention directed only to 
the walls ; by which means, making a quick 
march through the midst of their quarters, he 
threw himself into Methone, and, with the 
loss of but a few who were intercepted in the 
passage, effectually secured the town. For 
this bold exploit, he was the first man of all 
who signalized themselves in this war, that re- 
ceived the public commendation at Sparta. 
Upon this the Athenians re-erabarked and 
sailed away, and coming up to Pheia, a town 
of Elis, they ravaged the count y for two days 
together. A body of picked men of the lower 
Ells, with some other E leans, that were got 
together from the adjacent country, endeavour- 
ed to stop their devastations, but coming to a 
skirmish, were defeated by them. But a storm 
arising, and their ships being exposed to dan- 
ger on the open coast, they went immediately 
on board, and sailing round the cape of Icthys, 
got into the harbour of Pheia. The Messe- 
nians in the meantime, and some others who had 
not been able to gain their ships, had marched 
over-land and got possession of the place. 
Soon after the ships, being now come about, 
stood into the harbour, took them on board, 
and quitting the place put out again to sea. 
By this time a great army of Eleans was drawn 
together to succour it, but the Athenians were 
sailed away to other parts of the coast, where 
they carried on their depredations. 

About the same time, the Athenians had 
sent a fleet of thirty sail to infest the coast 
about Locris, and at the same time to guard 
Euboea. This fleet was commanded by Clea- 
pompus the son of Clinias, who making several 
descents, plundered many maritime places, and 
took Thronium. He carried from thence 
some hostages, and at Alope defeated a body 
of Locrians, who were marching to its relief. 

The same summer, the Athenians transport- 
ed from ^gina all the inhabitants, not only 
the men but the children and the women, re- 
proaching them as the principal authors of the 
present war. And judging they might securely 
keep the possession of -^Egina, which lay so 
near to Peloponnesus, if they peopled it with 
a colony of their own — with this view, not 
long after, they fixed some of their own people 
in possession of it. The Laceda;monians re- 



ceived the ^ginetae on their expulsion, and 
assigned them Thyraea for their place of resi- 
dence, and the country about it for their sub- 
sistence, not only on account of their own en- 
mity to the Athenians, but the particular obli- 
gatioiLs they lay under to the vEginetae, for the 
succour they had given them in the time 
of the earthquake and the insuiTection of 
the Helots. The district of Thyraea lies be- 
tween Argia and Laconia, declining quite down 
to the sea. Here some of them fixed their 
residence, but the rest were dispersed into 
other parts of Greece. 

The same summer, on the first day of the 
lunar month, at which time alone it can possi- 
bly fall out, there was an eclipse of the sun in the 
afternoon. The sun looked for a time like the 
crescent of the moon, and some stars appeared, 
but the full orb shone out afterwards in all its 
lustre. 

The same summer also, the Athenians, who 
had hitherto regarded as their enemy Nym- 
phodorus, the son of Pythes of Abdera, whose 
sister was married to Sitalces, and who had a 
great influence over him, made him their public 
friend and invited him to Athens. They 
hoped by this to gain over Sitalces the son of 
Teres king of Thrace to their alliance. This 
Teres, father of Sitalces, was the first who 
made the kingdom of Odrysae the largest in all 
Thrace ; for the greater part of the Thracians 
are free, and governed by their own laws. 
But this Teres was not in the least related to 
Tereus, who married from Athens Procne the 
daughter of Pandion, nor did they belong both 
to the same part of Thrace. Tereus lived in 
Daulia, a city of that province which is now 
called Phocis, and which in his time was in- 
habited by Thracians. Here it was that the 
women executed the tragical business of Itys : 
and many poets who make mention of the 
nightingale, do it by the name of the Daulian 
bird. And it is more probable that Pandion 
matched his daughter to a person at this lesser 
distance from him, from the view of mutual 
advantage, than to one seated at Odrysae, which 
is many days' journey further off. But Teres, 
whose name is not the same with Tereus, was 
the first king of Odrysae, and compassed the 
regal power of violence. This man's son Sital- 
ces the Athenians admitted into their alliance, 
hoping he might gain over to their side the cities 
of Thrace and Perdiccas. Nymphodorus arriv- 
j ing at Athens finished the alliance with Sitalces, 



64 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book ir. 



and made his son Sadocus an Athenian. He 
also undertook to bring the war now in Thrace 
to an end, and to persuade Sitalces to send to 
the Athenians a body of Thracian horsemen 
and targeteers. He also reconciled Perdiccas 
to the Athenians by procuring for him the re- 
stitution of Therme ; immediately after which, 
Perdiccas joined the Athenians and Phormio 
in the expedition against the Chalcideans. 
Thus was Sitalces the son of Teres a Thracian 
king, and 'Perdiccas the son of Alexander 
a Macedonian king, brought into the Athenian 
league. 

The Athenians in the fleet of one hundred 
sail, still continuing their cruize on the coast 
of Peloponnesus, took Solium a fort belonging 
to the Corinthians, and delivered the place 
with the district of land belonging to it to the 
Palirensians, exclusively of other Acarnanians. 
They took also by storm Astocus, of which 
Evarchus was tyrant, whom they forced to fly 
away, and added the town to their own associ- 
ation. Sailing from hence to the island Ceph- 
allene, they reduced it without a battle. Ceph- 
allene lies towards Acarnania and Leucas, and 
hath four cities; the Pallensians, Cranians, 
Samaeans, Pron£Bans. Not long after this the 
fleet sailed back to Athens. 

In the autumn of this summer, the Atheni- 
ans, with all their forces, citizens and sojourners, 
made an incursion into the territories of Megara, 
under the command of Pericles the son of 
Xantippus. — Those also who had been cruiz- 
ing about Peloponnesus in the fleet of one 
hundred sail (for they were now at ^gina,) 
finding upon their return that all their fellow 
citizens were marched in the general expedition 
against Megara, followed them with the fleet 
and came up to them. By this means, 
the army of the Athenians became the larg- 
est they had ever at any time got together, the 
city being now in its most flourishing state, and 
as yet uninfected with the plague : for there 

« Macedonia at this time was not reckoned a part of 
Greere, and botli kinf;and people were regarded as Bar- 
barians. Alexander, fallicr of this Perdicras, was 
oblijzed to plead an Arrive pcdiiirco, in order to assist 
at tlic Olympic games. And I'erdinras now himself, 
whose surcessor Alexander llic Great, not many years 
after, was le ider of Grenre and conqueror of Asia, was 
at this time halanring Itetwccn the LarediPmonians and 
Athenians, important to either merely as a ncighlioiir 
tolheir colonics in 'IMiracc. The Greek generals will 
be sometimes seen in this history to use the monarch of 
Macedonia very cavalierly. 



were of Athenian citizens only no less than ten 
thousand heavy-armed, exclusive of the three 
thousand who were now at Potidaea: the sojourn- 
ers of Athens who marched out along with them, 
were not fewer than three thousand heavy-arm- 
ed: they had besides a very large number of light- 
armed soldiers. They laid waste the greatest part 
of the country, and then returned to Athens. 
Every succeeding year of the war the Atheni- 
ans constantly repeated these incursions into 
the territory of Megara, sometimes with their 
cavalry, and sometimes with all their united 
force, till at last they made themselves masters 
of Nisaea. 

In the close also of the summer, Atalante, 
an island lying near the Locrians of Opus, till 
now uninhabited, was fortified and garrisoned 
by the Athenians, to prevent the pirates of 
Opus, and other parts of Locris, from annoy- 
ing Euboea. — These were the transactions of 
the summer, after the departure of the Pelo- 
ponnesians out of Attica. 

The winter following, Evarchus the Acar- 
nanian, who had a great desire to recover As- 
tacus, prevailed with the Corinthians to carry 
him thither, with a fleet of forty ships, and a 
force of fifteen hundred heavy-armed, and en- 
deavour to re-establish him. He himself also 
hired some auxiliaries for the same purpose. 
This armament was commanded by Euphy- 
madas son of Aristonymus, Timoxenus son of 
Timocrates, and Eumachus son of Chrysis ; 
who sailing thither executed their business. 
They had a mind to endeavour the reduction 
of some others of the maritime towns of Acar- 
nania, but miscarrying in every attempt they 
made, they returned home. But in their pas- 
sage touching at Cephallcne, and debarking 
upon the lands of the Cranians, they were 
treacherously inveigled into a conference, where 
the Cranians, fiilling suddenly upon them, killed 
some of their men. It was not without dilFiculty 
that they drew the others safely oflf, and gained 
their own ports. 

But the same winter the Athenians in con- 
formity to the established custom of their coun- 
try, solemnized a public funeral for those who 
had been first killed in this war, in the manner 
as follows : 

The bones of the slain arc brought to a 
tabernacle erected for the purpose three days 
before, and all are at liberty to deck out the 
remains of their friends at their own discretion. 
But when the grand procession is made, the 



YEAR I.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



65 



cypress coffins are drawn on carriages, one for 
every tribe, in each of which are separately 
contained tlie bones of all who belonged to 
that tribe. One sumptuous bier is carried along 
empty for those that are lost, whose bodies 
could not be found among the slain. All 
who are willing, both citizens and strangers, 
attend the solemnity ; and the women who 
were related to the deceased, stand near the 
sepulchre groaning and lamenting. They de- 
posit the remains in the public sepulchre, which 
stands in the finest suburb of the city ; — for it 
hath been the constant custom here to bury all 
who fell in war, except those at Marathon, 
whose extraordinary valour they judged proper 
to honour with a sepulchre on the field of bat- 
tle. As soon as they are interred, some one 
selected for the ofl&ce by the public voice, and 
ever a person in great esteem for his under- 
standing, and of high dignity amongst them, 
pronounces over them the decent panegyric — 
and this done, they depart. Through all the 
war, as the occasions recurred, this method was 
constantly observed. But over these, the first 
victims of it, Pericles the son of Xantippus 
was appointed to speak. So, when the proper 
time was come, walking from the sepulchre, and 
mounting a lofty pulpit erected for the purpose, 
from whence he might be heard more distinctly 
by the company, he thus began : 

" Many of those who have spoken before me 
on these occasions, have commended the 
author of that law which w^e are now obeying, 
for having instituted an oration to the honour 
of those who sacrifice their lives in fighting for 
their country. For my part, I think it suffi- 
cient, for men who have approved their virtue 
IP action, by action to be honoured for it — by 
<3vv;h as you see the public gratitude now per- 
forming about this funeral ; and that the vir- 
tues of many ought not to be endangered by 
the management of any one person, when Vaeii 
credit must precariously depend on his oration, 
which may be good and mav be bad. Difficult 
indeed it is, judiciously to handle a subiect 
where even probable truth will hardlv gain as- 
sent. The hearer, enlightened by a long ac- 
quaintance, and warm in his affection, may 
quickly pronounce every thing unfavourably 
expressed, in respect to what be wishes and 
what he knows, — whilst the stmnger pro- 
nounceth all eyap-gerated-thi-ough envy of those 
deeds which be is conscious are above his own 
achievement. I'or the praises bestowed upon 
16 



others, are then only to be endured, when men 
imagine they can do those feats they hear to have 
been done : they envy what they cannot equal, 
and immediately pronounce it false. Yet, as 
this solemnity hath received its sanction from 
the authority of our ancestors, it is my duty also 
to obey the law, and to endeavour to procure, 
as far as I am able, the good will and approba- 
tion of all my audience. 

" I shall therefore begin first with our fore- 
fathers, since both justice and decency require 
we should on this occasion bestow on them 
an honourable remembrance. In this our 
country they kept themselves always firmly 
settled, and through their valour handed it 
down free to every since-succeeding generation. 
Worthy indeed of praise are they, and yet more 
worthy are our immediate fathers ; since, en- 
larging their own inheritance into the extensive 
empire which we now possess, they bequeathed 
that their work of toil to us their sons. Yet 
even these successes, we ourselves here pre- 
sent, we who are yet in the strength and vigour 
of our days, have nobly improved, and have 
made such provisions for this our Athens, that 
now it is all-sufficient in itself to answer every 
exigence of war and of peace. I mean not 
here to recite those martial exploits by which 
these ends were accomplished, or the resolute 
defences we ourselves and our fathers have 
made against the formidable invasions of Bar- 
barians and Greeks — your own knowledge of 
these will excuse the long detail. But by 
what methods we have risen to this height of 
glory and power, by what polity and by what 
conduct we are thus aggrandized, I shall first 
endeavour to shov^^ ; and then proceed to the 
praise of the deceased. These, in my opinion, 
can be no impertinent topics on this occasion ; 
the discup«;ion of them must be beneficial to 
this numerous coinpany of Athenians and of 
stranp^era. . 

" We are happy in a form of government 
which cannot envy the laws of our neighbours ; 
— for it hath served as a model to others, but 
is original at Athens. And this our form, as 
committed not to the few, but to the whole 
body of the people, is called a democracy. How 
different soever in a private capacity, we all en- 
joy the same general equality our laws are fit- 
ted to preserve ; and superior honours just as 
we excel. The public administration is not 
confined to a particular family, but is attainable 
only by merit. Poverty is not a hindrance. 



66 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book ir. 



since whoever is able to serve his country, 
meets with no obstacle to preferment from his 
first obscurity. The offices of the state we go 
through without obstructions from one another ; 
and live together in the mutual endearments of 
private life without suspicions ; not angry with 
a neighbour for following the bent of his own 
humour, nor putting on that countenance of 
discontent, which pains though it cannot pun- 
ish — so that in private life we converse with- 
out diffidence or damage, whilst we dare not 
on any account oflcnd against the public, 
through the reverence we bear to the magis- 
trates and the laws, chiefly to those enacted for 
redress of the injured, and to those unwritten, a 
breach of which is allowed disgrace. Our laws 
have further provided for the mind most fre- 
quent intermissions of care by the appointment 
of public recreations and sacrifices' throughout 
the year, elegantly performed with a peculiar 
pomp, the daily delight of which is a charm that 
puts melancholy to flight. The grandeur of 
this our Athens causeth the produce of the 
whole earth to be imported here, by which we 
reap a familiar enjoyment, not more of the de- 
licacies of our own growth, than of those of 
other nations. 

" In the affairs of war we excel those of our 
enemies, who adhere to methods opposite to 
our own. For we lay open Athens to general 
resort, nor ever drive any stranger from us 
whom either improvement or curiosity hath 
brought amongst us, lest any enemy should 
hurt us by seeing what is never concealed. 
We place not so great a confidence in the pre- 
paratives and artifices of war, as in the native 
warmth of our souls impelling us to action. In 
point of education, the youth of some people 
are inured by a course of laborious exercise, 
to support toil and exercise like men ; but we, 
notwithstanding our easy and elegant way of 
life, face all the dangers of war as intre- 
pidly as thoy. This may be proved by facts, 
since the Lacedajmonians never invade our ter- 
ritories barely with their own, but with the 
united strength of all their confederates. But, 
when we invade the dominions of our neigh- 
bours, for the most j)art wc conquer with- 
out difficulty in an enemy's country those who 



« nesidrs the vast niimlicr of fnstivnls, wliirh were 
celebrntcd at Athens with i)omj)Oii8 proressioiis, rostly 
sacrifirea, nnd HOiTictiincs piiMic (;"i»''8< ^'ic presidents 
in course otFered u|» sncrilitcs every inoriiiiig constant- 
Jy for tlie public welfare. 



fight in defence of their own habitations. The 
strength of our whole force no enemy yet hath 
ever experienced, because it i? divided by our 
naval expeditions, or engaged in the different 
quarters of our service by land. But if any 
where they engage and defeat a small party of 
our forces, they boastingly give it out a total 
defeat; and if they are beat, they were cer- 
tainly overpowered by our united strength. 
What though from a state of inactivity rather 
than laborious exercise, or with a natural rather 
than an acquired valour, we learn to encounter 
danger 1 — this good at least we receive from it, 
that we never droop under the apprehension of 
possible misfortunes, and when we hazard the 
danger, are found no less courageous than those 
who are continually inured to it. In these res- 
pects our whole community deserves justly to 
be admired, and in many we have yet to 
mention. 

" In our manner of living we show an ele- 
gance tempered with frugality, and we cultivate 
philosophy without enervating the mind. We 
display our wealth in the season of beneficence, 
and not in the vanity of discourse. A confes- 
sion of poverty is disgrace to no man, no effort 
to avoid it is disgrace indeed. There is visibly 
in the same persons an attention to their own 
private concerns and those of the public ; and 
in others engaged in the labours of life, there 
is a competent skill in the affairs of government. 
For we are the only people who think him that 
does not meddle in state-affairs — not indolent, 
but good for nothing. And yet we pass the 
soundest judgments, and are quick at catching 
the right apprehensions of things, not think- 
ing that words are prejudicial to actions, but 
rather the not being duly prepared by previous 
debate, before we are obliged to proceed to ex- 
ecution. Herein consists our distinguishing 
excellence, that in the hour of action we show 
the greatest courage, and yet debate beforehand 
the expediency of our measures. The courage 
of others is the result of ignorance; deliber- 
ation makes them cowards. And those un- 
doubtedly must be owned to have the greatest 
souls, who, most acutely sensible of the mise- 
ries of war and the sweets of peace, are not 
hence in the least deterred from faring danger. 

«' In acts of beneficence, further, we difler 
from the many. Wc preserve friends not by 
receiving but by conferring obligations. For 
he who does n kindness hath the advantage 
over him who by the law of gratitude becomos 



YEAR I.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



67 



a debtor to his benefactor. The person oblig- 
ed is compelled to act the more insipid part, 
conscious that a return of kindness is merely a 
payment and not an obligation. And we alone 
are splendidly beneficent to others, not so much 
from interested motives, as for the credit of 
pure liberality. I shall sum up what yet re- 
mains by only adding — that our Athens in 
general is the school of Greece ; and, that ev- 
ery single Athenian amongst us is excellently 
formed, by his personal qualification, for all the 
various scenes of active life, acting with a most 
graceful demeanor, and a most ready habit of 
despatch. 

"That I have not on this occasion made 
use of a pomp of words, but the truth of facts, 
that height to which by such a conduct this 
state hath risen, is an undeniable proof. For 
we are now the only people of the world 
who are found by experience to be greater 
than in report — the only people who, repelling 
the attacks of an invading enemy, exempts their 
defeat from the blush of indignation, and to 
their tributaries yields no discontent, as if 
subject to men unworthy to command. That 
we deserve our power, we need no evidence to 
manifest. We have great and signal proofs of 
this, which entitle us to the admiration of the 
present and future ages. We want no Homer 
to be the herald of our praise ; no poet to deck 
off a history with the charms of verse, where 
the opinion of exploits must suffer by a strict 
relation. Every sea has been opened by our 
fleets, and every land hath been penetrated by 
our armies, which have every where left be- 
hind them eternal monuments of our enmity 
and our friendship. 

" In the just defence of such a state these 
victims of their own valour, scorning the ruin 
threatened to it, have valiantly fought and 
bravely died. And every one of those who 
survive is ready, I am persuaded, to sacrifice 
life in such a cause. And for this reason have 
I enlarged so much on national points, to give 
the clearest proof that in the present war 
we have more at stake than men whose public 
advantages are not so valuable, and to illustrate 
by actual evidence, how great a commendation 
is due to them who are now my subject, and 
the greatest part of which they have already re- 
ceived. For the encomiums with which I have 
celebrated the state, have been earned for it by 
the bravery of these, and of men like these. 
And such compliments might be thought too 



high and exaggerated, if passed on any Grecians 
but them alone. The fatal period to which 
these gallant souls are now reduced, is the sur- 
est evidence of their merit — an evidence begun 
in their lives and completed in their deaths. 
For it is a debt of justice to pay superior ho- 
nours to men, who have devoted their lives in 
fighting for their country, though inferior to 
others in every virtue but that of valour. 
Their last service effaceth all former demerits, 
— it extends to the public; their private de- 
meanors reached only to a few. Yet not one 
of these was at all induced to shrink from dan- 
ger, through fondness of those delights which 
the peaceful affluent life bestows, — not one was 
the less lavish of his life, through that flattering 
hope attendant upon want, that poverty at length 
might be exchanged for afliuence. One pas- 
sion there was in their minds much stronger 
than these, — the desire of vengeance on their 
enemies. Regarding this as the most honour- 
able prize of dangers, they boldly rushed to- 
wards the mark, to glut revenge, and then to 
satisfy those secondary passions. The uncertain 
event, they had already secured in hope ; what 
their eyes showed plainly must be done, they 
trusted their own valour to accomplish, think- 
ing it more glorious to defend themselves and 
die in the attempt, than to yield and live. 
From the reproach of cowardice indeed they 
fled, but presented their bodies to the shock of 
battle ; when, insensible of fear, but triumph- 
ing in hope, in the doubtful charge they in- 
stantly dropped — and thus discharged the duty 
which brave men owe to their country. 

" As for you, who now survive them — it is 
your business to pray for a better fate — but, 
to think it your duty also to preserve the same 
spirit and warmth of courage against your 
enemies ; not judging of the expediency of 
this from a mere harangue — where any man 
indulging a flow of words may tell you, what 
you yourselves know as well as he, how 
many advantages there are in fighting valiantly 
against your enemies — but rather, making the 
daily-increasing grandeur of this community 
the object of your thoughts, and growing 
quite enamoured of it. And when it really 
appears great to your apprehensions, think 
again, that this grandeur was acquired by 
brave and valiant men ; by men who knew 
their duty, and in the moments of action were 
sensible of shame ; who, whenever their at- 
tempts were unsuccessful, thought it dishonour 



68 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book n. 



their country should stand in need of any thing 
their valour could do for it, and so made it 
the most glorious present. Bestowing thus 
their lives on the public, they have every one 
received a praise that will never decay, a se- 
pulchre that will always be most illustrious — 
not that in which their bones lie mouldering, 
hut that in which their frame is preserved, to 
be on every occasion, when honour is the em- 
ploy of either word or act, eternally remem- 
bered. This whole earth is the sepulchre of 
illustrious men : nor is it the inscription on the 
columns in their native soil alone that show 
their merit, but the memorial of them, better 
than all inscriptions, in every foreign nation, re- 
posited more durably in universal remembrance 
than on their own tomb. From this very mo- 
ment, emulating these noble patterns, placing 
your happiness in liberty, and liberty in valour, 
be prepared to encounter all the dangers of 
war. For, to be lavish of life is not so noble 
in those whom misfortunes have reduced to 
misery and despair, as in men who hazard the 
loss of a comfortable subsistence, and the en- 
joyment of all the blessings this world affords, 
by an unsuccessful enterprise. Adversity, 
after a series of case and affluence, sinks deeper 
into the heart of a man of spirit, than the stroke 
of death insensibly received in the vigour of life 
and public hope. 

<' For this reason, the parents of those who 
are now gone, whoever of them may be attend- 
ing here, I do not bewail, — I shall rather com- 
fort. It is well known to what unhappy acci- 
dents they were liable from the moment of 
their birth ; and, that happiness belongs to 
men who have reached the most glorious period 
of life, as these now have who are to you the 
source of sorrow, — these, whose life hath re- 
ceived its ample measure, happy in its continu- 
ance, and equally happy in its conclusion. I 
know it in truth a difficult task, to fix comfort 
in those breasts, which will have frequent re- 
membrances in seeing the happiness of others, 
of what they once themselves enjoyed. And 
sorrow flows not from the absence of those 
good things we have never yet experienced, but 
from the loss of those to which we have been 
accustomed. They who are not yet by age 
exempted from issue, should be comforted in 
the hope of having more. The children yet 
to be born will be a private benefit to some, in 
causing them to forget such as no longer are, 
and will be a double benefit to their country 



in preventing its desolation, and providing for 
its security. For those persons cannot in 
common justice be regarded as members of 
equal value to the public, who have no children 
to expose to danger for its safety. — But you, 
whose age is already far advanced, compute 
the greater share of happiness your longer time 
hath afforded for so much gain, persuaded in 
yourselves, the remainder will be but short, 
and enlighten that space by the glory gained by 
these. It is greatness of soul alone that never 
grows old : nor is it wealth that delights in 
the latter stage of life, as some give out, so 
much as honour. 

" To you, the sons and brothers of the de- 
ceased, whatever number of you are here, a 
field of hardy contention is opened. For him 
who no longer is, every one is ready to com- 
mend, so that to whatever height you push 
your deserts, you will scarce ever be thought 
to equal, but to be somewhat inferior to these. 
Envy will exert itself against a competitor, 
whilst life remains : but when death stops the 
competition, affection will applaud without 
restraint. 

" If after this it be expected from me to say 
any thing to yon who are now reduced to a 
state of widowhood, about female virtue, I shall 
express it all in one short admonition ; — It is 
your greatest glory not to be deficient in the 
virtue peculiar to your sex, and to give the men 
as little handle as possible to talk of your be- 
haviour, whether well or ill. 

" I have now discharged the province allotted 
me by the laws, and said what I thought most 
pertinent to this assembly. Our departed 
friends have by facts been already honoured. 
Their children from this day till they arrive at 
manhood shall be educated at the public ex- 
pense of the state' which hath appointed so 
beneficial a meed for these and all future re- 
lics of the public contests. For wherever the 
greatest rewards are proposed for virtue, there 
the best of patriots are ever to be found. — 
Now, let every one respectively indulge the 
decent grief for his departed friends, and then 
retire." 

Such was the manner of the public funeral 
solemnized this winter, and with the end of 
which, the first year of this war was also ended, 

» The law was, that tliey should be instrurted at the 
public, expense, and when come to ape presented with 
a complete suit of armour, and lioiiourcd witli a scat in 
all public places. 



YEAR n.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



69 



TEAR II. 

In the very beginning of summer, the Pelo- 
ponnesians and allies, with two-thirds of their 
forces, made an incursion as before into Attica, 
under the command of Archidamus son of 
Zeuxidamus, king of the Lacedaemonians, and 
having formed their camp, ravaged the country. 

They had not been many days in Attica, be- 
fore a 'sickness began first to appear amongst 
the Athenians, such as was reported to have 
raged before this in other parts, as about Lem- 
nos and other places. Yet a plague so great 
as this, and so dreadful a calamity, in human 
memory could not be paralelled. The physi- 
cians at first could administer no relief, through 
utter ignorance ; nay, they died the faster, the 
closer their attendance on the sick, and all hu- 

» The historian in the funeral oration hath given us a 
very exalted idea of the Athenian state, and the distin- 
guishing excellencies of that humane and polite people. 
The plague, which now broke out, enables him to con- 
trast his pieces, and give his history a most agreeable 
variety. It is now going to be exceeding solemn, seri- 
ous, and pathetic. It is as an historian and not as a 
physician that he gives us the relation of it: a relation, 
which in general hath been esteemed an elaborate and 
complete performance. He professeth to give an accu- 
rate detail of it. The accuracy hath generally been 
allowed, but it hath been blamed as too minute. Lucre- 
tius however hath transferred all the circumstances 
mentioned by Thucydides into his own poem, 1. 6. en- 
larging still more minutely upon them; and yet, this is 
the greatest ornamenc, and certainly the least exception- 
able part of his poem. Lucretius, an excellent poet, 
affected to write with the precision of a philosopher; 
and Thucydides, the historian, always composed with 
the spirit of a poet, Hippocrates hath left some cases 
of the plague, which he hath recited as a physician; hut 
none of them is dated at Athens. Thucydides hath 
mentioned nothing of his practising there, much 'ess of 
his practising with success. He says on the con.iary 
that "all human art was totally unavailing;" ■•-'^ his 
follower Lucretius, that, " Mussabat tacito nicuicma 
timore." The letters of Hippocrates, which mention 
this affair, are certainly spurious: the facts they would 
establish are without any grounds, as Le Clerc hath 
proved to conviction in his Histoire de la medecine, 1. 3. 
They make the plague to have broken out first in Eu- 
rope, and to have spread from thence into the domin- 
ions of the king of Persia. This is quite contrary to the 
account of Thucydides; and to the experience of every 
age. All plasues and infectious distempers have had 
their rise in Africa. Need I say more than that Dr 
Mead hath proved it? But whether his account of this 
plague at Athens be duly succinct, not too minute, se- 
rious, affecting; and, whether Thucydides hath well 
managed the opportunity it gave him to moralize like 
a man of virtue and good sense, every reader will judge 
for himself. The translator hath chiefly endeavoured 
to preserve that solemn air, which he thought the prime 
distinction of the original. 



man art was totally unavailing. Whatever sup- 
plications were offered in the temples, whatever 
recourse to oracles and religious rites, all were 
insignificant ; at last, expedients of this nature 
they totally relinquished, overpowered by cala- 
mity. It broke out first, as it is said, in that 
part of Ethiopia which borders upon Egypt ; 
it afterwards spread into Egypt and Libya, and 
into great part of the king's dominions, and from 
thence it on a sudden fell on the city of the 
Athenians. The contagion showed itself first 
in the Piraeus, which occasioned a report that 
the Peloponnesians had caused poison to be 
thrown into the wells, for as yet there were no 
fountains there. After this it spread into the 
upper city, and then the mortality very much 
increased. Let every one, physician or not, 
freely declare his own sentiments about it ; let 
him assign any credible account of its rise, or 
the causes strong enough in his opinion to in- 
troduce so terrible a scene — I shall only relate 
what it actually was ; and as, from an informa- 
tion in all its symptoms, none may be quite at 
a loss about it, if ever it should happen again, 
I shall give tn exact detail of them ; having 
been sick of it myself, and seen many others af- 
flicted with i(. 

This very year, as is universally allowed, had 
been more than any other remarkably <Vee from 
common disorders ; or, whatever diseases had 
seized the body, they ended at length in this. 
But those who enjoyed the most perfect health 
were suddenly, without any apparent cause, 
seized at first with head-aches extremely vio- 
lent, with inflammations, and fiery redness in 
the eyes. Within — the throat and tongue be- 
gan instantly to be red as blood ; the breath 
was drawn with difliculty and had a noisome 
smell. The symptoms that succeeded these 
were sneezing and hoarseness ; and not long 
after, the malady descended to the breast, with 
a violent cough : but when once settled in the 
stomach, it excited vomitings, in which was 
thrown up all that matter physicians call dis- 
charges of bile, attended with excessive torture. 
A great part of the infected were subject to 
such violent hiccups without any discharge, as 
brought upon them a strong convulsion, to 
some but of a short, to others of a very long 
continuance. The body, to the outward touch, 
was neither exceeding hot, nor of a pallid hue, 
but reddish, livid, marked all over with little 
pustules and sores. Yet inwardly it was scorch- 
ed with such excessive heat, that it could not 
l2 



w 



PELOPONNESIAxN WAR. 



[book u. 



bear the lightest covering or the finest linen 
upon it, but must be left quite naked. They 
longed for nothing so much as to be plunging 
into cold water ; and many of those who were 
not properly attended, threw themselves into 
wells, hurried by a thirst not to be extinguish- 
ed ; and whether they drank much or little, 
their torment still continued the same. The 
restlessness of their bodies, and an utter inabil- 
ity of composing themselves by sleep, never 
abated for a moment. And the body, so long 
as the distemper continued in its height, had 
no visible waste, but withstood its rage to a 
miracle, so that most of them perished within 
nine or seven days, by the heat that scorched 
their vitals, though their strength was not ex- 
hausted ; or, if they continued longer, the dis- 
temper fell into the belly, causing violent ul- 
cerations in the bowels, accompanied with an 
incessant flux, by which many, reduced to an 
excessive weakness, were carried off. For the 
malady beginning in the head, and settling first 
there, sunk afterwards gradually down the 
"whole body. And whoever got safe through 
all its most dangerous stages, yet the extremi- 
ties of their bodies still retained the marks of 
its violence. For it shot down into their privy- 
members, into their fingers and toes, by losing 
which they escaped with life. Some there 
were who lost their eyes ; and some who, being 
quite recovered, had at once totally lost all me- 
mory, and quite forgot not only their most in- 
timate friends, but even their own selves. For 
as this distemper was in general virulent be- 
yond expression, and its every part more grie- 
vous than had yet fallen to the lot of human 
nature, so, in one particular instance, it appear- 
ed to be none of the natural infirmities of man, 
since the birds and beasts that prey on human 
flesh either never approached the dead bodies, 
of which many lay about uninterred ; or cer- 
tainly perished if they ever tasted. One 'proof 

» This passage is translated close to tlie letter of the 
original. It was intended by the author to show the ex- 
cessive malignancy of the plague, as the very flesh of the 
dead hodies was so fatally pestilential to carnivorous 
animals; — " Either they never tasted; or, if they tast- 
ed, died." One proof of this is presumptive, arising 
from the disappearance of all birds of prey. The second 
was certain, and an object of sensible observation. Eve- 
ry hody could sec that dogs, those familiar animals who 
live with and accompany men abroad, either never tast- 
ed; or, if hunger at anytime forced them to it, they 
certainly lost their lives. Lucretius literally translates 
the circumstance itself, but halh enlarged in the proofs, 
and intimates that the distemper raged amongst those 



of this is the total disappearance then of such 
birds, for not one was to be seen, either in any 
other place, or about any one of the carcases. 
But the dogs, because of their familiarity viith 
man, afforded a more notorious proof of this 
event. 

The nature of this pestilential disorder was 
in general — for I have purposely omitted its 
many varied appearances, or the circumstances 
particular to some of the infected in contradic- 
tion to others — such as hath been described. 
None of the common maladies incident to hu- 
man nature prevailed at that time ; or what- 
ever disorder any where appeared, it ended in 
this. Some died merely for want of care ; and 
some, with all the care that could possibly be 
taken ; nor was any one medicine discovered, 
from whence could be promised any certain re- 
lief, since that which gave ease to one was pre- 
judicial to another. Whatever difference there 
was in bodies, in point of strength or in point 
of weakness, it availed nothing ; all were 
equally swept away before it, in spite of regu- 
lar diet and studied prescriptions. Yet the most 
affecting circumstances of this calamity were 
— that dejection of mind, which constantly 
attended the first attack ; for the mind sink- 
ing at once into despair, they the sooner gave 
themselves up without a struggle — and that 
mutual tenderness, in taking care of one 
another, which communicated the infection, 
and made them drop Uke sheep.'^ This lat- 
ter case caused the mortality to be so great. 
For if fear withheld them from going near one 

animals, even without eating the flesh of the dead, and 
was general to every living species. 

Muliaque humi cum inhumata jacerent corpora supra 
Corporibus, lamen aliluum genus a'que feranim, 
Aut procul absiliebat, ut acrem exiret odoreni, 
Aul, ubi |:uslaral, languebat morte propinqua. 
Nee tamen oniniuo temere illit solibu* ulla 
Cnniparebat avis, nee nociibu' saecla feranim 
ExibanI sylvis : languebant pleraque mnrbo, 
E( moriebantur: cum primis fida canum vis 
Strata vijs auiniam pouebat in omnibus aegrani ; 
Exiorquebal enim vilam vis morbida membrii. 

a This passage is thus translated upon the authority 
of Dr. Mead, in his treatise on tke Plague, wliich con- 
vinced me that the comma should be omitted in the ori- 
ginal after in^ou, and 5«f»:riia,- be governed of »»». 
Lucretius has given it a different turn, as if the resem- 
blance to sheep was not in tlieir dying fast, but to the 
forlorn and solitary manner in which those creaturex 
die ; and he hnth put before it what follows a little af- 
ter in Thucydides. 

Nam quicunqae miot fufitalNint viiere ad ■es'^ 
Vitai nimium cupidi, mortitque timcatn, 
Feribaol paulo pod turpi morta n>aUqu« 
Devrtoa, opit rxpertn, incuria mactans, 
Laoigerat tanquam pecudca, et bucera iMcla. 



YEAR II.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



71 



another, they died for want of help, so that 
many houses became quite desolate for want of 
needful attendance ; and if they ventured, they 
were gone. This was most frequently the 
case of the kind and compassionate. Such per- 
sons were ashamed, out of a selfish concern for 
themselves, entirely to abandon their friends, 
when their menial servants, no longer able to 
endure the groans and lamentations of the 
dying, had been compelled to fly from such a 
weight of calamity. But those especially, who 
had safely gone through it, took pity on the dy- 
ing and the sick, because they knew by expe- 
rience what it really was, and were now secure 
in themselves ; for it never seized any one a 
second time so as to be mortal. Such were 
looked upon as quite happy by others, and 
were themselves at first overjoyed in their late 
escape, and the groundless hope that hereafter 
no distemper would prove fatal to them. Be- 
side this reigning calamity, the general removal 
from the country into the city was a heavy 
g^evance, more particularly to those who had 
been necessitated to come thither. For as 
they had no houses, but dwelled all the summer 
season in booths, where there was scarce room 
to breathe, the pestilence destroyed with the 
utmost disorder, so that they lay together in 
heaps, the dying upon the dead, and the dead 
upon the dying. Some were tumbling one 
over another in the public streets, or lay expir- 
ing round about every fountain, whither they 
had crept to assuage their immoderate thirst. 
The temples, in which they had erected tents 
for their reception, were full of the bodies of 
those who had expired there. For in a cala- 
mity so outrageously violent, and universal de- 
spair, things sacred and holy had quite lost 
their distinction. Nay, all regulations observed 
before in matters of sepulture were quite con- 
founded, since every one buried wherever he 
could find a place. Some, whose sepulchres 
were already filled by the numbers which had 
perished in their own families, were shamefully 
compelled to seize those of others. They sur- 
prised on a sudden the piles which others had 
built for their own friends, and burned their 
dead upon them ; and some, whilst one body 
was burning on a pile, tossed another body 
they had dragged thither upon it, and went 
their way. 

Thus did the pestilence give their first rise 
to those iniquitous acts which prevailed more 
and more in Athens. For every one was now 



more easily induced openly to do what for de- 
cency they did only covertly before. They 
saw the strange mutability of outward condi- 
tion, the rich untimely cut off, and their wealth 
pouring suddenly on the indigent and necessir 
tons ; so that they thought it prudent to catch 
hold of speedy enjoyments and quick gusts of 
pleasure ; persuaded that their bodies and their 
wealth might be their own merely for the day. 
Not any one continued resolute enough to form 
any honest or generous design, when so uncer- 
tain whether he should live to effect it. What- 
ever he knew could improve the pleasure or 
satisfaction of the present moment, that he de- 
termined to be honour and interest. Rever- 
ence of the gods or the laws of society laid no 
restraints upon them ; either judging that piety 
and impiety were things quite indifferent, since 
they saw that all men perished alike ; oi', 
throwing away every apprehension of being 
called to account for their enormities, since 
justice might be prevented by death ; or rather, 
as the heaviest of judgments to which man 
could be doomed, was already hanging over their 
heads, snatching this interval of life for pleasure, 
before it fell. 

With such a weight of calamity were the 
Athenians at this time on all sides oppressed. 
Their city was one scene of death, and the ad- 
jacent country of ruin and devastation. In 
this their affliction they called to mind, as was 
likely they should, the following prediction, 
which persons of the greatest age informed 
them had been formerly made : 

Two lieavy judi^ments will at once befall, 

A Doric war without, a plague witliin your wall. 

There had indeed been a dispute before, 
whether their ancestors in this prediction read 
x.ojAios a plague, or ^»/-«o; a famine. Yet in their 
present circumstances all with probability a- 
greed that \o</^5f a plague, was the right : for 
they adapted the interpretation to what they 
now suffered. — But in my sentiments, should 
they ever again be engaged in a Doric war, and 
a famine happen at the same time, they will have 
recourse with equal probability to the other 
interpretation. It was further remembered 
by those who knew of the orgcle given to the 
Lacedaemonians, that v^^hen they inquired of the 
god, " whether they should engage in this 
war," his answer was, that — << if they carried it 
on with all their strength, they should be victo- 
rious, and he himself would fight on their side ;" 
— and therefore they concluded that what now 



72 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book n. 



befell was the completion of the oracle. The 
pestilence broke out immediately upon the 
irruption of the Peloponnesians, and never ex- 
tended itself to Peloponnesus, a circumstance 
which ought to be related. It raged the most, 
and for the longest time, in Athens, but after- 
wards spread into the other towns, especially 
the most populous. And this is an exact ac- 
count of the plague. 

The Peloponnesians, after they had ravaged 
the inland parts, extended their devastatioils to 
those which are called The Coast, as far as 
Mount Laurium,' where the Athenians had sil- 
ver-mines. And here they first ravaged the 
part which looks towards Peloponnesus, and 
afterwards that which lies towards Euboea and 
Andros. But Pericles, who was then in the 
command, persisted in the same opinion as be- 
fore in the former incursion, that " the Athe- 
nians ought not to march out against them." 
Yet, whilst the enemy was up in the country, 
before they had advanced as far as the coast, 
he had equipped a fleet of a hundred ships to 
invade Peloponnesus: and when every thing 
was ready, he put to sea.^ On board these 
ships he had embarked four thousand heavy- 
armed Athenians ; and in vessels for transport- 
ing horse, now first fitted up for this service 
out of old ships, three hundred horsemen. The 
Chians and the Lesbians joined in the expedi- 
tion with fifty sail. At the very time this fleet 
went to sea from Athens, they left the Pelo- 
ponnesians on the coast of Attica. When they 

1 The silver-mineg at Laurium originally belonged to 
private persons, but were united to the public domain 
by Themistocles. A great number of slaves were cm- 
ployed in working them, and the produce paid amply 
for all the labour bestowed upon them. Wliether the 
state was much enriched by them, is a question ; the 
undertakers and proprietorsof the slavcswho wrought 
them drew great wealth from them, as we are told by 
Xenophon in his treatise of revenue. 

^ Plutarch relates in the life of Pericles, that on this 
occasion, when all was ready, " when the forces were 
shipped, and Pericles himself had just gotten on hoard 
liis trireme, the sun was eclipsed. It soon grew so dark, 
tjiat all men were astonished at so dreadful a prodigy. 
Pericles, seeing liis own pilot quite terrified and con- 
founded, threw a cloak over his face, and wrapping him 
up in it, asked. Whether he saw any thing dreadful or 
any thing that portended danger? The pilot answering 
in the negative, What dirterenre then (he went on) 
between this affair and that, unless that what hath 
darkened the sun is bigger than a cloak? Pericles had 
easily learned of his preceptor Anaxagoras how to ac- 
count for eclipses. Hut whether Plutarch hath placed 
this incident in ri^'ht time, is a question : for Thucydi- 
des, who is exact in these things, mentiond no eclipse 
of the nun this summer. 



were arrived before Epidaurus, a city of Pelo- 
ponnesus, they ravaged great part of the coun- 
try about it, and making an assault on the city 
itself, had some hopes of taking it, but did not 
succeed. Leaving Epidaurus. they ravaged the 
country about Trcexene, Halias, and Hermione; 
alt these places are situated on the sea-coast 
of Peloponnesus. But sailing hence, they 
came before Prasia;, a fort of Laconia, .situated 
upon the sea, around which they laid the coun- 
try waste ; and having taken the fort by assault, 
demolished it. After these performances they 
returned home, and found the Peloponnesians 
no longer in Attica, but retired within then- 
own dominions. 

The whole space of time that the Pelopon- 
nesians were upon the lands of the Athenians, 
and the Athenians employed in their sea ex- 
pedition, the plague was making havoc both in 
the troops of the Athenians, and within the 
city. This occasioned a report that the Pelo- 
ponnesians, for fear of the infection, as having 
been informed by deserters that it raged in the 
city, and been witnesses themselves of their 
frequent interments, retired out of their terri- 
tory with some precipitation. Yet they per- 
severed in this incursion longer than they had 
ever done before, and had made the \7h0le 
country one continued devastation ; for the 
time of their continuance in Attica was about 
forty days. 

The same summer, Agnon the son of Ni- 
cias, and Cleopompus the son of Clinius, joined 
in the command with Pericles, setting them- 
selves at the head of the force which he had 
employed before, carried them without loss of 
time against the Chalcideans of Thrace. But 
when they were come up to Potidaea, which 
was still besieged, they played their engines of 
battery against, and left no method unattempted 
to take it. But the success in this attempt did 
not answer expectation, nor indeed was the 
event in any respect the least proportioned to 
their great preparations ; for the plague follow- 
ed them even hither, and making grievous 
havoc among the Athenians, destroyed the 
army ; so that even those soldiers that had 
been there before, and had from the beginning 
of the siege been in perfect health, caught the 
infection from the troops brought thither by 
Agnon. — Phormio, and the body of sixteen 
hundred men under his command, had be- 
fore this quitted Chalcidice, so that Agnon 
sailed back with the ships to Athens, of his 



YEAR II.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



73 



four thousand men the plague having swept 
away one thousand and fifty in about forty days : 
but the soldiers who were there before were left 
to carry on the siege of Potidaea. 

After the second incursion of the Pelopon- 
nesians, the Athenians whose lands were now 
a second time laid waste, who felt the double 
affliction of pestilence and war, had entirely 
changed their sentiments of things. The blame 
was universally thrown on Pericles, as if at his 
instigation they had engaged in this war, and 
by him had been plunged in all these calamities. 
They desired with impatience to make up the 
breach with the Lacedaemonians ; but though 
they despatched an embassy for this purpose, 
no terms could be agreed on. Thus grievously 
distressed, and no method of resource occurring 
to their minds, their resentments fell still hea- 
vier on Pericles. He, seeing them quite dispi- 
rited with their present misfortunes, and intent 
on such projects as he had reason to expect 
they would, called a general assembly of the 
people, which, by continuing in the command 
of the army, he was authorized to do. He had 
a mind to encourage them, to soothe the hot re- 
sentments fermenting in their breasts, and bring 
them into a more calm and confident temper. 
He presented himself before them, and spoke as 
follows : — 

" I fully expected, I freely own it, to become 
the object of your resentments. I am not ig- 
norant of the causes of it ; and for this purpose 
have convened this assembly, to expostulate 
with, nay, even to reprimand you, if without 
any reason you make me the mark of your dis- 
pleasure, or cowardly sink under the weight of 
your misfortunes: for it is my firm opinion, 
that by the full health and vigour ot' a state the 
happiness of its constituents is better secured, 
than when each separate member is thriving 
whilst the public welfare totters. Be the situ- 
ation of any private person prosperous and fine 
as his heart can wish — if his country be ruined, 
he himself must necessarily be involved in that 
min. But he that is unfortunate in a flourish- 
ing community, may soon catch hold of expe- 
dients of redress. When therefore your coun- 
try is able to support the misfortunes of its 
every member, and yet each of those members 
must needs be enveloped in the ruin of his 
country, why will you not join and unite your 
efforts to prevent that ruin — and not (as you 
are now going to do, because confounded with 
your domestic misfortunes) basely desert the 
17 



public safety, and cast the most unjust censures 
upon me who advised this war, upon your own- 
selves also who approved this advice 1 What 
— I am the man that must singly stand the 
storm of your anger ! — I am indeed the man 
who I am confident is not inferior to any one 
amongst you in knowing what ought to be 
known, and in speaking what ought to be spoke, 
who sincerely loves his country, and is superior 
to all the sordid views of interest. For he 
who thinks aright, and yet cannot communicate 
his own thoughts, is just as insignificant as if 
he could not think at all. He that enjoys both 
these faculties in perfection, and yet is an ene- 
my to his country, will in like manner never 
say any thing for his country's good : or, though 
he love his country, and be not proof against 
corruption, he may prostitute every thing to 
his own avarice. If therefore you judged my 
qualifications in all these respects to be in some 
moderate degree superior to those of other 
men, and were thus drawn into a war by my 
advice, there can certainly be no reason why I 
should be accused of having done you wrong. 
Those indeed v/ho are already in the fast pos- 
session of all the ends attainable by war, must 
make a foolish choice if they run to arms : but, 
if once under a necessity, either through tame 
submission to be enslaved by a neighbour power, 
or by a brave resistance to get the mastery over 
them — he who flies danger in such a case, is 
much more worthy of reproach than he who 
meets it with bold defiance. 

" I indeed am the man I was, and of the 
mind I was. It is you whose resolutions have 
wavered ; — you who, whilst unhurt, through 
my persuasion resolved on war, and repent so 
soon as you feel its strokes — who measure the 
soundness of my advice by the weakness of 
your own judgments, and therefore condemn 
it, because the present disasters have so entirely 
engaged the whole of your attention, that you 
have none left to perceive the high importance 
of it to the public. Cruel indeed is that 
reverse of fortune which hath so suddenly 
afliicted you, dejecting your minds and dis- 
piriting your former resolutions! Accidents 
sudden and unforeseen, and so opposite to that 
event you might reasonably have expected, en- 
slave the mind ; — which hath been your case 
in all the late contingencies, and more parti- 
cularly so in this grievous pestilence. Yet 
men who are the constituents of such a mighty 
state, and whose manners have been by educa- 



74 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book II. 



» Pericles here is aliout to convinre tlie Athenians, 
that they may rise to supreme (ioniinion in consequence 
of tlieir naval superiority. It was Ills amliilion to ex- 
ecute the prand extensive plan whicli was formed ori- 
ginally by Themistocios. And tlie words, in which he 
introduceth this topic, are so full of energy, that they 
bear hard upon a translator. He calls it a point — 
Ki/iTT-jiStTTipxv txovTt Tito jrp2o-T»))(r«i'. My first attempts 
at them were very faint and imperfect, I was soon 
convinced of it by the greatest Genius of the aije, who 
did me the honour to read over this speech in manu- 
Bcript, and wlio as he thinks and speaks like Pericles, 
could not endure that any of his words should be depre- 
ciated. I hope now I have expressed all the ideas which 
the original words include. Mr llobbcs hath entirely 
dropped them in his translation. 



tion formed for its support, ought never to want \ 
that inward fortitude which can stem the great- ; 
est of afflictions, nor by self-desertion utterly ; 
to efiace their native dignity. The world will 
always have equal reason to condemn the person 
who sinks from a height of glory by his own 
pusillanimity, and to hate the person who im- 
pudently pretends to what he never can deserve. 
It must be therefore your duty to suppress this 
too keen a sensibility of your own private losses, 
and with united fortitude to act in the defence 
of the public safety. Let us therefore bravely 
undergo the toils of this war ; and if the toil in- 
creascth, let our resolution increase with it. And 
let these, added to all those other proofs of my 
integrity I have exhibited on other occasions, 
suffice to convince you that your present censures 
and suspicions of me are rash and groundless. 

" I shall now lay before you a point, which, 
so far as I can judge, you have as yet never 
properly considered, nor have I in any former 
discourse insisted upon — ' the means within 
your reach of rising to supreme dominion. 
Nor should I meddle even now with a^ point, 
pompous beyond poetic visions, did I not see 
you beyond measure fearful and dejected. You 
think you are only masters of your own depen- 
dents ; but I loudly aver that you are greater 
masters now both at land and sea, those ne- 
cessary spheres for carrying on the services of 
life, than any other power ; and may be greater 
yet, if so inclined. There is not now a king, 
there is not any nation in the universal world, 
able to withstand that navy, which at this junc- 
ture you can launch out to sea. Why is not 
this extensive power regarded in balancing the 
loss of your houses and lands, those intolerable 
damages which you think you have suffered 1 
— It is not so reasonable to grieve and despond 
under such petty losses, as to despise from the 
thought, that they are merely the trappings and 



embellishments of wealth ; to fix the firm re» 
membrance within us, that liberty, in defence 
of which we are ready to hazard our all, will 
easily give us those trifles again ; and that by 
tamely submitting to our enemies, the posses- 
sion of all we have will be taken from us. We 
ought not in either of these respects to degen- 
erate from our fathers. By toil, and toil alone, 
they gained these valuable acquisitions, de- 
fended themselves in the possession, and be- 
queathed the precious inheritance to us. And 
to lose the advantages we have possessed, will 
be much more disgraceful than to have miscar- 
ried in their pursuit. But we ought to en- 
counter our enemies not with valour only, but 
with confidence of success. Valour starts up 
even in a coward, if he once prevails through 
lucky ignorance ; but such a confidence must 
be in every mind, which is seriously convinced 
of its own superiority, as is now our case. Nay, 
even when the match is equal, the certainty of 
what must be done arising from an inward 
bravery, adds the greater security to courage. 
Confidence then is not built on hope which 
acts only in uncertainty, but on the sedate de- 
termination of what it is able to perform, an 
assurance of which is more guarded against 
disappointments. 

" It is further your duty to support the pub- 
lic character (as in it to a man you pride your- 
selves) with which its extensive rule invests 
our community, and either not to fly from toils 
or never to aim at glory. Think not you have 
only one point at stake, the alternative of 
slavery instead of freedom ; but think also of 
the utter loss of sovereignty, and the danger of 
vengeance for all the offences you have given 
in the practice of it. To resign it, is not in 
your power, — and of this let him be assured, 
who refines through fear, and hopes to earn 
indemnity by exerting it no longer. In your 
hands it hath run out into a kind of tyranny. 
To take it up seems indeed unjust, but to lay 
it down is exceeding dangerous. And if such 
dastardly souls could persuade others, they 
would soon bring this state to utter ruin, or 
indeed any other, where they were members, 
and enjoyed the chief administration of affairs. 
For the imdisturbed and quiet lite will be of 
short continuance without the interposition of 
a vigilant activity. Slavery is never to be en- 
dured by a state that once hath governed — such 
a situation can be tolerable only to that which 
hath ever been dependent. 



YEAR II.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



75 



" Suffer not yourselves therefore to be se- 
duced by men of such mean and grovelHng 
tempers, nor level your resentments at me-^ 
since, though I advised the war, it was not be- 
gun without your approbation — if the enemy 
hath invaded you in such a manner as you 
could not but expect fronj your own resolutions 
never to be dependent. What though beyond 
our apprehensions we have suffered the sad 
visitation of pestilence? — Such misfortunes no 
human foresight will be able to prevent — though 
I know that even this hath in some measure 
served to sharpen your aversion to me. But 
if this be just, I claim as my lawful right the 
glory of all those happy contingencies, which 
may ever befall you beyond your expectation. 
The evils inflicted by heaven must be borne 
with patient resignation ; and the evils by ene- 
mies with manly fortitude. Such rational be- 
haviour hath hitherto been habitual in Athens ; 
let it now be reversed by you ; — by you, who 
know to what a pitch of excellence the state 
hath rose in the esteem of the world, by not 
yielding to adversity ; but, by braving all the 
horrors of war, and pouring forth its blood in 
the glorious cause, hath reached the highest 
summit of power, and ever since retained it. 
The memory of this, time itself will never be 
able to efface, even though we may suffer it to 
droop and perish in our hands — as what is hu- 
man must decline — Our memory I say, who, 
though Grecians ourselves, gave laws to all 
other Grecians, stood the shock of most formi- 
dable wars, resisted them all when combined 
against us, conquered them all when separately 
engaged, and maintained ourselves in possession 
of the most flourishing and most powerful state 
in the world. These things let the indolent 
and sluggish soul condemn, but these let the 
active and industrious strive to emulate, for 
these they who cannot attain will envy. 

« To be censured and maligned for a time, 
hath been the fate of all those whose merit 
hath raised them above the common level ; — 
but wise and judicious is the man who, enjoying 
the superiority, despiseth the envy. An aver- 
sion so conceived will never last. His merit 
soon breaks forth in all its splendour, and his 
glory is afterwards handed down to posterity, 
never to be forgot. You, who have so clear a 
prospect before you, both of what will be some 
time glorious, and of what at present is not 
disgraceful, recollect your own worth and secure 
both. Sink not so low as to petition terms 



from the Lacedaemonians ; nor let them ima- 
gine that you feel the weight of your present 
misfortunes. The man whose resolution never 
sinks before it, but strives by a brave opposi- 
tion to repel calamity, such — whether in a 
public or private capacity — must be acknow- 
ledged to be the worthiest man." 

By arguments like these did Pericles en- 
deavour to mollify the resentments of the 
Athenians against himself, and to divert their 
minds from their public calamities. In regard 
to the public, they seemed to be satisfied with 
all that he had urged ; they desisted from soli- 
citing an accommodation with the Lacedaemoni- 
ans ; and were more hearty than ever for con- 
tinuing the war. Yet, in their own private 
concerns, they were grievously dejected under 
their present misfortunes. The poor citizens 
who had but little, could not bear with patience 
the loss of that little. The rich and the great 
regretted the loss of their estates, with their 
country-seats and splendid furniture ; — but 
worst of all, that instead of peace they had the 
sad alternative of war. However, neither poor 
nor rich abated their displeasure to Pericles, 
till they had laid upon him a pecuniary fine.^ 
And yet, no long time after — so unsteady are 
the humours of the people — they elected him 
general again, and intrusted him with the ad- 
ministration of affairs. The keen sense they 
had at first of their own private losses soon 
grew blunt and unaffecting, and they could not 
but allow him the most capable person to pro- 
vide for all the urgent necessities of the pub- 
lic. For the supreme authority he enjoyed in 
times of peace he had exercised with great mo- 
deration ; he was vigilant and active for the 
good of the community, which never made so 
great a figure as under his administration ; and 
after the war broke out it is plain he best knew 
the reach of its ability to carry it on. He 
lived two years and six months from its com- 
mencement : and after his death,^ his judicious 



1 Plutarch (in the life of Pericles) says, Authors are 
not agreed about the quantity of the fine at this time 
laid upon Pericles. Some lower it to fifteen talents, 
others mount it up to fifty. The demagogue, who in- 
cited the people to fine him, is also said by some to have 
been Cleon, with whose genius and character the rea- 
der will soon become acquainted. 

2 As the historian is here going to take his leave of 
Perirles. he adjoins a true representation of his patriot- 
ic spirit, his great abilities, his judicious foresiuht, and 
successful administration. And here, the reader may be 
informed of some points, which Thucydides either 



70 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book n. 



foresight in regard to this war was more and 
more acknowledged. For he had assured them 
they could not fail of success, provided they 
would not meddle by land, but apply themselves 
solely to their navy, without being solicitous 
to enlarge their territories in this war, or ex- 
posing Athens itself to danger. But they had 
recourse to schemes quit opposite to these, nay 
even to some that had no connection at all with 
this war, wherein private ambition or private 
interest pushed them to such management as 
was highly prejudicial to themselves and their 

thoupjlu needless when he wrote, or foreign to his sub- 
ject. — PericleR had two sons by his former wife. The 
eldest of them proved a great vexation to his father, 
who was unable to support him in his expensive way of 
living. Pericles had no hirge estate, and he was not 
richer for fingering the public money. He laid it all 
out in adorning his Athens, and was rewarded for it by 
giving so many magnificent and lasting proofs of his 
fine taste in painting, sculpture, and building. For the 
city of Rome received not so much decoration from her 
foundation till the time of the Caesars, as Athens did 
from Pericles alone. Yet economy was his passion at 
home, as that of his son Xantippus was luxury. This 
son however was taken off by the plague, as was after- 
wards a sister of Pericles, most of his intimates and 
relations, and his other son Paralus. This last was the 
heaviest blow; he felt it deeply: and all Athens did all 
that lay in their power to comfort him, since, contrary 
to a law of Pericles' own making, they enrolled his son 
Pericles, whom he had by Aspasia, an Athenian of the 
full blood. At length he was seized himself by the 
plague; and, after languishing a long time, in a manner 
different to most others, died of it. In his last moments 
he showed to a friend who was visiting him a charm 
which the women had hung about his neck, as if he 
was sick indeed when he could submit to such foolery. 
When several of them were sitting round his bed, and, 
thinking he did not hear them, were enumerating the 
great exploits of his life, the shining incidents of his 
administration, his victories, and the nine trophies he 
had erected, he interrupted them with these words, " I 
wonder you lay stress upon such actions, in which for- 
tune claims a share along with me, and which many 
others have performed as well as myself, and yet pass 
over the highest glory and most valuable part of my 
character, that no citizen of Athens ever put on mourn- 
ing through me." The wonderful man, though engaged 
for forty years in business, and constantly attacked by 
every furious, seditions, and turbulent Athenian, had 
never amidst all his power given way to the spirit of 
revenge. For th's, as Plutarch finely observes, he in 
some measure deserved the lofty title of Ol'impian, too 
arrogant in any other liirht for man to wear; since 
gentleness of manners and thehabitsof mercy and for- 
giveness raise men to the nearest resemblance of the 
gods. Plutarch adds, that the Athenians never regretted 
any man so much, and with so much reason — If the 
reader be willing to hear any more of Aspiisia, the 
name writer tells us that nfter the death of Pericles, 
iihe married one Lysicles. a low and obscure man, and 
a dealer in cattle, whom liowevershc improved into an 
Athenian of the first class. 



allies. Wherever these politic schemes suc- 
ceeded, private persons carried off all the ho- 
nour and advantage; — whenever they miscarried, 
th.' hardships of the war fell more severely on 
the state. The reason was this — Pericles, a 
man of acknowledged worth and ability, and 
whose integrity was undoubtedly proof against 
corruption, kept the people in order by a gentle 
management, and was not so much directed by 
them as their principal director. He had not 
worked himself into power by indirect methods, 
and therefore was not obliged to soothe and 
honour their caprices, but could contradict and 
disregard their anger with peculiar dignity. 
Whenever he saw them bent on projects inju- 
rious or unreasonable, , he terrified them so by 
the force of his eloquence, that he made them 
tremble and desist ; and when they were dis- 
quieted by groundless apprehensions, he ani- 
mated them afresh into brave resolution. The 
state under him, though styled a democracy, 
was in fact a monarchy. His successors more 
on a level with one another, and yet every one 
affecting to be chief, were forced to cajole the 
people, and so to neglect the concerns of the 
public. This was the source of many grievous 
errors, as must unavoidably be the case in a 
great community and possessed of large do- 
minion ; — but in particular of the expedition to 
Sicily ; the ill conduct of which did not appear 
so flagrantly in relation to those against whom 
it was undertaken, as to the authors and 
movers of it, who knew not how to make the 
proper provision for those who were employed 
in it. For, engaged in their own private con- 
tests for power with the people, they had not 
sufficient attention to the army abroad, and at 
home were embroiled in mutual altercations. 
Yet, notwithstanding the miscarriage in Sicily, 
in which they lost their army with the greater 
part of their fleet, and the sedition which in- 
stantly broke out in Athens, they bravely re- 
sisted for three years together, not only their 
first enemies in the war, but the Sicilians also 
in conjunction with them, the greater part of 
their dependents revolted from them, and at 
length Cyrus the king's son, who, favourinjj 
the Peloponnesians, supplied them with money 
for the service of their fleet ; — nor would at 
last be conquered, till by their own intestine 
feuds they were utterly disabled from resisting 
longer. So much better than any other person 
was Pericles acquainted with their strength, 
when he marked out such a conduct to them as 



YEAR II.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



77 



would infallibly have enabled the Athenian 
state to have continued the war longer than the 
Peloponnesians could possibly have done. 

The Lacedaemonians, in junction with their 
allies, the same summer fitted out a fleet of 
one hundred ships against the island Zacynthus 
which lies over against Elis. They are a co- 
lony of the Achaeans of Peloponnesus, and 
were then in league with the Athenians. On 
board this fleet were a thousand heavy- armed 
Lacedaemonians : and Cnemus the Spartan 
commanded in the expedition. Making a de- 
scent upon the island, they ravaged great part 
of the country, — but finding the entire reduc- 
tion of it impracticable, they re-embarked and 
returned home. 

In the close of the same summer, Aristeus 
the Corinthian, Aneristus, Nicolaus, Protode- 
mus, and Timagoras of Tegea, ambassadors 
from the Lacedaemonians, and Polls the Argive, 
without any public character, travelling into 
Asia, to engage the Persian king to supply them 
with men and money for carrying on the war, on 
their journey stop first in Thrace and address 
themselves to Sitalces the son of Teris. They 
had a mind to try if they could prevail upon 
him to quit the Athenian alliance, to march to 
the relief of Potidaea, now besieged by the 
Athenians, to desist for the future from giving 
the latter any assistance, and to obtain from 
him a safe-conduct through his territory for 
the continuance of their journey beyond the 
Hellespont to Pharnaces son of Pharnabazus, 
who would afterwards conduct them in safety 
to the royal court. Learchus the son of Calli- 
machus, and Ameiniades the son of Philemon, 
happening at that time to be with Sitalces, on 
an embassy from Athens, persuade the son of 
Sitalces, who had been made a citizen of 
Athens, to seize and deliver them up to them, 
that they might not go forward to the king, to 
the prejudice of that community of which he 
was a member. He, hearkening to their advice, 
arrests them just as they were going on ship- 
board to cross the Hellespont, after they had 
travelled through Thrace to the spot marked 
for their embarkation. He executed this by 
means of some trusty persons despatched pur- 
posely after them along with Learchus and 
Ameiniades, and expressly ordered to deliver 
them up to the latter : they, so soon as they 
had got them in their power, carried them to 
Athens. Upon their arrival there, the Atheni- 
nians standing in great fear of Aristeus, lest 



upon escape he might do them further mischief, 
since before this he had been the author of all 
the projects to their prejudice both at Potidaea 
and in Thrace, put them to death on the very 
day of their arrival, unjudged and suing in vain 
to be heard, and cast them into pits. This 
cruel usage of them they justified from the ex- 
ample of the Lacedaemonians, who had in the 
same manner put to death and cast into pits 
the Athenian merchants and those of their 
allies, whom they had seized in the trading 
vessels upon the coasts of Peloponnesus. For, 
in the beginning of the war, the Laccdiemonians 
had put to death as enemies all those whom 
they could take at sea — not those only who 
belonged to the states in alliance with the 
Athenians, but even such as were of the yet 
neutral communities. 

About the same time in the end of summer, 
the Ambraciots in conjunction with many of 
the Barbarians, whom they had excited to take 
up arms, invaded Argos of Amphilochia, and 
made excursions over all its dependent terri- 
tory. Their enmity against the Argives took 
its original from hence. — This Argos was first 
built, and this province of Amphilochia first 
planted, by Amphilochus the son of Amphi- 
araus, immediately after the Trojan war, who 
on his return home, being dissatisfied with the 
state of affairs in that other Argos, founded 
this city in the gulf of Ambracia, and gave it 
the same name with the place of his nativity. 
It soon became the largest city of Amphilochia, 
and the inhabitants were most powerful of any 
thereabouts. Yet many generations after, 
being sunk by misfortunes, they prevailed upon 
the Ambraciots bordering upon Amphilochia 
to unite with them. This community of resi- 
dence brought them to their present use of one 
common language, the Greek ; but the rest of 
the Amphilochians are still Barbarians. Yet 
in process of time, the Ambraciots dri^e the 
Argives from amongst them, and keep posses- 
sion of the city for themselves. Upon this 
event the Amphilochians threw themselves 
under the protection of the Acarnanians, and 
both together implored the succour of the 
Athenians, who sent thirty ships to their as- 
sistance under the command of Phormio. 
Upon Phormio's arrival they take Argos by 
storm, made all the Ambraciots slaves, and 
then both the Amphilochians and Acarnanians 
settle themselves together in the city. To 
these incidents was first owing the le«gue 
M 



78 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book II. 



offensive and defensive betv^reen the Athenians ' 
and Acarnanians. The chief cause of the [ 
inveteracy which the Ambraciots bore to the I 
Argives, was their having made them in this 
manner slaves ; and which afterwards impelled 
them in the confusion of this war, to form this 
invasion with the junction of the Chaonians and 
some other neighbouring Barbarians. Advanc- 
ing up to Argos, they were entire masters of 
the whole territory, but in vain endeavoured to 
take the town by assault ; upon which they 
again returned home, and dispersed to their re- 
spective nations. — Such were the transactions 
of the summer. 

On the first approach of winter, the Atheni- 
ans sent out twenty ships to cruize on the 
coasts of Peloponnesus, under the command of 
Phormio ; who, fixing his station before Nau- 
pactus, kept so strict a guard, that nothing 
durst pass in or out from Corinth and the 
gulf of Crissa. — Six other ships they send to 
Caria and Lycia, under the command of Mele- 
sander, to levy contributions there, and to stop 
the excursions of the Peloponnesian privateers, 
harbouring in those parts, from molesting the 
course of their trading vessels from Phacelis, 
Phoenicia, and the adjacent continent. Mele- 
sander, with the Athenian and confederate 
force he had on board his ships, landed in 
Lycia, and was defeated in the first battle, in 
which he lost part of his army and his own life. 

The same winter the Potidseans, as they 
were no longer able to hold out the siege ; and 
as besides, the irruptions of the Peloponnesians 
into Attica had not induced the Athenians to 
raise it ; their provisions being quite spent ; 
and amongst other calamities to which their 
extremities had reduced them, having been 
forced to feed upon one another ; they held a 
parley about their surrender with the Athenian 
ofiicers, who commanded in the siege,' Xeno- 



» III this siege of Potidsa, two persone served ninon<,'st 
the heavy-armed as private soldiers, one of whom was 
tlie glory of liuman nature; nnd the other the glory and 
hane of iiis country: [ mean the divine Porratfs. and at 
tliis time young Alriliiadcs. Plutarch (in the life of Al- 
ciliiades) says, they Iny in the same tent, and fought 
alway.s side hy side. Once, in a sharp skirmisii, hotli of 
themdistiniuislicd themselves above all their fellow-sol- 
diers. Alcihiades at length was wounded, anddro|)ped; 
Socrates stood over and defended him, and saved hotli 
him and his arms from the enemy. Rocrates therefore 
had the justest right to the public reward, ns the per- 
son who had liehaved l>est in this anion. Hut when the 
generals, on account of Alcihiades' quality, allowed a 
great desire to confer honour upon him, Pocrates, ^vlll- 
ing also to inc-caec his ardour for gallant actions, turned 



phon the son of Euripides, Hestiodorus the 
son of Aristoclidcs, and Phanomachus the son 
of Callimachus. They, sensible of the hard- 
ships their troops suffered by long lying abroad 
in the winter season, and that the carrj'ing on 
of the siege had already cost Athens two thou- 
sand talents,^ granted them a composition. 
The terms agreed on were these — " That 
they should quit the place with their wives, 
their children, and auxiliaries, every man with 
one suit of clothing, but the women with two ; 
and with a certain sum of money to defray the 
expense of their departure." — By virtue of 
this composition they went away to Chalcis, 
where every one shifted for himself. But the 
Athenians called their generals to account for 
their conduct, because they had signed this 
composition without their privity (for they 
thought it in their power to have made them 
surrender at discretion,) and afterwards sent to 
Potidaea some of their people whom they set- 
tled in a colony there. — These things were done 
this winter, and so ended the second year of 
this war, the history of which hath been com- 
piled by Thucydides. 

TEAH III.' 

Early tlie next summer, the Peloponnesi- 
ans and their allies, omitting the incursion as 
before into Attica, marched their forces against 
Plataea. Archidamus, son of Zcuxidamus king 
of the Lacedaemonians, commanded, who hav- 
ing encamped his army, was preparing to ravage 
the adjacent country. He was interrupted by 
an embassy from the Platfeans, who addressed 
themselves to him in the following manner. — 

" The war, Archidamus and Lacedsemoni- 
ans, you are now levying on Platsea, is a fla- 
grant breach of common justice, a blemish on 
your honour and that of your fathers. Pau- 
sanias the Laccda-monian, son of Clcombrotus, 
when — aided by those Grecians, who cheerfully 
exposed themselves with him to the dangers of 
that battle which was fought on our land — he 
had delivered Greece from Persian slavery, at 

witness in his favour, and procured him the wreath and 
the public present of a complete suit of armour. So- 
crates coveted no recomi)ense for brave exploits hut the 
consciousness of having performed then, and young 
Alcibiades was to he nursed up to virtue. He was 
capable of every degree either of virtue or vice; and 
Socrates always endeavoured to encourage him in the 
former, and gave his eager and enterprising soul the 
just direction. 

« jCUP", SOOstcrllnir, 

a Before Christ, 429. 



YEAR III.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



79 



a public sacrifice to Jupiter the deliverer, ' 
solemnized by him on that occasion in the 
public forum of Plataea, called all the confede- 
rates together, and there conferred these 
privileges on the Plataeans — ' That they should 
have free possession of the city and territory 
belonging to it, to be governed at their own 
discretion; — that no one should ever unjustly 
make war upon them, or endeavour to enslave 
them ; and in case of such attempts, all the 
confederates then present should avenge it to 
the utmost of their power.' — Such grateful re- 
turns did your fathers make us in recompense 
of our valour and the zeal we excited in the 
common dangers. Yet their generosity you 
are now reversing — you, with the Thebans our 
inveterate foes, are come hither to enslave us. 
But by the gods, who w-ere then witnesses to 
the oath they swore, by all the tutelary deities 
both of your own and of our community, we 
adjure you to do no damage to Plataean ground, 
nor to violate your oaths, but to retire and 
leave us in that state of independence which 
Pausanias justly established for us." — To these 
words of the Platseans, Archidamus made this 
reply : 

*' What you have urged, ye men of Platsea, is 
just and reasonable, if it be found agreeable to 
your actions. Let the declarations of Pau- 
sanias be observed ; be free and independent 
yourselves, and at the same time vindicate their 
own freedom to others, to those who, after 
participation of the same common dangers, 
made that oath in your favour, and yet are now 
enslaved by the Athenians. To rescue them 
and others from that slavery have our prepara- 
tions been made, this war hath been undertaken. 
You who know what liberty is, and are such 
advocates for it, do you abide firmly by your 
oaths ; at least, as we heretofore advised you, 
keep at quiet, enjoying only what is properly 
your own ; side with neither party ; receive 
both in the way of friendship, in the way of 
enmity, neither. To a conduct Uke this we 
never shall object." 

When the Plataean ambassadors had heard 
this reply of Archidamus, they returned into the 
city, and communicating what had passed to the 
body of the citizens, they carried back in an- 
swer to him — " That they could not possibly 
comply with his proposals, without the consent 
of the Athenians, because their wives and 
children were in their power — that they were 
apprehensive a compliance might endanger 



their whole community, since in such a caso 
either the Athenians might not confirm the 
neutrality, or the Thebans, who were compre- 
hended in the same neutral oath to the two 
principal powers, might again attempt to seize 
their city." — Archidamus to remove their ap- 
prehensions spoke as follows : " Deliver up your 
city and your houses to us Lacedaemonians ; 
let us know the bounds of your territory and 
the exact number of your trees, and make as 
true a calculation as you possibly can of all that 
belongs to you. Depart yourselves, and reside 
wherever you please, so long as the war conti- 
nues ; at the end of it we will restore every thing 
again. In the mean time, we will make the 
best use of every thing intrusted to us, and pay 
you an annual equivalent for your subsistence." 
Upon hearing tliis, they again returned into the 
city, and the whole body of the people assisting 
at a general consultation, they returned for an- 
swer — " That they desired only to communi- 
cate the proposals to the Athenians, and then 
with their approbation would accept them. In 
the meantime they begged a suspension of 
arms, and to have their lands spared from de- 
predation." He granted them a truce for the 
time requisite to receive an answer, and forbore 
ravaging the country. 

The ambassadors of Plataea, having been at 
Athens, and consulted with the Athenians, re- 
turn again with this answer to their city ; " The 
Athenians say that in no preceding time, ever 
since we entered into confederacy with them, 
did they ever suffer us in any respect to be in- 
jured ; that neither will they neglect us now, 
but send us a powerful aid. And you they 
solemnly abjure by the oaths which your fathers 
have sworn, to admit no change or innovation 
in the league subsisting between you and 
them." — When the ambassadors had thus de- 
livered the answer of the Athenians, after 
some consultation, the Plataeans resolved, " ne- 
ver to desert them, to bear any devastation of 
their lands, nay, if such be the case, to behold 
it with patience, and to suffer any extremities to 
which their enemies might reduce them ; — that, 
further, no person should stir out of the city, 
but an answer be given from the walls — That 
it was impossible for them to accept the terms 
proposed by the Lacedaemonians." 

This was no sooner heard than Archidamus 
the king made this solemn appeal to all their 
tutelary heroes and gods. — "Ye gods and 
heroes," said he, « who protect this region of 



80 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book n. 



PlatJEa, bear witness to us, that it was not till 
after a violation of oaths already sworn, that 
we have marched into this country, where our 
fathers through the blessings you sent down 
upon their prayers overcame the Medes, and 
which you then made that fortunate field 
whereon the arms of Greece were crowned 
with victory — and that whatever we shall here 
undertake, our every step shall be agreeable to 
justice. We have offered many honourable 
conditions to them, which are all rejected. 
Grant therefore our supplications, that the 
first transgressors of justice may receive their 
punishment, and that those who fight with 
equity may obtain revenge." After this solemn 
address to the gods, he roused up his army into 
action. 

He first of all formed an inclosure round 
about them with the trees they had felled, so 
that no one could get out of the city. In the 
next place, they raised a mount of earth before 
the place, hoping that it could not long hold 
out a siege against the efforts of so large an 
army. Having felled a quantity of timber on 
mount Cithaeron, with it they framed the mount 
on either side, that thus cased it might perform 
the service of a wall, and that the earth might 
be kept from mouldering away too fast. Upon 
it they heaped a quantity of matter, both stones 
and earth, and whatever else would cement to- 
gether and increase the bulk. This work em- 
ployed them for seventy days and nights with- 
out intermission, all being alternately employed 
in it, so that one part of the army was carrying 
it on, while the other took the necessary re- 
freshments of food and sleep. Those Lace- 
daemonians who had the command over the 
hired troops of the other states, had the care 
of the work, and obliged them all to assist in 
carrying it on. The Plataeans, seeing this 
mount raised to a great height, built a counter- 
work of wood, close to that part of the city- 
wall against which this mount of earth was 
thrown up, and strengthened the inside of it 
with bricks, which they got for this use by 
pulling down the adjacent houses. The wooden 
case was designed to keep it firm together, and 
prevent the whole pile from being weakened 
by its height. They farther covered it over 
with sheep-skins and hides of beasts, to de- 
fend the workmen from missive weapons, and 
to preserve the wood from being fired by the 
enemy. This work within was raised to a 
great height, and the mount was raised with 



equal expedition without. Upon this, the 
Plataeans had recourse to another device. 
They broke a hole through the wall, close to 
which the mount was raised, and drew the 
earth away from under it into the city. But 
this being discovered by the Peloponnesians, 
they threw into the hole hurdles made of reeds 
and stuffed with clay, which being of a firm 
consistence could not be dug away like earth. 
By this they were excluded, and so desisted 
for a while from their former practice. Yet 
digging a subterraneous passage from out of 
the city, which they so luckily continued that 
it undermined the mount, they again withdrew 
the earth from under it. This practice long 
escaped the discovery of the besiegers, who 
still heaping on matter, yet the work grew rather 
less, as the earth was drawn away from the 
j bottom, and that above fell in to fill up the void. 
However, still apprehensive, that as they were 
few in number, they should not be able long to 
hold out against such numerous besiegers, they 
had recourse to another project. They desisted 
from carrying on the great pile which was to 
counterwork the mount, and beginning at each 
end of it where the wall was low, they run 
another wall in the form of a crescent along 
the inside of the city, that if the great wall 
should be taken this might afterwards hold out, 
might lay the enemy under the necessity of 
throwing up a fresh mount against it, and that 
thus the further they advanced the difficulties 
of the siege might be doubled, and be carried 
on with increase of danger. 

When their mount was completed, the Pelo- 
ponnesians played away their battering-engines 
against the wall ; and one of them worked so 
dexterously from the mount against the great 
pile within, that they shook it very much, and 
threw the Platneans into consternation. Others 
they applied in different parts against the wall, 
the force of which was broken by the Platxeans, 
who threw ropes around them ; they also tied 
large beams together, with long chains of iron 
at both ends of the beams, by which they 
hung downwards from two other transverse 
beams inclined and extended beyond the wall ; 
— these they drew along obliquely, and against 
whatever part they saw the engine of battery 
to be aimed, they let go the beams with a full 
swing of the chains, and so dropped thorn down 
directly upon it, which by the weight of the 
stroke broke off the beak of the battering ma- 
chine. Upon this the Pelopormesians, finding 



YEAR III.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



81 



all their engines useless, and their mount 
effectually counterworked by the fortification 
within, concluded it a business of no little 
hazard to take the place amidst so many ob- 
stacles, and prepared to draw a circumvallation 
about it. 

But at first they were willing to try whether it 
were not possible to set the town on fire, and 
burn it down, as it was not large, by help of a 
brisk gale of wind ; for they cast their thoughts 
towards every expedient of taking it without 
a large expense and a tedious blockade. Pro- 
curing for this purpose a quantity of faggots, 
they tossed them from their own mount into 
the void space between the wall and the inner 
fortification. As many hands were employed 
in this business, they had soon filled it up, and 
then proceeded to toss more of them into the 
other parts of the city lying beyond, as far as 
they could by the advantage which the emi- 
nence gave them. Upon these they threw 
fiery balls made of sulphur and pitch, which 
caught the faggots, and soon kindled such a 
flame as before this time no one had ever seen 
kindled by the art of man. It hath indeed 
sometimes happened, that wood growing upon 
mountains hath been so heated by the attrition 
of the winds, that without any other cause it 
hath broken out into fire and flame. But this 
was exceeding fierce ; and the Plataeans, who 
had baflied all other efforts, were very narrowly 
delivered from perishing by its fury ; for it 
cleared the city to a great distance round about, 
so that no Platsean durst approach it : and if 
the wind had happened to have blown along 
with it, as the enemy hoped, they must all un- 
avoidably have perished. It is now reported, 
that a heavy rain falling on a sudden, attended 
with daps of thunder, extinguished the flames, 
and put an end to this imminent danger. 

The Peloponnesians, upon the failure of this 
project, marched away part of their army ; but, 
continuing the remainder there, raised a wall 
of circumvallation quite round the city, the 
troops of every confederate state executing a 
determinate part of the work. Both inside 
and outside of this wall was a ditch, and by 
first digging these they had got materials for 
brick. This work being completed about the 
rising of Arcturus,' they left some of their 
own men to guard half of the wall, the other 
half being left to the care of the Boeotians ; 



18 



» Beginning of September. 



then marched away with the main army, and 
dismissed the auxiliary forces to their respective 
cities. — The Plataeans had already sent away 
to Athens their wives, their children, their old 
people, and all the useless crowd of inhabitants. 
There were only left in the town during this 
siege, four hundred Plataeans, eighty Athenians, 
and one hundred and ten women to prepare their 
food. This was the whole number of them 
when the siege was first formed ; nor was 
there any other person within the wall, either 
slave or free. — And in this manner was the 
city of Plataea besieged in form. 

The same summer, and about the time that 
the army appeared before Plataea, the Atheni- 
ans, with a body of their own people, consist- 
ing of two thousand heavy-armed, and two hun- 
dred horsemen, invaded the Chalcideans of 
Thrace and the Bottiaeans. The corn was in 
the ear, when this army was led against them, 
under the command of Xenophon the son of 
Euripides and two colleagues. Coming up to 
Spartolus, a town in Bottia^a, they destroyed 
the corn, and hoped to get possession of the 
place by the management of a faction they had 
within. But a contrary party, having sent in 
good time to Olynthus, had procured from 
thence an aid of heavy-armed and other force 
for their protection. These even made a sally 
out of Spartolus, and forced the Athenians to 
a battle under the walls of the town. The 
heavy-armed Chalcideans, with some of their 
auxiliaries, are defeated by the Athenians, and 
retire into Spartolus. The horse and light- 
armed Chalcideans get the better of the horse 
and light-armed Athenians ; but they had with 
them a small number of targeteers from the 
province called Crusis. On the first joiliing 
of battle other targeteers came to their assist- 
ance from Olynthus. The light-armed of 
Spartolus seeing this reinforcement just come 
up, and reflecting that they had received no 
loss before, with re-animated courage again 
charge the Athenians, in conjunction with the 
Chalcidean horse, and the fresh reinforcement. 
The Athenians retire to the two companies 
which they had left to guard the baggage. 
Here they drew up again, and whenever they 
thought proper to charge, the enemy fell back ; 
when they retreated from the charge, the enemy 
pressed upon and infested them with missive 
weapons. The Chalcidean horse rode up where 
they thought they could break them, and falling 
in without fear of a repulse, put the Athenians to 
m2 



82 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book II. 



flight and pursued them to a great distance. 
The Athenians fly for refuge to Potidaa ; and 
afterwards, obtaining a truce to fetch off their 
dead, return with their shattered army to Ath- 
ens. In this action they lost four hundred and 
thirty men, and all their commanders. The 
Chalcideans and Bottiteans erected a trophy, 
and having taken proper care of their dead, 
separated to their own cities. 

Not long after this, in the same summer, the 
Ambraciots and Chaonians, who aimed at the 
total reduction of Acarnania, and to compass a 
general defection there from the Athenians, 
prevailed upon the Lacedaemonians to supply 
them with shipping from their confederate ci- 
ties, and to send a thousand heavy-armed into 
Acarnania. They told them, that — << if they 
would join them with a land and a naval force 
at the same time, it would be impossible for 
the Acarnanians to succour one another by 
sea ; that hence they might easily get all Acar- 
nania into their power, from whence they might 
become masters of Zacynthus and Cephallene, 
and a stop would then be made to the Atheni- 
an cruises on the coasts of Peloponnesus ; 
nay, that there was even a hope of reducing 
Naupactus." — This scheme was pleasing to the 
LacedjEmonians, who ordered Cnemus (yet 
their admiral) to sail thither with a few ships, 
having on board the heavy-armed : and circula- 
ted orders to their confederates to fit out their 
ships, and repair with all expedition to Leucas. 
The Corinthians were those who showed most 
zeal for the Ambraciots, a colony of their own ; 
and the shipping of Corinth, Sicyon, and the 
adjacent places, was prepared with all possi- 
ble expedition ; but that of Leucas, Anactori- 
um, and Ambracia, was already at Leucas, and 
waiting for the rest. Cnemus and the thou- 
sand heavy-armed performed their voyage un- 
discovered by Phormio, who commanded the 
Athenian fleet of twenty sail, stationed round 
Naupactus, and immediately landed his men 
for the destined service. Besides the thousand 
Peloponnesians he brought with him, he was 
now joined by the Ambraciots, Leucadians, 
Anactorians, of the Grecians ; — of the Barba- 
rians, by a thousand Chaonians not subject to 
a regal government, but commanded by Pho- 
tius and Nicanor, men of those families which 
had a right to command by annual election. 
With the Chaonians came the Thesprotiar.s, 
who also had no king. Sabylinthus, guardian 
of their king Tharyps, yet a minor, led the 



Melossians and Antitanians. The Paravipans 
were headed by their <»wn king Ordoeus, who 
had also the command of a thousand Orestians, 
subjects of Antiochus, which served with his 
troops by the permission of Antiochus. Per- 
diccas sent also a thousand Macedonians, of 
which the Athenians were ignorant, but these 
were not yet come up. 

With these forces Cnemus began his march, 
without waiting the arrival of the ships from 
Corinth, and passing through Argia they de- 
stroyed Limnsea, a village unfortified. They 
march next for Stratus, the capital city of Acar- 
nania, judging that if they first took this, all 
other places would readiiy submit. The Acar- 
nanians, finding a large army broke in amongst 
them by land, and more enemies coming to at- 
tack them by sea, gave up all view of succour- 
ing one another, and stood separately on their 
own defence. They sent information to Phor- 
mio, and requested him to come up to their re- 
lief He sent them word, " he could not possibly 
leave Naupactus without a guard, when a fleet 
was ready to sail from Corinth." The Pelo- 
ponnesians and their allies, dividing themselves 
into three bodies, advanced towards the city of 
the Stratians, with a design to appear before it, 
and if it did not surrender at once, to storm it 
without loss of time. The Chaonians and the 
rest of the Barbarians marched in the middle ; 
to the right were the Leucadians, Anacto- 
rians, and their auxiliaries ; to the left Cne- 
mus with his Peloponnesians and Ambraciots ; 
each body at so great a distance from the rest, 
that sometimes they were out of one another's 
sight. The Grecians, in their march, kept 
firm within ranks, and guarded all their mo- 
tions, till they came up to the spot fit for their 
encampment. But the Chaonians, confident 
of their own bravery, and valuing themselves 
as the most martial people in that part of the 
world, could not bear the delay of encamping, 
but with the rest of the Barbarians rushing ea- 
gerly forwards, thought to take the town at a 
shout, and carry all the honour. Tlie Strati- 
ans finding them thus advanced, thought that, 
could they master them thus detached, the 
Grecians would become more averse to attack 
them. With this view, they place ambuscades 
in the approaches of the city ; and when the 
enemy was near, rush up at once from the 
places of ambush, and out of the city ; charg- 
ing them on all sides. The Chaonians are 
thrown into consternation, and many of them 



YEAR III.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR 



83 



are slain. The rest of the Barbarians, 
when they saw them give way, durst not 
keep their ground, but fled immediately. 
Neither of the Grecian bodies knew any-thing 
of this engagement, so hastily had those ad- 
vanced, and were supposed to have done it 
only to encamp with greater expedition. But 
when the Barbarians came running back to 
them in disorderly rout, they received them 
into shelter, and all closing firm together stood 
quiet the rest of the day. The Stratians durst 
not directly assault them, because the other 
Acarnanians were not yet come up to their 
assistance, but were continually slinging at 
them from a distance, thus harassing them 
abundantly, but unable, without better wea- 
pons, to make them dislodge : the Acarnanians 
only could have attacked them with effectual 
vigour. 

By the favour of a dark night, Cnemus with- 
drew his army by a quick march to the river 
Anapus, which is eighty stadia^ distant from 
Stratus. The next day he obtains a truce to 
fetch off the dead. And the CEniadae coming 
up in a friendly manner to his relief, he went 
to take refuge amongst them, before the Acar- 
nanians could draw their succours together, and 
from thence the forces which composed his army 
marched to their own homes. But the Stratians 
erected a trophy on account of their victory 
over the Barbarians. 

The fleet of Corinth and the other con- 
federate states, that was to sail from the gulf 
of Crissa, to attend the orders of Cnemus, and 
prevent the Acarnanians on the coast from 
succouring those within the land, never arrives : 
for about the time of the action at Stratus, 
they had been compelled to fight the Athenian 
squadron of twenty ships, stationed at Nau- 
pactus under the command of Phormio. Phor- 
mio had watched their coming out of the gulf, 
intending to attack them so soon as ever they 
got out to sea. The Corinthians and their allies 
sailed out indeed, yet not so well prepared to 
fight by sea, as to forward the land-expedition 
on Acarnania. They never imagined that the 
Athenians with their twenty ships durst pre- 
sume to attack them who had forty-seven. 
Yet when they saw them steering the same 
course on the opposite shore, they kept first 
along their own coast, and afterwards from 
Patrae of Achaia stretched over to the opposite 

1 About eight miles. 



side in order to make for Acarnania. But 
now again they descried them standing directly 
against them from Chalcis and the river Eve- 
nus, and found they had observed their anchor- 
ing the night before. Thus are they compelled to 
come to an engagement in the midst of the open 
sea.^ The ships of every state were under the 
command of those who had been appointed by 
their principals : over the Corinthians were 
Machon, Isocrates, and Agatharchidas. The 
Peloponnesians drew up their ships in form of 
a circle, as large as they possibly could, with- 
out leaving open a passage for the ships of the 
enemy. The heads of the ships stood to sea, 
the sterns were turned inwards. Within were 
ranged the small vessels that attended the fleet, 
and five ships that were prime sailers, which 
were to start out at narrow passages, wherever 
the enemy should begin the attack. The 
Athenians drawing up their ships in a line, 
and sailing quite round them, brushed along by 
them in their passage, and making successive 
feints of engaging, forced them to draw into a 
smaller compass. Phormio had beforehand 
given strict orders not to engage without the 
signal : for he hoped the enemy could not long 
preserve that order of battle like a land-axmy, 
but that the ships must fall foul upon one 
another, and the small vessels within give them 
no little embarrassment ; that further, the wind 
would blow out of the gulf, as was usual every 
morning : in expectation of which he continued 
to sail round about them,^ and then they could 
not possibly keep firm in their stations for any 
time. He thought farther, that the time of 
engagement was entirely in his power, as his 
ships were best sailers, and that it was most 
advisable to begin at such a juncture. As 
soon as that wind began to rise, and the greater 
ships, now contracted into a narrow circle, were 



a Phormio was watching to catch them in the open 
sea, ev T)i fupupi-opia as Thucydides words it above. 
They were now out of the gulf, stretching across tlie sea, 
in the midst of which Phormio came up to them, and 
engaged, xmtx ,ui(rov to Trapi/iov. The sea without the 
capes that form the mouth of the gulf of Crissa, is in- 
deed a narrow sea, or Tropj^o;, but then it was open sea 
in regard to the gulf witl:in the capes, and gave Phor- 
mio all the advantages which more expert sen men knew 
how to use. As the Peloponnesian fleet stood out from 
Patree in Achaia, and the Athenian from Ohalcia in 
iTltolia, the situation of those two places easily guides 
to the place of the engagement. Phormio got a deal of 
honour by this action, which Plutarch in his jjiece about 
the glory of the Athenians, reclions up aiiion!:8t the 
most remarkable exploits related by our historian. 



84 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book II. 



disordered both by the wind and the smaller ' 
vessels within, one falling foul upon another, 
the poles were applied to push them off again ; 
amidst the noise caused by this confusion, call- 
ing out to take care, and cursing one another, 
they could no longer hear the orders of their 
commanders, or their masters; and the sea begin- 
rung to run so high as to render useless the oars 
of unexperienced mariners, as they were, they 
left the unmanageable ships to the pilot's art. 
Exactly at this juncture Phormio gives the sig- 
nal. The Athenians engage, and at the first 
shock sink one of the admiral-ships, and several 
more afterwards in the different parts of the en- 
gagement. They pursued their success with so 
much fury, that amidst the general disorder not 
one durst think of resisting, but all, with the 
greatest precipitation, fled towards Patrae and 
Dyme of Achaia. The Athenians pursuing and 
taking twelve of their ships, and having slaugh- 
tered most of the crews, draw off to Moly chrium : 
and having erected a trophy on the promontory, 
and consecrated a ship to Neptune, returned to 
their station at Naupactus. 

The Peloponnesians, without loss of time, 
crept along the coast with the remnant of their 
fleet saved at Patrae and Dyme, to Cyllene, a 
dock belonging to the Eleans ; whither, after 
the battle of Stratus, arrive also from Leucas, 
Cnemus and the ships of that station, which 
ought to have been joined by these other. 
The Lacedaemonians send thither Timocrates, 
Brasidas, and Lycophron, to assist Cnemus 
in his naval conduct, ordering him to get ready 
for a more successful engagement, and not to 
leave the dominion of the sea to such a small 
number of ships. For their late defeat appear- 
ed to them quite unaccountable, especially as 
this was the first trial they had of an engage- 
ment at sea ; nor could they think it so much 
owing to a want of skill in naval affairs, as to 
a want of courage, never balancing the long 
experience of the Athenians with their own 
short application to these matters. These per- 
sons therefore they sent away in anger, who 
coming to Cnemus, issued their circular orders 
to the states for new quotas of shipping, and re- 
fitted what was already there for another engage- 
ment. Phormio also sends messengers to Athens 
with an account of these preparations, and to re- 
port the victory they had already gained; and re- 
questing a further reinforcement of as many ships 
as they could expeditiously despatch, since he 
was in daily expectation of another fight. 



Twenty ships were the number they agree to 
send him, but they ordered him who was to 
carry them to touch by the way at Crete. For 
Nicias a Cretan of Gortys, a public friend of 
the Athenians, had persuaded them to appear 
before Cydonia, assuring them that this place, 
which had been an enemy to them, should soon 
be their own. This he insinuated merely to 
gratify the Polychnitae, who bordered upon 
the Cydonians. The commander therefore 
with these ships went to Crete, and joining the 
Polychnitae, ravaged the territory of the Cydo- 
nians ; by which, together with adverse winds 
and weather unfit for sea, no little time was un- 
seasonably wasted away. 

The Peloponnesians at Cyllene, during the 
time that the Athenians lay weather-bound in 
Crete, having got every thing in readiness for 
another engagement, sailed along the coast to 
Panormus of Achaia, where the land-forces of 
the Peloponnesians were come to forward their 
attempts. Phormio, likewise, with the twenty 
ships which had fought the former battle, sadled 
up to cape Moly chrium, and lay at anchor just 
without it. This cape belonged to the Athe- 
nian alliance, but' the other cape over-against it 
belonged to the Peloponnesians. The arm of 
sea which divides them is about seven^ stadia 
over ; and this is the mouth of the gulf of Crissa. 
The Peloponnesians with a fleet of seventy- 
seven ships rode also at anchor, under the cape 
of Achaia, which is not far distant from Panor- 
mus, where their land-forces lay. When they 
had here a sight of the Athenians, both parties 
lay for six or seven days over-against each 
other, intent on the needful preparations for 
engaging. The scheme on each side was this : 
— The Peloponnesians, struck with their for- 
mer defeat, would not sail from without the 
capes into the open sea : — The Athenians 
would not enter into the straits, judging it 
would be an advantage to the enemy to fight 
in a narrow compass. At length Cnemus, 
Brasidas, and the other Peloponnesian com- 
manders, desirous to come soon to an engage- 
ment, before the Athenian squadron should re- 
ceive a reinforcement, called first their soldiers 
together, and seeing some of them not yet re- 
covered from the terror occasioned by the former 



» The cape on the Peloponnesian side was railed 
Rhium, or the Rhiiim of Achaia; the opposite cape An- 
tirrhiiiui, or Molychrium. 

^ About three quarters of a mile. 



TEAR III.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



85 



defeat, and by no means eager to fight again, en- 
deavoured to animate and rouse up their courage 
by the following harangue : 

« If the former engagement, ye men of Pelo- 
ponnesus, affects any of you with sad appre- 
hensions about the event of another, know 
that it by no means affords you any reason- 
able ground for such desponding thoughts. 
That was owing, as you well know, to a defi- 
ciency in all needful preparations ; for you 
were not then fitted out for service of sea, but 
for the service of land. We then were dis- 
tressed in several respects by the adverse turns 
of fortune ; and in some, we who fought for the 
first time at sea run into errors through want 
of skill. It thus happened that we were de- 
feated, but not through any cowardice of our 
own. There can be no reason for men, who 
were not conquered by superior courage, but 
who can explicitly account for the means of 
their defeat, to let their spirits be sunk by a 
calamity merely accidental ; but they ought to 
reflect, that though fortune may disconcert the 
human enterprises, yet that men can never be 
deserted by their own valour ; and where true 
valour is, they ought not to catch a plea from 
want of experience to palliate what signs of 
cowardice they betray. Inferior skill in you is 
by no means a balance for your superior va- 
lour. The expertness of your enemies which 
you so much dread, if it be accompanied with 
valour, will indeed direct them in a performance 
of their duty, amidst all the hazards of war; 
but if it wants true valour, those hazards will 
be too hard for all human art. For fear ba- 
nisheth the remembrance of what ought to be 
done ; and art without strength is quite unavail- 
ing. Place therefore your own superior valour 
in the balance against their superior skill ; 
and remove the apprehensions flowing from 
your defeat by the recollection that you were 
not prepared to fight. You have now the 
advantage of a larger number of ships, and an 
opportunity of fighting on your own coasts, in 
sight of a land army of your own. Victory is 
generally obtained by those who are most in 
number and best provided. So that upon close 
examination, no reason appears why we should 
dread the event. Our former miscarriages 
make not against us ; nay, the past commission 
of them will instruct us now. Let every 
master therefore and every mariner act his part 
with manly resolution ; let each take care to 
perform his duty, nor quit the post to which he 



is appointed. We shall take care to order the 
engagement, in no worse a manner than our 
predecessors have done ; and shall leave no 
man any reason to excuse his cowardice. Yet — 
if any one will be a coward, he shall certainly 
receive the punishment he deserves ; but the 
valiant shall be honoured with rewards propor. 
tioned to their merit." 

In such terms did their commanders animate 
the Peloponnesians. But Phormio — who be- 
gan to apprehend a depression of spirits in his 
own men, since he plainly saw that by keeping 
their ships close together they were afraid of 
the numerous ships of the enemy — had a mind 
by calling them together to re-inspire them with 
courage, and give them an exhortation suitable 
to their present condition. He had hitherto 
in all his discourses insisted, and induced them 
to give him credit, that " no number of ships 
could be got together large enovigh to make 
head against them." And his seamen had 
long since been elated with this presumption, 
that <' as they were Athenians, they ought not 
to avoid any fleet of the Peloponnesians, how- 
ever numerous." But, when he saw them intimi- 
dated by the formidable object before their, eyes, 
he thought it high time to endeavour to revive 
their sinking courage. The Athenians being 
gathered round him, he harangued them thus : 

"I have observed, my fellow-soldiers, that 
the number of your enemies hath struck you 
with fear, — I have therefore called you to- 
gether, as I cannot bear to see you terrified 
with what is by no means dreadful. These 
enemies of yours whom you have already con- 
quered, who in no wise think themselves a 
match for you, have got together a great number 
of ships and a superior force. In the next 
place they come confidently to attack you with 
the vain presumption, that valour is only pe- 
culiar to themselves. Their confidence is oc- 
casioned by their skill in the service of the 
land. Their frequent successes there induce 
them to suppose that they must also for cer- 
tainty be victorious at sea. If they have any 
reason to presume so far upon their excellence 
at land, you have more to form presumptions 
in your own favour, since in natural courage 
they are not in the least superior to us, and if 
larger degrees of skill give either side an ad- 
vantage, we have hence an argument to be 
more confident of success. The Lacedaemoni- 
ans, now at the head of their league, merely to 
preserve their own reputation, have dragged 



86 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book ii. 



numbers hither to fight against their will ; ] 
otherwise, they durst never have attempted to ' 
engage us a second time, after receiving so sig- 
nal a defeat. Frighten not yourselves with 
extravagant suspicions of their courage — but 
rather strike a panic into them; a panic, for 
which they have more ample reason, as you 
have already gained a victory over them, and. 
as they arc certain you would not give them an- 
other opportunity to fight, unless you had some 
grand design to execute. An enemy, that like 
them exceeds in number, in action depends 
more on their strength than on their conduct. 
They who are far inferior in strength of num- 
bers, and dare, though uncompelled, to fight, 
must do it through the prevalence of some ex- 
tensive views. This they cannot but know, 
and hence dread more this our diminutive 
than they would an equal force. Large armies 
defeated, through defect of skill, or sometimes 
through defect of courage, by an inferior force, 
are cases that have often happened. Yet 
neither of these defects can be imputed to us. 
For my own part, I shall not willingly hazard 
the event within the gulf, nor will I sail into 
it. For I am not ignorant that want of sea- 
room is very improper for a few ships that sail 
best, and are best managed, against a number 
which those on board them know not how to 
govern. In such a situation, no one can pour 
down to an attack in the proper manner for 
want of having a clear view of the enemy ; nor, 
if he is forced to sheer off, can he do it with 
safety. There is no room to break through, 
or to tack at pleasure, which is the business of 
ships that are better sailers ; but the fight must 
of necessity be the same with a battle at land, 
and in this case the greater number of ships 
must have the advantage. I shall take the 
greatest care I am able to prevent these incon- 
veniencies. And you I expect to stand regu- 
larly to your posts on board every ship. Re- 
ceive your orders with alacrity, especially as 
we lie so near our enemy ; and above all things, 
when we come to action, observe the rules of 
discipline without hurry and noise : for these 
are matters of great importance in every scene 
of war, and of not the least in a naval engage- 
ment ; and charge your enemies with a spirit 
worthy of your former achievements. Great 
indeed are the points you are now to decide, 
the hopes of the Peloponnesians of making a 
figure at sea arc now either to be totally de- 
molished, or the power of the sea must become 



precarious to the Athenians, even near their 
own homes. Once more I call to your remem- 
brance that great part of these enemies you have 
already conquered — and the courage of enemies 
once conquered, is seldom equal to what it was, 
when unconscious of defeat." 

In this manner Phormio encouraged his 
men. — But the Peloponnesians, when they 
found that the Athenians would not sail into 
the gulf and straits, had a mind to compel 
them to it against their inclinations. At 
break of day they began to move, their ships 
being ranged in lines, consisting of four, and 
stood along their own coasts within the gulf, 
the right wing leading the course in the same 
order as they had lain at anchor. In this wing 
they had ranged twenty of their best sailers, 
with a view that if Phormio should imagine 
they had a design upon Naupactus, and he 
himself should hasten to its succour, the Athe- 
nians might not be able to out-sail them and 
escape their outermost squadron, which com- 
posed the right wing, but be surrounded on all 
sides. He, just as they expected, being alarm- 
ed for that place, which he knew was de- 
fenceless, no sooner saw them under sail, than 
against his will and in no little hurry he got 
on board and sailed along his own coast — the 
land forces of the Messenians marching along 
the adjacent shore to be ready with their assist- 
ance. The Peloponnesians seeing them move 
along in a line, ship after ship, and that they 
were now within the gulf and near the shore, 
which was what they chiefly wanted, — on a 
signal given, at once altered their course, pour- 
ing down directly upon the Athenians, all as 
fast as their ships could advance, in full ex- 
pectation of intercepting the whole fleet. 
Eleven of the Athenian ships, which were a- 
head of the rest, being too quick for the wing 
of the Peloponnesians and their shifting o^ 
their course ran safely off.' Yet intercepting 

» The Latin translators, whose cliief aim is a grnm- 
matical construction, have made a slip here in point of 
clioro^raphy; tl)ey say, *' Subterfufferunt or fug erunt 
in apertum marej'^ But it is surprisinj; that Mr Hobbes 
should be guilty of so much inadvertence, as to make 
eleven Athenian ships "get out into open sea." Thq 
Peloponnesians made their tack towards the open sea, 
on purpose to prevent them from getting out of the gulf, 
which gave opportunity to the foremost ships in the 
Athenian line to run away up the gulf towards Nau- 
pactus, for the sake of securing which, they had thought 
themselves obliged, though contrary to their judgment 
and inclination, to come within the capes. Had they 
run out to sea, they never could have reached Naupac- 
tus, but would have run directly from it. 



YEAR III.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



87 



all the rest, they run them aground and so dis- 
abled them. The Athenians on board, who 
could not escape by swimming, were slaughter- j 
ed to a man : some of these empty ships 
they got off again and carried away in tow ; 
and one they had already took with the ' 
whole crew on board. The Messenians got 
down to the succour of some of them. They 
waded with their arms through the water, and j 
climbing on board and fighting from the decks, I 
saved some which were already in tow. — In 
this manner did the Peloponnesians defeat and 
destroy the Athenian ships. I 

Their twenty ships which were of the right ' 
wing, gave chase to the eleven Athenians, ' 
which, on the shifting of the course, had ran ! 
off amain. But all these, elcepting one ship, 
outsailed them, and got safe into Naupactus. 
Having gained their harbour, they tacked about 
under the temple of Apollo, and stood ready to 
defend themselves, in case the enemy should 
make an attempt upon them so near the shore. 
Soon after, they appeared sailing along and 
singing their paean, as having gained a victory. 
One ship belonging to Leucas was shot far 
a-head of the rest, giving chase to that only 
ship of the Athenians which was left behind. 
It happened that a trading vessel was then 
lying out at anchor before the harbour. The 
Athenian ship came up first with this vessel, 
and fetching a compass round her, runs directly 
against the Leucadian that was chasing, and 
instantly sinks her. By this accident so sud- 
den and unexpected, the Peloponnesians are 
thrown into consternation ; and having besides 
followed the chase without any regular order, 
as secure of victory, some of the ships now 
dropping their oars, stopped further motion. 
This was an unlucky expedient when so near 
the enemy ; but their design was to wait for 
the greater number of ships that were yet 
behind. Some of them being ignorant of the 
coast, ran upon the shelves and were stranded. 
When the Athenians saw them suffer these dis- 
tresses, their courage began to revive. Shout- 
ing out aloud with one voice, they encouraged 
one another to attack. The miscarriages of 
which they were this moment sensible, and 
their irrecoverable disorder, prevented the 
others from making any long resistance. And 
they soon were forced to run back again to- 
wards the station of Panormus, from whence 
they came. The Athenians chasing them 
Ihitlier, took the six ships that were most be- 



hind, and recovered their own, which were in 
the enemy's hands by having been run ashore, 
and afterwards brought off in tow. Some 
men besides they killed, and made some pri- 
soners. 

On board the Leucadian, which was sunk 
near the trading vessel, was Timocrates the 
Lacedsemonian, who, when the ship received 
the stroke that sunk her, immediately slew 
himself,' and floated afterwards into the har- 
bour of Naupactus. The Athenians returning 
thither again, erected a trophy near the place 
from whence they had pursued this victory. 
They took up their dead, and the shattered 
pieces of their ships, whatever they found on 
their own coasts, and by a truce gave permission 
to the Peloponnesians to fetch off theirs. 

The Peloponnesians also erected a trophy, 
in token of a victory gained by forcing ashore 
and damaging some of the enemy's ships. The 
ship they took they consecrated on the Ehium 
of Achaia, near their trophy. Yet, after this, 
being in some dread of the reinforcement ex- 
pected from Athens, all of them, except the 
Leucadians, sailed away by favour of the night 
into the gulf of Crissa and Corinth. The 
Athenians, in the twenty ships from Crete, 
that ought to have been up with Phormio 
before the engagement, not long after the above 
retreat of the other ships arrived at Naupactus. 
And here this summer ended. 

Before the separation of the fleet that with- 
drew into Corinth and the gulf of Crissa, 
Cnemus, Brasidas, and the other commanders 
of the Peloponnesians, by the advice of the 
Megareans, formed a design, in the beginning 
of this winter, to make an attempt on the 
Piraeus, the haven of the Athenians. It was 
not guarded or secured in the usual manner ; 
nor was this judged requisite, as the naval 
power of Athens was become so extensive. 

1 We have here a notable proof of tlie peculiar spirit 
and genius of the Spartans. They regarded the land as 
their own element, in which they were superior to the 
rest of the world. And yet now they were convinced, 
that without practice at sea, they should never l;e able 
to pull down the power of Athens. Their first attempts 
are awkward and unsuccessful. The art shown by the 
Athenians in tacking round, darting out again, and sink- 
ing a ship at one stroke, put tbem all to a stand; and it 
seems made so sudden and strong an impression on 
Timocrates, whose passion it was to die fighting, and 
with wounds all before, that he could not endure the 
thought of perishing in a whole skin, and therefore 
snatched tbe moment, and killed himself for fear he 
should be drowned. 



88 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book n. 



Their project was, that every mariner carrying 
with him an oar, a cushion, and a leathern 
thong, should march over-land from Corinth, 
to the sea on which Athens is situated, and 
that, making the best of their way to Megara, 
and drawing out the forty ships that lay there 
in the Nissan dock, they should immediately 
stand into the Piraeus. For there was not so 
much as one ship appointed to its guard ; nor 
was there the least suspicion at Athens that 
the enemy would attempt in this manner to 
surprise them : for, openly, and in a regular 
train, they durst not attempt it ; nor could a 
project which required deliberate procedure 
have escaped discovery. But no sooner had 
they resolved upon, than they set out to exe- 
cute, the present scheme. Arriving in the 
night, they drew the ships out of the Nisaean 
dock; but instead of making directly for the 
Piraeus, as they at first intended, dismayed 
with the danger of the attempt, and, as it is 
said, forced by a contrary wind to steer another 
course, they went over to that promontory of 
Salamis which faceth Megara. Upon this 
promontory was a fort, and three ships were 
stationed below to prevent all importation and 
exportation at Megara. This fort they assault- 
ed, and carried the three ships, though empty, 
away with them. Other parts of Salamis they 
plundered, as the inhabitants never dreamed of 
this invasion. 

The lights,* that signify the approach of 
enemies, were however held up and waved to- 
wards Athens, which caused as great a conster- 
nation there as was known during eJI the series 
of the war. Those in the city imagined the 
enemy to be already within the Piraeus. 
Those in the Piraeus concluded the city of the 
Salaminians to be taken, and that the enemy 
was only not within their port, which indeed 
they might easily have been, had they not been 
hindered by their own fears and a contrary 
wind. At break of day, the Athenians ran 
down in general concourse to the Piraeus. 
They got their ships afloat, and leaping on 



« These, (ncrording to the scholiast) were liphtcd 
torches, which f>ersons on the wall reared aloft in the air, 
to notify o ucighbourinj; and confederate places, that 
they discerned the approach of enemies, in order to put 
them on their guard. The same thin;; was also done 
at the approach of friends, to notify what succour was 
at hand. In the latter case, they held the li?ht steady 
and unmoved; in the former they waved them to and 
fro, as an indication of fear. 



board with the utmost expedition and uncom- 
mon tumult, sailed away for Salamis, but left 
what land-forces they had to guard the Piraeus. 
When the Peloponnesians had notice of the 
approach of this succour, having now over-nin 
great part of Salamis, and got many prisoners 
and a large booty, beside the three ships sta- 
tioned at Budorus, they made the best of their 
way back to Nisaca. They were afraid of 
trusting too much to their ships, which having 
been long laid up were become leaky. After 
thus getting back to Megara, they returned 
again over-land to Corinth. The Athenians, 
finding they were gone from Salamis, sailed 
home again. But ever after this they guarded 
the Piraeus in a stricter manner, barring up the 
mouth of the haven, and omitting no method 
of securing it effectually for the future. 

About the same time, in the beginning of 
this ' winter, Sitalces the Odrysian, son of 
Teres, a Thracian king, marched an army 
against Perdiccas, the son of Alexander, king 
of Macedonia, and the Chalcideans bordering 
on Thrace, to enforce the execution of two en- 
gagements, one made to and the other by him- 
self. For Perdiccas, who had entered into 
some engagement to him, for reconciling him 
to the Athenians when he was formerly press- 
ed hard with war, and for not restoring his 
brother Philip, then at enmity with him, to his 
throne, had not yet performed that engage- 
ment. And he himself was under an engage- 
ment to the Athenians, since the late alliance 
offensive and defensive made between them, 
that he would finish the war for them against 
the Chalcideans of Thrace. On both these 
accounts, he undertook the present expedition, 
carrying along with him Amyntas the son of 
Philip, to restore to him the kingdom of Mace- 
donia, with the Athenian ambassadors commis- 
sioned to attend him on this occasion, and 
Agnon an Athenian general : though the Athe- 
nians had obliged themselves by treaty to 
accompany the expedition with a fleet by sea, 
and a numerous land army. 

Beginning the march himself from Odrysae, 
he summons to attend him first all his Thra- 
cian subjects that live within the mountains 
H.-emus and Rhodope, quite down to the 
Hellespont and Euxine sea ; next, the Get® 
beyond mount Ha»mus, and as many other 
nations as lay between the river Ister and along 
quite down to the Euxine. The Gets', and the 
nations so situated, border upon the Scythians, 



YEAR ni.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



89 



wearing the same habiliments of war, and all 
like them drawing the bow on horseback. 
He procured also to join him many of the free 
Thracians that live upon the mountains, and 
make use of scimitars, who are distinguished 
by the name of Dians, and dwell most of them 
about Rhodope. Some of these he took into 
pay, but some of them voluntarily attended. 
He had levies also from amongst the Agriani- 
ans, Leaeans, and the other nations of Pseonia 
subject to himself. These were the furthest 
people in his dominions, reaching up to the 
Graseans and Leaians of Pseonia and the river 
Strymon, which deriving its source from mount 
Scomias waters the Graseans and Leseans, and 
is the boundary of his empire from those Paeo- 
nians who still are free. Towards the Tribal- 
lians, who are also a free people, the boundary 
is formed by the Trerians and Tilataeans. 
These live to the north of mount Scomius, and 
reach westerly as far as the river Oscius, which 
riseth out of the same mountain with the Nes- 
tus and the Heber, a great but barren mountain 
adjoining to the Rhodope. 

The kingdom of Odrysae is of this large 
extent along the coast, reaching from the city 
of Abdera to the mouth of the river Ister in 
the Euxine sea. The shortest cut round its 
coast requireth four days and as many nights 
for a trading-vessel, of the round built, sailing 
directly before the wind. A good walker will 
also be eleven days in going the nearest way by 
land from Abdera to the Ister. So large was 
its extent along the coast. But towards the 
continent, to go along it from Byzantium to the 
Leaeans and the Strymon, for so far does it run 
upwards from the sea, would cost an expedi- 
tious walker thirteen days' continued journey. 
The yearly tribute exacted from this tract of 
Barbaric land, and his cities in Greece, by 
Seuthes, who succeeding Sitalces in these do- 
minions, very much improved the revenue, 
amounted to four hundred talents of silver,^ 
though it might be paid either in silver or gold. 
The presents constantly made to him either of 
gold or silver were not less in value, besides 
gifts of vestments both figured and plain, and 
all kinds of furniture, which were not only 
made to him, but to all his officers, and the 
noble Odrysians. The custom observed by 
them and general to all the Thracians, " of 
receiving rather than bestowing," was contrary 



19 



» je78,940 sterling. 



to that which prevails in the Persian court, 
where it was a greater shame to be asked and 
to deny, than to ask and be denied. Yet, as 
their power was great, this practice continued 
long in vogue amongst them ; for nothing could 
be obtained by him who brought no present ; 
and this aftbrded a large increase of power to 
his kingdom. It had the greatest revenue, and 
was in other respects the most flourishing, of 
all the kingdoms in Europe between the gulf 
of Ionia and the Euxine sea. But in military 
strength and numerous armies, it was the se- 
cond, though at a great distance from the Scy- 
thians. For there is no one nation in Europe, 
nor even in Asia, that in these points can in 
any degree be a match for them ; or when stand- 
ing singly, nation against nation, is able to 
make head against the Scythians, united and in 
good harmony with one another. Yet, at the 
same time, in every point of conduct, and 
management of all the necessary affairs of life, 
they fall vastly short of other people. 

Sitalces therefore, who was king of so large a 
country, got his army together; and, when 
every thing was ready, marched against Mace- 
donia. He first of all passed through his own 
dominions ; then over Cercine, a desert moun- 
tain, the boundary between the Sintians and 
Paeonians. He went over it by a passage he 
had, by cutting down the wood, made formerly 
himself, in an expedition against the Paeonians. 
In their march from Odrysae over this moun- 
tain, they left the Paeonians on their right, 
but on their left the Sintians and Maedians. 
On their descent from it, they arrived at Do- 
berus, a city of Paeonia. He lost none of his 
army in the march, but by sickness ; notwith- 
standing which it was very much increased ; 
for many of the free Thracians came daily in 
without invitation, and followed for the sake 
of plunder ; so that the whole number is said 
at last to have amounted to a hundred and fifty 
thousand. Of these, the greater part were 
foot, but about a third of them were horse. 
The greatest share of the horse was provided 
by the Odrysians, and next to them by the 
Getae. Of the foot the free Thracians that 
came from about mount Rhodope, and used 
scimitars, were the most valiant : all the rest 
that followed were a mixed crowd, formidable 
only in their number. All these therefore 
were got together at Doberus, and preparing to 
break into thfe lower Macedonia, subject to Per- 
diccas, under the ridge of the mountains. For 
N 



90 



PELOPOiNNESIAN WAR. 



[book II. 



in the general name of Macedonians are com- 
prised the Lyncestians and Helimiotians and 
other nations lying upwards, allied to and de- 
pendent upon the rest, yet governed as distinct 
kingdoms. The dominion over the maritime 
Macedonia was first obtained by Alexander, 
father of Perdiccas, and his ancestors the 
Temenidse, who derived their original from 
Argos. These by a successful war had driven 
the Pierians out of Pieria, who afterwards 
fixed their residence at Phagres under mount 
PangjEus, on the other side the Strymon, and 
at other places ; for which reason, the tract of 
ground lying under Pangajus towards the sea 
is still called the gulf of Pieria. From the 
region called Bottisea they also expelled the 
Bottiseans, who now live upon the confines of 
the Chalcideans. And further, they seized in 
Paeonia, near the river Axius, a narrow tract of 
land running along from the mountains down to 
Pella, and the sea ; and got possession of that 
which is called Mygdonia, lying between the 
Axius and the Strymon, by driving away the 
Edonians. They expelled the Eordians out of 
what is now called Eordia (of whom the great- 
est part were destroyed, but a small number 
dwell now about Phj'sca ;) and out of Almopia, 
the Almopians. These Macedonians also 
conquered other nations, of which they are 
still in possession, as Anthemus, Grestonia 
and Bisaltia, and a large part of the territories 
belonging to the other Macedonians. But 
this whole tract of country hath the general 
name of Macedonia, and Perdiccas, son of 
Alexander, reigned over them when Sitalces 
formed this invasion. 

The Macedonians, unable to make head 
against the numerous army by which they were 
invaded, retired within the walled and fortified 
places of the country, which at this time were 
not many. But Archelaus, son of Perdiccas, 
succeeding his father in the kingdom, built 
those fortresses which are now there, opened 
the roads, and made many other regulations 
both in the military way about horses and arms, 
and in other public matters, more than all the 
eight preceding kings put together. The 
Thracian army from Dobcrus broke first into 
that y)art of the country, which was formerly 
in the possession of Philip. They took Eido- 
mene by storm ; and got Gortynia, Atalante, 
and some other places, by composition, which 
were readily brought to capitulate, out of their 
regard for Amyntas, whose son Philip now 



appeared amongst them. They also laid siege 
to Europus, but were not able to reduce it. 
They afterwards advanced into the other Mace- 
donia, lying to the left of Pella and Cyrrhus. 
Within these, they did not advance into Bot- 
tiaea and Pieria ; but ravaged Mygdonia, Gres- 
tonia, and Anthemus. The Macedonians never 
once thought of being able to make head 
against them with their foot ; but, sending for 
horse from their allies in the upper Macedonia, 
wherever by the advantage of ground a few 
could encounter with many, they made fre- 
quent attacks upon the Thracian army. They 
made so strong an impression, that nothing 
could resist such excellent horsemen and so 
completely armed. For this reason, the enemy 
inclosed them about with their numerous for- 
ces, and thus made it exceeding hazardous 
for them to fight against such manifold odds 
of numbers ; so that at last they were forced 
to give over these skirmishes, judging it im- 
prudent to run any hazards against so large an 
inequality of strength. 

Sitalces, at a parley held with Perdiccas, 
imparted to him the motives of the war. And, 
as the Athenians were not yet come up 
with their fleet, because diffident of his punc- 
tuality to the engagement between them, and 
had only sent him presents and ambassadors, 
he detached part of his army against the Chal- 
cideans and Bottiaeans ; where, by driving them 
into their fortresses, he ravaged the coun- 
try. During his stay . in these part^, the 
southern Thessalians, Magnetians, and other 
people subject to the Thessalians, and the 
Grecians as far as Thermopylae, grew appre- 
hensive that his army might be turned against 
them, and prepared for their defence. Under 
the same apprehensions were the northern 
Thracians beyond the Strymon that inhabit 
the plains, the Panaeans, the Odomantians, 
the Droans, and the Dersaeans, who are all of 
them free and independent. He further gave 
occasion for a rumour that spread amongst the 
Grecians, enemies to Athens, that this army, 
brought into Greece by virtue of an alliance 
with them, would invade them all in their 
turns. Yet, without advancing any further, 
he was at one and the same time continuing 
his ravage upon Chalcidica, and Bottiaea, and 
Macedonia. But unable to execute any of 
those points for which he formed this invasion, 
when his army began to want provisions, and 
to suffer by the rigour of the winter's cold, he 



YEAR ni.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



91 



is persuaded by Seuthes the son of Sparadoxus, 
and his own cousin-german, who had a greater 
influence over him than any other person, to 
march back again with the utmost expedition. 
This Seuthes had been secretly gained by 
Perdiccas, who promised to give him his sister, 
and a large dower with her. Thus persuaded, 
after a stay upon the whole of but thirty days, 
and eight of these in Chalcidica, he retired 
precipitately into his own dominions. Perdic- 
cas, according to promise, soon after gives his 
sister Stratonice in marriage to Seuthes. And 
to this end came this grand expedition of Si- 
talces.' 

The same winter, the Athenians at Nau- 
pactus, after the separation of the Pelopon- 
nesian fleet, coasting from thence under the 
command of Phormio, appeared before Astacus. 
Making there a descent, they pierced into the 
midland parts of Acarnania, with four hun- 
dred heavy-armed Athenians from on board the 
fleet, and four hundred Messenians; and ex- 
pelled from Stratus, Coronta, and other places, 
the disaffected part of the inhabitants ; and 
having re-established at Coronta Cynes the 
son of Theolytus, embarked again on board 
their ships. They judged it not advisable, in 
the winter season, to undertake any thing 
against the Oeniadse, the only people of Acar- 
nania who had persisted in continual hostilities 
against them. For the river Achelous, that 
takes its rise from mount Pindus, and runs 
through Dolopia, the provinces of the Agrjeans 
and the Amphilochians, and all the plain of 
Acarnania, passing above by the city of Stratus, 

I Sitalces, and his son Sadocus, who, as Thurydides 
relates above, was made a citizen of Athens, have not 
escaped the buffoonery of Aristophanes, in his comedy 
of ' The Acharnanians.' Act I. Sc. 4. " Crier. Ambas- 
fiador to Sitalces, come into court. .Smbass. Here. 
Dicceopolis. Oh ! here's another Itnave summoned to 
make his appearance. Ambass. We should not have 
staid so long in Thrace — Dicaopolis. I believe you, un- 
less you had been well paid for it. Ambass. Had not a 
great enow fallen and covered all the country, and all 
the rivers at the same time been frozen over. When 
Thcognis was contending here for glory, we were drink- 
ing all the time with Sitalces. He is an honest heart, 
and loves Athenians dearly. In good truth, he is dot- 
ingly fond of you all : he is for ever writing upon the 
wall, 'O rare Athenians!' And his son, whom we 
made an Athenian, longs mightily for some of your 
dainty sausages, and hath pressed his father to succour 
his dear countrymen. He, at a solemn sacrifice, swore 
he would ; and hath got such a numerous army at his 
heels, that the Athenians cry out — What a vast swarm 
of guatB is coming along here !" 



and discharging itself into the sea near the 
Oeniadae, renders all the adjacent country one 
continued morass, and by a stagnation of 
water makes it impracticable for an army in 
the winter season. Most of the isles of the 
Echinades lie over-against the Oeniadce, not 
greatly distant from the mouth of the Ache- 
lous; insomuch that the river, being great, 
causeth a continual afflux of sand, and by 
it some of these islands are already joined to 
the main-land ; and it is expected that air 
the rest in a short time will be so too : for the 
current is large and rapid, and brings down 
with it great quantities of sand. The isles 
stand thick ; and stopping, bind fast together 
from farther dissipation, the sands brought 
down by the current. They lie not in a line, 
but in an alternate situation one from another, 
preventing the straight course of the waters for- 
wards into the sea. They are further unculti- 
vated, and of no large extent. The tradition 
is — that Apollo, by an oracle, made a grant of 
this land to Alcmaeon the son of Amphiaraus, 
when a vagabond, after the murder of his 
mother, telling him, that " he never should be 
freed from the terrors that haunted him, till he 
found a place for his residence, which at the 
time he slew his mother had never been seen 
by the sun, and then was not land ;" because 
every other part of the earth was polluted by 
the parricide. After great perplexities, he at 
length, as it is said, discovered these rising heaps 
of sand at the mouth of the Achelous, and 
thought enough cast up to suffice for his sup- 
port, after the long course of wandering about 
to which he had been necessitated ever since 
he murdered his mother. Fixing therefore his 
residence in the parts about the Oeniadae, he 
gi-ew powerful, and left to the whole country 
the name of Acarnania, from his son Acarnas. 
This account of Alcmaeon we have given ex- 
actly as we have received it from tradition. 

The Athenians and Phormio weighing from 
Acarnania, and touching again at Naupactus, 
very early in the spring returned to Athens. 
Thither they brought all the freemen whom 
they had made prisoners in the late naval en- 
gagements (these were afterwards exchanged 
man for man,) and the ships taken from the 
enemy. 

And thus the winter ended, and with it the 
third year of the war, the history of which 
hath been compiled by Thucydides. 



THE 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



BOOK III. 



Year IV. Attica invaded.— Lesbos revolts from the Athenians ; the latter sent out a fleet to reduce them.— Con- 
tinuation of the siege of Plataea.-The escape of a liody of Flataans over all the works of the besiegers-V. Attica 
invaded.— Surrender of Mitylene in Lesbos.— A bloody decree made at Athens against all the Mityleneans; but 
re-considered and repealed ; though very near being put in execution. — Plataea surrenders : and the inhabitants 
are put to death.— The sedition atCorcyra.— The Athenians meddle in the wars of Sicily. — The plague rageth 
again at Athens. — VI. Earthquakes. — The affairs of Sicily. — Expedition of Demosthenes into ^tolia, where 
he receives a total defeat. — Delos purified by the Athenians. — Invasion of Argos in Amphilochia : battle of 
Olpe : a second battle, or rather slaughter of the Ambraciots at Idomenc.— Eruption of Mount iEtna. 



YEAH IT. 

Is the succeeding summer, the Pcloponnesians 
and alUes, when the corn was full-grown, made 
incursions into Attica, under the command of 
Archidamus son of Zeuxidamus king of the 
Lacedaemonians, and having fixed their camp 
ravaged the country. The Athenian cavalry 
at all convenient places skirmished with them 
as usual, and checked the greater number of 
the light-armed from advancing before the 
heavy-armed, and infesting the parts adjacent 
to the city. Having continued here till provi- 
sions began to fail, they retired and were dis- 
banded to their respective cities. 

Upon this irruption of the Pcloponnesians, 
Lesbos immediately revolted from the Atheni- 
ans, excepting Methymne. They were well 
inclined to such a step before the war broke 
out, but were discountenanced by the Lacedae- 
monians, and now were necessitated to make 
their revolt sooner than they intended. They 
would have been glad to have deferred it, till 
they had completed the works they were about 
for securing their harbour, perfecting their 
walls and the ships then upon the stocks — till 
they had received what they wanted from Pon- 
tus, both archers and corn, and whatever they 
had already sent for thither. 

The reason was — the people of Tenedos 

X Before Christ 428. 



then at enmity with them, those of Methymne, 
and even some persons of Mitylene underhand, 
who in a civil broil had received the hospitable 
protection at Athens, had sent the Athenians 
advice — " That they are compelling all Lesbos 
to go into Mitylene, and are getting every thing 
in readiness for a revolt by the aid of the Lace- 
daemonians and their kindred Boeotians ; and 
if timely prevention be not given, Lesbos will 
be lost." 

The Athenians, at present miserably distress- 
ed by the plague and a war now grown very 
brisk and vigorous, knew that the accession of 
Lesbos to their enemies, possessed as it was 
of a naval force and fresh in strength, must be 
a terrible blow, and would not listen at first 
to the accusations sent, chiefly from the earnest- 
ness of their own wishes, that they might be 
groundless. But when they had in vain des- 
patched an embassy to the Mityleneans to put a 
stop to the forced resort of the Lesbians thither 
and their other preparations, their fears were 
increased, and they became intent on some ex- 
pedient of timely prevention — and ordered 
thither on a sudden forty sail that lay ready 
fitted out for a cruize on Peloponnesus. Cleip- 
pides, son of Deinias, with two colleagues, had 
the command of this fleet. Information had 
been given them, that the festival of Apollo 
Maloeis was soon to be celebrated without 
the city, at which solemnity the whole people 
n3 93 



94 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book ni. 



of Mitylene are obliged to assist. — It was there- 
fore hoped, that they might surprise them on 
this occasion, and by one sudden assault com- 
plete the work. Should it so fall out, it would 
be a happy turn : — but, if this miscarried, they 
were to order the Mitylencans to deliver up 
their shipping and demolish their works, and, in 
case they refused, to make instant war. 

With these instructions the fleet went to sea. 
And the Athenians seized ten triremes belong- 
ing to the Mityleneans, which happened at that 
time to be lying in their port as an auxiliary 
quota in pursuance of treaty, and cast into 
prison all the crews. But a certain person 
passing over from Athens to Euboea, and hast- 
ening by land to Gerscstus, finds a vessel there 
ready to put off, on board of which he gets a 
quick passage to Mitylene, and on the third 
day after his setting out from Athens, gives 
notice to the Mityleneans that such a fleet was 
coming to surprise them. Upon this they ad- 
journed their festival, and patching up their 
half-finished walls and harbours as well as they 
could, stood ready on their guard. Not long 
after the Athenian fleet arrived, and finding the 
alarm had been given, the commanders notified 
to them the injunctions they brought; with 
which as the Mityleneans refused to comply 
they ranged themselves for action. 

The Mityleneans, unprepared as they were, 
and thus suddenly necessitated to make some 
resistance, advanced on board their ships a little 
beyond the mouth of their harbour, as willing 
to engage. But being forced to retreat upon the 
approach of the Athenian fleet, they begged a 
parley with the commanders, from a view, if it 
were possible upon easy conditions, to rid them- 
selves of that fleet for the present. And the 
Athenian commanders readily accorded, from 
the apprehension, that they had not sufficient 
strength to support the war against all Lesbos. 

Hostilities having thus ceased for a time, the 
Mityleneans despatched their agents to Athens, 
and amongst the number one of those persons 
who had sent intelligence of their motions, but 
had now repented of the step — to procure if 
possible the recalment of the fleet, by assurances, 
that they were not bent on any innovation. But 
in the meantime, undiscovered by the Athenian 
fleet which lay at anchor in the road of Malea, to 
the north of the city, they send a trireme to 
carry an embassy to Lacedscmon ; for they had 
no room to believe they should succeed in their 
negotiation at Athens. This embassy, after 



a laborious and dangerous voyage, arriving at 
Lacedaemoii, began to solicit a speedy succour. 
And when their agents returned from Athens 
totally unsuccessful, the Mityleneans and all the 
rest of Lesbos, excepting Methymne, prepare 
for war. This last place sent in aid to the 
Athenians, as did also the Imbrians and Lem- 
nians, and some few other of their allies. 

The Mityleneans once indeed made a gene- 
ral sally with all their people against the sta- 
tion of the Athenians. Hereupon a battle 
ensued, after which the Mityleneans, though 
by no means worsted, yet durst not continue 
all night in the field, but difl!ident of their own 
strength retreated behind their walls. After 
this they kept themselves quiet, unwilling to 
run any more hazards, till they had got some 
additional strength from Peloponnesus, and 
were in other respects better provided. By 
this time Meleas a Lacedjemonian and Her- 
mseondas a Theban are arrived among them, 
who had been despatched on some business be- 
fore the revolt, and unable to compass the re- 
turn before the Athenian fleet came up, had 
now in a trireme got in undiscovered since the 
battle. It was the advice of these to despatch 
another trireme and embassy in company with 
them, which is accordingly done. But the 
Athenians, as the Mityleneans remained in so 
quiet a posture, became more full of spirits 
than before, and sent summons of aid to their 
confederates, who came in with more than or- 
dinary alacrity, as they saw such an appearance 
of weakness on the side of the Lesbians. Hav- 
ing now formed a station on the south side of 
the city they fortified by a wall two camps, 
which invested the place on both sides, whilst 
their shipping was so stationed as to shut up 
both the harbours. By this means the commu- 
nication by sea was quite cut off from the 
Mityleneans. Of the land indeed the Mityle- 
neans and other Lesbians, who had now flocked 
to their aid, were for the most part masters. 
The quantity which the Athenians had occu- 
pied by their camps was but inconsiderable, as 
the station of their shipping and their market 
was held chiefly at Melea : and in this posture 
stood the war against Mitylene. 
j About the same time this summer, the 
, Athenians send out thirty sail of ships against 
Peloponnesus, under the command of Asopius 
the son of Phormio, in pursuance of some so- 
licitations they had received from the Acar- 
, nonians to send them either a son or some re< 



ITEAR IV.] 



PELOPOxNNESlAN WAR. 



95 



lation of Phormio to command in those parts. 
These ships sailing along the coasts of Laconia 
ravaged all the maritime places. After this, 
Asopius sends back the greatest part of his 
ships to Athens, but with a reserve of twelve 
proceeds himself to Naupactus. And raising 
afterwards the whole force of the Acarnanians, 
he leads them against the Oeniadae. With 
his ships he sailed up the Achelous, and the 
army marching by land laid the country waste. 
But when this was found ineffectual, he dis- 
missed the land-force, and stretching over him- 
self to Leucas, and having made a descent upon 
Nericum, was intercepted in his retreat — by 
those of the adjacent country, who ran together 
for mutual aid, supported by a small party that lay 
there for guards, — with the loss of his own life 
and a part of his army. After this, the Athe- 
nians staid only to take up their dead by favour 
of a truce obtained from the Leucadians, and 
then steered homewards. 

The ambassadors of Mitylene, who were sent 
in the first ship, having been ordered by the 
Lacedaemonians to repair to Olympia, that their 
applications might be addressed, and resolutions 
formed about them, in the grand resort of their 
whole alliance, arrive at that place. It was that 
Olympiad in which Dorieus the Rhodian was 
a* second time victor. So, when the solemnity 
was ended, and an^ audience was granted them, 
they spoke as follows — 

« Ye men of Lacedaemon, and you their con- 

» Olympiad 88. 

« In this manner for private ends and through party 
feuds, was a most noble and sacred institution abused. 
All Grecians in general paid their attendance at the 
Olympic Games ; and were obliged by all the ties of ho- 
nour and religion to suspend their animosities and quar- 
rels, and meet together as countrymen and brethren, 
with frank and open ingenuity. And yet, in the present 
instance, they are going to contrive the means of annoy- 
ing one another, so soon as that solemnity is over,which 
was calculated to teach them union and concord, and a 
steady attachment to the interests of Greece their com- 
mon mother. The policy however of the present proceed- 
ing is remarkable. The Athenians who assisted at the 
games could suspect nothing from the presence of the 
Mityleneans, who were equally bound in duty to attend. 
The Lacedaemonians and allies had thus an opportunity 
of assembling together to receive complaints, and to en- 
courage revolts from Athens, without danger of sus- 
picions or a detection of their counsels, till they were 
ripe for execution. " The Lacedaemonians, (it is a re- 
mark which will afterwards occur in this history,) 
amongst one another, and in paying all due regard to 
the laws of their country, gave ample proofs of honour 
and virtue, in regard to the rest of mankind, they re- 
puted as honourable the things which pleased them, 
and as just the things which promoted their interest." j 



federates, we are sensible of that method of 
procedure, which hath hitherto prevailed 
amongst the Grecians — Revolters, whilst a war 
is on foot, and deserters from a former alliance 
they readily receive, and so long as their own 
interest is furthered by it, abundantly caress 
them ; yet, judging them traitors to their for 
mer friends, they regard them as persons 
who ought not to be trusted. To judge 
in this manner is certainly right and proper, 
where those who revolt, and those, from whom 
they break asunder, happen to be equal to one 
another in turn of principle, in benevolent 
affection, and well matched together in expe- 
dients of redress and military strength, and no 
just reason of revolt subsist. — But the case is 
quite different between us and the Athenians. 
And we ought not to be treated with censure 
and reproach, from the appearance of having 
deserted them in extremities, after having been 
honourably regarded by them in the season of 
tranquility. This our conduct to justify and 
approve, especially as we come to request your 
alliance, our words shall first be employed, as 
we know that friendship can be of no long 
continuance in private life, nor public associa- 
tions have any stability, unless both sides engage 
with an opinion of reciprocal good faith, and 
are uniform in principle and manners. For out 
of dissonancy of temper, diversities of conduct 
continually result. 

" An alliance, it is true, was formerly made 
between us and the Athenians, when you 
withdrew yourselves from the Median war, 
and they staid behind you to complete what 
was yet to be done. We grant it — we made 
an alliance with the Athenians — not to enslave 
the rest of Greece to Athenians, but to de- 
liver Greece from the Barbarian yoke. And 
whilst they led us on in just equality, so long 
with alacrity we followed their guidance. But 
when once we perceived that they relaxed in 
their zeal against the Mede, and were grown 
earnest in riveting slavery upon allies, we then 
began to be alarmed. It was impossible, 
where so many parties were to be consulted, 
to unite together in one body of defence, and 
thus all the allies fell into slavery, except our- 
selves and the Chians. We indeed, left in 
the enjoyment of our own laws, and of nomi- 
nal freedom, continued still to follow them to 
war : but, from the specimens we had hitherto 
seen of their behaviour, we could no longer re- 
gard these Athenians as trusty and faithful 



96 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book nr. 



leaders. For it was not in the least probable, 
that after enslaving those who were compre- 
hended in the same treaty with ourselves, they 
would refrain from treating such as yet were 
free in the same tyrannic manner, whenever 
opportunity served. Had we all indeed been 
left in the free exercise of our own laws, we 
should then have had the strongest proof that 
the Athenians acted upon honest uninnovating 
principles. But now, when they have laid their 
yoke upon the greater number, though they 
still continue to treat us as their equals, yet 
undoubtedly it highly grates them ; and they 
cannot long endure, when such numbers couch 
beneath their power, that our state alone 
should stand up and claim equality. Nor it 
cannot be ! For the more their power hath 
swelled in bulk and strength, by so much are 
we become more desolate. - The only secure 
pledge of a lasting alliance is that mutual awe, 
which keeps the contracting parties in proper 
balance. For then, if any be disposed to make 
encroachments, he finds he cannot act upon 
advantage, and is eflfectually deterred. Our 
preservation hitherto hath not been owing 
to their honesty, but their cunning. Their 
scheme hath been, gradually to advance their 
empire by all the specious colourings of justice, 
by the road of policy rather than of strength. 
And thus we have been reserved to justify 
their violence, and to be quoted as a proof, 
that unless those whom they have enslaved had 
deserved their fate, a state upon an equal foot- 
ing with themselves would never have marched 
in conjunction with them to execute their ven- 
geance. By the same strain of policy, their 
first step was to lead out those that were strong- 
est against the weaker parties, designing to 
finish with them, when left destitute of any 
outward resource, by the prior reduction of the 
rest. Whereas, if they had begun with us, the 
confederate body remaining yet possessed of 
its strength, and able to make a stand, their 
enslaving project could not have equally suc- 
ceeded. They were besides under some appre- 
hension of our naval force, lest uniting with 
yours or any other state, such an accession 
might have endangered the whole of their plan. 
Some respite was also gained, from the respect 
we hiive ever shown to their whole community 
and to the scries of magistrates who have pre- 
sided amongst them. We knew, however, that 
we could not long hold out, had not this war 
come timely to our relief. We saw our own 



fate in the examples which had been made of 
others. 

" What friendship, therefore, what assurance 
of liberty could subsist, when, receiving each 
other with the open countenance, suspicion lay 
lurking within 1 — when, in war apprehensive 
of our power, to us they paid their court ; and 
we, from the same principle, paid our court to 
them in the season of tranquility 1 The bond 
of union, which mutual good-will cements in 
others, was in us kept fast by fear. For 
through the prevalence of fear, and not of 
friendship, we have thus long persisted in alli- 
ance. And whichever side security had first 
emboldened, that side would first have begun 
encroachments upon the other. Whoever 
therefore chargeth us with injustice for revolt- 
ing, whilst they were only meditating our ruin, 
and before we actually felt the miseries design- 
ed us, — that person chargeth us without a rea- 
son. For had our situation been such, that 
we could have formed equal schemes to their 
prejudice, and disconcerted all their projects, 
what necessity did we lie under to resign our 
equality and receive their lawl But, as the 
power of attempting was ever within their reach, 
we ought certainly to lay hold of every proper 
expedient to ward off the blow. 

" Such are the reasons, ye men of Lacedae- 
mon, and you their confederates, such the 
grievances which induced our revolt ; — reasons 
so clear, that all who hear them must justify 
our conduct — grievances so heavy, that it was 
time to be alarmed, and to look for some expe- 
dient of safety. We long since showed our in 
clination to find this expedient, when during 
the peace we sent you to negotiate a revolt, 
but by you rejected, were obstructed in our 
scheme. And now, no sooner did the Boeotians 
invite, than we without a pause obeyed the call. 
Now we have determined to make a double re- 
volt ;— one from the Grecians, no longer in con- 
cert with the Athenians to force the load of 
oppression upon them, but with you to vindi- 
cate their freedom — another from the Atheni- 
ans, that we may not in the train of affairs be 
undone by them, but timely vindicate our own 
safety. 

" Our revolt, we grant it, hath been too pre- 
cipitate and unprepared. But this lays the 
stronger obligation upon you to admit us to 
alliance, with the utmost expedition to send us 
succours, that you may show your readiness to 
redress the oppressed, and at the same instant 



YEAR IV.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



97 



annoy your foes. Such a juncture for this 
was never known before. What with the 
plague and the exorbitant expense of the war, 
the Athenians are quite exhausted. Their 
fleet is divided, some to cruise upon your coast, 
others to make head against us. It is not pro- 
bable they can have now the competent reserve 
of shipping, should you invade them a second 
time this summer both by land and sea; so 
that, either they must be unable, thus divided, 
to make head against you, if you singly attack 
them, or the union of us both they will not be 
able to face. 

" Let no one amongst you imagine, that this 
will be endangering your own domestic welfare, 
for the sake of foreigners with whom you have 
no connexion. For though Lesbos lies ap- 
parently at a great distance from you, yet the 
conveniences of it will lie near at hand for your 
service. For the war will not be made in At- 
tica, as such a one supposeth, but in those parts 
whence Attica deriveth its support. Their 
revenue ariseth from the tribute paid by their 
dependents. And that revenue will be increas- 
ed, if they can compass the reduction of us. 
For then not a soul will dare to revolt, and 
their own will be enlarged by the addition of 
our strength, and more grievous burdens will 
be laid upon us, as being the last who have 
put on their yoke. On the other hand, if with 
proper alacrity you undertake our support, you 
will gain over a state possessed of a consider- 
able navy, that acquisition you so greatly want ; 
and you will more easily be enabled to demolish 
the Athenians, by withdrawing their dependents 
from them : for then, every one of that number 
will with assurance and confidence revolt — and 
3'^ou yourselves be cleared of the bad imputation 
you at present lie under, of rejecting those who 
fly to you for protection. If, added to this, you 
manifest your views to re-establish the general 
freedom, you will so considerably strengthen 
the sinews of war, that all resistance will be 
unavailing. 

" Reverencing therefore as you ought, these 
hopes which Greece hath conceived of you ; — 
reverencing further Olympian Jove, in whose 
temple we now stand, like supplicants distress- 
ed and suing for redress — grant to the Mity- 
leneans the honour of your alliance, and under- 
take their protection. Reject not the entrea- 
ties of men, who have now indeed their lives 
and properties exposed to dangers merely their 
own, but whose deliverance from their present 
20 



plunge will reflect security and advantage upon 
all; and who, if you now continue to be deaf to 
their entreaties, must drop into such a ruin as 
will at length involve you all. At this crisis 
show yourselves to be the men, which the voice 
of Greece united in your praise and our dread- 
ful situation require you to be." 

In this manner the Mityleneans urged their 
plea; and the Lacedaemonians and confederates, 
having listened with attention, and owned them- 
selves convinced, admitted the Lesbians into 
their alliance, and decreed an incursion into 
Attica. To put this in execution, orders were 
issued to the confederates then present, expedi- 
tiously to march with two-thirds of their forces 
to the Isthmus. The Lacedaemonians them- 
selves arrived there first, and got machines ready 
at the Isthmus to convey their ships over-land 
from Corinth to the sea of Athens, that they 
might invade them at the same time both by 
land and sea. They indeed were eager and in- 
tent on the enterprise : but the other confed- 
erates were very slow in assembling together, as 
they were busy in getting in their harvest, and 
began to be sadly tired of the war. 

When the Athenians found that such prepara- 
tions were made against them, as an avowed 
insult on their imagined weakness, they had a 
mind to convince their foes that such imagina- 
tions were erroneous, and that they were well 
able, without countermanding their fleet from be- 
fore Lesbos, to make head against any force that 
could come from Peloponnesus. Accordingly, 
they manned out a hundred ships, obliging all, 
as well sojourners as citizens (those excepted 
of the first and second class)', to go on board. 

1 The original is, " except those who were worth 
five hundred medimns, and the horsemen or knights." 
The Athenians were ranged into classes by golon. Plu- 
tarch hath described the manner in the life of Solon, as 
thus translated in Potter's Antiquities of Greece, v. i. p, 
14. 

" Solon finding the peoplevariously affected, some in- 
clined to a monarchy, others to an oligarchy, others to 
a democracy, the rich men powerful and haughty, the 
poor men groaning under the burden of their oppression, 
endeavoured, as far as was possible, to compose all their 
differences, to ease the grievances, and give all reason- 
able persons satisfaction. In the prosecution of this 
design, he divided the Athenians into four ranks, accord- 
ing to every man's estate; those who were worth five 
hundred medimns of liquid and dry commodities he 
placed in the first rank, calling them Pentacosiomedini- 
ni. The next were the horsemen, or Ippcis, being such 
as were of ability to furnish out a horse, or were worth 
three liundred medimns. The third class consisted of 
those that had two haadred medimns, who were called 



98 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book ni. 



Showing themselves first before the Isthmus in 
great parade, they displayed their force, and 
then made descents at pleasure all along the 
coast. The Laceda>monians seeing them thus 
strong beyond what they had imagined, conclud- 
ed that the Lesbians had purposely amused 
them with fictions ; and being perplexed how 
to act, as their confederates were not yet come 
up to join them, and as information was brought 
them, that the first Athenian squadron, consis- 
ting of thirty sail, was laying waste the territory 
round about their city, they retired to their own 
homes. 

Afterwards they set about the equipment of 
a fleet to be sent to Lesbos ; and ordered the 
confederate cities to send in their contingents, 
the whole amounting to forty sail ; and further 
appointed Alcidas to be admiral in chief, who 
was ready to put himself at the head of the ex- 
pedition. The Athenians departed off the coast 
with their hundred sail, when they saw their 
enemies had retreated. 

During the time this fleet was out at sea, 
though the Athenians at the commencement 
of the war had as large, if not a larger number 
of ships, yet they never had their whole navy 
so completely fitted out for service and with 
so much pomp as now. One hundred of their 
ships were stationed for guards round Attica, 
and Eubcea, and Salamis ; and another hundred 
were coasting all along Peloponnesus, beside 
those that were at Potidaea, and in other parts, 
— insomuch that the whole number employed 
this summer amounted to two hundred and 
fifty sail. The expense of this, with that of 



Zeugitae. In the last he placed all the rest, calling them 
Tlietes, and allowed them not to ho cnpahle of hearing 
any office in the government, only gave them a liherty 
to give their votes in all puhlic assenihlies; which, 
though at the first it appeared inconsiderahle, was after- 
wards found to he a very important privilege; for it be- 
ing permitted every man after the determination of 
the magistrates to make an appeal to the people ns 
Bemhled in convocation, herehy it came to puss, that 
causes of the greatest weight and moment were hroughl 
before them. And thus he continued the power and 
magistracy in the hands of the rich men, and yet nei- 
ther exposed the inferior people to their cruelty and op- 
pression, nor wholly deprived them of havin^^ a share 
in the government. And of this equality lie Inmself 
niakea mention in this manner: 

Wlut power wm fit I did on all bnlow, 
Nnr raised the poor too high, nor pressed too low; 
The rich that ruled an., every cflice bore, 
Confined hjr laws lliey could not press Ihe poor: 
Both parlies 1 secured from lawless might, 
So OODC prevail'd upun anolbrr's right.' 

MrCrtKh. 



Potidaea, quite exhausted their treasure. For 
the pay of the heavy-armed who were stationed 
at Potidaea, was two drachmas a-day, each of 
them receiving a drachma' for himself and an- 
other for his servant. The number of the 
first body sent thither was three thousand, and 
not fewer than those were employed during the 
whole siege; — but the sixteen hundred who 
came with Phormio were ordered away before 
its conclusion. The whole fleet also had the 
same pay. \n this manner was their public 
treasure now for the first time exhausted — and 
such a navy, the largest they ever had, complete- 
ly manned. 

The Mityleneans, during the time the Lace- 
daemonians lay at the Isthmus, with a body of 
their own and auxiliaries, marched by land 
against Methymne, expecting to have it be- 
trayed to them. Having assaulted the place, 
and being disappointed in their expectations, 
they marched back by way of Antissa, and 
Pyra, and Eressus. In each of these places 
they halted for a while, to settle aflfairs in as 
firm order as possible, and to strengthen their 
walls, and then without loss of time returned to 
Mitylene. 

Upon their departure, the Methymneans 
marched out against Antissa. The Antisseans 
with a party of Auxiliaries sallying out to meet 
them, gave them a terrible blow, so that many of 
them were left dead upon the spot, and those who 
escaped made the best of their way back. 

The Athenians — advised of these incidents, 
and that further the Mityleneans were quite 
masters of the country, and that their own 
soldiers were not numerous enough to bridle 
their excursions — about the beginning of au- 
tumn, send a reinforcement of a thousand hea- 
vy-armed of their own people commanded by 
Paches the son of Epicurus. These having 
rowed themselves the transports which brought 
them, arrive; and build a single wall in circle 
quite round Mitylene, and on the proper spots of 
ground strengthened it by erecting forts. Thus 
was Mitylene strongly besieged on all sides, both 
by sea and land. — And by this time it began to 
be winter. 

But the Athenians, wanting money to carry 
on the siege, determined now to tax themselves, 
and by their first contribution raised' two 

« Seven pence three farthings. 

■» It was a voluntary contrihuiioii: the original term 
implieth it. The manner was no doubt thesiimeas was 
observed in succeeding times, when the neccsyiiies of 



YKIH IV.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



99 



hundred talents' for the present service ; and 
at the same time despatched twelve ships under 
the command of Lysicles and four colleagues 
to levy money abroad. He, intent on raising 
contributions, made a visit for this purpose to 
several places ; and, having landed at Myus in 
Caria, intending to pierce through the plain of 
Maeander as far as the hill of Sandius, he was 
attacked on his route by the Carians and Ansei- 
tans, where himself and a great part of his army 
perished. 

This winter the Plataeans — for they were still 
blocked up by the Peloponnesians and Boeo- 
tians — finding themselves much distressed by 
the failure of their provisions, giving up all hope 
of succour from the Athenians, and quite des- 
titute of all other means of preservation, formed 
a project now in concert with those Athenians 
who were shut up with them in the blockade, 
" first of all to march out of the town in com- 
pany, and to compass their escape, if possible, 
over the works of the enemy." The authors 
of this project were Thaeanetus the son of Ti- 
medes a soothsayer, and Eumolpidas the son of 
Daimachus, who was one of their commanders. 
But afterwards, half of the number, affrighted by 
the greatness of the danger, refused to have a 
share in the attempt. Yet the remainder, to 
the number of about two hundred and twenty, 
resolutely adhered to attempt an escape in the 
following manner : 

They made ladders equal in height to the 
enemy's wall. The measure of this they learn- 
ed from the rows of brick, where the side of the 
wall facing them was not covered over with 
plaster. Several persons were appointed to 
count the rows at the same time ; some of them 
might probably be wrong, but the greater part 
would agree in the just computation ; especial- 
ly as they counted them several times over, and 
were besides at no great distance, since the part 
marked out for the design was plainly within 
their view. In this method, having guessed the 
measure of a brick from its thickness, they 



the state called for an extraordinary supply. In such 
occasions, the president of the assembly laid before the 
Atheni.ins the present want of money, and exhorted 
them with cheerfulness and generosity to contribute to- 
wards the national support. Such as were willing rose 
up in turn sayin;;, " I contribute so much," and naming 
the sura. Such as, thouf^h rich, were niggardly and 
Rtrangers to all public spirit, sat silent on these occa 
eions, or, as fast as they could, stole out of the as- 
•cmbly. 

» je38,750. 



found out what must be the total height for the 
ladders. 

The work of the Peloponnesians was of the 
following structure : it was composed of two 
circular walls ; one towards Plata;a, and the 
other outward, to prevent any attack from 
Athens. These walls were at the distance of 
sixteen feet one from the other ; and this inter- 
mediate space of sixteen feet was built into 
distinct lodgments for the guards. These 
however, standing thick together, gave to the 
whole work the appearance of one thick entire 
wall, with battlements on both sides. At 
every ten battlements were lofty turrets of the 
same breadth with the whole work, reaching 
from the face of the inward wall to that of the 
outward ; so that there was no passage by the 
sides of a turret, but the communication lay 
open through the middle of them all. By night, 
when the weather was rainy, they quitted the 
battlements, and sheltering themselves in the 
turrets, as near at hand and covered over-head, 
there they continued their watch. Such was the 
form of the work by which the Platseans were 
inclosed on every side. 

The enterprising body, when every thing 
was ready, laying hold of the opportunity of a 
night tempestuous with wind and rain, and 
further at a dark moon, marched out of the 
place. The persons, who had been authors of 
the project, were now the conductors. And 
first they passed the ditch which surrounded 
the town ; then they approached quite up to 
the wall of the enemy, undiscovered by the 
guards. The darkness of the night prevented 
their being seen, and the noise they made in 
approaching was quite drowned in the loudness 
of the storm. They advanced also at a great 
distance from one another, to prevent any dis- 
covery from the mutual clashing of their arms. 
They were further armed in the most compact 
manner, and wore a covering only on the left 
foot for the sake of treading firmly in the mud. 
At one of the intermediate spaces between the 
turrets they got under the battlements, know- 
ing they were not manned. The bearers of 
the ladders went first, and applied them to the 
wall. Then twelve light-armed, with only a 
dagger and a breast-plate scaled, led by Ara- 
meas the son of Chorsebus, who was the first 
that mounted. His followers, in two parties 
of six each, mounted next on each side of the 
turrets. Then other light-armed with javelins 
succeeded them. Behind came others holding 



100 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book in. 



the bucklers of those above them, thus to faci- 
litate their ascent, and to be ready to deliver 
them into their hands, should they be obliged 
to charge. When the greater part of the num- 
ber was mounted, the watchmen within the tur- 
rets perceived it. For one of the Plata^ans, 
in fastening his hold, had thrown down a tile 
from off the battlements, which made a noise in 
the fall ; and immediately was shouted an alarm. 
The whole camp came running towards the 
wall, yet unable to discover the reason of this 
alarm, so dark was the night, and violent the 
storm. At this crisis the Plataeans, who were 
left behind in the city, sallied forth and assaulted 
the work of the Peloponnesians, in the part op- 
posite to that where their friends were attempt- 
mg to pass, from them to divert as much as 
possible the attention of the enemy. Great 
was the confusion of the enemy yet abiding in 
their posts, for not one durst leave his station 
to run to the place of alarm, but all were great- 
ly perplexed to guess at its meaning. At last 
the body of three hundred, appointed for a re- 
serve of succour upon any emergency, marched 
without the work to the place of alarm. Now 
the Ughted torches, denoting enemies, were 
held up towards Thebes. On the other side, 
the Plataeans in the city held up at the same 
time from the wall many of these torches already 
prepared for this very purpose, that the signals 
given of the approach of foes might be mistak- 
en by their enemies the Thebans, who judging 
the affair to be quite otherwise Uian it really 
was, might refrain from sending any succour, 
till their friends who had sallied might have 
effectuated their escape, and gained a place of 
security. 

In the meantime those of the Plataeans, 
who having mounted first, and by killing the 
guards had got possession of the turrets on cither 
hand, posted themselves there to secure the 
passage, and to prevent any manner of obstruc- 
tion from thence. Applying further their lad- 
ders to these turrets from the top of the wall, 
and causing many of their number to mount, 
those now upon the turrets kept off the ene- 
mies, running to obstruct them both above and 
below, by discharging their darts ; whilst the 
majority, rearing many ladders at the same 
time, and throwing down the battlements, got 
clean over at the intermediate space between 
the turrets. Every one, in the order he got 
over to the outward side, drew up upon the in- 
ner brink of the ditch, and from thence, with 



their darts and javelins, kept off those who 
were flocking towards the work to hinder their 
passage. When all the rest were landed upon 
the outside of the work, those upon the turrets 
coming down last of all, and with difficulty, 
got also to the ditch. By tliis time the reserve 
of three hundred was come up to oppose them, 
by the light of torches. The Platteans by this 
means, being in the dark, had a clear view of 
them, and from their stand upon the brink of 
the ditch, aimed a shower of darts and javelins 
at those parts of their bodies which had no ar- 
mour. The Plataeans were also obscured ; as 
the glimmering of lights made them less easy 
to be distinguished ; so that the last of their 
body got over the ditch, though not without 
great difficulty and toil. For the water in it 
was frozen, not into ice hard enough to bear, but 
in a watery congelation, the effect not of the 
northern but eastern blasts. The wind blowing 
hard, had caused so much snow to fall that night, 
that the water was swelled to a height not to be 
forded without some difficulty. However, the 
violence of the storm was the greatest further- 
ance of their escape. 

The pass over the ditch being thus com- 
pleted, the Plataeans went forward in a body, 
and took the road to Thebes, leaving on their 
right the temple of Juno built by Andocrates. 
They judged it would never be supposed, that 
they had taken a route which led directly towards 
their enemies : and they saw at the same time 
the Peloponnesians pursuing them with torches 
along the road to Athens, by Cythaeron and the 
'Heads of the Oak. For ^six or seven stadia 
they continued their route towards Thebes, 
but then turning short, they took the road 
to the mountains by Erythrae and Hysiae ; and 
having gained the mountains, two hundred and 
twelve of the number completed their escape 
to Athens. Some of them indeed turned back 
into the city, without once attempting to get 
over ; and one archer was taken prisoner at the 
outward ditch. 

The Peloponnesians desisted from the fruit- 
less pursuit, and returned to their posts. But 
the Plataeans within the city, ignorant of the 
real event, and giving ear to the assurances of 
those who turned back, that ♦• tliev are all to a 
man cut off," despatched a herald as soon as it 
was day to demand a truce for fetching off the 
dead ; but learning hence the true state of the 



Dryosccphaltp. 



' About half a mile. 



TEAR v.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



101 



affair, they remained well satisfied. And in this 
manner these men of Plataea, by thus forcing a 
passage, wrought their own preservation. 

About the end of this winter, Salaethus the 
Lacedaemonian was despatched in a trireme 
from Lacedaemon to Mitylene ; who being 
landed at Pyrrha, went from thence by land, 
and having passed the Athenian circumvallation 
by favour of a breach made in it by a torrent 
of water, gets undiscovered into Mitylene. 
His commission was, to tell the governors of 
the place, that " at the same time an incursion 
will be made into Attica, and a fleet of forty 
sail be sent to their relief, according to pro- 
mise ; that he himself was despatched before- 
hand, to assure them of these, and to take all 
proper care of other points." Upon this the 
Mityleneans resumed their spirits, and grew 
more averse to any composition with the Athe- 
nians. 

The winter was now past, and in this man- 
ner ended the fourth year of the war, of which 
^ Thucydides hath compiled the history. 

TEAR y^' 

Is- the beginning of the ensuing summer — 
after that the Peloponnesians had despatched 
Alcidas, admiral appointed, and the forty-two 
ships under his command, to the relief of Mi- 
tylene, with the most pressing orders — they 
and their confederates invaded Attica. Their 
design was, by this diversion to give the Athe- 
nians so much employ on all sides, that they 
might be unable to give any obstruction to their 
squadron bound for Mitylene. This present 
invasion was led by Cleomenes, who was his 
father's brother, in the right of Pausanias son 
of Pleistionax the king, but yet in his minority. 
They now utterly destroyed those parts of 
Attica that had been ravaged already. What- 
ever again began to flourish, and whatever had 
been spared in former incursions, now fell be- 
fore their fury. And this incursion, next to 
the second, was the sharpest they ever made 
upon the Athenians. For, having continued 
their stay so long, as to give time to their squad- 
ron to arrive at Lesbos, and send them news of 
their success, they had leisure to extend their 
devastations over almost all the country. But 
when all their expectations ended in disappoint- 
ment, and forage began to fail, they withdrew 
and were disbanded to their respective cities. 

» Before Christ 427. 



In the meantime the Mityleneans, when 
they saw nothing of the squadron from Pelo- 
ponnesus (which was loitering in the course,) 
and their provisions began to fail, are necessi- 
tated to capitulate with the Athenians upon 
this occasion — Salaethus, who had also himself 
given up all hopes of relief, causeth the popu- 
lace, who were before light-armed, to put on 
heavy armour, with a design to make a sally 
on the Athenians. But they, so soon as they 
had received their armour, would no longer 
obey their governors, but assembling together 
in bodies, ordered those in authority either pub- 
licly to produce what provisions they had, and 
divide equally among them, or otherwise they 
would immediately make their own terms with 
the Athenians, and give up the city. Those 
in command being sensible that they had not 
force sufficient to hinder this, and that their 
own danger would be extreme, should they by 
standing out be excluded the capitulation, join 
with them in procuring the following terms 
from Paches and the Athenians : 

" That it should be submitted to the people 
of Athens to determine as they please in rela- 
tion to the Mityleneans. 

" That the Mitylenians should immediately 
receive their army into the city — and despatch 
an embassy to them to know their pleasure. 

" That sufficient respite should be indulged 
for this, during which Paches should put no 
one Mitylenean in chains, should make none a 
slave, should put none to death." 

These were the terms of the surrender — But 
those of the Mityleneans who had been most 
active in all the negotiations with the Lacedae- 
monians, were thrown into the utmost conster - 
nation, and being quite in despair when the 
army took possession of the place, seat them- 
selves down at the altars for refuge. Paches, 
having ordered them to arise with a promise 
of protecting them from insults, sends them 
over to Tenedos, till he could know the pleasure 
of the Athenians. Having further despatched 
some triremes to Antissa, he took it in, and 
made all other dispositions he judged expedient 
in regard to his army. 

The Peloponnesians on board the squadron 
of forty ships, who ought to have made the ut- 
most expedition, but instead of that had loiter- 
ed upon the coast of Peloponnesus, and made 
the rest of the voyage in a leisurely manner, 
had proceeded so far as Delos, before their mo- 
tions were known at Athens. Being advan- 
O 



102 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book III. 



ced from Dclos to Icarus and Myconus, they re- 
ceive the first inteUigence that Mitylcnewas ta- 
ken. But being desirous of certain information, 
thej' sailed forwards to Embatus of Erythrsea. 
Mitylene had been taken about seven days be- 
fore they came up to Embatus. Here assured 
of the truth, they consuUed what was now to be 
done ; and Teutiaplus an Elean, gave his opin- 
ion thus : 

" To you, O Alcidas, and as many other 
Peloponnesians as are joined with me in the 
present command, I freely declare it to be my 
own opinion that we should sail to Mitylene, 
as we are, before the enemy is apprized of our 
arrival. It is probable, as they are so lately 
possessed of the city, we shall find it very re- 
missly and imperfectly guarded: and towards 
the sea entirely neglected, as on that side they 
cannot in the least expect the approach of an 
enemy, and our strength in that element is 
superior. It is probable also that their land- 
force is dispersed, in that negligent manner 
which victory indulgeth, into the scattered 
liouses of refreshment. If, therefore, we can 
come upon them by surprise and by night, I 
hope by the assistance of our friends within, if 
really within we have a friend remaining, to 
give a new turn to our affairs. Let us not be 
staggered at the danger of the attempt, but re- 
member, that all the turns of war arc owing to 
some such reverse as this ; which that comman- 
der who is most on his guard against, and w^lio 
can discern and seize such critical moments for 
assaulting his enemies, must be most frequently 
successful." 

his opinion thus, but it had no 

Alcidas. Some other persons, 

Ionia, and some Lesbians who 

on board, advised him further 



He 

effect 
exiles 
were 



gave 
upon 
from 
also 



— " That since he seemed to be discouraged 
by the apparent danger of that attempt, he 
should seize some city in Ionia, or Cyme in 
.^tolia; that by favour of such a hold for war, 
they might bring about the revolt of Ionia ; 
that in such a step success might justly be 
hoped, as his presence would be highly accept- 
able there : that, if they could cut off the very 
great revenue which accrued thence to the 
Athenians, the loss, added to the expense of 
endeavouring a recovery, must drain their trea- 
sure — That they further thought thry could pre- 
vail on Pisuthnes, to join with them in the war." 
But Alcidas would not listen to these pro- 
posals, and got a majority to support his own 



opinion — " That, since it was too late to suc- 
cour Mitylene, they should without loss of 
time return to Peloponnesus." Weighing 
therefore from Embatus, he put again to sea ; 
and touching at Myonesus of the Teians, he 
there butchered in cold blood a number of pri- 
soners, whom he had taken in the voyage. 
Putting afterwards into Ephesus, he was at- 
tended there by an embassy from the Samians 
of Ana;a representing to him — '< That it was 
no honourable method of vindicating the liberty 
of Greece, to butcher men who had not so 
much as lift up the hand against him, who were 
not enemies in heart, but of mere necessity de- 
pendent on the Athenians : that, unless he 
changed his conduct, he would bring over but 
few of his enemies into friendship, but turn a 
far greater number of friends into enemies." — 
He was wrought upon by this remonstrance, 
and set all the Chians and others, whom he 
had yet reserved, at liberty. For those who 
had at any time descried this squadron, had 
never thought of flying, but boldly approached 
it as certainly Athenian. They really had no 
ground to imagine, that whilst the Athenians 
were masters of the sea, a Peloponnesian fleet 
should dare to put over to Ionia. 

From Ephesus, Alcidas made the best of his 
way, or rather fled outright, for he had been 
discovered by the Salaminian and the Paralus, 
whilst he lay at anchor near Claros. These 
vessels happened at that time to be on a course 
from Athens. He was now apprehensive of a 
chase, and so stretched out to sea ; determining, 
if possible, not to make any land again till he had 
reached Peloponnesus. Notice of him came 
first to Paches and the Athenians from Erv- 
thrsea ; it was then repeated from all parts. 
For as the country of Ionia is quite unfortified, 
the sight of the Peloponnesians on that coast 
had struck a panic, lest, though their intention 
was not to continue there, they should at once 
assault and destroy their cities. The Salami- 
nian' also and Paralus, after they had descried 

» Tlicsc two vessels seem to have been the packets or 
y.irlits of tlie stnte of Athens. Their force was small 
in comparison of the ships of war. as they were chiefly 
desisncd for nimlWenessand expeiiition. They carried 
amhiissadors to and fro, went on all public errands 
whether of a civil or relipious nature, and transported 
majristrates and cenerals to and from their posts. They 
were navisated only by free born citizens of Athens, 
who besides rccciviuii more pay, esteemed it also ft 
greater honour to serve on board tUese vessels, wliicb 
were sacred. 



YEAR v.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



103 



liim at Claros, came voluntarily to notify the 
tidings. Paches set upon the chase with 
warmth, and pursued it as far as the isle of 
Latmos. But there giving up all hope of reach- 
ing him, he turned back again for his post ; and 
since he had not been able to come up with 
them by sea, thought a great point was carried 
in not finding them refuged in any harbour, 
where they must have been under a necessity 
to fortify their station, and oblige him to a re- 
gular procedure and attack. 

In sailing back he touched at Notium of the 
Colophonians, in which at this time the Colo- 
phonians resided, the upper city having been 
taken by Itamenes and the Barbarians who had 
broke in by favour of an intestine sedition. It 
was taken about the time that the Peloponne- 
sians made their second incursion into Attica. 
But in Notium a second sedition broke out, be- 
tween those who resorted thither for refuge and 
the old inhabitants. The latter having obtain- 
ed an aid of Arcadians and Barbarians from 
Pisuthnes, kept within a part separated b}'^ a 
transverse wall, and the management of affairs 
was in the hands of some Colophonians of the 
upper city, who were in the Medish interest, 
and had been received amongst them as an aid. 
But the former, who had resorted hither for 
refuge, and were a body of exiles, apply to Pa- 
ches for protection. He invited Hippias, the 
commander of the Arcadians within the trans- 
verse wall, to come out to a conference, assur- 
ing him, " if they came to no agreement, he 
would replace him within both safe and sound." 
Upon this Hippias came out: and Paches im- 
mediately put him under an arrest, but laid no 
bonds upon him. This done, he on a sudden 
assaults the wall ; by favour of the surprise 
carries it : and puts all the Arcadians and Bar- 
barians within to the sword. After this he re- 
placeth Hippias within, in the same state he had 
promised ; but when he had him there, imme- 
diately apprehends him again and shoots him to 
death with arrows. Notium he delivers into the 
hands of the Colophonians, excluding those on- 
ly who were in the interest of the Mede. In 
process of time, the Athenians having sent lea- 
ders thither on purpose, and declared Notium 
an Athenian colony, settled in it the Colopho- 
nians that were any where to be found, under 
the accustomed regulations. 

Paches, being returned to Mitylene, complet- 
ed the reduction of Pyrra and Ercssns; and 
ha\ing apprehended Salaethus the Laccda;mo- 



nian who had been concealed in the city, sends 
him to Athens along with those citizens of Mi- 
tylene from Tenedos, whom he had kept in 
safe custody there, and all others who appeared 
to have been concerned in the revolt. As an 
escort to these he sends away also the greater 
part of his army. With the remainder he him- 
self staid behind to regulate the affairs of Mity- 
lene and the rest of Lesbos, to the best of his 
discretion. 

When the authors of the revolt and Salaethus 
were arrived at Athens, the Athenians instant- 
ly put Salaethus to death. He made them 
many fruitless proposals to save his life ; and 
amongst the rest, that the siege of Platsea 
should be raised, which was still besieged by 
the Peloponncsians. They next entered into 
consultation, what should be done with the re- 
volters ; and in the warmth of anger decreed 
— "That not only those who were now at 
Athens should be put to death, but the same 
sentence should extend to all the men of Mi- 
tylene who were adult ; and the women and 
children be sold for slaves." They were ex- 
asperated against them not only because they 
had revolted, but because they had done it 
without the provocation which others had re- 
ceived in the rigour of their government. The 
Peloponnesian fleet added the greater impetu- 
osity to this their resentment as they had dared 
to venture so far as Ionia in aid of the rebels. 
For it plainly appeared to them, that the revolt 
had not been made without much previous de- 
liberation. In short, they despatch a trireme 
to notify their decree to Paches, with orders to 
see it put in immediate execution upon the Mi- 
tyleneans. 

The day following, repentance on a sudden 
touched their hearts, moved by the reflection, 
that they had passed a savage and monstrous 
decree in dooming a whole city to that destruc- 
tion, which was due only to the authors of the 
guilt. This was no sooner perceived by the 
Mitylenean ambassadors then residing at 
Athens, and such of the Athenians as inclining 
to mercy had a mind to save them, than they 
addressed themselves to the magistrates, beg- 
ging the decree might be again debated. Their 
request was the more easily granted, as the 
magistrates had discovered that the bulk of the 
city were desirous to have a second opportunity 
of declaring their sentiments. An assembly of 
the people is again convened, and various opin- 
ions were offered by different persons, till Clcou 



104 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book III. 



the son of Clcanetus, who in the former assem- 
bly had proposed and carried the murdering 
sentence, who in all other respects was the 
most violent of all the citizens, and at this 
time had by far the greatest influence over 
the people, stood forth again and spoke as fol- 
lows : — 

" Upon many other occasions my own expe- 
rience hath convinced me, that a democracy is 
incapable of ruling over others ; but I see it 
with the highest certainty now in this your 
present repentance concerning the Mityleneans. 
In security so void of terror, in safety so ex- 
empt from treachery, you pass your days with- 
in the walls of Athens, that you are grown 
quite safe and secure about your dependents. 
Whenever, soothed by their specious entreaties, 
you betray your judgment or relent in pity, 
not a soul amongst you reflects that you are 
acting the dastardly part, not in truth to confer 
obligations upon those dependents, but to en- 
danger your own welfare and safety. It is then 
quite remote from your thoughts, that your 
rule over them is in fact a tyranny, that they 
are ever intent on prospects to shake off your 
yoke — that yoke, to which they ever reluctantly 
submitted. It is not forgiveness on your part, 
after injuries received, that can keep them fast 
in their obedience, since this must be ever the 
consequence of your own superior power, and 
not of gratitude in them. 

" Above all, I dread that extremity of danger 
to which we are exposed, if not one of your de- 
crees must ever be carried into act, and we re- 
main for ever ignorant — that the community 
which uniformly abides by a worse set of laws, 
hath the advantage over another, which is fine- 
ly modelled in every respect, except in prac- 
tice ; — that modest ignorance is a much surer 
support than genius which scorns to be con- 
trolled ; — and that the duller part of mankind 
in general administer public affairs much bet- 
ter than your men of vivacity and wit. The 
last assume a pride in appearing wiser than the 
laws ; in every debate about the public good 
they aim merely at victory, as if there were no 
other points sufficiently important wherein to 
display their superior talents ; and by this their 
conduct they generally subvert the public wel- 
fare : the former, who are difTidcnt of their own 
abilities, who regard themselves as less wise 
than the laws of their country — though unable 
to detect the specious orator, yet being better 
judges of equity than champions in debate, for 



the most part enforce the rational conduct. 
This beyond denial is our duty at present ; we 
should scorn competitions in eloquence and wit, 
nor wilfully and contrary to our own opinion 
mislead the judgment of this full assembly. 

" For my part, I persist in my former decla- 
rations, and I am surprised at the men who 
proposed to have the affair of Mitylene again 
debated, who endeavour to protract the execu- 
tion of justice, in the interest of the guilty more 
than of the injured. For by this means the suf- 
ferer proceeds to take vengeance on the cri- 
minal with the edge of his resentment blunted ; 
when revenge, the opposite of wrong, the more 
nearly it treads upon the heels of injury, gen- 
erally inflicts the most condign punishment. 
But I am more surprised at him, whoever he 
be, that shall dare to contradict, and pretend to 
demonstrate, that the injuries done by the Mity- 
leneans are really for our service, and that our 
calamities are hardships on our dependents. 
He certainly must either presume upon his own 
eloquence, if he contends to prove that what 
was plainly decreed was never decreed ; or, 
instigated by lucre, will endeavour to seduce 
you by the elaborate and plausible artifice of 
words. In such contentions, the state indeed 
awards the victory to whom she pleaseth, but 
she sustains all the damage herself. You are 
answerable for this, Athenians — you, who 
fondly dote on these wordy competitions — you, 
who are accustomed to be spectators of speeches 
and hearers of actions. You measure the pos- 
sibility of future effects by the present eloquence 
of your orators ; you judge of actions already 
past, not by the certain conviction of your own 
eyes, but the fallible suggestions of your ears, 
when soothed by the inveigling insinuating 
flow of words. You are the best in the world 
to be deceived by novelty of wit, and to refuse 
to follow the dictates of the approved judicious 
speaker, — slaves as you are to whatever trifles 
happen always to be in vogue, and looking 
down with contempt on tried and experienced 
methods. The most earnest wish that the 
heart of any of j'our body ever conceived is, to 
become a speaker; if that be unattainable, you 
range yourselves in opposition against all who 
are so, for fear you should seem in judgment 
their inferiors. When any thing is acutely ut- 
tered, you are ready even to go before it with 
applause, and intimate your own preconception 
of the point, at the same time dull at discerning 
whither it will tend. Your whole passion, in- 



YEAR v.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



105 



a word, is for things that are not in reality and 
common life ; but of what passeth directly be- 
fore your eyes you have no proper perception. 
And, frankly, you are quite infatuated by the 
lust of hearing, and resemble more the idle 
spectators of contending sophists, than men 
who meet to deliberate upon public affairs. 
From such vain amusements, endeavouring to 
divert you, I boldly affirm that no one city 
in the world hath injured you so much as 
Mitylene. 

" Those who, unable to support the rigour of 
your government, or who, compelled to do it by 
hostile force, have revolted from you, I readily 
absolve. But for a people who inhabit an 
island, a fortified island ; who had no reason to 
dread the violence of our enemies, except by 
sea ; who even at sea, by the strength of their 
own shipping, were able to guard themselves 
against all attacks ; who enjoyed their own 
model of government, and were ever treated by 
us with the highest honour and regard — for such 
a people to revolt in this manner is never to be 
forgiven. Is not their whole procedure one 
series of treachery 1 Have they not rather 
made war upon than revolted against us 1 for 
revolt can only be ascribed to those who have 
suffered violence and outrage. Have they not 
further sought out our implacable foes, and 
begged to participate with them in our des- 
truction? This certainly is a much greater 
aggravation of guilt, than if merely on their 
own domestic strength they had rebelled against 
us. They would not be deterred by the cala- 
mities of their neighbours, who have frequently 
before this revolted, and been punished for it 
by a total reduction : nor would they so far 
acquiesce in present felicity, as not to hazard 
the dangerous reverse of misery. Audacious 
in regard to the future, presumptuous above 
their strength, but below their intention, they 
made war their choice, and in perferring vio- 
lence to the just observance of duty have placed 
their glory. For, though uninjured and un- 
provoked, the first moment they saw a proba- 
bility of prevailing, they seized it and rebelled. 

" It is the usual effect of prosperity, especi- 
ally when felt on a sudden, and beyond their 
hope, to puff up a people into insolence of man- 
ners. The successes of mankind, when attain- 
ed by the rational course, are generally of much 
longer continuance than when they anticipate 
pursuit. And in a word, men are much more 
expert at repelling adversity than preserving 
21 



prosperity. By this ought we long ago to have 
adjusted our conduct towards the Mityleneans, 
never distinguishing them above others with 
peculiar regard ; and then, they never would 
have been that insolent people we have found 
them now. For so remarkably perverse is the 
temper of man, as ever to contemn whoever 
courts him, and admire whoever will not bend 
before him. 

" Let condign punishments therefore be 
awarded to their demerits. Let not the guilt 
be avenged upon the heads of the few, and the 
bulk of offenders escape unpunished. The 
whole people to a man have rebelled against us, 
when it was in their power to have been 
sheltered here, and now again to be reinstated 
in their former seats. But they judged the 
danger would be lessened by the general con- 
currence with the few, and so all revolted in 
concert. 

" Extend further your regards to the whole 
body of your dependents ; for if you inflict the 
same punishments on those who revolt by com- 
pulsion of enemies, and who revolt on pure 
deliberate malice, which of them, do you think, 
will not seize the least pretext to throw off 
your yoke ; when, if he succeeds, his liberty is 
recovered, and, though he fails, the hurt is so 
easy to be cured 1 Besides this, our lives and 
fortunes will be endangered upon every single 
attempt which shall be made. Suppose we 
succeed, we only recover an exhausted ruinated 
city, but shall for the future be deprived of the 
revenue arising from it, the essence of our 
strength : but if we cannot prevail, we shall 
enlarge the number of enemies we already have ; 
and at a time when we ought to be employed 
in resisting our present adversaries, we shall be 
entangled in wars against our own dependents. 
We ought not therefore to encourage the hope, 
whether raised by the force of entreaty, or pur- 
chased by the force of corruption, that their 
errors are but the errors of men and shall 
therefore be forgiven. The damage they have 
done was not involuntary, but they have been 
deliberate determined villains : forgiveness is 
only for those who erred not by design. 

" Moved by the ardency and zeal of my for- 
mer plea, you made the decree ; and now I 
earnestly conjure you, not to repent of your 
own determinations, not to plunge yourselves 
in inextricable difficulties, through pity, through 
delight of hearing, and soft forbearance, the 
three most prejudicial obstacles of power. It 
o3 



106 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book ni. 



is just to show pity to those who arc its proper 
objects, and not to men who would never have 
felt compassion for us, nor to foes who of ne- 
cessity must be implacable. The orators, those 
delights of your ears, will have room in debates 
of lesser moment to catch at your applause, but 
should be silenced here, where they only can 
give the public a short-lived pleasure, whilst 
they embroil it with perplexities not easy to be 
surmounted, and themselves alone, in requital 
of speaking well, will be well rewarded for it. 
Forbearance, further, may be shown to those 
who are willing to be, and will for the future 
prove themselves, our friends ; but not to such 
inveterate souls as these, who, if suffered to 
live, will live only to wreak their malice against 
you. 

" I shall wave enlargements, and give you 
only one short assurance, that if you hearken 
to my admonitions, you will at the same time 
do justice to the Mityleneans and service to 
yourselves ; but if you resolve in any other 
manner, you will receive no thanks from them, 
and will establish the clearest evidence for your 
own condemnation. For, if these men had 
reason to revolt, it follows that you have ty- 
rannically ruled them. Grant the injustice of 
such a rule, but yet that you have presumed to 
be guilty of it ; — why then, upon the mere 
motive of interest, you ought now to chastise 
them beyond what is right, or immediately to 
forego your power, and dropping yourselves 
down into impotent security, to set about the 
practice of humanity and virtue. But adieu to 
this vain expedient ! and at once resolve to 
make them feel that weight of misery they 
designed for us. Convince them that those 
who have escaped it can feel as strong resent- 
ments as those who projected the fatal blow. 
Determine now, by recollecting with yourselves 
what kind of usage you would have received 
from them, had they succeeded in their plots ; 
they ! the uninjured, unprovoked aggressors. 
It is an allowed truth, that men who without 
the least provocation have recourse to acts of 
malice, will be sated with nothing less than com- 
plete destruction, as they must ever be terrified 
at the sight of a surviving foe. For he who 
suffers from a quarter whence he never deserv- 
ed it, will not so easily lay down his resent- 
ments, as when mutual enmity hath kindled 
the contention. Be not therefore traitors to 
your ownselves. Figure to yourselves, as 
strongly as you can, the miseries they designed 



you ; remember how you wished for nothing 
in this world so much as to have them in your 
power, and now retaliate upon them. Relent 
not at the scene of horror imagination may 
present to your fancy, but fix your remembrance 
fast on that weight of misery which was just 
now suspended over your own heads. Punish 
these wretches according to their deserts ; 
make them a notable example to the rest of 
your dependents, that death must be the por- 
tion of whoever dares revolt. For when once 
they are certain of this, your arms will be no 
more recalled from your foreign enemies, to be 
employed in the chastisement of your own de- 
pendents." 

In this manner Cleon' supported the decree, 
and when he had concluded, Diodotus the son 
of Eucrates, who in the former assembly had 
most strenuously opposed the bloody sentence 
against the Mityleneans, stood forth, and thus 
replied : — 

" I neither blame those who proposed the 
resumption of the decree against Mitylene, nor 
do I praise the men who inveigh against re- 
peated consultations on points of the greatest 
importance. But I lay it down for certain, 

» From the short sketch of Cleon's character given 
before by Thucydides, and the speech he hath now 
made, it is likely he can be no favourite with the reader. 
Cicero hath styled him "a turbulent hut eloquent Athe- 
nian." By means of his eloquence, and an impudence 
that never could be dashed, he was now a prime favour- 
ite with the people, but the scorn and terror of all good 
men at Athens. He had ever been a snarlcr at Pericles, 
hut so long as he lived could obtain no share in the pub- 
lic administration. He had now got the ascendant by 
en joling the people, and by his loud and daily invectives 
against their ministers and commanders. He will make 
a very splendid and very despicable figure in the sequel. 
Aristophanes, who had a particular f:rud2C against him, 
hatli exhibited him in the most dissracefiil light. Hid 
comedy of the Horsemen or Knights is entirely employ- 
ed 10 show him off. He calls him throughout the 'Paph- 
lagonian,' to brand his low and brutal disposition, who, 
" quitting his oricinal trade of sclliii!: Icatlicr, vile lea- 
ther, since people rather swam than walked in the shoes 
made of it, was now become the leading politician, the 
scourge and post of the republic." The chorus of the 
play salutes him with the most villainous titles. And 
an oracle is cooked up, which prophesicth that they 
shall never get rid of Cleon, till he is overpowered by a 
creator scoundrel than himself. A dealer in blnck-pud- 
dings is at last procured to be his competitor. The con- 
test is carried on with all the ribaldry and scurrility 
that unbridled wit could forge for such characters, and 
Cleon is at lensth defeated. This is the event upon the 
stage, but was by no means so in the state of Athens. 
The wit of Aristophanes seldom hurt knaves and 
scoundrels; it wounded and was mischievous only to 
the ablest ministers and the \varuic;U patriots. 



YEAR v.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



107 



that there are no two greater impediments of 
sound mature counsel than precipitation and 
anger ; of which, the one is closely connected 
with madness, the other with raw inexperience 
and short Umitary judgment. 

" It may indeed be warmly asserted, that 
words are not the proper guides to actions. 
But the author of such an assertion is either 
wanting in discernment, or confines it only to 
his own selfish views. He is wanting in dis- 
cernment, if he imagines there is any other pos- 
sible method of putting light into things that 
are future or unseen ; or confines it only to 
himself, if willing to recommend a scandalous 
measure, and conscious he hath not eloquence 
enough to support it openly, he launcheth out 
into plausible calumnies, to intimidate his op- 
ponents as well as his audience. 

" But odious beyond all support is their pro- 
cedure who prematurely condemn the advice 
of others as purchased and corrupt. For would 
they only acquiesce in the charge of ignorance, 
the defeated opponent goes oflf with the bare 
character of a man less enlightened indeed, 
but quite as honest. If he be charged with 
corruption, his point he may carry, but his 
honesty will ever be suspected : and if his 
point be lost, he must pass for knave and block- 
head both. Such methods can never be con- 
ducive to the public good. The men best 
able to advise, are by this means intimidated : 
though the public welfare would then be best 
secured, if every person of so disingenuous a 
temper was not able to open his mouth ; for 
then, by his seducements, the public could 
never be misled. But it is the duty of every 
true patriot to despise the slanders of oppo- 
nents, and on fair and impartial views to get his 
own advice accepted. It is the duty of every 
well-regulated public, not indeed to load a man 
■with honours for having given the best advice, 
but, never to abridge him of his present por- 
tion ; and if he cannot prevail, by no means to 
disgrace, much less to punish him : for then, 
neither would the successful debater, from a 
view of enhancing his own personal honours, 
ever speak against conscience, or aim merely 
at applause ; nor would he, who hath been un- 
successful in his motions, be greedy of propos- 
ing whatever may cajole, and so earn popularity 
for himself. But the method in vogue with us 
is the reverse of this ; and what is worse, if a 
person be suspected of corruption, though he 
advise the most prudent expedients, yet the 



odium raised against him upon the weak sug- 
gestion of lucre, quite weighs him down, and 
we are deprived of the manifest service he could 
do to the state. Nay, such is our method, 
that even the best advice, if readily oifered, can 
escape suspicion no more than the worst. And 
hence it is necessarily incumbent, as well upon 
him who would persuade the public into the 
most prejudicial measures, to seduce the peo- 
ple with art ; as upon him who would advise 
the best, to disguise the truth in order to pre- 
vail. Amidst these jugglings, the public alone 
is debarred the service of its most able counsel- 
lors, since in a plain and open method they can- 
not possibly act, and artifice must clear the 
way before them. For the man who openly 
bestows any benefit upon it, is constantly sus- 
pected of doing underhand a greater to himself. 

" When affairs therefore of so high concern 
are before you, when the general temper is so 
over-run with jealousy, we, who presume to 
advise, must enlarge our prospect farther than 
you, who only assist at a transient consulta- 
tion ; because we are accountable for what we 
propose, and you are not accountable for the 
prejudices with which you hear. For if not 
only he who proposed, but he who complied, 
were equally answerable for events, your deter- 
minations would be better framed than they 
are at present. But now, hurried along as you 
are by your hasty resentments on any sinister 
event, you wreak your fury only upon the single 
opinion of the person who advised, and not 
upon your own joint opinions, by concurrence 
of which the miscarriage was incurred. 

" For my part, I neither stand up to deny 
certain facts in favour of the Mityleneans, nor 
to waste the time in fruitless accusations. We 
are not debating now what wrongs they have 
done us, since that would be a reproach to 
sense ; but what determination about them is 
best. For, though I can prove, beyond a scru- 
ple, that they have injured us in the most out- 
rageous manner, yet I shall not for that reason 
advise you to butcher them, unless it be expe- 
dient ; nor, were they objects of forgiveness, 
should I advise forgiveness, unless I judged it 
for the interest of the public. I apprehend, 
that our consultations turn more upon a future 
than a present view. And Cleon here most 
confidently asserts, that the surest expedient 
of your future welfare is, to prevent all other 
revolts by inflicting death in doom of this ; but, 
equally confident of the just expedient of future 



108 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book ni. 



security, I dcclar§ quite on the other side. 
And I entreat you, by no means to reject the 
real advantage of mine for the specious colour- 
ings of his advice. Strict justice, I grant, may 
be with him ; and, enraged as you are against 
the Mityleneans, may have a sudden influence 
upon you. But we meet not here in judgment 
upon them, and justly to decide is not now our 
employment ; we are only to consult how to 
dispose of them best for our own advantage. 

" In the public communities of men, death 
is the penalty awarded to several crimes, to 
such as are not enormous like this, but of a less 
guilty nature. Yet puffed up with hope, men 
run all hazards, and no one ever yet hath boldly 
incurred the danger, if self-convinced before- 
hand, that he could not survive the attempt. 
Where was the city so bent on revolt, that, 
when its own domestic strength, or the aid of 
others, were judged unequal to the work, durst 
ever attempt it 1 The whole of mankind, whe- 
ther individuals or communities, are by nature 
liable to sin : and a law of infallible prevention 
will never be enacted. Men by repeated trials 
have enforced all kinds of punishment, attentive, 
if possible, to restrain the outrages of the wick- 
ed. And in the early age it is probable, that 
milder penalties were assigned for the most 
enormous wrongs ; but, being found by expe- 
rience ineffectual, they were afterwards extend- 
ed generally to loss of life : this however is not 
yet effective. Some terror therefore must be 
invented, even more alarming than this, or this 
will never sutficiently restrain. But then there 
is a poverty which renders necessity daring ; 
there is a power which renders pride and inso- 
lence rapacious. There are other contingen- 
cies, which, in the fervour of passions, as every 
human mind is possessed by some too stubborn 
to admit a cure, drive them on boldly to con- 
front extremities. But the greatest incentives 
of all are hope and love : this points out a path, 
and that moves along according to direction : 
this thoughtlessly proposeth the scheme, and 
that immediately suggcsteth a certainty of suc- 
cess. These are the sources of all our evils ; 
and these invisible principles within us are too 
strong for all the terrors that are seen without. 
To these add fortune, who contributes her am- 
ple share to divest the mind of its balance. 
She shows herself by unexpected starts, and 
encourageth even the incomprtent to venture 
dangers, and hath a greater influence over com- 
munities, as the ends proposed by them are 



of the greatest concern, such as liberty or do- 
minion, where every individual, amidst the uni- 
versal ardour, unaccountably plumes himself up, 
and acts with a spirit above himself. But in 
truth, it is quite impossible ; it is a proof of 
"egregious folly to imagine, when human nature 
is impelled by its own impetuous passions to- 
wards such objects, that the force of laws or 
arty intervening terror is strong enough to di- 
vert them from the mark. Hence therefore 
ariseth the strongest dissuasive to us from con- 
fiding in the penalty of death as the only pledge 
of our future safety, which must betray us into 
weak prejudicial measures, which must drive 
all revolters into utter despair, by showing them 
plainly, that we shall never accept repentance, 
shall not give them one moment's indulgence 
to palliate their offences. 

" Consider with yourselves, in the merciful 
light, that a revolted city, when for certainty 
assured that it cannot hold out, may submit 
upon our own conditions, whilst yet in a ca- 
pacity to reimburse our expenses, and to ad- 
vance the future tribute. But in the opposite 
case, can you imagine there is any city which 
will not better prepare itself for revolt than 
Mitylene hath done, and hold out a siege to 
the last extremity 1 Is there no difference be- 
tween a quick and a slow submission ] Shall 
not we be hurt, if forced through their despair 
to continue a tedious and expensive siege ; and, 
when the place is taken, to be masters only of 
one heap of desolation, unable for the future 
to squeeze the least pittance or revenue from 
it 1 It is revenue alone which renders us a 
terror to our foes. We ought not therefore 
with the rigour of judges to inflict the exactest 
punishments upon these offenders. W e ought 
rather to provide for futurity, and by moderate 
correction still to preserve those cities in a full 
capacity of paying us the needful tribute. To 
keep men firm in their duty, we should scorn 
the expedient of severe and sanguinary laws, 
since mild discretionary caution would better 
answer the purpose. This prudent conduct we 
are now reversing, if, when re-possessed of a 
city stripped of its former liberty and ruled with 
violence, sufllicient motives of evolt, that it 
may again become independent ; if now we judge, 
that this ought to be avenged with a weight of 
severity. Men who have known what liberty 
is, ought not to be too severely chastised, if they 
have dared to revolt ; but we ought to observe 
them with timely vigilance before they revolt. 



YEAR v.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



109 



to prevent their taking the least step towards 
it or even once entertaining a thought about it; 
at least, when we have quelled the insurrection, 
the guilt should be fastened upon as few as 
possible. 

" Consider, I beseech you, with yourselves, 
how greatly you will err in this, and in another 
respect, if Cleon's advice be approved. For 
now, the populace of all the cities are gene- 
rally well-alFected towards us. They either re- 
fuse to concur with the few in their revolts ; 
or, if their concurrence be forced, they instant- 
ly turn enemies to those who forced them ; — 
and you proceed to determine the contest, as- 
sured that the populace of the adverse city 
will be active in your favour. But if you doom 
to general excision the people of Mitylene, 
those who had no share in the revolt — who, 
when once they had got arms into their hands, 
spontaneously delivered up the place ; — you 
will be guilty, first, of base ingratitude, for mur- 
dering your own benefactors, — and you will, 
next, establish such a precedent, as the factious 
great above all things wish to see. For then, 
whenever the latter effect the revolt of cities, 
they will instantly have the people attached to 
their party ; since you yourselves have enforced 
the precedent, that punishment must fall upon 
the heads, not only of the guilty, but even of 
the innocent. Whereas, indeed, though they 
had been guilty, we ought to have dissembled 
our knowledge of it, that we might not force 
the only party which ever takes our side into 
utter enmity and aversion. And I esteem it 
much more conducive to the firm support of 
empire, rather to connive at the wrongs we may 
have felt, than in all the severity of justice to 
destroy those persons whom in interest we 
ought to spare. And thus, that union of jus- 
tice to others and duty to yourselves in this in- 
stance of punishing the Mityleneans, as alleged 
by Cleon, is plainly found to be grossly incon- 
sistent, to be utterly impossible. 

« Own yourselves therefore convinced, that 
the greatest advantages will result from the 
conduct which I have recommended; and, 
without giving too wide a scope to mercy or 
forbearance, by which I could never suffer you 
to be seduced, follow my advice, and in pur- 
suance of it resolve — <To judge and condemn, 
at your own discretion, those guilty Mitylene- 
ans whom Paches hath sent hither to attend 
your decisions, and to let the others continue as 
thej are.' These are expedients of your fu- 



[ ture welfare, and of immediate terror to your 
foes. For they who can form the soundest de- 
liberations, stand stronger up against hostile op- 
position, than the men who rush to action with 
indiscreet unpremeditating strength." 

Diodotus ended here. And when these two 
opinions, diametrically opposite to one another, 
had been thus delivered, the Athenians had a 
stiff contest in support of each, and upon hold- 
ing up of hands there seemed near an equality ; 
but the majority proved at last to be along with 
Diodotus. 

Upon this they immediately sent away an- 
other trireme, enjoining all possible despatch, 
lest this second, not coming in time, might 
find the city already destroyed, as the other had 
got the start of a day and a night. The Mit}-- 
lenean ambassadors amply furnished them with 
wine and barley- cakes and promised thetn 
great rewards if they arrived in time. By 
this means they were so eager to accelerate the 
passage, that even whilst plying the oar they 
eat their cakes dipped in wine and oil ; and 
whilst one half of the number refreshed them- 
selves with sleep, the others kept rowing amain. 
So fortunate were they that not one adverse 
blast retarded their course. The former vessel, 
as sent on a monstrous errand, had not hasten- 
ed its passage in the least ; and the latter was 
most intently bent on expedition. That indeed 
got before to Mitylene, but only long enough 
for Paches to read over the decree, and give or- 
ders for its immediate execution. At that crisis 
the latter arriveth, and prevented the massacre. 
To such an extremity of danger was Mitylene 
reduced. 

The other Mityleneans, whom Paches had 
sent to Athens as deepest concerned in the re- 
volt,' were there put to death, according to the 
advice of Cleon. And the number of these 
amounted to somewhat above a thousand. 

The Athenians, further, demolished the walls 
of Mitylene and took away their shipping. 
They did not for the future enjoin an annual 
tribute upon the Lesbians, but dividing the 

» We hear no more in this history of Paches, who 
certainly in the reduction of Lesbos had done a great 
service to his country, and liad behaved through the 
whole affair with great discretion and humanity. And 
yet Plutarch tells us in two passages, (in the lives of 
Aristides and Nicias) that at his return he was called 
to account for his conduct during his command, and 
finding he was going to be condemned, his resentment 
and indignation rose so high Ihat he instantly slew liim- 
self in court. 



no 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book III. 



whole island into shares (except what belonged 
to Mcthyrnne), three thousand in the whole, 
they set apart three hundred of these as sacred 
to the gods, and sent some of their own people, 
who were appointed by lot, to take possession 
of the rest, as full proprietors. The Lesbians, 
as tenants of these, were obliged to pay them 
two minse' yearly for every share, in considera- 
tion of which they had still the use of the soil. 
The Athenians also took from them several 
towns upon the continent, which had belonged 
to the Mityleneans, and which continued after- 
wards in subjection to the Athenians. Thus 
ended the commotions of Lesbos. 

The same summer after the reduction of 
Lesbos — the Athenians, commanded by Nicias^ 
the son of Niceratus, executed a design upon 

» £6 9s. 2d. sterling. 

a Nicias is now for the first time in the chief command, 
who is to act parts of very great importance in the se- 
quel of tlie war. \Vc should therefore take some notice 
of him on his first appearance. Plutarch, who hath 
wrote liis life, gives light into several circumstances, 
which fall not within the cognizance of a general his- 
torian, [le was born of a noble family in Athens, and 
was one of the most wealthy citizens. Besides his estates, 
he had a larje annual income from the silver mines at 
Laurium. Not that those mines belonged to him, as 
one would infer from Plutarch; for they were the patri- 
mony of the state, annexed to it hy Thcmistocles for 
the support of the navy: hut, as Xenophon relates in 
his treatise of revenue, Nicias had a thousand slaves 
constantly employed in workini:! these mines. He hired 
them out to Sosias the Thracian, who was undertaker 
of the work, on condition to receive a clear ohole aday 
for every one of them; and he always kept up the num- 
ber. His income from hence was therefore near jC2000 
sterling a-year. He acted under Pericles so long as he 
lived, and after his death, was set up by tiie more so- 
ber and sensible Athenians as a balance to Cleon, who 
was the idol of the people. Nicias was a true lover of 
his country, of unblemished integrity, and very gentle 
and complacent in his manners. His good qualities 
were numerous and shining: his foibles were, a great 
diffidence of himself, and a dread of the people, which 
made him court them by laying out his wealth in public 
games and shows for their entertainment. He had an 
inward fund of real piety; hut was superstitiously at- 
tached to the ceremonial of the reliL'ion of his country. 
His great wealth drew a great number of followers and 
parasites about him; and his benevolent disposition was 
always seeking occasions of doing good. In short, says 
Plutarch, "bad men had a suie fund in his pusillani- 
mity, and good men in Ills humanity." Noliody could 
either hate or fear him at Athens, and therefore his in- 
terest there was great. Ho was always cautions, and 
always difiident, and under such an awe of the pcoitle 
in the general assemblies, that they would stiout out to 
him by way of encouracemcnt, as his mod<'siy was ami- 
able and engasring when opposed to the impudence of 
Cleon. — Thus much may suthcc at present, since his 
military expeditions and the whole of his political con- 
duct will be related by Thucydidcs. 



Minoa, the island which lies before Megara. 
The Megareans, having built a fort upon it, 
used it as a garrison. But it was the scheme 
of Nicias, to iix the post of observation for the 
Athenians there, as being much nearer situated, 
and to remove it from Budorus and Salamis. 
This would prevent the sudden courses of the 
Peloponnesians, frequent from thence ; would 
curb the piratical cruises ; and, at the same 
time, stop all importations into Megara. Be- 
ginning therefore with the two forts detached 
from Nisaea, he took them by means of the 
engines he played against them from the sea ; 
and having thus opened the channel between 
them and the island, he took in by a wall of 
fortification that part of the mainland from 
whence, only by crossing the morass and the 
help of a bridge, a succour could be thrown 
into the island, which lay at a very small dis- 
tance from the continent. This work was 
completed in a few days, after which Nicias, 
leaving behind in the island a sufficient garrison 
to defend the works, drew ofl' the rest of his 
army. 

About the same time this summer, the Pla- 
ta;ans, whose provisions were quite spent, and 
who could not possibly hold out any longer, 
were brought to a surrender in the following 
manner. The enemy made an assault upon 
their wall, which they had not sufficient strength 
to repel. The Lacedaemonian general being 
thus convinced of their languid condition, was 
determined not to take the place by storm. In 
this he acted pursuant to orders sent him from 
Lacedsemon, with a view that whenever a peace 
should be concluded with the Lacedemonians, 
one certain condition of which must be recipro- 
cally to restore the places taken in the war, 
Platsea might not be included in the restitution, 
as having freely and without compulsion gone 
over to them. A herald is accordingly des- 
patched with this demand — " Whether they are 
willing voluntarily to give up the city to the 
Lacedaemonians, and accept them for their 
judges who would ]punish only the guilty, and 
contrary to forms of justice not even one of 
those." — The herald made this demand aloud. 
And the Platteans, who were now reduced to 
excessive weakness, delivered up the city. 

The Peloponnesians supplied the Platscans 
with necessary sustenance for the space of a 
few days, till the five delegates arrived from 
Lacedajinon to preside at their trial. And yet, 
when these were actually come, no judicial 



YEAR v.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



Ill 



process was formed against them. They only 
called them out, and put this short question to 
them — " Whether they had done any service to 
the Lacedaemonians and their allies in the pre- 
sent war 1" — Their answer was, "That they 
begged permission to urge their plea at large ;" 
which being granted, they pitched upon Asty- 
machus the son of Asopalaus, and Laco the 
son of Aeimnestus, who had formerly enjoyed 
the public hospitality of the Lacedaemonians, 
to be their speakers, who stood forth and plead- 
ed thus : 

« Placing in you, Lacedaemonians, an en- 
tire confidence, we have delivered up our city ; 
but never imagined we should be forced to such 
a process as this, when we expected only to be 
tried by justice and laws — when we yielded to 
plead, not before other judges as is now our 
fate, but only before yourselves. Then indeed 
we thought that justice might be obtained. — 
But now we have terrible grounds for appre- 
hending, that we have at once been doubly 
overreached. Strong motives occur to alarm 
our suspicions, that the point most in view is 
to deprive us of our lives, and that you will 
not prove impartial judges. We cannot but be 
too certain of this, when no manner of crime 
is formally objected, against which we might 
form our defence ; when barely at our own en- 
treaty we are heard, and your concise demand 
is such, that if we ansv/er it with truth we con- 
demn ourselves ; if with falsehood, must be in- 
stantly refuted. 

" Thus on all sides beset with perplexities, 
something of necessity must be said in our own 
behalf; nay, where the danger is so urgent, 
the only small glimpse of security appears in 
hazarding a plea. For persons like us distress- 
ed, in silence to abandon their own defence — 
this may with sad compunction torture them 
at last, as if their safety might have been earn- 
ed by speaking for themselves — though never 
was persuasion so much to be despaired of as 
at present. Were we indeed, who are the per- 
secuted party, entirely unknown to our judges, 
we might then allege such evidence as through 
ignorance you could not overturn, and so fur- 
ther our defence. But now we must speak be- 
fore men who are informed of every point. 
Nor do our fears result from the prior know- 
ledge you have had of us, as if you were now 
proceeding against us for having in valour been 
inferior to yourselves ; but from our own sad 
forebodings, that we are cited to a tribunal 



which hath already condemned us to gratify 
others. Yet, what we can j ustly say for our- 
selves in regard to all our differences with the 
Thebans, we shall boldly allege ; the good ser- 
vices we have done to you and the rest of 
Greece we shall fairly recite — and strive, if 
possible, to persuade. 

" To your concise demand — Whether we 
have done any good service in this war to the 
Lacedaemonians and their allies ? — we answer 
thus : If you interrogate us as enemies, though 
we have done you no good, yet we have done 
you no harm ; if you regard us as friends, you 
have offended more than we, in making war up- 
on us. — In regard to the peace and against the 
Mede, we have ever honestly performed our 
duty : the peace was not violated first by us 
against him; we alone of all the Boeotians at- 
tended you in the field to maintain the liberty 
of Greece. For, though an inland people, we 
boldly engaged in the sea-fight at Artemisium ; 
and in the battle fought upon this our native 
ground, we assisted you and Pausanias; and 
whatever the danger to which Greece, in that 
troublesome period of time, was exposed, in 
all we bore a share beyond our strength. To 
you in particular, O ye Lacedaemonians, in that 
greatest consternation Sparta ever felt, when 
after the earthquake your rebellious Helots had 
seized upon Ithome, we immediately despatch- 
ed the third part of our force for succour. 
These things you are bound in honour never 
to forget. For thus upon former, and those 
most critical occasions, we with honour showed 
ourselves your friends. — But at length we be- 
came your enemies ! — For that blame only 
yourselves: because when we stood in great 
want of support against the violence and op- 
pression of the Thebans, to you we applied, 
and by you were rejected. You commanded 
us then to address ourselves to Athens. Athens, 
you said, was near, but Sparta lay too remote 
to serve us. Yet, notwithstanding this, in the 
present war we have committed no one disho- 
norable act in regard to you, nor should ever 
have committed. You enjoined us indeed to 
revolt from the Athenians, and we refused to 
comply ; but in this we have done no injustice. 
For they marched cheerfully to our succout 
against the Thebans, when you shrunk back ; 
and to betray them afterwards had been base in 
us ; in us, who were highly indebted to them, 
who at our own request were received into their 
friendship, and honoured by them with the 



112 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book in. 



freedom of Athens. No, it was rather our 
duty boldly to advance wherever they pleased 
to order. And whenever either you or the 
Athenians lead out your allies into the field, 
not such as merely follow you are to be censur- 
ed for any wrong you may respectively com- 
mit, but those who lead them out to its com- 
mission. 

" Manifold and notorious are the instances 
in which the Thebans have injured us. But 
outrageous above all is the last, about which 
you need no information, since by it we are 
plunged into this depth of distress. A right 
undoubtedly we had to turn o]^ avenging arms ' 
upon men, who, in the midst of peace, and what 
is more, upon the sacred monthly solemnity, 
fj.'ioniously seized upon our city. We obeyed 
herein that great universal law, which justifieth ' 
self-<lefence against a hostile invader ; and 
therefore cannot with any appearance of equity, ' 
be now doomed to punishment at their own in- 
stigation. For, if your own immediate inter- 
est, and their present concurrence with you in 
war, is to prescribe and regulate your sentence, 
you will show yourselves by no means fair 
judges of equity, but partially attached to pri- 
vate interest. What though these incendiaries 
seem now a people well worth your gaining 1 
there was a season, a most dangerous and criti- 
cal season, when you yourselves, and the other 
Grecians, were in different sentiments. Now 
indeed, incited by ambition, you aim the fatal 
blow at others ; but at that season, when the 
Barbarian struck at enslaving us all, these 
Thebans were then the Barbarian's coadjutors. 
And equitable certainly it is, that our alacrity at 
that season should be set in the balance against 
our present transgressions, if transgressors at 
present we have been. You then would find 
our greater merits quite outweighing our petty 
offences ; and our merits to be dated at a time 
when it was exceeding rare to see Grecian 
bravery ranged in opposition to the power of 
Xerxes ; when praise was ascribed, 'not to those 
who, intent on self-preservation, dropped all 
the moans of withstanding his invasion, but 
who chose, through a series of danger, coura- 
geously to execute the most glorious acts. Of 
this number are we, and as such have been, 
pre-eminently, most honourably distinguished. 
And yet, from this original we fear our ruin 
now may have taken its rise, as we chose to 
follow the Athenians from a regard to justice, 
rather than you from the views of interest. 



But 80 long as the nature of things continues 
to be the same, you also ought to convince the 
world, that your sentiments about them are not 
changed, that your principles still suggest it to 
you as your greatest interest, that whenever your 
gallant compatriots have laid upon you an obli- 
gation strong enough to be eternally in force, 
something on every present occurrence should 
be done for us by way of just acknowledg- 
ment. 

" Reflect further within yourselves, that you 
are now distinguished by the body of Greece 
as examples for upright disinterested conduct. 
Should you therefore determine in regard to 
us what in justice cannot be supported — for 
the eyes of the world are now intent on your 
proceedings, and as judges applauded for their 
worth you sit upon us whose reputation is 
yet unblemished : take care that you do not 
incur the general abhorrence, by an indecent 
sentence against valuable men, though you 
yourselves are more to be valued ; nor repo- 
site in her common temples those spoils you 
have taken from us the benefactors of Greece. 
How horribly will it seem for Platsea to be 
destroyed by Lacediemonians ; that your fa- 
thers inscribed the city upon the tripod of 
Delphos in justice to its merit, and that you 
expunged its very being from the commu- 
nity of Greece to gratify the Thebans ! To 
such excess of misery have we been ever ex- 
posed, that if the Medes had prevailed we must 
have been utterly undone ; and now must be 
completely ruined by the Thebans, in the pre- 
sence of you who were formerly our most cor- 
dial friends ! Two of the sharpest, most pain- 
ful trials we are to undergo, who but lately, 
had we not surrendered our city, must have 
gradually perished by famine ; and now stand 
before a tribunal to be sentenced to death. 
Wretched Platseans, by all mankind abandon- 
ed ! We, who beyond our strength were once 
the supports of Greece, are now quite desti- 
tute, bereft of all redress ! Not one of our old 
allies to appear in our behalf; and even you, 
O ye Laceda:>monians, you our only hope, as we 
have too much reason to apprehend, determined 
to give us up. 

" But. by the gods, who witnessed once the 
social oaths we mutually exchanged ! by that 
virtue we exerted for the general welfare of 
Greece ! by those we adjure you to be moved 
with compassion, and to relent, if with the 
Thebans you are combined against us ! In 



TEAR v.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



113 



gratitude to us, beg the favour of them, that 
they would not butcher whom you ought to 
spare; demand such a modest requital from 
them for your base concurrence, and entail not 
infamy upon yourselves, to give others a cruel 
satisfaction. To take away our lives will be 
a short and easy task ; but then, to efface the 
infamy of it, will be a work of toil. You have 
no colour to wreak your vengeance upon us as 
enemies, who have ever wished you well, and 
bore arms against you in mere self-defence. 
Your decisions can in no wise be righteous, 
unless you exempt us from the dread of death. 
Recollect in time, that you received us by free 
surrender, that to you we held forth our hands ; 
the law forbids Grecians to put such to death ; 
and that we have been from time immemorial 
benefactors to you. For cast your eyes there 
upon the sepulchres of your fathers, who fell 
by the swords of the Medes, and were interred 
in this our earth: these we have annually ho- 
noured with vestments, and all solemn decora- 
tions at our public expense. Whatever hath 
been the produce of our soil, to them we have 
ever offered the first-fruits of the whole ; as 
friends, out of earth that was dear to them ; as 
companions, to those who once fought together 
in the same field ; and, lest all this by a wrong 
determination you instantly disannul, mature- 
ly reflect. For Pausanias interred them here, 
judging he held laid them in a friendly soil, and 
in the care of men with friendly dispositions. 
If therefore you put us to death, and turn this 
Plataean into Theban soil, what is this but to 
leave your fathers and relations in a hostile 
land, and in the power of those who murdered 
them, never again to receive the sepulchral ho- 
nours'? Will you further enslave the spot 
on which the Grecians earned their liberty] 
Will you lay desolate the temples of those 
gods to whom they addressed their vows before 
that battle against the Medes, and so were vic- 
torious? And, will you abolish the solemn 
sacrifices, which those gallant patriots have 
founded and anointed? 

" It cannot, O Lacediemonians, be consistent 
with your glory, to violate the solemn institu- 
tions of Greece, the memory of your own fore- 
fathers, and your duty to us your benefactors, 
thus, merely to gratify the malice of a hostile 
party, to put men to death who have never 
wronged you. No ; but — to spare, to relent, 
to feel the just emotions of compassion, to re- 
call the idea not only what miseries we are de- 
22 



signed to suffer, but what persons they are for 
whom they are designed; and to remember the 
uncertain attack of calamity; upon whom, and 
how, undeservedly, it may fall ! To you, as in 
honour and necessity too obliged we address 
our entreaties ; invoking aloud the gods whom 
Greece at her common altars and with joint 
devotion adores, — to accept our plea : alleging 
those oaths which your fathers have sworn, — 
to pay them reverence. We are suppliants now 
at the sepulchres of your fathers, we call upon 
the dead reposited there, to be saved from The- 
bans, that the kindest of friends, as we have 
been, may not be sacrificed to the most deadly 
foes. Again, we recall to memory that day, in 
which having performed the most splendid 
achievements in company with them, we are 
yet this day in danger of the most deplorable 
fate. Conclude we must — though it is hard 
for men in our distress to conclude ; when the 
very moment their words are ended, their very 
lives are most imminently endangered : yet still 
we insist that we surrendered not our city to 
the Thebans, rather than that we should have 
chose the most miserable end by famine ; but 
confiding in you, into your hands we gave it. 
And highly fitting it is, that if we cannot pre- 
vail, you should reinstate us in it, and leave us 
there at our own option to take our fate. But 
once more we conjure you, that we, who are 
citizens of Platasa, who have showed ourselves 
the most steady patriots of Greece, and now, 
O Lacedsemonians, your suppliants, — may not 
be turned over, out of your hands, out of your 
protection, to the Thebans, our unrelenting 
enemies ; — that you would become. our saviours, 
and not doom to utter destruction the men to 
whom all Greece is indebted for her freedom." 
In this manner the Platseans spoke ; and the 
Thebans, fearing lest their words might work 
so far upon the Lacedaemonians as to cause 
them to relent, stood forth, and declared a de- 
sire to be also heard; « since the Platseans, as 
they conceived, had been indulged in a much 
longer discourse, than was requisite to answer 
the question." Leave accordingly was given, 
and they proceeded thus : 

" We should not have requested your atten- 
tion to any thing we had to offer, if these Platse- 
ans had replied in brief to the question, and had 
not run out into slander and invective against 
us ; — if they had not defended themselves in 
points quite foreign to the purpose, and not at 
all charged against them as crimes; and launched 



114 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book in 



forth into their own praise, uncensured and 
unprovoked. But now it is incumbent upon 
us, in some points to contradict and in 
some to refute, to prevent the bad elFects which 
might result, either from the criminations ut- 
tered against us, or the pompous praise they 
have bestowed upon themselves ; that you, un- 
der proper information with whom the greater 
truth remains, may fairly decide between us. 

" Our enmity against them we openly avow, 
as it proceeded from just and honourable mo- 
tives ; since to us, who were the founders of 
Plataea, after we had gained possession of 
BoBotia and of other towns as well as Plataea, 
which, after being purged from extraneous mix- 
tures, remained in our jurisdiction, — these men 
disdained to pay submission, and scorned origin- 
al and fundamental laws. They wilfully divi- 
ded from the other Boeotians, transgressing the 
laws of their country, and, when likely to be 
forced back into their duty, they went over to 
the Athenians, and in concert with them accu- 
mulated wrongs upon us, which have since been 
justly retaliated upon them. 

« But, when the Barbarian invaded Greece, 
they were the only Boeotians who did not join 
the Mede. — This they allege, and hence they 
arrogate applause to themselves, and lavish 
their calumnies upon us. We grant indeed 
they did not join the Mede ; and the reason 
was, because the Athenians did not join him. 
Yet afterwards, when with the same all-grasp- 
ing ambition the Athenians invaded Greece, 
they were the only Boeotians then who joined 
those Athenians. But consider further the re- 
spective situation from which such conduct 
ensued in both. Our city at that time was not 
administered by the few who presided with an 
equal and steady rule, nor directed by the gene- 
ral voice of the people. Its state was such, as 
with laws and policy is quite incompatible ; it 
bordered close upon a tyranny : the encroach- 
ing ambition of a handful of men held fast pos- 
session of it. These, with no other view than 
the strong establishment of their own private 
authority in the success of the Mede, by force 
overawed the people, and opened their gates 
to the invader. This was not the act of a 
whole city, of a city master of its own conduct ; 
nor ought she to be reproached for offences 
committed in despite of her laws. But on the 
other hand, when the Mode was once repulsed 
and the city repossessed of her ancient polity, 
you ought then to consider — fresh invasions 



being formed by the Athenians, projects at- 
tempted to bring the rest of Greece and our 
dominions also into their subjection, sedition 
fomented amongst us, by favour of which they 
seized the greater part — Whether in the field of 
Coronea we fought them and prevailed, recover- 
ed the liberty of Boeotia, proceed even now 
with all alacrity to regain their liberty for others, 
supplying them with horse and all other mili- 
tary provision, far beyond any other confeder- 
ate. Such is the apology we make for all the 
charge against us in having joined the Mede. 
But — that you have been the most outrageous 
foes to Greece, and are most deserving of what- 
ever punishment can be inflicted upon you, we 
shall next endeavour to demonstrate. 

" In order to procure some revenge on us, it 
is your own plea, < you became confederates and 
citizens of Athens.' — Be it so. You ought 
then to have marched in their company only 
against us ; you ought not to have followed 
them in their expeditions against others. Had 
your own wills been averse to attend them on 
these occasions, it was always in your power 
to have recourse to that Lacedaemonian league, 
in which you concurred against the Mede, and 
about which you make at present the greatest 
parade. That would have been amply sufficient 
to turn aside our enmity from you; and, what 
is above all, had securely enabled you to rectify 
your measures. But it was not against your 
will, neither was it upon compulsion, that you 
have solely adhered to the Athenians. 

" But, then you rejoin — « It was base to be- 
tray your benefactors.' — Yet it was much more 
base and more enormous to betray at once the 
whole body of Grecians, with whom you had 
sworn a mutual defence, than the single Atheni- 
ans : the Athenians truly have enslaved your 
country ; and the others would regain its free- 
dom. You have not made your benefactors 
the requital which gratitude enjoined, or which 
is exempted from reproach. — ' Injured and op- 
pressed, you applied,' it is pretended, «to 
them for redress ;' — and then you co-operat- 
ed with them in oppressing others. But it 
is not more dishonourable to be wanting in 
any act of gratitude, how justly soever it 
may be due, than to make the return in a 
manner in itself unjust. You yourselves by 
acting thus have afforded undeniable proofs, 
that you alone did not join the Mede from a 
zeal for the Grecians, but merely because the 
Athenians did not join him. You were desir- 



YEAR v.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



115 



ous to act in concert with the latter, but in | 
opposition to the former; and now modestly 
claim to be recompensed by your country, for 
all the iniquitous services you have done to a 
party. But justice will never suffer this. To 
Athenians you gave the preference, strive 
therefore from them to obtain redress. Cease 
vainly to allege the mutual oaths you once ex- 
changed, as if they were obliged at present to 
preserve you : — you renounced, you violated 
first those oaths, who rather concurred to en- 
slave the iEginetse and some other people of the 
same association, than endeavoured to prevent 
it ; and all without compulsion ; still happy in 
the uninterrupted possession of your own rights, 
and not compelled to receive law from others, 
as was our fate. Nay, to the very last moment, 
before this blockade was formed against you, 
when we calmly invited you to be quiet and 
neutral, you insolently refused. Which there- 
fore is the people, on whom all Greece may 
fasten her hatred more deservedly than on you, 
who have made it a point to exert your bravery 
in ruining your country] Those former good 
dispositions you have so largely boasted, you 
have now shown plainly to be repugnant to 
your genius. What your natural turn hath 
ever been, the event hath with truth ascertain- 
ed. The Athenians took the road of violence, 
and you attended them through all the journey. 
—And thus, ample proof hath been exhibited 
by us, that against our wills we served the 
Persian, and that you with most cheerful dis- 
position have promoted the Athenian tyranny. 
" But in regard to your finishing charge 
against us as guilty of excessive outrage and 
injustice : — that, contrary to every law, in the 
midst of peace, on a day of sacred solemnity, 
we seized upon your city — this great offence, 
in our opinion, is less to be imputed to us than 
to yourselves. Had we marched indeed against 
your city in a hostile manner, had we scaled your 
walls and put your property to fire and sword, 
the charge had then been just. But if men of 
the first rank amongst you both for wealth and 
birth, desirous to put a stop to your foreign 
combinations, and recall you to the common in- 
stitutions of all Boeotians ; if such at their own 
free motion invited our presence, wherein are 
we unjustl for the leaders, in all cases, are great- 
er transgressors than the followers. Though, 
in the present, neither are they in our judg- 
ments, nor are we, transgressors. They were 
citizens as well as you ; they had larger con- 



cerns at stake ; and therefore, opening their 
gate and receiving us within their walls as 
friends and not as foes, they intended to pre- 
vent the corrupted part of your body from 
growing worse, and protect the worthy and 
good according to their merit. They calmly 
studied the welfare of your minds and your 
bodies, not suffering your city to become an 
alien, but recovering it again to its duty and 
relations, exempting it from being the foe of 
any honest Grecian, and re-uniting it in the 
bonds of amity with them all. — There are 
proofs besides, that we did not intermeddle in 
a hostile manner. We did no manner of vio- 
lence to any one : we proclaimed aloud, that 
" whoever was desirous to conform to the 
primitive institutions of all Boeotians, should 
come and join us." — You heard our voice with 
pleasure; you came in and entered into articles 
with us ; you remained for a time without dis- 
turbance ; but at length, having discovered the 
smallness of our number, and then perhaps we 
were judged to have proceeded inhumanly in 
presuming to enter without the consent of your 
populace, you then returned us not such treat- 
ment as you had received from us, you made 
no remonstrances against innovations, nor 
persuaded us to depart, but in open breach of 
articles you rushed upon us. We lament not 
here so much the death of those whom you 
slew in this base attack upon us ; some colour 
of law might be alleged for their destruction : 
but when, contrary to every law, in cold blood, 
you murdered men who had spread their arms 
for mercy, and had surrendered themselves 
prisoners on promise of their lives, — was not 
that a monstrous act? In one short interval of 
time you were guilty of three outrageous 
enormities, an infraction of articles, the suc- 
ceeding butchery of our people, and a breach 
of the solemn promise made to us, that you 
would not kill them, provided we refrained 
from plundering your lands. Yet still you cry 
aloud, that we are the breakers of law ; you 
still remonstrate, that you are not debtors to 
justice. It is false. The point, we presume, 
will soon be determined right : and for these, 
for all offences, you shall have your reward. 

" We have thus distinctly run over this af- 
fair, for your sakes, O ye Lacedemonians, as 
well as for our own ; that you may be convin- 
ced with how much equity you are going to 
condemn them, and that we have pursued the 
offenders upon yet stronger obligations of jus* 



116 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book m. 



tice. Let not the recital of their former 
virtues, if virtues truly they ever had, mollify 
your hearts. Virtue should he pleaded by men 
who have suffered ; but, on those who have 
committed baseness, it should redouble their 
punishment, because they sin in foul contra- 
riety to their former selves. Let them not save 
themselves by lamentations and pathetic com- 
plaints, though they cried out so movingly 
upon the sepulchres of your fathers, and their 
own destitute forlorn condition. For, to stop 
their cries, we have proved against them, that 
OUT youths, when butchered by them, met with 
a more cruel and unjust fate : those youths, 
some of whose fathers, reconciling Boeotia 
with you, died in the field of Coronea ; the 
rest, now advanced in years, bereft of their 
children, their houses desolate, prefer a suppli- 
cation far more just to you, to avenge them 
upon these Plataeans. Those are most de- 
serving of pity, who have suffered some great 
indignity ; but when vengeance is duly inflicted 
on such men as these Plataeans, the world hath 
cause to triumph. Their present destitute for- 
lorn condition is the work of themselves. They 
wilfully rejected a better alliance; and, though 
uninjured, broke every law against us; execu- 
tioners of hatred more than justice, though now 
about to suffer less than the precedent they 
set requireth. For they shall be executed by 
lawful sentence ; not like men who with stretch- 
cd-out hands obtained fair quarter, as they de- 
icribe themselves, but who surrendered on this 
condition — to submit to justice. 

"Avenge therefore, Lacedaemonians, the 
law of Greece, so grossly violated by them. 
Retaliate all the injuries we have suffered, re- 
quiting so that cheerful friendship we have ever 
shown you ; and let not their flow of words 
overturn our just demands. Make now a pre- 
cedent for Greece hereafter to follow. Show 
them, that decisions must be formed, not ac- 
cording to what men may say, but according to 
what they have done : if their actions have 
been right, that a short simple narration may at 
any time suffice ; but, if those actions have 
been wrong, that all studied ornamental periods 
are intended to disguise the truth. If those 
who preside at judgments, as you at present, 
would proceed in a summary way, to a general 
determination against the guilty, little room 
would be left to disguise unjustifiable actions 
by plausible speeches." 

In this manner the Thebans replied ; and 



the Lacedaemonian judges agreed in the resolu- 
tion, that the question, — " Whether they had 
received any good service from them in the 
warl" — was properly and fairly conceived. 
They grounded this, upon the former proposal 
made to them to remain neutral, according to 
the old treaty of Pausanias after the Medish 
invasion, and upon another more lately, which 
they had offered before they had blocked them 
up, to be common friends to both sides in con- 
formity to the same treaty. But after this dou- 
ble refusal, looking upon themselves as no 
longer bound to observe those articles, which 
others had deliberately infringed to traverse 
their interest, — they now proceed again to 
bring them forwards man by man, and put the 
question — " Whether they had done good ser- 
vice to the Lacedemonians and allies in the 
present war 1" — and upon their answering 'No,* 
led them aside and slew them. Not one of 
the number did they exempt ; so that in this 
massacre there perished of Platseans not fewer 
than two hundred, and twenty-five Athenians 
who had been besieged in their company ; and 
all the women were sold for slaves. The 
Thebans assigned the city, for the space of a 
year, to be the residence of certain Megareans, 
who had been driven from home in the rage of 
a sedition, and to those surviving Plataeans 
who had been friends to the Theban interest. 
But afterwards they levelled it with the earth, 
rooted up its whole foundation, and near to 
Juno's temple erected a spacious inn, two hun- 
dred feet square, partitioned within both above 
and below into a range of apartments. In this 
structure they made use of the roofs and doors 
that had belonged to the Plataeans ; and of the 
other moveables found within their houses, of 
the brass and iron, they made beds, which they 
consecrated to Juno, in whose honour they also 
erected a fane of stone one hundred feet in 
diameter. The land being confiscated to pub- 
lic use, was farmed out for ten years, and occu- 
pied by Thebans. So much, nay, so totally 
averse to the Plataeans were the Lacedaemoni- 
ans become ; and this, merely to gratify the 
Thebans, whom they regarded as well able to 
serve them in the war which was now on foot.' 



« Thiicydidcs hath here been very sparing of his ccn- 
sure. Nothinc had enough ran he said of tlic linrcdic- 
inonian behaviour on this orrasion. To pnl l>rave men 
to death coolly and deliberately, who had most pallantijr 
defended themselves, and merely for tlieir steady at- 
tachment to liberty and the Athenians, ivere hated by 



TEAR v.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



117 



And thus was the destruction of Plataea com- 
pleted in the ninety-third year of its alliance 
with Athens. 

The forty sail of Peloponnesians, which had 
been sent to the relief of Lesbos, after flying 
through the open sea to avoid the pursuit from 
Athens, were driven by a tempest on the coast 
of Crete ; and from thence they separately 
dropped into Cyllene, a Peloponnesian harbour, 
where they find thirteen triremes of Leucadi- 
ans and Ambraciots, with Brasidas the son of 
Tellis sent thither purposely to assist Alcidas 
with his counsel. It was now the project of 
the Lacedaemonians, since they had miscarried 
at Lesbos, to augment their fleet, and sail im- 
mediately for Corcyra, now embroiled in sedi- 
tion, as there were no Athenians in those parts, 
excepting only twelve ships which were station- 
ed at Naupactus — and thus their design might 
be effectuated, before a fleet large enough to 
obstruct them could be sent from Athens. — 
This was their plan, and Brasidas and Alcidas 
prepared for its execution. 

The Corcyreans were now embroiled in a 
sedition, excited by the return of the prisoners, 
whom the Corinthians had taken in the naval 
engagements of Epidamnus. They had obtain- 
ed their release, as was publicly given out, for 
the sum of eighty talents,^ for the payment of 
which their former friends at Corinth had 
joined in a security ; but, in fact, for a secret 
promise they had made the Corinthians, to put 
Corcyra into their hands. To fulfil their en- 
gagements they tampered with every single Cor- 
cjTean in order to bring about a revolt from the 
Athenians. An Athenian and Corinthian 
ship arrived at the same time with ambassadors 
on board. These were admitted together to 
an audience, at which the Corcyreans decreed 
" to maintain their alliance with the Athenians 
according to treaty, — but to be friends to the 
Peloponnesians as in preceding times." Py- 

the Thebans, shows the public spirit of Spartans at this 
time to have been none at all. — The city of Platsea, thus 
barbarously demolished, was rebuilt after the peace of 
Antalcidas, which put an end to the Peloponnesian war. 
But not long after, it was again demolished by the The- 
bans, for a refusal to join them against the LacediEmoni- 
ans. However, Alexander the Great once more re-es- 
tablished it, in a generous acknowledgement of the ser- 
vices that little state had rendered to Greece; and the 
Plataeans continued even in the time of Plutarch, to 
celebrate the annual festival in honour of those, who at 
the famous battle of Plataea had died for the liberties of 
Greece. 

« jE 15,500 sterling. 



thias, who at that time was at the head of the 
people, entertained and lodged the Athenians 
without the public warrant. And therefore 
against him the accomplices prefer an accusa- 
tion, as plotting how to subject Corcyra to 
Athenian slavery. Pythias being acquitted, 
in his turn exhibits a charge against five of the 
most considerable of their number, for having 
cut pales in the sacred grove of Jupiter and 
Alcinus. The fine for every pale was by law 
a stater.'' Being condemned to pay the whole, 
they fled into the temples and sat down as sup- 
plicants, in hope to obtain a mitigation of their 
fine, which was quite exorbitant. Pythias, 
who was also strong in the senate, gets a fiesh 
order to have it levied in all the rigour of law. 
Thus debarred of any legal redress, and con- 
scious further that Pythias, so long as he con- 
tinued in the senate, would prevail upon the 
people to declare those their friends and those 
their foes who were so to Athens, — they rise 
up from the sanctuary, and seizing daggers rush 
suddenly into the senate-house, where they 
stab Pythias and others both senators and pri- 
vate persons, to the number of sixty. Some 
few indeed who were the adherents of Pythias, 
saved themselves on board the Athenian vessels 
which yet lay in the harbour. 

After this bold assassination, they summon- 
ed the Corcyreans to assemble immediately, 
where they justified their proceedings " as most 
highly for the public good, and the only expe- 
dient of preventing Athenian slavery ;" — advis- 
ing them " for the future to receive neither of 
the rival parties, unless they came peacefully 
in a single vessel ; if in more to declare them 
enemies ;" and in conclusion they forced the 
ratification of whatever they had proposed. 
They also instantly despatch ambassadors to 
Athens, representing the necessity they lay un- 
der to act as they had done, and to persuade those 
who had fled for refuge thither, not to rush into 
such measures as might hurt the welfare of 
their country, from a dread of the miseries 
which might thence ensue. 

When these ambassadors were arrived at 
Athens, the Athenians laid them and all their 
adherents under an arrest as enemies to the 
state, and sent them prisoners to ^gina. 

In the meantime, those of the Corcyreans 
who had thus seized the government, animated 
by the arrival of a Corinthian trireme and a 



» £1 Os. 9d. 



f2 



118 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book ni. 



Lacedaemonian embassy, attack the people and 
overpower them in battle. The people, by 
favour of the night which approached, fly to 
the citadel and more elevated parts of the city, 
where they drew up together and secured their 
posts; they also got possession of the Hyllaic 
harbour. But their opponents seized the fo- 
rum, where most of their own houses were situ- 
ated, and the harbour which points towards the 
forum and the continent. 

The day following they skirmished a little 
with their missive weapons, and both parties 
sent out detachments into the fields, to invite 
the concurrence of the slaves, upon a promise 
of their freedom. A majority of slaves came 
in to the assistance of the people, and th(»other 
party got eight hundred auxiliaries from the 
continent. 

After one day's respite they come again to 
blows. The people get the better now, by the 
advantage of their strong posts and their num- 
bers. The women with notable boldness as- 
sisted in the combat, by throwing tiles from 
the tops of the houses, and sustaining the tu- 
mult beyond their sex. About the close of the 
evening, the few were forced to fly, and then, 
apprehensive lest the people should rush down 
upon, and so at a shoUt seize the dock and put 
them to the sword, in order to stop their pass- 
age they set fire to the houses all round the 
forum and to such as were adjacent, sparing ' 
neither their own nor those of their enemies. , 
The large effects of the merchants were con- ' 
sumed in the flames, and the whole city was in ' 
danger of being reduced to ashes, had a gale of ! 
wind arose to drive the flame that way. This 
put a stop to the contest, and brought on a ces- 
sation, when both sides applied themselves to 
strict guard for the night. The Corinthian 
vessel, after this victory on the side of the peo- 
ple, stole privately away ; and many of the 
auxiliaries, who crept off unperceived, repassed 
to the opposite shore. i 

The day following, Nicostratus the son of 
Diotrephes, who commanded the Athenian 
squadron, comes up to their assistance with his 
twelve sail from Naupactus and five hundred 
heavy-armed Messcnians. He forthwith nego- ! 
tiated an accommodation, and persuades them 
to make up the affair with one another, by in- 
stantly condcmninu: the ten principal authors 
of the sedition (who immediately fled), and 
pcrniitting all others to continue in the city, 
<]pon articles signed between both parties and , 



the Athenians — " To have the same friends and 
the same foes." Having so far carried his 
point, he was intent on immediate departure. 
But the managers for the people made him a 
proposal, to leave five ships of his squadron 
with them, to deter the enemy from any fresh 
commotion, which should be replaced by five 
of their own, which they would instantly man 
to attend him on his station. With this pro- 
posal he complied ; and they named distinctly 
the mariners, who to a man were of the op- 
posite party. Affrighted at this as a pretext 
to convey them to Athens, they sit down in the 
temple of the Diosuri. Nicostratus endeavour- 
ed to raise them up and to cheer their despon- 
dency. Yet all he could say was unavailing; 
and the people ran again to arms, pretending 
that such a refusal to put to sea was a plain 
proof, that their intentions were insincere 
throughout. Then they rifled their houses of 
all the arms they could find ; and some of them 
who fell into their hands had immediately been 
butchered, if Nicostratus had not interposed. 

A second party, terrified at these proceed- 
ings, take their seats also as suppliants in the 
temple of Juno. The number of these was 
not less than four hundred. The people, grown 
now apprehensive of some fatal turn, persuade 
them to leave their sanctuary ; and having 
prevailed, transport them into that island which 
faceth the temple of Juno, whither every thing 
needful for their sustenance was carefully sent 
them. 

The sedition continuing in this posture, 
about the fourth or fifth day after the transpor- 
tation of the latter body into that island, the 
Peloponnesian ships, which had assembled at 
Cyllene after the voyage of Ionia, appear in 
sight to the number of fifty-three. Alcidas 
was commander-in-chief as before, and Brasidas 
attended as his council. They came to anchor 
in the harbour of Sybota on the main ; and next 
morning, at break of day, steered directly for 
Corcyra. 

Great was the tumult now at Corcyra : they 
were afraid of the malcontents within, and the 
hostile fleet approaching the city. They got 
sixty ships immediately on float, and each so 
fast as it was manned advanced to meet the foe. 
THie Athenians indeed proposed to put out first 
to sea themselves ; and that the Corcyreans 
should aftcr\\'ards come out and join them, 
when they had got all their ships together. 
But, as they advanced in a straggling manner 



YEAR v.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



119 



\owards the enemy, two ships went directly 
over to them ; and on board others the mari- 
ners were at blows with one another. In short, 
there was no manner of order in any of their 
motions. The Lacedaemonians, perceiving 
how it was, with twenty of their ships drew 
up to engage the Corcyreans, and opposed 
the remainder to the twelve Athenian, two of 
which were only the Salaminian and the Paralus. 

The Corcyreans, who charged in this disor- 
derly manner, and with few ships in a line, were 
on their side terribly distressed ; while the 
Athenians, fearing lest the other,vastly superiour 
in number, might quite surround their little 
squadron, would not venture to attack them 
•when altogether, nor to break upon the mid- 
dle of the enemy's line ; but, assaulting them 
towards one of the extremities, sink one of 
their ships. Upon this, the Peloponnesians 
having formed a circle, the Athenians sailed 
round and round, and endeavoured to break 
their order. Those who pursued the Corcyre- 
ans perceiving this, and fearing what had hap- 
pened formerly at Naupactus, steered away 
from thence to support their own squadron. 
And now, with their whole embodied strength, 
they designed to pour upon the Athenians. 
They, having already shifted the helm, fell 
gradually away. They were desirous to favour 
the flight of the Corcyreans beyond the possi- 
bility of a chase, and so they fell ofl' entirely 
at their own leisure, keeping the enemy in 
their front still ranged in order. Such was this 
engagement, which at the setting of the sun 
was quite ended. 

The Corcyreans were afraid lest the enemy, 
in prosecution of their victory, should immedi- 
ately assault the city, or take up the persons in 
the island, or by some other method attempt to 
distress them. For this reason, they removed 
the prisoners again from the island, into the 
temple of Juno, and applied themselves to 
guard the city. But the enemy, though vic- 
torious at sea, durst not think of proceeding to 
attack the city ; but satisfied with taking thir- 
teen ships belonging to the Corcyreans, they 
returned to the main, from whence they had 
sallied to the engagement. The next day also, 
they refrained from making any attempt upon 
the city, where the disorder and consternation 
were as great as ever. Brasidas is reported ur- 
gently to have pressed it upon Alcidas, but 
in the council of war it was quite overruled. 



They landed however at cape Leucymne, and 
plundered the country. 

The Corcyrean people, whose fears were 
still suggesting that they should be attacked by 
the enemy's fleet, had conferred with the 
suppliants and others about the only means to 
preserve the city. And some of them they 
persuaded to join in navigating their ships; 
for by some means or other they had again 
manned thirty, expecting every moment the 
enemy's approach. But the Peloponnesians 
continued the ravage of their fields only till 
noon, and then repassed to their former stations. 
Yet before the dawn of the succeeding day, 
they saw sixty lights held up, to denote an equal 
number of Athenian ships advancing from 
Leucas. The Athenians, advertised of the 
sedition and the course of the fleet under Al- 
cidas against Corcyra, had sent away this rein- 
forcement under the command of Eurymedon 
the son of Thucles. Upon this the Pelopon- 
nesians, whilst yet it was night, crept home- 
wards along the shore, and carrying their ves- 
sels over the isthmus of Leucas, lest they 
should be discovered in going round it, 
are safely retreated within their own con- 
fines. 

When the Corcyreans had discovered the 
approach of the Athenian reinforcement, and 
the departure of the enemy, they received the 
Messenians within their walls, who till now 
had lodged without ; and, having ordered the 
ships which they had manned to come about 
into the Hyllaic harbour, whilst they were going 
about in pursuance of this order, they put all 
the adverse faction whom they found to the 
sword. Those farther, who had taken on in 
the ships at their persuasion, they threw into 
the sea and then retired. They afterwards 
went to Juno's temple, and persuaded a party 
of suppliants there, to the amount of fifty, to 
undergo a judicial trial, in which they were all 
condemned to die. The majority of suppliants, 
who refused to hear such persuasion, no sooner 
saw the fate of their brethren, than they either 
slew one another within the temple, or hung 
themselves up upon the trees within its verge : 
each finding some expedient for his own des- 
patch. During those seven days that Eury- 
medon with his reinforcement continued at 
Corcyra, the people of that city extended the 
massacre to all whom they judged their enemies. 
The crime on which they justified their pro- 



120 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book III. 



ceedings, was their attempt to overturn the de- 
mocracy. 

Some perished merely through private en- 
mity ; some for the sums they had lent, by the 
hands of the borrowers. Every kind of death 
was here exhibited. Every dreadful act usual 
in a sedition, and more than usual, was perpe- 
trated now. For fathers slew their children ; 
some were dragged from altars ; and some were 
butchered at them. And a number of persons 
immured in the temple of Bacchus were starv- 
ed to death. So cruel was the progress of 
this sedition, and so excessively cruel did it 
appear, because the first of so black a nature 
that ever happened. But afterwards the con- 
tagion spread, one may say, through the whole 
extent of Greece, when factions raged in every 
city, the popular demagogues contending for 
the Athenians, the aspiring few for the Lace- 
daemonians. In peace, it is true, they were 
void of all pretext, of all opportunity, to invite 
these rivals. But now, amidst declared hostil- 
ities, and the quest of alliance to afllict their 
enemies and add an increase of strength to 
themselves, opportunities were easily found by 
such as were fond of innovations to introduce 
the side they favoured. The consequence of 
this was sedition in cities, with all its nu- 
merous and tragical incidents. Such were 
now, and such things ever will be, so long as 
human nature continues the same ; but under 
greater or less aggravations and diversified in 
circumstances, according to the several vicis- 
situdes of conjunctures, which shall happen to 
occur. In the seasons of peace and aflHuence, 
communities as well as individuals have their 
tempers under better regulation, because not 
liable to that violence which flows from neces- 
sity. But war, which snatcheth from them 
their daily subsistence, is the teacher of vio- 
lence, and assimilates the passions of men to 
their present condition. 

By these means were cities harassed with 
seditions. And those to whose fate the later 
commotions fell, through inquiry what had 
happened in such instances before, grew enor- 
mously ambitious to suppress the machination 
of others, both in policy of attempts and ex- 
travagance of revenge. Even words lost now 
their former significance, since to palliate ac- 
tions they were quite distorted. For truly, what 
before was brutal courage, began to be esteemed 
that fortitude which becomes a human and soci- 



able creature; prudent consideration, to be 
specious cowardice ; modesty, the disguise of ef- 
feminacy ; and being wise in every thing, to be 
good for nothing. The hot fiery temper was ad- 
judged the exertion of true manly valour ; cau- 
tious and calm deliberation, to be a plausible pre- 
text for intended knavery. He who boiled with 
indignation was undoubtedly trusty ; who pre- 
sumed to contradict was ever suspected. He 
who succeeded in a roguish scheme was wise, 
and he who suspected such practices in others, 
was still a more able genius. But was he pro- 
vident enough, so as never to be in need of 
such base expedients ; he was one that would 
not stand to his engagements, and most shame- 
fully awed by his foes. In short, he who 
could prevent another in executing villany, or 
could persuade a well-designing person to it, was 
sure to be applauded. 

Men now, who were allied in blood, were 
less valued or caressed, than such as were 
connected by voluntary combination ; since the 
latter, unscrupulous and uninquisitive, were 
more ready to embark in any scheme whatever. 
For now associations were not formed for such 
mutual advantage as is consistent with, but for 
the execution of such rapines as are contrary 
to human laws. In mutual trust they persist- 
ed, not out of any regard to religious obligation, 
but from the bond of communicated gmlt. To 
the fair and honest proposals of adversaries, 
they hearkened indeed when such by active 
strength could controul them, but never through 
candid ingenuity. Revenge upon another 
was a more valued possession than never to 
have suffered injur}'. Oaths, if ever made for 
present reconciliation, had a temporary force, 
so long as neither knew how to break them : 
but never when either party had power to abet 
their violation. He who, at inviting oppor- 
tunity, durst first incur the perjury, if the ad- 
versary was off his guard, executed his rancour 
with higher spirit than from enmity open and 
avowed. Such a step was thought most se- 
cure ; and, because he had thus surpassed in 
guile, it was certainly extolled as a master-piece 
of cunning. Large is the number of villains, 
and such obtain more easily the reputation of 
dexterity than their dupes can that of goodness •. 
the latter are apt to blush ; the former most im 
pudently triumph. 

The source of all these evils is a thirst of 
power, in consequence either of rapacious or 



YEAR v.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



121 



ambitious passions. The mind, when actuated 
by such, is ever ready to engage in party-feuds, 
For the men of large influence in communities 
avowing on both sides a specious cause, some 
standing up for the just equaUty of the popular, 
others for the fair decorum of the aristocratical 
government, by artful sounds, embarrassed those 
communities for their own private lucre. Both 
sides, intent on victory, carried on the conten- 
tion with the keenest spirit. They most dar- 
ingly projected, and then regularly executed, 
the most dreadful machinations. Their revenge 
was not limited by justice or the public wel- 
fare ; it aimed at more ample satisfaction. 
Either side constantly measured it by such re- 
taliation as was judged the sweetest, either by 
a capital condemnation through an iniquitous 
sentence, or by earning the victory with their 
own hands, in which they were always ready to 
glut the present rancour of their hearts. And 
hence it was, that the pious and upright con- 
duct was on both sides disregarded. And, 
when any point of great importance was be- 
fore them, to carry it by specious collusive ora- 
tory was the greatest enchancement of their 
credit. Yet all this while, the moderate mem- 
bers of such communities, either hated because 
they would not meddle, or envied for such ob- 
noxious conduct, fell victims to both. 

Seditions in this manner inti-oduced every 
species of outrageous wickedness into the 
Grecian manners. Sincerity, which is most 
frequently to be found in generous tempers, 
was laughed out of countenance and for ever 
vanished. It was become the universal practice, 
to keep up a constant enmity of intention 
against one another, and never to believe. No 
promise was strong enough, no oath sufficiently 
solemn, to banish such mutual diffidence. 
Those who excelled in shrewd consideration 
resigned all hope of any lasting security, and 
stood ever on their guard against whom it was 
impossible for them to trust. But persons 
of meaner understandings took more effectual 
means for their preservation. Living in con- 
stant apprehensions, from their own inferiority 
and the craft of their opponents, lest by words 
they should be over-reached, or that such sub- 
tile heads might execute their treacheries upon 
them unawares, they boldly seized the present 
moment, and at once despatched the men they 
dreaded ; who, presuming too much on their 
own penetration, and that it was superfluous 
to aim a blow at those whom they could at any 
23 



time supplant by cunning, despised them so far 
as to neglect a proper guard, and so contributed 
to their own destruction. 

Many such daring outrages were now by way 
of precedent committed at Corcyra ; nay, all 
whatever, that men, who are wreaking revenge 
upon such as before were their masters, and 
had exerted their superiority with savageness 
more than humanity, can in turn retaliate upon 
them, were executed there. — Some joined in 
these acts of violence to procure a discharge 
from their former poverty ; but the greater 
number, through a passionate desire to seize 
the property of their neighbours : or, though 
they were not lured by the lust of rapine, but 
engaged in the contest upon fair and open views, 
yet hurried to wild extravagence through mad 
and undisciplined anger, they proceeded to cruel 
acts, and with inexorable fury. The whole 
order of human life was for a season confounded 
in this city. The human temper, too apt to trans- 
gress in spite of laws, and now having gained 
the ascendant over law, seemed pleased with ex- 
hibiting this public manifestation, that it was 
too weak for anger, too strong for justice, and 
an enemy to all superiority. Men could not 
otherwise have awarded the preference to re- 
venge over righteous duty, and to lucre over 
that habit of justice in which envy never yet 
had power to annoy them. But more than 
this, when the point in view is revenge upon 
others, men haughtily make precedents against 
themselves, by infringing those laws which are 
binding by the ties of nature, and from which 
alone any hope of safety can be extracted for 
themselves in a plunge of misery, precluding 
thus all possibility of redress, should they be 
reduced in some future extremity to make the 
same appeal. 

And thus the Corey reans continued to ex- 
ecute the rage of such cruel passions, upon the 
heads of one another, within the precincts of 
their own city, of which this was the first ex- 
ample in Greece, till Euiymedon with the 
Athenian fleet under his command put out 
again to sea. 

But, after his departure, they who by flight 
had preserved their lives, to the number of 
about five hundred, having seized their forts 
upon the opposite shore, got possession of their 
own land, on that side the water. Putting out 
hence, they plundered the Corcyreans in the 
island, and made such havoc that a violent 
famine ensued in the city. They further sent 



122 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book ni. 



a deputation to Lacedsmon and Corinth, to ne- 
gotiate the means of their restoration. But 
nothing of this kind succeeding, they got to- 
gether afterwards a body of auxiliaries and 
transports, and so passed over to the island of 
Corcyra, to the amount of six hundred men. 
Having now set fire to their transports, to pre- 
clude every other expedient but gaining firm 
footing where now they were, they marched up 
to the mountain Istone, and having fortified 
themselves there, made cruel work with those 
in the city, and were masters of the country 
round about. 

About the end of the same summer, the 
Athenians sent out twenty sail for Sicily, under 
the command of Laches the son of Melanopus 
and Charoeadas the son of Euphiletus. A war 
was now on foot between the Syracusans and 
Leontines. Confederate with the Syracusans 
were, excepting Caraarina, all the Doric cities, 
which had formerly entered into alliance with 
the Lacedsemonians before this war broke out, 
but had yet no where effectually joined them. 
With the Leontines were the Chalcidic cities, 
and Camarina. Of Italy, the Locrines sided 
with the Syracusans ; and the Rhegians, from 
the motive of consanguinity, with the Leon- 
tines. The allies therefore of the Leontines 
sent to Athens,* petitioning the Athenians in 
respect of their old alliance and their Ionic de- 
scent, to send them a succour of shipping : for 
the Syracusans had now blocked them up both 
by land and sea. The Athenians immediately 
sent one, giving out that they were bound in 
duty to take this step ; but their real motive 
was, to prevent the exportation of corn from 
thence to Peloponnesus, and also to sound the 
possibility of bringing Sicily into their own sub- 
jection. Their squadron therefore arriving at 
Rhegium on the Italian shore, supported their 



» One of the persons, or the chief, employed on this 
occasion, is said to be Gorgias of Leontiuin. the first 
rhetorician of that or of any age. VVlien he had his 
audience from the Allienians to deliver the rcnsons of 
hiH embassy, he made a speech so smooth and flowing, 
go new in the manner of its turns, bo pretty in the ex- 
pression, and «o nicely diversified by a change and op- 
position of figures, that he won their hearts, and suc- 
ceeded in liis ncgoriation. Our historian indeed, who 
takes no notice of Gorgias, gives two political reasons 
juBt after the ready compliance of the Ath eiiians on this 
occasion. It is a step which draws great consequences af- 
ter it. Thucydidos in the sequel will open all the plan, 
and give an exact detail of the operations of this new war, 
iuto which the Athenians are beginning to embark. 



allies in the present war ; and in this the suiDv 
mer ended. 

In the beginning of the winter the plague 
broke out a second time at Athens, not that 
during this whole interval of time it had wholly 
ceased, though its rage had very much abated 
But now the mortality began again, and con- 
tinued not less than a year : but the former 
had raged for the space of two. There was 
nothing which lay upon the Athenians so hard 
as this, or so much impaired their strength. It 
appeared from the muster-rolls, that there per- 
ished four thousand and four hundred of those 
citizens who wore the heavy armour, and three 
hundred of the horsemen. The number of the 
lower people that died was not to be computed. 
— There happened at the same time many 
earthquakes ; at Athens ; in Euboea ; amongst 
the Boeotians, and especially at the Boeotian 
Orchomenus. 

The same winter, the Athenians and Rhe- 
gians, on the coast of Sicily, form an expedi- 
tion with thirty sail, against those which are 
called the isles of -^olus. This was not feasi- 
ble in the summer season, for want of water. 
These isles are inhabited by the Liparcans, 
who were a colony from Cnidus. Their resi- 
dence was chiefly in one of them called Lipare, 
though by no means large. They go from 
hence to the tillage of the others, Didyme and 
Strongyle and Hiera. It is believed by those 
people, that Vulcan^ keeps his forge in Hiera, 
because in the night it visibly throws forth a 
great quantity of fire, and in the day, of smoke. 
These isles are situated over-against the shore 
of the Siculi and the Messenians, and were al- 
lied with Syracuse. The Athenians having 
plundered the soil, and finding the inhabitants 
would not come in, put back again to Rhegium. 
— And here the winter ended, and the fifth 
year of this war, the history of which Thucy 
dides hath compiled. 

TEAR TI. 

The following summer, the Peloponnesians 
and confederates assembled at the Isthmus, in 



a So Virgil, I. viii. 416. 

Iniula Sicaoium juzia Iatu«£n1iainque 
Erigilur Lipareo, fumanlibus ardua uzis: 
Quam subler tpecui el Cyclopum exnx camioi* 
Antra £Inaea tonant, yalidiquF iocuilibui ictui 
Auditi referunl geoiitum, ttriduntque cavernit 
Striclurae Chalybum, et fornacibus ii^nis anbelat; 
Vulooi domin, et Vulcasia nomloe tellus. 

> Before Christ 436. 



YEAR VI.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



123 



order to make the usual iroad into Attica ; 
and Agis son of Archidamus, king of the La- 
cedaemonians, was there ready for the command. 
But the frequent earthquakes which happened 
about this time, caused them to return back, 
and entirely put a stop to the designed incur- 
sion. 

About the same space of time shocks of 
earthquakes were felt in Euboea, where at Oro- 
biae the sea breaking over what was then land 
with impetuous swells, laid a part of that city 
under water : some of which stagnated there, 
though some washed its way back ; however, a 
tract now continues sea which before was land. 
All those who could not reach the higher 
grounds in time, by running before the surge, 
were drowned. — A similar inundation happen- 
ed at the isle of Atalantas, amongst the Lo- 
crians of Opus, where it washed away the 
Athenian fort, and of two vessels that lay dry 
upon the beach, staved one to pieces. — At 
Peparethus also the surge of the sea rose very 
high, but did not overflow. An earthquake 
however demolished part of the fortification,' 
the townhouse, and some few dwelling-houses. 
— My soliftion of such effects is this: where the 
shock of the earthquake was most violent, it 
forcibly drove away the sea before it, which 
suddenly returning again occasioned these more 
violent swells. And without an earthquake I 
deem all such accidents impossible. 

The same summer, many of the other na- 
tions, as they happened to be drawn into the 
quarrel, were engaged in the war of Sicily, as 
well as the Sicilians themselves, who took up 
arms one against another, and the Athenians 
together with their allies. Yet, the most me- 
morable actions alone, either of the allies thus 
aided by the Athenians, or of the common ene- 
my against the Athenians, shall I now relate. 
— Charoeadas the Athenian commander having 
lost his life in the Syracusan war, Laches who 
had now the sole command of the fleet, in 
junction with the allies, appeared before Mylae 
of the Messenians. The garrison of Mylae 
consisted of two companies of Messenians; 
and these had formed an ambuscade to cut off 
the enemy when landed. But the Athenians 
and allies drive them from the place of ambush 
with great slaughter. Then they proceeded to 
assault the works, which necessitated the de- 
fendants to give up their citadel by capitulation, 

» Plytaneum. 



and even to attend them against Messene. But 
after this, the Athenians and allies were no 
sooner approached, than the Messenians also 
compounded, giving hostages and all other secu- 
rities required for their future behaviour. 

The same summer, the Athenians with 
thirty sail of ships commanded by Demos- 
thenes^ the son of Alcisthenes and Procles the 
son of Theodorus, appeared upon the coast of 
Peloponnesus ; whilst a larger armament of 
sixty, and two thousand heavy-armed, was em- 
ployed against Melos, under the command of 
Xicias son of Niceratus. Melos is an island ; 
and as the inhabitants of it were averse to the 
Athenian subjection, and had refused to accede 
to their alliance, they were now bent on its re- 
duction. Having laid the island waste, and the 
Melians still refusing to submit, the Athenians 
put again to sea, and crossed over to Oro- 
pus on the opposite shore ; where arriving at 
night, the heavy-armed were detached to march 
with all expedition by land towards Tanagra of 
Boeotia. Notice being given of their arrival 
there, they were instantly joined by the whole 
force of Athens, which had marched out of the 
city under the orders of Hipponicus the son of 
Callias and Eurymedon the son of Thucles. A 
camp they formed ; and having for the space of 
a day laid the territory waste, they reposed them- 
selves there the succeeding night. But the 
next morning, having gained a victory over the 
Tanagreans, who aided by a party of Thebans 
sallied out upon them, they only staid to gather 
up the arms and erect a trophy, and then march- 
ed away — these back again to the city ; and 
those to the fleet. Nicias upon this, putting 
out again with his sixty sail, plundered all the 
sea-coast of Locris, and then returned into the 
harbour of Athens. 

It was about this time that the Lacedaemo- 
nians founded the colony of Heraclea in Tra- 



» This Demosthenes will make a considerable figure 
in the course of this war. The most celebrated orator 
of the same name hath ranked him amongst tiie great- 
est of his countrymen, with Aristides, Pericles, and Nic- 
ias. He styles him also an orator; and Thucydides will 
give us hereafter a specimen of his manner of harangu- 
ing. His name-sake indeed hath carried off all the 
glory of eloquence: but the Demosthenes, who is the sub- 
ject of this note was an able general, very enterprising, 
and very brave; always vigilant in the service of his 
country, though more as a soldier than a statesman; and, 
provided his country was served, not too anxious about 
who carried off the honour. In short, he was an open- 
hearted, disinterested, worthy Athenian. 



124 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book in 



chinia. Their view in doing it was this; — 
those, who in general are styled Meliensians, 
are divided into three bodies ; Paralians, Hier- 
ensians, and Trachinians. The last of these 
the Trachinians, who had been terribly distress- 
ed by a war made upon them by the bordering 
Oetaeans, had first of all intended to throw 
themselves under the Athenian protection ; 
but afterwards, apprehending they might not be 
hearty in their support, they made application 
to Lacedajmon by Tisamenus, the delegate ap- 
pointed by them on this occasion. The Dori- 
ans too, from whom the LacedsBmonians are 
descended, sent their ambassadors also to ac- 
company and join with him in the negotiation, 
for they likewise were infested by these Oetae- 
ans. The Lacedaemonians, after an audience, 
resolved to send out this colony, as a sure ex- 
pedient not only to protect the Trachinians and 
Dorians from insult, but to annoy the Atheni- 
ans more sensibly in the course of the war, 
from a city so commodiously seated. For 
thence they could at any time make an attack 
upon Euboea, as the passage was but short; and 
further, it lay most conveniently upon the road 
to Thrace. In a word, they were very eager 
about building this city. In the first place, 
therefore, they begged the advice of the god at 
Delphi. His answer being favourable, they 
sent out a colony composed of their own and 
the neighbouring people ; encouraging further 
all Grecian adventurers whatever to join in this 
settlement, except lonians and Achseans, and 
some of foreign nations. Three Lacedaemoni- 
ans are appointed to be the leaders of this 
colony; Leon, and Alcides, and Damagon. 
These arriving at the spot, erect upon a new 
foundation and wall round the city which is 
now called Heraclea, distant about forty stadia' 
from Thermopylae, and twenty from the sea. 
They proceeded next to build the naval docks ; 
and these they began at Thermopylae close un- 
der the straits, since there they were capable of 
the strongest defence. 

The Athenians, when they saw the large 
resort to this colony, were at first under great 
apprehensions. They suspected it to be chiefly 
intended for the annoyance of Euboea, as the 
passage from it was short to Censeum in Eu- 
bcEa ; though, in the sequel, their apprehen- 
sions proved entirely groundless. Not the 



t About fourmiles. 



least damage accrued to them from this colony ; 
and the reason was this ; the Thessalians, who 
were masters of all the country round about it, 
and upon whose very land it was built, fearing 
lest this new settlement might prove too power- 
ful a neighbour at last, gave it all possible 
annoyance, and harassed the new inhabitants 
with continual war, till from the large number 
they were at first they mouldered into nothing. 
When the Lacedsemonians first declared the 
colony, the whole world was eager to get a set- 
tlement in a city which they thought would 
want no support Not but that its sudden 
decay was owing also in great measure to the 
Lacedaemonian leaders. From the first moment 
of their arrival they had spoiled every thing 
wherein they meddled ; they reduced their 
numbers to a handful of men, because their 
fears had driven away the rest, as the govern- 
ment was always severe and not always just. 
The neighbouring people surprising them in 
such a state, prevailed against them with the 
utmost ease. 

The same summer, and even during that 
interval of time, the Athenians were employed 
at Melos, the Athenians of the fleet of thirty 
sail who were upon the Peloponnesian coast, 
in the first place, having placed an ambush at 
Elomenus of Leucadia, intercepted and cut off 
a part of the garrison. In the next place, with 
an augmented force they came up to Leucas, 
being attended now by the whole strength of 
the Acarnanians except the Oeniadce, by the Za- 
cynthians and Ccphallenians, and fifteen sail 
of Corcyreans. The licucadians, though their 
territory was laid waste both without and with- 
in the Isthmus, where the city of Leucas and 
the temple of Apollo are seated, yet durst not 
venture out against such superior numbers. 
Upon this, the Acarnanians vehemently pressed 
it upon Demosthenes the Athenian general, 
to block them up by a wall of circumvallation : 
imagining they might easily reduce them, 
and rid themselves of a city which had been 
their eternal foe. But Demosthenes chose, 
rather to hearken at this time to the sug- 
gestions of the Mcssenians ; " how glorious 
it would be, as he was now at the head 
of so large a force, to invade the .^tolians, 
who were such plagues to Naupactus; and, 
if their reduction could be completed, the 
rest of that continent might easily be brought 
into the Athenian subjection. For, though 
the iEtolians were a great and warlike people, 



YEAR VI.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



125 



yet as they dwelled in open villages remote 
from one another, as light armour only was in 
use amongst them, they presumed he might 
easily complete their reduction, before any 
succour could reach them." They advised 
him further, "to begin with the Apodoti, to 
take the Ophionians next, then to proceed to 
the Eurytanians (which is the most numerous 
people of ^tolia, reported also to speak in a 
most barbarous dialect, and to feed upon raw 
flesh) ; that, if these could be surprised, the 
rest of ^tolia would submit of course." He, 
therefore, willing to oblige the Massenians, and 
incited above all by the thought, that without 
exposing the Athenian forces, after he had 
done with the ^tolians, he might march with 
the allied strength of the continent, and pene- 
trate by land as far as Bceotia, through the 
Locrians of Ozoli, to Cytinium in Doris, keep- 
ing Parnassus on his right till he got down 
amongst the Phocians, who, he reckoned, from 
their constant friendship with the Athenians, 
would readily join him, or however might easily 
be compelled to do it ; and then, that Boeotia 
borders next on the Phocians : — Demosthenes, 
I say, weighing from Leucas with his whole 
force, to the great regret of the Acarnanians, 
coasted along to Solium. He there communi- 
cated his plan to the Acarnanians, in which 
they refused to join, because he had refused 
the blockade of Leucas. Demosthenes, with 
his other force, the Cephallenians, and Messe- 
nians, and Zacynthians, and three hundred 
soldiers draughted from on board the Athenian 
ships (the fifteen Corey rean were already de- 
parted), set about this expedition against the 
JEtolians. He began it from Oeneon in 
Locris : for the Locrians, called Ozolce, were 
allies, and had notice to meet the Athenians 
with all their force in the midland parts. These, 
being not only borderers, but using also the 
same kind of arms with the ^tolians, were 
judged most proper to accompany the expe- 
dition, as they knew so well their method of 
battle, and their country. Having reposed his 
army one night within the verge of the temple 
of the Nemean Jove (in which the inhabitants 
have a tradition that Hesiod' the poet expired, 



in pursuance of an oracle which had fixed 
Nemea for the place of his death), he marched 
again at break of day, and entered iEtolia. 
On the first day he taketh Potidania, on the 
second Crocylium, and on the third Tichium. 
There he halted, and sent away the booty to 
Eupolium, of Locris. It was now his resolu- 
tion, after he had subdued the rest, to march last 
of all against the Ophionians, if they did not 
voluntarily submit beforehand, in his retreat 
back to Naupactus. 

This preparation against them did by no 
means escape the JEtoIians. The scheme was 
no sooner formed than they had gained intel- 
ligence of it ; and by the time the army was 
within their borders, they were all drawn to- 
gether in a numerous body for their mutual 
defence ; nay, even the most distant Ophio- 
nians, who are seated upon the Meliac bay, 
the Bomiensians and Calliensians, were already 
come up. 

The Messenians continued to amuse Demos- 
thenes with the same suggestions as at first: they 
still insisted, that the conquest of the ^toiians 
would be an easy performance, and advised him 
to advance immediately against their villages, nor 
give them time to gather together in a body to 
oppose him, but to attack every place he came 
to, and take it. This advice being quite to his 
own taste, and relying upon his own good for- 



1 The story of Hesiod's death is related by Plutarch 
in The Banquet of the seven wise men. Solon inter- 
posing here said, " Such things, Diodes, must be re- 
ferred immediately to the gods, they are above human 
condition. But the case of Hesiod is within the lot of 
liumanity, and concerns us all. But perhaps you know 



the story." I do not, he replied. " It is then well worth 
your hearing. A certain Milesian, it seems In whose 
company Hesiod was hospitably lodged and ciitci lained 
in Locris, had secretly debauched the daughter of their 
host. When the affair came to light, it was suspected 
that Hesiod had all along been privy to the intrigue, 
and concealed such base behaviour; and, though be was 
entirely innocent, he fell a victim to hasty resentment 
and foul calumniation. The brothers of the damsel laid 
wait for, and slew him at the Nemean temple in Locris, 
and with him his servant, whose name was Troilus. 
Their bodies being thrown into the sea, that of Troilus, 
indeed, floating up into the river Daphnus, was stopped 
at a rock quite surrounded with water, a small distance 
from tne sea. But the moment Hesiod's body was 
thrown into the sea, a shoal of dolphins caught it and 
carried it to Rhium and Molycrium. The Locrians that 
very day were assembled at Rhium for a solemn festival 
and sacrifice, which they still continue to celelirate at 
the same place. The dead body was no sooner beheld 
in its approach, than full of wonder, as was likely, they 
hurried down to the beach, and, knowing it to be the 
body of Hesiod, and very fresh, they postponed every 
other care to the discovery of this murder, from their 
high regard for Hesiod. This was soon done; the assas- 
sins were found out, whom they threw headlong into 
the sea and demolished their houses. But Hesiod was 
buried by them in the temple of the Nemean Jove." 

Q 



tS6 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book III. 



tune, which hitherto had never been checked, 
without wating for the Locrians who were 
very much wanted, and were to have joined 
him (for he stood most in need of light-armed 
darters), he advanced to ^^gitium, and assault- 
ing, takes it by storm. Tiie inhabitants made 
their escape, and posted themselves upon the 
hills which overlook the town. It was situated 
amongst lofty eminences, and distant from the 
sea about eighty stadia.' 

But now the ^^tolians, who were come up 
for the preservation of -^gitium, running down 
in separate bodies from different eminences, 
made an attack upon the Athenians and allies, 
and poured in their javelins amongst them : 
and whenever the Athenian army approached 
to charge, they plied before them ; when they 
again fell back, these again returned to the 
charge. This kind of engagement continued 
for a long time, a series of alternate pursuits 
and retreats, in both which the Athenians 
suffered most. So long however as their 
archers had darts, and opportunity to use them, 
they lost no ground; for the light-armed JEto- 
lians fell back to avoid the darts. But when 
the chief of the archers dropped, his party was 
soon dispersed, and the whole army began to 
incline. Their strength was quite exhausted 
by so many repeated charges; and now, the 
^tolians pressing hard upon them, and pour- 
ing in whole showers of missive weapons, they 
turned about and fled. Now tumbling into 
caverns from whence they could not recover 
themselves, or bewildered in places of which 
they had no knowledge, they were miserably 
destroyed. For Cromon the Messenian, who 
laid out all the routes, had been killed in the 
battle. The ^tolians pursued with their darts, 
and being not only swift of foot, but also 
lightly armed, easily overtook many of them in 
their flight, and did great execution. A large 
party, who had lost their way, threw them- 
selves into a wood which was quite impassable. 
The ^tolians set the wood on fire, in the 
flames of which they were all consumed. 
Every affecting species of flight and destruc- 
tion was now the fate of the Athenian army. 
Those who had the good fortune to escape, 
effected it by reaching the sea and Ocneon of 
Locris, from whence they first began the expe- 
dition. 

The number of the allies who thus perished, 

t About eight miles. 



was large ; that of heavy armed Athenians was 
about a hundred and twenty ; so considerable 
was the loss, and all of them in the very flower 
of their youth. In the whole course of this 
war, the state of Athens never lost at any one 
time so many of her most gallant citizens as 
now. Pfocles also, the other commander in this 
expedition, perished. 

They afterwards fetched off their dead by a 
truce obtained from the ^tolians. This being 
done, they retired to Naupactus, and there 
shipped themselves for Athens. Demosthenes 
however was left behind at Naupactus, and 
the parts adjacent. After such a miscarriage 
he durst not presume to face the people of 
Athens. 

About the same time, the Athenians on the 
Sicilian station, having sailed towards Locris, 
landed upon that coast They destroyed a 
party of Locrians who endeavoured to make 
head against them ; and then take Peripolium, 
a town situated on the river Halex. 

The same summer the ^tolians, who had 
some time before despatched an embassy to 
Corinth and Lacedaemon, composed of Tolo- 
phus the Ophionian, Boriades the Eurysthan- 
ian, and Tisander the Apodotian, prevail there 
in their suit for a diversion against Naupactus, 
because the Athenians had invaded their terri- 
tories. It was about autumn when the Lace- 
daemonians marched away three thousand heavy- 
armed of their alhes ; of which number five 
hundred belonged to Heraclea, the city so 
lately founded in Trachinia. Eurylochus, a 
Spartan was appointed to command in the ex- 
pedition, and was accompanied by two other 
Spartans, Macarius and Menedseus. The army 
being drawn into a body at Delphi, Eurj'lochus 
despatched a herald to the Ozolian Locri ; his 
route to Naupactus lay through their territory. 
He was also desirous to detach them from the 
Athenian alliance. The Amphissensians were 
the readiest of all the Locri to give their con- 
currence, as standing in perpetual awe of the 
hatred bore them by the Phocians. These 
therefore were the first who sent in hostages, 
and who persuaded others to follow their ex- 
ample, from a dread of this army which was 
now approaching. Accordingly, the Myonen- 
sians, their own borderers, were the first who 
complied ; for their part of I^ocris is most diffi 
cult of access. These were followed by the 
Ippensians, and Messapians, and Tritrpcnsians, 
and Challxans, Tolophonians, Hessians, and 



YEAR VI.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



127 



Oeanthians ; and all these gave a personal at- 
tendance in the expedition. The Olpeans 
indeed sent in their hostages, but would not 
attend. The Hyaeans refused their hostages 
till one of their villages called Polls was seized. 

When all things were ready, and the hosta- 
ges placed securely at Cytinium of Doris, Eu- 
rylochus with his army taking the route of 
Locris, advanced against Naupactus. He seized 
upon Oeneon and Eupolium as he marched, for 
refusing to concur. When they had entered 
the territory of Naupactus, and were joined by 
the ^tolian aid, they wasted the country to the 
very suburb, of which also, because unfortified, 
they took possession. Turning thence to Mo- 
lycrium, a Corinthian colony, but now subject 
to the Athenians, they reduce it. 

But Demosthenes the Athenian (for he had 
continued at Naupactus ever since the -^tolian 
miscarriage) having received intelligence of 
this army, and dreading the loss of this place, 
had addressed himself to the Acarnanians, and 
with some difficulty, owing to his departure 
from Leucas, persuades them to send a suc- 
cour to Naupactus. Accordingly, they put a 
thousand of their heavy-armed under his or- 
ders, whom he threw into the town by sea, 
which effectually preserved it. For the danger 
before was manifest, as the wall was very large 
in compass, and the number of defendants in- 
considerable. 

When Eurylochus and his council had dis- 
covered that such a succour had been received 
into the town, and that its reduction was now 
impracticable, they marched away their forces, 
not towards Peloponnesus, but to that ^tolia 
which is now called Calydon, to Pleuron, to 
the neighbouring towns, and to Proschion of 
jiEtolia. The Ambraciots had now been with 
and prevailed upon them, to join in some at- 
tempts upon Argos in Amphilochia, upon the 
rest of that province, and Acarnania ; assuring 
them, that could these be reduced, the whole 
continent there would instantly go over to the 
Lacedaemonian league. Eurylochus having 
assured them of his concurrence, and given 
the ^tolians their dismission, halted there- 
abouts with his army, till the Ambraciots had 
entered upon the expedition against Argos, and 
it was time for him to join them. And here 
the summer ended. 

The Athenians in Sicily, the beginning of 
the winter, putting themselves at the head of 
their Grecian allies, and as many of their 



Sicilian as, unable to support the Syracusan 
yoke, had revolted from Syracuse to join them, 
began fresh operations of war in concert, and 
assaulted Nessa a town of Sicily, the citadel of 
which was in the hands of the Syracusans. 
But the attempt was unsuccessful, and they 
again determined to draw off. During the re- 
treat, the Syracusans sallying forth, fell upon 
those allies of the Athenians who marched in 
the rear, and with such force, that they put a 
part of the army to flight, and slew a consider 
able number, 

After this. Laches and the Athenians, hav- 
ing made some attempts, and landed on the 
coast of Locris near the mouth of the river 
Caicinus, were engaged by a party of Locrians 
consisting of about three hundred, under 
Proxenus the son of Capaton. These the 
Athenians defeated, and having stripped them 
of their arms, went off the coast. 

The same winter also the Athenians purified 
Delos, in obedience to an oracle. Pisistratus 
the tyrant had purified it formerly, not indeed 
the whole, but so much of the island as lies 
within the prospect of the temple. The puri- 
fication now was universal, and performed in 
the following manner : 

They broke up all the sepulchres of the 
dead without exception, and prohibited for the 
future any death or birth in the island, both 
which were to be confined to Rhenaea. For 
Rhensea lies at so small a distance from Delos, 
that Polycrates the tyrant of Samos, who was 
formerly of great power by sea, amongst other 
isles he reduced to his dominions, took Rhenaea 
also, which he consecrated to Delian Apollo, 
and fastened it to Delos by a chain. And 
after this purification, the Athenians made the 
first institution of the Delian games to be so- 
lemnized every fifth returning year. Not but 
that in the earlier times there was used to be a 
great conflux of lonians and neighbouring 
islanders to Delos. They resorted to the so- 
lemn festivals there with their wives and chil- 
dren, in the same manner as the lonians do 
now to Ephesus. Games of bodily exercise 
and of music were actually celebrated, and 
cities exhibited their respective choruses. For 
this we have the testimony of Homer in the 
following verses of his hymn to Apollo : 

To thee, O Phcebus, most the Delian isle 
Gives cordial joy, excites the pleasing smfle; 
When gay lonians flock around thy fane; 
Men, women, children, a resplendent train, 



128 



PELOPONNE^IAN WAR. 



[book in. 



Wliose flowing garmenls sweep the sacred pile, 
Whose grateful concourse <,'laddcns all the isle, 
Where champions fight, where dancers beat the 

ground, 
Where cheerful music echoes all around, 
Thy feast to honour, and thy praise to sound. 

That there was also a musical game to which 
artists resorted to make trials of their skill, he 
fully showeth in other verses to be found in the 
same hymn : for, having sung the Delian chorus 
of females, he closeth their praise with these 
lines, in which further he hath made mention 
of himelf ; 

Hail! great Apollo, radiant god of day. 

Hail! Cynthia, goddess of the lunar sway; 

Henceforth on me propitious smile! and you. 

Ye blooming beauties of the isle, adieu! 

When future guests shall reach your happy shore, 

And refused here from toils lament no more: 

When social chat the mind unbending cheers. 

And tills demand shall greet your friendly ears — 

'* Who was the Bard, e'er landed on your coast. 

Who sung the sweetest, and who pleased you most?" 

W^ith voice united, all ye blooming fair, 

Join in your answer, and for me declare; 

Say — *'The blind bard the sweetest notes may boast, 

He lives at Chios, and he pleased us most." 

Such an evidence hath Homer left us, that 
in early times there was a great concourse and 
festival at Delos. But afterwards the people 
of the islands and the Athenians sent in their 
parties for the chorus with victims. But the 
usual games, and the most of the solemn rites, 
had been disused, through some sinister events, 
till the Athenians now made a fresh institution 
of this solemnity, with the addition of a chariot- 
race, which had not formerly been a part of it. 

The same winter, the Ambraciots, in pursu- 
ance of their engagements with Eurylochus, 
who waited their motions, march away with 
three thousand heavy-armed against the Am- 
philochian Argos. Accordingly, breaking into 
Argia, they seize Olpie, a strong place, situated 
on an eminence on the sea-side. This place 
had been formerly fortified by the Acarnanians, 
who used it for the public tribunal of justice. 
It is distant from the city of Argos, which is 
also a maritime town, about twenty-five stadia.' 
The Acarnanians were now in motion, some 
running to the defence of Argos, others to en- 
camp at the important po.<5t of Crena; in Am- 
philochia, to observe the motions of the Pelo- 
ponncsians commanded by Eurylochus, that 
they might not perfect their junction with the 

1 About two miles and a half. 



Ambraciots, without some molestation on their 
route. They also send to Demosthenes the 
Athenian general in the -^tolian expedition, 
to come and put himself at their head ; and to 
the Athenian squadron of twenty sail, which 
was then upon the coast of Peloponnesus, un- 
der the command of Aristotle, son of Timo- 
crates, and Hierophon son of Antimnestus. 

The Ambraciots at Olpae sent also a messen- 
ger to their own city, ordering them, to a man, 
to come out into the field. They were afraid 
lest Eurylochus might not be able to pass the 
Acarnanians, and so they should be compelled 
either to fight alone ; or, should they attempt 
a retreat, to find it full of danger. 

But the Peloponnesians commanded by 
Eurylochus had no sooner heard that the Am- 
braciots were at Olpse, than dislodging from 
Proschium they marched with all expedition to 
their support. After passing the Achelous, they 
took the route of Acarnania, desolate at pre- 
sent, as the inhabitants were fled to the defence 
of Argos, having on their right the city and 
garrison of the Stratians, and the rest of Acar- 
nania on their left. When they had passed 
through the territory of the Stratians, they 
crossed Phytia, and again through the extre- 
mity of Medeon, and then marched across 
Limnsea. They now entered the kingdom of 
the Agrseans, which had deserted the Acarna- 
nian to favour the Peloponnesian interest. 
Securing then the mountain Thyamus, a wild 
uncultivated spot, they crossed it, and de- 
scended thence by night into Argia. They 
afterwards passed undiscovered betwixt the city 
of the Argians, and the post of the Acarna- 
nians at CrenjE, and so perfected their junction 
with the Ambraciots at Olpae. After this 
junction, their numbers being large, they take 
possession next morn, at break of day, of a 
post called Metropolis, and there fix encamp- 
ment. 

Not long after this the Athenian squadron 
of twenty sail comes into the bay of Ambracia, 
to succour the Argians. Demosthenes also 
arrived, with two hundred heavy-armed Mes- 
senians, and sixty Athenian archers. The 
station of the fleet was fixed under the fort 
of Olpie. But the Acarnanians, and some 
few of the Amphilochians, who had already 
gathered into a body at Argos, (for the majori- 
ty of them was obstructed by the Ambraciots,) 
got every thing in readiness to engage the ene- 
my. They elect Demosthenes to be the com- 



TEAR VI.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



129 



mander of the whole associated force, with the 
assistance of their own generals. He caused 
them to advance near Olpse, and there encamped 
. them. A great hollow lay between the armies. 
- For five days they remained in a state of inac- 
tion, but on the sixth both sides drew up in 
order of battle. The Peloponnesians were 
more numerous, and their line of course was 
farther extended. Demosthenes therefore, 
that he might not be inclosed, placeth an am- 
buscade of the heavy and light-armed, to the 
number in all of about four hundred, in a hol- 
low way overgrown with shrubs and bushes, 
with orders that in the heat of the charge they 
should rise up and attack the over-extended 
line of the enemy in their rear. When all 
things were ready on both sides, they came to 
blows. Demosthenes led the right wing, com- 
posed of the Messenians, and his few Atheni- 
ans. The other consisted of the Acarnanians, 
drawn up in the order they happened to fall 
into as they came up, and the Amphilochian 
darters who were at hand. But the Pelopon- 
nesians and Ambraciots were drawn up pro- 
miscuously, except the Mantineans. The 
Mantineans stood embodied rather to the left, 
but not in the extremity: for Eurylochus, 
with a select party, was posted there over-against 
the Messenians and Demosthenes. 

No sooner was the battle joined, and the 
Peloponnesians on that wing were moving for- 
ward their superior numbers to surround the 
right of their adversaries, than the Acarnanians, 
starting up from their ambuscade, falling upon 
them in the rear, assault and put them to flight. 
They gave way before the very first shock, and 
struck such a consternation into the bulk of the 
army, that they also began to run : for they no 
sooner saw the party with Eurylochus, and 
which was the flower of their strength, entirely 
broken, than they felt a panic for themselves. 
And the Messenians, who fought at the same 
post with Demosthenes, behaved so very well 
that they finished the rout. The Ambraciots 
in the meantime, and those in the right, had 
got the better of their opponents, and were 
pursuing them towards Argos ; for beyond a 
doubt they are the most warlike people of any 
in those parts. But when they were returned 
from the pursuit, they perceived the bulk of 
their army was defeated ; and the rest of the 
> Acarnanians beginning to charge them, with 
much difiSculty they threw themselves into 
24 



Olpse. The number of the slain was great, as 
they had made their attacks without any order, 
and with the utmost confusion ; we must ex- 
cept the Mantineans, who kept most firmly 
together, and retreated in the best order of the 
whole enemy. The battle was ended only with 
the night. 

The next morning, as Eurylochus was killed 
and Macarius also, the command devolved upon 
Menedaeus. The defeat was irrecoverably 
great, and he was highly perplexed — whether 
he should abide a siege, in which he must not 
only be shut up by land, but by the Athenian 
ships be blocked up also by sea, — or whether 
he should endeavour to secure his retreat. At 
length he treats with Demosthenes and the 
Acarnanians for a suspension of arms both for 
his own departure and the fetching of the 
dead. The dead they at once delivered, and 
set up a trophy themselves, and took up their 
own dead to the number of about three hundred. 
But a truce for their departure was not openly 
granted to them all. Demosthenes, in concert 
with the Acarnanian generals, agreed to a 
secret article with the Mantineans, and Mene- 
daeus and the other Peloponnesian oflficers, and 
as many others as were of any consideration — 
that " they should depart immediately." His 
policy was, to have the Ambraciots and the 
promiscuous body of mercenaries left quite des- 
titute, wishing above all things for such a pre- 
text to calumniate the Lacedaemonians and 
Peloponnesians amongst the Grecians of those 
parts, "as men who wilfully abandon their 
friends, from a mere selfish treacherous regard 
to their own safety." Having leave therefore 
to fetch off their dead, they interred them all 
as well as their hurry would admit. And those 
in the secret, were busy in concerting the means 
of their departure. 

But now intelligence is brought to Demos- 
thenes and the Acarnanians, that the Ambra- 
ciots of the city, with their whole collected 
force, had, in pursuance of the former summons, 
begun their march for Olpae, through Amphi- 
lochi, designing to join their countrymen at 
Olpae, and quite ignorant of the late defeat. 
Upon this, he immediately detacheth a part of 
his army, to beset all the passes, and to seize all 
the advantageous posts upon their route, and 
got ready at the same time to march against 
them with the remainder of his force. 

In the meantime, the Mantineans and those 
<l2 



130 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book ni. 



comprehended in the secret articles, got out 
of the town upon the pretext of gatliering 
herbs and fuel, went gradually off in small 
parties, gathering what they pretended to come 
out for as they passed along. But when they 
had thus straggled to a considerable distance 
from Olpae, they moved away in a more nim- 
ble pace. The Ambraciots and others, who in 
great numbers came out in their company, when 
they perceived them thus stealing off, felt an 
inclination to follow, and so taking to their 
heels, ran speedily after them. The Acama- 
nians imagined at first, that they were all equal- 
ly endeavouring to escape without permission, 
and therefore set out in pursuit of the Pelo- 
ponnesians. Their officers endeavoured to 
stop them, crying out, that " leave was given 
for their escape." — Upon which a soldier, con- 
cluding their officers had been guilty of treach- 
ery, darted his javelin amongst them. But 
afterwards they connived at the escape of the 
Mantineans and the Peloponnesians, but made 
slaughter of the Ambraciots. Great indeed 
was the tumult, and the perplexity also to dis- 
tinguish which was an Ambraciot, and which 
was a Peloponnesian ; and amidst the confusion 
about two hundred were slain. The rest made 
their escape into the bordering kingdom of 
Agraeis, where Salythius king of the Agraeans, 
who was their friend, took them under his pro- 
tection. 

The Ambraciots of the city were now ad- 
vanced as far as Idomene. There are two lofty 
eminences which are called by this name. The 
higher of the two, by favour of the dark, the 
detachment sent before by Demosthenes from 
the camp had seized, without being discovered, 
and had posted themselves upon it. The Am- 
braciots had possessed then^selvcs already of 
the lower, and halted there for the night. 
Demosthenes after his evening repast, and the 
remainder of the army, about shut of evening, 
began to march. He himself took half of them 
to attack the enemy in front, whilst the other 
was fetching a compass round the mountains of 
Amphilochia. 

The next morning was no sooner in its dawn, 
than he comes upon the Ambraciots yet in 
their beds, still ignorant of all that had passed, 
and rather supposing these new-comers to be 
their friends. For Demosthenes had politicly 
placed the Messenians in the van, and ordered 
them to discourse as they moved along in the 
Doric dialect, thus to prevent any alarm from 



their advanced guards, who further, so long as 
the dark continued, could not possibly distin- 
guish their faces. By this means, he no sooner 
assaulted the camp than the rout began. Num- 
bers of them were slain upon the spot. The re- 
mainder fled amain towards the mountains. But 
the passes were all beset ; and more than this, 
the Amphilochians, who were well acquaint- 
ed with their own country, were pursuing in the 
light enemies who were encumbered with the 
heavy armour. Quite ignorant of the country 
nor knowing whither they were flying, they 
rushed headlong into hollow ways, into all the 
ambuscades laid ready by the enemy, to their 
own destruction. Yet as no possible method 
of escape was unattempted, some of them turn- 
ed towards the sea, which was not greatly dis- 
tant. And when they beheld the Athenian 
ships moving along the shore, in so fatal a con- 
currence for their ruin, they plunged into the 
water, and swam up to them, chosing rather, 
in the present consternation, to be destroyed 
by the Athenians on board of those ships, than 
by the Barbarians and their most inveterate 
foes, the Amphilochians. Through such a 
series of misfortunes, but few out of the nu- 
merous body of Ambraciots were so happy as to 
escape to their own home. The Acarnanians, 
having stripped the dead, and erected the tro- 
phies, marched back to Argos. 

On the following day they were addressed by 
a herald, sent from those Ambraciots who had 
escaped from Olpse, and were now in the 
Agraeis. His commission was to obtain the 
bodies of the dead who had been killed since 
the first engagement, as they were attempting 
without permission to escape along with the 
Mantineans and others who were going off by 
agreement. This herald, casting his eyes up- 
on the arms of the Ambraciots from the city, 
was astonished at the number. He knew no- 
thing of that fresh calamity, but concluded 
they all belonged to the party for whom he was 
now employed. Somebody asked him the rea- 
son of his surprise, and what he judged to be 
the number of the dead ? Now he who asked 
the question supposed the herald to have been 
sent by those of Idomene. " Not more than two 
hundred," says the herald. The demandant 
then replied, <' It should seem otherwise by the 
arms, for these are the arms of more than a 
thousand men." The herald rejoined, " Then 
they cannot belong to those of our party." The 
other replied, ** They must, if you fought yeS' 



YEAR VI.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



131 



terday at Idomene." " We fought nowhere 
yesterday : we suiTered the day before in our 
retreat from Olpae." " But we fought yester- 
day against those Ambraciots, who were ad- 
vancing from the city to relieve you." Whwi 
the herald heard this, and found that the army 
of relief from the city was thus destroyed, he 
Iburst into a groan ; and, quite overpowered 
with the weight of the present calamities, he 
went off abruptly, and without renewing his de- 
mand about the dead. 

During the whole course of this war, no 
other Grecian city suifered so great a loss in so 
short a time. I have not presumed to mention 
the number of the slain, because it is said to 
have been incredibly great, when compared 
with the size of their city. But I am well con- 
vinced that if, in compliance with the advice of 
the Athenians and Demosthenes, the Acarna- 
nians and Amphilochians would have proceeded 
to the excision of Ambracia, they might have 
done it with the bare shout of their voice. But 
they dreaded its falling into the hands of the 
Athenians, who might prove worse neighbours 
to them than the old. 

But to return. A third part of the spoils 
was bestowed upon the Athenians, the rest 
was divided amongst the confederate cities. 
Those allotted the Athenians were lost at sea. 
For the three hundred suits of armour which 
are reposited in the temples of Athens, were 
selected for Demosthenes, who now returned 
thither, and brought them with him. The 
dread he had been under ever since his mis- 
carriage in ^tolia was quite dispelled by the 
good service he had now performed. 

The Athenians, with their squadron of 
twenty sail, were now returned to Naupactus ; 
and, since the departure of the Athenians and 
Demosthenes, the Acarinanians and Amphilo- 
chians had granted by treaty to those Ambra- 
ciots and Peloponnesians, who had refuged 
with Salynthius and the Agraeans, a safe retreat 
from amongst the Oeniadae, who had also gone 
over to Salynthius and the Agraeans. And 
afterwards the Acarnanians and Amphilochians 
concluded a peace and an alliance for a hun- 
dred years with the Ambraciots, upon these 
conditions : 

" That neither the Ambraciots should be 
obliged to join the Acarnanians in any at- 
tempts against the Peloponnesians ; nor the 
Acarnanians to act with the Ambraciots against 
the Athenians. 



" That if either were attacked, the others 
should march to their defence. 

" That the Ambraciots should restore all 
the places and frontier belonging to the Am- 
philochians, which were at present in their 
hands. And, 

" That they should in no shape sup- 
port Anactorium, which was then in hostility 
with the Acarnanians." 

These articles being mutually agreed to, the 
war came to a conclusion. But after this, the 
Corinthians sent a party of their own people, 
consisting of three hundred heavy-armed, com- 
manded by Xenoclides the son of Euthycles, 
for the guard of Ambracia, who arrived, after 
great difficulties, as they marched all the way 
over-land. And this is the account of trans- 
actions in Ambracia. 

The Athenians in Sicily, this same winter, 
made a descent against Himeraea from their 
ships, whilst the Sicilians, pouring down from 
the upper country, were ravaging its frontier. 
They steered their course also against the isles 
of ^olus. But when they were returned to 
their old station at Rhegium, they found there 
Pyth^dorus the son of Isolochus, who was 
commissioned to take upon him the command 
of the fleet, in the room of Laches. For the 
confederates of Sicily had sent a deputation to 
Athens, to solicit a more ample succour of 
shipping. Because, as in fact the Syracusans 
were masters of all their lands, and they were 
also awed at sea by a few Syracusan vessels, 
they were now intent on gathering together 
such a naval force as might strike an effectual 
terror. The Athenians equipped out forty 
sail as a reinforcement for Sicily. Their mo- 
tive was, not only to bring the war in those 
parts to a speedy determination, but also to 
keep their own mariners in constant practice. 
Pythodorus, one of the admirals appointed for 
this service, they sent off immediately with a 
few ships : Sophocles son of Sostratides, and 
Eurymedon son of Thucles, were soon to follow 
with the main body of the fleet. But Pytho- 
dorus, who had now took the command from 
Laches, steered, about the close of the winter, 
against that fortress of the Locrians which 
Laches had taken before. But, being defeated 
at his landing by the Locrians, he returned 
again to his station. 

About the spring of the year, a torrent of 
fire overflowed from mount -^tna, in the same 
manner as formerly, which destroyed part of 



132 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book in. 



the lands of the Cataneans, who are situated at 
the foot of that mountain, which is the largest in 
all Sicily. It is said that fifty years intervened 
between this flow and the last which preceded ; 
and that in the whole the fire hath thus issued 



thrice since Sicily was inhabited by the Greci- 
ans. Such were the occurrences of this winter, 
at the end of which the sixth year also of this 
war, the history of which Thucydides nath 
compiled, expired. 



THE 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



BOOK IV. 



Year VII. The Athenians seize and fortify Pylus in Laconia. The Lacedaemonians make slight of it at first, 
yet afterwards exert their utmost efforts to dislodge them, though in vain. Their body thrown into Sphacteria 
is intercepted, and blocked up by the Athenian fleet. A suspension of arms and a truce ensue, but soon broke. 
Proceedings in Sicily : a naval engagement in the strait of Messene. At Athens, Cieon is drawn in by his own 
bravado to undertake the reduction of Sphacteria. He repairs thither, and completes the work beyond all ex- 
pectation. The Lacedaemonians, terribly distressed, send many proposals for a peace, but none are accepted. 
The Athenians invade the Corinthians: battle of Soligia. Tragical period of the sedition at Corcyra. Death 
of Artaxerxes Longimanus. — VIII. Expedition against Cythera. Continuation of affairs in Sicily. The sur- 
prise of Megara unsuccessfully attempted. A project formed for a total revolution in Bccotia. Brasidas begin- 
neth his march for Thrace, and by his noble behaviour carries all before him. The battle of Delium. Successful 
progress of Brasidas in Thrace.— IX. Truce for a year. The aflTairs of Thrace continued. 



T£AR VII/ 

The ensuing summer, when the corn was be- 
ginning to ear, ten sail of Syracusan, joined 
by an equal number of Locrean vessels, at the 
invitation of the inhabitants, stood away for 
Messene in Sicily, and took possession of the 
place. And thus Messene revolted from the 
Athenians. But this event was chiefly owing 
to the practices of the Syracusans, who, fore- 
seeing that this town might open the way for 
the reduction of Sicily, were greatly afraid lest 
the Athenians should get established there, 
and, with augmented forces, pour out from 
thence upon them. The Locrians assisted 
out of enmity to the Rhegians, whom they 
were desirous to have it in their power to at- 
tack both by land and sea. At the same time 
also, these Locrians broke in upon the terri- 
tory of the Rhegians with their entire force, 
to deter them from any attempt to save Mes- 
sene, and to gratify also those fugitives from 
Rhegium, who acted now in combination with 
them. For Rhegium had for a long time been 
embroiled in sedition, and so was unable to 
take the field against these invaders, who for 
the same reason were more eager to distress 

» Before Christ 425. 



them. When the ravage was completed, the 
Locrians marched their land-forces back, but 
their ships were stationed on the guard of 
Messene. They also were very busy in the 
equipment of an additional number, which 
were to repair to that station, and be ready to 
move from thence to any future operations of 
war. 

About the same season of the spring, before 
the corn was fully grown, the Peloponnesians 
and allies made their inroad into Attica. Agis, 
the son of Archidamus, king of the Lacedae- 
monians, commanded. They fixed their camp, 
and ravaged the country. 

The Athenians now sent out to sea the 
forty ships already prepared for the Sicilian 
voyage, under the command of Eurymedon 
and Sophocles, who staid behind to bring up 
this reinforcement, since Pythodorus, the third 
in the commission, was already in his post at 
Sicily. They had orders also in the course of 
the voyage to touch at Corcyra, and provide 
effectually for the preservation of those in the 
city, who were sadly infested by the outlaws 
posted on the mountain. Sixty sail of the 
Peloponnesians were now upon that coast, to 
act in support of those on the mountain, who, 
as the city was sorely oppressed with famine, 
presumed they should with ease carry all be- 

133 



134 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book IV. 



fore them. Demosthenes, further, who had 
been in no public employ since his return from 
Acarnania, procured leave to go on board this 
fleet, with authority to employ it on the coast ! 
of Peloponnesus, if he judged it for the service. I 
When they were got to the height of Laco- 
nia, intelligence is brought them, that " the 
Peloponnesian fleet is now in Corcyra." Eu- 
rymedon and Sophocles were for making/the 
best of their way thither. But it was the ad- 
vice of Demosthenes to go first to Pylus, and 
after they had secured that place, to proceed 
in their voyage. This was positively refused ; 
but it so happened, that a storm arose which 
drove the whole fleet to Pylus. Demosthenes 
insisted that they should immediately fortify 
the place, since this was the motive of his at- 
tendance in the fleet. He showed them, that 
" there was at hand plenty of timber and stone 
for the work ; that, besides the strength of its 
natural situation, the place itself was barren, 
as was also the greatest part of the adjacent 
country." For Pylus lies at the distance of 
about four hundred stadia' from Sparta, in the 
district which was formerly called Messenia ; 
but the name given it by the Lacedaemonians 
is Coryphasium. The others replied : " there 
are many barren capes in the Peloponnesus, 
which those may secure who have a mind to 
plunge the commonwealth into needless ex- 
penses." This place, however, seemed to him 
to be better marked out for this purpose than 
any other, as being possessed of a harbour ; 
and as the Messenians, who formerly bore 
some relation to it, and still used the same 
dialect with the Lacedaemonians, might from 
hence give them great annoyance, and at the 
same time effectually keep possession of it. 
But when neither the commanders nor sol- 
diers, nor the inferior offices,^ to whom he 
afterwards communicated his project, would 
be brought to a compliance, he quietly let it 
drop till the mere love of employment, during 
the idleness of their suspended voyage, sedi- 



. > About forty English miles. 

» The word in the original is Taxiarclis. They seem 
lo he nearly the same with captains of a company, in 
the modern style, as their command was over about one 
liundrcd men. Taxiarchs were also officers of a liijjher 
class, in number ten, every Athenian tribe appointing 
one, whose business it was to mnrsball the armies, to 
order the marches and encampments, to take care of 
provisions, and to punisli military offences. Dut the 
former seem to be tiieoflirers to whom Demosthenes 
applied himself in the present in:9tancc. 



tiously inclined the private soldiers to compass 
it with a wall. They took the work in hand, 
and plied it briskly. Tools ihey had none for 
hewing and fitting the stones ; but picked out 
and carried such as they judged most proper 
for the work, and laid them one upon another 
as compactly as they could. The mud that 
was any where requisite, for want of vessels, 
they carried on their shoulders, bending for- 
wards as much as possible, that it might have 
room to stick on, and holding it up with both 
hands clasped fast behind that it might not 
slide down. They spared no pains to prevent 
the Lacedaemonians, and to put the place in a 
proper posture of defence, before they could 
come to their disturbance. For the largest 
part of it was so well fortified by nature, that 
it stood in no need of the defence of art. 

The news of this arrived at Sparta during 
the celebration of some public festival. They 
set light by it ; assured, that so soon as they 
appeared in sight, the enemy would either 
abandon it, or the place be recovered by an 
easy effort. And they were something more 
dilatory, because their army was yet in Attica. 

The Athenians, having completed their 
works on the side towards the land, and on 
the other necessary spots, in the space of six 
days, leave Demosthenes with five ships to 
guard it, and with the larger number resumed 
their voyage for Corc3'ra and Sicily. 

But the Peloponncsians in xVttica were no 
sooner advertised of this seizure of Pylus, 
than they marched back with all expedition. 
The Lacedaemonians, and Agis their king, re- 
garded this affair of Pylus as their own do- 
mestic concern. And besides, as they had 
made the inroad early in the year, and whilst 
the corn was yet green, many of them laboured 
under a scarcity of provisions. The weather 
also, which proved tempestuous beyond what 
was usual in that season, had very much in- 
commoded the army. In this manner, many 
accidents concurred to accelerate their retreat, 
and to render this the shortest of all their in- 
vasions. For the whole of their stay in Attica 
was but fifteen days. 

About the same time Simonides, an Athe- 
nian commander, having gathered together a 
small party of Athenians from the neighbour- 
ing garrisons, and a body of the circumjacent 
dependents, took possession of Eion in Thrace, 
a colony of the Mrdeans. It had declared 
against the Athenians, but was now put into 



TEAR VII.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



135 



their hands by treachery. Yet, the Chalci- 
deans and the Bottiasans coming immediately 
to its relief, he was beat out of it again, and 
lost a great number of his men. 

After the retreat of the Peloponnesians out 
of Attica, the Spartans,' in conjunction with 
those of their allies, marched without loss of 
time to the recovery of Pylus. The rest of 
the Lacedaemonians were longer in their ap- 
proach, as but just returned from another ex- 
pedition. Yet a summons had been sent all 
round Peloponnesus, to march directly for 
Pylus. Their fleet of sixty sail was also re- 
manded from Corcyra, which, being transported 
by land over the isthmus of Leucas, arrive 
before Pylus, undescried by the Athenians 
who lay at Zacynthus. And by this time the 
land army had also approached. 

Demosthenes, before the coming up of the 
Peloponnesian fleet, had timely despatched two 
vessels to Eurymedon, and the Athenians on 
board that fleet now lying at Zacynthus, press- 
ing them to return, as the place was in danger 
of being lost ; which vessels made the best of 
their way, in pursuance of the earnest com- 
mands of Demosthenes. But the Laceda;mo- 
nians were now preparing to attack the fortress 
both by land and sea, presuming it would easily 
be destroyed, as the work had been raised with 
so much precipitation and was defended by so 
small a number of hands. But, as they also 
expected the return of the Athenian ships from 
Zacynthus, they designed, in case they took 
not the place before, to bar up the mouths of 
the harbour, so as to render the entrance im- 
practicable to the Athenians. For an isle which 
is called Sphacteria, lying before and at a small 
distance, locks it up and rendereth the mouths 
of the harbour narrow ; that near the fortress 
of the Athenians and Pylus, a passage for two 
ships only abreast ; and that between the other 
points of land, for eight or nine. The whole 
of it, as dcbert, was overgrown with wood and 
quite untrod, and the compass of it at most is 
about fifteen stadia.^ They were therefore 
intent on shutting up these entrances with 
ships moored close together, and their heads 
towards the sea. And to prevent the moles- 
tation apprehended, should the enemy take 

» The reader will he pleased to take notice, that the 
word Spartans is here einphatica). It means those of 
the first class, the noblest persons in the community, as 
is plain from the sequel. 

9 One mile and a half. 



possession of this island, they threw into it a 
body of their heavy-armed, and posted another 
body on the opposite shore ; — for by these 
dispositions the Athenians would be incom- 
moded from the island, and excluded from 
landing on the main land ; and as, on the op- 
posite coast of Pylus without the harbour, there 
is no road where ships can lie, they would be 
deprived of a station from whence to succour 
the besieged : and thus, without the hazard of 
a naval engagement, it was probable they should 
get possession of the place, as the quantity of 
provisions in it could be but small, since the 
seizure had been executed with slender pre- 
paration. Acting upon these motives, they 
threw the body of heavy-armed into the island, 
who were draughted by lot out of all the bands. 
These for a time were successively relieved by 
others. But the last body, who guarded that 
post, and were forced to continue in it, consisted 
of about four hundred and twenty, exclusive of 
the Helots who attended them, and these were 
commanded by Epitadas, the son of Molobrus. 

Demosthenes, perceiving by these dispo- 
sitions that the Lacedjemonians would attack 
him by land and sea, provided for his own de- 
fence. The triremes yet remaining with him 
he drew ashore, and ranged them by way of 
palisade before the fortress. The mariners he 
armed with bucklers, sorry ones indeed, as most 
of them were only twigs of osier plaited. Better 
arms were not to be procured in so desert a 
place. And even these they had taken out of a 
cruizer of thirty oars and a light packet belong! ig 
to Messenians, who happened accidentally to 
put in. The Messenians on board were about 
forty heavy armed, whom he ranged amongst 
his own body. The greater part therefore of 
the unarmed, as well as some who had armour, 
he placed on the strongest parts of the fortress 
towards the continent, with orders to beat off 
the land army whenever they approached. And 
having selected from his whole number sixty 
heavy armed and a few archers, he marched out 
of the fortress to that part of the beach where 
he supposed the enemy would endeavour to 
land. The shore indeed was rough and rocky, 
and bordered on the main sea ; yet, as the wall 
was weakest in this quarter, he judged it would 
soonest tempt and animate an assault. For 
never imagining they should be out-numbered 
in shipping, they had left the wall on this side 
but weak ; and should the enemy now force a 
landing, the place would undoubtedly be lost. 



136 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book IV. 



Sensible of this, and determined if possible 
to prevent their landing, Demosthenes posted 
himself with his chosen band on the very edge 
of the water, and endeavoured to animate them 
by the following harangue : 

" My fellow soldiers, here posted with me 
in this dangerous situation, I conjure you, in 
so urgent an extremity, to throw away all su- 
perfluous wisdom. Let not a soul amongst 
you compute the perils which now environ us, 
but regardless of the issue and inspirited by 
hope let him charge the foe, and be confident 
of success. A situation desperate like this 
alloweth no room for calm consideration, but 
demands the most precipitate venture. Supe- 
rior advantages however are along with us ; — 
of this I am convinced, provided we only stand 
firm together, and scorning to be terrified at 
the number of our foes, do not wilfully betray 
those advantages which are now in our favour. 
The shore is most difficult of access : — this in 
my judgment makes abundantly for us ; — this 
will support us, if we keep our ground. But 
if we give way, difficult as it is now, their 
landing will be easy — when there are none to 
obstruct it. Nay, what is worse, we shall make 
the enemy more furious, when, if we may 
afterwards press hard upon him, it is no longer 
in his power to re-embark with ease For so 
long as they continue on board they may most 
easily be encountered ; whilst they are busy in 
landing, they cannot so far overmatch us, as 
that we ought to shrink before their numbers. 
Lcrge though they be, the spot of action will 
be small for want of ground to draw up in 
order. "What though their force be superior 
for the land 1 that advantage will be lost in 
their present service, when they must act from 
their vessels and on the water, where many 
lucky contingencies are requisite. And thus I 
am satisfied, that with these disadvantages they 
are but merely a balance for our smallness of 
number. 

'< As for you, O Athenians, who are now 
present, and who, by the long experience of 
frequent descents, are perfectly convinced that 
men, who stand firm and scorn to give way 
before the dash of the surge or the menacing 
approach of a vessel, can never be beat off — 
from you I insist, that, firmly embodied together 
and charging the enemy on the very margin of 
the water, you preserve all us who arc here, 
and preserve this fortress." 

In this manner Demosthenes having encour- 



aged his men, the Athenians became more 
animated than ever; and, marching forwards 
to the very margin of the sea, posted them- 
selves there in order of battle. The Laceds- 
monians were also in motion ; their land force 
was marching to assault the fortress, and their 
fleet was approaching the diore. It consisted 
of forty-three vessels, and a Spartan, Thrasy- 
melidas the son of Cratesicles, was on board 
as admiral. He steered directly for the spot 
on which Demosthenes expected his coming. 
In this manner were the Athenians assaulted 
on both sides, by land and sea. 

The ships of the enemy came on in small 
divisions, because there was not room for lar- 
ger. They slackened by intervals, and endea- 
voured by turns to force their landing. They 
were brave to a man, and mutually animated 
one another to beat oflf the Athenians and seize 
the fortress. 

But Brasidas signalized himself above them 
alL He commanded a trireme ; and observing 
that the other commanders and pilots, though 
they knew they could run aground, yet kept 
aloof because the shore was craggy, and shun- 
ned every hazard of staving their vessels, he 
shouted aloud, " that it was shameful for the 
saving of timber to suflTer enemies to raise 
fortifications within their territory." He en- 
couraged them on the contrary " to force their 
landing, though they dashed their vessels to 
pieces ;" begging the confederates <' in this 
juncture not to refuse bestowing their ships on 
the LacediEmonians in lieu of the great servi- 
ces they had done them, but to run them ashore, 
and landing at all adventures to seize the ene- 
my and the fortress." In this manner he ani- 
mated others, and having compelled his own 
pilot to run the vessel ashore, he was at once 
upon the stairs, and endeavouring to get down 
was beat back by the Athenians. After many 
wounds received, he fainted with the loss of 
blood ; and falling upon the gunnel, his shield 
tumbled over into the water. It was brought 
ashore and taken up by the Athenians, who 
afterwards made it a part of the trophy, which 
they erected for this attack. 

The others indeed with equal spirit endea- 
voured, but yet could not possibly land, as the 
ground was difficult of access, and the Athen- 
ians stsod firm, and no where at all gave way. 
Such now was the strange reverse of fortune, 
that the Athenians upon land, upon La- 
conic land, beat off the Lacedemonians who 



YEAR VII.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



137 



were fighting from the water ; and the Lacedae- 
monians from ships were endeavouring a de- 
scent upon their own now hostile territory 
against the Athenians. For at this period of 
time it was the general opinion, that those 
were landmen and excelled most in land en- 
gagements, but that these were seamen and 
made the best figure at sea. 

The attack was continued the whole day 
and part of the next before it was given 
up. On the third day, they detached some 
vessels to Asine to fetch timber for engines, 
hoping by them to accomplish the taking of 
the wall adjacent to the harbour, which, though 
of a greater height, yet might easier be ap- 
proached by sea. 

During this pause, forty sail of Athenians 
came up from Zacynthus. This fleet had 
been enlarged by the accession of some guard- 
ships from off the station of Naupactus, and 
four sail of Chians. These no sooner dis- 
covered the main land about Pylus and the 
island Sphacteria to be full of armed soldiers, 
the harbour also to be occupied by the ships of 
the enemy, which lay quiet in their posts, than, 
perplexed how to act, they sailed back for the 
present to the isle of Prote not far distant and 
desert, and there spent the night. 

The day following, being formed into the 
order of battle, they showed themselves again 
as ready for engagement, should the enemy 
venture to stand out against them into the 
open sea; and if not, were determined to 
force their way into the harbour. The enemy 
still kept in the same quiet posture, nor set 
about executing their former design of barring 
the entrances. They continued in their usual 
position along the shore, when they had man- 
ned their vessels, and got every thing ready to 
engage the assailants should they break into 
the harbour, where there was no danger of 
being straitened for room. The Athenians, 
perceiving their intent, broke into the harbour 
at both entrances. Falling there upon the 
greater number of vessels now advanced into 
deep water to obstruct the passage, they put 
them to flight ; and following the chase, which 
could be but short, they shattered several, and 
took five, one of which had her whole crew on 
board. They proceeded to attack the rest, 
which had fled amain towards the shore. 
Some moreover, which had just been manned, 
were disabled before they could launch into 
Ifce deep. Others, deserted by the mariners 
25 



who had fled along the shore, they fastened to 
their own, and towed away empty. The 
Lacedaimonians seeing these things, and pro- 
digiously alarmed at the sad event, lest now 
the communication should be cut off with the 
body in the island, rushed down with all their 
force to prevent it. Armed as they were they 
plunged into the water, and catching hold of 
the vessels in tow pulled them back towards 
the shore. It was now the apprehension of 
every soul amongst them, that the business 
flagged wherever he himself was not present. 
Great 'was the tumult in this contest for the 
ships, inverting the general custom of both con- 
tending parties. For the Lacedaemonians, in- 
flamed and terrified, fought a sea-fight (if it 
may be so expressed) from the shore : the 
Athenians, already victorious, and eager to 
give their good fortune its utmost completion, 
fought a land-battle from on board. The 
struggle on both sides was long and laborious, 
and blood was abundantly shed before the dis- 
pute could be ended. But at length the 
Lacedaemonians recovered all their empty ves- 
sels, excepting such as had been taken on the 
first onset. Each party being retired to their 
respective posts, the Athenians erected a trophy, 
and delivered up the dead, and were masters of 
all the wreck and shatters of the action. Then, 
without loss of time, they ranged their vessels 
in circuit quite round the island, and kept a 
strict watch, as having intercepted the body of 
men which was posted there. But the Pelo- 
ponnesians on the main-land, with the accession 
of their auxilliaries who had now joined them, 
remained upon the opposite shore near Pylus. 

When the news of this action at Pylus was 
brought to Sparta, it was resolved, as the great 
calamity was so urgent, that the magistrates in 
person should repair to the camp, and consult 
upon the very spot what resource they had left. 
And when their own eyes had showed them 
the impossibility of relieving their men, and 
they were loath to leave them in the wretched ex- 
tremity either of perishing by famine, or, over- 
powered by superior numbers, of being shame- 
fully made prisoners, it was concluded "to send 
to the Athenian commanders to ask a suspension 
of arms at Pylus, whilst they despatched an em- 
bassy to Athens to procure an accommodation, 
and to obtain leave as soon as possible to fetch 
off their Spartans." These commanders ac- 
cepting the proposal, the suspension was agreed 
upon on the following conditions : 
R 



138 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



( 



IV. 



"That the Lacedsemonians should imme- 
diately deliver up the ships in which they had 
fought ; and all the ships of war in general, 
which they had any where in Laconia, they 
should bring to Pylus, and deliver up to the 
Athenians. That they should refrain from 
making any attempt whatever upon the fortress, 
either by sea or land. 

" That the Athenians should permit the 
Lacedaemonians on the main-land to carry over 
a stated quantity of provisions to those in the 
island, two Attic choenixes' of meal, with two 
cotyls of wine, and a piece of flesh, for every 
Spartan, and a moiety of each for every servant. 
These provisions to be carried thither under 
the inspection of the Athenians: and no 
vessels whatever to cross over without permis- 
sion. 

" That the Athenians, notwithstanding, be 
at liberty to continue their guard round the 
island, but not to land upon it : and should 
refrain from giving any annoyance to the 
army of the Peloponnesians, either by sea or 
land. 

" That if either party should violate these 
conditions, either in the whole or any part 
whatever, the truce to be immediately void ; 
otherwise, to continue in force till the return 
of the Lacedaemonian embassy from Athens. 

« That the Athenians should convey that 
embassy thither and back again in a trireme. 

" That upon their return the truce should be 
ended, when the Athenians should restore the ! 
ships now delivered to them, in the same num- I 
ber and condition as they were in before." 

On these conditions a suspension of arms 
took place, in pursuance of which the ships 
were delivered up to the number of sixty, and i 
the ambassadors despatched away, who arriv- , 
ing at Athens, addressed themselves as foUow- 
cth :— I 

" Hither, Athenians, we are sent on the 
part of the Lacedsemonians, to negotiate with 
you in behalf of their citizens in the island, and 
to propose an expedient which will tend very 
much to your advantage, and will at the same 
time preserve as much as possible our own 
honour in the great calamity with which we are 
at present beset. It is not our purpose to run 
out into a long unaccustomed flow of words. 
"We shall adhere to the rule of our country, to 



> More than two pints of meal, and one pint of wine, 
English measure. 



spare many words where few may suffice ; and 
then only to enlarge, when the important occa- 
sion requireth an exact detail for the more 
judicious regulation of necessary acts. Receive 
therefore our discourse with an attention cleared 
of enmity. Be informed as men of understand- 
ing ought: and conclude that you are only to be 
put in mind of that judicious method of pro- 
cedure, of which yourselves are such competent 
judges. 

" You have now an opportunity' at hand to 
improve a present success to your own interest 
and credit, to secure the possession of what 
you have hitherto acquired, and to adorn it 
with the accession of honour and glory. Yoti 
are only to avoid that insolence of mind so fre- 
quent to men who have been, till the present, 
strangers to success. Such men are ever apt 
to presume too much on larger acquisitions, 
though merely because their present prosperity 
was beyond their expectation : whilst tliey, who 
have experienced the frequent vicissitudes of 
fortune, have gained a more judicious turn, 
and presume the least upon continuance of 
success. And there is the highest reason to 
conclude, that experience hath improved the 
commonwealth of Athene and us Lacedaemo- 
nians in this piece of wisdom, much more than 
any other people. 

« But be assured of it now, when you behold 
the calamities with which we are at present 
environed ; we, who are invested with the 
highest honours and dignity of Greece, are 
this moment addressing ourselves to you, 
begging such favours as we formerly thought 
were more peculiarly lodged in our own dis- 
pensation. Not that we are thus reduced 
through failure of our strength, or through 
former strength too haughtily exerted, but 
merely through the weight of such unfore- 
seen disasters as continually happen, and to 
which the whole of mankind alike are ever sub- 
ject. And from hence it is right that you should 
learn, amidst the present strength of your state, 
and its late acquisitions, that fortune may not 
always declare upon your side. W ise indeed 
are they, who in their estimates of success 
make judicious allowances for chanro. Such 
are best able to bear the alterniitivcs of 
calamity with prudence and temper. Such 
will form their judgments of war. not as the 
infallible means of accomplisliing whatever 
scheme they please to undertake, but as de- 
riving its eflects from the guidance of fortune. 



YEAR VII.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



139 



Such are the persons who are most of all ex- 
empted from fatal miscarriages; because they 
are not puffed up by presuming too far on pre- 
sent prosperity, and would gladly acquiesce in 
the peaceable enjoyment of what they now 
possess. 

« It concerns your honour, Athenians, to deal 
in this manner with us, lest, in case you now 
reject our proposals, when you yourselves in 
future times miscarry (many such events must 
happen), your present good fortune may then 
be perversely ascribed to chance, even though 
you are now able to deliver down to poster- 
ity the fame of your power and moderation be- 
yond a possibility of blemish. The Lacedae- 
monians invite you to agreement, and a conclu- 
sion of the war. They offer you peace and 
alliance, nay friendship in its whole extent, and 
the exchange of good offices mutually revived ; 
demanding nothing in return but their citizens 
out of the island. To this step they have con- 
descended rather than be exposed to the dangers 
incidental on either side, should they either 
seize some favourable opportunity to force 
their escape by arms, or holding out to the 
last against your blockade, be reduced with all 
the aggravations of defeat. Great enmities, in 
our opinion, may the soonest be brought to a 
firm determination — not when either party hav- 
ing exerted all their strength, and gained the 
far greater superiority in war, disdains the fair 
accommodation, and relieth on that forced ac- 
quiescence which necessitated oaths impose ; 
but rather, when, though victory be within their 
reach, they recollect humanity, and having suc- 
ceeded by valour quite beyond their expecta- 
tions, determine the contest with temper and 
moderation. Then the foe, who hath not felt 
the extremity of force, is henceforth disarmed 
by the strength of gratitude, and is more se- 
curely bound by the affections of his own mind 
to abide for the future by all his compacts. 
Such ready deference mankind are more apt to 
show towards those who have been with a re- 
markable superiority their enemies, than to 
such as they have opposed in more equal com- 
petition. It is natural when men take the me- 
tiiod of voluntary submission, for the pleasing 
contest of generosity to be kindled between 
them ; but to hazard the last extremities and 
even grow desperate against that haughtiness 
which will not relent. 

« Now, if ever, is the crisis come to effect 
BUch a pleasing reconciliation between us both, 



before the intervention of some incurable event 
to ulcerate our passions, which may lay us un- 
der the sad necessity of maintaining an eternal 
enmity both public and private in regard to 
you, and you lose the benefit of those advan- 
tageous offers we now lay within your option. 
Whilst the event is yet undetermined, whilst 
the acquisition of glory and of our friendship 
is within your reach, whilst yet we only feel 
the weight of a supportable calamity, and are 
clear from foul disgrace, let us now be mutually 
reconciled ; let us give the preference to peace 
over war, and effectuate a cessation of miseries 
to the other Grecians. The honour of such an 
event will by them be more abundantly ascrib- 
ed to you. At present they are engaged in a 
perplexing warfare, unable yet to pronounce its 
authors. But in case a reconciliation now 
take place, a point for the most part within 
your decision, they will gratefully acknowledge 
you for generous benefactors. 

" If then you thus determine, you gain an op- 
portunity to render the Lacedaemonians your 
firm and lasting friends, since now they request 
your friendship, and choose to be obliged 
rather than compelled. Reflect within your- 
selves how many benefits must in all probabiUty 
result from such a lucky coincidence. For you 
cannot but know, that when we and you shall 
act with unanimity, the rest of Greece, con- 
scious of inferiority, will pay us the utmost 
honour and regard." 

The Lacedaemonians talked in this strain 
upon the presumption, that the Athenians had 
formerly been desirous of peace, and had been 
obstructed merely through their opposition; 
but now, thus freely tendered, they would ac- 
cept it with joy, and give up the men. The 
Athenians, on the contrary, reckoning the 
Spartans in the island already in their power, 
imagined that a peace would be at any time in 
their own option, and were now very eager to 
improve their present success. But such a 
measure was insisted upon most of all by Cleon 
the son of Claenetus, the greatest demagogue at 
this time, and most in credit with the people. 
It was he who persuaded them to return the 
following answer. 

" That, previous to all accommodation, the 
Spartans shut up in the island must deliver up 
their arms and their persons, and be brought 
prisoners to Athens, When this was done, 
and the Lacedaemonians had surrendered Nisaea 
and Pegae, and Troezene and Chalcis, (of which 



140 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[rook TV. 



places they had not possessed themselves by 
arms, but in pursuance of a former treaty, when 
distress exacted compliance from the Athenians, 
and they had been obliged upon any terms to 
purchase peace,) then they might fetch away 
their countrymen, and conclude a peace for 
whatever term both parties should agree." 

To this answer the Lacedaemonians made no 
direct reply,' they only requested that a com- 
mittee might be appointed, with whom, after 
the arguments on each side should be freely of- 
fered and discussed, they might agree upon 
some expedient to mutual satisfaction. Cleon 
upon this broke out into loud invectives against 
them, affirming, " he knew beforehand that 
they intended nothing just or fair; but now their 
view was mainfest to ail, as they had absolutely 
refused to have any transactions with the body 
of the people, and had thus expressed a desire 
to negotiate with a small committee : if their 
views were fair and upright, he called upon 
them to explain themselves, in the presence of 
all." But the Lacedaemonians, perceiving that 
nothing they could urge would have any influ- 
ence on the people, and in case, to ward off the 
distress they feared, they should make too large 
proposals, these offered and unaccepted, would 
expose them to the censure of their confeder- 
ates ; and that further, the Athenians would 
not comply with their demand on any reasona- 
ble terms ; they broke off all further confer- 
ence, and quitted Athens. The very moment 
they return to Pylus, the truce was at an end. 
The Lacedaemonians re-demanded their ships, 
according to the article for that purpose agreed 
on. But the Athenians objecting some infrac- 
tions to them, such as an incursion towards the 
fortress, expressly prohibited by the articles, 
and some other matters of little consequence, 
absolutely refused a restitution. They justi- 
fied the refusal upon this express stipulation 
between them, that " if the conditions were in 
any degree violated, the truce should immedi- 
ately be void." The Lacedaemonians protested 
against these proceedings, and charging the de- 
tention of their ships with the higest injus- 



t niodorus Sirulus, 1. 12. says further, That the La- 
ccdtrinoninn amhassadors ofTered to set at liberty an 
eqnnl immlicr of Athenians, who were now their pri- 
Bonerci. And, when this offer was rejected, the anihas- 
sadora replied freely. " It was plain they set a liiu'her 
vhhieon Spartans than on their own citizens, since they 
JudL'ed an equal nurnitcr of the Idttcr not to be an cqui- 
Tttlenl." 



tice, broke off all further debate and prepared 
for war. 

Pylus was now the scene in which both these 
warring parties exerted their utmost efforts. 
The Athenians sailed the whole day round the 
island with two ships in an opposite course ; in 
the night, their whole fleet was stationed round 
it upon guard, except on that side towards the 
main sea when the weather was tempestuous. 
And to strengthen their guard they had now re- 
ceived a reinforcement of twenty sail from 
Athens, so that the number of their shipping 
amounted in the whole to seventy. The Pelo- 
ponnesians maintained their post on the conti- 
nent, and made frequent assaults upon the fort : 
intent all along to seize the first favourable op- 
portunity, and to accomplish the preservation 
of their countrymen. 

In Sicily, this while, the Syracusans and con- 
federates, augmenting the number of their 
guard-ships on the station of Messene with an- 
other squadron they had since equipped, from 
Messene renewed the war. The Locrians 
spared no pains to spur them on from the great 
aversion they bore to the Rhegians. They had 
now broke into the territories of the latter with 
their whole force. They had even a mind to 
hazard a naval engagement against them, as 
they saw the number of Athenian ships at hand 
to be very inconsiderable, and had received in- 
telligence that the larger numbers designed for 
this service were stopped for the present to 
block up the isle of Sphacteria. For should 
they once get the better at sea, they hoped, as 
they then might attack Rhegium both by sea 
and land, to find it an easy conquest, and so the 
posture of their own affairs would be consider- 
ably strengthened. For as Rhegium, which is 
a promontory of Italy, lies at a very small dis- 
tance from Messene in Sicily, they could then 
prevent the approach of the Athenians, and be 
entirely masters of the strait. This strait is 
that part of the sea which runs between Rhe- 
gium and Messene, and over which lies the 
shortest cut from Sicily to the continent. It i.i 
the place which was formerly called Charybdis, 
and through which Ulysses is said to have 
sailed. As the current here sets in strongly 
from two great seas, the Tyrrhene and Sicilian, 
and runs with great rapidity, it is not at all 
strange that it should have been esteemed a 
dangerous passage. 

Yet in the very middle of this strait the 
Syracusans and confederates, with a number of 



YEAH VII.] 



PELOPOiNNESlAN WAR. 



141 



ships little more than thirty, were forced to 
engage in the evening of the day, the dispute 
beginning about a vessel that was passing 
through. They stood away to oppose sixteen 
sail of Athenians and eight of Rhegians. They 
were worsted by the Athenians ; but each side 
separated in hurry and confusion, just as they 
could, to their several stations at Messene and 
Rhegium. They lost one ship in this action, 
which was stopped by the sudden approach of 
night. 

But after this the Locrians evacuated the 
territory of Rhegium, and the whole collected 
fleet of the Syracusans and confederates, took 
a new station at Peloris of Messene, and their 
whole land-force attended. The Athenians 
and Rhegians sailing up to their station, and 
finding none at present on board the ships, 
rushed in amongst them. Yet they lost one 
of their own vessels by the force of a grappling- 
iron fastened upon it, the crew of which was 
saved by swimming. Immediately after this 
the Syracusans got on board, and being towed 
along the shore towards Messene, the Athe- 
nians came up again to attack them ; but, the 
enemy running off into the deep and giving the 
first charge, they lose another of their ships. 
Though continuing to be towed along the 
shore, and to charge in this manner, yet the 
Syracusans, without suffering any loss, got safe 
into the harbour of Messene. And now the 
Athenians, having received intelligence that 
Camarina was betrayed to the Syracusans by 
Archias and his accomplices, stood away for 
that place. 

In the meanwhile the Messenians, with 
their whole force by land, and accompanied by 
their ships, marched away against Chalcidic 
Naxus, which bordered upon their own terri- 
tory. The first day they force the Naxians to 
shelter themselves behind their walls, and then 
they plundered the country. The day follow- 
ing, sailing up the river Acesine, they plundered 
along the shore, and with their land-force made 
an assault upon the city. The Siculi, who live 
upon the mountains, were now pouring down 
in numbers to repel the Messenians. This the 
Naxians perceiving, became more outrageous, 
and animating one another with the thought 
that the Leontines and their other Greek alUes 
were now marching to their relief, they sud- 
denly sally out of the city and fall upon the 
Messenians, whom they put to flight, and 
slaughtered more than a thousand of them ; 



the remainder with diflSculty, escaping to their 
own homes : for the barbarians attacked them 
upon their road, and made great havoc of them. 
The ships upon the station of Messene broke 
up soon after, withdrawing respectively to their 
own harbours. 

Immediately the Leontines and allies, in 
concert with the Athenians, appeared before 
Messene, as now reduced to a very low ebb. 
They assaulted it on all sides ; the Athenians 
making their attempt firom their ships on the 
side of the harbour, whilst the land-forces did 
the same on the body of the place. But the 
Messenians, and a party of Locrians com- 
manded by Demoteles, who after their late blow 
had been left there for the security of the 
place, made a sudden sally from the city, and 
falling unexpectedly on the army of the Leon- 
tines, put the greater part to flight, and did 
great execution upon them. This was no 
sooner perceived by the Athenians, than they 
threw themselves ashore to succour their con- 
federates, and falling in with the Messenians, 
who had lost the order of their battle, drove 
them again behind their walls. This done, 
having erected a trophy, they put over to Rhe- 
gium. And after this, the Grecians of Sicily 
continued a land war against one another, in 
which the Athenians had no participation. 

At Pylus, the Athenians still kept the 
Lacedaemonians blocked up in the island, and 
the army of the Peloponnesians remained in 
their old post upon the continent, in a state of 
inactivity. Their constant guard subjected the 
Athenians to excessive hardships, since pro- 
visions and fresh water were equally scarce. 
There was but one single fountain for their 
use, which lay within the fortress of Pylus, 
and yielded but a slender quantity of water. 
The majority of them were forced to dig into 
the gravel upon the beach of the sea, and take 
up with such water as could thus be got. They 
were further very much straitened in their 
station for want of room. They had not road 
enough for their ships to ride in with tolerable 
convenience, so that alternately one division lay 
ashore to take their necessary repasts, whilst the 
other launched more to sea. But what discou- 
raged them most was the length of the blockade, 
so contrary to what they had expected. They 
had imagined a few days' siege would have worn 
out a body of men shut up in a barren island, 
and having only salt water for their drink. 
But this had been redressed by the Lacedae- 
r2 



142 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book TV. 



monians, who had by a public edict encouraged 
all who were willing to carry over into the 
island meal, and wine, and cheese, and any 
other eatable which might enable them to hold 
out, assigning a large pecuniary reward for any 
successful attempt of this nature, and promising 
freedom to every Helot who carried them pro- 
visions. This was performed through a series 
of dangers by several ; but the Helots were 
most active of all, who putting off from Pelo- 
ponnesus (wherever they chanced to be) landed 
by favour of the dark on the side of the island 
which lies upon the main-sea. Their chief 
precaution was to run over in a hard gale of 
wind. For whenever the wind blew from the 
sea, they were in less danger of being discover- 
ed by the guard of triremes, which then could 
not safely lie quite round the island. In ex- 
ecuting this service, they put every thing to 
hazard. As a prior valuation had been given 
in, they run their vessels on shore at all adven- 
tures; and the heavy-armed soldiers were 
ready to receive them at every place most con- 
venient for landing. Those, however, who 
ventured out when the weather was calm, were 
certainly intercepted. Such, further, as were 
expert at diving, swam over through the har- 
bour, dragging after them by a string bottles 
filled with poppies mixed up with honey and 
the powder of linseed. These for a time 
escaped discovery, but were afterwards closely 
watched. No artifice was left unpractised on 
either side ; some being ever intent to carry 
provisions over, and other to intercept them. 

At Athens, in the meantime, the people, 
being informed of the hardships to which their 
own forces are reduced, and that those in the 
island receive supplies of provisions, were per- 
plexed how to act. They were full of appre- 
hensions lest the winter should put a stop to 
their siege, being conscious of the impossibility 
of procuring them subsistence from any part of 
Peloponnesus ; and more so, as the soil about 
them was barren, and that even in summer 
they were not able to furnish them with neces- 
sary supplies; that further, as no harbours 
were in the parts adjacent, there would be no 
commodious road for their shipping; so that, 
in case they relaxed their guard, the besieged 
would go securely away ; or otherwise, they 
might get off, by the favour of stormy weather, 
in those vessels which brought over provisions. 
But they were most of all alarmed at the con- 
duct of the Lacedasmonians, who because they 



had now a safe resource in prospect, had dis- 
continued all manner of negotiation. In a 
word they highly repented the refusal of their 
former offers. 

Cleon, conscious to himself that the blame 
of baffling that accommodation would be thrown 
upon him, taxed them who brought the last 
advices as broachers of falsehoods. But those 
who had been sent to make the report, demand- 
ed, " since they could not be credited, that a 
deputation might be sent to know its truth." 
For which office Cleon himself was nominated 
by the Athenians, in conjunction with The- 
ogenes. 

But now he plainly saw that he must either 
be necessitated to make the same report as 
those had done whom he had charged with 
falsehood ; or, should he report dilfcrently, 
must soon be convicted of a lie. He perceived 
also, that the inclinations of the people were 
mostly bent on an ample reinforcement ; upon 
which he ventured to give them this further 
advice — That " sending a deputation on such 
an errand was quite superfluous, since oppor- 
tunities might be lost by so dilatory a measure : 
if they were really convinced of the truth of 
the report, they should at once put to sea 
against their enemies." He then proceeded 
to a malicious glance against Nicias son of 
Niceratus, who at that time presided over the 
military affairs. He hated him, and sneered 
him thus — That " if their generals were really 
men, it would be an easy matter to sail thither 
with an additional strength, and make a seizure 
of those in the island ; for his own part, was 
he in command, he would do it in a trice." 
The Athenians began immediately to clamour 
and rail at Cleon, for not instantly setting 
about that enterprise himself, which to him 
appeared so easy. This Nicias laying hold of, 
chagrined at the same time by the sneer upon 
himself, called upon him aloud — «< To take 
what force he pleased, and to perform the ser- 
vice in his stead." Cleon, imagining this to 
be a mere verbal offer, declared himself ready. 
But when he found that Nicias was earnest in 
the point of resignation, he drew back, alleg- 
ing, that " it could not be, since not he 
but Nicias was general." He trembled now, 
since he never suspected that the other would 
venture to give up his office to him. Nicias 
however called a second upon him, and form- 
ally surrendered his office to him, so far as re- 
lated to Pylus, desiring the Athenians to be 



jfEAR VII.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



143 



his witnesses. The people now, for such is 
the temper of the multitude, the more pains 
Cleon took to decline the voyage, and disentan- 
gle himself from his own bravados, called out 
so much the more vehemently upon Nicias to 
give up the command, and roared aloud at the 
other to go on board. Unable now to extricate 
himself, he intimates his acceptance of the em- 
ploy, and standing forth, averred, that " he was 
not under the least dread of the Lacedaemoni- 
ans ; would not be accompanied by so much as 
one Athenian, but would take only what Lem- 
nians and Imbrians were at hand, and those 
targeteers who were come to their aid from 
iEnus, and the four hundred archers from 
other places. With these, he said, added to 
the military force already at Pylus, he would 
either in the space of twenty days bring oil' all 
the Lacedsemonians alive, or put them all to 
death upon the spot." 

This big way of talking raised a laugh among 
the people ; all men of sense however were not 
a little delighted. They concluded, they should 
compass by it one of these two desirable ends ; 
either to rid themselves effectually of Cleon, 
which they chiefly expected ; or, should they 
be disappointed of this, to get those Lacedsemo- 
nians into their power.' 

» The honour of Athens was very deeply concerned 
in the point, which had been the subject of tliis day's 
debate in the assembly of the people, and yet it hath 
turned out a mere comic scene. The dignity of the re- 
public had never been well supported on these occasions, 
since tlie death of Pericles. Cleon had introduced all 
kinds of drollery and scurrility into the debates; and it 
was now become quite the same thing to the people, 
whether they laughed with or laughed at him. He hath 
now railed Xicias, though none but a person of so dif- 
fident and fearful a temper as Nicias could so have been 
railed, out of an honourable command ; and then is 
laughed liimself into it, and though an arrant poltroon 
is metamorphosed into a general of the first class, and 
soon after swells into a very hero. However, the Athe- 
nian good sense, whatever turn Tlnicydides gives it, 
can hardly be justified on this occasion, in thrusting so 
important a commission upon Cleon purely for a joke. 
Plutarch says, they always bore his impertinent and 
mad way of talking, because it was humorous and di- 
verting. Once, when the assembly liad been met some 
time, and the people had sat lona; expecting his coining, 
at length he made his appearance with a garland on his 
head, and hedged the favour of them to adjourn till the 
morrow," For, at present, said he, I am not at leisure, 
since I have sacrificed to-day, and must entertain my 
friends." A loud laugh ensued at his impudence, and 
then tliey rose and adjourned. This affair of Pylus, 
was. however, far from a jocular point ; and the Athe- 
nians might have paid very dear for their mirth, had 
not Cleon been wise enough to associate Demosthenes 
with him in the command. 



! Having thus transacted the requisite pointi» 
in the public assembly, where the Athenians 

, had awarded the expedition to him by a formal 
decree, and Demosthenes, at Clcon's own re- 
quest, was joined in the commission of com- 
manders at Pylus, he hastened to his post with 
the utmost speed. His reason for associating 
Demosthenes in the command, was owing to 
some notice received that he was bent on land- 
ing upon the island ; as the soldiers, terribly in- 
commoded by the straitness of their stations, 
and resembling besieged more than besiegers, 
were eager for this bold adventure. Demos- 
thenes was animated more to the attempt be- 
cause the island had lately been set on fire. 
Before this accident, as it had been quite cov- 
ered over with wood, and was pathless, because 
ever uninhabited, he durst not think of such a 
step, and judged all these circumstances, to be 
for the enemy's advantage. For, though a more 
numerous army should have landed against 
them, they were enabled terribly to annoy them 
from posts undescried. What errors might be 
committed, or how large their strength, might 
be more easily concealed on that side by the 
covert of the woods ; whereas all the errors of 
his own army would lie clear and open to ob- 
servation, when the enemy might suddenly at- 
tack, and in what quarter they pleased, since 
battle must be entirely in their own option. On 
the other side, should he force them to a close 
engagement on rough and woody ground, the 
smaller number by being skilled in the passes, 
he imagined, must prove too hard for a superior 
number without such experience ; that by this 
means his own force, merely on account of its 
numbers, might be imperceptiby destroyed, as 
it could not be discerned which part of it was 
hardest pressed, and stood most in need of sup- 
port. 

These inward suggestions were more preva- 
lent in the mind of Demosthenes from the re- 
membrance of his ^tolian defeat, which was 
partly owing to the woods amongst which he 
engaged. But as the narrowness of their station 
had necessitated his soldiers to land sometimes 
upon the skirts of the island, and under the 
cover of an advanced guard, to dress their re- 
past, a soldier, though entirely without design, 
set the wood on fire, which spread but slowly, 
till a brisk gale happening to arise, the great- 
est part of it was unexpectedly destroyed by 
the flames. Demosthenes, having gained by 
this means a clearer view of the Lacedaemo- 



144 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book IV. 



nians, found them more numerous than from 
the quantity of victuals sent in by stipulation 
he was used to compute them. He then judged 
it highly to concern the Athenians to exert 
their utmost efforts : and, as the island was 
now become more opportune for a descent, he 
got every thing in readiness for its execution, 
having sent for a supply of men from the ad- 
jacent confederates, and busied himself about 
all the dispositions needful for success. He 
had further received an express from Cleon 
notifying his approach, who now, at the head 
of the supply he himself had demanded, ar- 
riveth at Pylus. ISo sooner were they joined, 
than they despatched a herald to the camp on 
the continent, demanding, " Whether they were 
willing to order their people in the island to 
surrender their arms and persons, without risk- 
ing extremites, on condition to be kept under 
an easy confinement till the whole dispute 
could be properly accommodated 1" — This be- 
ing positively refused, they remained quiet one 
day longer ; but on the succeeding day, hav- 
ing embarked their whole strength of heavy- 
armed on board a few vessels, they put out by 
night, and a little before the ensuing dawn, 
landed on each side of the island, both from 
the main sea and the harbour, amounting in 
the whole to eight hundred men in heavy ar- 
mour. They advanced with their utmost 
speed tow^ards the first guard on the island. 
This was done in pursuance of a previous dis- 
position : for this first guard consisted of 
about thirty heavy-armed : the main body un- 
der Epitadas was posted about the centre, 
where the ground was most level and watery : 
and another party guarded the extremity of the 
island facing Pylus, which, towards the sea, 
was a rocky cliff, and by land, altogether im- 
pregnable. On the top, further, of this cliff 
was seated a fort, built some ages before of 
stones picked carefully for the purpose. This 
they judged might be serviceable to them, 
should they be forced to shelter themselves 
from superior violence. In this manner was 
the enemy posted. 

The Athenians immediately, in their first 
career, put the whole advanced guard to the 
sword, having surprised them yet in their huts, 
and but seeking to lay hold of their arms. 
Their landing was yet undiscovered, since the 
enemy judged their vessels to be only the usual 
guard which was every night in motion. 

No sooner also was the dawn completely 



broke, than the remainder of the Athenian 
force was landed from a number of vessels, 
somewhat more than seventy. All the mari- 
ners came ashore, in their respective distinc- 
tions of arms, excepting the rowers of the low- 
est bench.' They were eight hundred archers, 
and a body no less numerous of targeteers. 
The Messenian auxiliaries attended, and all in 
general who had been employed at Pylus, ex- 
cept such as were necessarily detained for the 
guard of the fortress. 

According to disposition formed by Demos- 
thenes, they advanced in separate bodies, con- 
sisting of near two hundred, more or less, and 
took possession of all the eminences. The 
design was, thus to reduce the enemy to a 
plunge of distress by surrounding them on all 
sides, and puzzling them in their choice which 
party first to make head against, that at the 
sight of numbers on all sides they might be 
quite confounded ; and, should they then attack 
the body in their front, they might be harassed 
by those in their rear ; or should they wheel 
towards those on either flank, they might be 
exposed to the bodies both in front and rear. 
Which way soever the enemy might turn, they 
were sure to have behind them the light-armed 
and less martial of their opponents, infesting 
them with their bows, and darts, and stones. 
These would do execution from a distance : an 
enemy could not possibly engage with them ; 
since even fly'ing they would prevail, and when 
the enemy retreated would return briskly to 
their work. With so much address had De- 
mosthenes previously planned the order of 
landing, and in close adherence to it brought 
them now to action. 

The body commanded by Epitadas, and 
which was the bulk of the whole force in the 
island, when they saw their advanced guard en- 
tirely cut ofl', and the enemy advancing to attack 



1 It is in the original, excepting the Thalamii. The 
rowers on the different henches were distincuislied by 
n peruliar name. Those of tlie uppermost were railed 
Tliarnilae: those of the middle, ZcusitK ; and those of 
tlie lowest, Thnlaniii. Thelahoiiroftlie Thalamii was 
the least, though most constant, lieransc of their near- 
ness to the water, and the shortness of their oars. 
Much more strength and skill were required on the 
upper hcnclics, and most of all on the uppermost, who 
for that reason had better pay. Those on the lowest 
bench seem to have been mere drndges at the onr, and 
qualified for nothiniihetter ; the others were morecom- 
plete seamen, and ready on all occasious for the duty 
both of rowing and fislitini;. 



TEAR VII.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



145 



them next, drew up in order and marched 
towards the heavy-armed of the Athenians, de- 
signing to engage them. For the latter were 
so placed as to oppose them in front; the 
light-armed were posted on either of their 
flanks, and in the rear. But against these 
heavy-armed they could not possibly come to 
action, nor gain an opportunity to exert their 
own distinguishing skill. For the light-armed 
pouring in their darts on either of their flanks, 
compelled them to halt ; and their opposites 
would not move forvpard to meet them, but 
stood quiet in their posts. Such indeed of the 
light-armed, as adventured in any quarter to 
run up near their ranks, were instantly put to 
flight; however, they soon faced about and 
continued their annoyance. They were not 
encumbered with any weight of armour ; their 
agility easily conveyed them beyond the reach 
of danger, as the ground was rough, and ever 
left desert had never been levelled by culture. 
In such spots the Lacedaemonians, under the 
load of their arms, could not possibly pursue. 
In this kind of skirmish, therefore, they were 
for a small space of time engaged. 

When the Lacedaemonians had no longer 
sufficient agility to check the attacks of these 
skirmishing parties, the light-armed soon took 
notice that they slackened in their endeavours 
to beat them off. It was then, that their 
own appearance, many times more large than 
that of their foes, and the very sight of them- 
selves began to animate them with excess of 
courage. Experience had now lessened that 
terror in which they had been used to regard this 
foe. They now had met with no rough recep- 
tion from them, which fell out quite contrary to 
what they firmly expected at their first landing, 
when their spirits had sunk very low at the 
thought, that it was against Lacedaemonians. 
Contempt ensued ; and embodying, with a loud 
shout they rushed upon them ; pouring in 
stones and arrows and darts, whatever came 
first to hand. At such a shout, accompanied 
with so impetuous a charge, astonishment seized 
their foes, quite unpractised in such a form of 
engagement ; at the same time the ashes of 
the wood, which had been burnt, were moun- 
ting largely into the air. So that now each 
lost sight of what was close before him, under 
the showers of darts and stones thrown by 
such numbers, and whirling along in a cloud of 
dust. 

, Amidst so many difficulties the Lacedaemo- 
26 



nians now were sorely distressed. The safe- 
guards on their heads and breasts were no 
longer proof against the arrows, and their jave- 
lins were broke to pieces when poised for throw- 
ing. They were quite at a loss for some means 
of defence ; they were debarred the prospect of 
what was passing just before them ; and the 
shouts of the enemy were so loud that they 
could no longer hear any orders. Dangers thus 
surrounding them on all sides, they quite des- 
paired of the possibility of such resistance as 
might earn their safety. At last, a great part 
of that body being wounded, because obliged to 
adhere firmly to the spot on which they stood, 
embodying close, they retreated towards the 
fort on the skirt of the island, which lay at no 
great distance, and to their guard which was 
posted there. But when once they began to 
move off, the light-armed, growing more reso- 
lute and shouting louder than ever, pressed 
hard upon their retreat ; and whatever Lacedae- 
monian fell within their reach, in the whole 
course of the retreat, was instantly slaughtered. 
The bulk of them with difficulty recovered the 
fort, and in concert with the guard posted there 
drew up in order to defend it, in whatevei 
quarter it might possibly be assaulted. The 
Athenians, speedily coming up, were hindered 
by the natural site of the place from forming a 
circle and besetting it on all sides. Advancing 
therefore directly forwards, they endeavoured 
to beat the defendants off. Thus, for a long 
time, for the greatest part of the day, both sides 
persisted in the contest, under the painful pres- 
sures of battle and thirst and a burning sun. 
No efforts were spared by the assailants to 
drive them from the eminence ; nor by the de- 
fendants to maintain their post. But here the 
Lacedaemonians defended themselves with more 
ease than in the preceding engagement, be- 
cause now they could not be encompassed on 
their flanks. 

When the dispute could not thus be brought 
to a decision, the commander of the Messeni- 
ans, addressing himself to Cleon and Demos- 
thenes, assured them, " they took a deal of 
pains to no manner of purpose ; but would they 
be persuaded to put under his guidance a party 
of the archers and light-armed, to get a round 
about way on the enemies' rear by a tract which 
he himself could find, he was confident he could 
force an entrance." Having received the party 
he demanded, marching off from a spot unde- 
scried by the Lacedaemonians, in order to con- 



146 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book IV 



ceal the motion, and continuing to mount higher 
and higher along the ridge of rock that lay upon 
the verge of the island, in the quarter where the 
Lacedaemonians, depending upon its natural 
strength, had placed no guard, with great diffi- 
culty and fatigue he got behind them undis- 
covered. Now showing himself on a sudden 
upon the summit and in their rear, he astonished 
the enemy with this unexpected appearance ; 
and his friends, who now beheld what they so 
earnestly looked for, he very much emboldened. 
The Lacedjemonians were now exposed to the 
missive weapons on both sides ; and (if a point 
of less consequence may be compared to one of 
greater) were in a state parallel to that of their 
countrymen at Thermopylae. ' For those being 
hemmed in by the Persians in a narrow pass, 
were utterly destroyed : these now, in like 
manner beset on both sides, were no longer able 
to contend. Being but a handful of men op- 
posed to superior numbers, and much weakened 
in their bodies for want of food, they quitted 
their post. And thus the Athenians became 
masters of all the approaches. 

But Cleon and Demosthenes, assuredly con- 
vinced that should the foe give way too fast, it 
would only conduce to their expeditious 
slaughter under the fury of the victorious troops, 
began to stop their fury, and to draw off their 
men. They were desirous to carry them alive 
to Athens, in case they would so far hearken 
to the voice of a herald as to throw down their 
arms dejected as they must be in spirit and 
overpowered with the instant danger. It was 
accordingly proclaimed, that " such as were 
willing should deliver up their arms and their 
persons to the Athenians, to be disposed of at 
dycretion." 

When this was heard, the greater number 
threw down their bucklers and waved their 
hands, in token of accepting the proposal. A 
suspension of arms immediately took place, and 
a conference was held between Cleon and 
Demosthenes on one side, and Styphon the son 



» The famous three hundred Spartans with kin? Le- 
onidas at their l)cad, who stopped the vast army of 
Xerxes at the pass of Thermopylae, and at Ieno;th per- 
ished all to a man. They were all afterwards entomhed 
on the spot where they fell with this short epitaph : — 

Tell, traveller, at Sparta what you nw, 
' Ttut here we lie obedient to her law. 

The same spirit and resolution was at this time jrencr- 
ally expected from the Spartans, now cnrompassed 
round about by their enemies, in the isle of Sphacteriu. 



of Pharax on the other. Of those who had 
preceded in the command, Epitadas, who was 
the first, had been slain, and Hippagrctes, who 
was his successor, lying as dead among the 
slain, though he had yet life in him, Styphon 
was now the third appointed to take the com- 
mand upon him, according to the provision 
made by their law, in case their generals drop. 
Styphon intimated his desire of leave to send 
over to the Lacedaemonians on the continent for 
advice. This the Athenians refused, but how- 
ever called over some heralds to him from the 
continent. Messages passed backwards and 
forwards twice or thrice ; but the last who 
crossed over to them from the Lacedaemonians 
on the continent brought this determination, — 
" The Lacedaemonians permit you to take care 
of your own concerns, provided you submit to 
nothing base." In consequence of this, after a 
short consultation with one another apart, they 
delivered up their arms and their persons. The 
remainder of the day and the succeeding night 
the Athenians confined them under a strong 
guard. But the day following, having erected 
a trophy upon the island, they got themselves 
in readiness to sail away, and distributed the 
prisoners to the custody of the captains of the 
triremes. The Lacedaemonians, having ob- 
tained permission by a herald, fetched off their 
dead. 

The number of those who were slain, and 
those who were taken alive, stood thus : they 
who had thrown themselves into the island 
amounted in the whole to four hundred and 
twenty heavy-armed. Of these three hundred 
wanting eight were carried off alive, the rest 
had been destroyed. Among the prisoners were 
about one hundred and twenty Spartans. The 
number of Athenians slain was inconsiderable : 
for it was not a standing fight. The whole 
space that these men were besieged in the 
island, from the engagement at sea, till the 
battle in the island, was seventy-two days. 
Twenty of these during the absence of the 
ambassadors to negotiate an accommodation, 
they were supplied with food : the remainder 
of the time, they were fed by such as got over 
by stealth. Nay, meal and other eatables were 
found in the island, even when all was over. 
Their commander Epitadas had made a more 
sparing distribution than his stores required. 

Now the Athenians and Pcloponnesians 
respectively drew off their forces from Py- 
lus to return home : and the promise of 



YEAR VII.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



147 



Cleon, mad as it had been, was fully executed. 
For within the twenty days, he brought them 
prisoners to Athens, and made his words good.' 

The expectation of Greece was more disap- 
pointed by this event, than by any other occur- 
rence whatever in the series of the War. It 
was generally presumed that neither famine 
nor any extremity could have reduced these 
Lacedaemonians to deliver up their arms, but 
that, sword in hand and fighting to the last 
gasp, they would have bravely perished. They 
could not afterwards believe that those who 
surrendered were like to those who were slain. 
Some time after, a solaier in one of the con- 
federate bands of the Athenians, demanding 
with a sneer of one of them who were taken 
prisoners in the island, " if the slain were not 
of true gallantry and courage!" the other re- 
plied, that " a spindle (by which he meant an 
arrow) would be valuable indeed, if it knew 
how to distinguish the brave ;" intimating by 
this answer, that the slain were such as stones 
and darts despatched in the medley of battle. 

When the prisoners were brought to Athens, 
it was the public resolution there " to keep 
them in bonds, till some definitive treaty could 
be agreed on. And if, previously to this, the 
Peloponnesians should repeat their inroad into 
the Attic territory, they should all undergo a 
public execution." They established also a 
garrison for Pylus. And the Messenians of 
Naupactus sending thither the most proper of 
their own people, as into their own native 
country (for Pylus is a part of the ancient 
Messenia,) infested Laconia with depredations 
and did them vast damage, the more because 
they spoke the same dialect.^ 

As for the Lacedsemonians, who never knew 
before what it was to be thus plundered, war 



1 It should be added here, that he also robbed for the 
present a very able and gallant officer of the praise he 
merited on this occasion. The whole affair of Pylus 
was planned, carried into execution, and brought to a 
Buccessful and glorious issue, by the conduct and bravery 
of Demosthenes. Aristophanes (in the Knights) hath 
made a low comic character of the latter, and in- 
troduced him venting sad complaints against Cleon for 
pilfering the honour from him. " This Papblagonian 
(says he) hath snatched from every one of us whatever 
nice thing we had cot to suit the palate of our Lord and 
master (the people). 'Tis but the other day, I myself 
had cooked up a noble pasty of Lacedemonians at 
Pylus, when this vilest of scoundrels came running 
thither, pilfered it away from me, and hath served it 
up to table as if it was of his own dressing." 

a Tlie Doric. 



in such a shape being new to them, and their 
Helots deserting continually to the foe ; ap- 
prehensive farther, lest such unusual proceed- 
ings within their own district might draw worse 
consequences after them — they had a painful 
sense of their present situation. This com- 
pelled them to send their embassies to Athens, 
desirous however at the same time to conceal 
what they really thought of their own state, 
and spare no artifice for the recovery of Pylus 
and their people. But the Athenians grew 
more unreasonable in their demands, and after 
many journeys to and fro, sent them finally 
away with an absolute denial. Such was the 
course of proceedings in relation to Pylus. 

The same summer, and immediately on the 
close of the former event, the Athenians set 
out to invade Corinth with a fleet of eighty 
ships which carried two thousand heavy-armed 
of their own people, and, with some horse- 
transports, on board of which were two hun- 
dred horsemen. They were also attended by 
some of their confederates, by the Milesians, 
and Andrians, and Carysthians. Nicias the 
son of Niceratus with two colleagues com- 
manded this armament. At the early dawn of 
morning they came to anchor between Cer- 
sonesus and Reitus, on the shore of that place 
which the Solygian hill overhangs, of which 
formerly the Dorians possessing themselves 
made war upon the Corinthians then in Corinth 
who were of jEolian descent. Upon that 
eminence there is now a village called Solygia. 
From the shore where the armament came now 
to anchor, this village was distant about twelve,' 
the city of Corinth sixty ,^ and the isthmus 
twenty stadia.^ 

The Corinthians, who had already been 
advised from Argos of the approach of the 
Athenian armament, had long since by way of 
prevention drawn their whole force together 
at the isthmus, excepting what was in employ 
without the isthmus, and the five hundred 
absent in the guard of Ambracia and Leucadia. 
With all the rest of their people able to bear 
arms they were posted on the isthmus, to 
watch the approach of the Athenians. But 
when the Athenian fleet had passed by undis- 
covered by favour of the night, and signals 
notified their approach elsewhere, leaving half 
their force at Cenchrea to obstruct any at- 



3 Near one mile and a quarter. 
* Six miles. * Two miles. 



148 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book IV, 



tempt of the Athenians upon C tommy on, they 
marched with all speed against the enemy. 
Battus, one of their commanders, (for there 
were two such in the field) at the head of a 
separate body marched up to the open village 
of Solygia, in order to defend it, whilst Lyco- 
phron with the remainder advanced to the 
charge. The Corinthians fell first upon the 
right wing of the Athenians, who were but 
just landed before Chersonesus, and then pro- 
ceeded to engage the whole of that army. 
The action was warm, and fought hand to 
hand. The right wing, consisting of the Athe- 
nians, and also the Carysthians, who were 
drawn up in the rear, gave the Corinthians a 
warm reception, and with much difficulty re- 
pulsed them. Retreating therefore upwards to 
a wall built of stone, for the ground was a con- 
tinued ascent, and being there above the enemy, 
they annoyed them with stones; and having 
sung their pa;an, rushed down upon them again. 
The Athenians having stood the shock, they 
engaged the second time hand to hand. But a 
band of Corinthians being come up to the 
support of their own left wing, occasioned the 
rout of the right wing of the Athenians, and 
pursued them to the sea-side. But the Athe- 
nians and Carysthians now turned again, and 
beat them off from the ships. 

In other parts of the action the dispute was 
resolute on both sides, especially where the 
right wing of the Corinthians, with Lycophron 
at it.5 head, was engaging the left wing of the 
Athenians. They were apprehensive the ene- 
my would endeavour to force their way to the 
village of Solygia. For a considerable space 
the battle was obstinate, neither side giving 
way ; but at length, through the advantage on 
the Athenian side of being assisted by a party 
of horse, whereas their opposites had none, the 
Corinthians were broke and driven up the 
ascent, were grounding their arms, they came 
down no more to the charge, but remained in a 
quiet posture. In this rout of the right wing, 
numbers of the Corinthians perished, and Ly- 
cophron their general. But the rest of the 
body had the good fortune to make a safe re- 
treat, and so to secure themselves upon the 
eminence, as they could not be briskly pursued, 
and were not compelled to move off with pre- 
cipitation. When the Athenians perceived 
that the enemy would no more return to the 
charge, they rifled the bodies of the foes 
whom they had slain, and carried oil' their own 



dead, and then without loss of time erected 
their trophy. 

That division of the Corinthians, which had 
been posted at Cenchrea to prevent any at- 
tempt upon Crommyon, had the view of the 
battle intercepted from them by the mountain 
Oneius. But when they saw the cloud of 
dust, and thence knew what was doing, they 
marched full speed towards the spot. The 
aged inhabitants also, when they are informed 
of the battle, rushed out of Corinth to succour 
their own people. The Athenians perceiving 
the approach of such numerous bodies, and 
judging them to be succours sent up by the 
neighbouring Peloponnesians, threw them- 
selves immediately on board their ships, with 
what spoil they had taken, and the bodies of 
their own dead excepting two, which not find- 
ing in this hurry they left behind. They were 
no sooner re-embarked than they crossed over 
to the adjacent islands, from whence they des- 
patched a herald to demand leave, which was 
granted, to fetch off the dead bodies they had 
left behind.^ 

The number of Corinthians slain in the bat- 
tle was two hundred and twelve; that of 
Athenians somewhat less than fifty. 

The Athenians, leaving the islands, appear- 
ed the same day before Crommyon, situated in 
its territory, and distant from the city of Co- 
rinth one hundred and twenty stadia.^ They 
landed and ravaged the country, and that night 
reposed themselves there. The day following 
they sailed along the coast, first to Epidaurus ; 
and, after a kind of descent there, arrived at 

» This incident is related by Plutarch, in the life of 
Nicias, as a proof of the great piety and humanity of 
Nicias. His asking leave to fetch off these two bodies 
was, acrording to that writer, an actual rennncialion 
of the victory; since if was ajrainst all rules, for persons 
who had condescended fo such a submission, to erect a 
trophy. But, witiiout disparaging the pood qualitieaof 
Nirias,or his obedience fotlie institutions of his country 
in regard fo the dead, which were ever most sacredly 
observed, if may be questioned, whetiier he renounced 
the victory on this occasion. Thucydides says, the 
trophy was already erected, which ascertained, with- 
out doubt, the honour of the vicfory, and nofhingis 
said of its demolition by the Corinthians, when they re- 
ceived this request of truce from Nicias. His re-em- 
barking in a hurry seems a distinct atl'air. It had no 
connection with the late battle, whirli had been clearly 
and fairly won; but was owing fo a fresh army coming 
info the field on the side of the enemy. This slopped 
him indeed from gaining any fresh honour, but surely 
did not deprive him of what he was already possessed 
of. 

9 About 12 English miles. 



YEAR VII.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



149 



Methone, which lies between Epidaurus and 
Troezen. Possessing themselves there of the 
isthmus of Chersonesus on which Methone is 
situated, they run up a wall across it, and 
fixed a garrison of continuance in that post, 
which for the future extended their depreda- 
tions over all the districts of Troezen, Halias, 
and Epidaurus. But the fleet, when once 
this post was sufficiently secured, sailed away 
for Athens. 

During the space of time which coincided 
with these transactions, Eurymedon and So- 
phocles, who with the ships of the Athenians 
had quitted Pylus to proceed in the voyage to 
Sicily, arrived at Corcyra. They joined the 
Corcyreans of the city, marching out against 
those who were posted on the mount of Istone, 
that party who repassing soon after the sedi- 
tion were at this time masters of the country, 
and committed sad ravage. Accordingly they 
assaulted that post, and carried it by storm. 
The defendants, who had fled away in a body 
towards another eminence, were soon forced to 
capitulate, " giving up their auxiliaries, and 
then giving up their own arms, to be proceeded 
with afterwards at the pleasure of the people 
of Athens." The commanders removed them 
all for safe custody into the isle of Ptychia, 
till they could conveniently be conveyed to 
Athens, with this proviso, that " if any one 
person should be caught in any attempt to get 
off, the whole number should forfeit the benefit 
of the capitulation." 

But the leaders of the populace at Corcyra, 
apprehending that the Athenians, should they 
be sent to Athens, might possibly save their 
lives, contrive the following machination. — 
They tamper successfully with some of those 
who were confined in the isle, by the means of 
some trusty agents whom they sent privately 
amongst them, and instructed that " with great 
professions of regard for them, they should in- 
sinuate no other resource was left for them 
but to make their escape with all possible ex- 
pedition, and that themselves would undertake 
to provide them with a bark, for it was the 
certain resolution of the Athenian commanders 
to give them up to the fury of the Corey rean 
populace." — When they had given ear to these 
suggestions, and were on board the bark thus 
treacherously provided for them, and so were 
apprehended in the very act of departure, the 
articles of capitulation came at once to an end, 
and they were all given up to the Corcyreans. 



Not that the Athenian commanders did not 
highly contribute to the success of this treach- 
ery ; since, in order to make it go down more 
easily, and to lessen the fears of the agents in 
the plot, they had publicly declared that " the 
conveyance of those persons to Athens by any 
other hands would highly chagrin them, be- 
cause, then, whilst they were attending their 
duty in Sicily, others would run away with all 
the honour." The Corcyreans had them no 
sooner in their power, than they shut* them up 
in a spacious edifice. Hence afterwards they 
brought them out by twenties, and having 
formed two lines of soldiers, in all military 
habiliments, facing one another, they compelled 
them to walk between the lines, chained one 
to another, and receiving blows and wounds as 
they passed along from those who formed the 
lines, and struck at pleasure so soon as they 
perceived the objects of their hatred. They 
were followed by others who carried scourges, 
and lashed those forwards who moved not 
readily along. Threescore persons had been 
brought forth and destroyed in this manner, 
before those who remained in the edifice be- 
came sensible of their fate. For they had 
hitherto imagined, that those who fetched them 
out did it merely to shift their confinement. 
But when they learned the truth from some 
person or other whom they could not dis- 
believe, they called out aloud on the Atheni- 
ans, and implored as a favour to be put to 
death by them. To stir from the place of 
their confinement they now absolutely refused, 
and averred, that to the utmost of their power 
they would hinder every body from coming in 
to them. But the Corcyreans had not the 
least inclination to force an entrance by the 
doors. They mounted up on the top of the 
edifice, and tearing off the roof, flung the 
tiles and shot arrows down upon them. The 
others protected themselves to the best of their 
power ; and many of them were employed in 
making away with themselves by cramming 
the arrows shot from above down their own 
throats. Others tearing away the cordage 
from the beds which happened to be within, 
or twisting such ropes as they could find from 
shreds of their own garments, so strangled 
themselves to death. No method was omitted 
during the greatest part of the night (for night 
dropped down upon this scene of horror) till, 
either despatched by their own contrivance, or 
shot to death by those above, their destructioa 
S 



150 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book rv. 



was completely finished. So soon as it was 
day, the Corcyreans having thrown their 
bodies on heaps into carriages, removed tliem 
out of the city. But their wives, so many 
as had been taken prisoners in company with 
their husbands, thoy adjudged to slavery for 
life. 

In this manner the Corcyreans from the 
mountains were destroyed by the people. And 
a sedition so extensive was brought to this 
tragical period, so far at least as relates to the 
present war. For nothing of the same nature 
broke out afterwards so remarkable as to need 
a particular relation. 

The Athenians departed from Corcyra, 
made the best of their way for Sicily, whither 
they were bound at first setting out, and pro- 
secuted the war there in concert with their 
allies. 

In the close of this summer, the Athenians 
on the station of Naupactus, marching injunc- 
tion with the Acarnanians, possessed them- 
selves of Anactorium, a city of the Corin- 
thians, situated on the mouth of the gulf of 
Ambracia. It was put into their hands by 
treachery. In consequence of this, the Co- 
rinthian inhabitants were ejected, and the place 
re-peopled by new inhabitants invited thither 
from all parts of Acarnania. And the sum- 
mer ended. 

The ensuing winter, Aristides, the son of 
Archippus, one of those who commanded the 
squadrons which the Athenians had put out to 
raise contributions among their dependents, ap- 
prehended Artaphernes, a noble Persian, at 
Eion on the river Strymon. He was going to 
Lacedsemon on a commission from the king. 
Being conveyed to Athens, the Athenians had 
his letters, which were wrote in Assyrian, 
translated and read in public. Their contents 
were large, but the principal w^as this passage 
addressed to the Lacedfemonians, that " he 
was not yet properly informed what it was 
tlicy requested of him. For though he had 
been attended by frequent embassies, yet they 
did not all agree in their demands. If there- 
fore they were desirous to make an explicit 
declaration, they should send some of their 
body to him in company with this Persian." 
But the Athenians afterwards send Artapher- 
nes back to Ej)hcsu3 in a trireme, and with an 
embassy of their own, who meeting at that 
place with the news that Artaxerxes, the son 
of Xerxes, was lately dead, (for about this 



time that monarch died,) the ambassadors re- 
turned back to Athens. 

The same winter also, the Chians demo- 
lished their new fortifications. The Athe- 
nians had expressly ordered it, suspecting that 
they were intent on some innovating schemes. 
It availed nothing, that they had lately given 
the Athenians all possible securities, and the 
strongest assurances that they would in no 
shape attempt or think of innovations. And 
thus the winter ended ; and with it the seventh 
year of this war, of which Thucydides hath 
compiled the history, was brought to a con- 
clusion. 

TEAR VIII.' 

Early in the following summer, at the 
time of the new moon, the sun was partially 
eclipsed ; and in the beginning of the same 
month, the shock of an earthquake was felt. 

The fugitives from Mitylene and Lesbos in 
general, who, to a great number, had sheltered 
themselves on the continent, assemble in a 
body, and having hired some additional suc- 
cours in Peloponnesus, and drawn them over 
safely from thence, surprise Rha?tium ; but, 
in consideration of two thousand Phocean 
staters^ paid immediately down, they restored 
it again undamaged. This being done, they 
marched next against Antandrus, and got pos- 
session of it by the treachery of a party within 
the city, who betrayed it to them. It was, 
farther, their intention to set at liberty those 
cities styled the Actean, which had formerly 
been possessed by the Mityleneans, but were 
now in the hands of the Athenians. But 
their principal view was the possession of 
Antandrus, which once effectually secured, 
(for it lay convenient for the building of ships, 
as it had plenty of timber, and mount Ida 
stood just above it,) they would then be am- 
ply furnished with all the expedients of war, 
nay, might act oilensively from thence, might 
terribly annoy Lesbos which lies near it, and 
reduce the -^olian fortresses along the coast 
This was the plan which now they were intent 
to put in execution. 

The same summer the Athenians, with a 
fleet of sixty ships, and taking with them two 
thousand heavy-armed, a few horsemen, the 
Milesians, and others of their confederates, 

> Before Christ 424. « Above 1800/. sterling. 



YEAR Vlli.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



151 



made an expedition against Cythera. The 
command was lodged with Nicias son of Ni- 
ceratus, Nicostratus son of Diotrephes, and 
Autocles son of Tolmseus. Cythera is an 
island : it lies upon the coast of Laconia over- 
against Malea. The inhabitants are Lacedae- 
monians, resorting thither from the neighbour- 
ing coast. A. magistrate was sent over yearly 
from Sparta by the style of judge of Cythera ; 
the garrison of heavy-armed established there 
was regularly relieved ; and no care omitted in 
the good government and management of the 
place. It was the port which their trading 
ships first entered, in their return from Egypt 
and Libya. It was the chief security of La- 
conia against those piratical parties which 
might infest it from the sea, from whence 
alone they are capable of doing them any mis- 
chief; for by its situation it hath entirely the 
command of the seas of Sicily and Crete. 
The Athenian armament therefore arriving 
here, with a detachment of ten ships and two 
thousand heavy-armed, surprise a maritime town 
which is called Scandea. With the rest of 
their force they made a descent on that part of 
the island which is opposite to Malea, and 
advanced towards the city of Cythera, situated 
also on the sea, and they found immediately 
that all the inhabitants were drawn out into 
the field in readiness to receive them. An 
engagement ensued, wherein the Cythereans 
maintained their ground for a small space of 
time, but then turning about, fled amain into 
their citadel. They soon afterwards capitu- 
lated with Nicias and his colleagues, submit- 
ting to the Athenians at discretion, barring 
only the penalty of death. Some of the Cy- 
thereans had beforehand obtained a conference 
with Nicias. This rendered the capitulation 
more easy and expeditious, and not only the 
present, but all future points were by this 
means speedily and satisfactorily adjusted. 
For the Athenians insisted that they should 
evacuate Cythera, because they were Lacedse- 
monians, and because the island lay so conve- 
niently on the Laconic coast. The accom- 
modation being once perfected, the Athenians, 
having secured Scandea, the fortress situated 
upon the harbour, and fixed a garrison in Cy- 
thera, stood away for Asine and Helas, and 
most of the adjacent places on the coast. 
There they made descents, and reposing them- 
aelves in the nights at the most convenient of 



those places, they spent about seven days in 
ravaging the country. 

The Lacedaemonians, though they saw the 
Athenians had possessed themselves of Cy- 
thera, and expected further that they would 
proceed to make more such descents upon 
their territories, yet nowhere drew together 
in a body to repulse them. They only sta- 
tioned their parties of guard in such posts as 
were of greatest importance. In other re- 
spects they exerted their utmost vigilance, 
being under apprehensions that the very form 
of their government was in danger of subver- 
sion. Their loss in Sphacteria was unexpected 
and great indeed. Pylus was now in the hands 
of the enemy, as was also Cythera. War was 
bursting in upon them on all sides with irre- 
sistible impetuosity. This compelled them, 
contrary to their usual maxims, to form a body 
of four hundred horse and archers. If they 
were ever dejected by the prevalence of fear, 
at this juncture they were more feelingly so, 
when they saw the necessity of entering the 
lists, contrary to all that practice of war to 
which they had been inured, in a naval contest, 
and in this against the Athenians, whose pas- 
sion it was to compute as so much loss, what- 
ever they left unattempted. Their general mis- 
fortune besides, which so suddenly and so fast 
had poured in upon them, had thrown them in- 
to the utmost consternation. They excessively 
dreaded the weight of such another calamity, 
as they had been sensible of in the blow at 
Sphacteria. Intimidated thus, they durst no 
longer think of fighting ; nay, whatever mea- 
sures they concerted, they at once desponded 
of success, as their minds, accustomed until 
of late to an uninterrupted career of good for- 
tune, were now foreboding nothing but disap- 
pointment. Thus, for the most part whilst 
the Athenians were extending their devas- 
tations all along their coasts, they remained in- 
active. Each party on guard, though the ene- 
my made a descent in the face of their post, 
knowing themselves inferior in number, and sad- 
ly dispirited, made no offer to check them. One 
party indeed which was posted near Cortyta 
and Aphrodisia, perceiving the light- armed of 
the enemy to be straggling, ran speedily to 
charge them ; but when the heavy-armed ad- 
vanced to their support, they retreated with so 
much precipitation, that some (though few) of 
them were killed and their arms rifled. The 



152 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



' [book IV. 



Athenians, after erecting a trophy, re-embark- 
ed and repassed to Cythcra. 

From hence they sailed again along the coast 
of the Limerian Epidaurus ; and, after ravag- 
ing part of that district, they arrived at Thyrea, 
which, though it lies in the district called Cynu- 
ria, is the frontier town which parts Argia and 
Laconia. This place belonged to the Lacedae- 
monians, who had assigned it for the residence 
of the exiled ^ginetaj, in requital of the servi- 
ces they had done them at the time of the earth- 
quake and the insurrection of the Helots, and 
further because, though subject to the Athe- 
nians they had ever firmly abode in the Lace- 
dajmonian interest. The ^ginetse, thus again 
invaded by the Athenians, abandoned the 
fortification upon the sea-side which they were 
busy in throwing up, and retreated into the city, 
which was the place of their residence, seated 
higher up, at the distance of about ten stadia* 
from the shore. A party of Lacedaemonians 
had been posted there, to assist those who were 
employed in the new fortification ; and yet, 
though earnestly pressed by the -^ginetae, they 
refused to accompany them within their walls, 
being averse to run the risk of a new blockade. 
They chose rather to retreat towards the emi- 
nences, as they judged themselves disabled by 
the inferiority of their number from facing the 
enemy, and remained there in a state of inac- 
tion. 

By this time the Athenians, having com- 
pleted their landing advanced with their whole 
force, take Thyrea by storm. They set the 
city in flames, and destroyed whatever was 
within it. Such of the -^ginetae as survived 
the instant carnage, they carried prisoners to 
Athens ; and with them Tantalus son of Pa- 
trocles, who commanded there as general for 
the Lacedaemonians. He had been wounded 
and so taken prisoner. They also carried 
thither some few persons whom they had taken 
in Cy thera, such as for its security it was expe- 
dient to remove. These the Athenians, after 
a consultation, decreed « to be disposed of in 
the islands, but the rest of the Cythereans still 
to occupy their own land, subjected to the yearly 
tribute of four talents ;^ but the ^ginetae, as 
many as had been taken prisoners, to be all in- 
stantly put to death," (to gratify that eternal 
rancour they bore them,) «< and Tantalus to bo 

» About a mile. 
I 9 Seven hundred and seventy-five pounds sterling. 



kept in prison along with his countrymen taken 
in Sphacteria." 

The same summer a suspension of arms 
was agreed on in Sicily ; first, between the 
Camarineans and Geloans : and then, the other 
Sicilians, holding a general congress at Gela, 
whither the ambassadors from the several 
states resorted, entered into conferences about 
the terms of a general reconciliation. Many 
different expedients were proposed on all sides, 
and many disputes arose, each insisting on a re- 
paration suitable to their own private sense of 
grievance. But Hermocrates^ the son of 
Hermon a Syracusan, who laboured most of 
any at a firm reunion, delivered his sentiments 
thus : 

" I am here the representative, ye men of 
Sicily, of one and not the meanest of the Sicilian 
states nor yet the most exhausted by war ; and 
what I am going to propose is calculated for, 
and will, I am convinced, most effectually secure 
the welfare of our common country. And 
what need is there now to run over in minute 
detail the calamities inseparable from war, in 
the hearing of men who have experienced them 
all 1 None ever plunge headlong into these, 
through an utter ignorance of them ; nor, when 
the views are fixed on gratifying ambition, are 
men used to be deterred by fear. The acqui- 
sitions proposed in the latter case, are gener- 
ally imagined to overbalance dangers : and the 
former choose rather to submit to hazards, 
than suffer diminution of their present enjoy- 
ments. Yet where the parties actuated by 
these different views, embroil themselves at a 
juncture when it is impossible to succeed, ex- 
hortations to a mutual agreement are then 
most highly expedient. 

" To be influenced by such exhortations, 
must at present be highly for the advantage of 
us all. For it was the strong desire of fixing 



» This ijrreat and accomplished Syracusan seems to be 
ushered into this history with peruliar dignity, ns the 
very mouth of Sicily, exiiorling them nil to concord and 
unanimity, and teaching them the method of securing 
the welfare and e'ory of their common country, upon 
the noblest. This is noted merely to draw upon him the 
attention of the reader. He will act afterwards in the 
most illustrious scenes, and show himself on all occa- 
sions a man of true honour and prodily, a firm and 
di8intt>reBted patriot, an excellent statesman, and n most 
able commander. The Athenians never had n more 
determined or a more generous enemy. But that will 
not hinder our historian from representing bim in all 
bis merit. 



YEAR VIII.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



153 



our own separate views on a firm establish- 
ment, which at first embroiled us in this war, 
and which at present raiseth such mutual alter- 
cations even during our endeavours to effect an 
accommodation : and, in fine, unless matters 
can be so equally adjusted as to satisfy all par- 
ties, we shall again have recourse to arms. But 
then, we ought to recollect, that not merely for 
securing our separate interests, if we would 
act like men of sense, is this present congress 
opened ; but, to concert the best measures 
within our reach to preserve (if possible) our 
country from falling, and, as I judge, in great 
danger of falling, a sacrifice to Athenian ambi- 
tion. It is to convince you how necessary a re- 
union is, not so much from what I can urge, as 
from the light these very Athenians themselves 
hold out before you. Possessed of a power 
far superior to any other Grecians, here they 
lie amongst us with a few ships, to note down 
our indiscretions ; and, under the plausible pre- 
text of alliance, though with malice lurking in 
their hearts, they are studying to improve them 
in a specious manner to their own advantage. 
For should war be again our option ; and in it, 
should the assistance of men be accepted, who 
though uninvited would be glad to invade us ; 
whilst we are harassing and exhausting one an- 
other, and cutting open for these Athenians a 
road to our subjection, it is much to be appre- 
hended that, when once they behold our strength 
at the lowest ebb, they will pay us & visit with 
more formidable armaments, and exert their ut- 
most endeavours to complete our destruction. 

" It becomes each party amongst us, pro- 
vided we know what is really our interest, to 
form alliances and to launch in hazardous 
attempts, rather to acquire what belongs to 
others than to prejudice what themselves at 
present possess ; and to rest assured that sedi- 
tion must ruin our several states, nay, Sicily 
itself, of which we, the joint possessors, are 
ready, are all of us ready, to be supplanted by 
hostile treachery, whilat mutually embroiled in 
our domestic quarrels. It is high time we 
were convinced of this, that every individual 
might be reconciled with his neighbour, and 
community with community, and all in general 
combine together to preserve the whole of 
Sicily ; that our ears be deaf to the mischie- 
vous suggestions, that those amongst us of 
Doric descent are enemies to every thing that 
is Attic, whilst those of Chalcidic, because of 
that Ionian affinity, are s»re of their protec- 
37 



tion. The Athenians invade us not from 
private enmity, because we are peopled here 
from these divided races, but to gratify their 
lust after those blessings in which Sicily 
abounds, and which at present we jointly pos- 
sess. Nay, this they have already clearly de- 
clared, by their ready compliance with the in- 
vitation of those of the Chalcidic race. For 
though they have never claimed assistance 
from hence by virtue of their natural attach- 
ments here, yet they have shown a greater 
readiness in support of those than any com- 
pact between them required. Yet, though the 
Athenians be in this manner rapacious, in this 
manner politic, by me at least they ought to 
be forgiven ; since I blame not men who are 
greedy of empire, but such as are too eager to 
bend their necks to their yoke : because it is 
the constant never-failing turn of the human 
temper, to controul who will submit, but to 
make head against more powerful encroach- 
ments. As for us, who know these things, 
and yet will not timely provide against them, 
though each in this assembly be separately 
convinced, that it demands our greatest atten- 
tion to unite in dissipating a storm which 
threatens us all, we err strangely in our con- 
duct ; especially, when its diversion might be 
so readily effected, would we only bring our 
private quarrels to an amicable determination : 
for it is not from quarters of their own, that 
the Athenians rush thus to annoy us, but 
from ground which belongs to those who in- 
vited them. Thus, of course, without any 
intervening trouble, one war will not be termi- 
nated by another, but dissension will at once 
subside in peace. And these new-comers, who 
under specious colours are here for our ruin, 
must return again with a disappointment, 
which they may as speciously palliate. So 
desirable a benefit will at once infallibly accrue, 
from proper determinations in regard to the 
Athenians. 

" That peace is the greatest of human bless- 
ings, is a truth which all the world alloweth ; 
— What hindereth us then, why we should not 
firmly establish it with one another \ or do you 
rather imagine, that if the condition of one 
man be happy and that of another be wretched, 
tranquillity will not contribute sooner than 
warfare to amend the state of the latter, and 
to preserve the state of the former from a sad 
reverse 1 or that peace is not better calculated 
to preserve unimpaired the honours and splen 
s2 



154 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book IV. 



dours of the happy, and all other blessings, 
which, should we descend to a minute detail, 
might largely be recounted, or might be set in 
the strongest light by opposing to them the 
calamities which ensue from war '? Fix your 
minds therefore on these considerations, that 
you may not overlook my admonitions, but in 
compliance with them look out respectively in 
time for expedients of prevention. 

" In case it be presumed, that success must 
result from power, without taking into debate 
the justice or violence of the cause, let me 
detect the dangerous fallacy of such a sanguine 
hope, which must be blasted in the end. 
Many are they, it is well known, who would 
have gratified their revenge on violent oppres- 
sors, and many who have exerted their utmost 
force for their own aggrandizement ; yet the 
first, so far from accomplishing their revenge, 
have met destruction in its pursuit ; and it 
had been the fate of the latter, instead of en- 
larging, to suffer the loss of what they already 
possessed. For revenge is not certain, because 
justly sought after to retaliate violence ; nor 
is power assured of its end, because invigorated 
with sanguine expectation. Events are for 
the most part determined by the fallible unsteady 
balance of futurity ; which, though deceivable 
as deceit can be, yet holds out before us the 
most instructive hints. For thus armed equally 
beforehand with needful apprehension, we em- 
bark into mutual contest with wise premedita- 
tion. Now therefore, checked by the gloomy 
dread of the yet invisible event, and awed on 
all sides by the terrors which the presence of 
these Athenians spread amongst us ; deterred 
further by those hopes already blasted, which 
assured us alternately of success against one 
another, had not they interfered to obstruct 
and control us ; let us send far away from 
Sicily these enemies that are hovering about 
us ; let us enter into firm and lasting union 
with one another; at least, let us conclude a 
truce for so long a time as can possibly be 
agreed, and defer our own private disputes to a 
remote decision. In a word, let us acknow- 
ledge, that, if my advice takes place, we shall 
continue free in our respective communities, 
where, masters of ourselves and accountable to 
none beside, we shall be enabled to recompense 
both our friends and our foes according to 
their deserts. But, in case it be obstinately 
rejected, and the mischievous insinuations of 
Others prevail, why then adieu henceforth to 



the just vindication of our own wrongs ; or, if 
we are violently bent upon effecting it, we 
must strike up a friendship with unrelenting 
foes, and must range ourselves in opposition 
there, where nature hath most closely attach- 
ed us. 

'< For my own part, who now, as I observed 
at setting out, represent the greatest of the 
Sicilian states, and in this character am more 
accustomed to attack another than to defend 
myself, I here, in her name, conjure you to 
make use of conviction, and unite together in a 
speedy accommodation, nor so eagerly to thirst 
after the damage of our foes as to plunge 
ourselves into irreparable mischiefs. I am not 
conscious to myself of that foolish haughtiness 
of heart, which expects to be absolute in its 
own private will ; or that fortune, whose mas- 
ter I am not, should attend my orders ; but I 
am ready to give way to good sense and reason. 
And I require you all respectively thus to give 
way to one another, and not to wait till you 
are compelled to do so by your enemies. It 
can argue no baseness for kinsmen to give way 
to kinsmen, a Dorian to a Dorian, or a Chalci- 
dean to others of his own race. Nay, what is 
most comprehensive, we are all neighbours, all 
joint inhabitants of the same land, a land wash- 
ed round by the sea, and all styled by the same 
common name of Sicilians. Wars indeed in 
the course of time I foresee we shall wage 
upon one another, and future conferences will 
again be held, and mutual friendship shall thus 
revive. But when foreigners invade us, let us 
be wise enough to unite our strength, and 
drive them from our shores : for to be weaken- 
ed in any of our members, must endanger the 
destruction of the whole ; and to such con- 
federates and such mediators we will never for 
the future have recourse. 

« If to such conduct wc adhere, we shall 
immediately procure a double blessing for 
Sicily. We shall deliver her from the Athen- 
ians, and a domestic war. For the future 
we shall retain the free possession of her in 
our own hands, and more easily disconcert 
any projects that hereafter may be formed 
against her." 

The Sicilians acknowledge the weight of 
these arguments thus urged by Ilermocrates, 
and all the several parties joined in one 
common resolution " to put an end to the 
war, each retaining what they were at pre- 
sent possessed of; but that Morgantina should 



YEAR VIII.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



155 



be restored to the Camarineans, upon the pay- 
ment of a certain sum of money to the Syracu- 
sans." Such also as were confederated with 
the Athenians, addressing themselves to the 
Athenian commanders, notified their own readi- 
ness to acquiesce in these terms, and their 
resolution to be comprehended in the same 
peace. These approving the measure, the last 
hand was put to the accommodation. 

The Athenian fleet, which had no longer 
any business there, sailed away from Sicily. 
But the people at Athens manifested their 
displeasure against the commanders at their 
return home, by passing a sentence of banish- 
ment against Pythodorus and Sophocles, and 
subjecting Eurymedon, who was the third, to 
a pecuniary mulct ; as if, when able to have 
perfected the reduction of Sicily, they had been 
bribed to desist. They had enjoyed so long a 
career of good fortune, that they imagined 
nothing could disconcert their schemes ; that 
enterprises of the greatest as well as of small 
importance, no matter whether adequately or 
insufficiently supported, must be ended to their 
wish. This was owing to the unexpected good 
luck with which most of their projects had of 
late succeeded, and now invigorated all their 
expectations. 

The same summer, the Megareans of the 
city of Megara, pressed hard by the Athenians, 
who constantly twice a year made an inroad 
into their territory with their whole united 
force ; harassed at the same time by their own 
outlaws, who having been ejected by the popu- 
lar party in the train of a sedition had settled 
at Pegse, and from thence were continually 
plundering them, began to have some conference 
about the expediency of recalling their outlaws, 
that the city might not doubly be exposed to 
ruin. The friends of these exiles, perceiving 
such a design to be in agitation, insisted more 
openly than ever that the affair should be 
regularly considered. The leaders of the people 
being convinced that their own and the strength 
of the people united in their present low con- 
dition could not possibly overrule it, were so 
far influenced by their fears as to make a se- 
cret offer to the Athenian generals, Hippocrates 
the son of Ariphron and Demosthenes the son 
of Alcisthenes, " to put the city into their 
hands;" concluding, they should be less en- 
dangered by such a step than by the restoration 
of the exiles whom they themselves had eject- 
ed. It was agreed, that in the first place the 



Athenians should take possession of the long 
walls (these were eight stadia' in length, reach- 
ing down from the city to Nisaea their port) to 
prevent any succour which might be sent from 
Nissea by the Peloponnesians, since there alone 
they kept their garrison for the security of 
Megara. After this, they promised their endea- 
vours to put them in possession of the upper city. 
And this they would be able to effect more easily, 
when the former point was once secured. 

The Athenians therefore, when all was fix- 
ed and determined on both sides, crossed over 
by night to Minoa the island of the Megareans 
with six hundred heavy-armed, commanded by 
Hippocrates, and sat themselves down in a 
hollow whence the bricks for the walls had 
been taken, and which lay near enough for 
their purpose : whilst another body, under 
Demosthenes the other commander, consisting 
of light-armed Plataeans, and the Athenian 
patroles, concealed themselves near the temple 
of Mars, which lies still nearer. Not a soul 
within the city knew any thing of these mo- 
tions, excepting those whose vigilance it con- 
cerned this night to observe them. When the 
morning was ready to break, the plotters of 
Megara proceeded thus : 

Through a series of time they had estab- 
lished a custom to have the gates of the long 
walls opened to them in the night, by carry- 
ing out a wherry upon a carriage, which they 
persuaded the officers posted there, they con- 
veyed nightly down the ditch into the sea, 
and so went upon a cruise. And before it was 
light, bringing it back again to the walls upon 
the carriage, they conveyed it through the 
gates, that it might escape the notice of the 
Athenian watch on Minoa, who by this means 
might be eluded, as they never would descry 
any boat in the harbour. The carriage w^as 
now at the gates, which were opened as usual 
for the reception of the wherry. This the 
Athenians observing (for this was the signal 
agreed on) came running from their place of 
ambush to take possession of the gates before 
they could be shut again. The very moment 
the carriage was between, and obstructed the 
closing tliem together, both they and the Mega- 
rean coadjutors put the watch which was 
posted at the gates to the sword. The Platae- 
ans, and patroling parties under Demosthenes, 
rushed in first to that spot where the trophy 

» About three quarters of a mile. 



156 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book IV. 



now stands, and having thus gained an entrance 
(for the Peloponnesians who were nearest had 
taken the alarm), the Plataeans made good 
their ground against those who attacked them, 
and secured the gates till the heavy-armed 
Athenians, who were coming up with all speed, 
had entered. Each of these Athenians after- 
wards, so f\ist as he got in, advanced along the 
wall. The Peloponnesian guards, though few 
in number, made head against them for a time ; 
some of them soon dropped, and then the rest 
ran speedily off. They were dismayed at such 
an attack from their enemies in the night ; and, 
as the treacherous Megareans fought against 
them, they concluded that all the Megareans 
were combined together in betraying them. 
It happened farther that an Athenian herald 
had proclaimed of his own accord that " such 
Megareans as were willing to side with the 
Athenians should throw down their arms." 
When the Peloponnesians heard this, they at 
once quitted their posts ; and, seriously believ- 
ing that all the Megareans had combined to be- 
tray them, fled amain into Nisasa. 

At the time of morning's dawn, the long 
walls being thus surprised, and the Megareans 
within the city thrown into a tumult, the 
agents for the Athenians, in concert with all 
their accomplices in the plot, insisted on the 
necessity to throw open the city gates, and 
march out to battle ; since it had been agreed 
between them, that so soon as ever the gates 
were thus opened, the Athenians should rush 
in. There was a method to be observed on 
their side, in order to be distinguished ; this 
was, to besmear themselves with ointment, 
that they might receive no harm. Their secu- 
rity would have been greater, had they opened 
the gates at once ; for now four thousand heavy- 
armed Athenians and six hundred horsemen, 
who had marched in the night from Eleusis, 
according to a prior disposition, were at hand. 
But whilst the accomplices, properly be- 
smeared, stood ready at the gates, one of their 
own party, who was privy to the whole plot, 
discovereth it to the other Megareans. These 
drawing up together, came forwards in a body, 
and denied " the expediency of marching out, 
(since formerly, when stronger than now, they 
durst not hazard such a step,) or running such 
a manifest risk of losing the city ; and, should 
any one affirm the contrary, the point should be 
instantly determined by blows." They gave 
not the least hint as if they had discovered the 



design, but strenuously insisted that their own 
measure was most advisable, and stood firm 
together for the security of the gates. Thus 
it was no longer possible for the conspirators to 
put their plot in execution. 

The Athenian commanders, being sensible 
that the project had been somehow crossed, and 
that they were not able themselves to take the 
city by storm, immediately run up a wall to 
invest Nisaea ; concluding, that could they carry 
it before any succours came up, it would be 
impossible for Mcgara to hold out much longer. 
Iron and workmen, and all proper materials, 
were quickly supplied them from Athens. 
They begun at the wall which they had lately 
surprised, they ran it along for some time 
parallel with Megara, and then down to the 
sea on both sides of Nisaea. The work, both 
of ditch and wall, was divided amongst the 
army. They made use of the stones and 
bricks of the suburbs, and having felled some 
trees and wood, they strengthened what was 
weak with an additional palisade. The houses 
of the suburbs, being topped with battlements, 
served the use of turrets. This whole day 
they plied hard at the work ; and about th« 
evening of the succeeding day it was only not 
completed. The garrison within Nisrea was 
in great consternation. They laboured already 
under a scarcity of provisions, which they had 
been used to fetch daily from the upper city. 
Thus concluding that the Peloponnesians could 
not succour them with sufficient expedition, 
and imagining the Megareans were combined 
against them, they capitulated with the Atheni- 
ans on the following terms: 

" To be dismissed every man at a certain 
ransom, after delivering up their arms. 

" But as for the Lacedaemonians, their com- 
mander, and every other person in that number, 
these to be disposed of by the Athenians at dis- 
cretion." 

These terms being agreed to, they evacuated 
Nisaea. And the Athenians, having thus cut 
off their long walls from the city of the Mega- 
reans, and possessed themselves of Nisa?a, were 
preparing to accomplish what was yet to be 
done. 

But Brasidas son of Tellis, the Lacedaemo- 
nian, happened at this time to be about SicyMi 
and Corinth, levying forces to march for Thrace. 
He was no sooner informed of the surprisal of 
the walls, than he trembled for the Pelopon- 
nesians in Nisxa, and lest Mcgara should be 



YEAR VIII.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



157 



taken. He summons the Boeotians to attend 
him expeditiously with their forces at Tripo- 
discus (the place so named is a vi lage of the 
Megaris under the mountain Geranea), whither 
he was marching himself with two thousand 
seven hundred heavy-armed Corinthians, four 
hundred Phliasians, six hundred Sicyonians, 
and what levies he had already made upon his 
own account. He imagined he might come up 
before Nissea could be taken. But hearing the 
contrary (for he came up in the night to Tri- 
podiscus), with a picked body of three hundred 
men, before the news of his march could be 
spread, he approached to the city of Megara, 
undescried by the Athenians, who were posted 
near the sea. He intended to declare that he 
was ready to attempt, and in fact would have 
been glad to have effected, the recovery of 
Nissea. But it was principally his view to get 
admission into Megara, and provide for its 
security. He demanded admission, assuring 
them he had great hope of recovering Nissea. 
But the factious in Megara, perplexed at this 
step of Brasidas — on one side, lest he meant 
to reinstate the exiles by ejecting them ; the 
other, lest the people with such an apprehension 
might at once fall upon them, and their city 
thus plunged into a tumult of arms might be 
lost, if the Athenians, who lay ready in am- 
bush, should seize it ; refused him admittance, 
and both factions thought proper, without any 
stir, to await the event. For it w^as severally 
their full expectation, that a battle must ensue 
between the Athenians and these new-comers ; 
and then, without plunging themselves into un- 
necessary hazards, they might join their own 
favourite party if victorious. 

Brasidas, when he could not prevail, with- 
drew again to the main of his army. By the 
succeeding dawn the Boeotians joined him, 
who had resolved to succour Megara, even 
previous to the summons sent b}"^ Brasidas, 
since they regarded the danger that place was 
in as their own. They were actually advanced 
with their whole force as far as Platoea ; and, 
the messenger having met with them here, they 
became much more eager than before. They 
sent forwards a detachment of two and twenty 
hundred heavy-armed, and six hundred horse- 
men, but dismissed the multitude to their own 
homes. When the whole force was thus 
united, consisting of at least six thousand 
heavy-armed, and the heavy-armed Athenians 
gtood drawn up in order near Nisaea and the 



sea-shore, whilst their light-armed were strag- 
gling about the plain, the Boeotian cavalry 
made an unexpected sally against those strag- 
glers, and chased them to the shore : for hither- 
to no aid whatever had taken the field in behalf 
of the Megareans. The Athenian cavalry 
clapped spurs to repel the Boeotian, and a bat- 
tle ensued. The horse were a long time thus 
engaged, and both sides claimed a victory. 
For the general of the Boeotian cavalry, and a 
small number of his party, the Athenians drove 
before them to Nissa, where they put them to 
the sword and rifled them. They remained 
masters of the dead bodies, gave them up 
afterwards by a truce, and erected a trophy : but 
neither side so keeping their ground as to ren- 
der the action decisive, they retreated as it 
were by consent ; the Boeotians to their main 
army, and the Athenians to Nisjea. 

Brasidas, after this, advanced nearer to the 
sea and to the city of Megara with his army. 
Having occupied there some advantageous 
ground, they/ drew up in order and stood still, 
imagining the Athenians would attack thiem ; 
and assured, that the Megareans were intently 
observing for whom the victory might declare. 
In both these respects, they judged their pre- 
sent posture the most judicious ; because it 
was not their own business to attack, or volun- 
tarily to run into conflict and danger ; and 
thus, having manifestly exhibited their alacrity 
to act defensively, a victory might justly be 
ascribed to them without the expense of a 
battle. In regard further to the Megareans, 
the consequence could not but be fortunate : 
for, in case the latter had never beheld them 
thus prompt in their succour, they would have 
stopped all farther risk, and so undoubtedly they 
should have lost the city, as men completely 
vanquished ; but now, should the Athenians 
decline an engagement, the points for which 
they themselves came thither must be secured 
without a blow ; which proved to be the result. 
For the Megarians, when the Athenians came 
out and drew up in order close to the long 
walls, and then, as the enemy did not advance 
to attack them, stood quiet in their ranks ; their 
commanders also judging the hazard by no 
means equal, and themselves, who had so far 
been successful, not at all concerned to begin 
an engagement against superior numbers, in 
which, should they prevail, they could only take 
Megara, but, should they miscarry, must Jose 
the flower of their domestic strength ; especi- 



158 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book IV. 



cially as tlieir opponents would act in probability : 
with more daring resolution, since as the large ' 
strength they had now in the licld consisted 
only of quotas from several constituents, they i 
hazarded but little ; thus facing one another j 
for a considerable space, and neither side pre- 
suming to make an attack, till each at length 
wheeled off, the Athenians first towards Nissea, 
and the Peloponnesians again to their former 
post : — then, I say, the Mcgareans in the inter- 
est of the exiles, regarding Brasidas as victor, 
and animated by the refusal of attack on the 
Athenian side, open the gates of Mcgara to 
Brasidas himself, and the several commanders 
from the auxiliary states; and, having given 
them admission,' proceed with them to consul- 
tation, whilst the partizans of the Athenian in- 
terest were in the utmost consternation- 
Soon afterwards, the confederates being 
dismissed to their respective cities, Brasidas 
also himself returned to Corinth, to continue 
his preparations for that Thracian expedition, 
in which before tliis avocation he had been in- 
tently employed. 

The Athenians also being now marched 
homewards, the Megareans in the city, who 
nad acted most zealously in favour of the 
Athenians, finding all their practices detected, 
stole off as fast as possible. The others, after 
concerting the proper steps with the friends of 
the exiles, fetch them home from Pegae, having 
first administered to them the most solemn 
oaths "to think no more on former injuries, 
and to promote the true welfare of the city to 
the utmost of their power." 

But these, when re-invested with authority, 
and taking a review of the troops of the city, 
having previously disposed some bands of sol- 
diers in a proper manner, picked out about a 
hundred persons of their enemies, and who 
they thought had busied themselves most in 
favour of the Athenians. And having com- 
pelled the people to pass a public vote upon 
them, they were condemned to die and suffered 
an instant execution. They farther new-mo- 
delled the government of Megara into almost an 
oligarch}'. And this change, though introduced 
by an inconsiderable body of men ; nay, what is 
more, in the train of sedition ; yet continued for 
a long space of time in full force at Magara. 

The same summer, the Mitylcncans being 
intent on executing their design of fortifying 
Antaudrus, Demodocus and Aristides, who 
commanded the Athenian squadron for levy- 



ing contributions, and were now at Hclospont, 
(for Lamachus the third in the commission 
had been dotachcd with ten ships towards 
Pontus,) when informed of what was thus in 
agitation, became apprehensive that Antandrus 
might prove of as bad consequence to them as 
x\naea in Samos had already done; wherein the 
Saraian exiles having fortified themselves, were 
not only serviceable to the Peloponnesians at sea, 
by furnishing them with pilots ; but farther, 
were continually alarming the Samians at 
home, and sheltering their deserters. From 
these apprehensions they assembled a force 
from among their dependents, sailed thither, 
and having defeated in battle those who came 
out of Antandrus to oppose them, gain once 
more possession of that town. And no long 
time after, Lamachus, who had been detached 
to Pontus, having anchored in the river Calex 
in the district of Heraclea, lost all his ships. 
A heavy rain had fallen in the upper country, 
and the land-flood rushing suddenly down, bore 
them all away before it. He himself and the 
men under his command were forced to march 
over land through Bithynia (possessed by those 
Thracians who are seated on the other side of 
the strait in Asia) to Chalcedon, a colony of 
Megareans in the mouth of the Euxine sea. 

This summer also Demosthenes, immediately 
after he had quitted the Megaris, with the com- 
mand of forty sail of Athenians, arrives at 
Naupactus. For with him, and with Hippo- 
crates, some persons of the Bceotian cities in 
those parts had been concerting schemes how 
to change the government of those cities, and 
introduce a democracy on the Athenian model. 
The first author of this scheme was Ptoeodorus, 
an exile from Thebes, and matters were now 
ready for execution. 

Some of them had undertaken to betray 
Siphae : Siphx is a maritime town in the dis- 
trict of Thcspise, upon the gulf of Crissa. 
Others of Orchomcnus engaged for Cha?ronca, 
a town tributary to that Orchomenus which 
was formerly called the Minyeian but now the 
Boeotian. Some Orchomenian exiles were the 
chief undertakers of this point, and were hiring 
soldiers for the purpose from Peloponnesus. 
Chajronea is situated on the edge of Boeotia 
towards Phanotis of Phocis, and is in part in- 
habited by Phocians. The share assigned to 
the Athenians was the surprisal of Dolium, a 
temple of Apollo in Tanngra, looking towards 
Eubcca. These things farther were to bo 



YEAR VIII.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



159 



achieved on a day prefixed, that the Boeotians 
might be disabled from rushing to the rescue of 
Delium with all their force, by the necessity of 
staying at home to defend their respective ha- 
bitations. Should the attempt succeed, and 
Delium once be fortified, they easily presumed 
that, though the change of the Boeotian govern- 
ments might not suddenly be effected, yet, 
when those tow^ns were in their hands, when 
their devastations were extended all over the 
country, and places of safe retreat lay near at 
hand for their parties, things could not long 
remain in their former posture ; but in process 
of time, when the Athenians appeared in sup- 
port of the revolters, and the Boeotians could 
not unite in a body to oppose them, the de- 
signed revolution must necessarily take place. 
This was the nature of the scheme at present 
in agitation. 

Hippocrates, having the whole force of 
Athens under his command, was ready at the 
proper time to march into Boeotia. But he 
had despatched Demosthenes beforehand to 
Naupactus with forty ships, that, after he had 
collected a sufficient force in those parts from 
the Acarnanians and their other confederates, 
he should appear with his fleet before Siphae, 
which was then to be betrayed to him. A 
day also was fixed upon between them, in which 
both of them were at once to execute the parts 
assigned them. 

Demosthenes, being arrived at Naupactus, 
found the Oeniadae already compelled by the 
united Acarnanians into an association with 
the confederates of Athens. He marched 
away, therefore, at the head of the whole con- 
federacy in those parts, and invaded first Salyn- 
thius and the Agrseans ; and having carried 
some other points, got all in readiness to show 
himself before Siphae at the time appointed. 

About the same time this summer, Brasidas, 
at the head of seventeen hundred heavy-armed, 
began his march towards Thrace. When he 
was come up to Heraclea in Thachis, he des- 
patched a messenger beforehand to his corres- 
pondents in Pharsalus, to beg a safe-conduct 
for himself and his army. And as soon as he 
was met at Melitia of Achaea, by Pana^rus, 
and Dorus, and Hippolochidas, and Torylaus, 
and Strophacus, who had been formerly the 
public host of the Chalcideans, he continued 
his march forwards. Others also of the Thcs- 
salians assisted in conducting him, and from 
Larissa Niconidas the friend of Perdiccas. 



The passage through Thessaly without proper 
guides is always difficult, and must be more so 
to an armed body. Besides, to attempt such 
a thing through a neighbouring dominion with- 
out permission first obtained, hath ever been 
regarded by all the Grecians with a jealous eye, 
and the bulk of the Thessalians had been ever 
well-aflTected to the Athenians. Nor could 
Brasidas have possibly effected it, had not the 
Thessalian been rather despotic than free 
governments. For upon his route he was 
stopped at the river Enipeus, by some of con- 
tary sentiments to the rest of their country- 
men, who ordered him to proceed at his peril, 
and taxed him with injustice in having come 
so far without the general permission. His 
conductors told them in return, that " without 
such permission he should not proceed ; but, 
as he had come amongst them on a sudden, 
they thought themselves obliged in friendship 
to conduct him." Brasidas also gave them 
strong assurances, that " he was come thither 
for the service of Thessaly and of them ; that 
his arms were not intended against them, but 
against the common enemy, the Athenians ; 
that he never suspected any enmity between 
Thessalians and Lacedaemonians, why they 
might not tread upon one another's ground; 
that even now, should they withhold their con- 
sent, he was neither willing nor indeed able to 
proceed ; but," he conjured them, <' however, to 
give him no molestation." Having heard these 
declarations, they acquiesced and withdrew. 
Brasidas now, by the advice of his conductors, 
advanced with the utmost speed without ever 
halting, in order to anticipate fresh and more 
potent obstruction. Nay, the very same day 
that he left Melitia, he advanced as far as 
to Pharsalus, and encamped upon the banks of 
the Apidanus. From thence he proceeded to 
Phacium, and from thence into Peraebia. Be- 
ing so far advanced, his Thessalian guides re- 
ceived their dismission ; and the Peraebians, 
who are tributaries to the Thessalians, escorted 
him to Dium in the kingdom of Perdiccas : it 
is a fortress of Macedonia situated under mount 
Olympus on the Thessalian side. In this man- 
ner Brasidas, advancing so expeditiously as to 
prevent all obstruction, completed his passage 
through Thessaly, and arrived in the dominions 
of Perdiccas and the region of Chalcis. For 
those in Thrace who revolted from the Athe- 
nians, had joined with Perdiccas in procuring 
this auxiliary force out of Peloponnesus, be- 



160 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book IV. 



cause the great success of the Athenians had 
struck a terror amongst them. 'I'he Chalci- 
deans were persuaded, that they should be first 
attacked by the Athenians : and in truth their 
neighbour-states, who yet persevered in their 
obedience, were secretly instigating them to it. 
Perdiccas, indeed, had not yet declared himself 
their enemy ; but he dreaded the vengeance of 
the Athenians for former grudges ; and now he 
had a scheme at heart for the subjection of 
Arribffius king of the Lyncestians. 

Other points concurred to facilitate the pro- 
curement of such a succour from Peloponnesus, 
such as the misfortunes by which the Lacedae- 
monians at present were afflicted. For, the 
Athenians pressing hard on Peloponnesus, and 
not least of all on Laconia, they hoped in case 
they could equally annoy them in this quarter, 
by thus marching an array against their depen- 
dants, to effect a diversion. And they were 
more encouraged by the offers of maintenance 
for their troops, and solicitations to support re- 
volts. They were at the same time glad of a 
pretext to rid themselves of their Helots, lest, 
in the present state of aifairs, now that Pylus 
was in hostile hands, they might be tempted to 
rebel. This farther gave rise to the following 
event : — Dreading the youth and number of 
these slaves (for many precautions have ever 
been put in practice by Laceda;monians to 
curb and awe their Helots,) they made public 
proclamation, that " so many of them as could 
claim the merit of having done signal service to 
the Lacedsemonians in the present war should 
enter their claims, and be rewarded with free- 
dom." The view in this was, to sound them, 
imagining that such who had the greatness of 
spirit to claim their freedom in requital of their 
merit, must be also the ripest for rebellion. 
About two thousand claimants were adjudged 
worthy, and accordingly were led about in so- 
lemn procession to the temple, crowned with 
garlands, as men honoured with their freedom. 
But, in no long time after, they made away with 
them all : nor hath the world been able to dis- 
cover, in what manner they were thus to a man 
destroyed. 

Now also with alacrity they sent away seven 
hundred of their heavy-armed under the orders 
of Brasidas. The rest of his body were mer- 
cenaries, whom he had hired in Peloponnesus. 
And it was in compliance with his own parti- 
cular desire, that Brasidas was employed in this 
service by the Lacedxmonians. 



The Chalcideans, however, were highly satis- 
fied with a person who had ever passed in Spar- 
ta for one of the most active and accomplished 
citizens; and who, in his foreign employments, 
had performed very signal services for his coun- 
try. From his first appearance amongst them, 
his justice and moderation so instantly recom- 
mended him to the adjacent cities, that some 
voluntarily submitted, and others were by in- 
trigue put into his possession. By him the 
Lacedsemonians were actually empowered, if 
the accommodation they wished for took place, 
which it afterwards did, to make exchange and 
restitution of towns, and so relieve Peloponne- 
sus from the hardships of war. 

Nay more, even in succeeding time, upon the 
breaking out of the Sicilian war, the virtue and 
prudence of Brasidas exerted at this juncture, 
which some attested by their own experience, 
others upon sound and unsuspected report, im- 
printed a zeal on the confederates of Athens to 
go over to the Lacedaemonians. For, having 
been the first sent out to a foreign trust, and 
approved in all respects as a worthy man, he left 
behind him a strong presumption, that the rest 
of his countrymen were like himself.^ 

So soon therefore as it was known at Athens, 
that he was arrived to take upon him the con- 
duct of affairs in Thrace, the Athenians de- 
clare Perdiccas their enemy, ascribing this ex- 
pedition to his cabals, and by strengthening 
their garrisons kept a strict watch over all their 
dependents in that quarter. 

But Perdiccas with his own forces, and ac- 
companied by the body under Brasidas, march- 
eth against a neighbouring potentate, Arribaeus 
son of Bromerus, king of the Macedonian Lyn- 
cestians : enmity was subsisting between them, 
and the conquest of him was the point in view. 
When he was advanced with his army, and in 
conjunction with Brasidas, to the entrance of 
Lyncus, Brasidas communicated his intention 
to hold a parley with Arribaeus, before he pro- 
ceeded to act offensively against him ; and if 
possible, to bring him over to the Laceda;mo- 
nian alliance ; for Arribneus had already noti- 
fied by a herald, that he was willing to refer the 
points in dispute to the arbitration of Brasidas. 
The Chalcidean ambassadors also, who followed 



1 When Brasidas wns beginning his marrh for Thrace, 
he wrote tliis letter to tlie opiiori at Sparta:—" I will 
execute your orders in this war, or die." riutarch'* 
Laconic Apophthegms. 



YEAR VIII.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



161 



the camp, were continually suggesting to him, 
that " he ought not to plunge himself rashly 
into difficulties for the sake of Perdiccas," de- 
signing to reserve him more entirely for their 
own service. And besides this, the ministers of 
Perdiccas had declared it at Lacedjemon to be 
their master's intention, to bring over all the 
neighbouring states into this alliance : so that 
it was entirely with public views, that Brasidas 
insisted upon treating with Arribaeus. But 
Perdiccas urged in opposition, that " he had 
not brought Brasidas to be the judge of his con- 
troversies, but to execute his vengeance on the 
enemies he should point out to him ; that it 
would be unjust in Brasidas to treat with Ar- 
ribaeus, when he supported half the expense of 
his troops." Yet, in spite of such remonstran- 
ces, and in open defiance of him, Brasidas par- 
leyed. And being satisfied with the offers of 
Arribaeus, he drew off his troops, without so 
much as entering his dominions. But hence- 
forth Perdiccas, looking upon this step as an 
injury to himself, reduced his contribution of 
support from a moiety to a third. 

Brasidas however the same summer, without 
loss of time, continued the operations of war ; 
and, a little before the vintage, being attended 
by the Chalcideans, marched towards Acan- 
thus, a colony of the Andrians. The inhabi- 
tants of this place were embroiled in a sedition 
about his reception ; a party, who co-operated 
with the Chalcideans, were for it; but the peo- 
ple opposed. Yet, fearing the loss of their 
fruit, which was not quite got in, the people 
were at last prevailed upon by Brasidas, to grant 
entrance to himself without any attendants, and 
after giving him audience to resolve for them- 
selves. Brasidas is admitted ; and standing 
forth in the presence of the people, for though 
a Lacedaemonian he was an able speaker, he 
harangued them thus : 

« My commission from the Lacedaemonians 
and the march of their troops hither under ray 
command verify, O ye Acanthians, the declara- 
tion made by us, when first we began this war 
against the Athenians, that we were going to 
fight for the liberties of Greece. But if our 
appearance here hath been too long deferred, it 
should be ascribed to the unexpected turns of 
war nearer home, whereas we hoped to demo- 
lish the Athenians speedily without endanger- 
ing you, we ought to be exempted from any 
«ensure here. For now, you behold us oppor- 
28 



tunely at hand, and intent in conjunction with 
you to pull these tyrants down. 

'« I am surprised indeed that your gates 
should be barred against me, or that my pre- 
sence should any way chagrin you. For we 
Lacedaemonians, imagining we were going to 
confederates, whose wishes were fastened upon 
us before their eyes could behold us, and from 
whom we might depend upon the most cordial 
reception; we, I say, have pierced forwards 
through a series of dangers, marching many 
days together through hostile territories, and 
surmounting every obstacle by a zeal for 
your service. If therefore your affections are 
alienated from us, or if you act in opposition to 
your own, and to the liberty of the rest of 
Greece, your conduct must terribly distress us. 
And that, not only because you yourselves re- 
ject us, but may by such a step deter all others, 
to whom I shall afterwards apply, from co-op- 
erating with me. Such obstacles you will raise 
before me, if you, to whom first I have ad- 
dressed myself, you who are masters of a city 
of great importance, and are in esteem for your 
good sense and discretion, should refuse to re- 
ceive me. I shall be utterly unable to put a 
plausible colour upon such a refusal, and shall 
be exposed to reproach, as if I meant injustice 
under the cloak of liberty, or came hither too 
weak and impotent to make head against the 
Athenian strength, should it be exerted against 
me. 

" And yet with that force, of which at this 
very moment I am honoured with the command 
I marched myself to the succour of Nissea, and 
openly defied a superior number of Athenians 
who declined the encounter. It is not there- 
fore probable, that they can send hither a force 
to our annoyance equal to that armament 
they employed at Nisaea : nor am I sent 
hither to execute the schemes of oppression, 
but to further the deliverance of Greece. I 
have the security of most solemn oaths, sworn 
by the magistrates of Laceda^mon, that what- 
ever people I bring over to their alliance shall 
remain in free possession of their own liberties 
and laws. And farther, we are forbid the use 
of violence and fraud as the means of render- 
ing you dependent on us ; but, on the contrary, 
are to act in support of you who are oppressed 
with Athenian bondage. Upon reasons so 
valid do I insist upon it, that I am no longer 
suspected by you, having given you the strong- 



162 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book IV 



est assurances, that I am no impotent avenger, 
and that you may boldly abet my cause. 

" If there be any person in this assembly, 
who hesitates upon the apprehension that I 
may betray the city into the hands of a private 
cabal, let him bid adieu to his fears, and dis- 
tinguish himself in open confidence. I came 
not hither to be the tool of faction ; I am 
convinced that liberty can never be re-estab- 
lished by me, if, disregarding ancient constitu- 
tions, I enslave the multitude to the few, or 
the few to the crowd. Such things would be 
more grievous than the yoke of foreign do- 
minion. And should we Lacedaemonians pro- 
ceed in this manner, our labours could never 
merit a return of gratitude, but instead of 
honour and glory, foul reproach would be our 
portion. The crimes on which we have 
grounded this war against the Athenians, would 
then appear to be our own, and more odious in 
us for having made parade of disinterested 
virtue, than in a state which never pretended 
to it. For it is more base in men of honour to 
enlarge their power by specious fraud than by 
open force. The latter, upon the right of that 
superior strength with which fortune hath in- 
vested it, seizeth at once upon its prey ; the 
other can only compass it by the treachery of 
wicked cunning. 

« It is thus that in all concerns of more than 
ordinary importance, we are accustomed to 
exert the utmost circumspection. And besides 
the solemn oaths in your favour ; you can re- 
ceive no greater security of our honest intention 
than the congruity of our actions with our 
words, from whence the strongest conviction 
must result, that with what I have suggested 
you are obliged in interest to comply. But if 
all my promises are unavailing, and you declare 
such compliance impossible ; if, professing 
yourselves our sincere well-wishers you beg 
that a denial may not expose you to our resent- 
ments ; if you allege that the dangers through 
which your liberty must be sought, overbalance 
the prize ; that in justice it ought only to be 
proposed to such as are able to embrace the 
ofler, but that no one ought to be compelled 
against his own inclinations; — I shall beseech 
the tutelary gods and heroes of this island to 
bear me witness, that whereas I come to serve 
you, and cannot persuade, I must now, by 
ravaging your country, endeavour to compel 
you. And, in acting thus, I shall not be con- 
scious to myself of injustice, but shall justify 



the step on two most cogent motives : — for the 
sake of the Lacedsemonians ; lest whilst they 
have only your affections, and not your actual 
concurrence, they may be prejudiced through 
the sums of money you pay to the Athenians; 
— for the sake of all the Grecians ; that they 
may not be obstructed by you in their deliver- 
ance from bondage. This is the end we pro- 
pose, and this will justify our proceedings. For 
without the purpose of a public good, we La- 
cedaemonians ought not to set people at liberty 
against their wills. We are not greedy of 
empire, but we are eager to pull down the 
tyranny of others. And how could we answer 
it to the body of Greece, if, when we have 
undertaken to give liberty to them all, we in- 
dolently sufler our endeavours to be traversed 
by you 1 

" Deliberate seriously on these important 
points, and animate yourselves with the glori- 
ous ambition of being the first who enter the 
lists for the liberties of Greece, of gaining an 
eternal renown, of securing the uninterrupted 
possession of your private properties, and in- 
vesting the state of which you are members 
with the most honourable' of all titles." 

Here Brasidas concluded. And the Acan- 
thians, who had already heard this affair largely 
discussed on both sides, and secretly declared 
their votes — the majority, because the argu- 
ments of Brasidas were prevailing, and because 
they dreaded the loss of their fruit, resolved to 
revolt from the Athenians. Then they re- 
quired of Brasidas himself to swear the oath 
of their security, which the Lacedaemonian ma- 
gistrates had at his departure enjoined him to 
take, that " whatever people was brought over 
into their alliance by him should remain in 
possession of their own liberties and laws," 
and this done, they receive his army. Not 
long after, Stagyrus also, another colony of the 
Andrians, revolted. And thus ended the 
transactions of this summer. 

Very early in the succeeding winter, when 
the strong places of Boeotia were to have been 
betrayed to Hippocrates and Demosthenes the 
Athenian commanders, preparatory to which 
Demosthenes was to show himself with his 
fleet before Siphae, and the olhtr to march to 
Delium, there happened a mistake about the 
days prefixed for execution. DemostlnMies in- 
deed, who steered towards Siphae, and had on 

» Free. 



YEAR VIIl.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



163 



board the Acarnanians, and many of the con- 
federates of that quarter, is totally disappointed. 
The whole scheme had been betrayed by 
Nicomachus the Phocian of Phanotis, who 
gave information of it to the Lacedaemonians, 
and they to the BcEotians. All Boeotians now 
taking up arms to prevent consequences (for 
Hippocrates was not yet in their country to 
distress them on that side), Sipha) and Chae- 
ronea are secured in time. And so soon as 
the conspirators perceived that things went 
wrong, they gave up all farther thoughts of 
exciting commotions in the cities. 

Hippocrates having summoned into the field 
the whole force of Athens, as well citizens as 
sojourners, not excepting even foreigners who 
chanced at that time to be there, arriveth 
too late before Delium, not before the Boeoti- 
ans were returned home again from Siphse. 
He encamped his forces, and set about fortify- 
ing Delium, the temple of Apollo, in the fol- 
lowing manner. — Round about the temple and 
its precincts they sunk a ditch : of the earth 
thrown up they formed a rampart instead of a 
wall. They drove into the ground on each side 
a row of stakes, and then threw on the vines 
they cut from within the precincts of the tem- 
ple. They did the same by the stones and 
bricks of the adjacent buildings which had been 
demolished, and omitted no expedient to give 
height and substance to the work. They 
erected wooden turrets upon such spots as 
seemed most to require it. No part of the old 
pile of the temple was now standing : the 
portico, which stood the longest, had lately fal- 
len down. They began the work the third day 
after their marching out from Athens. That 
day they plied it, and the following, and con- 
tinued it on the fifth till the time of repast. 
Then, the work being for the most part com- 
pleted, they drew off their army to the distance 
of about ten stadia' from Delium, in order to 
return home. Their light-armed indeed, for the 
most part, marched off directly, but the heavy- 
armed, halting there, sat down upon their arms. 

Hippocrates staid behind for the time neces- 
sary to post the proper guards, and to put the 
finishing hand to those parts of the fortification 
which were not yet perfectly completed. But 
during all this space, the Boeotians, had been 
employed in drawing their forces together to 
Tanagra. When the quotas from the several 

* About an English mile. 



cities were come up, and they perceived the 
Athenians were filing ofi' towards Athens, the 
other rulers of Boeotia (for they were eleven 
in all) declared their resolution not to engage, 
since the enemy is no longer on Boeotian 
ground : for the Athenians, when they ground- 
ed their ar;ns, were within the borders of 
Oropia. But Pagondas the son of ^Eoladas, 
one of the Boeotian rulers in the right of 
Thebes, and at this time in the supreme com- 
mand, in concert with Arianthidas the son of 
Lysimachidas, declared for fighting. He judged 
it expedient to hazard an engagement ; and 
addressing himself to every battalion apart, 
lest calling them together might occasion them 
to abandon their arms, he prevailed upon the 
Boeotians to march up to the Athenians, and to 
offer battle. His exhortation to each was 
worded thus : 

" It ought never, ye men of Boeotia, to have 
entered into the hearts of any of your rulers, jf^-^ 
that it is improper for us to attack the Atheni- 
ans, because we find them not upon our own 
soil. For they, out of a neighbouring country, 
have rushed into Boeotia, and have fortified a 
post in it ; from whence they intend to ravage 
and annoy us. And our enemies in short they 
are, in whatever place we find them, from 
what place soever they march to execute hos- 
tilities against us. Now therefore let him who 
hath judged this step we are taking hazardous 
and insecure, acknowledge and forego his error. 
Cautious and dilatory measures are not to 
be adhered to by men who are invaded, and 
whose all is at stake : they are expedient 
only for those whose properties are secure, 
and who bent on rapine exert their malice 
in the invasion of others. But it is eter- 
nally the duty of you Boeotians to combat 
such foreigners as presume to invade you, 
either upon your own or your neighbour's 
ground, no matter which. And this above all 
must be done against Athenians, not only be- 
cause they are Athenians, but because they are 
the nearest borderers upon us. For it is a 
maxim allowed, that no state can possibly pre- 
serve itself free, unless it be a match for its 
neighbouring powers. 

" Let me add farther, that when men are 
bent on enslaving not neighbours only, but 
even such people as are more remote, how can 
it be judged improper to encounter such, so ' 
long as we can find ground whereon to stand ? 
Call to mind for your present information the 



164 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book TV. 



Buboeans situated in yon island opposite to us ; 
call to mind the present disposition of the 
bulk of Greece in regard to these Athenians. 
Why should we foiget, that neighbouring states 
so often battle one another about settling their 
various boundaries ; whereas, should we be 
vanquished, our whole country will be turned 
merely into one heap of limitation, and that 
never again by us to be disputed 1 for when 
once they have entered upon it, they will re- 
main the masters of it all, beyond control. So 
much more have we to fear from these neigh- 
bours of ours, than any other people. 

" Those again, who in all the daring inso- 
lence of superior strength are wont to invade 
their neighbours, as these Athenians now do 
us, march with extraordinary degrees of con- 
fidence against such as are inactive, and de- 
fend themselves only on their own soil. His 
schemes are more painfully completed, when 
men sally boldly beyond their borders to meet 
the invader, and, if opportunity serveth, attack 
him first. Of this truth our own experience 
will amply convince us. For ever since the 
defeat we gave these very men at Coronea, 
■when taking the advantage of our seditions 
they had possessed themselves of our lands, 
we have kept Boeotia quiet from every alarm 
till the present. This we ought now to re- 
member, that the seniors among us may pro- 
ceed as they then begun ; that the juniors, the 
sons of those sires who then displayed such 
uncommon bravery, may exert themselves to 
preserve unblemished their hereditary virtues. 
We ought all to be confident, that the god will 
fight on our side, whose temple they pollute 
by raising ramparts, and dwelling within its 
verge. And, as the victims we have offered 
are fair and auspicious, we ought at once to 
advance to the charge of these our foes, and 
make them know, that their lust and rapine 
they only then can gratify when they invade 
such cowards as abandon their own defence : 
but from men who were born to vindicate their 
own country for ever by the dint of arms, and 
never unjustly to enslave another — that from 
such men they shall not get away without that 
struggle which honour enjoins." 

In this manner Pagondas exhorted the Boeo- 
tians, and persuaded them to march against 
the Athenians. He put them instantly in 
motion, and led them towards the enemy ; 
for it was now late in the day. When he had 
approached the spot en which they were posted, 



he halted in a place from whence, as an emi- 
nence lay between, they could have no view of 
one another. There he drew up his men, and 
made all ready for the attack. 

When the news was brought to Hippocrates, 
who was yet at Delium, that " the enemy is 
advancing to the charge," he sendeth orders to 
the main body to form into the order of battle. 
And not long after, he himself came up, hav- 
ing left about three hundred horse at Delium, 
to guard that place in case an attempt should 
be made upon it, or seizing a favourable op- 
portunity to fall upon the rear of the Boeotians 
during the engagement. Not but that the 
Boeotians had posted a party of their own to 
watch their motions, and find them employ- 
ment. When therefore the whole disposition 
was perfected, they showed themselves on the 
top of the eminence, and there grounded their 
arms, remaining still in the same order in 
which they designed to attack ; being in the 
whole about seven thousand heavy-armed, 
more than ten thousand light-armed, a thou- 
sand horse, and five hundred targeteers. The 
right wing was composed of Thebans and those 
who ranked with them ; the centre of the Ha- 
liartians, and Coroneans, and Copiensians, and 
others that live ahout the lake (Copseis) ; and 
the left of Thespiensians, Tanagreans, and Or- 
chomenians. In the wings were posted the 
cavalry and light-armed. The Thebans were 
drawn up in files of twenty five ; the others 
variously, as circumstances required. And 
such was the order and disposition of the Bseo- 
tians. 

On the Athenian side, the heavy-armed, 
being in number equal to their enemies, were 
drawn up in one entire body of eight in depth. 
Their cavalry was posted on either wing. 
But light-armed soldiers, armed as was fitting, 
the Athenians had none at this juncture, nei- 
ther in the field nor in the city. The num- 
ber which had taken the field at first to attend 
this expedition exceeded many times over the 
number of the enemy ; but then most of them 
' had no arms at all, since the summons had 
I been extended to all who resided in Athens, 
both citizens and foreigners. The crowd of 
I these, so soon as ever the route was pointed 
I homewards, were, excepting a few, gone 
speedily off. But, when they were drawn 
up in the order of battle, and were every 
1 moment expecting the charge, Hippncratrs 
1 the general showing himself in the front of 



YEAR VIII.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



165 



the Athenians, animated them with the fol- 
lowing harangue : 

« The admonition, Athenians, I intend to 
give you will be very concise, but such a one 
is sufficient to the brave; I pretend not to 
encourage Athenians, but merely to remind 
them of their duty. Let the thought be a 
stranger to every heart amongst you, that we 
are going to plunge into needless hazards in the 
territory of a foe. Be it the territory of a 
foe, yet in it you must fight for the security of 
your own. And, if we conquer now, the Pe- 
loponnesians will never again presume, with- 
out the aid of the Boeotian horse, to repeat 
their inroads into Attica. By one battle there- 
fore you acquire this, and secure your own 
land from future annoyance. Charge there- 
fore your enemies, as you ought, with a spirit 
worthy of the state of Athens — that state 
which every soul amongst you boasts to be 
the first of Greece — and worthy of your great 
forefathers who formerly at Oenophyta, under 
the conduct of Myronides, defeated these peo- 
ple in the field, and possessed for a time all 
Boeotia as their prize." 

Hippocrates had not gone alonghalf the line 
encouraging them in this manner, when he was 
compelled to desist and leave the greater part 
of his army unaddressed. For the Bceotians, 
to whom Pagondas also had given but a short 
exhortation, and had this moment finished the 
paean of attack, were coming down from the 
eminence. The Athenians advanced to meet 
them, and both sides came running to the 
charge. The skirts of both armies could not 
come to an engagement, as some rivulets that 
lay between stopped them equally on both 
sides. The rest closed firm in a stubborn 
fight, and with mutual thrusts of their shields. 
The left wing of the Boeotians, even to the 
centre, was routed by the Athenians, who 
pressed upon those who composed it, but 
especially on the Thespiensians. For, the 
others who were drawn up with them giving 
way before the shock, the Thespiensians were 
inclosed in a small compass of ground, where 
such of them as were slaughtered defended 
themselves bravely till they were quite hewed 
down. Some also of the Athenians, disor- 
dered in thus encompassing them about, knew 
not how to distinguish, and slew one another. 
In this quarter therefore the Boeotians were 
routed, and fled towards those parts where the 
battle was yet alive. Their right wing, in 



which the Thebans were posted, had the better 
of the Athenians. They had forced them at 
first to give ground a little, and pressed upon 
them to pursue their advantage. It happened 
that Pagondas had detached two troops of 
horse (which motion was not perceived) to 
fetch a compass round the eminence and sup- 
port the left wing which was routed. These 
suddenly appearing in sight, the victorious 
wing of Athenians, imagining a fresh army 
was coming up to the charge, was struck into 
consternation. And now being distressed on 
both sides by this last turn, and by the The- 
bans who pursued their advantage close and 
put them into a total disorder, the whole 
Athenian army was routed and fled. Some 
ran towards Delium and the sea, others to 
Oropus, and others towards mount Parnes; 
all to whatever place they hoped was safe. 
But the Boeotians, especially their horse, and 
the Locrians who had come up to the field of 
battle just as the rout began, pursued them 
with great execution. But the night putting 
an end to the chase, the bulk of the flying 
army preserved themselves more easily. 

The day following, such of them as had 
reached Delium and Oropus, leaving behind a 
garrison in Delium, which still remained in 
their possession, transported themselves by sea 
to Athens. The Boeotians also, having erected 
a trophy, carried off their own dead, rifled 
those of the enemy, and having posted a guard 
upon the field of battle, retired to Tanagra, 
and called a consultation about the method of 
assaulting Delium. 

A herald, farther, despatched by the Athe- 
nians about their dead, meets upon his way a 
herald of the Boeotians, who turned him back 
by assuring him that his errand would be fruit- 
less till he himself should be again returned. 
The latter, being come to the Athenians, de- 
clared to them in the name of the Boeotians : 

" That by their late proceedings they had 
enormously violated the laws of the Grecians, 
amongst whom it was an established rule, that 
amidst their mutual invasions religious places 
should be ever spared, whereas the Athenians 
had not only fortified, but had made Delium a 
place of habitation, and whatever profanations 
mankind can be guilty of, had been there by 
them committed : that the water, which it 
would even be impious for the Boeotians 
themselves to touch unless by way of ablution, 
before they sacrificed, had been profanely 
t2 



166 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book IV. 



drawn by ihcm for common use ; that, for 
these reasons the Boeotians, in the cause of 
the god and in their own, invoking the asso- 
ciated Daemons and Apollo, gave them this 
early notice to evacuate the sacred place, and 
clear it of all incumbrances." 

This message being thus delivered by the 
hcra d, the Athenians returned this answer to 
the Boeotians by a herald of their own : 

" That they were hitherto guilty of nothing 
illegal in regard to the holy place, nor would 
willingly be so for the future. They had no 
such intention when they first entered into it, 
and their view was merely to give an ejection 
from thence to persons who had basely injured 
them. It was a law among the Grecians for 
those who were masters of any district, whether 
great or small, to be also proprietors of its 
temples, which are to be honoured by them 
with the usual forms, and with what additional 
ones they may be able to appoint. Even the 
BcEotians, as well as many other people, who 
this moment were possessed of lands from 
which they had ejected the old .proprietors, 
made a seizure first of those temples which had 
belonged to others, and continued in the free 
possession of them. For their own parts, 
could they conquer more of their territory, 
they should manfully retain it; and as to the 
spot they now occupied, their position there 
was voluntary, and as it was their own they 
would not quit it. It was necessity alone made 
them use the water, which ought not to be as- 
cribed to any insolent or profane motive, but to 
the preceding invasions their enemies had 
made, self-preservation against which laid 
them under a present necessity of acting as 
they did. It might with reason be hoped, that 
every proceeding to which war and violence 
indispensably obliged, would obtain forgiveness 
from the god : for the altars are a refuge to 
involuntary offences, and transgression is im- 
puted only to those who are bad without com- 
pulsion, and not to such as urgent necessities 
•may render daring. The guilt of impiety be- 
longed more notoriously to such as insisted on 
the barter of temples for the bodies of the 
dead, than to those who are content to lose 
their just demands rather than submit to so 
base an exchange." They farther enjoined 
him in their name to declare, that " they would 
not evacuate Bceotia, since the ground which 
they occupied in it belonged to no Boeotians, 
but was now their own property, acquired by 



dint of arms. All they required, was a truce 
for fetching off their dead, according to the 
solemn institutions of their common country." 

The Boeotians replied thus: "If they are 
now in Boeotia, let them quit the ground which 
belongetlx to us, and carry off what they de- 
mand. But if they are upon ground of their 
own, they themselves know best what they 
have to do." They judged indeed that Oro- 
pia, on which it happened that the bodies of 
the dead were lying, as the battle had been 
fought upon the lines of partition, belonged to 
the Athenian jurisdiction, and yet that it was 
impossible for them to be carried off by force ; 
and truce farther they would grant none, 
where the point related to Athenian ground; 
that it v\'as therefore the most proper reply— 
" they should quit their territory, and so ob- 
tain their demands." The herald of the Athe- 
nians having heard this, departed without 
effect. 

Immediately after, the Boeotians having sent 
for darters and slingers from the Melian bay, 
and being reinforced by two thousand heavy- 
armed Corinthians, and the Peloponnesian 
garrison which had evacuated Nisaea, and a 
party of Megareans, all which had joined 
them since the battle, marched against Delium, 
and assaulted the fortification. They tried 
many methods, and took it at last by the help 
of a machine of a very peculiar structure. 
— Having split asunder a large sail-yard, they 
hollowed it throughout, and fixed it together 
again in a very exact manner, so as to resemble 
a pipe. At its extremity they fastened a cal- 
dron by help of chains, into which a snout of 
iron was bent downwards from the yard. The 
inside, farther, of this wooden machine was 
lined almost throughout with iron. They 
brought it from a distance to the fortification 
on carriages, and applied it where the work 
consisted chiefly of vines and timber. And 
when near enough, they put a large bellows to 
that extremity of the yard which was next 
themselves, and began to blow. But the blast, 
issuing along the bore into the caldron, which 
was filled with glowing coals and sulphur and 
pitch, kindled up a prodigious flame. This 
set fire to the work, and burnt, with so much 
fury, that not a soul durst any longer stay upon 
it, but to a man they abandoned it and fled 
away amain : and in this manner was the for- 
tress carried. Of the garrison, some were put 
to the sword, but two hundred were made 



YEAR VIII.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



167 



prisoners. The bulk of the remainder, throw- 
ing themselves on board their vessels, escaped 
in safety to Athens. 

It was the seventeenth day after the battle 
that Delium was taken. And not long after, 
a herald despatched by the Athenians came 
again, but quite ignorant of this event, to sue 
for the dead, which were now delivered by the 
BcEOtians, who no longer laid any stress upon 
their former reply. 

In the battle there perished of the Boeotians 
very little under five hundred ; of the Athe- 
nians, few less than a thousand, and Hippo- 
crates the general ; but of light armed and bag- 
gage-men a considerable number indeed.' 

Somewhat later in time than this battle, 
Demosthenes, who, on his appearance before 
Siph?e, had been disappointed in his hope of 
having it betrayed to him, having the land-force 
still on board his fleet, consisting of four hun- 
dred heavy armed Acarnanians, and Agrseans, 
and Athenians, made a descent on Sicyonia. 
But before all his vessels could land their men, 
the Sicyonians had marched down to make 
head against them. They defeated those that 
were landed, and chased them again on board. 
Some they killed, and some they took alive ; 
and after erecting their trophy, they delivered 
up the dead by truce. 

During the former transactions at Delium, 
Sitalces also king of the Odrysians was killed 



» The Athenians received in truth a terrible blow on 
this occasion. Tlie Boeotians, a people lieavy and stupid 
to a proverb, continued ever after the terror of tlie 
Athenians, tlie politest and most enliijlilened people 
upon earth. Nay, tliat gross and stu()id people had, 
this day, well nigh completed the destruction of all 
that was pre-eminently wise and good at this time upon 
earth; and done an irreparable mischef to sound reason 
and good sense for ever after. When the two troops of 
horse, after fetching a compass round the hill, had com- 
pleted the rout of the Athenians, who were now flying 
away with the utmost speed, t!ie divine Socrates was 
left almost alone, facing tl;e enemy, and fighting and 
retreating like a lion overpowered. Alcibiades, who 
served in the cavalry, was making off on horseback ; 
but, seeing Socrates in such imminent danger, he rode 
up to iiim, covered Isis retreat, and brouglit him off 
safe. He thus repaid him the grcpt obligation he had 
formerly received from him at PotidiKn. Straho relates 
further, (Geog. I. 9.) that Xenophon also the same day 
owed l.is life to Socrates. Having fallen from his horse, 
and being trampled anions tlie crowd, Socrates took 
him upon his slioulders, and carried him to a p'are of 
safety. Upon the whole, brutal strength and mere 
bodily merit were never so near getting a total conquest 
over all tlie light and understanding which Imman 
nature hath to boast of, that did not come directly down 
from heaven. 



in an expedition he had formed against tho 
Triballians, who encountered and vanquished 
him. And Seuthes the son of Sparodocus, 
his nephew by the brother, succeeded him in 
the kingdom of the Odrysians and the rest of 
Thrace over which he had reigned. 

The same winter, Brasidas, in conjunction 
with the allies of Thrace, marched against 
Amphipolis, an Athenian colony, upon the 
river Strymon. 

The spot of ground on which this city now 
standeth, Aristagoras the Milesian formerly, 
when he fled from king Darius, had endeavour- 
ed to plant, but was beat off by the Edonians. 
Two and thirty years after, the Athenians 
made the same attempt, having sent thither a 
colony consisting of ten thousand of their own 
people and such others as voluntarily came in, 
all of whom were destroyed by the Thracians 
at Drabescus. But after an interval of twenty- 
nine years, the Athenians came hither again 
with a fresh colony led by Agnon the son of 
Nicias, who having drove away the Edonians, 
built this city upon the spot of ground which 
had formerly been called the Nine Roads. They 
rushed to the seizure from Eion, a maritime 
emporium situated at the river's mouth, and 
belonging to them. Eion is distant twenty 
stadia^ from the spot where the city now 
standeth, and which by Agnon was named 
Amphipolis, because it is alm.ost surrounded 
by the Strymon which floweth along it on both 
sides. Running therefore a wall from the 
river to the river, he planted his colony on a 
spot conspicuous both to the land and to the sea. 

Against this place, Brasidas decamped from 
Arne of Chalcidica, advanced with his army. 
About sunset he arrived at Aulon and Bro- 
miscus, where the lake Bolbe issueth into the 
sea. From hence, after taking the evening re- 
past, he continued his march by night. It 
was winter, and a snovtr was falling. This 
favoured and encouraged his enterprise, as he 
intended to surprise the people of Amphipolis, 
except such as were privy to his design. For 
there resided in the place a body of Argyl- 
lians, who are an Andrian colony, and others 
who acted in combination with him, some of 
them at the instigation of Perdiccas, and others 
at that of the Chalcideans : but in a more par- 
ticular manner the Argyllians, who had a place 
of residence very near it,, who farther had ever 

9 About two English miles. 



168 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book TV. 



been suspected by the Athenians. And were 
really intent on the ruin of the place when 
now a fair opportunity was within their reach, 
and Brasidas at hand (who long before had 
been tampering with these inhabitants of 
foreign mixture) in order to have the city be- 
trayed to him. The Argyllians at this junc- 
ture received him into their own city, and re- 
volting from the Athenians led his army for- 
wards that very night to the bridge laid over the 
Strymon. The city is seated at some distance 
from this pass ; and it was not then defended 
by a fort as it is now, but was only the station 
of a small party of guards. Brasidas therefore 
easily forced the guard, being favoured in some 
degree by treachery, not a little also by the sea- 
son and his own unexpected approach. He 
then passed the bridge, and was immediately 
master of all the effects of those Amphipolitans 
who reside in all the tract without the walls. 
This passage was so sudden, that those within 
the city had no notice of it ; and as to those 
without, many of them being seized, and 
others flying for preservation within the wall, 
the Amphipolitans were thrown into vast con- 
fusion, increased by their mutual suspicions of 
one another. And it is said, that if Brasidas, 
instead of permitting his troops to disperse for 
plunder, had advanced directly against the city, 
it must unavoidably have fallen into his hands. 
But he, on the contrary, having ordered them 
to halt, employed himself in the ravage of what 
lay without ; and, finding nothing effectuated 
in his favour by accomplices within, he for the 
present desisted. But those his accomplices 
were overpowered in number by the opposite 
party, who prevented their opening the gates 
immediately to Brasidas ; and, acting in con- 
cert with Eucles their commandant, who re- 
sided there by the orders of the Athenians to 
guard the place, they despatch a messenger to 
the other commander in Thrace, Thucydides 
the son of Olorus, who compiled this history, 
and was then in Thasus, (Thasus is an island, 
a colony of the Parians, and distant about half 
a day's sail from Amphipolis,) pressing him to 
come instantly to their relief. 

ThucidideS no sooner received this notice, 
than with the utmost expedition he put to sea, 
with seven ships that happened to be at hand. 
He designed nothing so much as to prevent if 
possible the loss of Am})hipolis; or, if that 
was impracticable, to throw himself into Eion, 
and secure it in time. 



Brasidas, in the meanwhile, fearing at the ap- 
proach of this succour from Thasus, inform' 
ed besides that Thucydides drew an ample re- 
venue from the working of his gold-mines in this 
quarter of Thrace, and was on this account of 
great credit amongst the principal persons of 
this part of the continent, tried all possible ex- 
pedients to get possession of the city before his 
arrival, lest his appearance amongst them 
might animate the Amphipolitans with the 
hope of succour by sea and from Thrace, 
which the credit of Thucydides might easily 
obtain for their effectual preservation, and in 
pursuance of this they might refuse to capitu- 
late. He sent them therefore very moderate 
terms, ordering his herald to proclaim that " the 
Amphipolitans and Athenians within the city 
should, if they desired it, be continued in the 
free possession of their property, and of all 
their rights and liberties whatever : but those 
who refused to stay, should have the space of 
five days allowed them to quit the town and 
remove their effects." 

This proposal was no sooner heard, than the 
inclinations of the many took a new turn. The 
Athenian interest had but a few supporters in 
the city : the bulk of the inhabitants were 
a mixture of foreign nations. There were also 
within many persons, relations of those who 
had been made prisoners without. And thus, 
in their present consternation, the proposal was 
generally received as mild and gentle. The 
Athenians for their part, who thought them- 
selves more exposed to danger than the rest, 
and had besides no hope of speedy relief, 
were delighted with the offer of quitting 
the place. So also were all the rest, that they 
were not to lose their rights and liberties as 
citizens, and should thus escape the danger 
they had dreaded, even beyond their hopes. 
Upon this, the agents of Brasidas expatiated 
only on the mildness and generosity of the 
terms he had offered, because now they per- 
ceived that the multitude hod altered their 
sentiments, and would no longer hearken to 
the Athenian commandant. In short, an ac- 
commodation was perfected, and they opened 
the gates to Brasidas, upon the conditions he 
had proposed by his herald. And in this man- 
ner did the inhabitants deliver up Amphipolis. 

But in the evening of the same daj^, Thucy- 
dides and the squadron came over to Eion. 
Brasidas was already in possession of Am- 
phipolis, and designed that very night to seize 



YEAR VIII.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



169 



Eion also. And unless this squadron had 
come in thus critically to its defence, at break 
of day it had been lost. 

Thucydides instantly took care to put Eion 
in a posture of defence, in case Brasidas should 
attack it ; and to provide farther for its future 
security, when he had opened a refuge there 
for such as were willing to remove thither 
from Amphipolis, according to the articles of 
the late surrender. 

But Brasidas on a sudden fell down the river 
with a large number of boats towards Eion, 
designing if possible to seize the point of land 
that juts out from the walls, which would have 
given him the command of the river's mouth. 
He endeavoured at the same time also to as- 
sault it by land, but was repulsed in both at- 
tempts. And now he eftectually employed his 
care in resettling and securing Amphipolis. 

Myrcinus also, a city of Edonia, revolted to 
him upon the death of Pittacus king of the 
Edonians, who was killed by the sons of 
Goaxis and his own wife Braures. Gapselus 
soon after did the same, and Oesyme : they 
are colonies of the Thracians. These events 
were owing to the practices of Perdiccas, who 
came thither in person immediately after the 
surrender of Amphipolis. 

The loss of that city cast the Athenians into 
great consternation, and with reason, because 
it was a place of great importance to them, 
since from thence they had materials for build- 
ing ships, and a pecuniary revenue ; and far- 
ther, because, after a safe-conduct through 
Thessaly, the route was now open to the 
Lacedaemonians as far as the Strymon, to annoy 
their dependents. Yet, had they not possessed 
themselves of the bridge, the large lake formed 
above the river, and the check given by the 
triremes stationed at Eion, would have hin- 
dered the Lacedaemonians from penetrating 
further. But all obstacles appeared to the 
Athenians now quite easy to be surmounted ; 
and their apprehensions that their dependents 
would revolt, alarmed them much. For Bra- 
sidas in the rest of his conduct gave constant 
proofs of an excellent temper ; and the declara- 
tion was ever in his mouth, that " he had been 
sent thither to restore the liberty of Greece." 
Accordingly the cities which were subject to 
the Athenians had no sooner heard of the sur- 
render of* Amphipolis, together with the brave 
exploits and the mild engaging deportment of 
Brasidas, than they conceived the most ardent 
29 



inclination to shake off the yoke. They 
secretly despatched their agents to him, ear- 
nestly desiring a visit from him, with respective 
assurances from each, that they would be the 
first to revolt. They judged, there was no 
longer room to apprehend any bad consequen- 
ces from such a step ; falsely estimating the 
Athenian power to be much less considerable 
than it afterwards appeared. But this their 
judgment was founded more upon uncertain 
presumption than deliberate prudence. It is 
the turn of mankind, when their passions are 
warm, to give themselves up to blind and 
sanguine hope, and to throw aside with des- 
potic scorn whatever seemeth to be counter to 
their wishes. It was but lately that the Athe- 
nians had been vanquished by the Boeotians ; 
and Brasidas had been making such recitals as 
might persuade, though in fact they were col- 
lusive, that at Nissea with his single force he 
offered battle to the Athenians and they de- 
clined it. This made them confident, and they 
became perfectly convinced, that there was no 
longer a strength sufficient to chastise them. 
But what had the greatest influence on their 
thoughts, and disposed them entirely to run all 
hazards, was the immediate pleasure they 
promised themselves in a change, and that now 
they were going for the first time to experience 
the sweets of Lacedaemonian friendship. 

These inclinations were perceived by the 
Athenians, who sent garrisons into each of 
these cities in order to curb them, with as much 
expedition as the shortness of time and the 
wintry season would permit. 

Brasidas also had sent to Lacedsemon, soli- 
citing a speedy reinforcement, and was busy 
himself in providing materials to build triremes 
in the Strymon. But the Lacedeemonians ne- 
glected to supply him, partly through the envy 
which the leading men at Sparta had conceived 
against him, and partly because their attention 
was principally confined to the recovery of their 
people made prisoners in Sphacteria, and to 
bring the war to a conclusion. 

The same winter the Megareans having 
recovered their long walls, which were in the 
possession of the Athenians, leveled them with 
the ground. 

Brasidas thus master of Amphipolis gather- 
ed together the allies, and leadeth them into 
the district called Acte. It is the tract which 
stretcheth out into the sea from the canal 
which was dug by Xerxes, and Athos the 



170 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book rv 



highest mount in Acte is its utmost verge upon 
the ^^gean sea. The cities in it are, Sane, a 
colony of Andrians, seated close to the canal 
and on that part which faceth the sea towards 
Eubcea ; Thyssus farther, and Cleone, and 
Acrothous, and Olophyxus, and Dium, which 
are promiscuously inhabited by various sets of 
Barbarians, who speak both languages. There 
is also a small number of Chalcideans amongst 
them, but the bulk are Pelasgians (the issue of 
those Tyrrhenes who formerly inhabited Lem- 
nos and Athens), and Bisaltians, and Cresto- 
nians, and Edonians : they reside in small 
fortresses. Most of them went over to Bra- 
sidas ; but Sane and Dium stood out. He 
therefore made his army halt on their lands, 
and laid them waste. Yet as this had no effect, 
he marched from thence to Torone of Chalci- 
dica, then possessed by the Athenians. He 
hastened thither at the invitation of a small 
party, who were ready to betray the city to 
him. Being arrived whilst yet it was dark, he 
sat down about break of day with his army 
near the temple of Dioscuri, which lieth not at 
most above three stadia from the city.^ The 
bulk of the Toroneans and the Athenian gar- 
rison were ignorant of his approach : but the 
accomplices, who knew he would be punctual^ 
sent some of their body unperceived to observe 
his approach. When these were thus certainly 
assured he was at hand, they conducted back 
with them to their friends seven men armed 
only with daggers. Twenty had at first been 
selected for this service, but only seven of 
them now had the courage to proceed : Lysis- 
tratus the Olynthian was the person who com- 
manded. They got in by the wall towards the 
sea without causing an alarm, and ascending 
from thence slaughtered the guard in the cita- 
del, which is seated upon the most eminent 
spot, the whole city being built on the declivity 
of a hill, and burst open the postern towards 
Canastraeum. Brasidas, having since advanced 
a little with the rest of his force halted again. 
But he ordereth a hundred targeteers to go 
before, that, when the gates should be opened, 
and the signal given which was before agreed 
on, they might break in first. These after an 
interval of time wondered at the delay, and by 
gradually advancing were got close to the city. 
Such of the Toroneans within as acted in 
concert with those who had entered, when once 



» Above a quarter of a mile. 



the postern was burst, and the gates leading to 
the forum were thrown open after bursting the 
bar, in the first place conducting some of them 
about, led them in at the postern, that they 
might strike a sudden panic on the ignorant 
inhabitants when attacked in rear and in flank 
and on all sides. This done, they lifted up the 
appointed signal of fire, and gave instant ad- 
mittance to the rest of the targeteers through 
the gates which led to the forum. 

Brasidas, when once he saw the signal, 
roused up his army and led them running to- 
wards the place, shouting all at once aloud, and 
thus striking the greatest consternation into the 
inhabitants. Some immediately rushed in at 
the gates ; others mounted over the square 
wooden machines, which, as the w^all had lately 
fallen down and was now rebuilding, lay close 
to it for the raising of stones. Brasidas, with 
the bulk of his force betook himself immedi- 
ately to the upper parts of the city ; intending 
to seize the eminence, and possess himself 
effectually of the place. The rest dispersed 
themselves equally through every quarter. 

Amidst this surprisal, the majority of the 
Toroneans, quite ignorant of the plot, were in 
vast confusion. But the agents in it and all 
their party quickly ranged with the assailants. 
The Athenians, (for of them there were about 
fifty heavy-armed asleep in the forum,) when 
they found what was done, some few excepted 
who were slain instantly on the spot, fled away 
for preservation ; and some by land, others in 
the guard ships stationed there, got safe into 
Lecythus, a fort of their own. They kept 
this in their own hands, as it was the extremity 
of the city towards the sea stretched along on 
a narrow isthmus. Hither also those of the 
Toroneans who persevered in their fidelity, fled 
to them for refuge. 

It being now broad day, and the city firmly 
secured, Brasidas caused proclamation to be 
made to those Toroneans who had fled for 
refuge to the Athenians, that " such as were 
willing might return to their old habitations, 
and should enjoy their rights without any mo- 
lestation." But to the Athenians a herald 
was sent expressly, commanding them "to 
evacuate Lecythus which rightly belonged 
to the Chalcideans, and a truce should be 
granted them to remove themselves and their 
baggage." An evacuation they absolutely re- 
fused, but requested one day's truce to fetch oflT 
their dead : he solemnly accorded two. Dur- 



YEAR IX.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



171 



ing this space he was very busy in strengthen- 
ing the houses adjacent to Lecythus, and the 
Athenians did the same within. 

He also convened the Toroneans to a general 
assembly, and harangued them very nearly in the 
same manner as he had done at Acanthus, — 
" that it was unjust to look upon those who 
had been his coadjutors in the surprisal of the 
city, as men worse than their neighbours, or 
as traitors ; they had no enslaving views, nor 
were biassed to such conduct by pecuniary per- 
suasions ; the welfare and liberty of the city 
had been their only object. Neither should 
they who had no share in the event, be more 
abridged than those who had. He was not 
come thither to destroy the city, or so much as 
one private inhabitant of it. For this very 
reason he had caused the proclamation to be 
made to those who had sheltered themselves 
amongst the Athenians, because such an at- 
tachment had not in the least impaired them in 
his esteem, since it was entirely owing to their 
ignorance that they had thus undervalued the 
Lacedaemonians, whose actions, as they were 
always more just, would for the future entitle 
them much more to their benevolence ; their 
terror hitherto had been merely the result of 
inexperience." He then exhorted them in 
general " to take care for the future to be 
steady and firm allies, since, should they hence- 
forth oiTend, they would be made answerable 
for the guilt. They were not chargeable for 
the past, as they had rather been sufferers 
themselves from superior force ; the preceding 
opposition therefore deserved forgiveness." 

Having spoken thus, and revived their spi- 
rits, when the truce was expired he made 
assaults upon Lecythus. The Athenians de- 
fended themselves from a paltry rampart and 
the battlements of the houses. One whole 
day they effectually repulsed them. But on 
the following, when a machine was to be 
planted against them by the enemy, from 
whence they intended to throw fire upon their 
wooden fences, and the army was now ap- 
proaching to the spot which seemed convenient 
for lodging their machine, and whence it might 
be played off with effect ; they raised for pre- 
vention a wooden turret, the base of which 
was an edifice that lay ready at hand, and car- 
ried up many buckets and tubs of water and 
heavy stones ; and upon it also many defen- 
dants were mounted. But the edifice, too 
heavily laden, on a sudden was crushed by the 



weight. The crash with which it fell was 
great: and those of the Athenians who stood 
near and saw it, were rather concerned than ter- 
rified. But those at a distance, and especially 
such as were most remote, imagining the place 
was already taken in that quarter, fled amain to 
the sea and to their vessels. 

When Brasidas perceived they were quitting 
the battlements and had himself beheld the 
accident, he led his army to the assault, and 
immediately carried the fortress. Such as were 
found within it were instantly destroyed. And 
the Athenians in boats and ships, after having 
thus abandoned it to the enemy, crossed over 
to the Pallene. 

But Brasidas, (for in Lecythus there is a 
temple of Minerva; and before he proceeded 
to the assault he had publicly proclaimed, that 
a reward of thirty minae^ of silver should be 
given the m.an who first mounted the rampart,) 
concluding now that it was taken less by hu- 
man than some other means, reposited the 
thirty minae in the temple, as an offering to 
the goddess. And having demolished Lecy- 
thus and cleared all away, he consecrated the 
whole spot as sacred to her. During the re- 
mainder of the winter, he provided for the 
security of the places already in his possession, 
and was planning future conquests. And with 
the end of this winter the eighth year of the 
war expired. 

TEAK ix.^ 

Very earl)'^ in the spring of the ensuing sum- 
mer, the Athenians and Lacedaemonians made 
a truce to continue for a year. The motives 
on the Athenian side were these — that " Bra- 
sidas might no longer seduce any of their towns 
to revolt, before they were enabled by this in- 
terval of leisure to act against him ; and be- 
sides, that if they reaped any advantage from 
this truce, they might proceed to a farther 
accommodation." On the Lacedaemonian side 
it was imagined that <' the Athenians were 
under such terrors, as in fact they were, and, 
after a remission of calamities and misfortunes, 
would more eagerly come into some expedients 
for a future reconciliation ; of course, would 
deliver up to them their citizens, and come into 
a truce for a larger term." The recovery of 
these Spartans was a point on which they laid 



» 96Z. los. sterlins 



a Before Christ 433. 



172 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book IV. 



a greater stress than ever, even during the 
career of success which attended Brasidas. 
They foresaw, that in case he extended his 
conquests, and even brought them to a balance 
witli their foes, of those they must for ever be 
deprived, and the conflict then proceeding upon 
equal advantages, the dangers also would be 
equal, and the victory still in suspense. 

Upon these motives, both parties and their 
allies agreed to a truce of the following tenor : 

" As to the temple and oracle of the Py- 
thian Apollo, it seeraeth good unto us, that 
access be granted to all who desire it, without 
fraud and without fear, according to the laws 
of our country. The same is approved of by 
the Lacedaemonians and their allies now pre- 
sent; and they promise to send heralds on 
purpose, and to spare no pains to procure the 
consent of the Boeotians and Phocians. 

" As to the treasure belonging to the god, 
care shall be taken by us to find out those who 
have presumed to embezzle it ; and this fairly 
and honestly, according to the laws of our 
country, both by you, and by us, and by all 
others who are willing ; all proceeding respec- 
tively according to the laws of their several 
constitutions. 

" It hath farther seemed good to the Lace- 
daemonians and their other allies, if the Athe- 
nians agree to the truce, that both parties 
shall keep within their own bounds, and hold 
what we are at present respectively possessed 
of; that is to say, the former to keep in Co- 
ryphasium,' within the mountains of Bouphras 
and Tomeus ; the latter in Cythera ; without 
enlarging the communication for the procuring 
of alliance, neither on our side against you, 
nor on your side against us. That those in 
Nissea and Minoa pass not beyond the road 
that leads from the gates of Megara, adjacent 
to the temple of Nisus, towards the temple of 
Neptune, and from the temple of Neptune 
carrieth directly to the bridge laid across to 
Minoa. That neither the Megareans nor their 
allies pass beyond the same road, nor into the 
island which the Athenians have taken ; both 
keeping within their bounds, and upon no oc- 
casion whatever to have any intercourse with 
one another ; the Megareans still to retain 
what they possess in Trcezen, and whatever 
they hold by compact with the Athenians ; to 



1 In which stood the fort of Pyius. 



have farther the free use of the sea upon their 
own coasts, and those of their alliance. 

" That the Lacedaemonians and allies shall 
not navigate the sea in a long ship,^ but in any 
other vessel rowed with oars, and of no larger 
burden than five hundred talents.^ 

" That by virtue of this truce, safe-conduct 
be granted both of passage and re-passage, 
either by land or sea, either to Peloponnesus 
or to Athens, to all heralds and ambassadors, 
and their whole retinue how numerous soever, 
commissioned to negotiate the determination 
of the war, or to get controverted points ad- 
judged. 

" That so long as this truce be in force no 
deserters be entertained, neither by you, nor 
by us, whether they be freemen or slaves. 

" You shall do justice in our causes, and we 
shall do the same for you, according to the 
laws of our respective constitutions, to the end 
that all controversies may be judicially settled 
without a war. 

" These articles have the approbation of the 
Lacedaemonians and their allies. But, if any 
thing more honourable or more just occurs to 
you, you are to repair to Laceda>mon, and pro- 
pose it there. For whatever points you may 
demonstrate to be just, will in no degree what- 
ever be rejected, neither by the Lacedaemonians 
nor by their allies; provided the persons 
charged with these new commissions be sent 
with full powers to put to them the finishing 
hand, in the same manner as you require the 
same conditions from us. 

" This truce shall be in force for a year." 
Ratified by the people. 

The Acamantine tribe presided. Phanippus 
was the notary public. Niciades was in the 
chair. Laches pronounced — " Be it for the 
welfare and prosperity of the Athenians, that 
a suspension of arms is granted upon the terms 
offered by the Lacedaemonians and allies." 

Agreed in the public assembly of the people, 

" That this suspension shall continue for a 
year. 

" That it shall take place this very day, being 
the fourteenth day of the month Elaphebolion. 

" That during this interval, ambassadors and 
heralds shall pass between them, to adjust the 
terms upon which the war <ihould be definitive- 
ly concluded. 

a A ship of war. » Fiv« and twenty tons. 



YEAR IX.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



173 



« That the generals of the state and the 
presidents in course shall first at Athens con- 
vene an assembly of the people, to adjust the 
terras upon which their embassy should be cm- 
powered to put an end to the war. And 

" That the ambassadors, who were now pre- 
sent in the assembly, shall give a solemn rati- 
fication that they will punctually abide by this 
truce for a year." 

The Lacedaemonians and their allies agreed 
to these articles, and pledged their oath for the 
observation of them to the Athenians and their 
allies at Lacedaemon, on the twelfth day of the 
month Gerastius. 

The persons who settled the articles and 
assisted at the sacrifice were, 

For the Lacedaemonians — Taurus the son of 
Echetimidas, Athenaeus the son of Periclidas, 
Philocharidas the son of Eryxidaidas. For 
the Corinthians — JEneas the son of Ocytus, 
Euphamidas the son of Aristonymus. For 
the Siconians — Damotimus the son of Nau- 
crates, Onasimus the son of Megacles. For 
the Megareans — Nicasus the son of Cecalus, 
Menecrates the son of Amphidorus. For the 
Epidaurians — Amphias the son of Eupaeidas. 
For the Athenians — Nicostratus the son of 
Diotrephes, Nicias the son of Niceratus, Au- 
tocles the son of Tolmaeus, generals of the 
state. 

In this manner was a suspension of arms 
concluded, during which they continued with- 
out interruption to hold conferences with one 
another, about settling the terms of a firm and 
lasting peace. 

During the interval these matters were thus 
in agitation, Scione a city in the Pellene re- 
volted from the Athenians to Brasidas. The 
Scioneans indeed in the Pellene give out that 
they are of Peloponnesus ; that their ancestors 
who settled in these other seats were driven 
there originally by a storm, which in their re- 
turn from Troy dispersed the Achaeans. When 
they had notified their revolt to him, Brasidas 
passed over to Scione by night. A party of 
his friends sailed before him in a trireme, and 
he followed at some distance in a fly-boat, to 
the end that, if he should fall in with any vessel 
larger than this boat, the trireme might make 
head against her ; but if another trireme of 
equal strength should come up to them, he 
judged she would neglect his smaller boat, and 
would attack the ship, which would give him 
time to complete his passage in security. 



When he was safe landed, and had convened 
an assembly of the Scioneans, he harangued 
them as he had done before at Acanthus and 
Torone. But he added farther, that " they 
were a people most deserving of applause, 
since, though the communication with the 
Pellene, as being an isthmus, was cut oiT by 
the Athenians who were masters of Potidsea, 
and they were by this means become islanders 
to all intents and purposes, yet they had, with- 
out prior solicitation, advanced boldly towards 
liberty, nor could bear to lie in cowardly in- 
activity till necessity forced them to such 
measures as tended to their manifest welfare. 
This was ample proof that they were ready to 
undergo any other the greatest perils, to obtain 
the wished for settlement of their state. He 
therefore regarded them, as in truth the most 
gallant friends of the Lacedaemonians, and 
would in all respects do proper honour to their 
worth." 

The Scionians were elevated by these hand- 
some commendations. All of them became 
full of spirits, not even those excepted to whom 
the prior steps had been by no means agree- 
able. They cheerfully determined to sustain 
all future war, and in every shape gave Bra- 
sidas honourable entertainment. By public 
vote they placed upon his head a golden crown 
as the deliverer of Greece, whilst every single 
Scionean was busy in adorning him with rib- 
bons, and caressing him like a victor in the 
solemn games. His stay at present was short; 
he only placed a small party in the town to 
secure it, and then re-passed to Torone. But 
soon after, he transported thither the greater 
part of his force, designing with the aid of the 
Scioneans to make attempts upon Mende and 
Potidaea. He concluded however that the 
Athenians would lose no time in throwing a 
succour as into an island, and so he endeavoured 
to be beforehand with them. 

He had already formed an intelligence to 
the prejudice of those cities, to get them be- 
trayed : and he was now intent on executing 
his schemes against them. But during this 
pause, Aristonymus, despatched by the Athe- 
nians, and Athenaeus by the Lacedaemonians, to 
circulate the news, arrived in a trireme, and 
notify to him the suspension of arms. His for- 
ces were then transported back to Torone. 

The persons employed communicated the 
articles of the truce to Brasidas, and all the 
Lacedaemonian confederates in Thrace declared 
U 



174 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book rv. 



their acquiescence in what had been done. 
Aristonymus was well satisfied in other res- 
pects, but finding, by computing the days, that 
the revolt of the Scioneans was too late in 
point of time, he protested against their being 
entitled to the benefit of the truce. Brasidas 
on the other hand urged many arguments to 
prove it prior in time, and refuseth to restore 
that city. When therefore Aristonymus had 
reported this afiair at Athens, the Athenians 
in an instant were ready to take up arms again 
for the reduction of Scione. But the Lacedae- 
monians, by an embassy purposely despatched, 
remonstrated that " they should regard such a 
proceeding as a breach of the truce," and assert- 
ed " their right to the city, as they reposed en- 
tire credit on Brasidas ; however, they were 
ready to refer the dispute to a fair arbitration." 
The others refused to abide by so hazardous a 
decision, but would recover it as soon as pos- 
sible by force of arms. They were irritated at 
the thought, that persons seated as it were upon 
an island should presume to revolt from them, 
and have such confidence in the unprotitable 
land power of the Lacedsemonians. There was 
farther more truth in the date of the revolt than 
at present the Athenians could evince : for, in 
fact, the Scioneans revolted two days too late. 
But at the instigation of Cleon they immedi- 
ately passed a decree, that " the Scioneans 
should be reduced by force, and then put to 
the sword." And their intention was recalled 
from all other points, to expedite the needful 
preparations for the execution of this. 

In the meantime, Mende, also a city in the 
Pellene, and a colony of the Eretrians, revolt- 
ed from them. Brasidas received them into 
his protection, thinking himself justified, as 
they had openly come over to him in the time 
of truce. Besides, he had himself some rea- 
sons to recriminate upon the Athenians, as 
violaters of the articles. Upon this account 
the Mendeans were more encouraged to the 
step, as they saw Brasidas was determined to 
support them ; and were convinced, by the 
affair of Scione, that he would not abandon 
them. The design farther had been originally 
set on foot by the few; who, though they de- 
layed it for a time, were resolved to push it in- 
to execution : for they apprehended that a 
discovery might prove fatal to themselves; and 
so forced the bulk of the people to act against 
their inclination. But the Athenians, who 
bad quick intelligonce of it, were now exas- 



perated much more than before, and redoubled 
their preparations against both those places. 

Brasidas, who soon expected the arrival of 
their armament, conveyed away the wives and 
children of the Scioneans and Mendeans to 
Olynthus of Chalcidica, and had them escorted 
thither by five hundred heavy-armed Pelopon- 
nesians and three hundred Chalcidic targe- 
tecrs : the commander of the whole escort 
was Polydamidas. Those left behind, expect- 
ing soon to be visited by the Athenians, united 
their endeavours to get things in good order for 
their reception. 

In the interval, Brasidas and Perdiccas 
marched together a second time into Lyncus 
against Arribaeus. They commaTided their se- 
parate bodies ; one, the forces of the Mace- 
donians subject to himself, and the heavy-armed 
Grecians who dwelled amongst them ; the 
other, the remainder of his own Peloponne- 
sians reinforced by Chacideans and Acan- 
thians, and quotas from other cities such as 
they were able to furnish. The number of 
heavy-armed Grecians computed together, 
amounted to about three thousand : the ca- 
valry that attended, both of Macedonians and 
Chalcideans, was upon the whole little less than 
a thousand, and the remaining crowd of Bar- 
barians was great. 

Breaking thus into the territory of Arribseus, 
and finding the Lyncestians already in the field 
to oppose them, they also sat down and faced 
them. The infantry on each side were posted 
on an eminence, and a plain lay between them. 
This yielding room for the excursions of the 
horse, the cavalry of both began a skirmish 
first. But then Brasidas and Perdiccas, so 
soon as the Lyncestian heavy-armed were mov- 
ing first from the eminence to the aid of their 
cavalry, and were ready to engage, marched 
also down into the plain to oppose them, where 
they charged and routed the Lyncestians. A 
large number of the latter were slain, the rest 
fled for preservation to the eminences, and there 
stood quiet. 

The victors after this, having erected a tro- 
phy, continued for two or three days in the 
same post, waiting for the lUyrians who were 
coming up to join Perdiccas for a stipulated pay. 
And then Perdiccas intended to advance farther 
against the villages of Arribaeus, and sit no 
longer inactive. Mende however was still up- 
permost in the care of Brasidas ; — that place 
must be lost, should the Athenians arrive be- 



YILVR IX.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



175 



fore it in the interval : — the Illyrians besides 
were not yet come up. He relished not the 
project, and was more inclined to go back. This 
engendered some disputes between them, in 
the midst of which the news was brought, that 
the Illyrians had deserted Perdiccas, and joined 
themselves with Arribseus. Upon which it 
was soon resolved between them to retire, as 
there was reason to dread the accession of men 
so renowned for military valour. Yet the dis- 
agreement between them prevented their fixing 
on any certain time for filing off". Night came 
on, in which the Macedonians and the crowd 
of Barbarians being struck with a sudden panic 
(as numerous armies are apt to be, without any 
certain cause,) and imagining that much larger 
numbers were coming against them than in fact 
was true, and that they were only not near 
enough to attack them, they instantly took to 
their heels and hurried homewards. Perdiccas 
for a time knew nothing of the matter, and 
when informed of it, was compelled by the fly- 
ing troops to dislodge in their company, with- 
out being able to get a sight of Brasidas. For 
they were encamped at a distance from each 
other. 

At the dawn of day, Brasidas perceived that 
the Macedonians had dislodged, and that the 
Illyrians and Arribseus were approaching to 
attack him. He therefore drew his forces to- 
gether, forming a square with his heavy-armed, 
in the centre of which he disposed all the crowd 
of light-armed ; and in this form he intended to 
retreat. He appointed the youngest men to 
sally out, in case the enemy anywhere attacked 
them : and he himself with a picked body of 
three hundred, determined to bring up the rear 
in person, in order to sustain and make good 
their retreat against the van of the enemy who 
should press upon their rear. And before the 
enemy came near, as well as the hurry would 
admit, he animated his soldiers thus : 

" Did I not suspect, ye men of Peloponnesus, 
that thus abandoned as you are, and ready to be 
attacked by Barbarians, and those numerous 
too, you were in some consternation, I should 
judge it needless to instruct or to encourage 
you. But now, against this desertion of our 
friends, and this multitude of our enemies, I 
shall endeavour by a short admonition and ex- 
hortation to raise within you the full grandeur 
of your souls. Upon you it is incumbent to 
behave with gallantry in every martial scene, 
upon the account, not merely of acting in the 



open field in the presence of so many confede 
rates, but of your own hereditary valour. Your 
souls ought not to be dismayed at a multitude 
of foes, since you were not born under govern- 
ments where the many control the few, but 
where the few command the many. And the 
only means, by which you acquired this noble 
privilege, was victorious perseverance in the 
fields of battle. Yet of these Barbarians, your 
fears of whom are the result of your ignorance, 
you ought to be informed, from what you have 
learned yourselves in former conflicts against 
them with the Macedonians, as well as from 
what I conjecture, and what I depend upon 
from the accounts of others, that in action 
they will be by no means terrible. For when 
a hostile force, though in reality weak, carrieth 
with it the appearance of strength, a true dis- 
covery of its state is no sooner obtained, than 
it redoubleth the courage of their opponents. 
But men in whom valour is firmly implanted, 
none can assault with extraordinary spirit but 
such as know them not. These enemies of 
yours are dreadful for a while, merely till 
brought to trial. Their multitude rendereth 
them terrible to the sight; the loudness of 
their shouts is insupportable to the ear. Theii 
weapons, brandished about and clashing in the 
air, have a frightful and menacing look. But 
their spirit will not answer their show, when 
charging against such as will sustain their shock. 
They are not drawn up with skill, nor will 
they blush when compelled to quit their ground. 
To fly from or to fly after an enemy is equally 
a matter of glory to them : by such things is 
their valour established and rescued from re- 
proach. For a battle where every combatant 
is his own commander, leaveth a specious and 
handsome opportunity to each of providing for 
his safety. They this moment judge it more 
safe to intimidate us at a distance than to run 
to the charge : for otherwise, before this they 
had attacked us. And you plainly see, thai, 
all the terror which now runs before them, 
will vanish at the onset, as terrible only to 
sight and hearing. When therefore they ad- 
vance to the charge, sustain it and repulse 
them ; and when opportunity serveth, fall back 
into your ranks again with regularity and order. 
You shall thus the sooner secure your retreat, 
and be convinced for the time to come, that 
such rabbles, to men who can stand the first 
fury of their onset, have only made, at a dis- 
tance and by their pausing, a vain and menacing 



176 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book rv. 



parade of valour ; but such as will give ground 
and fly before them, they pursue with eager- 
ness ; and are excellently brave when there is 
no resistance." 

After this exhortation, Brasidas caused his 
army to file leisurely off. The Barbarians per- 
ceiving it pressed forwards with great noise and 
clamour, supposing that he fled, and that they 
might intercept and cut him off. But when 
the appointed parties sallied out from all quar- 
ters to receive them, and Brasidas himself with 
his picked body sustained their charge, they 
repulsed them at their first assault, to the 
great surprise of the enemy. Afterwards, re- 
ceiving every repeated attack, they beat them 
off continually ; and then, during the intervals 
of pause, retreated in good order ; till at length, 
the bulk of the Barbarians discontinued their 
efforts in the plain against the Greeks under 
Brasidas, and leaving only a part of their body 
to follow and annoy them in their retreat, the 
rest wheeled speedily off to pursue the flying 
Macedonians, and such as they overtook they 
slaughtered. To the narrow pass farther be- 
tween two hills, which was the entrance into 
the territories of Arribseus, they hurried before 
in order to secure it, knowing it to be the only 
route by which Brasidas could retreat. He 
was now drawing near it, and in the most dif- 
ficult part of the passage they were spreading 
themselves circularly to encompass him on all 
sides. But Brasidas perceiving their design, 
ordered the three hundred that marched with 
him to advance full speed up that hill which 
he thought was most practicable, and possess 
themselves of it, and this with the utmost 
expedition, each as he was able without re- 
garding form, and endeavour to drive the Bar- 
barians thence, who were already posting them- 
selves upon it, before they were joined by 
larger numbers and could invest him on all 
sides. They did so, attacked, and made them- 
selves masters of the hill, which enabled the 
main body of the Grecians to march up with- 
out obstruction. For now the Barbarians 
were thrown into consternation, when their 
detachment had in this manner been beat off 
from the eminence. And here they discon- 
tinued the pursuit, imagining the enemy had 
already passed the frontier, and secured their 
retreat. 

Brasidas, when once he was master of the 
eminences, marched on without molestation ; 
and the very same day reached Arnissa, tho 



first place within the dominions of Perdiccaa. 
His soldiers indeed, who were exasperated 
against the Macedonians for having thus pre- 
cipitately abandoned them, whatever yokes of 
oxen they met with on their route, or what- 
ever baggage lay dropped upon the ground, (as 
such things it was likely should happen in a 
retreat by night and confused by fear,) the 
former they unyoked and cut to pieces, and 
secreted the latter as lawful plunder. Here, 
Perdiccas first began to regard Brasidas as his 
enemy, and ever after forced himself against 
his inclinations to hate the Peloponnesians ; 
not indeed in his judgment preferring the Athe- 
nians, but prevailed upon by the exigencies of 
his own affairs, he cast about for the means of 
being again reconciled to the latter, and disen- 
tangling himself from the former. 

Brasidas, having retreated through Mace- 
donia to Torone, findeth the Athenians already 
in possession of Mende. Judging it impossible 
now to pass over into the Pallene and drive 
out the enemy, he chose to remain there and 
securely to garrison Torone. For, during the 
time of the expedition into Lyncus, the 
Athenians had put to sea against Mende 
and Scione with the armament they had pro- 
vided, consisting of fifty ships, ten of which 
were Chian, of a thousand heavy-armed of 
their own citizens, six hundred archers, a thou- 
sand mercenary Thracians, and a body of tar- 
geteers furnished by their adjacent dependents : 
Nicias the son of Niceratus, and Nicostratus 
the son of Diotrephes had the command of 
the whole. They weighed from Potidaea, and 
landing at the temple of Neptune, marched di- 
rectly for Mende. The Mendcans, with their 
own force and three hundred Scioneans who 
were come to their succour, and the Pelopon- 
nesian auxiliaries, in all seven hundred heavy- 
armed under the command of Polydamidas, 
were encamped without the city upon a strong 
eminence. Nicias taking with him a hundred 
and twenty light-armed Methoneans, and sixty 
picked men of the heavy-armed Athenians, 
and all the archers, attempted to mount by a 
path that led up the eminence ; but, being 
galled by the enemy, was not able to force the 
ascent. Nicostratus, with all the rest of the 
force, having fetched a compass about, in order 
to mount in a remote quarter, where the ascent 
was impracticable, was quite thrown into disor- 
der : and thus the whole Athenian army nar- 
rowly escaped a total defeat. As therefore 



YEAR IX.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



177 



the Mendeans and allies maintained their post 
the whole day, the Athenians drew off" and 
encamped. And, when night came on, the 
Mendeans withdrew into the city. 

The next day, the Athenians sailing round 
to the Scione side possessed themselves of the 
suburbs, and spent the whole day in ravaging 
the country, as not a soul sallied out to 
obstruct them : for some bustles now were on 
foot in the city inclining to a sedition. The 
three hundred Scioneans departed also in the 
succeeding night to their own home: and 
the day following, Nicias advancing with a 
moiety of the force within their frontier, ravag- 
ed the district of the Scioneans ; whilst Nicos- 
tratus, with the remainder, sat down before the 
upper gates of Mende, from whence the road 
leadeth to Potidsea. But Polydamidas, as the 
Mendeans and the auxiliaries had chanced to 
ground their arms in this quarter within the 
wall, drew them up in order of battle, and 
exhorted the Mendeans to sally out. It was 
replied in a seditious manner by one of the 
popular faction, that " they would not sally, 
and would have nothing to do with the war." 
At such a refusal Polydamidas having laid 
hands up>on the person, a tumult at once ensued, 
in which the people ran immediately to arms, 
and, furious with anger, made towards the 
Peloponnesians, and all those of the opposite 
faction who sided with them. They fell upon 
and routed them in an instant, terrified as they 
were at this sudden assault ; and the gates 
were thrown open at the same time to the 
Athenians. They supposed this insurrection 
had been made against them in consequence of 
some previous combination ; and as many as 
escaped out of the scuflle with life, fled away 
to the citadel, which was before in their pos- 
session. 

But the Athenians (for Nicias was now 
returned before the city) bursting into Mende, 
for it was not opened by composition, with 
their whole united force, plundered it as though 
taken by storm ; nay, the generals had some 
difficulty to restrain their soldiers from putting 
the inhabitants to the sword. And after this 
they issued their commands to the Mendeans 
to continue their government in the usual form, 
and to proceed judicially against those of their 
body whom they esteemed the principal authors 
of the revolt. Those in the citadel they shut 
up with a wall extending on both sides to 
30 



the sea, and posted a guard to secure the block 
ade. 

When in this manner they had possessed 
themselves of Mende, they marched against 
Scione. The inhabitants, with the Pelopon- 
nesian aids, coming out to receive them, posted 
themselves on a strong eminence before the 
city ; which, unless the enemy could take it, 
would infallibly prevent their walling them 
about. But the Athenians stormed the post, 
and after an engagement forcing them to dis- 
lodge, they formed their camp, and having 
erected a trophy, got every thing in readiness 
for the circumvallation. And no long time 
after, whilst they were busied in this work, the 
auxiliaries blocked up in the citadel at Mende, 
having forced the guard posted near the sea, 
get away by night ; and the major part of them, 
escaping privily through the Athenian camp 
before Scione, got safe into that town. 

When the circumvallation of Scione was in 
hand, Perdiccas, having despatched a herald 
for the purpose to the Athenian generals, 
strikes up a new treaty with the Athenians. 
He took this step out of pure enmity to Brasi- 
das, arising from the retreat out of Lyncus ; 
and had begun from that time to act in their 
favour. For it happened, that at this very 
juncture of time Ischagoras the Lacedsemon- 
ian was bringing up by land a reinforcement to 
Brasidas. But Perdiccas, as well to oblige 
Nicias, who, as he had renewed his alliance, 
commanded him to give some conspicuous 
proof of his attachment to the Athenians, as 
to gratify his own resentment in refusing 
the Peloponnesians a passage through his do- 
minions, had gained the concurrence of his 
Thessalian friends, since with the chief per- 
sons of that country he had ever been closely 
united by the hospitable ties, and so stopped 
the reinforcement and their convoy that they 
durst not attempt to pass through Thessaly. 
Ischagoras, however, and Aminias and Aris- 
teus, reach Brasidas in person, being commis- 
sioned by the Lacedaemonians to inspect the 
posture of their affairs, and brought with them 
some young men of Sparta, though contrary to 
their laws, who were to take upon them the 
government of the cities which were no longer 
to be trusted to their former managers. In 
effect, Clearidas the son of Cleonymus they 
place as governor in Amphipolis, and Epitelidas 
tlie son of Hegesander in Torone. 



178 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book rv. 



This same summer, the Thebans demolished 
the walls of the Thespiensians, alleging as 
the reason, that they were practising with the 
Athenians. This demolition had ever been 
intended, but its execution was now become 
more easy, as the flower of their youth had 
perished in the late battle fought against the 
Athenians. 

This summer also, the temple of Juno at 
Argos was destroyed by fire. Chrysis the 
priestess had placed a burning torch too near 
the garlands, and unawares fell fast asleep. 
The flames broke out and were raging all 
around before they were perceived. Chrysis 
indeed instantly, for fear of the Argivcs, flies 
away by night to Phlius. They, according to 
the law enacted for that purpose, appointed 
another priestess in her room, whose name was 
Phaeinis. Eight years of this war were elapsed, 
and it was the middle of the ninth when 
Chrysis fled. 

The circumvallation of Scione also was com- 
pleted about the close of this summer ; and 
the Athenians, leaving behind a sufiicient body 
to guard it, drew off the rest of their army. 

In the ensuing winter, things were quiet 
Detween the Athenians and Lacedaemonians, 
because of the suspension of arms. But the 
Mantineans, and Tegeatae, and the confederates 
on both sides, engaged at Laodicea of Orestis : 
but the victory was doubtful. Each party 



routed a wing of their opponents, and both 
sides erected trophies, and sent the spoils to 
Delphi. Many however were slain on both 
sides, and the battle was drawn, the night put- 
ting an end to the contest. The Tegeatse in- 
deed passed the night upon the field, and 
immediately erected a trophy. But the Man- 
tineans withdrew to Bucolion, and afterwards 
erected their trophy in opposition. 

In the close of this winter, and when the 
spring was already approaching, Brasidas farther 
made an attempt upon Potidaea. For having 
approached it in the night, and applied his 
ladders, so far he proceeded without causing an 
alarm. For the bell being passed by, during 
that interval, before he that carried it forwards 
could return, the moment was seized for apply- 
ing them.' However, the alarm was taken 
before he could possibly scale, upon which he 
drew off his army without loss of time, not 
caring to wait for the return of day. And thus 
ended the winter ; and with it the ninth year 
of this war, of which Thucydides hath compiled 
the history. 

»The officers regularly went their rounds to see that 
all the sentinels were at their posts. When they 
approached any of them, a little bell was rung, to 
which the sentinel was to answer, in proof that he 
was at his post and awake. The interval between the 
rounds was so considerable, and the vigilance of the 
sentinel, as the bell was just gone by, might be so relax, 
ed, that Brasidas hoped he might execute his scheme. 



THE 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



BOOK V. 



Tear X. The truce endeth. Cleon sent commander into Thrace ; his proceedings there. The battle of Am- 
phipolis, in which Brasidas and Cieon are killed. A general peace, styled the Nician. An alliance, offensive 
and defensiv€, between the Athenians and Lacedaemonians. — XI. The peace merely nominal ; and Thucydides 
proceedeth in his history of the Peloponnesian war. The Corinthians practise against the Lacedaemonians. 
An Argive league. No confidence between the principal states. A train of negotiations. A separate alliance 
between the Lacedjemonians and Bcbotians, contrary to article. Panactum demolished. — XIL The demolition 
of Panactum and the separate alliance highly resented at Athens. Many are scheming a rupture, but especially 
Alcibiades. By his means a negotiation is brought on at Athens, and an alliance formed with the Argives. 
The Lacedaemonians forbidden to assist at the Olympic games. — XIIL War between the Argives and Epidau- 
rians. The Lacedaemonians throw a garrison into Epidaurus; and the Athenians replace the Helots and 
Messenians in Pylus. — XIV. The Lacedaemonians take the field against the Argives. Two large armies face 
one another within sight of Argos, yet part without engaging. The Lacedaemonians take the field a second 
time. The battle of Mantinea. The Argives enter into league with the Lacedaemonians. — XV. Fresh stirs at 
Argos in favour of the Athenians. — XVI. Expedition of the Athenians against the isle of Melos. The con- 
ference in form, by way of dialogue. The Athenians become masters of that island. 



YEAR X.' 

Isr the following summer, the truce, made for a 
year, expired, of course, at the time of the 
Pythian Games. And, during this relaxation 
from war, the Athenians caused the Delians 
to evacuate the isle of Delos ; imagining that, 
upon the taint of some crimes long since com- 
mitted, they were not sufficiently pure to per- 
form due service to the god, and that this yet 
was wanting to render that work of purgation 
complete, in which, as I have already related, 
they thought themselves justified in demolish- 
ing the sepulchres of the dead. The Delians 
settled again, so fast as they could remove 
themselves thither, at Atramyttium, bestowed 
upon them for this purpose by Pharnaces. 
Cleon,^ having obtained the commission 



» Before Christ 422. 

« Cleon is now grown perfectly convinced that he is 
a very hero, and hath prevailed upon a majority of the 
people of Athens to be of the same mind, since, serious- 
ly and deliberately, they intrust him with a most impor- 
tant and delicate commission. He now imagines he ran 
carry all before him, and pluck all the laurels of Brasi- 



from the Athenians, went by sea into the 
Thracian dominions, so soon as the suspension 
of arms expired, having under his command 
twelve hundred heavy-armed Athenians, three 

das from the head of that accomplished Spartan, even 
without having Demosthenes for his second. We may 
guess to what a height of insolence he was now grown, 
from the Knights of Aristophanes. And, to set it in the 
most ludicrous view, tiie poet opens his play with Ni- 
cias and Demosthenes, whom he paints in a very inju- 
rious manner; and, no doubt, it must have been very 
grating to them, to see themselves represented in so low 
buffoonery upon the stage of Athens. " Demosthenes 
begins with a shower of curses on that execrable Paph- 
lagonian, Cleon ; Nicias seconds him ; then both of them 
howl together in a most lamentable duetto. They next 
lay their heads together about some means of redress. 
Demosthenes proposeth getting out of their master 
Cleon's reach. 'Let us go, then,' says Nicias. 'Ay; let 
us go,' cries Demosthenes. ' Say more,' says Nicias, 'let 
us go over to the enemy.' ' Ay ; over to the enemy,' 
adds the other. ' But first,' says Nicias, ' let us go and 
prostrate ourselves before the images of the gods.' 
'What images?' says Demosthenes ; 'dost thou think 
then there are any gods?' 'I do.' 'Upon what grounds?' 
' Because I am undeservedly the object of their hatred.' 
— Such are the daring misrepresentations Aristophanes 
makes of characters that by no means deserve it ! De- 
most lienes afterwards describes the arrogance of Cloon 

179 



180 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book v. 



hundred horsemen, and larger numbers of their 
allied forces. His whole armament consisted 
of thirty sail. Touching first at Scione, yet 
blocked up, he drew from thence the heavy- 
armed, stationed there as guards ; and, stand- 
ing away entered the haven of the Colophoni- 
ans, lying at no great distance from Torone. 
Being here informed, by the deserters, that 
Brasidas was not in Torone, nor the inhabitants 
able to make head against him, he marched 
his forces by land towards that city, and sent 
ten of his ships about, to stand into the harbour. 
His first approach was to the new rampart, 
which Brasidas had thrown up quite round the 
city in order to inclose the suburbs within its 
cincture, and thus by the demolition of the old 
"Wall, had rendered it one entire city. When 
the Athenians came to the assault, Pasitelidas, 
the Lacedaemonian, who was commandant, 
and the garrison under his command, exerted 
themselves in its defence. But, when they 
could no longer maintain it, and at the same 
time the ships, sent around on purpose, had en- 
tered the harbour, Pasitelidas, fearing lest the 
ships might take the town now left defenceless, 
and, when the rampart was carried by the ene- 
my, he himself might be intercepted, abandons 
it immediately, and retired with all speed into 
the town : but the Athenians were already 
disembarked and masters of the place. The 
land-force also broke in instantly at his heels, 
by rushing along through the aperture in the 
old wall ; and some, as well Peloponnesians as 
Toroneans, they slew in the moment of irrup- 
tion. Some also they took alive, amongst 
whom was Pasitelidas the commandant. Bra- 
sidas was indeed coming up to its relief, but 
receiving intelligence on his march that it was 
taken he retired ; since he was forty stadia^ 
off, too great a distance to prevent the enemy. 

thus : " He hath one foot fixed in Pyhis, and the other 
in Ihe assembly of tlie people. When Jie moves, he 
struts and stretches at such a rale, that his bum is in 
Thrare, liis liands in iEtolia, and his attention nmonwst 
the trilics at home." — Niciaa then proposeth poisoiiin<; 
themeclvcs liy drinking hull's blood, like Themistoclcs; 
— "Or rather," says Demosthenes, "a dose of good 
wine." This is acreed upon, in order to cheer up their 
spirits, and enable them to confront Cleon,and play ofl' 
against him, the seller of black-puddings. Nicins ac- 
cordingly goes and steals the wine. — Yet. in spite of 
the mo?t outrngcouB ridicule, and the opposition of all 
wise and honost men at Athens, we see Cleon now at 
Ihe head of an army, to stop the rapid conquests of 
Hrasidas. 
I About four milca. 



But Cleon and the Athenians now erectet. 
two trophies ; one upon the harbour, the other 
at the rampart. They farther doomed to 
slavery, the wives and children of the Torone- 
ans. The male inhabitants, together with the 
Peloponnesians and every Chalcidean that was 
found amongst them, amounting in all to sev- 
en hundred, they sent away captives to Athens. 
The Peloponnesians indeed were afterwards 
released, by virtue of the subsequent treaty ; 
the rest were fetched away by the Olynthians, 
who made exchanges for them, body for body. 

About the same time, the Boeotians, by 
treachery, got possession of Panactum, a fort 
upon the frontier, belonging to the Athenians. 

As for Cleon, having established a garrison 
at Torone, he departed thence, and sailed round 
Athos, as bound for Amphipolis. 

But two vessels about this time, bound for 
Italy and Sicily, sailed out of the harbour of 
Athens, having on board Phaeax, the son of 
Erasistrotus, with whom two other persons 
were joined in commission, to execute an em- 
bassy there. For the Leontines, after the depar- 
ture of the Athenians from Sicily, in conse- 
quence of the joint accommodation, had enrolled 
many strangers as denizens of their city, and the 
populace had a plan in agitation for a distribution 
of the lands. The noble, alarmed at this, gain 
the concurrence of the Syracusans and eject the 
commons. They were dispersed, and wander- 
ed up and down as so many vagabonds ; whilst 
the noble, striking up an agreement with the 
Syracusans, abandoned and left in desolation 
their own city, settling at Syracuse as free citi- 
zens of that place. And yet, soon after some of 
this number, dissatisfied even here, forsook 
Syracuse again, and seize upon Phoca;a, a 
quarter of the old city of the Leontines, and up- 
on Bricinnise, which is a fortress in the Leon- 
tine. Hither the greater part of the ejected 
commons resorted to them; and adhering firm- 
ly together, from these strongholds they annoy- 
ed the country by their hostilities. Mhen the 
Athenians had intelligence of this, they send 
out Phseax, to persuade, by all proper methods, 
their old allies in that country, and to gain, if 
possible, the concurrence of the other Sicilians 
to take up arms for the preservation of the 
people of Leontium, against the encroaching 
power of the Syracusans. Phaeax, upon his ar- 
rival, rccommendoth the .scheme successfully to 
the Camarineans and Agrigentines. But bin 
negotiations meeting with some obstacles at 



YEAR X.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



181 



Gela, he desisted from addressing himself to 
the rest, since he was assured he could not pos- 
sibly succeed. Retiring therefore through the 
district of the Siculi to Catane, and calling on 
his road at Bricinniae, and having encouraged 
the malcontents there to persevere, he depart- 
ed. Not but that, in this Sicilian voyage, 
both passing and repassing, and also upon the 
coast of Italy, he had urged to several cities 
" how expedient for them was the Athenian 
friendship." 

He met also in his course with those Lo- 
crians, who were going to another settlement, 
after expulsion from Messene. They had been 
driven to this necessity by seditious factions at 
Messene, one of which had invited them thither 
eince the joint accommodation among the Si- 
cilians ; and now they were forced to shift 
again, though Messene had for a time been 
entirely in their power. Phaeax therefore, 
meeting with these in their removal, gave them 
no annoyance ; for the Locrians had been at a 
conference with him, to concert the measures 
of an agreement with the Athenians. These, 
however, were the only party of all the confe- 
derates, who, when the Sicilians had amicably 
ended their disputes, refused to treat with the 
Athenians, who were brought to such submis- 
sion since merely by a war, in which they were 
embroiled against the Itonians and Meleans, 
who bordered upon them, and were colonies of 
their own. And, some time after this, Phaeax 
truly returned to Athens. 

But Cleon, who from Torone was gone 
about by sea against Amphipolis, marching 
away from Eion, maketh an assault upon Sta- 
girus, a colony of Andrians, but without suc- 
cess ; yet Galepsus, a colony of the Thasians, 
he taketh by storm. He sent farther ambassa- 
dors to Perdiccas, to summon his attendance 
in the expedition, according to the tenor of the 
new alliance. He sent others into Thrace to 
Polles, king of the Odomantians, that he would 
hire as large a body of Thracians as could be 
got, and bring them up under his own orders. 
And, during this interval, he himself lay quiet 
at Eion. 

But Brasidas, informed of these proceedings, 
placed himself in an opposite post at Credylium. 
This place belongeth to the Argilians, and is 
seated on an eminence on the other side of the 
river, and at no great distance from Amphipo- 
lis. From hence he had a perfect view of all 
Cleon's motions ; so that now it was impossi- 



ble for the latter to make any approach with 
his army, from thence to Amphipolis, without 
being discovered. Brasidas, however, sus- 
pected that Celon would approach, and, from 
a contempt of his opponents, would certainly 
advance thither, without waiting for reinforce- 
ments. 

He had at the same time, provided himself 
with fifteen hundred mercenary Thracians, and 
had assembled all the Edonian targeteers and 
horsemen. Of the Myrcinians and Chalcide- 
ans he had a thousand targeteers, besides those 
in Amphipolis. But his whole force of heavy- 
armed of all sorts amounted to about two thou- 
sand ; and he had three hundred Grecian horse- 
men. With a detachment, consisting of fifteen 
hundred of these, Brasidas had posted himself 
at Cerdylium ; the rest were left in Amphipo- 
lis, under the orders of Clearidas. 

Cleon remained without stirring for the pre- 
sent, but was soon forced to such a step as 
Brasidas expected. The soldiers were cha- 
grined at their inactivity, and were disparaging 
his conduct by invidious parallels, " against how 
much skill and courage, with how much un- 
skillfulness and cowardice he was matched ;" 
and that " with the highest regret they had 
attended him from Athens on this expedition." 
Sensible of their discontent, and unwilling to 
disgust them more by too long a continuance 
in the same post, he drew them up and led 
them on. He acted now upon the vain con- 
ceit with which his success at Pylus had puflfed 
him up, as a man of great importance. It 
cold not enter his heart, that the enemy would 
presume to march out against and offer him 
battle. He gave out that " he was only ad- 
vancing in order to view the place : he waited 
indeed the arrival of additional forces, not as if 
they were needful to his security, should the 
enemy attack him, but to enable him completely 
to invest the city, and to take it by storm." 
Being advanced, he posted his troops upon a 
strong eminence before Amphipolis, and went 
in person to view the marshes of the Strymon, 
and the situation of the city on the side of 
Thrace, how it really was. He judged he could 
retreat at pleasure without a battle. Not so 
much as one person appeared upon the works, 
or issued out at the gates ; for they were all 
shut fast. He now concluded himself guilty of 
a mistake in coming so near the place without 
the machines, "as the town must infallibly 
have been taken, because abandoned." 



183 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR 



[book V, 



Brasidas, however, had no sooner perceived 
that the Athenians were in motion, than de- 
scending from Cerdylium, he marcheth into 
Amphipolis. He there waved all manner of 
sally and all show of opposition against the 
Athenians. He was afraid of trusting too much 
to his own forces, as he judged them inferior to 
the enemy, not truly in numbers, for so far they 
were nearly balanced, but in real worth ; for 
the Athenian force, appointed for this service, 
was composed of the very flower of Athens, 
and the choicest troops of the Lemnians and 
Imbrians. For this reason, he prepared to 
assail them with art ; because in case he gave 
the enemy a view of his numbers, and of the 
sorry manner in which they were armed, he 
judged he should be less likely to gain a victory, 
than by concealing them till the moment of 
action, and avoiding that contempt which their 
real state would have inspired. Picking out, 
therefore, a party of one hundred and fifty 
heavy-armed for himself, and appointing Clea- 
ridas to command the rest, ho designed to fall 
suddenly upon the Athenians in their retreat; 
concluding he should never again find them in 
this forlorn manner, when the reinforcements 
they expected were come up. Calling, there- 
fore, all his soldiers around him, as he was de- 
sirous of animating them, and letting them into 
his scheme he harangued them thus : 

" Ye men of Peloponnesus, let it suffice 
that I briefly put you in mind that we are 
natives of that country which hath ever by 
valour preserved itself free, and that you of the 
Doric are now going to attack your opponents 
of the Ionic descent, whom you are inured to 
defeat. My words are chiefly designed to in- 
form you in what manner I have planned the 
method of attack, lest hazarding the event with 
so small a party, and not with our entire force, 
may seem unequal to the work, and may too 
much dispirit you. The enemy, I conjecture, 
from an utter contempt of us, and a strong 
presumption that we durst not come out into 
the field against them, have shown themselves 
before this city ; and this very moment, dis- 
orderly scattered as they are to view the situa- 
tion, they heartily despise us. The leader, 
therefore, who hath the most acuteness in de- 
tecting such blunders in a foe, and then scizeth 
the proper moment to fall upon them, as best 
enabled l)y his own strength ; not so much in 
the open and regular manner of a methodical 
fight, as with a surprise, most advantageous in 



the present juncture ; — such a leader may, for 
the most part, be assured of success. Such 
stealths as these draw after them the highest 
glory : by these the man who over-reacheth 
his enemy the most, performeth the most sub- 
stantial service for his friends. Whilst, there- 
fore, haughtily presuming on their own worth, 
they remain thus disordered, and, by what 
appeareth to me, are bent more on drawing off 
than remaining here, — during this their inter- 
mission of purpose, and before their resolutions 
can be regularly adjusted, I myself, at the head 
of my chosen party, will be amongst them, if 
possible, and will rush with vigour into the 
centre of their army. And then, Clearidas, 
when once you perceive that I am engaged, 
and, as in probability it must be, have 
thrown them into disorder, then, at the head 
of yours, accompanied by the Amphipolitans 
and the rest of the confederates, throw open 
the gates on a sudden for your sally, and ad- 
vance with your utmost speed to the charge* 
x\nd thus, it may confidently be hoped, the 
enemy must be thrown into the utmost con- 
sternation ; because a second body, thus run- 
ning to the charge, is more terrible to the foes 
than the present which is already engaged. And 
show yourself now, Clearidas, that gallant man, 
which in honour, as a Spartan, you ought to be. 
" You, in general, ye confederates, I exhort 
to follow with manly resolution, and to remem- 
ber that good soldiers are bound, in duty, to be 
full of spirit, to be sensible of shame, and to 
obey commanders ; that, this very day, if you 
behave with valour, you are henceforth free, 
and will gain the honourable title of Lacedse- 
monian allies ; otherwise, must continue to be 
the slaves of the Athenians; where the best 
that can befall you, if neither sold for slaves 
nor put to death as rebels, will be a heavier 
i yoke of tyranny than you ever yet have felt, 
j whilst the liberty of the rest of Greece must 
by you for ever be obstructed. But so das- 
tardly behaviour I conjure you to scorn, as you 
know for what valuable prizes you are to entei 
the lists. I myself shall convince you, that I 
' am not more ready to put others in mind of 
, their duty, than personally to discharge my 
; own through the whole scene of action." 
I Brasidas, having ended his harangue, pre- 
pared to sally out himself, and placed the main 
body under the orders of Clearidas, at the 
gates which are called the Thracian, to be 
ready to rush out at the appointed time. 



YEAK X.] 



PELOPONXESIAN WAR. 



1S3 



To Cleon now, — for Brasidas had been ' das, advancing to the attack of the right, is 
plainly seen coming down from Cerdvlium ; wounded : — he dropped ; — but the Athenians 
and, as the prospect of the city lay open to | are not sensible of it. Those who were near 
those without, had been seen also when sacri- ' him took him up and carried him off. This 
ficing before the temple of Minerva, and form- accident, however, enabled the right wing of 
ing the proper dispositions : — to Cleon, I say, | the Athenians to maintain their ground the 
who was now in a remote quarter to view the j longer ; though Cleon, who from the first had 
posts, advice is brought, that '• the whole force never intended to stand an engagement, flies 
of the enemy was visibly drawn up within the instantly away ; and, being intercepted by a 



city, and that, under the gates, many feet of 
horses and men might be discerned, as ready 
for a sally." Upon hearing this, he went to 
the place, and was convinced by his own sight. 
He determined, however, not to hazard a battle 
before his succours were arrived ; and though 



Myrcinian targeteer, is slain. But his heavy- 
armed, embodying together and gaining an 
eminence, repulsed Clearidas, who twice or 
thrice attacked them, and maintained their 
ground till the Myrcinian and Chalcidic cavalry 
and the targeteers, surrounding and pouring in 



he knew his motions could not be concealed, , their darts upon them, compelled them to fly. 
he went off, and ordered the signal to be given | Thus the whole Athenian army wais distressed 
for a retreat ; commanding farther that the in a laborious flight : they ran different ways 
left wing should file ofi' first, which indeed was , amongst the mountains ; numbers had been 
the only method of drawing off securely to j destroyed in the charge, others by the Chalci- 
Eion. But as they seemed to him to be long ; die horse and targeteers ; but the remainder 



about it, he wheeled off himself at the head of ! 
the right ; and thus, exposing his men to the | 
missive weapons of the enemy, was drawing ', 
off his army. j 

At this instant Brasidas, perceiving it was 
time to attack, since the army of the Athenians 
was already in motion, says to those about him, 
and to all that were near, — " These gentlemen 
wait not for us, that plainly appeareth by the 
shaking of their spears and heads ; for those 
who make such motions are not used to stay 
for the enemy's approach. But let somebody 
throw me open the appointed gates and let us 
boldly and with all speed sally out against 
them." In effect, Brasidas, issuing at the 
gates of the entrenchment, and the £~st of 
what was then the long wall, advanced with 
all speed directly along the road, where now 
standeth the trophy, to be seen by those who 
pass along by the strongest part of the town, 
and, falling upon the Athenians, dismayed not 
only at their own irregular situation, but also 
terrified at his bold attack in the very centre of 
their array, he putteth them to the rout. And 
now Clearidas, sallying out according to order 
at the Thracian gates, was advancing to second 
him. The consequence was, that, by such an 
unexpected and sudden assault on both sides, 
the Athenians were thrown into the highest 
confusion. Their left wing, which inclined 
the most towards Eion, as having filed off 
first, was instantly broken, and fled. These 
were no sooner dispersed in flight, than Brasi- 



escaped in safety to Eion. 

Those who took up Brasidas, when he drop- 
ped in the action, and bore him off, carried him 
into the city yet alive. His senses remained 
till he heard his party were victorious, and soon 
after that he expired.' 

The rest of the army with Clearidas, being 
come back from the pursuit, rifled the dead and 
erected a trophy. 

This done, aU the confederates assisted under 
arms at the funeral of Brasidas, whom they in- 
terred at the public expense within the city near 
the place where the forum now standeth. And 
afterwards the Amphipolitans, having inclosed 
his monument, performed sacrifice to him as a 
hero. They also enacted solemn games in his 
honour and annual sacrifices. Nay, they as- 
cribed their colony to him as founder, after 
demolishing the edifices of Agnon, and defac- 
ing every memorial which might continue the 
memory of his foundation. They acted thus, 
partly out of real gratitude to Brasidas, whom 
they regarded as their deliverer, and partly at 



1 The first embassy which came from the Grecians in 
Thrace to Sparta, after the death of Brasidas, made a 
visit to hiji mother Arsileonis. The first questiou she 
asked thera was, ''Did my son die bravely?" And 
when the ambassadors expatiated largely in his praise, 
and said, at last, " there w:i3 not sucn another Spartan 
left alive;" — "You mistake, gentiemen," said the 
mother : " my son was s sood man ; hut there are many 
better men than he in Sparta," ' Plutarch^s Laconic 
Apophthegms. 



184 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book v. 



this juncture to show their high respect for the 
Lacedaemonian alliance, as they stood in great 
dread of the Athenians. For, considering their 
hostile embroilments with the Athenians, they 
thought it neither for their interest nor satis- 
faction to continue the honours of Agnon. 

To the Athenians they also delivered the 
bodies of their dead. The number of them, 
on the Athenian side, amounted to six hundred, 
whereas the enemy lost but seven men. This 
was owing to the nature of the fight, which had 
not been carried on in a regular manner, but 
was rather a slaughter, in consequence of a 
surprise and sudden consternation. After the 
reception of their dead, the Athenians sailed 
away for Athens ; but those under the orders 
of Clearidas applied themselves to re-settle and 
secure Amphipolis. 

About the same time, in the close of this 
summer, Ramphias, and Autocharidas, and 
Epicydidas, Lacedsemonians, were conducting 
up, for the Thracian service, a reinforcement 
consisting of nine hundred heavy-armed. Being 
arrived at Heraclea, in Trachis, they regulated 
there such things as seemed to require an 
amendment; and, during the season they 
halted here, the battle of Amphipolis was 
fought, and the summer ended. 

But, early as possible in the succeeding 
winter, the reinforcement under Ramphias 
proceeded on their route as far as Pierium of 
Thessaly. But the Thessalians opposing 
their farther passage, and Brasidas being now 
dead, to whom they were conducting this sup- 
ply, they returned home. They imagined that 
their aid was no longer wanting, as the Athe- 
nians, in consequence of their overthrow, had 
q^jitted that country : and themselves had not 
sufficient ability to carry the plans into execu- 
tion which Brasidas had been meditating. But 
the principal motive of their return was their 
own consciousness, at setting out, that the 
Lacedsemonians were more inclined to peace. 

It so fell out indeed, immediately after the 
battle of Amphipolis and the return of Ram- 
phias from Thessaly, that neither of the parties 
meddled any longer with the operations of war, 
but were more inclined to a peace. The mo- 
tives on the Athenian side were these : — They 
had received a terrible blow at Delium, and a 
second lately at Amphipolis: hence they no 
longer entertained that assured confidence of 
their own strength, which had formerly occa- 
sioned them to reject all accommodations, as 



they imagined, in their then career of success 
they should soon give law to their enemies. Now 
also they were under apprehensions of their 
dependents, lest buoyed up by the late mis- 
fortunes of Athens, they might the sooner be 
induced to revolt. And they heartily repented 
now, that they had neglected the fine oppor- 
tunity, which their success at Pylus gave 
them, of bringing the dispute to a happy deter- 
mination. 

On the other hand, the Lacedaemonians 
acted on these motives : — They found them- 
selves strangely mistaken in the events of war. 
At its commencement, they imagined, that in 
the space of a few years, they should entirely 
have demolished the power of the Athenians, 
by laying their territory waste ; but they had 
suffered a terrible calamity in the affair of 
Sphacteria, such as never before had been the 
lot of Sparta. Devastations now were extend- 
ed over all their country, from Pylus and Cy- 
thera. Their Helots had also in numbers de- 
serted to the foe ; and they lived in constant 
expectation that those, who yet persevered in 
their allegiance, gained by the solicitations of 
those who were fled, might, in the present low 
ebb of Sparta, attempt to subvert their consti- 
tution, as had formerly been the case. It 
happened farther, that the thirty years' truce 
with the Argives was on the point of expiring ; 
and the Argives were unwilling to renew it, 
unless the Cynuria was previously restored. 
They juded it therefore a plain impossibility, 
to make head, at the same time, against both 
Argives and Athenians. They had also a sus- 
picion that some cities of Peloponnesus would 
revolt from them to the Argives, which proved 
afterwards true. 

Both parties, then, being respectively influ' 
enced by such considerations, an accommoda- 
tion was judged to be expedient. The anxiety 
of the Lacedaemonians about it was not tlie 
least, as they were eagerly bent on recovering 
their prisoners that had been taken at Sphac- 
teria ; for they were all citizens of Sparta, of 
the first rank, and allied to the most honour- 
able families. They had begun to solicit their 
liberty so soon as ever they were taken ; but 
the Athenians, flushed with conquest, at that 
time disdained to treat. Yet, after the blow 
received at Delium, the Lacedaemonians, know- 
ing then they were become more tractable, laid 
hold of the favourable juncture, and obtained a 
cessation of arms for a year, in which space 



YEAR X.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



185 



they were, by article, to hold mutual confer- 
ences, in order to settle an accommodation for 
a longer time. And since the Athenians had 
now again more lately been totally defeated at 
Amphipolis, and as well Cleon as Brasidas 
was dead, both of whom had most strenuously 
opposed an accommodation ; the latter, because 
he was successful and reaped glories in war ; 
the former, because, in a season of tranquillit}^, 
his villanies must needs be detected, and his 
bold calumniations lose all credit ; the persons, 
who at present were chief in the management 
of either state, were more strongly disposed 
than ever to adjust disputes. These were, 
Pleistionax, the son of Pausanias, king of the 
Lacedaemonians, and Nicias, the son of Nicera- 
tus, by far the most successful general of that 
age. IMicias desired it, as hitherto he had 
never been defeated, and was bent on secui'ag 
his own prosperity on a lasting foundation, on 
obtaining a relaxation of toils for himself, and 
of their present burdens for his fellow-citizens, 
and on leaving his name illustrious to posterity, 
as one who had never involved his country in 
calamity. These views, he judged, could only 
be accomplished by vacuity from danger, by 
exposing himself, as little as possible, to the 
uncertainties of fortune ; and vacuity from 
danger was compatible solely with peace. 
Pleistionax had been calumniated by his ene- 
mies on the account of his restoration ; and 
they inviduously suggested to his prejudice, 
upon every loss whatever v/hich the Lacedsemo- 
nians sustained, that such was the consequence 
of transgressing the laws in the repeal of his 
banishment. For they laid to his charge, 
that, in concert with his brother Aristocles, he 
had suborned the priestess of Delphi to give 
one general answer to all the deputations sent 
by the Lacedaemonians to consult the oracle, 
that " they should bring back the seed of the 
demigod son of Jove from a foreign land into 
their own country : if not, they should plough 
with a silver ploughshare ;" and thus, at length, 
so seduced the Lacedaemonians in the favour of 
an exile, residing at Lyceum, upon account of 
bis precipitate retreat out of Attica, as though 
purchased by bribes from the enemy, and from 
a dread of his countrymen dwelling in a house, 
one-half of which was part of the temple of 
Jupiter, that, nineteen years after, they con- 
ducted him home with the same solemn pro- 
cession and sacrifices as those, who were the 
original founders of Lacedaemon, had appointed 
31 



for the inauguration of their kings. Repining, 
therefore, at these calumniations, and judging 
that, as peace giveth no room for miscarriage, 
and that, farther, if the Lacedaemonians could 
recover the prisoners, his enemies would be 
debarred of a handle for detraction ; whereas, 
whilst the chances of war subsist, the persons 
at the helm of government must be liable to 
reproaches for every disaster ; he was ear- 
nestly desirous to bring about an accommoda- 
tion. 

This winter, therefore, they proceeded to 
a conference ; and, at the approach of spring, 
great preparations were openly in hand on the 
Lacedaemonian side, and a scheme for fortify- 
ing in Attica was circulated through all the 
states, in order to render the Athenians more 
compliant. Many meetings were held, and 
many demands, with large justifications, were 
urged on both sides, till, at length, it was 
agreed, that " a peace should be concluded, 
each party restoring what they had conquered 
in the war, but Nisaea to remain in the hands 
of the Athenians." Plataea was re-demanded 
by the latter, but the Thebans urged that it 
had not fallen into their hands by force or by 
treachery, but they possessed it in pursuance 
of a free and voluntary surrender. And, 
upon the same plea, the Athenians kept 
Nisaea. 

Things being so far adjusted, the Lacedae- 
monians called together their confederates ; 
and all their voices, excepting those of the 
BcEotians, and Corinthians, and Eleans, and 
Megareans, who were not at all satisfied with 
these proceedings, concurring for a peace, 
they ratify the accommodation, and solemnly 
pledged the observance of it to the Atheni- 
ans, who, in exchange, swore the same to the 
Lacedaemonians, in effect as foUoweth: — 

" The Athenians and Lacedaemonians, and 
their allies, have made peace on these terms, 
and every state hath sworn to their observ- 
ance. 

" In regard to the common temples : — Per- 
mission is granted, to all who desire it, to 
sacrifice, to visit, to consult the oracles, to 
send public deputations, ' in the prescribed 
forms of every people, both by land and sea, 
without any molestation. 

" That the sacred soil of the temple of 
Apollo at Delphi, and Delphi itself, be ruled 
after its own model, be taxed at its own discre- 
tion, and be administered by its own magi- 



186 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book v. 



Btrates, whose determinations to be final, both 
in regard to life and property, according to the 
primitive laws of the place. 

" That this peace continue for the space of 
fifty years, between the Athenians and the 
confederates of the Athenians, on the one side, 
nnd the Lacedaemonians and the confederates 
of the Lacedemonians, on the other, without 
fraud and without molestation, both at land and 
sea. 

'<Be it farther unlawful for either party to 
take up arms to the detriment of the other, — 
neither the Lacedaemonians and their allies 
against the Athenians and their allies, — nor 
the Athenians and their allies against the 
Lacedaemonians and their allies, without any 
fraud or evasion whatsoever. And, if any 
difference intervene between the contracting 
parties, let it be adjusted according to equity, 
and upon oath, in such manner as they shall 
agree. 

" Agreed, farther, that the Lacedaemonians 
and allies deliver up Amphipolis to the Athe- 
nians. 

" That, whatever cities the Lacedaemonians 
ileliver up to the Athenians, leave be given 
to the inhabitants to remove at their own dis- 
cretion, with all their effects. 

" That the cities, which pay the assessments 
rated by Aristides, enjoy all their rights and 
privileges whatever. 

" And, be it unlawful for the Athenians 
and their allies to take up arms to the annoy- 
ance of those cities which pay that assessment, 
from the time that this treaty be in force. 
Those cities are, Argilus, Stagirus, Acanthus, 
Scolus, Olynthus, Spartolus ; these cities to 
observe a strict neutrality, forming no engage- 
ments with either Lacedaemonians or Athe- 
nians. — Provided, that, if the Athenians can 
by fiiir means prevail upon these cities, it be 
lawful for the Athenians to admit them con- 
federates at their own free choice. 

" That the Mecyberneans, and Saneans, 
and Singeans, shall inhabit their own cities in 
the same manner as the Olynthians and Acan- 
thians. 

" Agreed, farther, that the Lacedaemonians 
and allies restore Panactum to the Athenians. 

" That the Athenians restore to the Lace- 
daemonians Coryphasium,' and Cythera, and 



« Tills includes the fort of Pylua, seated on the cape 
of Corypliasium. 



Methone, and Ptelcum, and Atalanta, and all 
the Lacedaemonians, now prisoners of the state 
at Athens, or public prisoners, in any quarter 
soever within the dominions of Athens; and 
to give leave of departure to all the Pelopon- 
nesians blocked up in Scione, and to all the 
confederates of the Peloponncsians whatever 
in Scione, and to all persons whatever whom 
Brasidas placed there. — This article also to 
extend to any confederates of the Lacedaemo- 
nians, now public prisoners in Athens, or 
public prisoners in any other quarter of the 
Athenian dominions. 

"•That, in return, the Lacedaemonians and 
allies release all the prisoners, both Athenians 
and confederates, which are now in their 
hands. 

" That, in regard to the Scioneans, Toro- 
neans, and Sermylians, and any other city 
belonging, of right, to the Athenians, the 
Athenians to proceed with the cities specified, 
and all the others, at their own discretion. 

" That the Athenians shall swear obser- 
vance to the Lacedaemonians and their allies, 
separately, according to their cities. Let both 
sides swear, in the most solemn manner, ac- 
cording to the forms of each separate state ; 
and the oath to be conceived in these words ; 
— " I abide by my compacts and the present 
articles, honestly, and without equivocation. — 
Be an oath taken, to the Athenians, by the 
Lacedaemonians and allies, to the same pur- 
port. 

" Be this oath renewed annually by the con- 
tracting parties. 

" Be pillars erected at Olympias, at Pythus, 
at the Isthmus, and at Athens in the citadel, 
and at Lacedaemon in the Amycleum, with 
this treaty inscribed upon them. 

" If any point be in any manner or degree, 
for the present, through forgetfulncss on cither 
side, omitted ; or, if any thing, upon a serious 
consultation holdcn, be judged more proper, 
the Lacedaemonians and Athenians are em- 
powered, with all due regard to their oaths, to 
make additions and alterations, at their joint 
discretions. 

" Plcistolas, presiding in the college of 
ephori, putteth this treaty in force at Sparta, 
on the twenty-seventh day of the month Arte- 
misius: at Athens, Alcaeus, the archon, on the 
twenty-fifth day of the month Elaphebolion. 

" Those who took the oath and sacrificed 
were, 



/EAR X.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



187 



" On the Lacedsemonian side, — Pleistolas, 
Damagetus, Chionis, Metagenes, Acanthus, 
Daithus, Ischagoras, Philochardas, Zeuxidas, 
Anthippus, Telles, Alcinidas, Empedias, Me- 
nas, Lamphilus. 

" On the Athenian, — Lampo, Isthmionicus, 
Nicias, Laches, Euthydemus, Procles, Py- 
thodorus, Agnon, Myrtilus, Thrasycles, Thea- 
genes, Aristoccetes, lolcius, Timocrates, Leo, 
Lamachus, Demosthenes." 

This treaty was perfected upon the close of 
the winter, in the first commencement of the 
spring, immediately after the Bacchanalian 
festivals at Athens. Ten complete years, and 
some few days over, were elapsed, since the 
first irruption into Attica, and an open com- 
mencement of the war. And let him that 
would be assured of the truth, compute only 
by the seasons of the year, and not by those 
who, in the contending states, were either 
archons, or, by the offices they bore, had 
events distinguished by an enumeration of 
their names. For it cannot be exactly known 
in what determinate part, whether, in the be- 
ginning or middle, cr any other portion, of a 
magistracy, any important event occurred. 
But, if the computation proceed by summers 
and winters, which method I have observed, 
such an inquirer will find, that these two 
halves being equivalent to a whole year, ten 
complete summers, and the same number of 
winters, elapsed in the course of this first part 
of the war. 

The Lacedaemonians, for to them it fell by 
lot to make the first restitutions, released im- 
mediately what prisoners they had in their 
hands ; and, having despatched Ischagoras, and 
Menas, and Philocharidas, in the quality of 
their ambassadors to the cities of Thrace, or- 
dered Clearidas to deliver up Amphipolis to 
the Athenians, and all the confederates there 
to submit to the terms of the treaty, according 
to the stipulation given for them. But this 
they positively refused, as they judged the 
treaty prejudicial. Clearidas also, to ingratiate 
himself with the Chalcideans, would not de- 
liver up Amphipolis, alleging, that, without 
tJieir concurrence, he could not possibly do it. 
He himself returned in person soon after with 
the ambassadors, in order to make his defence 
4t Lacedaemon, sh(Juld Ischagoras accuse him 
there of disobeying orders. His view was, 
farther, to try if the accommodation could by 
any means be evaded. But, when he found it 



fast confirmed, he posted back with all speed 
to his government, having express orders from 
the Lacedaemonians to deliver up Amphipolis ; 
or, if that was beyond his power, to cause all 
the Peloponnesians within that garrison in- 
stantly to evacuate the place. 

The confederates happened, at this juncture, 
to be at Lacedaemon, where such of them, as 
had hitherto refused to accept the treaty, were 
ordered by the Lacedaemonians to accede to it. 
But this they positively refused, alleging the 
same reason as before ; and plainly affirming, 
that " they would not come in, till better terms 
than the present were obtained for them." 
Their remonstrance had no effect upon the 
Lacedaemonians, who sent them away without 
redress, and struck up forthwith an alliance, 
offensive and defensive, with the Athenians. 
They had reason to conclude that " the Ar- 
gives would come to no agreement with them," 
since they had lately declared a negative to 
their ambassadors, Ampelidas and I^ichas ; 
" and yet these Argives," they judged, " could 
be no dreadful foe without the Athenians ; 
and that the rest of Peloponnesus would not 
now presume to interfere, who, without this 
method of prevention, would certainly have 
gone over to the Athenians." An Athenian 
embassy, therefore, being at this crisis resident 
amongst them, a conference was holden, and 
the terms completely adjusted. The ratifica- 
tion was made by solemn oath, and the articles 
of this alliance, offensive and defensive, were 
these : 

" The Lacedaemonians enter into this alliance 
for the term of fifty years. — Provided that 

" If any enemy enter the territories of the 
Lacedaemonians, and commit any manner of 
hostilities to their prejudice, the Athenians 
march forthwith to their succour, with all the 
possible means of redress, and with their whole 
united force. 

" And, in case such invaders shall have with- 
drawn themselves, that the state under which 
they acted be declared an enemy both to the 
Lacedaemonians and the Athenians, both which 
are to join in acting offensively against that 
state, nor to lay down their arms without the 
mutual consent of both the contracting states. 

" These terms to be observed with honour, 
with alacrity, and without any fraud whatever. 

« Provided, farther, that, if any enemy enter 
the territories of the Athenians, and commit 
hostilities to the prejudice of the Athenians, 



188 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



{book v. 



the Lacedaemonians march forthwith to their 
succour, with all the possible means of redress, 
and with their whole united force. 

" And, in case such invaders shall have with- 
drawn themselves, that the state under which 
they acted be declared an enemy both to Lace- 
demonians and Athenians, both which are to 
join in acting offensively against that state, 
nor to lay down their arms without the mutual 
consent of both the contracting states. 

<' These terms also to be observed with 
honour, with alacrity, and without any fraud 
whatever. 

« Provided, farther, — That, if there happens 
any insurrection among the Helots, the Athen- 
ians march to the succour of the Lacedaemonians 
with their whole strength, to the full extent of 
their power. 

" The same persons, on both sides, shall 
swear to the observance of these articles, who 
swore to the former. 

" The oaths to be annually renewed ; for 
which purpose, the Lacedaemonians shall give 
their attendance at Athens, at the Bacchanalian 
festival ; and the Athenians theirs at Lacedae- 
mon, at the Hyacinthian. 

" Both parties to erect their pillar ; one at 
Lacedaemon, near Apollo's, in the Amycleum ; 
the other at Athens, near Minerva's, in the 
citadel. 

" And, in case the Lacedaemonians and 
Athenians think proper to make any additions 
or alterations in the terms of this alUance, the 
same lawfully to be done by both, at their 
joint discretion. 

" The oath of observance was sworn, 

" On the Lacedaemonian side, by 'Pleis- 
tionax, 'Agis, Pleistolas, Damagetus, Chionis, 
Metagenes, Acanthus, Daithus, Ischagoras, 
Philocharidas, Zeuxidas, Anthippus, Alcina- 
das, Telles, Empedias, Menas, Laphilus. 

" On the Athenian side, by Lampo, Isth- 
mionicus. Laches, Nicias, Euthydemus, Pro- 
cles, Pythodorus, Agnon, Myrtilus, Thrasy- 
cles; Theagenes, Aristocrates, lolcius, Timo- 
crates, Leo, Lamachus, Demosthenes." 

This alliance was concluded in a very little 
time after the treaty of peace ; and the Athen- 
ians now released to the Lacedaemonians their 
Spartans, who were made prisoners at Sphac- 
teria. The summer also of the eleventh year 



t The kini;a sign this alliance, but did not sign the 
former treaty. 



was now begun ; and so far the transactions of 
these first ten years of this war, closely carried 
on, have been regularly compiled. 

TEAK xi.^ 

After the treaty of peace and the alliance, 
offensive and defensive, between the Lacedae- 
monians and Athenians; both which were con- 
cluded after the ten years' war, at the time 
when Pleistolas presided in the college of 
Ephori at Sparta, and Alcaeus was Archon at 
Athens ; the peace became in force amongst 
the acceding parties. But the Corinthiams 
and some of the Peloponnesian states were 
endeavouring the overthrow of all these pro- 
ceedings : and immediately^ there arose another 
great combustion, amongst the confederates, 
against Lacedaemon. More than this, as time 
advanced, the Lacedaemonians became suspected 
by the Athenians, as they showed no great 
punctuality in executing the conditions of the 
peace. For the space of six years and ten 
months, they refrained indeed from entering 
one another's territory in a hostile manner; 
but,during such a correspondence which abound- 
ed in suspicions, they were, in all other re- 
spects, active in a reciprocal annoyance. And 
at length, necessitated to dissolve the treaty con- 
cluded at the ten years' period, they engaged 
afresh in open war. 

The same Thucydides, an Athenian, hath 
also compiled an account of these latter trans- 
actions in a regular series, according to the 
summers and winters, down to that period of 
time when the Lacedaemonians and their allies 
put an end to the empire of Athens, and be- 
came masters of the long walls and the Piraeus. 
The whole continuance of the war to this 
period was twenty-seven years. And, if any 
man be inclined to think that this intervening 
accommodation should not be reckoned as war, 
he will find no arguments to support his opin- 
ion : for, let him only survey the transactions 
as they are distinctly related, and he will find 
it an absurdity to pronounce that an interval of 
peace, in which neither all the restitutions were 
made, nor the benefits obtained, which the 
mutual stipulations required. And, setting 
these considerations aside, in the Mantinean 
and Epidauric and other wars, transgressions 
were committed on both sides. The confede- 

« Before Christ 421. 



YEAR XI.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



189 



rates also of Thrace continued still to be as 
gpreat enemies as ever. And the Boeotians 
never agreed to more than a bare cessation of 
arms, renewable every tenth day. 

Including, therefore, the first war which last- 
ed ten years, and that suspicious interval which 
ensued, and ended at last in a second open 
rupture, the whole continuance, if computed 
by summers and winters, will turn out, upon in- 
quiry, to have been so many years, and some 
few additional days. And such as laid stress 
upon the predictions of oracles can assent only 
to this computation as genuine. For my own 
part, I perfectly well remember that, not only 
at the commencement, but even during the 
whole course of the war, many such predictions 
were given out, that " it must needs continue 
three times nine years." I also lived through its 
whole extent, in the very flower of my under- 
standing and strength, and with a close appli- 
cation of my thoughts, to gain an exact insight 
into all its occurrences. It was farther my lot 
to suffer a twenty years' exile from my country 
after my employment in the business of Am- 
phipolis, and to be present at the transactions 
of both parties, and not the least of those of the 
Peloponnesians, in consequence of my banish- 
ment ; by which means I had leisure to gather 
more ample informations about them. I shall 
relate therefore the quarrel and breach of the 
treat}', subsequent to the first ten years, and 
the incidents of the war which afterwards 
ensued. 

Upon the conclusion of the treaty of peace 
for fifty years and the subsequent alliance, the 
embassies from the different states of Pelo- 
ponnesus, who had been summoned thither to 
give their concurrence, withdrew from Lacedae- 
mon. The rest of them indeed went directly 
home ; but the Corinthians, stopping in their 
retui-n at Argos, began first, at a conference 
with some of the magistracy there, to insinuate 
" that since the Lacedaemonians, not in order 
to serve but to enslave Peloponnesus, had en- 
tered into a treaty and an alliance, offensive 
and defensive, with their once most inveterate 
foes, the Athenians, it highly behoved the Ar- 
gives now to watch over the preservation of 
Peloponnesus, and to form a public resolution, 
— That any Grecian state, which is free and 
uncontrolled, which enjoyeth and supporteth an 
equal share of rights and privileges, might en- 
ter into an alliance, offensive and defensive, 
with the Argives, for the guard of their mu- 



tual properties against their common foes: — 
This to be communicated only to the few who 
were absolute masters of the decisions of each 
state, and every where to shun all conference 
with the bulk of the people, lest the scheme 
might be detected, in case the multitude should 
refuse their concurrence." They assured them, 
that the majority of the states were so exas- 
perated against the Lacedaemonians, that they 
would infallibly come in. And, after suggest- 
ing such a course, the Corinthians also return- 
ed home. 

The persons at Argos who had listened to 
these insinuations, reported the scheme, in the 
next place, to the whole magistracy and people 
of Argos. The Argives resolved accordingly, 
and elected a committee of twelve, with whom 
such Grecians as desired it might agree upon 
an alliance, the Athenians and Lacedaemonians 
excepted. Neither of these states were per- 
mitted to treat with the Argives, without the 
public consent of the whole people. 

The Argives were the more readily per- 
suaded to such a measure as they plainly saw a 
war was unavoidable between themselves and 
the Laced;i;monians ; for the truce between 
them was on the point of expiring. They 
were also animated by the hope of gaining into 
their hands the sovereignty of Peloponnesus. 
For at this juncture of time, Lac^daemon lay 
under the greatest discredit, and was fallen into 
utter contempt upon account of their late 
disasters ; whereas the Argives were in the 
high vigour of their strength in all respects, as 
they had never interfered in the Attic war ; 
and, having observed an exact neutrality with 
both, had been thriving in peace and plenty. 
The Argives, therefore, in this manner invited 
those Grecians who were willing to enter into 
their alliance. 

The Mantineans and allies were the first 
who, out of a dread of the Lacedaemonians, ac- 
cepted the proposal. For these Mantineans, 
in the heat of the war against the Athenians, 
had seized and appropriated to themselves a 
certain district of Arcadia subject to Laceda3- 
mon, and now concluded that the Lacedaemo- 
nians would never leave them in the quiet pos- 
session of it, when they were at liberty to act 
for its recovery. This readily induced them to 
have recourse to the league of Argos, regarded 
by them as a powerful state, which had ever 
been at variance with Lacedaemon, and, like 
their own, was democratical. 
x2 



190 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book v. 



No sooner had the IMantineans revolted, 
than the rest of Peloponnesus began to mutter 
that " they ought also to take the same step," 
imagining that revolt to have been founded up- 
on some stronger reasons than yet appeared ; 
exasperated also against the Lacedasmonians for 
sundry reasons, and, above all, for this article in 
the peace with Athens, — that, "in case the two 
states of Laceda^mon and Athens think proper to 
make any additions or alterations, the same to 
be lawful." For this was the clause which gave 
the greatest alarm to Peloponnesus, and inspir- 
ed a jealousy that the Lacedaemonians might 
strike up a bargain with the Athenians to en- 
slave the other states: since, in justice, no al- 
teration ought to be made without the concur- 
rence of the whole confederacy. Alarmed, 
therefore, at these proceedings, many of them 
made instant application to the Argives, exert- 
ing their several endeavours to obtain their alli- 
ance. 

But the Lacedaemonians, perceiving what a 
combustion was arisen in Peloponnesus, prin- 
cipally owing to the insinuations of the Corinth- 
ians, who were also going to enter into this 
league with Argos, they despatch ambassadors 
to Corinth from a desire to prevent what 
might ensue. Here they represented to 
them, — "how criminal their conduct had been, 
in having thus originally fomented the present 
tumult; and that, in case they abandoned the 
Lacedaemonians and went over to the Argive 
league," they assured them, that, " by such a 
step, they must break the most sacred oaths; 
injustice they had already committed in refus- 
ing to accede to the Athenian peace, since, pur- 
suant to old stipulations between them, what- 
ever a majority of the confederates resolved 
was to be binding on all, unless some god or 
hero enjoined a dissent." But the Corinthians, 
in the presence of all those of the confederacy 
who had not accepted the peace, and whose at- 
tendance they had previously invited, replied to 
the Lacedaemonians without entering into a 
particular detail of the injuries they had done 
them, in not covenanting with the Atlienians 
for the restitution of Solium, or Anactorium, 
or any other point in which they thought them- 
selves aggrieved ; but speciously pretending, 
that " they could never abandon their allies in 
Thrace, whom by solemn oaths they were 
bound to support ; oaths which they had sever- 
ally sworn when they first revolted in concert 
with the Potidxans, and had on other occasions 



since renewed :" arguing from hence that 
"they could not have violated the common 
oath of the confederates in refusing their ac- 
cession to the Athenian peace, since, as they 
had sworn upon the faith of the gods to the 
former, they could not betray them with- 
out the guilt of perjury. The stipulation, in- 
deed, ran thus : unless some god or hero en- 
joined a dissent: — their present dissent, there- 
fore, appeared to them to be a divine injunc- 
tion." So far they argued from their former 
oaths ; and, in regard to the alliance offensive 
and defensive with Argos, — " They would hold 
consultations with their friends, and take such 
steps as were expedient and just." And with 
this answer the Lacedaemonian ambassadors de- 
parted home. An Argive embassy happened 
also at the same time to be at Corinth, who 
pressed the Corinthians to enter into their 
league without any farther hesitation. They 
desired them to attend, at the next public 
meeting they held, for a final answer. 

There arrived soon after an embassy from 
the Eleans, who made, in the first place, an 
alliance offensive and defensive with the Cor- 
inthians ; and then from Corinth repairing to 
Argos, became allies of the Argives, according 
to the scheme pre-established for this purpose ; 
for a misunderstanding had arisen between them 
and the Lacedaemonians about Lepreum. In a 
former war of the Lepreatse against a province 
of Arcadia, the Eleans had been prevailed upon 
to join the Lepreatse for a moiety of the land 
that should be conquered ; and, at the conclu- 
sion of the war, the Eleans left all the land in 
the management of the Lepreatse, subject to 
the annual tribute of a talent' to Olympian 
Jove. This was regularly paid till the Athen- 
ian war; but, that war being then made a 
pretence of its discontinuance, the Eleans 
would have exacted it by force. The others 
had recourse to the Lacedaemonians. The 
dispute was referred to the Lacedaemonian ar- 
bitration ; but the Eleans, taking up a sus- 
picion that they should not have justice, would 
not abide the reference, but began to ravage the 
territory of the Lepreatie. The Lacedaemoni- 
ans, notwithstanding this, proceeded to a sen- 
tence : — that " the Lepreata; were masters of 
their own conduct, and that the Eleans were 
guilty of injustice :" and, as the latter would 
not abide by their arbitration, they threw a 

» JC193 15s. sterling. 



YEAR XI.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



191 



garrison of heavy-armed into Lepreum ; but 
the E leans, regarding this step as the recep- 
tion of a city by the Lacedaemonians which had 
revolted from them, and alleging the treaty in 
which it was stipulated, — that, " of whatever 
places the parties were possessed upon the 
commencement of the Attic war, the same 
they should continue to hold at its expiration," 
as if they had met with injustice, they revolt 
to the Argives ; and the E leans entered into 
that league offensive and defensive, as hath been 
already related. 

The Corinthians soon followed their ex- 
ample, and with the Chalcideans also of 
Thrace, became the allies of Argos. But the 
Boeotians and Megareans, though they had 
tlireatened the same thing, thought proper to 
drop it. They had been ill used by the Lace- 
dsemonians, but judged however that the demo- 
cracy of the Argives would be less compatible 
with their interests, whose form of government 
was oligarchical, than the polity of the Lacedae- 
monians. 

About the same time of this summer, the 
Athenians, becoming masters of the Scioneans 
after a long blockade, put all who were able to 
bear arms to the sword, and made their wives 
and children slaves, and gave the land to be 
cultured by the Plataeans. 

They also again brought back the Delians 
toDelos; induced to it by the many defeats 
they had suffered in battle, and the express or- 
acle of the god at Delphi. 

The Phocians also and Locrians began about 
this time to make war upon one another. 

And now the Corinthians and Argives, 
united in league, go together to Tegea, to per- 
suade its revolt from the Lacedaemonians. 
They saw it was a large district ; and, in case 
they compassed its accession, they imagined 
the whole of Peloponnesus would be at their 
beck. But, when the Tegeatae declared, that 
" they would in no shape oppose the Lacedae- 
monians," the Corinthians, who till now had 
acted with great alacrity, slackened in their zeal 
for contention, and began to fear that no more 
of the states would come in. They proceeded, 
however, to the Boeoteans, and solicited them 
" to accede to the league between themselves 
and Argives, and to co-operate with them for 
the common welfare." — And, as there were 
truces for ten days between the Athenians and 
Bceotians, which were agreed upon soon after 
the peace for fifty years was made, the Corin- 



thians now pressed the Boeotians " to accom- 
pany them to Athens, and solicit for truces of 
the same nature for them ; but, in case the 
Athenians refused to grant them, to renounce 
the suspension of arms, and for the future never 
to treat without their concurrence." The 
Bceotians, thus solicited by the Corinthians, 
desired a longer time to consider about their 
accession to the Argive league. To Athens, 
indeed, they bore them company, but could not 
obtain the ten days' truces: for the Athenians 
answered, — " The Corinthians have a peace 
already, if they are confederates of the Lace- 
daemonians." And, upon the whole, the Boeo- 
tians absolutely refused to renounce their own 
truces, though the Corinthians insisted upon it, 
and urged, with some warm expostulations, 
that it had been so covenanted between t?icm. 
So there was only a mere cessation of arms be- 
tween the Corinthians and Athenians, without 
any solemn ratification. 

This same summer, the Lacedaemonians took 
the field with their whole united force, under 
the command of Pleistionax, the son of Pau- 
sanias, king of the Lacedaemonians, and marched 
to the Parrhasians of Arcadia. These were 
subject to the Mantineans, and, in consequence 
of a sedition, had invited this expedition. But 
it was also designed, if possible, to demolish 
the fortress of Cypsela, which the Mantineans 
had erected, and, as it was situated in Parrha- 
sia, towards the skirts of Laconia, had placed 
a garrison in it. The Lacedaemonians, there- 
fore, ravaged the territory of the Parrhasians. 
But the Mantineans, leaving their own city to 
the guard of the Argives, marched themselves 
to the support of their dependents. But, find- 
ing it impossible to preserve the fortress of 
Cypsela and the cities of the Parrhasians, they 
retired. The Lacedaemonians also, when they 
had set the Parrhasians at liberty, and demo- 
lished the fortress, withdrew their forces. 

The same summer also, upon the return 
from Thrace of those soldiers who had served 
under Brasidas, and who came home after the 
peace under the conduct of Clearidas, the 
Lacedaemonians decreed " those Helots, who 
had served under Brasidas, to be free, and 
to have permission to reside wherever they 
pleased." And, no long time after, they placed 
them together with such persons as were new- 
ly enfranchised, at Lepreum : it is situated 
between Laconia and Elea ; and they were 
now at variance with the Eleans. As for 



192 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book v. 



those Spartans who had been made prisoners 
in Sphacteria, and had deUvered up their arms, 
conceiving some fears about them, lest, should 
they lay their late disgrace too much to heart, 
as they were persons of the greatest rank, they 
might introduce some innovations in the state, 
they declared them infamous, even though 
some of the number were, at this time, pos- 
sessed of posts in the government. But this 
infamy extended no farther than to disqualify 
them from offices, and from buying and selling. 
Yet, in a short time afterwards, they were again 
restored to their full privileges. 

The same summer also the Dictideans took 
Thyssus, a town seated upon the Athos, and 
confederate with the Athenians. 

Through the whole course of the summer, 
tlie communication was open between the Pe- 
loponnesians and Athenians. Not but that the 
Athenians and Lacedaemonians began to be 
jealous of one another immediately after the 
peace, as the reciprocal restitution of places 
was not punctually performed. For, though 
it had fallen to the Lacedaemonians' lot to begin 
these restitutions, yet they had not restored 
Amphipolis and other cities. They had com- 
pelled neither their confederates in Thrace, nor 
the Boeotians, nor the Corinthians, to accept 
the peace, always pretending, that, " should 
they refuse it, they were ready to join with the 
Athenians in their compulsion;" nay, they 
limited to them a time, though not by a regular 
written notice, " within which, such as did not 
accede were declared enemies to both." The 
Athenians, therefore, seeing none of these 
points were put in actual execution, became 
jealous of the Lacedaemonians, as men who 
acted insincerely in every step ; insomuch, 
that, when Pylus was re-demanded, they re- 
fused its restitution, and heartily repented that 
they had released the prisoners taken at Sphac- 
teria. They also kept possession of other places, 
and intended to do so, till the other side had 
performed their engagements. But the Lace- 
daemonians alleged " they had done every thing 
in their power ; that, for instance, they had 
released such Athenians as were prisoners 
amongst them, had recalled their soldiers from 
Thrace, and, wherever they were masters of 
the execution, had performed it. As to Am- 
phipolis," they said, " they were not so far 
masters of it as to make an actual surrender. 
They had omitted no endeavours to bring the 
Boeotians and Corinthians to a compliance, to 



recover the disposal of Panactum, and to obtain 
the dismission of those Athenians who were 
prisoners of war in Bceotia. Pylus, however," 
they insisted, " should immediately be restored 
to them ; at least that the Messenians and 
Helots should be withdrawn, as their people 
had been from Thrace; and then the Athe- 
nians, if they pleased, might continue to gar- 
rison that fortress themselves." Many meetings 
were held, and much argumentation passed 
between them this summer; and, at last, they 
prevailed upon the Athenians to withdraw from 
Pylus the Messenians and others, as well He- 
lots as all deserters whatever, out of Laconia. 
These they transplanted to Crania of Cephal- 
lene. This summer, therefore, was a season 
of inaction, and the intercourse was open be- 
tween them. 

In the ensuing winter, — for other ephori 
were in office, as the authority of those under 
whom the peace was made was now expired, 
and some who were averse to the peace had 
succeeded — embassies attending from the whole 
confederacy, the Athenians, and Boeotians, and 
Corinthians also being present, and after much 
reciprocal altercation, coming to no regular 
agreement, the rest of them separated to their 
own homes without effect. But Cleobulus and 
Xenares, those two of the ephori who were 
most inclined to dissolve the peace, detained 
the Boeotians and Corinthians for a private 
conference. In this they exhorted them " to 
act unanimously in promotion of their scheme ; 
in pursuance of which the Boeotians should 
first make themselves a party in the Argive 
league, and then employ their good offices to 
form an alliance between the Argives and 
Laccuacmonians : for, by these methods, the 
Boeotians could least of all be necessitated to 
take part in the Attic peace ; as the liacedje- 
monians would prefer the renewal of friendship 
and alliance with the Argives to the enmity of 
the Athenians and the dissolution of the 
peace ; since, to their certain knowledge, the 
Lacedaemonians had ever been desirous to have 
the friendship of Argos, consistently with their 
honour ; knowing it would facilitate the success 
of their war without Peloponnesus." — They 
also requested the Boeotians " to deliver up 
Panactum to the Lacedaemonians, that, ex- 
changing it if possible for Pylus, they might 
get clear of the main obstacle to a fresh rupture 
with the Athenians." 

The Boeotians and Corinthians, instructed 



YEAR XT.] 



PELOPONxNESIAN WAR. 



193 



by Xenares and Clcobulus and the party in 
their interest at Lacedaemon, departed, both, to 
report this scheme to their principals. But 
two persons, in the greatest authority in the 
slate of Argos, were attending upon the road 
for their return. They met, and conferred 
with them " about the means of gaining the 
concurrence of the Bosotians in this league, 
upon the same footing with the Corinthians, 
and E leans, and Mantineans : for they were 
confident, were this point once completed, 
they might easily become the arbiters of war or 
peace, either in relation to the Lacedaemonians, 
(if they so determined, and would act together 
with firm unanimity,) or to any other state 
whatever." 

The Boeotian ambassadors were highly de- 
lighted with this discourse. The solicitations 
of these Argives happened to coincide with the 
instructions recommended to them by their 
friends at Lacedaemon. And the Argives, find- 
ing them satisfied with their motion, assured 
•them they would send ambassadors to the 
Boeotians, and so they parted. 

But the Boeotians, at their return, reported 
to the rulers of Boeotia the proposals from 
Lacedaemon, and those from the Argives upon 
{he road. The Boeotian rulers were delighted, 
and grew now more zealous than ever ; because, 
on both sides, from their Lacedaemonian friends, 
and also from the Argives, the solicitations 
were concurrent. And, very soon after, the 
Argive ambassadors arrived to forward the des- 
patch of the treaty. The Boeotian rulers, how- 
ever, at present, gave only a verbal approbation 
of the scheme, and then dismissed them, pro- 
mising to send an embassy of their own to Ar- 
gos, to perfect the alliance. 

But, in the meantime, it was judged to be 
previously expedient, that the Boeotian rulers, 
and the Corinthians, and the Megareans, and 
the ambassadors from the allies of Thrace, 
should mutually interchange their oaths, " to 
act in support of one another, if upon any occa- 
sion such support might be requisite, and to 
enter neither into war nor peace without joint 
consent ;" and then the Boeotians and Mega- 
reans (for these acted in union) to form a league 
with the Argives, but before such exchange of 
oaths, the Boeotian rulers communicated the 
whole of the plan to the four Boeotian councils, 
jn whom the sovereignty is lodged ; recom- 
mending it, as worthy their confirmation, that 
« whatever cities were willing might mutually 
32 



interchange such oaths for their reciprocal 
advantage." Yet the Boeotians who composed 
the councils refused a confirmation ; apprehen- 
sive it might tend to embroil them with the 
Lacedaemonians, should they pledge such an 
oath to the Corinthians, who were now aban- 
doning the Lacedaemonian interest : for the ru- 
lers had not made them privy to the scheme 
from Lacedaemon, how, " Xenares and Cleo- 
bulus, of the college of Ephori, and their 
friends, advise them, to enter first into league 
with the Argives and Corinthians, and then to 
extend it to the Lacedasmonians." They had 
presumed that the supreme council, though they 
secreted these lights, would not resolve against 
a plan which themselves had pre-digested and 
recommended to them. But now, as this affair 
took so wrong a turn, the Corinthians and am- 
bassadors from Thrace went home without ef- 
fect ; and the Boeotian rulers, who had all along 
intended, in case their scheme had passed to per- 
fect an alliance with the Argives, made no far- 
ther report to the councils in relation to the Ar- 
gives, sent no embassy to Argos in consequence 
of their promise, but suffered the whole plan to 
sink away in careless and dilatory unconcern. 

In this same winter the Olynthians, after a 
sudden assault, took Mecyberne, which was gar- 
risoned by Athenians. 

After the former proceedings, — for confer- 
ences were still continued between the Athe- 
nians and Lacedaemonians about those places 
they held from one another, — the Lacedaemoni- 
ans, conceiving some hope that, if the Atheni- 
ans could recover Panactum from the Boeoti- 
ans, they also might regain Pylus, addressed 
themselves in solemn embassy to the Boeotians, 
and importuned them to deliver up Panactum 
and the Athenian prisoners, that they in return 
might get Pylus from them. But the Boeotians 
persisted in a refusal, unless they would make 
a separate alliance with them, as they had done 
with the Athenians. Upon this the Lacedae- 
monians, though convinced that such a step 
would be injustice to the Athenians, — since it 
had been stipulated that, "without joint con- 
sent, they should neither make peace nor war," 
— ^yet, bent on the recovery of Panactum, that 
they might exchange it for Pylus, the party at 
the same time amongst them, who were medi- 
tating a fresh rupture, inclining to the Boeotian 
interest, made the requisite alliance in the very 
close of this winter on the approach of spring. 
The consequence was, that Panactum was im- 



194 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book r. 



mediately levelled with the ^ound ; and the 
eleventh year of the war was brought to a con- 
clusion. 

TEAR XII.' 

Early in the spring of that summer which 
was now approaching, the Argives, — when the 
expected embassy from Boeotia was not arrived 
in pursuance of promise, when they found that 
Panactum was demolished, and a separate alli- 
ance struck up between the Boeotians and 
Lacedaemonians, — began to fear they should 
be totally abandoned, and that their whole con- 
federacy would go over to the Lacedaemonians. 
They concluded that, through the prevalence 
of the Lacedjemonian arguments, the Boeotians 
had been persuaded to level Panactum and 
accede to the treaty made with Athens, and 
that the Athenians were privy to all these steps ; 
and so, of consequence, they themselves were 
now utterly excluded from an alliance with the 
Athenians, and their former hopes entirely 
blasted, that, in case disputes should arise, and 
their treaty with the Lacedaemonians not be re- 
newed, they might, at worst, depend on gaining 
the Athenian alliance. The Argives, there- 
fore, amidst these perplexities, and the dread 
of being attacked at once by the Lacedaemoni- 
ans and Tegeatae, by the Boeotians and Athe- 
nians, as they had formerly refused an accom- 
modation with the Lacedaemonians, and had 
grasped in thought at the sovereignty of Pelo- 
ponnesus ; — the Argives, I say, had no longer 
one moment to lose, but despatched instantly 
Eustrophus and ^son, whom they judged to 
be persons most agreeable there, in embassy 
to Lacedaemon. They now judged it their 
interest to procure the best peace which the 
present posture of affairs would allow from the 
Laccdnemonians, and then quietly to attend the 
event of things. In this view, the ambassadors 
on their arrival had a conference with the La- 
cedaemonians about the terms of a peace ; and 
at first the Argives insisted, that <' to some 
state or private person should be referred, for 
equitable arbitration, the controversy between 
them about the district of Cynuria ;" concern- 
ing which, as it is frontier to both, they are 
eternally at variance ; in this district stands 
the cities of Thyrea and Anthcna, and the 
possession of it is in the hands of the Lacedae- 



Bcfore Christ 420. 



monians. But, at length, when the Lacedae- 
monians would not suffer any mention to be 
made of this, declaring only, that, " were they 
willing to renew the former truce, they should 
find them complying," the Argivc ambassadors, 
however, prevailed upon the Lacedaemonians 
to agree to these proposals : that, " for the 
present, a peace should be concluded for the 
term of fifty years ; provided, notwithstanding, 
that liberty remain to either party to send a 
challenge, when neither was embarrassed by 
plague or war, and the right of this district be 
then decided by arms between Lacedtemon and 
Argos, as had formerly been donc^ when the 
victory was equally claimed on both sides : and 
that, in this case, it be not lawful to carry the 
pursuit beyond the boundaries of either Argos 
or Lacedaemon." These proposals, it is true, 
appeared at first to the Lacedaemonians to be 
foolish : but, at length, as their necessary in- 
terest made them vastly desirous of the Argive 
friendship, they complied with the demand, and 
the terms agreed on were digested into writing. 
But the Lacedaemonians, before they put the 
last hand to the treaty, insisted on their previ- 
ous return to Argos, and reporting it to the 
people ; and, in case the ratification was given, 
to repair again to Lacedaemon, at the Hyacin- 
thian festival, and swear observance. And upon 
this they returned to Argos. 

« Herodotus relates this remarkable piere of history 
in Clio. " They had a conference," says he, '"and came 
to an ajirccnient, that three hundred men on each side 
should deride the point by com' at, and tie land con- 
tested should remain tlie property of tl e viciors; that 
botli armies in tlie meantime should retire within their 
respective dominions, nor I e present at tl e combat, lest 
by l>ein<; spectators of it, eiti.er of tl em, seeing their 
countrymen defeated, mifrht run to their ;s-!istance. 
When articles were settled. I oth armies drew olf ; thofw 
selected on each side for tl:c combat staid boliind and 
euffajrcd. They fought ii out with equal reso'uiion and 
fortune : of six hundred men only t rce were left alive, 
two of them Arsives, .Alcinor and Clirontius; and one 
Lacedtrr.ioninn.Otl'.ryades ; these werenllt'c survivors 
when niirht came on. The Arsives, as victors, ran in 
liaste to .Ar-jos ; but Othryades. for the LacrdnMuoninns, 
linvins stripped the dead bodies of tl e .Ar;:ivcs, and 
carried oT their arms to the place wl ere his own side 
had encamped, continued upon the field of battle. Next 
mornins both parties came to learn the event; and 
then, truly, each party also claimed the victory: one 
averring, that a niajori'y survived on tlieir side; the 
other maintaining, tl: at ev«»n those hud fled, whilst their 
own combatant had kept Ms ground and spoiled the 
dead. In short, from wr;,n:-lin!i they came acain to 
blows and a general enixacement ; in which, afler preiit 
slau'.'liter on loth sides, the Lacoda-munians obtained 
the victory." 



YEAR XII.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



195 



Whilst the Argives were employed in this 
negotiation, the Lacedaemonian ambassadors, 
Andromenes, and Phaedimus, and Antimenidas, 
who were commissioned to receive Panactum 
and the prisoners of war from the Boeotians, 
and deliver them over into the hands of the 
Athenians, found, upon their arrival, that 
Panactum was already demolished by the Boeo- 
tians, upon pretext that, " in former times, upon 
occasion of some dispute about it, an oath had 
been taken by the Athenians and Boeotians, 
that neither should inhabit that place, excluding 
the other, but should jointly possess it;" but 
what Athenian prisoners of war were in the 
hands of the Boeotians were delivered up to 
Andromenes and his colleagues, who carried 
and released them to the Athenians. They 
also reported the demolition of Panactum, de- 
claring this to be equivalent to a restitution, as 
no enemy to Athens could occupy that post for 
the future. 

These words were no sooner heard than the 
Athenians conceived the deepest resentments. 
They thought themselves injured by the Lace- 
daemonians, not only in the demolition of Pan- 
actum, which ought to have been restored stand- 
ing, but also in the separate alliance made lately 
with the Boeotians, of which they now had no- 
tice, in open contradiction to their own declara- 
tion, <' of joining them to compel by force such 
as would not accede to the treaty." They re- 
flected also upon other points in which the en- 
gagements of the treaty had been in no wise 
fulfilled, and concluded themselves over- 
reached. For these reasons they gave a rough 
answer to the ambassadors, and an instant dis- 
mission. 

Upon so much umbrage, taken by the Athe- 
nians against the Lacedaemonians, such persons 
at Athens, as were willing to dissolve the peace, 
set themselves instantly at work to accomplish 
their views. Others were labouring the same 
point, but none more than Alcibiades, the son 
of CHnias ;' a person, in respect of age, even 

1 Alcibiades is here beginning his political intrigues, 
to open the field for his own soaring and enterprising 
genius to dilate itself more at large. Pericles' was his 
near relation and guardian; Socrates was his friend and 
guide so long as virtue was his care. Warmer pnssions 
soon gained the ascendant over him; and he plunged 
into all the busy scenes of life, with that intense appli- 
cation and f]exil)!e address to all persons and all oca- 
eions, wliicii surprised the world; " more changeable 
than a cameieon, as Plutarch expresseth it, since that 
creature cannot put on a fair or white appearance." His 
character is thus drawn in miniature by the neat and 



then but a youth ; at least he would have passed 
for such in the other states, though, for the 
dignity of his birth, he was much honoured and 
caressed. It seemed to him the most expedient 
step to form a good understanding with the 
Argives. Not but that his opposition to other 
measures was the result of his ambition and a 
study of contention, because the Lacedaemonians 
had employed their interest in Nicias and 
Laches to perfect the treaty, slighting his as- 
sistance upon account of his youth, nor paying 
him the deference he expected from the ancient 
hospitality between that state and the family 
from which he was descended. This, indeed, 
his grandfather had renounced ; but he himself, 
in the view of renewing it, had shown extraor- 
dinary civilities to the Spartans who were made 
prisoners at Sphacteria. Thinking himself, 
therefore, in all respects slighted, at this crisis 
he began openly to oppose them : he affirmed, 
that " the Lacedaemonians were a people who 
could not be trusted; that they had treacher- 
ously entered into the peace in order to divert 
the Argives from their alliance, that again they 
might attack the Athenians when left alone.'* 
Nay, farther ; upon the first dissatisfaction be- 
tween them, he secretly despatcheth his emissa- 
ries to Argos, exhorting them " at his invitation, 
to come to Athens, in company with the Man- 
tineans, and Eleans, and solicit an alliance, 
since opportunity favoured, and his whole inte- 
rest should be exerted in their support." 

The Argives, having heard these sugges- 
tions, and being now convinced that the Boeo- 
tian separate alliance had been made without 
the privity of the Athenians, who, on the con- 
trary, were highly discontented at the Lacedae- 



masterly pen of Cornelius Nepos: " Nature, says h^, 
seems to have exerted her utmost power in Alci'iades. 
It is agreed, by all writers who have made him the sub- 
ject of their pens, that a more extraordinary man never 
lived, either for virtues or vices. Born in a most noble 
republic, of a most honourable family, by far the hand- 
somest person of his age, fit for every thing, and full of 
address; he was a commander that made the greatest 
figure both by land and sea; an orator whom none 
could surpass; nay, his manner and matter, when he 
spoke, were quite irresistible. Exactly as occasions re- 
quired, he was laborious, persevering, indefatigable, 
generous; splendid in all his outward appearance, and 
at his table; full of affability, profuse of civility, and of 
the utmost dexterity in adapting himself to the exigen- 
cies of time; and yet, in the seasons of relaxation, and 
when business no longer required him to keep his fa- 
culties on the stretch, he wns luxurious, dissohife, lewd, 
and intemperate. The whole world was astonished 
that so vast an unlikeness, and so different a nature, 
should be united iu the same person." 



196 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book v. 



monian proceedings, took no farther notice of 
their embassy at Lacedaemon, though sent ex- 
pressly there to negotiate an accommodation, 
but recalled all their attention from thence to 
the Athenians. They reflected, that Athens, 
a state which from long antiquity had been 
their friend, which was governed by a democra- 
cy in the same manner as their own, and which 
was possessed of a great power at sea, could 
most effectually support them in case a war 
should break out against them. In short, they 
lost no time in despatching their ambassadors to 
the Athenians to propose an alliance, who were 
accompanied by embassies from the E leans and 
Mantineans. 

A Lacedaemonian embassy also arrived in 
great haste, composed of Philocharidas, and 
Leon, and Endius, persons who were judged 
most acceptable at Athens. They were afraid 
lest the Athenians, in the heat of their resent- 
ments, should clap up an alliance with the Ar- 
gives. They sent also by them a demand of 
the restitution of Pylus, in lieu of Panactum, 
and excuses for the separate alliance they had 
made with the Boeotians, " which had been 
concluded without any design of prejudicing 
the Athenians." Upon these points they spoke 
before the senate,' notifying at the same time 



» The Lacedaemonian embassy have, on this occasion, 
their first audience from the senate. The business of 
this history haili lieeri hitherto transacted in the assem- 
bly of tlie people: for, as the generals of the state were 
the chief ministers in time of war, and liad a power of 
convening the people at their own discretion, all points 
that required a speedy determination were brought he- 
fore tiie people in the first instance; and the influence of 
the senate, which operated in ordinary occasions, was 
checked and suspended in time of war, which starts 
many extraordinary occasions, or left it in the will of 
the generals of the state to call and treat as extraordin- 
ary whatever they pleased. By these means the people 
had engrossed the power, the balance which Solon de- 
signed always to jjreserve was in a great measure lost, 
and tlie arislocraiical intJuence was quite suspended. 

As, therefore, the popular assembly liad its note at 
first setting out, the form and roiisiitution of the senate 
now require an explanation. — At this time it consisted 
of five hundred persons, and for that renson is of\en 
styled the council of five hundred, and sometimes by 
Thucydides, the council of the l)ean, from the manner of 
their election. Every year, on an appointed day, each 
tribe returned the names of their mem'-ers who were 
qualified and stood candidates for this honour. The 
names were engraved on pieces of bra.sa, and ciisl into a 
vessel; the same number of beans were cast into an- 
other vessel, fifty of which were white and the rest 
black. Tliey then proceeded to draw out a name and a 
l>ean. and the persona to whom the white beans wore 
drawn hecamc the senators of the year. Each senator 



that " they were come with full power to put 
an end to all disputes;" by which they gave 
some alarm to Alcibiades, lest, should they 
make the same declaration before the assembly 
of the people, it might have an influence upon 
the multitude, and an alliance with the Ar- 
givcs might prove abortive. 

But Alcibiades now contriveth to baffle 
them by art. He prevailcth upon the Lacedte- 
monians, by solemnly pledging his faith to 
them, that " in case they would disown, before 
the people, the full powers with which they 
were invested, he would engage for the resti- 
tution of Pylus; for he himself would then 
persuade the Athenians to it, with as much 
zeal as he now dissuaded, and would get all 
other points adjusted to their satisfaction." 
His view in acting thus was to detach them 
from Nicias, and to gain an opportunity of in- 
veighing against them, in the assembly of the 
people, as men who had nothing sincere in their 
intentions, and whose professions were dissonant 
with themselves ; and so to perfect an alliance 
with the Argives, and Eleans, and Mantineans. 
And this artifice in the sequel took effect : for, 
when they were admitted to an audience before 
the people, and replied to the demand, when 
put, contrary to what they had said in the senate, 
that "they had no such powers," the Athe- 
nians in an instant lost all patience. And 

had a drachma, that is, sevenpence three farthings, a 
day for his salary. 

In the next place, the names of the tribes were thrown 
into a vessel, and into another nine black beans and one 
white one; the tribe, to whose name the white bean 
was drawn, took the first course of presidency for a 
tenth part of the year, and the order of the succeeding 
course was determined in the same manner by the bean. 
How the fifty in course were again subdivided into tens, 
and from these tens a chairman chosen for a day. hath 
been already explained, in the note on the popular as- 
sembly. Book I. 

The senate sat every day in the prytaneum, or state 
house, wl'.ere the presidents had also their diet. They 
were the grand council of state, took into consideration 
all the affairs of the commonwealth, de!>atcd, and voted 
by beans; and whatever determinations were thus n).ide 
in the senate were afterwards carried down to the as- 
sembly of the people, to be ratified and passed into laws. 
By Solon's original constitution, nothing was to be pro- 
posed to the people l>efore if had been canvassed and ap- 
proved in the senate: but this seems to have been eluded 
by the generals of the state, who had all the military 
business in t'eir department, ,ind a power to convene 
the people at their plensnre.nnd lay matters before 1 1 em 
in tie first instance. To restore the aristocraficnl power, 
and reduce that of the people, occasioned a usurpation 
and sad confns'on in Athens, as will be seen in Iho 
ciglilli book of this history. 



FEAR XII.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



197 



now, Alcibiades roaring out aloud against the 
Lacedaemonians with much more vehemence 
than he had ever done before, they listened 
greedily to all he said, and were ready instantly 
to call in the Argives and their companions, 
and to make them confederates. But the 
shock of an earthquake being felt before any 
thing could be formally concluded, the assembly 
was adjourned. 

At the next day's assembly, Nicias, — though 
the Lacedaemonians had been thus over-reached, 
and he himself ensnared by their public ac- 
knowledgment that they had no full powers, 
— spoke, however, on the Lacedaemonian side, 
insisting " on the necessity of maintaining a 
good correspondence with them, and defer- 
ring all agreement with the Argives, till they 
could send to the Lacedaemonians, and be dis- 
tinctly informed of their final resolutions." — 
« It maketh," said he, " for your credit, but for 
their disgrace, that a war should be averted : 
for, as your affairs are in a happy posture, it 
is above all things elligible for you to preserve 
your prosperity unimpaired, but they in their 
present low situation, should put all to hazard 
in the hopes of redress." He carried it, in 
short, that ambassadors should be despatched, 
he himself to be one in the commission, " ear- 
nestly to require of the Lacedaemonians, that, 
if their intentions were honest, they should 
surrender Panactum standing, and Amphipolis ; 
and should, farther, renounce the alliance with 
the Boeotians, in case they still refused to ac- 
cede to the peace ; — this in pursuance of the 
article, that ' neither should make peace with- 
out joint consent.' " They ordered it to be 
added farther, that " they themselves, could 
they have deigned to act unjustly, had con- 
cluded before this an alliance with the Argives, 
as they were already attending and soliciting 
such a measure." And, having subjoined their 
instructions in relation to all other points in 
which they thought themselves aggrieved, they 
sent away the ambassadors in commission along 
with Nicias. These being arrived, and having 
reported their instructions, added, in conclu- 
sion, that, " unless they would renounce their 
alliance with the Boeotians, if still refusing 
their accession to the peace, they would admit 
the Arg'.ves and their associates into league." 
The Lacedaemonians replied, "they would 
never renounce their alliance with the Boeo- 
tians :" for the party of Xenares the Ephorus, 
and all those who acted in the same combina- 



tion, had still the majority : however, at the 
request of Nicias, they renewed the oaths. 
Nicias was afraid of being forced to depart 
without settling any one point of his com- 
mission, and of falling under public censure, 
(which really came to pass,) as undoubted au- 
thor of the' peace with the Lacedaemonians. 
And v/hen, upon his return, the Athenians 
had heard that no one point was adjusted at 
Lacedaemon, they immediately conceived the 
warmest indignation ; and, looking upon them- 
selves as highly abused, Alcibiades introducing 
the Argives and their associates, who were still 
at Athens, they entered into treaty and an 
alliance offensive and defensive with them, as 
followeth : 

" The Athenians, and Argives, and Eleans, 
and Mantineans, for themselves and their re- 
spective dependents on all sides, have made a 
peace, to continue for the term of a hundred 
years, without fraud and without violence, both 
at land and at sea. 

" Be it unlawful to take up offensive arms, 
either by the Argives, and Eleans, and Man- 
tineans, or their dependents, against the Athe- 
nians and dependents of the Athenians, or 
by the Athenians and their dependents, against 
the Argives, and Eleans, and Mantineans, and 
their dependents, without any artifice or eva- 
sion whatsoever. On these conditions the 
Athenians, and Argives, and Eleans, and Man- 
tineans, to be confederates for one hundred 
years. 

" Provided, that, in case an enemy invade 
the territory of the Athenians, the Argives, and 
Eleans, and Mantineans march to the succour 
of the Athenians, in strict conformity to a sum- 
mons received from Athens, in the most vigor- 
ous manner they may be able, to the fulness of 
their abilities. 

" But if the enemy, after ravaging, be again 
withdrawn, the state under which they acted 
to be declared an enemy to the Argives, and 
Mantineans, and Eleans, and Athenians ; and 
to be pursued with the offensive arms of all 
those confederate states. 

" And, farther, that it be not lawful for any 
of the contracting states to lay down their arms 
against that state which hath so offended, with- 
out the consent of all the rest. 

" The Athenians also to march to the suc- 
cour of Argos, and Mantinea, and Elis, in case 
an enemy invade the territory of the Eleans, 
or that of the Mantineans, or that of the Ar- 



198 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book v. 



gives, in a strict conformity to a summons re- 
ceived from any of those states, in the most 
vigorous manner they may be able, to the ful- 
ness of their abilities. 

« But if the enemy, after ravaging, be again 
withdrawn, the state under which they acted to 
be declared an enemy to the Athenians, and 
Argives, and Mantineans, and E leans, and to be 
pursued with the offensive arms of all these con- 
federate states. 

" And, farther, that it be not lawful to lay 
down their arms against the state which hath 
so offended, without the joint consent of all 
these contracting states. 

" That no armed force be admitted to pass 
in order for war through any of their respective 
dominions, or those of their respective depen- 
dents, nor along their sea, unless such a pas- 
sage be granted unanimously by all the contract- 
ing parties, by the Athenians, and Argives, 
and Mantineans, and Eleans. 

" Agreed, farther, that, when the auxiliaries 
attend, the state which summoned them supply 
them with thirty days' provision so soon as 
they shall have entered the territory of the 
state which summoned their attendance, and 
the same at their departure. 

" And, if there be occasion for the atten- 
dance of such an auxiliary force for a larger 
space, that the state which sent for it maintain 
that force, by paying to every soldier, heavy- 
armed, and light-armed, and every archer, three 
oboli of -^gina' a-day, and a drachma of 
jEgina to every horseman. 

"But the state which^sent for auxiliaries to 
have the supreme command, so long as the war 
continueth within its district. 

" If, farther, it be agreed by the contracting 
states to act offensively with their united forces, 
the command then to be equally divided among 
all the states. 

" That the Athenians swear to observe these 
articles in their own names and those of their 
dependents ; but the Argives, and Mantineans, 
and Eleans, and the dependents of these, are to 
swear separately, each state for itself. 

"Each party to take the oath in the most 
solemn fashion of their own country, in the 

« Tlie value of three o'oli of JRiinn is a^otit six. 
penre, ami tlic drachma of i^^jjina nearly one shillinj: 
Enzlish; for, arrordine to Dr Arhiithnof, the talent of 
^};ina consisted of a hundred Attic mina*, and Here- 
fore was Inrger than tlic Attic talent in the proportion 
of one hundred to sixty. 



most sacred manner, with the choicest victims. 
The terms of the oaths to be thus conceived : 
— ' I will stand by the alliance, according to 
covenant, justly, honestly, and sincerely ; and 
I will not transgress its obligation by any fraud 
or evasion whatsoever.' 

" To be sworn — 

" At Athens, by the senate and the city- 
magistrates : the presidents in course to ad- 
minister the oath. 

" At Argos, by the senate, and the eighty, 
and the artynas : the eighty to administer the 
oath. 

" At Mantinea, by the demiurgi, and the 
senate, and the other magistrates : the theori 
and polemarchs to administer the oath. 

" At Elis, by the demiurgi, and the officers 
of state, and the six hundred : the demiurgi 
and the keepers of the sacred records to admin- 
ister the oath. 

" These oaths to be renewed. For which 
purpose, the Athenians to repair to Elis, and 
to Mantinea, and to Argos, thirty days before 
the Olympic Games. But the Argives, and 
Eleans, and Mantineans, are to repair to 
Athens, ten days before the great Pana- 
thenaea. 

" The articles relating to this peace, and 
these oaths, and this alliance, to be inscribed 
on a column of stone, 

" By the Athenians, in the citadel : 

" By the Argives, in the forum, in the 
temple of Apollo. 

" By the Mantineans, in the temple of Ju- 
piter, in the forum : and 

" All jointly to erect by way of memorial, a 
brazen pillar at Olympia, at the Olympics now 
approaching. 

« If it be judged expedient, by any of the 
contracting states, to make any additions to 
these articles already agreed, whatever, in pur- 
suance of this, be deemed proper, by the joint 
determination of all parties, the same to be 
valid." 

A peace and alliance, offensive and defen- 
sive, was in this manner concluded : and those 
subsisting between the Lacedaemonians and 
Athenians were not, upon this account, re- 
nounced by cither side. 

The Corinthians, however, who were con- 
federates of the Argives, refused to accede ; 
but, what is more, they had never sworn to 
the alliance, made previous to this, between 
the Eleans, and Argives, and Mantineans, — 



YEAR XII.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



199 



" to have the same foes and the same friends." 
They pretended that the defensive league al- 
ready made was quite sufficient, — '< to succour 
one another, but not to concur in an offensive 
war." In this manner the Corinthians were 
drawing off from the league, and again warped 
in their inclinations towards the Lacedaemo- 
nians. 

The Olympics were solemnized this sum- 
mer, in which Androsthenes, the Arcadian, 
was for the first time victor in the Pancrace, 
and the Lacedcemonians were excluded the tem- 
ple by the Eleans, so that they could neither 
sacrifice nor enter the lists. They had not dis- 
charged the fine set upon them by the Eleans, 
by virtue of the Olympic laws, who had charged 
them with a conveyance of arms into the fort 
of Phyrcon, and with throwing some of their 
heavy-armed into Lepreum, during the Olym- 
pic cessation. The fine imposed was two 
thousand minse,' at the rate of two minse for 
every heavy-armed soldier, agreeably to the let- 
ter of the law. 

The Lacedaemonians, upon this; despatched 
an embassy, to remonstrate against the injustice 
of the sentence ; that " the cessation had not 
been notified at Lacedaemon when they threw 
in their heavy-armed." 

The Eleans replied, that " the cessation was 
already in force : for they proclaim it first 
amongst themselves ; and so, whilst they were 
quiet, and expected no such usage, they had 
been wronged by a surprise." 

The Lacedaemonians retorted, that, " if so, 
it was needless for them to proceed to a publi- 
cation of it in Lacedaemon, if the Eleans had 
already judged themselves wronged. But the 
fact was far different in the light they saw it, 
and trespass had not been committed in any 
shape whatever. 

But the Eleans adhered to their first charge, 
that " they could not be persuaded the Lacedae- 
monians had not wronged them; yet, in case 
they were willing to surrender Lepreum to 
them, they are ready to remit their share of the 
fine, and to pay for them that part of it which 
was due to the god." 

But, when this would not content, it was 
urged again by the Eleans, that, " if they were 
unwilling to part with it, they should by no 
means surrender Lepreum ; but then, as they 
were desirous to have the use of the temple, 

» 2000 mitiffi— 6,458^. 6s. 8d. sterling. 



they must go up to the altar of Olympian Jupi 
ter, and swear, in the presence of the Grecians, 
that they would hereafter pay the fine." — But, 
as they also refused to comply with this, the 
Lacedaemonians were excluded the temple, the 
sacrifice, and the games, and performed their 
own sacrifices at home. Yet the rest of the 
Grecians, except the Lepreatae, were admitted to 
assist at the solemnity. 

The Eleans however, apprehensive they 
would sacrifice by force, set a guard of their 
armed j'ouths around the temple. These were 
reinforced by the Argives and Mantineans, a 
thousand of each, and a party of Athenian 
horse who were at Argos, in readiness to attend 
the festival. • But a great consternation had 
seized the whole assembly of united Greece, 
lest the Lacedaemonians should return with an 
armed force ; more especially, when Lichas, 
the son of Archesilaus, a Lacedaemonian, was 
scourged in the course by the under-officers, 
because, when his chariot had gained the prize, 
and the chariot of the Boeotian state was pro- 
claimed victor, pursuant to the exclusion of the 
Lacedaemonians from the race, he stepped into 
the midst of the assembly and crowned the 
charioteer, desirous to make it known that the 
chariot belonged to him. Upon this, the whole 
assembly was more than ever alarmed, and it 
was fully expected that some strange event 
would follow : the Lacedaemonians, however, 
made no bustle ; and the festival passed regu- 
larly through its train. 

After the Olympics, the Argives and their 
confederates repaired to Corinth, in order to 
solicit the concurrence of that state. A 
Lacedaemonian embassy happened also to be 
i-here. Many conferences were held, and no- 
thing finally determined : but, upon feeling 
the shock of an earthquake, they parted each 
to their respective cities. And here the sum- 
mer ended. 

In the ensuing winter, a battle was fought 
by the Heracleots of Trachis, against the 
vEnianians, and Dolopians, and Meliensians, 
and some of the Thessalians. For the border- 
ing nations were enemies to the city of Hera- 
clea, as this latter place had been fortified for 
their more especial annoyance. From its foun- 
dation they had ever opposed it, preventing its 
growth to the utmost of their power ; and at 
this time they defeated the Heracleots in a 
battle, in which Xcnares, the son of Cnidis, 
the Lacedaemonian commandant, was slain; a 



200 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book v. 



number also of the Heracleots perished. And 
thus the winter ended : and the twelfth year of 
the war came also, to an end. 



TEAR XIII.* 

The succeeding summer was no sooner be- 
gun, than the Boeotians, viewing the low estate 
to which it had been reduced by the late battle, 
took into their own hands the city of Heraclea, 
and discharged Hegesippidas, the Lacedaemo- 
nian commandant, as guilty of mal-administra- 
tion. They took this city into their own 
hands, from the apprehension that, during the 
embroilments of the LaccdjL-monians in Pelo- 
ponnesus, the Athenians might seize it. The 
Lacedaemonians, however, were chagrined at 
this step of the Boeotians. 

This same summer also, Alcibiades, the son 
of Clinias, being general of the Athenians, 
with the concurrence of the Argives and their 
allies, entered Peloponnesus with a small party 
of heavy-armed Athenians and archers, and 
enlarged his forces upon his route by the aids 
of the confederates in those quarters ; where 
he not only made such a disposition of affairs 
as might best answer the views of the alliance, 
but also, traversing Peloponnesus with his 
force, he both persuaded the Patreans to con- 
tinue their works quite down to the sea, and 
intended also to execute a plan of his own for 
erecting a fort upon the Rhium of Achaia.^ 
But the Corinthians, and Sicyonians, and all 
such as were alarmed at the annoyance this 
fort might give them, rushed out to prevent 
him, and obliged him to desist. 

The same summer a war broke out between 
the Epidaurians and the Argives. The pre- 
text was grounded on a victim due from the 
Epidaurians to the Pythian Apollo, as an 
acknowledgment for their pastures ; for the 
Argives were now the chief managers of the 
temple. But, this pretended grievance set 
apart, it had been judged expedient, by Alci- 
biades and the Argives, to get possession, if 
possible, of Epidaurus, in order to prevent 
molestation on the side of Corinth, and to ren- 



« Before Christ 419. 

* This was a grand project indeed ! It aimed at no 
loss tlian the total ruin of Corinth, and pultinii an end 
to all the naviaation of that tradins and opulent city 
throiiffh the hay of Crissa. The Athenians were al- 
ready entire musters of tlic sea on the other side of the 
Isthmus. 



der the passage of Athenian succours more ex- 
peditious from ^gina than by fetching a com- 
pass about Scyllajum. The Argives, therefore, 
were intent on their preparations, as resolved 
to take the field and act against Epidaurus, in 
order to exact the victim by force of arms. 

But, about the same time, the Lacedxrao- 
nians also marched out, with their whole force, 
as far as to Leuctra, upon their own frontier, 
towards Lyceum, under the command of Agis, 
the son of Archidamus, their king. Not a 
man was privy to the design of their thus 
taking the field, not even the states from which 
the quotas were furnished out. But, when 
the victims they sacrificed for a successful 
campaign proved inauspicious, they again mar- 
ched home, and circulated fresh orders to their 
confederates to be ready to take the field again 
after the next month, which was the month 
Carneius,' the grand festival of the Dorians. 
But, when they were thus withdrawn, the 
Argives, taking the field on the twenty-seventh 
day of the month preceding Carneius, and 
though celebrating their own festival that very 
day, continued all this intermediate time to 
make incursions and ravages upon Epidauria. 
The Epidaurians sent about to solicit the suc- 
cours of their allies ; some of whom excused 
themselves as bound to observe the approach- 
ing festivals, though others advanced as far as 
the frontiers of Epidauria, and then refused to 
act. And during the space of time that the 
Argives were in Epidauria, embassies from 
the several states held a congress at Mantinea, 
at the request of the Athenians; and, proceed- 
ing to a conference, Ephamidas, the Corinthian, 
remonstrated, that " their words were by no 
means consistent with their actions ; for whilst 
they were here sitting together upon the terms 
of peace, the Epidaurians and allies, and the 
Argives, were opposing one another in arms : 
that, consequently, the first thing to be done 
was to send deputations on both sides to dis- 



s This festival was observed by most cities in Greece; 
but with the greatest pomp and solemnity nt Sparta, 
where it began the thirtcentli of the month Carneius, 
arcordinj; to the Lareda-monian stylo, and lasted nine 
days. A camp was fornnd for its celebration, in which 
tliey continued durins the whole solemnity, and ol>- 
served strict military discipline. By these means, as 
we find a little lower, the Argives. in this instance no 
slaves to superstition, attended to the festival and war- 
fare at the same lime, and annoyed the Epiil.iurians, 
whilst relisious awe restrained the friends of the latter 
from acting in their defence. See Potter's ^rchaologia, 
vol. i. p. 408. 



YEAR XIV.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



201 



band those armies, and then orderly to proceed 
to treat of peace." Yielding, therefore, to the 
justice of such a remonstrance, they fetched 
the Argives out of Epidauria; and, returning 
to the congress, they were not able even then 
to agree together: upon which the Argives 
once more entered Epidauria, and resumed the 
ravage, 

The Lacedsemonians now had taken the 
field, and were advanced to Caryae ; but, as 
now again the victims sacrificed portended 
no success to a campaign, they once more 
withdrew. 

The Argives also, after ruining about a 
third of the territory of Epidauria, were return- 
ed home. In this incursion they were assisted 
by one thousand heavy-armed Athenians, with 
Alcib-iades at their head ; who, having heard 
that the Lacedaemonians had now left the 
field, as their service was now no longer need- 
ful, marched away. And in this manner the 
summer passed. 

In the beginning of the next winter, the 
Lacedaemonians, unknown to the Athenians, 
threw a body of men, to the number of three 
hundred, with Agesippidas as commandant, in- 
to Epidaurus by sea. Upon this, the Argives 
repaired instantly to Athens, with remon- 
strances, that, " though it was explicitly men- 
tioned in the treaty that no enemy should be 
suffered to pass through their respective domin- 
ions, yet they had perrmitted the Lacedaemoni- 
ans to make this passage by sea without moles- 
tation.^ Unless, therefore, they would replace 
the Messenians and Helots in Pylus, to annoy 
the Lacedaemonians, they should deem them- 
selves aggrieved." Upon this, the Athenians, 
at the instigation of Alcibiades, underwrote 
this charge upon the Laconic column, that 
" the Lacedaemonians were guilty of perjury ;" 
and removed the Helots from Crania into Py- 
lus, to resume their depredations, but refrained 
from any other act of hostility. 

In the course of this winter, though the 
Argives and Epidaurians were at war, yet no 
regular battle was fought between them. The 
hostilities consisted of ambuscades and skir- 
mishes, in which, according to the chance of 
action, some persons perished on both sides. 

But in the close of winter, when the spring 



1 The Argives, in this remonstrance, aclcnowledge 
the dominion of the sea, even on the coast of Pelopon- 
nesus, to belong to Athens. 
33 



was now approaching, the Argives, provided 
with ladders for scale, came under Epidaurus, 
hoping to take it by surprise, as insufficiently 
manned by reason of the war ; but, failing of 
success, they soon withdrew. And then the 
winter ended, and with it ended also the thir- 
teenth year of the war. 

TEAR XIV. 

About the middle of the ensuing summer, 
when their confederates the Epidaurians, were 
sadly distressed, when some of the Peloponne- 
sians had already revolted, and others showed 
plainly a spirit of discontent, the Lacedaemoni- 
ans were clearl}'^ convinced that, unless expedi- 
tiously prevented, the mischief would spread 
abroad. Upon this they took the field against 
Argos with their whole force, both themselves 
and their Helots ; and Agis, the son of Arch- 
idamus,kingof the Lacediemonians, command- 
ed in chief. They were attended in the field 
by the Tegeatse, and all the other Arcadians 
whatever confederated with the Lacedaemoni- 
ans. But the allies of the other parts of Pelo- 
ponnesus, and those without the isthmus, were 
assembled at Phlius : — the Boeotians, consist- 
ing of five thousand heavy-armed, and the 
same number of light-armed ; five hundred 
horsemen, each attended by a soldier on foot : 
— the Corinthians, of two thousand heavy-arm- 
ed; — the other confederates with their several 
quotas ; — but the Phliasians with the whole of 
their force, because the army was assembled in 
their district. 

The Argives, who had some time before in- 
telligence of the Lacedaemonian preparations, 
and that since they were filing towards Phlius 
in order to join the forces assembled there, 
nov/ took the field themselves. They v/ere 
joined by a succour of the Mantineans, strength- 
ened by the addition of their dependents, and 
three thousand heavy-armed E leans. Upon 
their march, they fell in with the Lacedaemoni- 
ans at Methydrium of Arcadia. Each party 
posts itself upon a rising ground. The Ar- 
gives got every thing in readiness to attack 
the Lacedaemonians whilst yet they were alone ; 
but Agis, dislodged by night and stealing a 
march, completed his junction with the body of 
confederates at Phlius. When this was per- 
ceived by the Argives, they drew off early the 
next dawn, first of all to Argos, and then to 



a Before Christ 418. 



x2 



202 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book V 



the pass on the route of Nemea, by which I 
they expected the Lacedsemonians, with their 
confederates, would fall into their country. 
Yet Agis took not that route which they ex- 
pected ; but, having communicated his design 
to the Lacedaemonians, and Arcadians, and 
Epidaurians, he took a different route, though 
much less practicable, and descended into the 
plains of Argos. The Corinthians, and 
Pellenians, and Phliasians, followed by an- 
other more direct route ; and orders had been 
given to the Boeotians, and Megareans, and 
Sicyonians, to take the route which leadeth 
to Nemea, on which the Argives were posted, 
that, in case the Argives should march in- 
to the plain to make head against the Lacedx'- 
monians, the last with their cavalry might 
press upon their rear. 

After these dispositions, and such a descent 
into the plain, Agis ravaged Saminthus and 
other places ; upon intelligence of which, the 
Argives, so soon as it was day, dislodged from 
Nemea, to stop the depredations, and on their 
march met with the body of Phliasians and 
Corinthians; and, encountering, slew some 
few of the Phliasians, whilst not a much 
greater number of their own men were destroyed 
by the Corinthians. The Boeotians also, and 
Megareans, and Sicyonians, took the route of 
Nemea conformably to orders, and found the 
Argives already dislodged ; but the latter, upon 
entering the plain, and in view of the ravage 
made upon their lands, drew up in order of 
battle. The Lacedaemonians stood regularly 
drawn up on the other side. And now the 
Argives were shut up in the middle of their 
enemies: for, on the side of the plain, the 
LacediEmonians, and those in their body, inter- 
cepted their return to the city ; on the high 
ground above them were the Corinthians, and 
Phliasians, and Pellenians ; on the other part, 
towards Memea, were the Boeotians, and Sicy- 
onians, and Megareans. Calvary they had 
none : for the Athenians were the only part 
of their confederacy who were not yet come 
up. 

The bulk, indeed, of the Argives and con- 
federates apprehended not the danger, which 
at present environed them, to be so great ; but 
rather concluded they might engage with ad- 
vantage, and that they had caught the Lacedae- 
monians fast within their territory, and near to 
Argos itself. Two Argives, however, — Thra- 
syllus, one of the five in command, and Alci- 



phron, the public host of the Laceda monians, 
— the very instant the armies were moving to 
the charge, had addressed themselves to Agis 
and proposed expedients to prevent a battle 
giving their word, that " the Argives were 
ready to do and to submit to justice, upon a 
fair and equitable arbitration, in case the La- 
cedemonians had any charge against them ; and 
for the future would live at peace, if a present 
accommodation could be effected." 

In this manner these Argives presumed to 
talk, merely of themselves, and without the 
public authority. Agis also, by his own pri- 
vate determination, accepted the proposals ; 
and, without reporting them to the council of 
war, without canvassing things maturely him- 
self, or at least communicating only with one 
I)erson of the number which had authority in 
the army, grants them a four months' truce, 
" in which space they were to make good what 
engagements they had now made ;" and then 
instantly drew off the army, without imparting 
the reasons of his conduct to the other con- 
federates. The Lacedyemonians, indeed, and 
confederates, followed when he led them off, 
because their laws enacted such obedience ; 
yet, amongst themselves, were lavish of their 
censure against Agis, that, when so fine an 
opportunity of engaging was in their power, 
when their enemies were hemmed in on all 
sides, both by their horse and their foot, they 
were drawn off, without performing any thing 
worthy of such mighty preparations ; for, to 
this very day, a finer army of Grecians had 
never appeared in the field. A most gallant 
figure, in truth, it made, whilst they were all 
together at Nemea. The Lacedaemonians were 
there to be seen with the whole collected force 
of their state, accompanied by the Arcadians, 
and Boeotians, and Corinthians, and Sicyo- 
nians, and Pellenians, and Phliasians, and 
Megareans. The troops which composed their 
several quotas were all picked men, and were 
judged a match in the field of battle, not only 
for the whole Argive alliance, but the addition 
of double strength. This great army, how^- 
ever, laying all the time most heavy imputa- 
tions on the conduct of Agis, drew off, and 
were disbanded to their several habitations. 

On the other part also, the Argives were 
still much more exasperated against those who 
had made this suspension without public au- 
thority. They imagined the Laceda monians 
had escaped them when they had the finest 



YEAR XrV.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



203 



opportunity of striking a blow, inasmuch as 
the contest must have been decided under the 
very walls of Argos, and in company with a 
numerous and gallant alliance. And hence, 
upon their return, at the Charadrum, the place 
"where the crimes committed in an expedition 
are adjudged, before they enter the city, they 
were beginning to stone Thrasyllus, who, fly- 
ing to an altar, escapeth with life ; his effects, 
however, they confiscated to public use. 

But, after this, came up the Athenian suc- 
cour, consisting of a thousand heavy-armed 
and three hundred horsemen, commanded by 
Laches and Nicostratus. The Argives, who, 
after all, were afraid to break the agreement 
with the LacedcEmonians, ordered them " to 
be gone forthwith ;" and, though they requested 
a conference, refused to introduce them into 
the assembly of the people, till the Mantineans 
and E leans, who were not yet departed, by 
great importunity obtained a compliance. Here 
the Athenians,' in the presence of Alcibiades 
their ambassador, assembled with the Argives 
and their allies, averred, that " the suspension 
was not valid, since agreed to without the con- 
sent of the body of the confederates ; now, 
therefore, as themselves were come up oppor- 
tunely to their assistance, they were obliged in 
honour to prosecute the war." The confede- 
rates allowed the force of this argument : and 
the whole alliance, except the Argives, marched 
instantly away against Orchomenus, of Arcadia. 
But even the Argives, though they staid be- 
hind at first, were persuaded by such reasoning, 
and soon after went also to take part in the 
expedition. Thus, united, they sat down be- 
fore and besieged Orchomenus. They made 
.•ieveral assaults upon it, desirous for other 
reasons to get it into their hands, but more 
particularly because the hostages from Arcadia 
were lodged in that city by the Lacedaemoni- 
ans. 

The Orchomenians, tenified at the weakness 
of their walls and the multitude of their be- 
siegers, and lest, as no relief appeared, they 
should soon be exhausted, thought proper to 
capitulate on these conditions ; — " to be re- 
ceived ito the confederacy, — to give hostages 
of their own body, — and to deliver up to the 
Mantineans those whom the Lacedaemonians 
had lodged with them." 

Having thus got possession of Orchomenus, 

1 Laches and Nicostratus. 



the confederates, in the next place, held a con- 
sultation, " against what other city, in their 
plan of conquest, they should next proceed." 
The Eleans exhorted them to march against 
Lepreum, but the Mantineans against Tegea ; 
and the Argives and Athenians adhered to the 
Mantineans. The Eleans, upon this, were 
offended that they had not voted for the siege 
of Lepreum, and separated to their own home. 
But the rest of the confederates set about pre- 
parations at Mantinea, as fully bent on the 
siege of Tegea ; and even some of the citizens 
of Tegea were exerting their efforts within that 
city to betray it to them. 

But the Lacedaemonians, after they were 
withdrawn from Argos, in pursuance of the 
suspension of arms for four months, laid heavy 
charges upon Agis, for not conquering Argos 
at so fair an opportunity, fairer than ever they 
had reason to expect, — " since so numerous and 
so gallant a body of confederates could never 
again, without greater diliiculty, be assembled 
together." And when afterwards the news 
arrived that Orchomenus was taken, their in- 
dignation became more violent than ever. In 
such a ferment, they instantly resolved, though 
not consistently with the calm Lacedaemonian 
temper, that " his house must needs be demo- 
lished, and a fine of one hundred thousand 
drachmas^ be imposed upon Agis." He ear- 
nestly pleaded against the execution of the 
sentence, that, " in another expedition, he 
would purge the charge by some notable service 
to the state ; if not, they might then proceed to 
punish him at pleasure." Upon this, they 
suspended the fine and demolition, but passed 
a law upon the present occasion, such as never 
before had been made amongst them ; for they 
elected a committee of ten Spartans to attend 
him as a council, without whose concurrence 
he was not permitted to lead out their army in- 
to the field. 

In the meantime a message is brought them 
from their friends at Tegea, that " unless they 
come thither with the utmost expedition, Tegea 
will revolt from them to the Argives and their 
confederates, and is only not revolted already." 

To prevent this, the whole Lacedaemonian 
strength, both of citizens and Helots, is levied 
with more sharpness than had ever been known 
before ; and, taking the field, they marched to 
Oresteum, of Menalia. An order was sent 

9 j£3229 3«. id, sterling. 



204 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book v. 



beforehand to their Arcadian allies, to assemble 
end follow them directly towards Tegea. 

But when the whole LaccdjEmonian strength 
was thus marched to Oresteum, the sixth part 
of the number, consisting of the more aged and 
younger classes, was from thence again dis- 
missed to Sparta, to take upon them the guard 
of that place, whilst the rest of their military 
force marcheth to Tegea ; and, not long after, 
their Arcadian confederates join them. 

They sent also to Corinth, to the Boeotians, 
Phocians, and Locrians, a summons of speedy 
aid into the Mantineans. But, for some of 
these, the summons was too short ; and, for 
the rest, it was by no means an easy task to 
take the field in separate bodies, and, waiting 
for their mutual junction, to force their passage 
through an enemy's country ; for such lay be- 
tween to obstruct their advance ; however, they 
were earnestly bent to attempt it. The Lace- 
dxmonians, in the meantime, enlarged with 
such Arcadian parties as were already come 
up, marched on and broke into the Mantinean ; 
and, having formed their camp near the temple 
of Hercules, they ravaged the country. 

The Argives and their allies, when their 
enemy was thus in sight, having posted them- 
selves on a spot of ground by nature strong 
and difficult of approach, drew up in order, as 
ready to engage. The Lacedicmonians also 
immediately advanced towards them, and even 
approached so near as within the cast of a stone 
or a dart. But one of the old experienced 
Spartans, perceiving that they were to attack 
so difficult a post, roared out aloud to Agis,' 
that " he was going to repair one evil by an- 
other," as if, by his present ill-judged eager- 
ness, he was bent on making reparation for his 
censured retreat from Argos. Upon this, 
either struck with such an exclamation, or 
whether upon a sudden his own thoughts sug- 
gested to him a diffi^rent conduct, he drew off 
his army again, with all possible expedition, 
before the battle could be joined. And, wheel- 
ing from thence into the Tegeatis, he turned a 
stream of water into the Mantinean, about 
which, as apt to do great damage to the lands 



« Pltitarrli e.iys it wns an apophtliesm of lliis Apis, 
Dial Lared.Tnionians never a«k oonrcriiin'; their rne- 
mies. "Flow many are they ?" but " Where arc they ?" 
And that, wlicn ho was hindered from fighting at Rlan- 
tinca, he said, "Tiicy, who would rule over many, 
must fichl azainnt many :" and, hcins asked wliat was 
the number of the Laceda-monians, he replied " Enow 
to beat cowards." 



on which side soever it flowed, the Mantineans 
and Tegeatifi are eternally at blows. It was 
his scheme to draw down the Argives and their 
allies from their strong post, on the eminence, 
in order to prevent the turning of this stream, 
so soon as they knew it was in agitation, and 
thus to gain an opportunity of fighting in the 
plain. In pursuance of this, he halted the 
whole day upon the stream, and accomplished 
its diversion. But the Argives and their allies, 
surprised at this sudden and precipitate retreat, 
had been, at first, unable to conjecture what it 
meant. At length, when the enemy was to- 
tally withdrawn, and quite out of their view, 
after lying inactively in their posts, and no 
orders received for a pursuit, they began a 
second time to lay heavy imputations on their 
own commanders ; — that, " on the former oc- 
casion, the Lacedaemonians, when fairly caught 
near Argos, had been suffered to escape ; that 
now again, though they were openly flying, not 
a soul must pursue them, but, through shame- 
ful indolence, their enemies are preserved, and 
themselves are treacherously betrayed." The 
commanders, upon the first noise of these 
clamours, were highly chagrined, but after- 
wards they marched them down from the emi- 
nence, and, advancing into the plain, encamped 
them there, as determined to fight the enemy. 
The day following, the Argives and allies were 
drawn up to be in readiness for action, should 
the enemy appear. And the Lacedsemonians, 
marching away from the stream to re-occupy 
their former camp near the temple of Hercules, 
on a sudden perceived that the whole body of 
their foes were ready drawn up in order of bat- 
tle, and had quitted their strong post on the 
eminence. 

At this crisis, the Lacedaemonians were 
struck with a greater astonishment than the 
memory of man could parallel. For now, in 
an interval of time exceeding short, they were 
bound to get every thing in readiness for fight : 
yet, such was their diligence, that in an instant 
they were formed into a beautiful array, Agis, 
their king, issuing all the necessary orders, ac- 
cording to law ; for, when a king leadeth their 
armies, all orders are given by him : he him- 
self declareth what he willeth to be done to 
the general officers ;^ they carry his orders to 
the colonels ; ^ these to the captains ; * who 
afterwards forward them to the subalterns ; * 



» Polemarrhs. 
« rentcrontatora. 



» LorhaL'Ps. 
* Eiiomuturclis 



YEAR XIV.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



205 



by whom they were communicated to all the ' 
private men under their respective commands. I 
The orders, when any such are requisite, are 
in this method dispersed and circulated with 
the greatest expedition : for, in the Lacedaemo- 
nian armies, almost the whole soldiery, few 
only excepted, have a command assigned in 
regular subordination ; and the care of execu- 
ting orders is incumbent upon numbers. 

In their present array, the left wing consist- 
ed of the Skiritaj, who, of all the Lacedasmo- 
nians, ever claim this post as their peculiar right ; 
next them were posted the Brasidean soldiers 
who had served in Thrace, accompanied by 
those who had lately been honoured with the 
freedom of Sparta ; then, along the line, were 
regularly posted all the troops which were com- 
posed of pure Lacedsemonians ; next to them 
stood the Hereans of Arcadia, and beyond 
them the Maenalians. In the right wing were 
the Tegeatae, but in the utmost extent of it 
some few Lacedeemonians. Their cavalry was 
equally posted on both the wings : and in this 
form was the Lacedaemonian disposition made. 

On the side of the enemy, the Mantineans 
had the right wing, because the business fell 
upon their ground ; next to them were the 
allies from Arcadia; then a picked body of 
Argives, to the number of a thousand, who 
long had been exercised in the study of arms 
at the public school at Argos ; and next to 
them stood the rest of the Argive forces : these 
were followed by their own confederates, the 
Cleoneans and Orneata?. The Athenians were 
ranged in the outermost body, and composed 
the left wing, supported by their own cavalry. 
Such was the order and disposition on both 
sides. 

The army of the Lacedyemonians had the 
appearance of superior numbers: but exactly 
to write the number, either of the several 
bodies on each side, or of their whole force, I 
own myself unable. The amount of the Lace- 
daemonians was not known, because of the pro- 
found secrecy observed in their polity ; and the 
amount of their enemies, because of the osten- 
tation ordinary to mankind in magnifying their 
own strength, hath been still disbelieved. How- 
ever, from the following computation, an in- 
quirer may discover the number of the Lacedae- 
monians, who on this occasion were drawn up 
in the field. 

Besides the Skiritae, who were in number 
fiix hundred, seven battalions were in this en- 



gagement. Now in every battalion there were 
four companies ; and, in every company, four 
platoons ; in the first rank of every platoon 
were four fighting soldiers. In regard to depth 
they were not equally formed, as every colonel 
determined the depth at his own private discre- 
tion ; but generally they were drawn up eight 
deep. The front line of their whole force, ex- 
cepting the Skiritae, consisted of four hundred 
and forty-eight men.' 

When both sides were ready, the small res- 
pite before the engagement was employed by 
the several commanders in animating the sol- 
diers under their respective orders. 

To the Mantineans it was urged, — that 
"■ the points, for which they were going to fight, 
were their country and their future fate, either 
rule or slavery ; that, of rule, whose sweets 
they had known, they might not be divested, 
and that they might never feel again what 
slavery is." 

To the Argives, — it was " for their ancient 
sovereignty, and the equal share of dignity they 
had once enjoyed in Peloponnesus, now timely 
to prevent an eternal submission to such losses, 
and earn revenge for the many injuries a neigh- 
bouring state, unrelenting in its enmity, had 
done them." 

But to the Athenians, — that, "in honour, 
they were obliged to signalize their valour in a 
conspicuous nvinner, in the company of numer- 
ous and gallant allies : that should they gain 
a victory over the Lacedaemonians on Pelopon- 
nesian ground, their own empire would be 
established and enlarged, and no enemy would 
ever again presume to invade their territories." 

And in this manner were the Argives and 
their confederates animated to the fight. 



» The Lacedsemonian mora, or brigade, consisted of 
four lochi, or battalions, equal to 20-J8 men : for a 
lochos, or battalion, consisted of four pcntecosties, or 
companies, equal to 512 men •,aipentecost7j, or company, 
of four enomatia, or platoons, equal to 128 men; and 
each enomatia or platoon, consisted of 32. This is the 
account of Thucydides, who computes the platoon by 4 
in front and 8 in depth. The platoon consisted there- 
fore of 32 ; which, multiplied by 4, is equal to 128, the 
number of a company ; which also multiplied by 4. is 
equal to .'512, the number of a battalion. The number 
of battalions was seven, which shows the number of 
Lacedaemonians to have been 3584; and then with the 
addition of 600 Skiritw, who were posted on the left, to 
have amounted, in the whole, to 4184 men. Or again, 
the whole front line, is equal to 448, multiplied by 8, 
the number in depth, is equal to 3584, added to GOO 
SJciritm, is equal to 4184, 



200 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book v. 



But the Laccdaeraonians were encouraging 
one another, and, during martial strains enjoined 
by their discipline, like men of bravery as they 
were, each animated his neighbour with the 
recital of the gallant acts they had performed 
together. They were persons, who knew that 
a long experience in the toils of war conduceth 
more to preservation, than a short verbal ha- 
rangue, how finely soever delivered. 

And now the armies were mutually ap- 
proaching : the Argives and their allies ad- 
vanced in a brisk and angry manner ; but the 
LacedjEmonians moved slowly forwards to the 
sound of many flutes, the music which their 
laws ordained; not from any religious motive, 
but for advancing with equal steps, keeping 
time with the notes, to prevent all disorders in 
the ranks ; accidents very frequent in large 
armies wIHJst drawing to an encounter.' 

But, during the approach, Agis the king 
bethought himself of making a new disposition. 
— It is the constant case with all armies, that, 
upon the right, their wings, whilst they ap- 
proach one another, extend themselves too far, 
60 that constantly, on both sides, the left wing 
is overreached and flanked by the enemy's 
right. This proceedeth from the dread every 
soldier lieth under of being exposed on his 
unarmed side, which maketh him eager to get 
it covered by the shield of the next person on 
his right, and positive that a firm closing to- 
gether in this manner, will render them im- 
penetrable to the shock of the enemy. This 
turn of the body is first begun by the right- 



> Milton hath made use of this Lacedemonian march 
to adorn and raise his own noble poetry. It was full 
and stron? in his imaginaliDn, when he wrote the fol- 
lowing lines. Paradise Lost, hook I. 

" Anon they move 
Id perfect philanz, to the Dorian raood 
Of flutes and soft recorders ; such as raised 
To heiih' of noblest temper heroes old, 
Amning to bailie ; and, instead of rage, 
Dtliberale valonr breathed, firm, and unmoved 
Wilb dread of death to flight or foul retreat : 
Nor wanting power to mitigate and suage, 
With solemn to-jches, troubled thoughts, and chase 
Anguish, and doubt, and fear, and sorrow, tnd pain, 
From mortal or immortal minds. Thus they, 
Breathing united force, with fixed thought, 
Moved on in silence to soft pipes, that charm'd 
Their pa'oful steps o'er the burn'd soil : And novr, 
Advanced in view, (hey stand, a horrid front 
of dreadful length and daz/Iing arms, in icuise 
Of warriors old »vi(h order'd spear and shield, 
Awaiiing what command their mighiy chief 
Had to injprwe. He through ihe armed files 
Darts his experienced eye ; and -ood, traverte 
The while battalion, vioTs their order due." 



hand man of the whole front, and is the result 
of his constant care to shift his defenceless 
side from the aim of the foe ; and the dread of 
being in the same manner exposed obligeth ail 
the rest to follow his motion. And thus, in 
the present approach, the Mantineans in their 
wing had far overreached the ^'kiritje ; but the 
Lacedaemonians and Tegeatse had done so, 
more in regard to the Athenians, in propor- 
tion as they exceeded them in numbers. Agis, 
therefore, fearing lest the left wing of the 
Lacedsemonians might be quite surrounded, 
and judging that the Mantineans quite too far 
overreached them, sent orders to the Skiritae 
and Brasideans to wheel away from the spot 
where they were first posted, and fill up the 
extremity of the line, so as to render it equal 
to the Mantineans ; and, to supply the void 
thus made, he ordered from the right wing, 
two battalions, commanded by general ofl[icers, 
Hipponoidas and Aristocles, to repair thither, 
and falling in, to close up the ranks ; judging 
that their own right would still be more than 
suflicient to execute their parts, and the wing 
opposed to the Mantineans might, by this dis- 
position, be properly strengthened. But, as 
he issued these orders in the very onset and 
close of battle, it happened that Aristocles and 
Hipponoidas absolutely refused to change their 
post, (though for such disobedience, as ap- 
parently the result of cowardice, they were 
afterwards banished from Sparta) ; and before 
the new disposition could be completed, the 
enemy had begun to charge. Upon the re- 
fusal of these two battalions to change their 
post, Agis countermanded those marching to 
strengthen the SkiritsB to their former places, 
who now were unable to fall into the ranks, 
or close together with those whom they had 
quitted : but on this occasion, more remarkable 
than ever, the Lacedaemonians, though in all 
respects outdone in the military art, gave sig- 
nal proofs of their superiority in true manly 
valour. 

For, to come to particulars, when once they 
were at blows with the enemy, the right wing 
of the Mantineans routs the Skirita; and Bra- 
sideans. Then the same Mantineans, sup- 
ported by their confederates and the thousand 
picked Argives, falling in at the void in the 
Laced-xmonian line, which was not yet filled 
up, did great execution upon them ; for, taking 
them in flank, they entirely broke them, drove 
them for shelter among their carriages, and 



YEAR XIV.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



207 



made a slaughter of the old men who were 
appointed for their guard. And in this quar- 
ter, the Lacedaemonians were clearly van- 
quished. 

But in the other quarters, and especially in 
the centre, where Agis the king was posted, 
and round him the horse-guards, styled the 
three hundred, falling upon those troops which 
were composed of the elder Argivcs, and them 
which are called the pentelochi, and upon the 
Cleoneans, and Orneatae, and those Athenians 
who ranked along with them, they broke them 
in an instant, so that many of them durst not 
stand to exchange a blow, but, so soon as they 
felt the Lacedaemonian shock, turned about 
at once, and others were trampled under foot 
in the great hurry they were in to secure their 
escape. 

But when the main body of the Argives and 
their allies was in this quarter routed, their 
foot, on both the flanks, were instantly dis- 
comfited. Now, also, the right of the Lace- 
daemonians and Tegcatae, by the advantage of 
superior numbers, had overreached and en- 
compassed the Athenians. These now, on 
all hands, were beset with danger ; in this 
quarter they were surrounded by their enemies, 
in another they were already vanquished ; and 
they must have suffered the most of any part 
of the army, had it not been for the excellent 
support their own cavalry gave them. It 
happened also that Agis, when he perceived 
that the Mantineans and the thousand Argives 
had got the better on the left, commanded 
the whole army to wheel off to the support of 
the vanquished. And whilst this was execu- 
ting, the Athenians laid hold of the interval, 
which this motion of the enemy, and their 
drawing off from around them occasioned, to 
secure their own escape without any opposi- 
tion, accompanied by the Argives, who were 
also vanquished with them. 

But the Mantineans, and those who fought 
in company with them, and the picked band of 
Argives, were now no longer intent on pres- 
sing upon their adversaries ; but, perceiving 
their own side to be completely vanquished, 
and the Lacedaemonians approaching to their 
attack, they turned about and fled. Yet num- 
bers of them perished, ^nd those chiefly Man- 
tineans ; for the greatest part of the picked 
band of Argives completed their escape. 

The flight however was not precipitate, nor 
the distance to a place of safety great. For 



the liacedacmonians, till the enemy flieth, main-* 
tain their combats with long and steady toil; 
but, after a route, pursue them neither long nor 
far. 

And thus, or very nearly thus, was the pro- 
cedure of the whole battle, the greatest that 
for many ages had been fought amongst Gre- 
cians, and where the competition lay between 
most renowned and flourishing states. The 
Lacedaemonians, amassing together the arms of 
their enemies who had been slain, immediately 
erected a trophy, and rifled the bodies of the 
dead. They also took up their own dead, and 
carried them to Tegea, ;where they received 
the rites of sepulture ; and also delivered, upon 
truce, the slain of their enemy. There fell 
of the Argives, and Orneatae, and Cleoneans, 
seven hundred ; and two hundred of the Man- 
tineans; two hundred also of the Athenians, 
including the ^^ginetse, and their several com- 
manders. On theLacedcEmonian side, — as the 
confederates were never hard pressed, what 
loss they suffered is scarcely deserving of no- 
tice ; and the exact number of their own dead 
it is diflicult to discover, but it was reported to 
have been about three hundred. 

When a battle was certainly to be fought, 
Pleistionax, the other king, marched out to 
their support, with the whole body of citizens, 
both old men and youths. But when he was 
advanced as far as Tegea, he received the news 
of a victory, and returned to Sparta. The 
Lacedaemonians also sent messengers to coun- 
termand their allies from Corinth, and from 
without the isthmus. And, being themselves 
returned to Sparta, after giving dismission to 
their allies, as the Carneian solemnities were 
at hand, they celebrate the festival. The im- 
putation also of cowardice, at that time laid to 
their charge by the rest of Greece, because of 
their misfortune at Sphacteria, and some other 
instances of impolitic and dilatory conduct, by 
this one action, they completely purged away. 
Now it was determined that their depression 
had been merely the result of fortune, but that 
in inward bravery they were still themselves. 

The day before this battle was fought, it 
happened that the Epidaurians, with the whole 
of their strength, had made an incursion into 
Argia, as left defenceless, and had done great 
execution on the guards, left behind at the 
general march of the Argives. 

Three thousand heavy-armed Eleans, as au.Y- 
iliaries to the Mantineans, came up after the 



208 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book v. 



battle ; as did also a thousand Athenians to join 
the former body, upon which the whole alli- 
ance marched immediately against Epidaurus, 
whilst the Lacedaemonians were solemnizing 
the Carneian festival. After an equal distri- 
bution of the work, they began to raise a cir- 
cumvallation around that city. The rest, in- 
deed, soon desisted; but the Athenians, con- 
formably to their orders, completed theirs round 
the eminence on which stood the temple of 
Juno. To guard this work, the whole alliance 
left behind a sufficient number draughted from 
their several bodies, and then departed to 
their respective homes. And the summer was 
now at an end. 

In the first commencement of the succeeding 
v.-inter, and after the celebration of the Car- 
neian festival, the Lacedaemonians immediately 
took the field ; and, advancing as far as Tegea, 
sent from thence to Argos proposals for an 
accommodation. There was already in that 
city a party in their intelligence, who were 
also bent in overturning the popular govern- 
ment at Argos; and, since the event of the 
late fatal battle, they were enabled to use more 
cogent arguments to persuade the many into 
the accommodation. Their scheme was, first 
to enter into truce with the Lacedaemonians, as 
preparatory to an alliance offensive and defen- 
sive, which was next in agitation ; and, this 
point carried, then immediately to execute their 
plot against the people. 

Lichas, son of Arcesilaus, the public host of 
the Argives, accordingly arriveth at Argos, 
charged to make two demands in the name of 
the Lacedaemonians ; the one, " whether war 
be still their option V the other, " how if their 
choice be peace l" Upon this a strong debate 
arose, for Alcibiades was present. But the 
party who acted in the Lacedaemonian interest, 
prevailed with the Argives to accept their pro- 
posals of an accommodation ; which were as 
followeth : 

" Thus resolved, by the Lacedaemonian coun- 
cil, to compound with the Argives. — 

" These to restore their children to the Or- 
chomcnians, and their men to the Maenalians ; 
to restore also the Lacedaemonians their citizens 
HOW detained at Mantinca ; to evacuate Epi- 
daurus and demolish their works. 

" And the Athenians, if they will not quit 
Epidaurus, to bo declared enemies to the Argives 
and to the Lacedaemonians, and to the confe- 



derates of the Lacedaemonians and to the con- 
federates of the Argives. 

" And, if the Lacedaemonians have in their 
power any young men, to release them to all 
the states. 

" In relation to the god,' we consent that 
an oath be administered to the Epidaurians, 
and we grant the form to be prescribed by the 
Argives. 

" The states of Peloponnesus, both small 
and great to be, none excepted, free, accordii. 
to their own primitive constitutions. 

" And, if any state without Peloponnesus 
shall enter offensively into the lands of Pelo- 
ponnesus, succours to be united, in pursuance 
of a general consult of Peloponnesians about 
the determinate and most expedient methods. 

" All confederates of the Lacedaemonians 
whatever, without Peloponnesus, shall enjoy 
the same privileges as those of the Lacedaemo- 
nians and those of the Argives enjoy, each re- 
maining in free possession of their territories. 

" These articles to be communicated to the 
confederates, and ratification to be made, if 
they approve. If different methods seem ad- 
visable to the confederates, all parties to desist 
and return directly home." 

These proposals, by way of preliminary, the 
Argives accepted ; and the army of the La- 
cedaemonians was drawn off from Tegea to 
their own home. And afterwards, in the course 
of mutual negotiation, the same party at Argos 
prevailed upon their countrymen to renounce 
their alliance with the Mantineans and Eleans, 
and even with the Athenians, and to strike up 
a peace, and an alliance offensive and defen- 
sive, with the Lacedaemonians. The tenor of 
it was this : 

" Resolved thus, by the Lacedaemonians and 
the Argives, on a peace and an alliance offen- 
sive and defensive, for the term of fifty years. 

" They shall do justice to each other recipro- 
cally, with impartiality and equity, according 
to their several forms of law. 

" The other states in Peloponnesus, compre- 
hended in this peace and alliance, shall con- 
tinue in the enjoyment of their own laws, their 
own independence, holding the same territories, 
doing justice with impartiality and with equity, 
according to their several forms of law. 

t The Pytliinn Apollo. This article seems desigoad 
to adjust the qtinrrcl ahoiit the victim, related in the 
transactions of the last year. 



YEAR XV.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



209 



"All confederates of the Lacedaemonians 
whatever, without Peloponnesus, shall enjoy 
the same privileges with the Lacedaemonians 
themselves ; and the Argive confederates shall 
enjoy the same with the Argives themselves ; 
each holding their respective territories. 

"If a joint expedition be at any time requi- 
site, a consultation to be held, by the Lacedae- 
monians and the Argives, about the determinate 
and most expedient methods of issuing orders 
to the rest of the alliance. 

" But, if any controversy arise between the 
states, either those within or those without 
Peloponnesus, either concerning their bound- 
aries or any other point, it shall be deter- 
mined by judges. 

« And, if any confederate state have a dis- 
pute with another state, they shall go with a 
reference, to that state which to the contending 
states shall be thought most impartial. Private 
persons, however, to be judged by the laws of 
that state to which they are subject." 

This peace, and such an alliance, was now 
perfected ; and the reciprocal damages of war 
and all other offences were now buried in obliv- 
ion. And, having already settled all points to 
general satisfaction, they concurred in a suf- 
frage, " to receive no herald nor embassy from 
the Athenians, till they were withdrawn out 
of Peloponnesus, and had given up their forti- 
fications at Epidaurus ;" and farther, " for the 
future to make neither peace nor war but with 
joint concurrence." Their attention was also 
extended to objects more remote; and in con- 
junction they despatched ambassadors to the 
cities in Thrace and to Perdiccas, and seduced 
Perdiccas to swear adherence to their league : 
not that he instantly declared his revolt from 
the Athenians, but he was bent on accomplish- 
ing it ever since he saw the Argives had done 
it ; for he was originally descended from Argos. 
They renewed also their ancient oaths to the 
Chalcideans, and strengthened them by the 
addition of new. 

The Argives also despatched an embassy to 
the Athenians, requiring them to quit the 
works they had raised at Epidaurus. The 
latter, sensible that their soldiers were but a 
handful of men when compared with those 
who were associated with them in that service, 
sent Demosthenes to draw them off. He, 
upon his arrival, pretending to solemnize some 
martial game without the fortress, when the 
rest of the garrison was gone out to the spec- 
34 



tacle, barred fast the gates. And afterwards, 
the Athenians, having renewed the peace with 
them, surrendered the fortifications they had 
raised, into the hands of the Epidaurians. 

When the Argives had in this manner gone 
off from the alliance, the Mantineans also, who 
at first stood out, finding at length that with- 
out the Argives they could do nothing of them- 
selves, thought proper to accommodate their 
disputes with the Lacedasmonians, and resigned 
their command over the cities of Arcadia. 
The Lacedaemonians also and Argives, to the 
number of a thousand each, marched in com- 
pany to Sicyon ; where, principally by the 
presence of the Lacedaemonians, the govern- 
ment was shifted into the hands of a smaller 
number. And after transacting such points 
in concert, they soon procured the demolition 
of the popular government at Argos ; and an 
oligarchy, suited to the Lacedaemonian model, 
was erected in its stead. 

As the winter was now in its close, these 
transactions ran out nearly into the spring; 
and the fourteenth year of the war expired. 

TEAR XT.' 

In the following summer, the Dictideans of 
Athos revolted from the Athenians to the 
Chalcideans ; and the Lacedaemonians resettled 
the state of Achaia, which for a time had been 
under a management not agreeable to them. 

The people of Argos also, combining gra- 
dually together and resuming their spirits, made 
an assault upon the few. They waited for a 
favourable opportunity, till the festival of the 
naked games was celebrating at Lacedaemon. 
A battle was fought within the precincts of 
Argos, in which the people was the victor ; 
some of their opponents they slew, and others 
they doomed to perpetual exile. The Lacedae- 
monians, when their adherents implored their 
succour, were too dilatory in moving ; but at 
last they adjourned the games, and marched 
away to their support; and hearing, when 
they were come to Tegea, that " the few 
were vanquished," they determined to pro- 
ceed no farther, maugre all the entreaties of the 
new exiles ; but, retreating forthwith to Sparta, 
they resumed the celebration of the games. 
Yet, being afterwards attended by deputations 
from those in Argos, as well as by such as had 

» Before Christ 420. 



210 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book v. 



been lately banished, in the presence of the ' 
whole confederacy, after many arguments had ' 
been urged on both sides, they came to a re- 
solution, that " the Argives in the city were 
guilty of injustice ;" and a decree was passed, 
that " they should march against Argos." 
But, after all, their proceedings are dilatory 
and remiss. 

In the meantime, the people of Argos, 
dreading the Lacedaemonian strength, and re- 
addressing themselves again to Athens for a 
renewal of alliance, and proceeding to execute 
a plan which they thought the strongest ex- 
pedient of preservation, built long walls quite 
down to the sea, that, in case they should be 
blocked up by land, all proper supplies might 
be thrown into the city by sea, through the good 
offices of the Athenians. To this scheme of 
new fortifications some cities also of Pelopon- 
nesus were privy underhand. The whole body 
of the Argives without distinction, the citizens, 
their wives, and their servants forwarded the 
work ; and from Athens they were supplied 
with carpenters and masons. And here the 
summer ended. 

Winter now succeeding, the Lacedaemonians, 
when advertised of these new fortifications, 
march their forces against Argos, their own, 
and all those of the allies, excepting the Co- 
rinthian. Some new projects in their favour 
were now also in agitation within Argos itself. 
The whole army was commanded by Agis, the 
son of Archidamus, king of the Lacedaemo- 
nians. The new turns they expected for their 
service took not efiect within the city ; but 
they made themselves masters of the new- 
erected walls, and levelled them with the 
ground. They also took Hysire, a town in 
Argia ; and having put all the freemen found 
within that place to the sword, they drew off, 
and dispersed to their several cities. 

After this, the Argives marched their force 
into Phliasia ; and, after ravaging that district, 
because the exiles from Argos had met with a 
reception there, they again retired : for many 
of those exiles had taken up their residence at 
Phlius. 

In the same winter, the Athenians, exaspe- 
rated against Pcrdiccas, prevented all man- 
ner of importations into IMacedonia. They 
charged him " with taking part in the late 
treaty, confirmed by the sanction of oaths, 
between the Argives and Lacedaemonians ; 
that, farther, when they had made great pre- 



parations against the Chalcideans of Thrace 
and Amphipolis, and Nicias, the son of Ni- 
ceratus, was appointed to command in that 
service, he had violated his obligations to act 
in concert, and that expedition came to no- 
thing purely through liis secession ; he was 
therefore an enemy to Athens." 

The winter expired in this manner ; and 
with it the fifteenth year of the war came also 
to an end. 

YEAR XVI.* 

When summer came on, Alcibiades, with 
twenty sail, arrived at Argos, where he seized 
three hundred of the citizens, whose fidelity to 
the Athenians, and adherence to the Lacede- 
monian interest, was still suspected ; and theso 
the Athenians secured in the neighbouring 
island, w'hich were subject to their dominion. 

The Athenians also undertook the reduc- 
tion of Melos with a naval force, consisting of 
thirty sail of Athenians, six of Chians, and 
two of Lesbians ; on board of which were 
transported twelve hundred heavy-armed Athe- 
nians, three hundred archers, and twenty who 
drew the bow on horseback. The number 
also of their dependents, from the continent 
and islands, which attended, was about fifteen 
hundred heavy-armed. The Melians are a 
colony of the Lacedaemonians, ^ and had there- 

» Before Christ 416. 

» The ori;.'inal of this roloiiy is curioiis. arcording to 
the acronnt given of it by Plutarch. — " When the Tyr- 
rhenes were masters of Lemnos and Iinhms, and made 
a practice of ravisliin? the wives of tiie Atlenians, at 
Br«uron, a mixed breed was tie conseq\ienrc; whom, 
as half-barbarians, the Athenians drove out of tie isles. 
Tims exiled, they repaired to Ttnnarus, and were use- 
ful to the Spartans in tlieir war ajrainst tl e Helots. 
They were afterwards rewarded for tl eir <;ood services 
with the freedom of Sparta and liheriy of intermar- 
riage. Yet, not beina allowed tlie honour of serving 
the offices of the state, or a seat in the rounril, they 
became afterwards suspected, as cahaHins together for 
had dosisns, and projectins to overthrow tie constitu- 
tion : the Laceda'monians tl erefore apprel ended them 
all; and, throwing them into prison, kept fliem con- 
fined under a stroni guard, till tliey could find out 
clear and incontestable evidence airninst tiiem. The 
wives of the prisoners came in a Inidy to the prison, 
and, after much prayer and entreaty, were at length 
admitted !)y the guard to the sight and disfourse of 
their husbands. When once they had cained access, 
they ordered them immediately to strip, and chanfro 
clothes with them: to leave them their own, and, 
dressed in those of their wives, to make their escape 
directly in that disguise. It was done; the women 
staid behind, determined to endure whatever might be 



YEAR XVI.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



211 



' fore refused to receive law from the Athenians 
in the same manner as the inhabitants of the 
other islands received it. At first, however, 
they observed a strict neutrality ; but, in pro- 
cess of time, when the Athenians, by ravaging 
their country, would have obliged them to act 
offensively, they openly took part in the war 
against them. 

With a force so strong as hath been de- 
scribed, Cleomedes, the son of Lycomedes, 
and Tisias, the son of Tisimachus, landed and 
encamped upon the island. Yet, before they 
proceeded to hostilities, they sent a deputation 
from the army to demand a conference ; whom 
the Melians refused to introduce into the as- 
sembly of the people, but, in the presence only 
of the magistrates and the few, commanded 
them to deliver their instructions. Upon this 
the Athenian deputation expressed themselves 
as followeth: 

« Since to the people in full assembly we 
are precluded from speaking, lest the many, — 
hearing their true interest declared at once by 
us in a continued discourse, and proved by ar- 
guments fitted to persuade and too strong to be 
refuted, — might be wrought into our views, 
for such, we are sensible, is the plain construc- 
tion of this our guarded audience by the few ; 
to you also, who now sit here, we recommend 
a method of making that point yet more secure, 
— that, to the reasons we offer, you reserve not 
your objections for one formal deliberate reply, 
but, in case we offer any seeming incongruity, 
you immediately interrupt us, and discuss the 
point. And tell us, first, whether or not this 
proposal be agreeable." 

The Melians, who composed the synod, an- 
swered thus: 

" The candour of sucb leisurely debate, for 
mutual information, is not to be disapproved ; 
and yet there seemeth to be great inconsistency 
between such candour and those warlike pre- 



the consequence ; and the guards, deceived by ap- 
pearances, let out the husbands instead of the wives. 
They marched o.T and seized Taygeta ; then seduced 
the Helots to revolt, and promised to support them ; 
which struck a great terror amongst the Spartrns. 
They sent to treat with them, and made up the matter 
on these co-iditions : 'that they should have their 
wives restored safe to them ; should he furnished with 
money and vessels for removal ; and, wlien settled in 
another country, sliould be reckoned a colony and 
kinsmen of tlie Larednemonians.' — A I ody of them 
settled some t'me after in the isle of Melos." Of the 
Virtues of IV omen. 



parations, with which you no longer intend 
hereafter, but in present act have already beset 
us. For we perceive, that hither you are 
come to be authoritative judges of your own 
plea, and that the decision must needs prove 
fatal to us : since if, superior in debate, we 
for that reason refuse submission, our portion 
must be war ; and, if we allow j'our pica, from 
that moment we become your slaves." 

Athenians. — " To what purpose thisl If 
here you are met together to retail your suspi- 
cions of future events, or to talk of any thing 
but the proper means of extricating and pre- 
serving your state from the present and mani- 
fest dangers which environ it, we had better be 
silent ; but, if the latter be your purpose, let 
us come to the point." 

Melians. — « There is reason for it, and 
there ought to be forgiveness, when men, so 
situated as we are, are liable to much distrac- 
tion both in speech and thought. The point 
for which we are assembled is, it is true, no 
less than our future preservation : if, therefore, 
it must be so, let the conference proceed in the 
method you require." 

Athen. — « As, therefore, it is not our pur- 
pose to amuse you with pompous details, — how, 
after completely vanquishing the Mede, we had 
a right to assume the sovereignty, or how, pro- 
voked by the wrongs received from you, we 
come hither to earn redress, — we shall wave 
all parade of words that have no tendency to- 
wards conviction : and, in return, insist from 
you, that you reject all hopes of persuading us 
by frivolous remonstrances, — that, as a colony 
of the LacedjEmonians, you were incapacitated 
from accompanying our arms, or that wrongs 
in any shape you have never done us. — But, 
these things apart, let us lay all stress on such 
points as may really, on both sides, be judged 
persuasive : since of this you are as strongly 
convinced as we ourselves are sensible of it, — 
that, in all human competitions, equal wants 
alone produce equitable determination ; and, 
in what terms soever the powerful enjoin obe- 
dience, to those the weak are obliged to sub- 
mit." 

Mel. — « If this be so, we boldly aver, — 
for, as you have discarded justice from the 
question, and substituted interest in its place, 
we must follow the precedent, — that you also 
itconcerneth, we should not be deprived of the 
common privilege of men ; but that to human 
creatures, ever liable to so dangerous a loss, the 



212 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book v. 



pleas of reason and equity, even though urged 
beyond their exact limitations, should be in- 
dulged and allowed their weight. And more 
to you than to others is this proper to be sug- 
gested, lest, after satiating revenge in all its 
fury, should you ever be overthrown, you may 
teach your enemies how you ought to be 
treated." 

Athex. — '< That affecteth us not: for, 
though to our share an overthrow of empire 
fall, the event would render us neither abject 
nor desponding ; because men, inured to en- 
larged command, as the Lacedsemonians for 
instance, are never terrible to the vanquished. 
But our contest, at present, is not against the 
Lacedaemonians. That revenge alone is terri- 
ble, when subjects tumultuously rebel, and gain 
the ascendant over such as were once their 
masters ; and truly, to avert such dangerous 
extremities, be the care intrusted to us. But, 
on the present occasion, that we are here for 
the enlargement of our own power, and that 
what we have to urge concerneth the preser- 
vation of the state of Melos — these are the 
points we are to establish. We are desirous 
to have our power extended over you without 
obstruction ; and your preservation to be amply 
secured for the common benefit of us both." 

Mel. — " And how can it turn out as bene- 
ficial for us to become your slaves as it will for 
you to be our masters 1" 

Athex. — " Plainly thus : — because, instead 
of suffering the extremities of conquest, you 
may merely become our subjects ; and we, by 
exempting you from a total destruction, shall 
gain your service." 

Mel. — '« But will not these terms content 
you : — that we be permitted to persevere in 
quiet : to be friends to you, instead of ene- 
mies; but, in regard to war, to be strictly 
neutral?" 

Athex. — " No : for all your enmity cannot 
hurt us so much as the acceptance of such 
friendship from you. The latter, to those over 
whom we rule, would suggest intimations of 
our weakness : your enmity is a proof of our 
power." 

Mel. — " Are your subjects then such sorry 
judges of equity and right, as to place upon the 
same level those who are under no manner of 
tie, and who were never indebted for their 
settlement to you, and those who, revolting 
from you, have been again reduced ?" 

Atiiex. — " Why should they noti They 



know such a sense of things may be well 
grounded in regard to both ; inasmuch as those, 
who are exempted from our yoke, owe such 
exemption to their own superior strength, and 
if we attack them not, it is the pure result of 
fear. And hence, the reduction of you, be- 
sides enlarging our empire, will invest it with 
more ample security ; especially when, seated 
on an island, you are bound to submit to the 
masters of the sea, and to remain henceforth 
too weak for resistance, unless your are victori- 
ous at the present crisis." 

Mel. — "■ Do you then conclude that what 
we have proposed is incompatible with your 
own security 1 — For since, excluding us from 
the plea of justice, you endeavour merely to 
persuade us into subserviency to your interest, 
we also are again necessitated to insist once 
more on the profitable to ourselves, and, by 
showing that with our welfare your own also 
coincideth, endeavour to prevail. — What think 
you of all those states which now stand neutral 
in your disputes 1 How will you avoid their im- 
placable hatred when, terrified at such your 
usage of us, they must live in constant expecta- 
tion of your hostilities 1 And whither can such 
conduct tend, but to enlarge the number of your 
declared enemies, and to constrain others, who 
never designed to be your foes, to take up arms 
against you, though to their own regret ?" 

Athex. — "That never can be: since from 
states seated on the continent we have nothing 
to apprehend ; they are under no immediate 
necessity of guarding their liberty against at- 
tacks from us. Those alone we dread who 
are seated in islands ; and who, like you, refuse 
our government ; or who, having felt the pains 
of subjection, are irritated against us. Such 
are most likely to have recourse to violent 
measures, and to plunge themselves and us into 
imminent dangers." 

Mel. — " If this be so ; — and if you, ye 
Athenians, can readily embark into so many 
perils to prevent the dissolution of your own 
empire ; if states, by you enslaved, can do as 
much to throw off your yoke ; — must it not be 
wretchedly base and cowardly in us, who yet 
are free, to leave any method, even to the last 
extremity, untried, of averting slavery 1" 

Athex. — " If you judge of things as wise 
men ought, we answer — Not. For the point 
in which your are at present concerned, is not^ 
trial of valour upon equal terms, in order to 
escape the reproach of cowardice ; but your 



YEAR XVI.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



213 



deliberations proceed at present about the 
means of self-preservation, that you may not 
be obliged to encounter those who must by far 
overpower you." 

Mel. — " But we, on the contrary, know, 
that the enterprises of war have sometimes very 
different events to those which superiority of 
numbers gave reason to expect ; and, in regard 
to ourselves, that, if we yield at once, eternal 
despair must be our fate ; but, by acting reso- 
lutely in our own defence, we may yet enter- 
tain a hope of success." 

Atken. — " Hope in this manner is ever 
applied to be the solace of danger. And truly, 
in situations which can afford to be disap- 
pointed, though ever prejudicial, it is not al- 
ways fatal. But such as idly lavish their last 
resource, their very all, upon hope, (for it is 
prodigal by nature,) are only by their own ruin 
convinced of its delusion ; nay, when its delu- 
sion is thus by sad experience discovered, and 
men should guard themselves against it, it will 
not yet let go its hold in the human heart. 
Choose not, therefore, so fatal a resource for 
yourselves in your present destitute situation, 
hangmg as you are on the very brink of ruin. 
Let not your conduct resemble the foolish be- 
haviour of the mob of mankind ; who, though 
by human means their safety might be earned, 
yet, when calamity hath chased away all visible 
hopes of redress, betake themselves to others 
of a darker cast, to divinations and to oracles, 
and all such vain expedients as hope suggesteth 
to draw them to their destruction." 

Mel. — " Difficult indeed, as we apprehend, 
and you well know, the contest must prove to 
us against your strength and fortune, matched 
as we are so unequally together. Yet the 
confidence still supporteth us, that in fortune, 
since of divine disposal, we shall not be in- 
ferior, as with innocence on our side we stand 
against injustice ; that, farther, our deficiencies 
in strength will be amplified by the addition of 
Lacedaemonian aid ; since it is incumbent upon 
them to support us, if from no other motive, 
yet from the ties of blood and a sense of 
honour. And thus it is not entirely without 
good grounds that we can form the resolution 
to withstand your efforts." 

Athex. — <' Nor have we any reason to ap- 
prehend, on our own account, that the divine 
benevolence will not equally exert itself for us ; 
because neither our opinions nor our acts are 
worse than those of the rest of mankind, either 



in regard to the worship of the gods or an ac- 
knowledgment of their providence. For of the 
divine nature we think like the rest of the 
world ; and of men, that beyond a scruple they 
are impelled, by the necessary bent of their 
nature, to seize dominion wherever they have 
power. As for ourselves, we were not the 
authors of this constitution, nor were we the 
first who digested it into practice. We found 
it already in force ; we have accordingly applied 
it, and shall leave it behind us for the practice 
of every future age ; conscious that you your- 
selves, and every other state, ^vested with 
equal power, would make the same exertion of 
it. And truly, so far as relateth to the gods, 
we have no more reason to distrust their pro- 
tection than our neighbours. But your senti- 
ments of the Lacedaemonians are such, that you 
are confident of support from them because it 
will be base in them to refuse it. Here we 
bless your simplicity, but envy not your folly. 
The Lacedaemonians, we allow, amongst one 
another, and in paying all due regard to the 
laws of their country, give ample proofs of 
honour and virtue : but their behaviour towards 
the rest of mankind, though it would open a 
large field of censure were it to be minutely 
examined, yet at present shall be shown by one 
concise declaration, — that according to the best 
lights we have been able to collect, they repute 
as honourable the things which please them, 
and as just the things which promote their in- 
terest. Such maxims are not in the least con- 
ducive to your preservation: it is all chimera." 

Mel. — " No. We ground our hopes of relief 
from them upon their own clear conviction of 
what their interest enjoineth them. This never 
can suffer them to entertain a thought of 
abandoning the Melians, who are a colony of 
their own ; of being faithless to the states of 
Greece, who wish them well ; or of promoting 
the schemes of the common foe." 

Athen. — " Of consequence you imagine, — 
that their interest is connected with your se- 
curity ; that the duties of justice should in hon- 
our be observed, though attended with dangers. 
But these are maxims which the Lacedaemo- 
nians, least of all men, have resolution enough 
to observe in fact." * 

Mel. — " We have the strongest grounds to 
imagine, that in our defence they will hazard 
any dangers, from a sense that their own pre- 
servation dependeth more on us than any other 
people, as we are finely situated for doing them 
z2 



214 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book v. 



service in Peloponnesus, and in afToction are [ 
more faithfully attached to them through the 
bands of consanguinity." 

Atiiex. — " But the certainty of obtaining 
succour in the intervals of need seemeth not to ' 
depend so much on the merit of those who im- 
plore it, as on the consciousness of superior 
strength in those who are implored to give it : ! 
a maxim this, to which no state adheres so 
strictly as the Lacediemonian. Hence, ever 
through a diffidence of their own domestic 
force, they never dare even to invade their 
neighbours ■#thout the concurrence of numer- 
ous allies. There cannot, therefore, be the least 
room to expect, that they will transport an 
aid into an island whilst we are masters of the 
sea." 

Mel. — " Not perhaps of their own forces ; 
but they have confederates enough to employ 
in this service. The sea of Crete is wide and 
spacious ; a passage through it, even the lords 
of the sea will find it more difficult to obstruct, 
than those who are intent on stealing it, to 
effect with safety. Or, grant they miscarry in 
the attempt, at worst they can make a diversion 
upon your territory, or against the remainder 
of your dependents who escaped the efforts of 
Brasidas. And then your attention and your 
arms must be drawn from a quarter where you 
have no right to fix them, for the necessary 
defence of your own home and your own ap- 
pendage." 

Athex. — " Though such turns may inter- 
vene, your own experience should teach you to 
distrust them : for you are not, cannot be ig- 
norant, that the Athenians never yet would 
condescend to raise a siege through hostile 
dread. But we cannot avoid observing, that, 
in the whole course of this debate, though de- 
clared by you to be held as the means of your 
preservation, you have not so much as started 
one single point upon which wise men can pre- 
sume to fasten the least confidence of redress. 
Your firmest security is placed in the faint hope 
of some distant contingencies; but your pre- 
sent strength is merely trifling against the ex- 
tensive scope of your antagonists. Nay, vic- 
tims you must fall to your own absurd pre- 
sumptions, unless, when we are once withdrawn 
to give you time to consult, you determine to 
try some other expedient. You will then no 
longer be controlled by that sense of shame, 
vi'hich, when dishonour glarcth before and dan- 



ger presseth on, precipitateth men into ruin. 
For though they see, with their eyes quite 
open, into what an abyss they are going to 
plunge, yet to avoid the imputation of what 
the world styleth dishonour, — so prevalent is 
the force of one bewitching sound ! — though 
vanquished by it, they scorn to yield to reason, 
wilfully embarrassing themselves with incura- 
ble calamities, and contracting a more shame- 
ful weight of dishonour, through their own mad 
obstinacy, than fortune could award them. 
Such consequences, you are now concerned by 
mature deliberations to avoid. You are next 
to reflect, that no shame can attend your plying 
under the force of a most formidable state ; a 
state which designeth to make the moderate 
demands alone, — that you would accept her al- 
liance, and securely enjoy your territory upon 
the condition only to pay her tribute ; and, 
when war or safety are left to your own op- 
tion, that you would not peevishly prefer the 
worse. For those are the men to maintain 
themselves in credit and prosperity, who never 
suffer their equals to insult them, who pay 
proper regard to their superiors, and towards 
their inferiors behave with moderation. Re- 
flect on these points whilst we withdraw ; and 
remember, again and again, that your country 
now calleth for all your prudence, since, by the 
single deliberation of this single day, as either 
it taketh a prosperous or sinister turn, her fate 
will be determined." 

Here the Athenians withdrew from the con- 
ference ; and the Melians, after being some 
time alone, and resolving finally to reject what 
they had already refused, gave in their answer 
thus : 

" We continue, Athenians, in the very same 
sentiments we have already declared. We 
shall not in an instant of time abandon that 
liberty which, in the free possession of our 
own state, we have enjoyed for the space of 
seven hundred years ; which still we shall 
spare no endeavours to preserve, intrusting it 
to that fortune which, by divine permission, 
hath hitherto preserved it, and to that redress 
we expect from human aid and the Laceda;- 
monians. But thus much again we offer : — 
to be friends to you, enemies to neither, on 
condition you quit our lands, after an accom- 
modation ratified between us to our reciprocal 
satisfaction." 

The Melians in this manner delivered their 



YEAR XVI.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



215 



final answer. But the Athenians, the very 
moment they quitted the place of conference, 
uttered themselves thus: 

" You, Melians, alone of all mankind, are 
the persons, so far as we can judge, who re- 
gard future contingencies as an over-balance 
for instant dangers, and, through mad presump- 
tion, value things yet invisible as really actual. 
But, the greater your dependence, the more 
rash your confidence upon Lacedsemonians, 
upon fortune, and upon hope, the more abun- 
dantly fatal your delusions will prove." 

And, this said, the Athenian deputation re- 
turned to their camp. 

But the Athenian commanders, upon this 
refusal of submission from the Melians, applied 
themselves instantly to the acts of war ; and, 
dividing the work in shares to the several 
parties in their army, completely shut up the 
Melians in a line of circumvallation. And, 
when this was perfected, and a sufficient num- 
ber, both of the Athenians and their depen- 
dents, were appointed to siay behind and con- 
tinue the blockade both by land and sea, they 
departed with the bulk of their forces. Those, 
farther, who were left for this service, staid 
behind and continued the blockade. 

About the same time, the Argives, making 
an irruption into Phliasia, and caught in an 
ambuscade laid for them by the Phliasians, and 
their own exiles, were slaughtered to the num- 
ber of eighty. 

The Athenians, by their excursions from 
Pylus, committed many depredations on the 
Lacedsemonians. But these had not influence 
enough upon the Lacedsemonians to cause a 
renunciation of the peace, or a renewal of the 
war. They only proclaimed, that, " their peo- 
ple had free leave to make reprisals on the 
Athenians." 

The Corinthians also had a war with the 



Athenians, on account of some private differ- 
ences between them ; but the rest of Pelopon- 
nesus interfered not in the quarrel. 

The Melians, farther, assaulting it by night, 
i carried that part of the Athenian circumvalla- 
lation which lay close to their market. They 
slew the guards who were posted there ; and, 
having gained a conveyance into the town for 
provisions, and all necessary stores they could 
procure by money, they afterwards withdrew, 
and discontinued all efforts of resistance : but 
the Athenians took care for the future to 
place a stronger guard upon their works. And 
here the summer ended. 

In the winter which followed, the Lacedae- 
monians drew out their forces in order to begin 
an expedition into Argia ; but, when the vic- 
tims offered on the frontiers boded no success 
to the expedition, they again withdrew. Yet 
the Argives, as such an invasion had been in- 
tended against them, suspected it was owing 
to the intrigues of a faction within their city ; 
some of whom they immediately secured, but 
the rest escaped by flight. 

About the same time also, the Melians 
carried another part of the Athenian circum- 
vallation, as the party by which it was guarded 
was not numerous. But, upon such distur- 
bances, a strong reinforcement was sent from 
Athens, under the command of Philocrates, 
the son of Deraeas. The Melians were now 
closely invested on all sides ; and, some schemes 
to betray the town being in agitation amongst 
them, they thought proper to make a volun- 
tary surrender. This they did " at the dis- 
cretion of the Athenians ;" who put to death 
all they found within the place able to bear 
arms, and made the women and children slaves. 
The town they afterwards re-peopled by send- 
ing thither a colony of five hundred. 



THE 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



BOOK VI. 



Tlic Athenians resolve on the expedition to Sicily. Description of that island. — Year XVII. The debate in 
the assembly of the people at Athens about the expedition. The generals nominated with full powers. The 
affair of the Mercuries. Departure of the grand fleet for Sicily. Proceedings at SyKicuse. The Athenian 
fleet arrives on the coast of Italy. Alcibiades recalled, to take his trial about the Mercuries and profanation 
of the Mysteries. A digression, — containing the true account of a former revolution at Athens, begun by 
Harmodius and Aristogiton. Alcibiades flies, and is proclaimed a traitor. The Athenians land at Syracuse. 
A battle ensues, in which the Athenians are victorious ; but, soon after, they return to Catana. The negotia- 
tions at Camarina. Alcibiades at Sparta.— XVIII. The Athenians land again at Syracuse, take Epipolce by 
surprise, and begin to invest Syracuse in form. Battles ; The Athenians carry on their vvorks ; counterwork 
of the Syracusans. Aid sent to Syracuse from Peloponnesus, under the command of Gylippus; he arrives at 
Tarentum. The Athenians, by openly joining the Argives against the Lacediumonians, violate the treaty 
of peace in Greece. 



Ix the same \yinter the Athenians came to a 
resolution, to make a second expedition against 
Sicily, with a larger force than had been sent 
thither heretofore, under Laches and Euryme- 
don, and to attempt its total reduction. The 
bulk of the people was, in truth, ignorant of 
the largeness of the island, and of the multitude 
of the Grecians and Barbarians by whom it 
was inhabited ; ignorant, farther, that they 
were going to embark in a war, not much less 
considerable than the Peloponnesian. 

The compass of Sicily is little under eight 
day's sail for a trading vessel ; and, though it 
be so large, it is severed from the main land, 
so as not to be part of the continent, by a gut, 
in breadth about twenty stadia.^ The manner 
in which it was inhabited in the earliest ages 
was this ; and the several nations which pos- 
sessed it these. 

The Cyclops and Lestrigons are said to be 
the most ancient inhabitants of some part of 
this country ; but, from what stock they were 
derived, or from whence they came hither, or 
what is become of them since, I have nothing 



» About two miles. 



35 



to relate. Poetical amusements must here suf- 
fice, or such information as every man picks up 
for his own use. 

The Sicanians appear to be the first people 
who, next those, inhabited this country ; though, 
according to their own accounts, they are prior ; 
because they claim to themselves the original 
tenure : but, according to the truest discoveries, 
they are found to have been Iberians, who 
were compelled to remove from the banks of 
the Sicanus, in Iberia, by the Libyans. And 
from them, at that time, this island received 
the name of Sicania, having before been called 
Trinacria. They continue, to this day, to in- 
habit the western parts of Sicily. 

After the taking of Troy, some of the Tro- 
jans, who had escaped the Achseans, arrive in 
their vessels upon the Sicilian shore, and, form- 
ing a settlement adjacent to the Sicanians, 
they all took jointly the name of Elymi ; and 
their cities were Eryx and Egesta. They were 
also increased by the accession of some Phocians 
from Troy, who, having first been driven to 
Libya by a storm, passed over afterwards from 
thence into Sicily. 

The Siculi passed over first into Sicily from 

217 



218 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book 



VI. 



Italy, for there they originally dwelled. They 
fled before the Opici ; and as the story is told, 
not without probability, having observed how 
the current set within the strait, and seized a 
favourable gale they crosscii^over upon rafts, 
and perhaps by some other methods. There 
are, even to this very day, a people in Italy 
called Siculi ; and that region, in a similar 
manner, obtained its name of Italy from a cer- 
tain Arcadian king, who bore the name of Ita- 
lus. These, crossing into Sicily with formid- 
able numbers, and vanquishing the Sicanians 
in battle, drove them into the southern and 
western parts, caused the name of the island 
to be changed from Sicania to Sicily, settled 
themselves in, and kept possession of, the rich- 
est tracts in the country, since their passage 
hither was near three hundred years earlier than 
the landing of any Grecians in- Sicily, Nay, 
they continue, to this very day, in possession 
of the midland and northerly parts of the is- 
land. 

The Phoenicians also had settlements quite 
round the coast of Sicily. They secured the 
capes on the sea and the small circumjacent 
isles, for the sake of trafficking with the Sici- 
lians. But when the Grecians, in considerable 
numbers, began to cross over and fix their 
residence here, the Phoenicians abandoned their 
other settlements, and, uniting together, seated 
themselves at Motya, and Soloeis, and Panor- 
mus, near to the Elymi ; secure of their own 
continuance in these quarters from their friend- 
ship with the Elymi, and because, from this 
part of Sicily, the passage to Carthage is ex- 
ceeding short. — So many were the barbarians 
seated in Sicily ; and such the order of their 
settlements. 

The first Grecians who came hither were 
the Chalcideans of Euboca. Thuclcs led the 
colony which settled at Naxus, and erected the 
altar of Apollo the Guide, which is still to be 
seen without the city ; and on which the depu- 
tations, sent from hence to the oracles, offer 
sacrifice before they begin their vo3'age. 

In the year following, Archias, a Corinthian, 
of the race of Hercules, founded Syracuse, 
having previously expelled the Sicilians out of 
that island on which the inner city is seated, 
though now no longer washed round about by 
the sea. And, in process of time, the upper 
city also, being taken in by a wall, became ex- 
ceeding populous. 

In the fifth year after the foundation of 



Syracuse, Thucles and his Chalcideans sallied 
forth out of Naxus ; and having, by force of 
arms, drove away the Sicilians, they build 
Leontium, and afterwards Catana. But the 
Cataneans themselves declared Evarchus their 
founder. 

About the same point of time, Lamis also, 
leading a colony from Megara, arrived in Sicily, 
and planted them on a spot called Trotilus, 
upon the river Pantacias. But, removing 
afterwards from thence to Rcontium, he asso- 
ciated himself a short time with the Cataneans 
for the protection of his party ; yet, being 
ejected by them, and then having founded 
Thapsus, he dies. His followers, upon this, 
removed from Thapsus ; and Hyblon, a Sici- 
lian king, betraying another place into their 
hands, and becoming himself tiieir conductor, 
they settled those Megareans who are called Hy- 
blsean ; and, after a continued possession of two 
hundred and forty-five years, they were expelled 
out of their city and territory by Gelon, tyrant 
of the Syracusans. Yet, before this ejectment, 
about a hundred years after their settlement 
there, they had sent out Paniniilus, and built the 
city of Selinus. Pammilus had come thither 
more lately from Megara, their mother city, 
and assisted them in making this new settle- 
ment at Selinus. 

Antiphemus from Rhodes, and Entimus 
from Crete, each leading a separate colony, 
founded Gela in conjunction, in the forty -fifth 
year after the foundation of Syracuse. The 
name of this new city was taken from the 
river Gela : yet the spot where the city now 
stands, and which was first walled round, is 
called Lindii. But their polity was framed 
upon the Doric model. 

In the hundred and eighth year, as near as 
possible, after this last settlement, the Geloans 
built Acragas, giving the city its name from the 
river Acragas. They declared Aristonous and 
Pystilus to be its founders, and gave it the civil 
institutions of Gela. 

Zancle was originally founded by a band of 
pirates, who arrived there from Cyme, a 
Chalcidic city in Opicia; though afterwards 
a numerous reinforcement fri>m Chalcis and 
the rest of Euboca joined them, and possessed 
that district in community. The founders 
were Perieres and Crata^mtMics ; one of them 
from Cyme, the other from Chalcis. But the 
name of Zancle was first of all given it by the 
Sicilians, because in shape it bears a resemblance 



YEAR XVI.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



219 



to a scythe, and the Sicilians call a scythe zan- 
clum. But, in process of time, these people were 
driven from thence by the Samians and other 
lonians, who flying from the Modes, had land- 
ed in Sicily. And, after a short interval, An- 
axilas, tyrant of the Rhegians, ejected the 
Samians, repeopled the city v^rith a number of 
mixed inhabitants, and changed its name to 
Messene, in honour of the country from whence 
he was originally descended, Himera also was 
founded from Zancle by Euclides, and Simus. 
and Sacon. Into this colony came also a very 
numerous body of Chalcideans. Some exiles 
farther from Syracuse, who had been worsted 
in a sedition, and were distinguished by the 
title of Miletidae, took up their residence 
amongst them. Hence their dialect became a 
mixture of the Chalcidic and the Doric ; but 
the Chalcidic model obtained in their civil in- 
stitutions. 

Acrae and Casmense were founded by the 
Syracusans ; Acrae seventy years after Syra- 
cuse, and Casmenae near twenty after Acrae. 
Camarina also was first founded by the Syra- 
cusans, very nearly one hundred and thirty-five 
years after the building of Syracuse ; its founders 
were Dascon and Menecolus. But the Cam- 
arineans being afterwards driven out by the 
arms of the Syracusans, because of a revolt, in 
process of time Hippocrates, tyrant of Gela, 
received the lands of the Camarineans as a ran- 
som for some Syracusan prisoners of war, and 
taking upon himself to be their founder, 
replanted Camarina. Yet once more, again it 
was demolished by Gelon ; and replanted a 
third time by the same Gelon. So many 
nations of Greeks and Barbarians inhabited 
Sicily. 

An island so large and so populous the 
Athenians were passionately bent on invading. 
Their truest and final view was, to compass 
its total reduction ; but the pretext, alleged for 
a colour, was their readiness to succour such 
as by blood were related, or by prior alliances 
had been attached, to them. An Egestean em- 
bassy, now residing at Athens, laboured the 
point with all possible industry, and with ex- 
traordinary earnestness pressed them to engage 
in it. For the Egesteans, who bordered upon 
the Selinuntians, had been embroiled in a war 
with the latter, about some connubial points, 
and a certain tract of land to which both laid 
claim. The Selinuntians, farther, assisted by 
their Syracusan allies, pressed hard upon them 



both by land and sea. And hence, the Eges- 
teans were now suggesting at Athens, that 
" they ought not to forget their alliance with 
the Leontines, made by Laches in the former 
war;" requesting farther, that a naval force 
might be sent thither for their succour. To 
this purpose many other arguments were al- 
leged by them, but the principal was this : « If 
the Syracusans, who have overthrown the 
Leondnes, be left in the unmolested enjoyment 
of their conquest, and proceed still farther to 
destroy the remaining parties of that alliance, 
they will get into their hands the whole power 
of Sicily. Such an event would be attended 
with the utmost danger ; lest in consequence 
of it, as they were Doric by descent, they 
might think themselves bound by the ties of 
blood to assist with a powerful armament their 
kindred Dorians, and, in quality of colonies, 
might succour those Peloponnesians by whom 
they were originally planted, and thus form a 
combination to demolish the Athenian empire. 
In policy, therefore, the Athenians were 
obliged to support the allies who yet remained, 
in order to make head against the Syracusans ; 
and this the more readily, as they themselves 
would undertake to furnish them with sums of 
money equal to the exigencies of the war." 
With such discourse the Athenians were fre- 
quently entertained in their popular assemblies, 
as the Egestean ambassadors, still urging their 
point, had gained many advocates to second 
their arguments. And at length it was decreed, 
that " ambassadors should be previously des- 
patched to Egesta to inspect the state of their 
wealth, whether they had such sums as they 
talked of in the public treasury and the tem- 
ples ; and also to draw up a report of the pre- 
sent posture of their war against the Selinun- 
tians. And, in pursuance of this, the ambas- 
sadors from the Athenians were sent to Sicily. 

The Lacedaemonians, in the same winter, 
joined by their allies, those of Corinth excepted, 
and marching into Argia, ravaged a small part 
of that territory, and carried off the corn, hav- 
ing brought carriages for that purpose. They 
also removed the Argive exiles to Ornea, and 
left them a small detachment from their main 
army for the security of their persons. A 
temporary truce being also made, during which 
the Orneatae and Argives were to abstain 
from all hostilities against one another, they 
drew off the army to their respective homes. 

However not long after this, the Athenians 



220 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book VI. 



arrived with thirty sail of ships and six 
hundred heavy-armed. The Argives in con- 
junction with the Athenians, took the field 
with all their strength, and besieged those in 
Ornca for the space of a day. But, as at 
night the besiegers removed to a distance in 
order for repose, those of Ornea made their es- 
cape. On the day following, the Argives, 
when sensible of their escape, levelled Ornea 
with the ground, and then withdrew. And 
afterwards the Athenians re-embarked for 
Athens. 

The Athenians also threw in by sea a party 
of horsemen into Methone, a frontier town-* of 
Macedonia. With these, consisting of their 
own citizens and such Macedonians as had re- 
fuged among them, they harassed the country 
belonging to Perdiccas. But the Lacedaemoni- 
ans sent a summons of aid for Perdiccas to the 
Chalcideans of Thrace, who kept terms with 
the Athenians by truces renewed every tenth 
day : these however refused to march. Thus 
ended the winter, and with it the sixteenth 
year of the war, of which Thucydides hath 
compiled the history. 

YEAR XVII.' 

In the succeeding summer, very early in the 
spring, the Athenian ambassadors returned 
from Sicily, accompanied by the Egesteans. 
They brought sixty talents of uncoined silver, 
being a month's pay for sixty sail of ships, the 
equipment of which for succour they were in- 
structed to solicit from the Athenians. Upon 
this, an assembly of the people was called, and 
the reports of the Egestean and their own am- 
bassadors were received, consisting of many 
points, specious indeed, but false in fact ; and, so 
far as related to their treasure, that " sums ample 
enough are already reposited in their temples 
and their public treasury." In consequence of 
this, a decree was made that " a fleet of sixty 
ships should sail for Sicily ; the commanders, 
Alcibiades, the son of Clinias, Nicias, the 
son of Niceratus, and Lamachus,^ the son of 

» Before Christ 415. 

* L.iinachiis, the third in this commission, seems to 
have been piclced out for tlie rommand for tlie peculiar 
conslitiitioi) of Iiis own character, whicli was a proper 
mean l<ctwcen the cautious and pliIepDiatic disposition 
of Nicias ami the fiery impetuous ardour of Alciltiades. 
He was now (accordinj; to I'lutnrcii) a iirave old expe- 
rienced officer. In liis youth he had hecn remarkable 
for heat and fire; a len(;th of service and years mellowed 
him into the right tcoiper, to deliberate beforehand, and 



Xenophanes, to be invested with full powers 
to act at their own discretion. The whole 
armament to act as an aid to the Egesteans 
against the Selinuntians ; to replace also the 
Leontines in their former habitations, if the 
state of the war gave them leisure to execute 
that service ; and to manage all other points in 
Sicily as they should judge most beneficial for 
the Athenian interest." 

But the fifth day after this, another assembly 
of the people was held upon the ways and 
means to expedite the equipment of the fleet, 
and by proper decrees to supply the command- 
ers with what might be requisite to accelerate 
their departure. Nicias, who against his will 
had been named for a commander, was per- 
suaded that the public determinations were 
rash and premature, since, on short examina- 
tion, and motives merely specious, they were 
bent on the total reduction of Sicily, — an ar- 
duous undertaking ! now therefore he stood 
up ; and, having a mind to stop proceedings, 
he advised the Athenians as follows : 

" I am aware that the present assembly is 
held to concert the means of expediting our 
preparations, and to get all in readiness for the 
expedition to Sicily. But, in my sentiments, 
we ought once more to resume the considera- 
tion of the previous point, ' Whether upon the 
whole it be advisable to equip out such a fleet;* 
and not, by rash and premature resolves on 
points of such vast importance, through too 
easy compliance vrith foreign solicitations, to 
embroil ourselves in an unnecessary war. For 
my own part, truly, I am invested with honour 
by the present measures, and no man upon 
earth is so little anxious about his own person- 



then gallantly to carry the point into execution. But 
then, he wanted the means of properly supporting the 
authority and dignity of his post. He was now ranked 
with two of the most wealthy and noble Athenians; 
whereas his own condition was low ; nay, he was (ac- 
cordinj: to Plutarch) so exceedingly poor, that before he 
went to any foreign command, he was used to petition 
the state for a little money to furnish him out. and even 
to buy him some shoes. Mr VVass, in his notes on 
Thucydides, refers us for his character to a comedy of 
Aristophanes, (The Acharnians;) that is, to inquire 
after the character of a plain blunt oflicer from a pro- 
fessed droll, or to seek truth from him who ridiculed all 
mankind. Aristophanes hath represented Luraachus 
as a vain glorious roarinc Imlly, a mere thing of arms, 
a creature of verbal pomp and parade ; contrary to 
all the truth of history. Writers who live by turning 
great and good men into ridicule, should never be 
reckoned good evidence as to the truth and reality of 
characters, when liistory dissents. 



YEAR XVn.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



221 



ml safety. But at the same time I pronounce 
that person to be a valuable member of the 
public, who makes use of all his prudence to pre- 
serve his own life and property : for /SUch a one 
purely for his own private benefit, must be desir- 
ous that the public welfare flourish and abound. 
But, however, neither in the preceding assem- 
blies could the pre-eminence of honour award- 
ed to me bias me to speak in contradiction to 
my judgment: nor shall it bias me at present ; 
but what I think tends most to the public good, 
that only shall I utter. 

" I am also sensible, that what I can urge 
may have but little influence on Athenians' 
tempers, when I attempt persuading you to se- 
cure what you already possess, and to hazard 
the present for things invisible and future : but 
that your eagerness is quite unseasonable ; and 
that the ends which you too sanguinely propose 
are not easy to be accomplished ; — these things 
I shall clearly demonstrate. 

" To this purpose I aver, that, if the in- 
tended expedition proceeds, you are going to 
leave many enemies behind you here, and to 
take the most certain method of fetching hither 
more numerous opponents. You imagine, 
perhaps, that the late peace will be firmly and 
constantly observed ; though it is merely a no- 
minal peace, and that only so long as you remain 
inactive. Nay, such it hath been made by the 
conduct of some even of our own community. 
And, should any considerable force of ours 
have the unhappiness to sink under hostile 
efforts, our old enemies will be suddenly upon 
us ; since merely by calamities they were re- 
duced to an accommodation, and, in a manner 
more disgraceful to themselves than to us, were 
necessitated to treat. In the next place, we 
have found, that in the treaty itself many arti- 
cles are still controverted. There are, farther, 
divers states, and those by no means the weak- 
est, who have not accepted the accommoda- 
tion ; but, on the contrary, are still in arms 
against us ; whilst others are inhibited merely 
by ten-day truces, and that only because the 
Lacedaemonian measures are hitherto pacific. 
But suddenly, perhaps, when once they <find 
our strength divided, the very measure into 
which Vv^e are now precipitating ourselves, 
they may fall upon us in a general combination 
augmented by the strength of Sicily, whose 
accession to their former confederacy they 
would have been glad to purchase at an}' price. 
Qft these possibilities we are bound sedately to 



reflect, that we may not plunge a state, so high- 
ly exalted, into superfluous dangers, nor fondly 
covet to wrest their empire from the hands 
of others before we have adequately ensur- 
ed our own, since the Chalcideans of Thrace, 
though so many years are now elapsed since 
they first revolted, are not yet reduced ; and 
some other states on the continent render us 
only a precarious obedience. 

u Yet — ' to the Egesteans, our old allies, 
who are injuriously oppressed, we are bound in 
honour to send a most speedy succour.' — And, 
in the meantime, we continue to defer aveng- 
ing ourselves upon those whose revolt from us 
is of long standing now, and whose injustice 
we are still obliged to suffer. Though the 
latter, could we once bring them back to their 
duty, we might easily control for the future : 
but the former, should we ever become their mas- 
ters, remote and numerous as they are, we should 
not without difficulty be able to awe. It must 
be madness, therefore, to invade that people, 
whom, though conquered, you can never retain 
in their obedience ; and who, in case the attempt 
against them miscarry, will for the future be 
much more disaffected towards you than they 
were before that attempt was made. 

" But it is farther my real opinion, that the 
Sicilians, as their affairs are now circumstan- 
tiated, would become less formidable to us, if 
once reduced to the Syracusan yoke ; — and yet 
on this remote contingency the Egesteans have 
chiefly insisted, in order to alarm us. Perhaps 
now it may come to pass, that its single states 
may combine against us to gratify the Lacedae- 
monians ; but, in the other case, it is quite im- 
probable that a united empire would hazard 
its own welfare to demolish another. For if, 
acting from a political precaution, they may 
side with the Peloponnesians to overturn our 
empire, those very Peloponnesians may proba- 
bly, from the same principle, concur with us to 
demolish the Sicilian. As for us, the Gre- 
cians there may have reason to, dread us most 
if we go not at all amongst them ; and, what 
is next to that, if we only give them a sight 
of our power for a short time, and then with- 
draw. But if, acting offensively, we incur mis- 
C3i"iiage, they will instantly despise us, and 
join our neighbouring foes to annoy us here. 
For things that are placed most remotely from 
us, as likewise those which yield no opportunity 
of adjusting our opinion of them by experience, 
such, it is universally known, are most apt to 

u 



222 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR- 



[hook VI. 



excite admiration. Reflect, ye citizens of 
Athens, that your present elevation of spirits 
is owing to your success against the liacedaj- 
monians and allies. You crouched for fear 
under their first attacks ; till, liaving gained the 
superiority over them, to their utter disappoint- 
ment, you instantly despised them. And now, 
nothing less than Sicily can content you. We 
by no means ought to be too much buoyed up 
by the disasters of our foes, but only to be so 
far confident as we are able to awe their in- 
triguing tempers. We ought to ascribe no other 
view to the Lacedjemonians, than a vigilant care 
to seize the first opportunity of wiping off their 
disgrace by giving us a blow, and thus recover- 
ing their former reputation ; and that they arc 
most earnest on accomplishing this, since, from 
time immemorial, the glory of military valour 
hath been their warmest, most prevailing pas- 
sion. Our welfare therefore, if we knew in 
what our welfare consists, by no means sum- 
mons us to enter the lists in behalf of the 
Egesteans of Sicily, who to us are mere bar- 
barians ; but to exert our utmost vigilance to 
guard our own constitution from oligarchical 
encroachments. 

" My duty obligeth me also to remind you, 
that we have had but a short respite to breathe 
from the havoc made amongst us by pestilence 
and war, and to repair the prodigious waste of 
our fortunes and our lives. These, according 
to all the rules of equity, should be reserved for 
our own domestic exigencies, and not to be lav- 
ished away on a set of fugitives, who implore our 
protection, and are bound in interest to tell 
specious falsehoods ; though, whilst plunging 
their neighbours into hazards, they have no- 
thing but words to contribute ; and, should we 
redress them, know not how to be grateful; 
but, in case we miscarry in the attempt, must 
involve their friends in their own destruction. 

" If there be, farther, a person, who, ele- 
vated with his own designation to the command, 
incites you earnestly to sail ; heedful of nothing 
but his own private views, nor qualified by his 
years for so important a trust ; if his passion 
be merely to excite admiration for his fine 
breed of horses, or, by the gams of his com- 
mission, to repair the havoc of his fortune 
caused Ity jtrodigality ; T conjure you to afford 
no such person an opportunity to make a splen- 
did figure at the expense of your country : but 
rest convinced, that men of such a turn will be 
corrupt in injbjic ofiicc, as ihcy arc bad econo- 



mists in private life ; that the enterprise in 
hand is a very arduous trust, far beyond such 
measures or such exploits as a stripling can 
devise or execute. 

" I own myself intimidated by that crowd of 
youths who sit by this person and abet his 
schemes. I am hence obliged to implore the 
men of years and experience, who happen to 
sit near them, by no means to dread that ap- 
pearance of pusillanimity, which, in case this 
decree of war be revoked, mio^ht be objected to 
them ; by no means to indulge the same raw 
passions by which boys are actuated, so as to 
doat upon remote contingencies. You, gentle- 
men, by experience are convinced, that success 
exceedingly seldom results from hot and san- 
guine presumption, but most frequently from 
calm and prudent deliberation. In behalf, 
therefore, of your country, which is now on 
the brink of more critical dangers than ever it 
was known before, hold up your hands in op- 
position, and support what I am going to move ; 
namely, — That < the Sicilians, confining them- 
selves within their present limits, which we do 
not pretend to abridge, with free navigation 
along the coast of the Ionian gulf, and trans- 
acting their own affairs at large through the 
whole extent of the Sicilian seas, be at liberty 
to take care of their own concerns without any 
molestation ;' — and, in particular, to return the 
Egesteans the following answer : — ' Since, 
without the privity of the Athenians, they have 
already involved themselves in a war against 
the Selinuntians, let them also, without the 
concurrence of the Athenians, bring it to a 
conclusion : that, moreover, we shall form no 
alliance for the future, as hath formerly been 
the case, with men whose indirect behaviour 
we must be forced to abet, though, when we 
stand in need of reciprocal assistance from 
them, we shall get none at all.' 

" And you, sir, who at present preside in 
this assembly, if your are conscious that it is 
your duty to superintend the public welfare, if 
you are desirous to behave like a worthy patriot, 
put the question, and call upon the Athenians 
once more to give their votes. And, in case 
you are afraid to act contrary to order, in pro- 
posing what is counter to a former decree ; 
refloot that, when so great a crowd of witnesses 
are at hand to justify the step, you only act 
the part of a physician to your country, which 
hath swallowed down pernicious counsels; and 
that tl)o best dischargolh Hm duty of first 



YEAR XVII.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



223 



magistrate, who will render to his country all 
the service he is able ; at least, with his eyes 
open, will never suffer it to be hurt." 

In this manner Nicias delivered his senti- 
ments. But the far greater part of the Athe- 
nians who were present declared for the 
expedition, and against the repeal of what had 
been already decreed. Some however there 
were, who made a fruitless opposition. 

The person who showed most ardour, and 
pressed them most earnestly to proceed, was 
Alcibiades, the son of Clinias ; partly from a 
resolution to oppose Nicias, with whom, in 
other political points, he generally clashed, and 
because he had calumniously glanced at him in 
his speech ; but, principally, because he was 
ambitious of being at the head of this expe- 
dition. He presumed, that not Sicily only, 
but Carthage also, might be reduced by him- 
self ; and, when he should be the author of so 
great a success, that he must needs abound in 
wealth and glory. His credit was great, at 
present, amongst the citizens ; but the warmth 
of his passion threw him into larger expenses 
than his fortune could support, being sump- 
tuous in every article of life, and especially in 
horses. And it was chiefly by him that the 
final overthrow of Athens was at length oc- 
casioned. For the bulk of the city, alarmed 
at the great irregularity of his private life, the 
excessive luxury of his dress and diet, as also 
at that greatness of spirit which he showed in 
every single branch of his conduct, turned out 
enemies to him as a man who affected the 
tyranny. And though, when in public com- 
mands, he conducted the war with the utmost 
bravery, yet, at home, each single citizen was 
chagrined at his manners, and displaced him to 
make room for others, which soon drew after 
it the subversion of the state. Upon this 
occasion, therefore, Alcibiades stood up, and 
advised the Athenians as follows : 

" Yes ; to me, ye citizens of Athens, in pre- 
ference to others, this command is due ; — for 
with this I must needs begin, since on this 
point Nicias hath attacked me ; — and I also 
judge myself deserving of the trust. In re- 
gard to those things which have caused me to 
be so loudly censured ; those very things give 
splendour to my ancestors and to myself, and 
are of public emolument also to my country. 
The great magnificence I displayed at the 
Olympic solemnities hath raised in the Gre- 
cians an idea of Athens far beyond its actual 



strength ; though, previous to this, they enter- 
tained the hope of being able totally to war her 
down. For I am the man who brought seven 
chariots thither, more than any private person 
ever furnished out before ; who carried off the 
first, and the second, and the fourth prize ; 
and, in all other respects, supported my quality 
as a victor. Such things, it must be owned, are 
declared to be honoured by the laws of Greece ; 
and, whenever achieved, they leave a high opin- 
ion of power behind them. The splendid 
figure I have made at home, whether in exhi- 
biting entertainments for the public, or any 
other method of munificence, may naturally 
excite the envy of Athenians, but are to stran- 
gers in^ances of our grandeur. And that man's 
extravaJgant spirit is not useless to the public, 
who, at his own private expense, does service 
not me/rely to himself, but to a whole commu- 
nity. Nor can it imply injustice, for a person 
whose sentiments are generous and exalted, to 
soar above the ordinary level ; since, should he 
afterwards be reduced to a state of depression, 
no man is to share in his reverse of fortune. 
As therefore in calamity we are not to expect 
even civil salutations, let others in the mean- 
time submit, as in justice they ought, to that 
assuming behaviour which prosperity inspireth ; 
or, at least, let equality of demeanor be first 
shown by him who demands it as a debt from 
another. I am indeed aware, that persons of 
such uncommon elevation, and all in general, 
who, in some splendid qualities, outshine the 
crowd, must, so long as they live, be the objects 
of spleen, chiefly to those who claim equality 
with them ; and, in the next place, to those 
amongst whom they are conversant ; and yet, 
to succeeding generations, they leave an ambi- 
tion of claiming affinity to them, though quite 
groundless and chimerical ; and to their country, 
whatever it be, the haughty boast, that they 
were not aliens, were not offenders, but citi- 
zens of its own growth, and patriots of true 
renown and worth. Of such reversionary hon- 
ours I own myself ambitious ; and, in order to 
succeed in the pursuit, have ever rendered my 
name illustrious in private life ; and, as to my 
public behaviour, reflect, Athenians, whether 
I am inferior to any person whatever, in per- 
forming good services to my country. For I 
am the person, who, without throwing you into 
hazard or expense, have brought the strongest 
powers of Peloponnesus to act in your concur- 
rence ; who reduced the Lacedaemonians to 



224 



PELOPOXXESIAN WAR. 



[book VI. 



stake their all upon the fortune of one day at 
Mantinea. It is true they came off victorious 
from the contest ; but have not even yet so far 
resumed their spirits as to dare to act offen- 
sively. 

" Such are the exploits which my greener 
years, nay even that unnatural giddiness im- 
puted to me, hath achieved ; which, by insinua- 
ting language, hath made the Peloponnesian 
strength to ply before it, auid, giving energy to 
my frantic humour, hath now persuaded the 
world that it is no longer to be dreaded, 
whilst, therefore, I flourish in this manner, 
whilst Nicias yet continues to be esteemed 
fortunate, lay hold of that service we are each 
of us able to perform ; and by no means repeal 
the decree of our expedition to Sicily, as if in- 
tended against a people we are not able to en- 
counter. 

" For in Sicily the cities swarm with crowds 
of promiscuous, disunited inhabitants ; inhabi- 
tants for ever used to sudden revolutions and to 
perpetual fluctuations. And hence, not one of 
those crowds is equipped with such arms as are 
requisite to defend a native soil, or to secure 
even personal safety ; nor is the region sup- 
plied with the needful stores of resistance. It 
is the habit of each, either to execute his pur- 
pose by artful language, or to wrest it from 
the pubUc by sedition. These are all his 
resources ; and, if they fail, at the worst, he 
barely shifts his habitation. It is therefore 
improbable that a rabble, so jumbled together, 
will ever be unanimously guided by one con- 
certed plan, or combine together for its just 
execution. Each moment they will be veering 
about to such expedients as happen most to 
soothe their caprice ; and the more, upon ac- 
count of these seditions, in which, we are in- 
formed, they are already embroiled. 

" Their number of heavy-armed, u must 
also be observed, is not so large as the pom- 
pous accounts of fame have made it ; nor does 
the sum total of the Grecians amongst them 
turn out so considerable as each city hath 
computed for her own. But Greece, in this 
manner ever addicted most terribly to belie 
her own numbers, hath been found, in the 
present war, scarce able to provide herself with 
arms. 

« Such, according to the best informations I 
have been able to collect, is the present con- 
dition of affairs in Sicily. Nay, there are 
means within our reach still more to faciU- 



tate its reduction. For we shall obtain th« 
concurrence of many barbarians seated there, 
who, from inveteracy against the Syracusans, 
will join us to attack them. Neither can any 
I obstacles accrue from the situations of our af- 
' fairs nearer home, if you only view it in the 
just and proper light. 

" The bravery of our fathers, though oppos- 
ed by the very same enemies, who at present, it 
is urged, should we sail for Sicily, must be left 
behind us, though opposed by all the power of 
the Mede, erected this our empire, by the sole 
resource of their superiority in naval power. 
The Peloponnesians, farther, have never had 
less hopes of being a match for us than at this 
very juncture, even though their strength be in 
all its maturity of vigour. It is true, they have 
it ever in their option to make inroads into our 
dominions, even though we wave this expedi- 
tion ; but, at sea, they never can be able to 
hurt us : the fleet we shall leave behind will 
be amply sufficient to make head against them. 
'• By what plausible arguments, therefore, 
can we excuse our behaviour, should we now 
pusillanimously desist ] what evasion can we 
find to deny our confederates the succour they 
demanded ? We are bound in honour, by the 
oaths we have sworn, to undertake their redress. 
Unavailing is the pretext, that they have done 
-such good ofllices for us. Our alliance with 
them was not made on the condition of their sail- 
ing hither to bring us succour, but of giving such 
full employ to our enemies there, as might ef- 
fectually deter them from coming hither. The 
ready road to empire, as not Athenians only, 
but every people who have risen to a summit of 
power, by experience know, is ever to succour 
those who implore our protection, whether 
they be Greeks or barbarians. For, had it 
been the constant method to cherish indolent 
inactive measures, or minutely to htigate who 
in justice ought to be protected, the enlarge- 
ment of our empire had been but trifling, or 
rather we had been liable to the loss of our 
original portion. For a state invested with 
superior power is not only openly opposed in 
the field, but recourse is had to every precau- 
tion to prevent their appearance in it Neither 
is it in our power to prescribe exact or arbi- 
trary limitations to our own empire ; but we 
are by necessity compelled to cabal against 
some, and with a high hand to keep others in 
subjection ; because, should we relax our cora« 
mand over others we endanger our own author 



YEAR XVII.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



225 



ity, and those we will not awe may become 
our .masters. Nor, farther, ought peace to 
be so n;uch the object of regard to you as it 
is to other people, unless you new-model your 
government, and render it conformable to that 
of your neighbours. 

" Weigh therefore these arguments ; and be 
convinced, that thus only our interest is capable 
of any considerable advancement, — if we pro- 
ceed against Sicily, and execute the expedition 
in order to deject the haughty Peloponnesian 
spirit, by so plain an instance how much we 
despise them, how little fond we are at present 
of this inactive interval, and how eager to be- 
gin again with a Sicilian voyage. And, by 
acting thus, there is probability on our side, 
that, in case we subdue the people there, we 
may gain the sovereignty over all Greece ; or, 
at worst, we shall depress the Syracusan power : 
the latter point alone will be an important ser- 
vice to ourselves and our allies. But, in case 
any measure of success attends us, our ships 
will enable us to secure our acquisitions, or at 
worst our departure ; for, though the whole 
body of the Sicilians combine together against 
Us, we shall be absolute masters of our own 
retreat. 

" Let not therefore the words of Nicias, 
calculated merely for the service of sloth, and 
to raise dissensions between the young and the 
old, disconcert your plan. But let the usual 
decorum take place, observant of which our 
forefathers, at whose consultations both the 
seniors and the youths assisted, exalted this 
state to its present height ; and do you now, 
adhering to the established practice, endeavour 
its farther exaltation. Remember also, that 
youth and age, if debarred one another's reci- 
procal assistance, lose all their influence and 
weight ; that, on the other hand, from the 
wildness of youth, and the moderation of the 
middle-aged, and the consummate prudence of 
the old, when tempered harmoniously together, 
the most perfect strength must infallibly result ; 
that a state, which supinely gives way to sloth, 
like other things, for want of exercise must in- 
fallibly droop and pine away, and the whole of 
her skill grow old and obsolete ; but, when 
inured to uninterrupted conflict, it is continually 
improving by practice, and will gain a perfect 
habit of surmounting every obstacle ; not by a 
parade of words, but by active perseverance. 

" Upon the whole, I am firmly convinced, 
that a state which hath been accustomed to full 
36 



employ, must soon droop into destruction if it 
resigns itself to sloth ; and that such persons 
take the best method of infallibly securing their 
welfare, who adhere most steadily to their pre- 
sent customs and laws, though possibly better 
might be substituted in their stead." 

In this manner Alcibiades spoke. And the 
Athenians, moved by his arguments, — which 
were also seconded by the entreaties of the 
Egestean and Leontine exiles, who, standing 
forth in the assembly, implored their protection, 
and, reminding them of their oaths, adjured 
them to redress their wrongs, — declared for the 
expedition with a warmer zeal than at any 
time before, Nicias was convinced by this, 
that whatever dissuasion he could allege would 
be quite incapable to change their resolves. 
Yet as possibly, by a minute detail of the 
immense preparations he was going to demand, 
he might cause them at once to change their 
sentiments, he stood up again, and re-addressed 
them as follows : 

" I perceive, -Athenians, that your resolu- 
tions are fixed on this expedition beyond the 
power of dissuasion ; and may its event be 
such as your wishes portend ! But I shall once 
more beg leave to communicate to you my own 
sense of the aflfair. 

" According to the best informations I have 
been able to procure, we are now going to in- 
vade a number of powerful cities, cities inde- 
pendent of one another, nor standing in need 
of public revolutions, which people who cringe 
under the yoke of slavery might readily embrace, 
in order to render their condition more sup- 
portable. Xor is it, farther, to be presumed, 
that they will readily exchange their own 
liberty for subjection to us, as they are numer- 
ous, at least for one island, and many of them 
inhabited by Grecians. For, without reckon- 
ing Xaxus and Catana, which I hope, upon 
account of their affinity to the Leontines, will 
side with us, there are no less than seven pro- 
vided in all respects with as good martial 
habiliments and stores as our own armies; 
and more particularly those against which we 
chiefly bend our course, Selinus and Syracuse. 
These cities abound with soldiers heavy- 
armed, with archers, and with darters. They 
have a great number of triremes, and plenty 
of hands to man them. They possess a 
large quantity of wealth, not only in pri- 
vate purses, but in their public treasuries. 
So rich are even the Seliiiuntians. And to 
2a2 



226 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book VI. 



the Syracusans, farther, a tribute is paid 
by several barbarians. But the points in 
which they most of all excel us, are, that nu- 
merous cavalry of which they are possessed, 
and corn of their own growth sufficient to an- 
swer all demands without foreign importations. 
An armament, therefore, simply naval, will by 
no means be sufficient to cope with such a 
strength. A large land force must accompany 
the naval, if we are desirous of performing 
such achievements as may be worthy the great- 
ness of our plan, and would not be debarred an 
opportunity of landing by their numerous 
cavalry. And this will be yet more needful, 
should the cities, alarmed at our approach, 
combine together against us, and no other 
friends but the Egesteans join us, or supply us 
with a body of cavalry sufficient to countenance 
our landing. It would be a terrible disgrace, 
should we be compelled by force to give over 
our design, or to send for a larger supply, as if 
our counsels at first setting out were rash and 
ill-concerted. We must steer at once against 
them with preparations in all respects well- 
proportioned to the design, since we know that 
we are bound to a land far remote from our 
own, and are under many disadvantages to 
grapple with our foes. It will not be now 
your employment to march to the relief of your 
dependents seated near to Athens against a 
hostile invasion, where all the needful supplies 
would be brought to your camp out of the 
territories of friends : but you are to roam to a 
distant climate, where you cannot call one inch 
of ground your own, and from whence, in the 
four winter months, you will scarcely be able to 
send a messenger to Athens. 

" In my opinion, therefore, it is incumbent 
upon us to carry thither large parties of heavy- 
armed, to be raised out of our own citizens, our 
allies, and our dependents, and an additional 
strength of Peloponnesians, if we are able to 
procure it by persuasion or by pay. Our 
archers and slingers must be also numerous, 
that we may be able to make good our descent 
in spite of the Sicilian horse. We must also 
be attended by supernumerary vessels, that we 
may be enabled with greater ease to fetch in 
necessaries for our army. We must also carry 
with us from Athens, in our tenders, a great 
quantity of corn, such as wheat and barley, 
parched ; with bakers, some of whom, for 
certain wages, must be obliged to grind, that, 
if our armament lie any where weather-bound, 



we may not stand in need of the necessaries of 
life ; for so numerous as we must be, it will 
not be possible for every city to receive us. 
All other provisions must be laid in by ourselves 
to the utmost of our power, and we must trust 
for nothing to the care of others. 

" But what concerns us most is, to carry 
from hence a fund of money as ample as we 
can raise. As for that which the Egesteans 
pretend is already laid up for our use, conclude 
it to be so only so far as words are current. 
For, unless we set out from Athens, not barely 
provided as well as those we are to encounter, 
— but, equality in strength for battle alone ex- 
cepted, in all other respects far surpassing 
them in every needful appointment, — we shall 
hardly be able to reduce who are to be reduced, 
or even to protect who are to be protected. 
We should regard ourselves in the character of 
people who are going to seek a new settlement 
among aliens and enemies ; and, as such, are 
necessitated to render themselves victors of the 
spot the very day they land ; or to rest assured, 
if they then miscarry, that the whole of that 
region will be in arms against them. Of this 
I own myself afraid ; against this I am con- 
vinced that by repeated consultations we ought 
timely to provide ; and, after all, must trust 
still farther to the goodness of our fortune, 
hazardous, as we are but men. Yet hence, I 
should be glad to set out in this enterprise with 
as little occasion as possible to rely on uncer- 
tain fortune, and to be amply provided with 
every expedient for a successful expedition ; 
for these, to my apprehension, are the readiest 
means to secure the public welfare, and the 
safety of us who are destined for the voyage. 
But, if any man thinks my reasons chimerical, 
I am ready to resign my command to his supe- 
rior abilities." 

In this manner Nicias delivered himself, 
with a view, if possible, to discourage the 
Athertians from proceeding, by so vast a de- 
mand of articles requisite to the design ; or at 
least, that, in case he must be obliged to under- 
take the service, he might set out with such 
ample expedients of security. 

Yet all this bulky and embarrassing de- 
mand of appointments could not raise in 
' the Athenians the least aversion to the ex- 
pedition, but rather fastened their eagerness 
upon it more intenselv than ever ; and Nicias 
I prevailed on that side of the question where he 
I hoped to have been defeated. It was now 



VEAR XVII.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



227 



universally agreed, that his advice was just and 
proper ; and, if obeyed, the expedition must 
be attended with all imaginable security. All 
ranks of men were now equally seized with a 
fondness for the voyage ; for such as were ad- 
vanced in years were confident that a career of 
success must attend the enterprise, and that so 
formidable an armament could not possibly 
miscarry ; the younger sort were animated 
with the desire of seeing so remote a clime, 
and gratifying at large the curiosity of their 
tempers, assured that safety would attend their 
course ; the bulk of the populace and the sol- 
diery in general were pleased with their present 
assignment of pay, and the hope of enlarging 
dominion, which would afford them perpetual 
employ and subsistence. The passions of the 
generality were for these causes so vehemently 
elated with the project, that such as could by 
no means approve were afraid to oppose it by 
a vote, lest they might be censured as men who 
malevolently opposed the public glory. And 
by this all opposition was effectually quashed. 

At length, a certain Athenian, standing 
forth from amongst the crowd, and calling 
aloud upon Nicias, told him, « he must no 
longer cast about for evasions, nor meditate 
delays; but declare expressly now, in the 
presence of them all, the particulars of the 
preparations which the Athenians should vote 
him." 

Nicias, though sorry at his heart, was ob- 
liged to reply, that, " in order to be exact he 
ought to consult more leisurely with his col- 
leagues. But, so far as he could judge in this 
sudden manner, they ought to set out with a 
fleet consisting of at least one hundred tri- 
remes ; that the Athenians themselves ought 
to furnish as many transports for heavy-armed 
soldiers as was possible, and to send for an 
additional number from their dependents ; that 
the number of heavy-armed, both of Athenians 
and dependents, should at least be five thou- 
sand, and, if possible, more ; that to these the 
rest of their preparations should be propor- 
tioned, such as archers to be levied at home, 
and procured also from Crete, not forgetting 
slingers ; and, in fine, that whatever should be 
judged in any degree expedient should be pro- 
vided in good time, and carried along with them 
in the fleet." 

This the Athenians had no sooner heard, 
than they instantly voted, " that the generals 
were invested with absolute authority, to de- 



termine the numbers of the expedition, and the 
whole procedure of the voyage, at their own 
discretion, as might best promote the pubUc 
welfare." 

In pursuance of this, the preparations were 
immediately in hand. Summonses for the 
quotas adjusted were sent to their dependents, 
and the levies at home went briskly forwards. 
Athens was now finely recovered from the 
pestilence and a long-continued destructive 
war ; both in a multitude of young men now 
arrived at the vigour of their age, and an in- 
crease of the public revenues by favour of the 
peace. By this means all the needful supplies 
were more easily provided ; and thus were the 
Athenians busied for the present in fitting out 
their armament. 

But, at this very juncture, almost all the 
statues of Mercury, wherever found within the 
precincts of Athens, and according to the 
established custom they were very numerous, 
both in the porches of private houses and the 
public temples, ' ***** had their faces dis- 
figured in the space of one night. The au- 
thors of this outrage were not known ; but 
large rewards were offered by the state in order 
to discover them, and a decree was also passed 
that, " If any person knew of the commission 
of any other impiety of the same nature, he 
should boldly inform the public of it, whether 
he were a citizen, or a foreigner, or a slave." 

This accident in truth made a deep impres- 
sion on their minds. For it was construed as 
a bad omen in regard to the expedition in hand, 
and as an evidence of some terrible combina- 
tion to introduce innovations and an overthrow 
of the democracy. 

An information was at length given in by 
some sojourners and their footmen, relating 
indeed not at all to the Mercuries, but to 
the defacements of other images committed 
formerly by some young men in a frolicsome 
and drunken mood ; and now, farther, " they 

1 1 liave omitted two words in the original, becanse 
I cannot translate them with any precision or clearness. 
Tliey are y, Tirgxywvoi £f j^sso-ia, opus qiiadratum, sa\'S 
one Latin translator ; opus ez lapide quadrate, says 
another. Mr Hobhcs hath it, Mercuries of square stone; 
how such a description can be applicable to a statue 
will be hard to conceive. Whether they allude to the 
inclosure in which the statues were erected, or to the 
form of the pedestals, or whether a Mercury was carved 
on any or all the sides of a square stone, I am not able 
to decide. The Mercuries were very numerous; and 
many of them, it is certain, wore strange, uncouth, and 
very bungling performances. 



228 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[bOOK VI. 



had celebrated the mysteries' in private houses 
by way of mockery ;" and amongst others they 
also accused Alcibiades. The party most in- 
veterate against him caught readily at this 
charge. As he was the main obstacle to the 
advancement of their own popularity and cre- 
dit, they concluded, that, in case they could 
rid themselves of him, they might at once 
become leaders of the state. Hence they 
aggravated the charge, and bellowed aloud, 
that " those mystic frolics, and the deface- 
ments of the Mercuries, struck at the very 
foundations of the democracy ; and that none 
of these outrageous acts had been committed 
without his participation." They alleged, as 
a circumstance that corroborated the charge, 
the whole tenor of his behaviour, flagrantly 
licentious, and quite inconsistent with a demo- 
cratical constitution. 

Alcibiades endeavoured forthwith to clear 
himself the best he could from all appearances 
of guilt, and declared himself ready, before he 
entered upon the voyage, to submit to a trial, 
(for the armament was now almost completed,) 
and, if proved to be guilty, to suffer the penal- 
ties of law ; and only, if acquitted, to take 
upon him the command. He conjured them, 
farther, " to receive no calumnious accusations 
against him in his absence ; but if he was 
really guilty, to put him instantly to death ; — 
that, in common prudence it could not be 
justified, to intrust to a person, so heavily 
charged, with the command of so large an ar- 
mament, before his innocence had been regu- 
larly explored." 

But his enemies — apprehensive that, in case 
he was brought to an immediate trial, he would 
be supported by all the favour of the soldiery ; 
and that the people, whose idol he was, might 
possibly relent, because in compliment to him 
the Argives and some of the Mantincans ac- 
companied the expedition, — opposed and put 
off the prosecution. They put the manage- 
ment of this point into the hands of a set of 
orators, who urged that <' for the present he 
might proceed in his voyage, that the expedi- 



» Tlie Bacred mysteries celebrated by tlie Athenians 
at El(Misis. I'lutarrh rolates, tluit the informers were 
broujlit in liy one Androrles, a doma-iocue, a virnh^nt 
foe of Alcibiades. Tliny de|)opod, that one Tlieodoriis i 
acted the part of the crier, rolytion of the torrh-licarnr, 
Alcibiades that of the hierophant, i.nd many of his 
intimates nssisled and were initiated in solemn and 
formal mockery. 



tion ought not to be deferred on his account, 
and upon his return a day should be assigned 
for his trial." Their design was to gather 
more heavy matter against him, which in his 
absence could be more easily effected, and then 
to recall him and force him to his trial. In 
short, it was resolved that " Alcibiades should 
go the voyage." 

Things being thus determined, and the year 
now advanced to the middle of summer, the 
fleet set sail for Sicily. Orders had been 
issued before for the bulk of the confederates, 
and victualling-ships, and small craft, and all 
the tenders in general, to repair to, and assem- 
ble together at Corcyra ; that, from thence, 
in a body, they might cross the Ionian to the 
cape of Japygia. But such as were subjects 
of Athens, and such of the confederates as 
were then in the city, marching down to the 
Piraeus on the appointed day by morning's 
dawn, went on board the ships in order to 
weigh and be gone. They were conducted 
thither by a great crowd, it may be said by the 
whole crowd of Athens, both citizens and 
strangers. The former attended, to perform 
the parting decorums where .their several at- 
tachments claimed it ; some to their friends, 
some to their relations, some to their own 
sons. The whole company moved along with 
a medley of hope and lamentation ; with hope, 
that success would attend their course ; with 
lamentation, lest they might never meet again. 
The sad recollection occurred — to how great a 
distance from their native soil they were going 
to be sent ! and now that the hour ol departure 
was come, and when this moment they were 
going to be dismissed into scenes of danger, 
the impressions of terror were felt with much 
keener sense than when the expedition was 
only decreed. However, at the sight of their 
present strength, of the numerous expedients 
of a prosperous enterprise which their eyes • 
beheld, their spirits were again elated. 

As for the strangers and bulk of the crowd, 
they attended merely for the pleasure of gazing 
at the means intended to accomplish a great 
and stupendous design. For never did any 
one state of Greece, before this time, equip by 
its own strength such a powerful armament. 
It was the finest and most glorious fleet that 
to this day the world Iiad seen. It is true, in 
number of ships and heavy-armed on board, 
that which sailed against Epidaurus under 
command of Pericles, and that also against 



¥EAR XVII.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



229 



Potidaea under Agnon, were by no means infe- 
ior. For those carried four thousand heavy- 
armed soldiers, all native Athenians, with three 
hundred horsemen : the number of their triremes 
was a hundred ; fifty more were furnished by 
the Lesbians and Chians, besides a large num- 
ber of confederates who attended those expedi- 
tions. But then they were fitted for a voyage 
in comparison trifling, and in a slight and pe- 
nurious manner. 

On the contrary, the present equipment was 
calculated for a length of time, and completely 
fitted out for both services, as occasion might 
demand, either of the sea or of the land. The 
shipping, at the great expense of the captains 
of the several triremes and of the state, was 
quite elaborate. The pay assigned by the 
public to every mariner was a drachma^ a-day. 
The number of new ships for the battle and 
chase was sixty ; that of transports for the 
heavy-armed, forty. The several captains of 
the triremes were very choice in making up 
their crews, and gave to such of the mariners 
as rowed on the uppermost bench, and to the 
sailors, a gratuity out of their own pockets over 
and above the public pay. They had farther 
adorned their vessels with images and all kind 
of sumptuous decorations. It was the high 
ambition of every single captain, to have his 
own ship excel all the rest of the flest in splen- 
dour and in swiftness. 

The land-force was distinguished by the 
choiceness of their levies and their arms ; and 
all the individuals vied with one another in the 
goodness of their accoutrements and equi- 
page whatsoever. It happened also on the 
same account that a warm contention was 
kindled amongst them, under what officers 
they should be ranged ; and opportunity affoi-d- 
ed, to the rest of Greece, to construe the whole 
into a mere ostentation of their power and opu- 
lence rather than an effective equipment against 
a foe. For, were a computation to be formed, 
both of the public disbursements of the state 
on this occasion, and the private expenses of 
the whole soldiery ; — of the state, what prodi- 
gious sums they had already advanced, and what 
additional sums the generals were to carry 
along with them ; — of the soldiery, what each 
had expended on his own equipage, every cap- 
tain on the decoration of his vessel, and to how 
much greater charges he was still liable ; — 



nd. 



without taking into the account the vast list of 
necessaries which, over and above the public 
allowance, each private person was obliged to 
lay in for so long a voyage, or the goods which 
a soldier or trader might take with him on 
board for the sake of traffic ; — the amount of 
talents now carried out of Athens would turn 
out exceeding large. 

Nor was it merely for the strangeness of the 
enterprise or the splendour of its show, that 
the armament was noised abroad, but also for 
the numerous force with which it was provided 
to attack the foe ; for the remoteness of the 
voyage, great as ever they had undertaken from 
their native clime, and that prodigious expecta- 
tion which was raised of the event ; in order 
to which the state had now exerted itself quite 
beyond its strength. 

When the whole force was got on board 
the fleet, when the stowage of all necessary 
stores and all baggage whatever was completely 
adjusted, silence then was proclaimed by sound 
of trumpet : but the solemn prayers for a suc- 
cessful expedition were not offered from every 
vessel apart, but in behalf of all united, by the 
voice of a herald. The goblets mingled with 
wine ran the circle of the whole armament and 
every crew as well as the commanders poured 
out the libations, and drank success and happi- 
ness out of gold and silver cups. The whole 
crowd that stood upon the beach, both of citi- 
zens and such strangers as were there and 
wished them prosperity, joined with them in 
the public prayer. And now, the pasan being 
sung and the libation finished, they put out to 
sea.^ After moving off at first in a line ahead, 



2 Many incidents are related by Plutarch, in the life of 
Nicias, in regard to the denunciations of the priests 
against tliis expedition, the coining an^d wresting of ora- 
cles Iioth for and against it, and omens which portended 
nothing but misfortune. Mere human foresigi.t, and a 
consciousness, that tlie means were not equal to tiie end 
proposed, gave the wisest and steadiest part of the 
Athenian community a sad apprehension of the event. 
Socrates constantly declared against it; and assured his 
friends, it would draw after it the destruction of the 
state: this his presentiment, soon became the public 
talk. Meton, the Astronomer, who was named to a 
post of hiah rank in the expedition, feigned himself 
mad and set his house on fire. Others deny that cir- 
cumstance of his counterfeiting madness; and say, lie 
set his house on fire by night, and appeared next morn- 
ing on the forum in an abject manner, and begsed of 
his fellow-citizens, in order to comfort him under so 
great a misfortune, to excuse his son, who wns to have 
commanded a trireme, from going the voyaue. An 
incident, farther, at the very time of the departure of 



230 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book vt. 



each vessel made afterwards the best of her 
way to ^gina. And this armament made all 
possible haste to reach Corcyra, where the force 
of their allies by which they were to be joined 
was already assembled. 

Though the intelligence of such an in- 
tended invasion had been brought to Syracuse 
from several quarters, 3'et for a long course of 
time tliey would yield no credit to its truth. 
Nay more, when an assembly was convened, 
such speeches as follow were made by different 
persons ; some believing the accounts received 
in relation to this armament of the Athenians ; 
others pronouncing them absolutely false. On 
this occasion Hermocrates, the son of Hcrmon, 
standing forth in the assembly, and as one con- 
vinced in his own mind that all such accounts 
were true, addressed and advised his country- 
men thus : 

" It will probably be my own fate, as it hath 
been the fate of others, to be disbelieved, when 
I speak of this intended invasion as a matter of 
truth and certainty. And I also know, by ex- 
perience, that both those who vent and those 
who retail such accounts of things as seem in- 
credible, are so far from effectually persuading, 
that they generally incur the imputation of 
madness. Yet no such apprehensions shall in- 
timidate or strike me dumb, when such a 
weight of danger hovers over my country ; 
when in my own heart I am convinced, that I 
am more clearly enlightened on the point than 
any other person whatever. 

" For I assert that to be a matter of the 
highest certainty, which you hear only with a 
fit of stupid surprise, that the Athenians have 
already set sail against us with a numerous 
force both for the service of the sea and the 
land. The pretext alleged by them is, execu- 
tion of treaties with the Egesteans and the 
restoration of the Leontines ; but the true mo- 
tive is their ambition to enslave Sicily, and 
above all this our own Syracuse, which if once 
reduced, they are well assured that nothing will 
be able afterwards to give a check to their 



the irrand flpct, jrave many persons vast ronrern. The 
wonmn were then relehratine; the rites of Adonis, in 
which many representations of deatlis and funerals 
were exhibited ail over Atliens; and tlie women, ar- 
cordinR to custom, were ninking lioavy moan and 
lamentation. This struck snd forebodings into people 
who laid stress on such inci<lcnt8, tiiat this expensive 
imd mighty armament, thouch now so vifjorous and 
^majnincent would soon moulder into ruin. 



arms. Taking it therefore for granted that 
they will be immediately upon us, deliberate 
in what manner you may make the most gallant 
defence in the present posture of your strength ; 
careful that through contempt you be not taken 
unprovided, nor through incredulity abandon the 
means of preservation. Nor, farther, let those 
who are convinced of their immediate appear- 
ance, be terrified at the boldness or strength of 
their undertaking. For they will not be able to 
hurt us more than we shall be enabled to reta- 
liate upon them. Nor are they more beyond 
our reach, because they invade us with so vast 
an armament ; since this, in regard to the other 
Sicilians, will plead more abundantly in our 
cause ; for, terrified at the foe, they will be dis- 
posed with higher warmth of friendship to co- 
operate with us. And if thus, in the train of 
affairs, we are either enabled to defeat their 
arms, or merely to force their return, their 
schemes unexecuted and their ambition disap- 
pointed, (for I am not in the least afraid that 
their sanguine expectations can be glutted with 
success,) such events would reflect the highest 
glory upon you, and complete what I firmly 
hope. 

" It is a truth evinced by facts, that few con- 
siderable armaments of either Grecians or Bar- 
barians, which have been sent out on remote 
expeditions, have returned successful. Nor, 
farther, are our present invaders more nu- 
merous than the Syracusans themselves, or 
their friends of the neighbouring states, whose 
strength mere hostile dread will cement and bind 
fast together. If therefore, though merely for 
want of needful supplies, they incur miscarria- 
ges on a foreign shore ; if they prove unsuccess- 
ful, though chiefly through their own miscon- 
duct ; the whole honour must however rest with 
us, as if we had ruined their projects by art and 
management. Even these very Athenians were 
indebted to a parallel coincidence of events for 
the v£ist enlargement of their strength and em- 
pire, when the Mede, who gave out that he 
aimed the blow at Athens, was, contrary to all 
human expectation, disconcerted by a series of 
errors that were purely his own. And some 
such fortunate coincidence, in our own behalf, 
we have at present all imaginable reason to ex- 
pect. 

" Let us therefore with active resolution put 
our domestic affairs into a posture of defence, 
and despatch our ambassadors to the Siculi, to 
keep firm in our friendship such as are already 



YEAR XVII.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



231 



our friends, and to endeavour to procure the 
friendship and concurrence of the rest. Nay, 
let our embassies regularly complete the whole 
circuit of Sicily, where they may represent the 
common danger which equally threatens them 
all. Let them, farther, cross over to Italy to 
procure for us their defensive alliance, or at 
least to negotiate a denial of reception to the 
Athenians. I also judge it advisable to send 
to Carthage: for even the Carthagenians are 
not exempted from the present dangers, but 
have been ever under apprehensions of receiving 
from them a visit at Carthage. It may per- 
haps effectually occur to their thoughts, that, 
should they now abandon us, the storm must 
soon extend itself to them ; by which they may 
be determined either secretly or openly, by 
some expedient or other, to vindicate our cause. 
And, were their inclination equal to their 
power, no people on the globe could so easily 
redress us. For they are possessed of an im- 
mensity of wealthy which gives an easy and 
prompt completion to the schemes of war arid 
to every human enterprise. Let us send far- 
ther, to Lacedaemon and Corinth, requesting 
the despatch of immediate succours hither, and 
the renewal of the war against the Athenians. 

« There is one point more, which in my 
opinion is more critical and important than all 
the rest : and which, though perhaps, inured 
as you are to domestic indolence, it may not 
gain your ready approbation, I shall however 
boldly recommend. Would all of us in general 
who are inhabitants of Sicily, or at least would 
only we Syracusans, with what other people 
we can get to assist us, put out instantly to 
sea with all the ships we have in readiness, 
and victualled but for the space of two months ; 
—would we then give these Athenians the 
meeting either at Tarentum or cape Japygia, 
and there convince them, that before they en- 
ter the lists of war for the conquest of Sicily, 
they must fight for their passage across the 
Ionian ; — we should then strike them with the 
utmost terror, and infinitely perplex them with 
the thought that from a friendly port we shall 
sally forth to guard our out-works (for Taren- 
tum will readily receive us), whilst they have 
a long tract of sea to pass with all their cum- 
bersome train, and must find it hard, through 
so long a voyage, to be always steering in the 
regular order. As their course must thus be 
slow, and must advance only in exact conform- 
ity to orders, we should have a thousand op- 



portunities to attack them. If again they clear 
their ships for action, and in a body bear down 
expeditiously upon us, they must ply hard at 
their oars ; and, when spent with their toil, 
we can fall upon them. Or, in case that may 
not be judged advisable, we have it always in 
our power to retire into the harbour of Taren- 
tum. And thus the Athenians, if in con- 
stant expectation of being fought with at sea, 
they must make their passage with a small por- 
tion only of their stores, will be reduced to great 
distress on coasts which will afford them no 
supply. Should they chose to continue in 
their station, they must infallibly be blocked 
up in it. Should they ventm^e a passage, they 
must unavoidably leave their tenders and store- 
ships behind; and as they have no assurance of 
a hearty reception from the cities on the coasts, 
must be terribly dismayed. 

" It is my firm opinion, that amidst that 
great perplexity of thought which must result 
from these obstructions, they will never pre- 
sume to sail from Corcyra ; or, at least, v/hilst 
they are agitating the forms of procedure, and 
sending out spy-boats to discover our numbers 
and position, the season of the year must be 
protracted to winter ; or, utterly dispirited at 
so unexpected a resistance, they will give up 
the voyage. This I more readily expect, as 
I am informed that their most experienced com- 
mander hath been forced into ofhce against his 
inclination, and would gladly lay hold of the 
pretext to desist, if such a show of resistance 
could be made by us as would preserve hia 
honour from suspicion. And I am perfectly 
convinced that rumour will increase and aggra- 
vate our strength. Now the sentiments of 
mankind are constantly adjusted by rumours : 
parity of danger is supposed, when an enemy 
declares he is ready to begin the attack ; and 
such an enemy is always more dreaded than he 
who betrays an intention merely to defend 
himself against an enemy's assaults. Such ex- 
cess of fear must now fall to the lot of the 
Athenians. They are invading us, with the 
fond presumption that we shall not fight. They 
think they have grounds for such a presump- 
tion, because we have not concurred with the 
Lacedaemonians in their demolition. But 
when, to their bitter disappointment, they find 
we have the courage to act offensively, the 
suddenness of our efforts will terrify them more 
than all the reality of our expected strength 
could have done. 



232 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book VI 



«' Determine therefore to execute with bold 
and ready resolution the plan I have proposed ; 
or, if this must not prevail, with the utmost 
expedition to get all things at home in readi- 
ness for war. And let each Syracusan be 
firmly convinced, that contempt of an enemy 
ought never to be shown but in the heat of ac- 
tion ; that the conduct of those men must 
tend most highly to the public preservation, 
who, alarmed by a decent fear, judge it needful 
to prepare with all caution and alacrity, as if 
the danger was instant at our doors. But 
these our enemies are actually coming ; they 
are already (I know it well) upon the voyage ; 
they are this moment only not in sight." 

In this manner Hermocrates spoke his sen- 
timents. But the popular assembly of the 
Syracusans was embroiled with much variance 
and contention. One party cried out, that " it 
was all a joke ; the Athenians durst not think 
of invading them." Another, " Hermocrates 
had truth and reason on his side." A third, 
<' Let them come ; what damage can they do 
us which we are not able heartily to repay 
them?" Others betrayed an open contempt 
at the whole account, and laughed at it as 
downright ridiuculous. The party was but 
small which gave credit to Hermocrates, and 
trembled for the future. At length, Athena- 
goras stood up, who being the first magistrate 
of the people, and whose credit at this time 
was highest with them, delivered himself as 
followeth : 

" The man who wishes the Athenians may 
not be so mad as to come hither and run them- 
selves headlong into our subjection, is either a 
coward or a traitor to his country. But for 
those who vent such news, and endeavour to 
frighten you by the terrible recital, at their 
audaciousness, truly, I am not in the least 
surprised ; but I am greatly so at their folly, 
if they imagine their views can escape detec- 
tion! Poor abject souls, quite dispirited with- 
in through their own pusillanimity, are glad to 
spread consternation throughout a whole com- 
munity ; that under the general panic, their 
own may lie veiled and undistinguished. And 
such is the effect which the present informa- 
tions may be ready to produce ; not from any 
grounds of truth and certainty, but the fictions 
and falsehoods of an iniquitous cabal, who are 
ever dabbling in the pratices of faction. 

««But you, Syracusans, I exhort, to apply 
your good sense on this occasion, and search 



after probability ; not by considering such ac- 
counts as these men have pompously detailed, 
but such enterprises as a wise and abundantly 
enlightened people (for such I esteem the 
Athenians) are likely to undertake. For what 
probability is there, that, leaving the Pelopon- 
nesians on their backs, when the war at home 
is not yet brought to any settled conclusion, 
they would wilfully embark into another of no 
less importance? For my part, I am persuad- 
ed they rest well contented, that, so many and 
so powerful states as we Sicilians are, we have 
not yet thought proper to invade them. 

" But, allowing these informations true, and 
that they are actually coming, — I am firmly 
persuaded, that Sicily is better able than Pelo- 
ponnesus to war them down, by how much in 
all respects, it is better furnished with every 
resource of war ; and that this our Syracuse 
alone is far superior in strength to that, nay 
double that armament, which by report now 
threatens its invasion. For I know, assuredly, 
that no horse can follow in their train ; that, 
farther, none can be procured for them in this 
country, if we abate an inconsiderable party 
which the Egesteans may furnish. And I 
know, that a body of heavy-armed, equal in 
number to our own, can never be transported 
by them across such a length of sea. The en- 
terprise is bold indeed, to attempt so long a 
voyage hither with only light and nimble ships, 
and to bring all those military stores, the roil 
of which must be excessively large, in order to 
attack so great a city. Shall I therefore be 
terrified at vain reports? I, who am firmly 
persuaded, that, if the Athenians were posses- 
sed of a city on our coasts as considerable in 
all respects as Syracuse itself, and should dare 
to provoke us ; if, masters of the neighbouring 
territory they should from thence make war 
upon us ; — even with such advantages they 
would with difliculty escape a total destruction. 
And what therefore, in all human probability, 
must be their fate, when all Sicily to a man 
will be combined to oppose them? For now 
their war must issue from a camp on the beach 
of the sea, of which their ships must form the 
ramparts. They will not be able to make long 
excursions from their tents and magazines of 
needful stores, as our cavalry will bridle and 
control them. But, in short, it is my firm 
opinion that they never will be able to accom- 
plish a descent, so far am I convinced that our 
force is in all respects superior. 



YEAR XVII.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



233 



« I am well persuaded, that all those ob- 
stacles, which I have hitherto recited, their own 
wise reflections have suggested to the remem- 
brance of the Athenians, and deterred them 
from hazarding their own ruin ; and that our 
own malcontents amuse us with fictitious ac- 
counts of things, that neither have nor can have 
existence. This is by no means the first oc- 
casion on which I have been able to detect 
their schemes. I am no stranger to their con- 
stant attempts of fomenting faction, ever intent 
as they are, by forgeries like these, or more 
malicious than these, or even by the open 
efforts of sedition, to strike a panic amongst 
the Syracusan people, and to seize the helm of 
your government. And I have reason to ap- 
prehend, that, amongst the many projects they 
attempt, some one at length may be fatally 
successful. But this must be charged to our 
own pusillanimity, who exert no precautions 
to avert impending miseries, nor bravely oppose 
the storm, though we perceive it to be gather- 
ing around us. And from hence it unavoid- 
ably results, that our state is seldom blessed 
with a season of tranquillity, but feels the bitter 
lot of sedition on sedition, of more numerous 
struggles against factions within than public 
hostilities without; nay, sometimes tyranny 
and despotic rule have been our portion. 

« To guard the present times from such 
disastrous contingencies, shall be my constant 
endeavour ; and, if favoured with your concur- 
rence, my care shall be successful. To this 
end I must prevail upon you, who are the 
many, to co-operate with me, whilst I inflict 
upon these artificers of faction the punishment 
they deserve, not barely for overt commissions, 
(for in these they are not easily caught,) but 
for all the treacherous plots which, how desir- 
ous soever, they are not able to execute. For 
we ought not only to award our vengeance on 
the open outrages of an enemy, but to disarm 
his malice by wise precaution; because the 
man who will not thus in time disarm it, will 
feel its blow before he is aware. 

" On the few I have also to bestow, partly 
some reproofs, partly some cautions, and partly 
some instructions. For chiefly by these me- 
thods I judge it feasible to deter them from 
their factious designs. Let me therefore re- 
quest from you, ye youths of Syracuse, the 
solution of a point which hath frequently 
occurred to my own imagination — What is it 
37 



you would have 1 — An immediate possession 
of the government of your country 1 — Why, 
the very laws of that country declare you in- 
capable of it. And these very laws were 
intended, rather to exclude you, so long as you 
are unequal, than to give you a disgraceful 
rejection when you shall be equal, to the trust. 
But, farther, — are you not piqued at heart at 
being placed upon the same rank and level with 
the bulk of your fellow-citizens 1 And where 
would be the justice in awarding distinctions of 
honour and trust to those who are in no res- 
pect difierenced from others 1 It may perhaps 
be urged that a democracy is repugnant to the 
dictates both of wisdom and justice ; that the 
most opulent members of a state are entitled 
to its highest honours, are best able to superin- 
tend the public welfare. But to this I reply, 
that, in the first place, by the word people is 
signified a whole community, including its 
every individual ; but an oligarchy means only 
a party ; in the next place, that men of opu- 
lence are the most suitable guardians of the 
public treasure; that men of understanding 
and experience are best qualified to advise ; 
but the many, after hearing, are the best judges 
of measures. And thus, by a democracy, 
equality of right and of privilege is most fairly 
preserved, as well to the separate members as 
to the whole community.. An oligarchy in- 
deed bestows an ample portion of dangers on 
the many, but in beneficial points it not only 
assumes the larger share to itself, but by an 
unbounded rapacity monopoliseth the public 
harvest. — These are the ends which the men 
of power, and the raw inexperienced youths 
amongst you, ambitiously pursue ; ends incom- 
patible with the welfare of a great and flourish- 
ing state. The accomplishment of these, I 
say, you have this very moment in agitation ; 
though the world cannot furnish such a set of 
fools, if you perceive not the pernicious tendency 
of your schemes. Nor can any set of Grecians, 
within my knowledge, equal either your brutal- 
ity or your villany, if with open eyes you dare 
proceed. Lay hold then at once of sound infor- 
mation, or repent if already informed, and unite 
in the infallible advancement of the general wel- 
fare of the whole community. And let the men 
of probity amongst you rest perfectly satisfied, 
that thus they shall obtain a proper share, nay 
more than a share, in those emoluments which 
will equally redound to all their country. But, 
2B 



234 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book VI. 



in case you give into different schemes, the ' 
hazard is great ; the whole of your plan will be 
baffled and confounded. | 

" Troub'e us therefore no farther with your ' 
informations, as we are privy to and shall cer- 
tainly disconcert the views of their authors. I 
For the Syracusan state, even though the 
Athenians actually invade us, will repel their 
efforts with a magnanimity worthy of herself; 
and we have already a set of brave command- 
ers, who will effectually manage the point. 
But, if not one tittle of these intended invasions 
be true, which is my firm opinion, the state 
will not be struck into a panic by your rumours, 
will never place the command of her forces in 
your hands, so as to rivet a voluntary servitude 
upon herself. She, on the contrar}^ will exert 
her own vigilance and discretion ; she will 
interpret the rumours you have spread as so 
many acts against her welfare, and will not give 
up her liberty to accounts expressly forged to 
terrify the ear ; but, aware in time, by no means 
to intrust herself into your management, will 
leave no possible method of defence untried," 

Thus spoke Athenagoras. But here one 
of the generals rising up prevented any other 
person from continuing the debate, and put an 
end to the present heats by delivering himself 
thus: — 

" It is contrary to all decorum, both for those 
who speak to pour forth calumniations against 
one another, and for those who hear to receive 
them with attention. At present, we are 
rather concerned to yield regard to the infor- 
mations which are brought us, that every in- 
dividual and this community may be timely 
prepared to repel the invaders. And, if this 
should prove at last to be mere superfluity of 
care, yet what harm can possibly accrue from 
guch an equipment of the state with horses, 
and arms, and such other habiliments as are the 
glory of war 1 We ourselves shall take all 
proper care of the provisions of war and the 
levy of soldiers ; and at the same time shall 
circulate our messengers to the cities around 
us, and watch the appearance of the foe ; and 
shall expedite every point judged needful in 
the present emergence. Some care of these 
points hath already been taken, and, what 
more wo shall perceive to be expedient, we 
flhall on the proper occasions communicate to 
you." 

When the general had expressed himself thus, 



the Syracusans broke up the assembly and de- 
parted. 

The Athenians, with the reinforcements of 
their allies, were by this time all arrived at 
Corcyra. And the first thing done by the 
commanders was, to take a review of the whole 
equipment, and to settle the order in which 
they were to anchor and form their naval sta- 
tion. They also divided it into three squad- 
rons, and cast lots for the command of each : 
to the end that, in the course of the voyage, 
they might be well supplied with water, and 
harbours, and the proper necessaries, wherever 
they might chance to put in ; that, in other 
respects, a better discipline might be kept up, 
and the men be more inured to a ready obedi- 
ence, as being under the inspection of an able 
commander in each several division. These 
points being settled, they despatched three 
vesssls to Italy and Sicily, to pick up informa- 
tions, what cities on those coasts would give 
them a reception. And their orders were, to 
come back in time and meet them upon the 
voyage, that they might be advertised into what 
ports they might safely enter. 

These previous points being adjusted, the 
Athenians, with an equipment already swelled 
to so great a bulk, weighing anchor from Cor- 
cyra, stood across for Sicily. The total of 
their triremes was a hundred and thirty-four, 
to which were added two Khodian vessels of 
fifty oars. One hundred of these were Athe- 
nian, and, of this number, sixty were tight ships 
fit for service ; the rest were transports for the 
soldiery. The remainder of the fleet consisted 
of Chians and the other allies. The total of 
the heavy-armed on board was five thousand 
one hundred men. Of these, fifteen hundred 
were citizens of Athens enrolled ; seven hun- 
dred were Athenians of the lowest class, 
(called Thetes,) who served by way of marines. 
The rest of the force consisted of the quotas of 
their alliance ; some of their own dependents ; 
five hundred belonged to the Argives ; the 
number of Mantineans and mercenaries was 
two hundred and fif>y ; the archers in the whole 
amounted to four hundred and eighty ; and, of 
these, eighty were Cretans. There were seven 
hundred Rhodian slingers, and a hundred and 
twenty light-armed Megarean exiles. And one 
horse transport attended, which carried thirty 
horsemen. 

So great an c(iuipmcnt sailed out at first to 



VEAR XVII.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



235 



begin the war. And, in the train of this equip- 
ment, went thirty storeships laden with corn, 
and carrying on board the bakers, and masons, 
and carpenters, and all things requisite in the 
works of fortification ; and also a hundred sail 
of small vessels, which necessity demanded to 
attend the ships that carried the stores. A 
large number also of small craft and trading 
vessels, sailed voluntarily in company with the 
fleet, for the sake of traffic. All which now, 
in one collected body, stood away from Corcyra 
across the Ionian gulf. 

The whole armament being got over to cape 
Japygia, or to Tarentum, as they severally 
could make the passage, sailed along the coast 
of Italy, — where not one city would receive 
them, would^ grant them a market, or suffer 
them to land, barely perm.itting them to anchor 
and to water, — though at Tarentum and Locri 
even that was denied them, — till they arrived at 
Rhegium, a promontory of Italy. At Rhegium 
the whole fleet was now assembled ; and with- 
out the city (for an admission into it was re- 
fused them) they formed an encampment 
within the verge of Diana's temple, where also 
they were accommodated by the Rhegians with 
a market. 

Here, having drawn their vessels on shore, 
they lay some time for refreshment ; and had a 
conference with the Rhegians, in which they 
pressed them as they were of Chalcidic descent, 
to succour the Leontines who were also Chal- 
cideans. Their answer was, that " they should 
side with neither party, but whatever measures 
were judged expedient by the other Italians 
they should conform to those." The Athe- 
nians' councils were now solely bent on the 
affairs of Sicily, in what manner they might 
most successfully make their approaches. They 
also waited for the return of the three vessels 
from Egesta, which had previously been des- 
patched thither : longing earnestly for a re- 
port about the state of their treasure, whether 
it was really such as their envoys at Athens 
had represented. 

To the Syracusans, in the meantime, un- 
doubted advice is brought from several quarters, 
and by their own spies, that " the fleet of the 
enemy lies at Rhegium." The truth of this 
being uncontested, they prepared for their de- 
fence with the utmost attention, and were no 
longer duped by incredulity. They also sent 
about to the Siculi ; to some places, their 
agents, who were to keep a watchful eye upon 



their conduct : and, to others, ambassadors. 
And into those towns upon the coast, which 
were exposed to a descent, they threw a garri- 
son. In Syracuse, they examined if the city 
was provided with the proper means of a de- 
fence, by a careful inspection of the arms and 
the horses ; and all other points were properly 
adjusted, as against a war coming swiftly upon 
them, and only not already present. 

The three vessels detached beforehand to 
Egesta, rejoin the Athenians, yet lying at Rhe- 
gium, with a report that <' the great sums which 
had been promised them were quite annihilated 
since they saw only thirty talents' in specie." 
Upon this the commanders were instantly seiz- 
ed with a dejection of spirit, because their first 
hope was thus terribly blasted ; and the Rhe- 
gians had refused to concur with their attempts, 
upon whom they had made their first essay of 
persuasion, and with whom they had the great- 
est probability of success, as they were by blood 
allied to the Leontines, and had ever shown 
themselves well-disposed to the Athenian state. 
The Egestean afiair had indeed taken no other 
turn than what Nicias fully expected, but the 
other two commanders were quite amazed and 
confounded at it. 

The trick, made use of by the Egesteans, at 
the time that the first embassy went thither 
from Athens to take a survey of their treasures, 
was this ; — Having conducted them into the 
temple of Venice at Eryx, they showed the 
offerings reposited there, the cups, the flagons, 
and the censers, and the other furniture of the 
temple, in quantity by no means small. These, 
being all of silver, presented to the eye a vast 
show of wealth, far beyond their intrinsic value. 
Having also made entertainments in private 
houses, for those who came in the vessels of 
the embassy, they amassed together all the gold 
and silver cups of Egesta : they borrowed others 
from the adjacent cities, as well Phoenician as 
Grecian ; they carried their guests about from 
one house of feasting to another ; and each 
exhibited them as his own property. Thus, all 
of them displaying generally the same vessels, 
and great abundance appearing at every place, 
the Athenians who made the voyage were pro- 
digiously surprised at the splendid shows. 
Hence it was that, on their return to Athens, 
they enlarged with a kind of emulation which 
should magnify it most, on the immensity of 

» je5812 10*. sterling. 



23G 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book VI. 



wealth they had seen at Egesta. In this man- 
ner, being deceived themselves, they obtruded 
the same fallacy upon others ; but now, when 
the true account was spread amongst them, 
that " there was no such wealth at Egesta," 
ihey were much censured and reproached by 
the soldiers. 

The generals, however, held a consultation 
about the methods of proceeding. And here 
it was the opinion of Nicias, " that with their 
whole armament they should stand immediately 
against Selinus, the reduction of which was the 
principal motive of the expedition ; and, in 
case the Egcsteans would furnish the whole 
armament with the proper supplies of money, 
their councils might then be regulated accord- 
ingly ; but, otherwise, they should insist on 
their maintaining the sixty sail of ships which 
had been sent expressly at their own request ; 
then, abiding by them, they should reconcile 
their differences with the Selinuntians, either 
by force of arms or negotiation; they after- 
wards might visit other cities, and display be- 
fore them the mighty power of the Athenian 
state ; and, having given such conspicuous 
proofs of their alacrity to support their friends 
and allies, might return to Athens; provided 
that no sudden and unexpected turn of affairs 
might give them opportunity to do service to 
the Leontines, or bring over some other cities 
to their interest; ever intent not to bring their 
own state into danger by a needless profusion 
of blood and treasure." 

Alcibiades declared " That it could never 
be justified, if, after putting to sea with so 
great an armament, they should return with 
disgrace, and no effectual service done to their 
country ; that, on the contrary they ought, by 
heralds despatched expressly, to notify their 
arrival in these parts to all the cities except 
Selinus and Syracuse; that, further, they 
should try what could be done with the Siculi, 
in order to persuade some of them to revolt 
from the Syracusans, and to strike up treaties 
of alliance and friendship with others, that so 
they might provide a resource of provisions and 
reinforcements ; that the first trial of this kind 
should be made upon the Messenians, who 
lay in the finest situation for favouring their 
passage and descent into Sicily, which must 
open to them the most convenient harbour 
and station for their armament: thus, gaining 
the concurrence of the cities, and certain from 
whom they might depend upon assistance, the 



way would then be open for them to make 
attempts upon Syracuse and Selinus, in case 
the former refused to make up the quarrel with 
the Egesteans, and the latter to suffer the re- 
plantation of the Leontines." 

The opinion of Lamachus was diametrically 
opposite, since he advised it " to be the most 
judicious measure to stand at once against 
Syracuse, and to try their fortune before that 
city with the utmost expedition, whilst they 
were yet not competently provided for resist- 
ance, and their consternation was still in its 
height: because every hostile force is always 
most terrible on its first approach ; and, in case 
it protract the time of encountering the eyes of 
its foes, they must recover their courage through 
familiarity with danger, and then the sight of 
an enemy is more apt to inspire contempt : — 
but, should they assault them on a sudden 
whilst yet their approach is with terror expected, 
the victory must infallibly be their own : — in 
this case, all things would co-operate with 
them to terrify the foe ; such as, the sight of 
their numbers, which now only could appear in 
their greatest enlargement ; the forebodings of 
their hearts what miseries w^re like to ensue ; 
and, above all, the instant necessity they must 
lie under of hazarding a battle : that, more- 
over, it was likely, that numbers of the eijemy 
might be surprised yet roaming abroad in the 
adjacent country, as still they were incredulous 
of the approach of the Athenians; or, even 
though the Syracusans were safely retired with 
all their effects into the city, the army must 
needs become masters of prodigious wealth, if 
they should besiege the city, and awe all around 
it ; that, by taking this step, the other Sicilians 
would be more discouraged from succouring 
the Syracusans, and more easily inclined to 
concur with the Athenians, and all shifts and 
delays to keep clear of the contest till one side 
was manifestly superior, would be precluded.** 
He added farther, that " they should take care 
to possess themselves of Megani, which was 
now deserted and not far from Syracuse either 
by sea or land, as it would afford a fine station 
for their ships to lie in, would shelter them up- 
on a retreat, and give expedition to their ap- 
proaches." 

But, though Lamachus delivered his senti- 
ments thus, he soon gave up his own opinion and 
w^ent over to that of Alcibiades. And in pur- 
suance of this, Alcibiades with his own single 
ship passed over to Messene ; and, having 



YEAR XVII.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



237 



gained a conference with the Messenians 
about an alliance offensive and defensive, when 
no arguments he brought could persuade, when 
on the contrary they returned this answer, that 
« into their city they would not receive them, 
though they were ready to accommodate them 
with a market without the walls," he repassed 
to Rhegium. And immediately the generals, 
having manned out sixty ships with the choicest 
hands of the whole fleet, and taken in a re- 
quisite stock of subsistence, steered away for 
Naxus, leaving the rest of the armament at 
Rhegium under the care of one of those in the 
commission. 

After a reception granted them into their 
city by the Naxians, they stood away from 
thence to Catana. And, when the Cataneans 
refused to receive them, (for in that city was 
a party strongly attached to the Syracusans,) 
they put into the river Terias. After a night's 
continuance there, the next day they sailed for 
Syracuse ; keeping the rest of the fleet ready 
ranged in the line of battle ahead. But they 
had attached ten beforehand, w^ho were ordered 
to enter the great harbour of Syracuse, and to 
examine what naval force lay there ready launch- 
ed for service, and to proclaim from their decks 
as they passed along the shore — that " the 
Athenians are come into those parts to replace 
the Leontines in their own territory, as they 
were bound in point both of alliance and con- 
sanguinity ; that whatever Leontines therefore 
were now residing at Syracuse, should without 
fear come over to the Athenians, as friends 
and benefactors." 

When the proclamation had been made, and 
they had taken a view of the city and its har- 
bours, and of the adjacent ground, what spots 
were most convenient for a descent and the 
commencement of the war, they sailed back 
again to Catana. A council of war had been 
held in that city, and the Cataneans were come 
to a resolution, " not to receive the armament ;" 
but, however, they granted an audience to the 
generals. At which, whilst Alcibiades har- 
angued, and the inhabitants of Catana were 
all in the public assembly, the Athenian 
soldiers, without giving any alarm, pulled down 
a little gate of a very sorry structure, and then, 
entered the city, walked up and down in the 
market. But such of the Cataneans as were 
of the Syracusan party no sooner found that 
the army was got in, than, struck into a sud- 
den consternation, they stole presently out of 



the city. The number of these was but trifling. 
The rest of the inhabitants decreed an alliance 
with the Athenians, and encouraged them to 
fetch over the remainder of their armament 
from Rhegiun*! 

This point being carried, the Athenians 
having passed to Rhegium, were soon with 
the whole of their fleet under sail for Catana, 
and, on their arrival there, they formed a pro- 
per station for their ships and men. 

But now intelligence was brought them from 
Camarina that " if they would come to coun- 
tenance them, that city would declare on their 
side ;" and that " the Syracusans are busy in 
manning their fleet." With the whole arma- 
ment therefore they steered along the coast, 
touching first at Syracuse. And when they 
found that no fleet was there in readiness to put 
to sea, they stood off again for Camarina ; and 
there, approaching the shore, they notified 
their arrival by the voice of a herald. Admit- 
tance was however refused them, the Cama- 
rineans alleging that << they were bound by 
solemn oaths to receive only one single ship of 
the Athenians, unless of their own accord they 
should require a larger number." Thus disap- 
pointed they put out again to sea, and, having 
made a descent on some part of the Syracusan 
territory, they picked up a booty, till the Syra- 
cusan cavalry making ahead against them and 
cutting off some of their light-armed who were 
straggled to a distance, they re-embarked, and 
went again to Catana. 

On their return thither they find the Sala- 
minian arrived from Athens to fetch back Alci- 
biades, by public order of the state, to take 
his trial for the crimes charged against him by 
his country, and also some others of the soldiery 
who attended him in the expedition, against 
whom informations had been given that they 
were guilty of impiety in the affair of the 
Mysteries, and against some of them in that of 
the Mercuries. For the Athenians, after the 
departure of the fleet, continued to make as 
strict an inquisition as ever into the crimes 
committed in regard to the Mysteries, and also in 
regard to the Mercuries. What sort of persons 
the informers were, was no part of their concern, 
but, in the height of jealousy, giving credit in- 
discriminately to all, through too great a defer- 
ence to men of profligate and abandoned lives, 
they apprehended and threw into prison the 
most worthy citizens of Athens ; esteeming it 
more prudent by pains and tortures to detect the 
2b2 



238 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book VI. 



fact, than that a person of irreproachable cha- 
racter, when once accused throujjh the villany 
of an informer, should escape without the 
question. For the people, having learned by 
tradition how grievous the tyranny of Pisistra- 
tus and his sons became at last ; and, what is 
more, that it was npt overthrown by themselves 
and Harmodius, but by the industry of the 
Lacedaemonians ; lived in a constant dread of 
such another usurpation, and beheld all these 
incidents now with most suspicious eyes. But, 
in fact, the bold attempt of Harmodius and 
Aristogiton took its rise merely from a com- 
petition in love. The particulars of which I 
shall here unfold more largely, to convince the 
world, that no other people, no not even the 
Athenians themselves, have any certain ac- 
count, either relating to their own tyrants or 
the transactions of that period. 

The truth is, that Pisistratus dying pos- 
sessed of the tyranny in a good old age, not 
Hipparchus (as is generally thought) but Hip- 
pias, the eldest of his sons, was his successor 
in power. Harmodius being at this time in 
the flower of his youth and beauty, Aristogiton 
a citizen of Athens, nay a citizen of the middle 
rank, doated upon and had him in his posses- 
sion. But, some attempts having been made 
upon Harmodius, by Hipparchus the son of 
Pisistratus, he rejected his solicitations, and 
discovers the whole affair to Aristogiton. 
The latter received the account with all that 
anguish which a warm affection feels ; and, 
alarmed at the great power of Hipparchus, lest 
by force he might seize the youth, he instantly 
forms a project, a project as notable as his rank 
in life would permit, to demolish the tyranny. 
And, in the meantime, Hipparchus, who, after 
making a second attempt upon Harmodius, was 
equally unsuccessful in his suit, could not pre- 
vail upon himself to make use of force ; but, 
however, determined, upon some remote oc- 
casions which might cover his real design from 
detection, and was actually studying an oppor- 
tunity to dishonour the youth. — For the power 
he had was never exerted in such a manner as 
to draw upon him the popular hatred, and his 
deportment was neither invidious nor distaste- 
ful. Nay, for the most part, this set of tyrants 
were exact observers of the rules of virtue and 
discretion. They exacted from the Atheni- 
ans only a twentieth of their revenue ; they 
beautified and adorned the city ; took upon 
themselves the whole conduct of the wars ; and 



presided over the religious sacrifices. In other 
respects, the state was governed by the laws 
already established, except that they always 
exerted their influence to place their own crea- 
tures in the first offices of the government. 
Several of their own family enjoyed the annual 
ofBce of archon at Athens ; and, amongst 
others, Pisistratus, the son of Hippias the 
tyrant, who bore the same name with his 
grandfather, and. in his archonship, dedicated 
the altar of the twelve gods in the public 
forum, and that of Apollo in the temple of the 
Pj'thian. The people of Athens, having since 
made additions to it in order to enlarge the 
altar in the forum, by that means efiaced the 
inscription : but that in the Pythian is yet 
legible, though the letters are wearing out 
apace, and runs thus : 

Pisistratus, from Hippias born. 
Of Pythian Piiobbus, radiant god of day, 

Ciiose thus the temple to adorn, 
And thus record his own superior sway. 

But, farther, that Hippias succeeded in the 
government as the eldest son, I myself can 
positively aver ; as I know it to be so, and have 
examined all the accounts of tradition wiUi 
much greater accuracy than others. But any 
one may be convinced of the fact by what I 
am going to subjoin. — Now, we have abundant 
light to prove, that he was the only one of 
the legitimate brothers who had any sons. 
So much the altar attests, and the column 
erected for a perpetual brand of the injustice 
of the tyrants in the citadel of Athens. In 
the latter, the inscription makes no mention 
of any son, of either Thessalus or Hippar- 
chus ; but nameth five sons of Hippias, who 
were brought him by Myrrhine, the daughter 
of Callias, the son of Hyperochidas. It is 
certainly most probable that the eldest son 
was married first ; nay, he is named the first 
after his fiither on the upper part of the 
column. And there were good reasons for this 
preference ; because his seniority gave him this 
rank ; and because he succeeded to the tyranny. 
Nor can it in any light seem probable to me, 
that Hippias, on a sudden and with ease, 
could have seized the tyranny, had Hipparchus 
died when invested with it, and he had only 
one day's time to effect his own establishment. 
The reverse is the truth ; that, havincr for a 
length of time been familiarized to the expecta- 
tion, having rendered himself awful to the 
citizens, and being supported by vigilant and 



YEAR XVII.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



239 



trusty guards, he received and enjoyed his 
power with abundant security. He never had 
cause, as a younger brother must have had, to 
work his way through perplexities and dangers, 
as in that case he could not by practice have 
been made an adept in the aflair of government. 
But was accidental, and owing entirely to 
subsequent misfortunes, that Hipparchus got 
the title, and passed in the opinion of succeed- 
ing ages for one of the tyrants. 

On Harmodius, therefore, who was deaf to 
his solicitations, he executed his resentment in 
the manner pre-determined. For, a summons 
having been delivered to a sister of his, a young 
virgin, to attend and carry the basket in some 
public procession, they afterwards rejected her ; 
alleging she never had nor could have been sum- 
moned, because she was unworthy of the honour. 
This affront highly provoked Harmodius ; but 
Aristogiton, out of zeal for him, was far more 
exasperated at it. The points needful to their 
intended revenge were concerted with the party 
who concurred in the design. But they waited 
for the great Panathensea, to strike the blow ; 
on which festival alone, without incurring sus- 
picion, such of the citizens as assisted in the 
procession might be armed and gathered to- 
gether in numbers. It was settled, that they 
themselves should begin ; and then, the body of 
their accomplices were to undertake their pro- 
tection against the guards of the tyrant's family. 

The persons made privy to this design were 
but few, from a view to a more secure execu- 
tion of it. For they presumed that even such 
as were not in the secret, when the attempt 
was once in whatever manner begun, finding 
themselves armed, would seize the opportunity, 
and readily concur to assert their own freedom. 
When therefore the festival was come, Hippias, 
repairing without the walls to the place called 
Ceramicus, and there attended by his guards, 
was prescribing and adjusting the order of the 
procession. Harmodius and Aristogiton, each 
armed with a dagger, advanced to execute their 
parts. But, when they saw one of their ac- 
complices in familiar conversation with Hip- 
pias, (for Hippias was affable and courteous to 
all men,) they were struck with fear ; they im- 
agined the whole of their plot had been betray- 
ed, and that already they were only not appre- 
hended. Now, therefore, by a sudden turn 
of resolution, they determined, if possible, to 
snatch a timely revenge upon him by whom 
they were aggrieved, and on whose account 



they had embarked into so dangerous an affair. 
In this hurry of thought they rushed back into 
the city, and met with Hipparchus at the place 
called Leocorium ; where, without any regard to 
their own safety, they made an instant assault 
upon him. And thus, in all the fury of pas- 
sion, one actuated by jealousy, and the other 
by resentment, they wounded and they kill 
him. As the people immediately ran together. 
Aristogiton by favour of the concourse escapes 
for the present, but, being afterwards seized, 
was unmercifully treated : but Harmodius is 
instantly slain on the spot. 

The news of this assassination being carried to 
Hippias at the Ceramicus, he moved off im- 
mediately ; not to the scene of action, but to- 
wards the armed accomplices in the procession, 
before they could be informed of the fact, as 
they were stationed at a distance. He art- 
fully suppressed on his countenance all sense 
of the calamity ; and, pointing to a certain spot, 
commanded them aloud to throw down their 
arms and file off thither. This command they 
obeyed, expecting he had something to com- 
municate to them. But Hippias, addressing 
himself to his guards, orders them to take away 
those arms. He then picked out, man by man, 
from amongst them, such as he designed to 
put to the question, and all upon whom a dag- 
ger was found : for, by ancient custom, they 
were to make the procession with a spear and 
a shield. 

In this manner truly, from the anguish of ^ 
irritated love,' this conspiracy took its rise, and 
this desperate attempt was executed by Har- 
modius and Aristogiton, from the impulse of 
a sudden consternation. But, after this, the 
tyranny became more grievous upon the Athe- 
nians. Hippias, who was now more than ever 
alarmed, put many of the citizens to death; 
and cast his thoughts about towards foreign 

1 And yet so violently were tyrants detestof! at 
Atlipnp.that the memory of Harmodius and Arisrojiton 
was ever :tfter honoured there, as martyrs for lihertjr 
and first authors of the ruin of tyrants. Their praises 
were publicly sunn; at the creat PaiiaMieiirea. No slave 
was ever called by their names. Praxiteles was em- 
ployed to rr>st their statues, which were afterwards set 
np in the forum : Xerxes indeed carried them away in- 
to Persia, I nt Alexander afterwards sent them back to 
Athens. Plutarch hath preserved a smart reply of An 
tip' o t' e orator, who will appear in this history, to tho 
elder Dionysius. tyrant of Syracuse. The Infter had 
put the question, which was the finest kind of brass ? 
"That," replied Antipho, "of which tl.e statues of 
Harmodius and Aristojriton were made." 



240 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book VI. 



powers, to secure himself an asylum abroad in 
case of a total reverse at home. To ^anti- 
das therefore, the son of Hippoclus, tyrant of 
Lampsacus, — to a Lampsacene though he him- 
self was an Athenian, — he married his daugh- 
ter Archedice, knowing that family to have a 
powerful interest with king Darius. And the 
monument of that lady is now at Lampsacus, 
and hath this inscription : 

From Hippias sprung, with regal power array'd, 

Within this earth Archedice is laid; 

By father, husband, brothers, sons, allied 

To haughty thrones, yet never stain'd with pride. 

For the space of three years after this, 
Hippias continued in possession of the tyranny 
at Athens ; but being deposed in the fourth 
by the Lacedsemonians, and the exiled Alcmaeo- 
nidae, he retired by agreement to Siga^um ; 
from thence, to iEantidas at Lampsacus ; and 
from thence, to king Darius : and with a com- 
mand under him, he marched twenty years 
after to Marathon ; and, though much ad- 
vanced in years, served in that war with the 
Medes. 

The people of Athens reflecting on these 
past transactions, and recollecting all the dis- 
mal narratives about them which tradition had 
handed down, treated with great severity, and 
deep suspicions, all such as were informed 
against in relation to the Mysteries : and they 
construed the whole procedureas the dawning 
of a plot to erect an oligarchical and tyrannic 
power. And as their passions were inflamed 
by such apprehensions, many worthy and 
valuable citizens were already thrown into 
prison. Nay, it seemed as if their inquisition 
was to have no end, since from day to day 
their indignation gave into more increasing 
severity, and numbers were constantly arrested. 
Here, one of those' who had been imprisoned 
on suspicion (and a suspicion too of being 
most deeply concerned in the crime) is per- 
suaded, by one of his fellow-prisoners, to turn 
an evidence, no matter whether of truth or 
falsehood. Many conjectures have passed on 
"both sides ; but no one, neither at that time 
nor since, had been able to discover the men 
who were really concerned in the affair. The 



1 This person, according to Plutarch in Alcibindes, 
■was Andocides the orator, a man always reckoned of 
the oligarcliical faction. And one Tinia'us, his intimate 
friend, who was a man of small consideration at Athens, 
but remarkable for a penetratins and cntcrprifiing ge- 
nius, was the person who persuaded him to turn in- 
former. 



argument which prevailed upon this person 
was, " the necessity for his taking such a step, 
even though he had no hand in the commis- 
sion, since by this he would infallibly procure 
his own safety, and deliver the city from its 
present confusion. For he must be much 
more secure of saving his life by such volun- 
tary confession on a promise of indemnity, 
than he could possibly be, should he persist in 
an avowal of his innocence, and be brought to 
a trial." In short, this man became an evi- 
dence, both against himself and against others, 
in the affair of the Mercuries. 

Great was the joy of the Athenian people 
at this, as it was thought, undoubted dis- 
covery. And as they had been highly cha- 
grined before at their inability to detect the 
criminals, who had so outrageously insulted 
the multitude, they immediately discharged 
this informer, and all other prisoners whom 
he did not name as accomplices. Upon such 
as he expressly named, the judicial trials were 
held. Some of them they put to death, as 
many as were prevented by timely arrests from 
flying from justice ; but they pronounced the 
sentence of death against the fugitives, and set 
a price on their heads. Yet all this while, it 
was by no means clear, that those who suffered 
were not unjustly condemned. Thus much 
however is certain, that by such proceedings 
the public tranquillity was restored. 

In regard to Alcibiades, the Athenians were 
highly incensed against him, since the party 
which were his enemies, and had made their at- 
tacks upon him before his departure, continued 
still to inflame them. And now, as they pre- 
sumed the truth had been detected in relation 
to the Mercuries, it appeared to them, beyond 
a scruple, that he must also have been guilty 
of the crimes charged against him about the 
Mysteries, upon the same ground of a secret 
combination against the democracy. 

At this critical period of time, when the 
public confusion was in all its height, it farther 
happened, that a Lacedaemonian army, though 
by no means large, advanced as far as to the 
isthmus, to execute some scheme along with 
the Boeotians. This was interpreted to the 
prejudice of Alcibiades, as if they had now 
taken the field at his instigation, and not on 
any account of obliging the Boeotians ; and 
that " had they not happily apprehended in 
time such as had been informed against, Athens 
had now been infaUibly betrayed." Nay, for 



YEAR XVII.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



241 



the space of a night, they kept guard under arms, 
within the city, in the temple of Theseus. 

About the same time, also, the friends of 
Alcibiades at Argos were suspected of a design 
to assault the people. And those hostages of 
the Argives who were kept in custody among 
the islands, the Athenians on this occasion, de- 
livered up to the people of Argos, to be put to 
death on these suspicions. 

Thus reasons flowed in from every quarter 
for suspecting Alcibiades. Desirous therefore 
to bring him to a trial and to execution, they 
accordingly despatched the Salaminian to Sicily, 
to order him and such others as they had in- 
formations against to repair to Athens. But 
it had been given them in charge to notify to 
him, that " he should follow them home in 
order to make his defence," and by no means 
to put him under arrest. This arrangement 
was owing to a desire of preventing all stirs in 
the army or in the enemy ; and, not least of 
all, to their willingness that the Mantineans 
and Argives should continue in the service, 
whose attendance in the expedition they wholly 
ascribed to the interest Alcibiades had with 
them. 

In pursuance of this, Alcibiades on board 
his own ship, and accompanied by all those who 
were involved in the same accusation, sailed 
away from Sicily with the Salaminian for 
Athens. And when they were got to the 
height of Thuria, they no longer followed ; 
but quitting their ship were no longer to be 
seen. Censured as they were, they durst not 
in fact undergo a trial. The crew of the Sala- 
minian exerted themselves immediately in the 
search after Alcibiades and his companions; but, 
when they found the search was inelTectual, 
they gave it up, and steered away for Athens. 
And Alcibiades, now become a fugitive, passed 
over in a vessel soon after from Thuria' to 
Peloponnesus. But the Athenians, upon his 
thus abandoning his defence, pronounced the 
sentence of death against him and his asso- 
ciates. 



» Somebody at Thuria, who knew Alcibiades, asked 
him, why he would not stand a trial, and trust his 
country ? " In other points I would ; but, when my 
life is ronrerned, I would not trust my own mother, lest 
she sliould make a mistake, and put in a black bean 
instead of a wlnie one." And, when he w;is afterwards 
told, that his countrymen liad pnssed the sentence of 
death agninst liini. he briskly replied— " But I'll make 
them know that I ara alive.'* Plutarch in Alcibiades. 
38 



After these transactions, the Athenian gene- 
rals who remained in Sicily, having divided 
their whole armament into two squadrons, and 
taken the command of each by lot, set sail with 
all their united force for Selinus and Egesta. 
They were desirous to know, whether the 
Egesteans would pay down the money : to 
discover also the present posture of the Seli- 
nuntians ; and to learn the state of their quar- 
rels with the Egesteans. In their course, 
keeping on the left that part of Sicily which 
lies on the Tyrrhene gulf, they arrived at Hi- 
mera, which is the only Grecian city in this 
part of Sicily ; and, when denied reception here, 
they resumed their course. Touching after- 
wards at Hyccara, a Sicanian fortress, but an 
annoyance to the Egesteans, they surprise it; 
for it was situated close upon the sea ; and 
having doomed the inhabitants to be slaves, 
they delivered the place into the hands of the 
Egesteans, whose cavalry was now attending 
on the Athenian motions. The land forces 
marched away from hence through the terri- 
tories of the Siculi, till they had again reached 
Catana ; but the vessels on board of which were 
the slaves, came back along the coasts. 

Nicias had proceeded from Hyccara directly 
to Egesta, where, after transacting other points 
and receiving thirty talents,^ he rejoined the 
grand armament at Catana. And here they 
set up the slaves to sale,^ and raised by the 
money paid for them'* one hundred and twenty 
talents. 

They also sailed about to their Sicilian allies, 
summoning them to send in their reinforce- 
ments. With a division also of their force they 
appeared before Hybla, a hostile city in the 
district of Gel a, but were not able to take it. 
And here the summer ended. 

Winter now succeeding, the Athenians be- 
gin immediately to get all things in readiness 
for an attempt upon Syracuse. The Syracu- 
sans were equally intent on making an attack 
upon them. For, since the Athenians had not 
thought proper, during their first panic and con- 
sternation, to fall instantly upon them, such a 
protraction re-inspired them day after day with 
new reviving courage ; since, farther, by cruiz- 



a £5812 10.?. sterlinir. 
3 Amon? the rest, Nicias sold at this sale I.ais the fa- 
mous courtezan, at this lime a very youni <;irl, wl;om 
her purchasers carried to Corinth, where she set up and 
drove a prodigious trade indeed. Plutarch in JiTicias. 
* £2'3,2oOL sterling. 



242 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book VI. 



ing on the other side of Sicily, they seemed to 
affect a remoteness from them ; and, though 
showing themselves before Hybla, and at- 
tempting the place, they had not been able to 
carry it, the Syracusans began now to treat 
them with an open contempt. They even in- 
sisted, as might be expected from a populace 
who are high in spirits, " that their generals 
ehould lead out towards Catana, since the ene- 
my durst not venture to march against them." 
The Syracusan horsemen also, sent daily out 
to observe their motions, rode boldly up to the 
camp of the Athenians, insulting them in 
other respects, but especially with this sneer- 
ing demand, " Whether they were not rather 
come to gain a settlement for themselves on a 
foreign shore, than to replace the Leontines in 
their old possessions ]" 

The Athenian generals, informed of these 
bravadoes, were desirous to seduce the whole 
strength of S3'racuse to as great a distance as 
possible from that city, that they might snatch 
an opportunity of transporting thither their 
own forces by favour of the night, and seize 
a proper* spot whereon to fix their encamp- 
ment, without any obstruction from the enemy. 
They were well convinced, that their point 
could not be so easily accomplished, should 
they endeavour to force a descent in the face 
of the enemy, or by a land-march should give 
them an early notice of their design. For, in 
such cases, their own light-armed, and that 
cumbersome train which must attend, as they 
had no horse to cover their motions, must suf- 
fer greatly from the numerous cavalry of the 
Syracusans : but, by the other scheme, they 
might pre-occupy a spot of ground, where the 
cavalry could not give them any considerable 
annoyance. Nay, what is more, the Syracu- 
san exiles who followed their camp, had in- 
formed them of a piece of ground convenient 
for their purpose near Olympiaeum. 

In order therefore to accomplish the point, 
the generals have recourse to the following ar- 
tifice. — They despatch an emissary, of whose 
fidelity they were well assured, and who might 
also pass with the generals of Syracuse as well 
affected to their cause. The person employed 
was a Catancan. He told them " he was sent 
by their friends in Catana," with whose names 
they were actiuaintcd, and knew well to be of 
that number in Catana which persisted in 
steadfast attachment to them : he said farther, 
that, " the Athenians reposed themselves by 



night within the city at a distance from their 
arms ; and that in case they (the Syracusans) 
on a day prefixed, would with all the forces of 
their city appear by early dawn before the 
Athenian camp, the Cataneans would shut up 
those within the city and set fire to their ship- 
ping, by which means they might force the en- 
trenchments and render themselves masters of 
the camp ; that, farther, the party of Cataneans, 
that would co-operate with them in this scheme, 
was very large, and already prepared to execute 
these points he was now sent to propose." 

The Syracusan generals, whose ardour other 
contingencies had already inflamed, and who 
had formed a resolution, even previous to such 
encouragement, to march their forces towards 
Ca ana, without the least reserve gave implicit 
credit to this emissary ; and, having instantly 
pitched upon a day for execution, dismissed 
him. They also (for by this time the Seli- 
nuntian and some other auxiliaries had joined 
them) issued out their orders for the whole 
military strength of Syracuse to march out on 
the day appointed. No sooner therefore were 
all the needful preparations adjusted, and the 
time at hand at which they were to make their 
appearance, than — on the march for Catana, 
they halted one night upon the banks of the 
Symsethus, in the Leontine district. But the 
Athenians, when assured they had thus taken 
the field, decamping instantly with the whole 
of their force, and with all the Sicilian and 
other auxiliaries who had joined them, and em- 
barking themselves on board their ships and 
transports, steered away by night for Syracuse. 
And, early the next dawn, they landed on the 
intended spot near Olympiasum, intent on 
forming and securing their encampment. The 
cavalry of the Syracusans, in the meantime, 
came up first to Catana ; and discovering that 
the whole Athenian army had put to sea by 
night, they return \*ith this intelligence to their 
foot. Upon this, the whole army, soon wheel- 
ing about, returned with all speed to the de- 
fence of Syracuse. 

In the meantime, the Athenians, as the ene- 
my had a long way to march, formed an en- 
campment on an advantageous spot without 
the least obstruction. On it, they were pos- 
sessed of the advantage of fighting only at their 
own discretion, and the Syracusan horse could 
not give them the least annoyance, either during 
or befi)re an engagement. On one side, they 
were flanked by walls, and houses, and trees, 



TEAR XVII.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



243 



and a marsh ; and on the other by precipices. 
They also felled some trees that grew near ; 
and, carrying them down to the shore, they piled 
them into a barricade for the defence of their 
ships; and to cover them on the side of Das- 
con. They also expeditiously threw up a ram- 
part, on the part which seemed most accessible 
to the enemy, of stones picked out for the pur- 
pose, and timber, and broke down the bridge 
of the Anapus. 

Thus busied as they were on fortifying their 
camp, not so much as one person ventured out 
of the city to obstruct their proceedings. The 
first who appeared to make any resistance, 
were the Syracusan cavalry ; and, when once 
they had shown themselves, the whole body of 
their infantry was soon in sight. They ad- 
vanced first of all quite up to the Athenian 
works; but, when they perceived that they 
would not sally out to fight them, they again 
retreated : and, having crossed the road to He- 
lorum, reposed themselves for the night. 

The succeeding day, the Athenians and al- 
lies prepared for engagement, and their order 
of battle was formed as follows : — The Ar- 
gives and Mantineans had the right, the Athe- 
nians the centre, and the rest of the line was 
formed by the other confederates. One half 
of the whole force, which was ranged in the 
first line, was drawn up by eight in depth. The 
other half, being posted near the tents, formed 
a hollow square, in which the men were also 
drawn up by eight. The latter were ordered, 
if any part of the line gave way, to keep a good 
look-out and advance to their support. And 
within this hollow square they posted all the 
train who attended the service of the army. 

But the Syracusans drew up their heavy- 
armed, which body consisted of the whole mili- 
tary strength of Syracuse and all the confede- 
rates who had joined them, in files consisting 
of sixteen. Those who had joined with auxili- 
ary quotas, were chiefly the Selinuntians ; and 
next, the horse of the Geloans, amounting in 
the whole to about two hundred: the horse 
also of the Camarineans, about twenty in num- 
ber, and about fifty archers. But their horse- 
men they posted to the right, being not fewer 
in number than twelve hundred ; and next to 
them, the darters. 

The Athenians being now intent on advan- 
cing to the charge, Nicias, addressing himself in 
regular order to the troops of the several states, 



animated them to the fight by the following 
harangue, repeated in turn to the whole army. 

" What need, my fellow-soldiers, of a long 
exhortation, since we are here, determined, and 
resolute for action 1 for this our present ar- 
rangement seems to me a stronger confirmation 
of your courage, than any words could be, how 
eloquently soever delivered, if we were inferi- 
or in strength. But when, Argives, and Man- 
tineans, and Athenians, and the flower of the 
isles, we are here assembled together, — how is 
it possible, when such brave and numerous 
allies are to fight in company, that we should 
not entertain a steadfast, nay the warmest 
hope, that the victory will be our own 1 nay 
more, as we have to do with a promiscuous 
crowd, the mob of a city, not selected for ser- 
vice, as we have had the honour to be ; and 
who, it must be added, are but Sicilians ; who, 
though affecting to despise us, will never sus- 
tain our charge, because their skill is far be- 
neath their courage. 

" Let every soldier farther recall to his re- 
membrance, that he is now at a vast distance 
from his native soil, and near no friendly land 
but what you shall render such by the efforts 
of your valour. Such things I am bound to 
suggest to your remembrance, the reverse, I 
am well convinced of what your enemies utter 
for their mutual encouragement. They un- 
doubtedly are roaring aloud — * It is for your 
country you are now to fight.' But I tell you, 
that from your country you are now remote ; 
and, as such, must either conquer, or not with- 
out diflSculty ever see it again, since the num- 
erous cavalry of the enemy will press hard upon 
our retreat. Call therefore to mind your own 
dignity and worth ; advance with alacrity to 
assault your foes ; convinced that your present 
necessities and wants are far more terrible 
than the enemy you are to engage," 

When Nicias had finished this exhortation, 
he led on his army towards the encounter. 
But the Syracusans were not yet prepared, 
as by no means expecting to be charged so 
soon ; and some of the soldiers, as the city 
lay so near, were straggled thither. These 
however came running with all eagerness and 
speed to gain their posts ; too late upon the 
whole ; but as each of them met with any 
number intent on action, he ranged himself in 
their company. The Syracusans, to do them 
justice, were not deficient in alacrity or cou- 



244 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book VI. 



rage, neither in the present battle nor any of 
the following. They maintained their ground 
gallantly so long as their competence of skill 
enabled them ; but when that failed them, 
they were forced, though with reluctance, to 
slacken in their ardour. However, though 
far from imagining that the Athenians would 
presume to begin the attack, and though ob- 
liged in a hurry to stand on their defence, they 
took up their arms, and advanced immediately 
to meet their foe. 

In the first place, therefore, the flingers of 
stones with either the hand or the sUng, and 
the archers, on both sides, began the engage- 
ment ; and alternately chased one another, as 
is generally the case among the bodies of the 
light-armed. In the next place, the sooth- 
sayers brought forwards and immolated the 
solemn victims ; and the trumpets summoned 
the heavy-armed to close firm together, and ad- 
vance. 

All sides now began to face ; the Syracu- 
sans to fight for their country ; each soldier 
amongst them for his native soil, to earn, for 
the present his preservation, and for the future 
his liberty. — On their enemies' side, the Athe- 
nians to gain possession of a foreign country, 
and not to damage their own by a dastardly 
behaviour ; the Argives and voluntary part of 
the confederates, to procure for the Athenians 
a happy accomplishment of their schemes, and 
again to visit their own country, to which they 
were endeared, victorious and triumphant ; and 
that part of the confederacy which attended in 
obedience to the orders of their masters, were 
highly animated by the thought, that they 
must earn their safety now at once, or, if de- 
feated now, must for the future despair, and 
then, secretly actuated perhaps by the distant 
hope, that, were others reduced to the Athe- 
nian yoke, their own bondage might be render- 
ed more light and easy. 

The business being now come to blows, 
they for a long time maintained the ground on 
both sides. It happened, farther, that some claps 
of thunder were heard, attended with lightning 
and a heavy rain. This caused a sudden con- 
sternation in the Syracusans, who now for the 
first time engaged the Athenians, and had 
gained very little experience in the affairs of 
war. But by the more experienced enemy, 
these accidents were interpreted as the ordi- 
nary effects of the season ; and their concern 
was rather employed upon the enemy, whom 



they found no easy conquest. But the Ar 
gives, having first of all defeated the left wing 
of the Syracusans, and the Athenians being 
afterwards successful in their quarter of the 
battle, the whole Syracusan army was soon 
thrown into disorder, and began the flight. 
The Athenians however did not continue the 
pursuit to any great distance ; for the Syracu- 
san cavalry, as they were numerous and un- 
broken, put a stop to the chase by assaulting 
those parties of heavy-armed whom they saw 
detached for the pursuit, and driving them 
back into their own line. Having pursued 
only so far as they could in an orderly and 
secure manner, they again retreated and erect- 
ed a trophy. 

But the Syracusans, who had rallied again 
in the road to Helorum, and were drawn up 
as well as the present posture of aflairs would 
permit, send a strong detachment from their 
body for the guard of Olympiieum, apprehen- 
sive that the Athenians might otherwise seize 
the treasures that were deposited there. And, 
this being done, with the remainder of their 
force they retired within the walls of Syracuse. 

The Athenians in the meantime made no 
advances against OlympijEum ; but, after ga- 
thering together the bodies of their slain, and 
laying them upon the funeral pyre, they pass- 
ed the night on the field of battle. 

The next day they delivered up their dead 
under truce to the Syracusans, of whom and 
their allies there had perished about two hun- 
dred and sixty men ; and then gathered up the 
bones of their own. Of the Athenians and 
their allies about fifty in all were slain. And 
now, with all the pillage they had made of the 
enemy, they sailed back to Catana. 

This was owing to the season of the year, 
now advanced to winter. It was no longer 
judged possible for them to be able to con- 
tinue the war in their present post before they 
had procured a supply of horse from Athens, 
and had assembled others from their confed- 
erates in Sicily, that they might not be en- 
tirely exposed to the horse of the enemy. 
They were also intent on collecting pecuniary 
aids in those parts, and some were expected 
from Athens. — "They might also obtain the 
concurrence of some other cities, which they 
hoped would prove more tractable, since they 
had gained a battle : they wanted, farther, to 
furnish themselves with provisions and all 
necessary stores, which might enable them 



YEAR XVII.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



245 



early in the spring to make new attempts on | 
Syracuse." Determined by these considera- , 
tions, they sailed back to Naxus and Catanaj 
in order to winter there. I 

The Syracusans, after they had performed ' 
the obsequies of their slain, called a general 
assembly of the people. And on this occasion 
Herniocrates, the son of Hermon, (a man who 
was inferior to none in all other branches of 
human prudence, who for military skill was in 
high reputation, and renowned for bravery,) 
standing forth among them, endeavoured to 
encourage them, and prevent their being too 
much dispirited by their late defeat. 

He told them, "that in courage they had 
•not been worsted, but their want of discipline 
had done them harm : and yet the harm suf- 
ferred by that was not near so great as they 
might justly have expected ; especially when, 
no better than a rabble of mechanics, they had 
been obliged to enter the lists, against the 
most experienced soldiery of Greece ; that 
what hurt them most was too large a number 
of generals, and the multiplicity of commands 
which was thence occasioned, (for the number 
of those who commanded was fifteen,) whilst 
the bulk of their array observed no discipline, 
and obeyed no orders at all : but were only a 
few skilful generals selected for the trust, 
would they only be intent this winter on train- 
^ ing their bodies of heavy-armed, and furnish 
others with arms who had none for themselves, 
in order to enlarge their number as much as 
possible and inure them to settled exercise and 
use, — he assured them, thus, in all probability, 
they must upon the whole be too hard for 
their foes, as their natural portion of valour 
was great, and skill would be attained by 
practice : that both of these would progres- 
sively become more perfect; discipline, by 
being exercised through a series of danger; 
and inward bravery would merely of itself in- 
crease in gallant confidence, when assured of 
the support of skill ; as to generals, that few 
only, and those invested with absolute power, 
ought to be elected and confirmed by a solemn 
oath from the people, that they were permitted 
to lead the army where and how they judged 
best for the public service. For by this means, 
what ought to be concealed would be less liable 
to detection, and all the schemes of war might 
be directed with order and a certainty of suc- 
cess." 

The Syracusans, who had listened to this dis- 



course, decreed whatever he proposed. They 
elected Hermocrates himself to be a general, 
and Heraclides the son of Lysimachus, and 
Sicanus the son of Hexecestus ; these three. 
They also appointed ambassadors to go to 
Corinth and Lacedaemon, to procure the al- 
liance of those states, and to persuade the 
Lacedaemonians to make hotter war upon the 
Athenians, with an open avowal that they 
acted in behalf of the Syracusans ; that, by 
this means, they might either be obliged to 
recall their fleet from Sicily, or might be less 
able to send any reinforcements to the army 
already there. 

The Athenian forces, which lay at Catana, 
soon made an excursion from thence to Mes- 
sene, expecting to have it betrayed into their 
power. But all the steps taken previously for 
the purpose, were totally disconcerted. For 
Alcibiades, upon his quitting the command 
when recalled to Athens, being convinced 
within himself that exile must be his portion, 
betrayed the whole project (as he had been in 
the secret) to such persons at Messene as 
were attached to the Syracusans. The first 
step this party took was to put to death all the 
persons against whom he informed. And at 
the time of this attempt, being quite in a fer- 
ment and under arms, they carried their point, 
so that those who wished to give it were ob- 
liged to refuse admission to the Athenians. 
The Athenians, therefore, after thirteen days' 
continuance on that coast, when the weather 
began to be tempestuous, when their provisions 
failed, and no hope of success appeared, re- 
turned to Naxus**, ' where, having thrown 
up an entrenchment round their camp, they 
continued the rest of the winter. They also 
despatched a trireme to Athens, to forward a 
supply of money and horsemen to join them 
without fail, by the beginning of the spring. 

The Syracusans employed themselves this 
winter in fortifying their city. They inclosed 
Temenites within their new works, and carried 
their wall through all that length of ground 
which faceth Epipolae, that, in case they should 
be unable to keep the field, the enemy might 
have as little room as possible to raise counter- 
works of annoyance. They also placed a gar- 
rison at Megara, and another in Olympiaum. 



1 In t!;e original is added "«« fe>e«*»5. Put all the 
editors and note writers give it up, and own tbey c»n 
maite nothing of it. 
2C 



246 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book vt. 



A.nd all along the sea they drove rows of piles, 
wherever the ground was convenient for de- 
scents. Knowing, also, that the Athenians 
wintered at Naxus, they marchecl out with all 
their force against Catana. They ravaged the 
territor}'^ of the Cataneans ; and, after burning 
the tents and camp of the Athenians, they re- 
turned home. 

Having also had intelligence, that the Athe- 
nians had sent an embassy to Camarina, under 
favour of a treaty made formerly with them by 
Laches, to try if it were possible to procure 
their concurrence ; they also despatched an em- 
bassy thither, to traverse the negotiation. For 
the Camarineans were suspected by them, as if 
they had not cordially sent in their quota of 
assistance for the first battle, and lest for the 
future they might be totally averse from acting 
in their support, as in that battle they had seen 
the Athenians victorious, and so, induced by 
the former treaty they had made with the lat- 
ter, might now declare openly on their side. 

When therefore Hermocrates and others 
were arrived at Camarina from Syracuse, and, 
from the Athenians, Euphemus and his col- 
leagues in the embassy, an assembly of the 
Camarineans was held , in which, Hermocrates, 
desirous to give them a timely distaste against 
the Athenians, harangued them thus : 

" Our embassy hither, ye men of Camarina, 
hath not been occasioned by any fears we were 
under, that you might be too much terrified at 
the great equipment with which the Athenians 
have invaded us ; but rather by our knowledge 
with what kind of arguments they would im- 
pose on your understanding, by which before 
we had an opportunity to remonstrate, they 
might seduce you into a concurrence. Sicily 
in fact they have invaded, upon such pretext as 
you have heard them give out ; but with such 
intentions as We have all abundant reason to 
suspect. And to me it is clear, that their 
schemes have no tendency to replant the Leon- 
tines, but rather to supplant us all. For, how 
is it reconcilable with common sense, that a 
people, who have ever been employed in the 
ruin of the states which are neighbouring to 
Athens, should be sincere in re-establishing a 
Sicilian people ; or, by the bonds of consan- 
guinity, hold themselves obliged to protect the 
Lcontinos, who nre of Chalcidic descent, whilst 
on the Chalcideans of Eubtea, from whom these 
others are a colony, they hold fast-rivetted the 
yoke of slavery] No ; it is the same cruel 



policy, that subjugated the Grecians in that 
part of the world, which now exerts itself to 
glut their ambition in this. 

" These are those very Athenians, who 
formerly, having been elected their common 
leaders by the well-designing lonians and that 
confederate body which derived from them 
their descent, on the glorious pretence of 
avenging themselves on the Persian monarch, 
abused their trust by enslaving those who 
placed confidence in them ; charging some 
with deserting the common cause, others with 
their mutual embroilments, and all, at length, 
with diflferent but specious criminations. And, 
on the whole, these Athenians waged war 
against the Mede, not in the cause of Grecian 
liberty, as neither did the other Grecians in 
the defence of their own : the former fought, 
not indeed to subject the rest of Greece to 
the Mede, but to their ownselves; the lat- 
ter, merely to obtain a change of master ; a 
master not inferior in policy, but far more 
abundant in malice. 

" But, though Athens, on manifold accounts, 
be obnoxious to universal censure and reproach, 
yet we are not come hither to prove how justly 
she deserveth it, since your own conviction 
precludes the long detail. We are much more 
concerned at present to censure and reproach 
ourselves, since, with all the examples before 
our eyes of what the Grecians in those parts 
have suffered, who, for want of guarding against 
their encroachments, have fallen victims to 
their ambition, — since, with the certain know- 
ledge that they are now playing the same 
sophistries upon us, — "the replantation of 
their kindred Leontines," — " the support of 
the Egesteans, their allies," — we show no in- 
clination to unite together in our common de- 
fence, in order to give them most signal proofs, 
that in Sicily are neither lonians, nor Helles- 
pontines, nor islanders, who will be slaves, 
though ever changing their master, one while 
to the Mede, and soon after to whoever will 
please to govern ; — but, on the contrary, that 
we are Dorians, who from Peloponnesus, that 
seat of liberty and independence, came to dwell 
in Sicily. Shall we, therefore, protract our 
union, till, city after city, we are compelled to 
a submission] we, who are convinced that thus 
only we can be conquered, and when we even 
behold that thus our foes have dressed up the ir 
plan ; amongst some of our people scattering 
dissensions, setting others to war down each 



YEAR XVn.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



247 



other for the mighty recompense of their al- 
liance, cajoling the rest as may best soothe the 
pride or caprice of each, and avail themselves 
of these methods to work our ruinl We even 
indulge the wild imagination, that though a 
remote inhabitant of Sicily be destroyed, the 
danger can never come home to ourselves ; and 
that he who precedes us in ruin is unhappy 
only in and for himself. 

" Is there now a man amongst you who 
imagines, that merely a Syracusan, and not 
himself, is the object of Athenian enmity, and 
pronounceth it hard that he must be exposed 
to dangers in which I only am concerned ] 
Let such a one with more solidity reflect that, 
not merely for what is mine, but equally also 
for what is his own, he should associate with 
me, though within my precincts ; and that this 
may be done with greater security now, since 
as yet I am not quite destroyed, since in me 
he is sure of a steadfast ally, and before he is 
bereaved of all support may hazard the conten- 
tion. And let him farther rest assured, that 
it is not the sole view of the Athenian to 
bridle enmity in a Syracusan ; but, under the 
colour of that pretext, to render himself the 
more secure, by gaining for a time the friend- 
ship of another. 

« If others, again, entertain any envy or 
jealousy of Syracuse, for, to each of these, 
great states are generally obnoxious, and would 
take delight in seeing us depressed, in order to 
teach us moderation, though not totally de- 
stroyed, from a regard to his own preservation, — 
these are such sanguine wishes, as, in the course 
of human affairs, can never be accomplished ; 
because it is quite impossible, that the same 
person shall build up airy schemes to soothe his 
own passions and then insure their success. 
And thus, should some sinister event take 
place, quite sunk under the weight of his own 
calamity, he would perhaps be soon wishing 
again, that I was so replaced as to excite his 
envy. Impossible this, for one who abandoned 
my defence, who refused beforehand to parti- 
cipate my dangers, — dangers, though not in 
name, yet in reality, his own. For, if names 
alone be regarded, he acts in the support of 
my power ; but, if realities, of his own preser- 
vation. 

" Long since, ye men of Camarina, it was 
incumbent on you, who are borderers upon us, 
and must be our seconds in ruin, to have fore- 
seen these things, and not to have abetted our 



defence with so much remissness as you have 
hitherto done it. You ought to have repaired 
to our support with free and voluntary aid ; 
with such as, in case the Athenians had begun 
first with Camarina, you would have come with 
earnest prayers to implore from us : so cordial 
and so alert you should have appeared in our 
behalf, to avert us from too precipitate submis- 
sions. But these things never were ; not even 
you, nor any other people, have showed such 
affection or alarcity for us. 

" From timorousness of heart you will study 
perhaps to manage both with us and the in- 
vaders, and allege, that there are treaties sub- 
sisting between yourselves and the Athenians. 
Yet these treaties you never made to hurf your 
friends, but to repel the efforts of your foes, 
should they dare to attack you. By them you 
are bound to give defensive aid to the Athe- 
nians when attacked by others, and not when 
they, as in the present case, injuriously fall 
upon your neighbours. Remember that the 
Rhegians, though even of Chalcidic descent, 
have refused to concur with them in replanting 
the Leontines, who are also Chalcideans. Hard, 
indeed, is your fate, if they, suspecting some 
bad design to lie lurking under a fair justifi- 
cation, have recourse to the wary moderate 
behaviour which appearances will not warrant ; 
whilst you, on the pretended ground of a rational 
conduct, are eager to serve a people who are 
by nature your foes; and join with most im- 
placable enemies to destroy your own kindred, 
to whom nature hath so closely attached you! 

" In such a conduct there is no justice : the 
justice lies in abetting our cause, and not 
dastardly shrinking before the terror of their 
arms. These arms are not terrible, would 
we only all combine in our mutual defence ; 
they are only so, if, on the contrary, we con- 
tinue disunited, the point which the Athe- 
nians labour with so much assiduity. For, 
even when singly against us they entered the 
lists, and were \ictorious, yet they were not 
able to effectuate their designs, but were 
obliged percipitately to re-embark. If united, 
therefore, what farther can we have to fear? 
What hinders us from associating together 
with instant alacrity and zeal? especially as 
we soon shall receive an aid from Peloponne- 
sus, who in all the business of war are far supe- 
rior to Athenians. Reject, I say, the vain pre- 
sumption, that either it will be equitable in re- 
gard to us, or prudential in regard to yourselvea, 



248 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book vl 



to take part with neither side, on pretence that 
you have treaties subsisting with both, there 
IS a fallacy in it, which, though veiled under 
plausible words, the event will soon detect. 
For if, through your determination to abandon 
his support, the party already attacked be van- 
quished, and the assailant be invigorated by 
success, what can such absenting of yourselves 
avail, but to help forwards the ruin of the one, 
and afford free scope to the pernicious schemes 
of the othcrl And how glorious would the 
reverse of this conduct be, would you exert 
your efforts to redress the injured, who also by 
the tics of consanguinity have a right to expect 
it from you ; to guard the common welfare of 
Sicily ; and not suffer your friends, your good 
friends, the Athenians, to run out into a course 
of outrage ! 

« In a word, we Syracusans have now only 
this to add : that arguments are superfluous, 
either for the instruction of you or of others, 
in points whose tendency you know as clearly 
as ourselves. But we earnestly conjure you, 
and, if prayers will not avail, we boldly protest 
against you, that, as the worst designs are 
formed against us by our eternal foes, the lo- 
nians, you would act as you ought ; — if not, 
that by you we are basely betrayed, Dorians by 
Dorians. If such must be our fate, if by the 
Athenians we must be destroyed, they will be 
indebted for their success to your determinations, 
but the glory of it will be totally assumed by 
themselves. Nay, the chief reward they will 
reap from the victory will be this, to enslave the 
persons who enabled them to gain it. But then, 
should the victory rest with us, you are the men 
from whom we shall exact revenge for all the 
dangers to which we have been exposed. Exa- 
mine things, therefore, and declare your resolu- 
tion, either at once, without embarking into dan- 
gers, to put on the Athenian chains ; or, vi'ith 
us, to face the storm and earn your preserva- 
tion ; not basely bending to the yoke of fo- 
reign tyrants, and preventing an enmity with us 
which win not quickly be appeased." 

In these words Hermocrates harangued the 
Camarineans : and, when he had ended, Eu- 
phcmus, ambassador of the Athenians, replied 
as follows ; 

" Our journey hither was intended for the 
renewal of a former alliance; but, as this Sy- 
Tacusan hath taken the liberty to be severe upon 
us, we lie under an obligation to show the jus- 
tice of our title to that share of dominion which 



we now possess. And the strongest evidence 
of this he himself hath been pleased to give, 
by affirming, that lonians have been eternal foes 
to Dorians. The fact is incontestably true ; 
since we, who are lonians, have been necessita- 
ted to stand ever upon our guard against the en- 
croaching designs of the Peloponncsians, who 
are Dorians, who are our superiors in number, 
and arc seated upon our borders. When, there- 
fore, in the close of the Persian invasion, we 
saw ourselves masters of a navy, we asserted 
our own independence from the government 
and guidance of the Laceda;monians, since no 
shadow of reason could be found why we should 
be obedient to them any more than they to us, 
save only that in this critical period their 
strength was greater. We were afterwards 
appointed, by free election, the leaders of those 
lonians who had formerly been subject to the 
monarch. And the preference awarded to us 
we continue to support ; assured that only thus 
we shall escape subjection to the Peloponne- 
sian yoke, by keeping possession of a power 
which can effectually awe all their encroach- 
ments. And, farther, (that we may come to 
particulars,) it was not with injustice that we 
exacted subjection from those lonians, and in- 
habitants of the isles, whom the Syracusans say 
we thought proper to enslave, though connected 
with us by the ties of blood : for they march- 
ed, in company with the Mede, against their 
mother-country, against us, their founders. 
They had not the courage to expose their own 
homes to ruin and devastation, by an honest re- 
volt, though we with magnanimity abandoned 
even Athens itself. They made slavery their 
choice, and in the same miserable fate would 
have been glad to envelop us. Thus solid are 
the grounds on which we found our title to that 
extensive rule we now enjoy. We honestly 
deserve it : since, in the cause of Greece, we 
equipped the largest fleet, and exerted the great- 
est ardour, without the least equivocation ; and 
since those othcrsacting, with implicit obedience 
to the Mede, did all they could to distress us. 
To which let it be added, that we were at the 
same time desirous to obtain a strength sufficient 
to give a check to the ambitit>n of Peloponncsi- 
ans. Submissive, therefore, to their dictates, we 
are not, will not be ; because, either in return for 
the repulse of the barbarian Iw our single efforts, 
or in requital of the dangers we bravely en- 
countered in defence of the liberty of those 
lonians, — greater than all the rest of Gi«jcce, 



YEAR XVII.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



249 



or even they themselves, durst hazard for their 
own, — we have an undoubted right to empire. 

« But, farther, to guard its own liberties and 
rights is a privilege, which, without either mur- 
mur or envy, will be allowed to every state : 
and now, for the security of these important 
points to ourselves, have we ventured hither to 
beg your concurrence ; conscious, at the same 
time, ye men of Camarina, that your welfare 
too coincides with our own. This we can 
clearly demonstrate, even from those crimina- 
tions which our adversaries here have lavished 
upon us, and from those so terrible suspicions 
which you yourselves are inclined to entertain 
of our proceedings. We are not now to learn 
that men, who with some high degrees of hor- 
ror suspect latent mischief, may for the pre- 
sent be soothed by an insinuating flow of 
words ; but, when summoned to action, will so 
exert themselves as is expedient for their wel- 
fare : and, consonant to this, we have already 
hinted that through fear alone we seized that 
power which we now possess in Greece ; that 
through the same motive we have ventured 
hither, to establish our own security in concert 
with that of our friends ; so far from the view 
of enslaving them to ourselves, that we are 
solely intent on preserving them from being en- 
slaved by others. 

« Let no man here retort upon us, — that all 
our solicitude for you is unmerited and super- 
fluous. Such a one must know, that, so long 
as you are safe, so long as you are able to em- 
ploy the Syracusans, the less liable they will 
be to send reinforcements from hence to the 
Peloponnesians for our annoyance : and as 
this is the real state of things, our concern 
should most largely be bestowed upon you. 
By parity of reason it also highly concerns us 
to replant the Leontines ; not in order to ren- 
der them vassals to ourselves, as their relations 
of Eubcea are, but to make them as strong and 
powerful as we are able ; that, seated as they 
then will be on her confines, they may com- 
pensate our remote situation in affording a di- 
version to Syracuse. For, if the view be 
carried back to Greece, we ourselves are there 
a match for our foes. The Chalcidean there, 
whom after unjustly enslaving we are taxed 
with absurdity for pretending to vindicate here, 
is highly serviceable to us ; because he is dis- 
armed, and because he furnisheth us with a 
tribute. But, here in Sicily, oiir interest de- 
mandeth, that the Leontines, and the whole 
39 



body of our friends, be restored to the full en- 
joyment of all their liberty and strength. 

" Now, to a potentate invested with supe- 
rior power, or to a state possessed of empire, 
nothing that is profitable can be deemed ab- 
surd ; nothing secure that cannot be safely 
managed. Incidents will arise with which we 
must temporize, and determine accordingly our 
enmity or our friendship. But the latter makes 
most for our interest here, where we ought by 
no means to weaken our friends, but through 
the strength of our friends, to keep down and 
disable our enemies. Of this you ought not 
to rest incredulous, as you know, that over our 
dependents in Greece, we either hold tight or 
slacken the rein, as squares best with the pub- 
lic service. We permit to the Chians and 
Methymneans the free use of their liberties 
and laws for a quota of shipping ; we do the 
same to many for an annual tribute, exacted 
perhaps with somewhat of rigour. Others 
amongst them, who fight under our orders, are 
absolutely free, though seated upon islands and 
easy to be totally reduced, because they are 
commodiously situated to annoy the Pelopon- 
nesian coast. And hence, it may be depended 
upon, that we shall make such dispositions al- 
so here as are most expedient for our own in- 
terest, and may best lessen the dread, which, 
as was said before, we entertain of the Syra- 
cusans. 

" The point at which they aim is an extent 
of their rule over you ; and when, by alarming 
your suspicions of us, they have wrought you 
to their own purpose, either by open force or 
taking advantage of your desolate condition^ 
when we are repulsed and obliged to abandon 
your defence, they intend to subdue all Sicily 
to their yoke. Such the event will unavoida- 
bly prove, if at present you adhere to them ; 
for never again will it be easy for us to as- 
semble together so large an armament to give 
a check to their ambition ; nor, when wc 
are no longer at hand for your support, will 
their strength against 3'ou be insufficient. It 
is vain in any man to indulge an opinion that 
this may not be the case, since the very train 
of things evinceth its truth. For, when first 
you invited us hither, it was not upon the sug- 
gestion of any other fear than this, that, should 
we suflfer you to be subjected by the Syracusans, 
the danger then would extend itself to us. 
And highly unjust it would be now, if the 
argument you successfully enforced with us 
2c2 



250 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR 



[book VI. 



should lose all its influence upon you, or should 
you ground suspicions on our present appear- 
ance against them, with a force superior to 
theirs, when you ought much more to enter- 
tain an endless distrust of them. The truth is 
this, that without your concurrence we are not 
able to continue here. And in case, with per- 
fidy open and avowed, we make seizure of your 
cities, yet we are unable to retain their posses- 
sion, remote as they lie from Athens ; as 
cities so large we never could garrison ; and 
as they are farther provided in all respects as 
well as any on the continent. But, on the con- 
trary, the Syracusans will not rush upon j'ou 
from a camp upon the beach ; but, posted in a 
city more formidable in strength than the whole 
of our armament, they are ever meditating your 
ruin, and, when they have seized a proper op- 
portunity, will strike the blow. They have af- 
forded you instances of this already, and a 
flagrant one indeed in the case of the Leon- 
tines. And yet they have the effrontery now, 
by words, as if you were so to be deluded, to 
exasperate you against us, who have hitherto 
controlled their views, and deterred them to 
this moment from making all Sicily their prey. 
" Our arguments have a tendency directly 
opposite. We have nothing in view but your 
certain and assured preservation, when we 
earnestly conjure you not wilfully to betray 
the means which at present will result from 
our union, which we can mutually exert in one 
another's behalf ; and strongly to represent to 
your own reflections, that, even without the 
concurrence of allies, a road to your reduction 
will at any time be open to these Syracusans 
through their own superior numbers ; but an 
opportunity exceedingly seldom afforded you 
to make head against them with so large an 
auxiliary body. And if, from groundless sus- 
picions, you suffer now so large a body to de- 
part either unsuccessful or defeated, )'et a 
time will come when you will ardently wish to 
see them return, though in a much less pro- 
portion of strength, and they have it no longer 
in their power to cross the sea for your sup- 
port. Take care, therefore, Camarineans, that 
neither yourselves nor others be deceived by a 
♦oo credulous belief of the bold calumniations 
these Syracusans utter. We have now laid 
before you the true ground of all those sad 
suspicions which are fomented against us ; 
but shall again recall them to your remem- 



brance by a short recapitulation, that they may 
have the proper influence upon you. 

" We declare, therefore, that we rule in 
Greece merely to prevent our being enslaved ; 
but are intent on vindicating liberty in Sicily, 
to suppress that annoyance which might other- 
wise be given us from hence ; — that mere ne- 
cessity obligeth us to embark in many underta- 
kings, because we have many sinister incidents 
to guard against ; — that now and formerly we 
came hither to support those Sicilians who 
have been unjustly oppressed ; nor uninvited, 
but solemnly conjured to take such steps. 
Attempt not, therefore, to divert our pursuits, 
either by erecting yourselves into censors of 
our proceedings, or into correctors of our poli- 
tics, a point too difficult for you to manage. 
But, so much of our activity or conduct as you 
can mould into a consistency with your own 
welfare, lay hold of that, and employ it to your 
best advantage ; and never imagine that our 
politics are equally prejudicial to all the world 
besides, but highly beneficial to the bulk of 
the Grecians. For, through every quarter, 
even those which we cannot pretend to con- 
trol, both such as dread impending mischiefs 
and such as meditate encroachments, — laying 
hold on both sides of the ready expectation ; 
the former, that redress may be obtained by 
our interposition ; the latter, that, if we think 
proper to oppose them, their own safety will 
be greatly endangered ; — both sides, I say, are 
hence obliged ; the latter, to practice modera- 
tion, though with regret ; the former, to enjoy 
tranquillity without previous embroilments of 
the public peace. The security, therefore, 
which now offers itself to your acceptance, and 
is always ready for those who want it, you are 
conjured by no means to reject ; but relying, 
like other communities, on that quantity of 
support we are able to afford you, put the 
change for once on the Syracusans ; and, in- 
stead of being ever on the watch against them, 
force them at length to be watchful and alarmed 
for themselves." 

Such was the repl)'^ of Euphemus. In the 
meantime the real disposition of the Cama- 
rineans was this : at bottom they were well- 
affected to the Athenians, save only for the 
ambition they showed of enslaving Sicily ; but 
had ever been embroiled with the Syracusans, 
through that jealousy, ever to be found in a 
neighbouring state. But, as the dread of vie- 



TEAR XVII.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



251 



tory on the side of the Syracusans, who were j 
close upon their borders, if earned without their 
concurrence, had influenced their measures, 
they sent a small party of horse to succour 
them on the former occasion ; and looked upon 
themselves as obliged in policy to serve them 
underhand in future exigencies, but with all 
possible frugality and reserve ; and, at the 
present juncture, that they might not betray 
any the least partiality against the Athenians, 
as they were come off victorious from a battle, 
to return the same impartial reply to both. 
Determined, therefore, by these considerations, 
they answered, — that, " since a war had broke 
out between two states, each of which was in 
alliance with themselves, they judged the only 
method of acting consistently with their oaths 
would be, to observe a strict neutrality." 
Upon this the ambassadors of both parties took 
their leaves and departed. And the Syracu- 
sans, within themselves, exerted their utmost ap- 
plications to get all things in readiness for war. 

The Athenians, who were now encamped at 
Naxus, opened negotiations with the Siculi, to 
draw over as many of them as was possible 
into their adherence. Many of these, who 
inhabited the plains, and were most awed by 
the Syracusans, stood resolutely out ; but the 
generality of those who were seated in the 
midland parts, as they were now, and had ever 
kept themselves uncontrolled, sided at once 
with the Athenians. They furnished them 
with corn for the service of the army, and there 
were some who supplied them with money. 
And then the Athenians, taking the field 
against such as refused to accede, forced some 
to a compliance, and prevented others from 
receiving garrisons and aids from Syracuse. 
During winter also they removed again from 
Naxus to Catana ; and having repaired their 
camp, which had been burned by the Syracu- 
sans, chose to pass the remainder of the winter 
there. 

They also despatched a trireme to Carthage, 
to ask their friendship, and whatever assistance 
could possibly be obtained. They sent also to 
Tuscany, as some cities on that coast had 
made them voluntary offers of assistance. 
And, farther, they circulated their orders among 
the Siculi, and despatched in particular one to 
the Egesteans, " to send them as large a num- 
ber of horses as they could possibly procure." 
They busied themselves in collecting materials 



for circumvallation, such as bricks and iron, 
and all other necessary stores ; being deter- 
mined to carry on the war with vigour on the 
first approach of spring. 

The ambassadors, who from Syracuse were 
sent to Corinth and Lacedaemon, endeavoured 
in their passage to prevail with the Italians 
" not to look with unconcern on the Athenian 
proceedings, since they also were equally in- 
volved in the danger." But, when arrived at 
Corinth, they were admitted to an audience, 
in which they insisted on a speedy supply, 
upon the plea of consanguinity ; and the Co- 
rinthians came at once to a resolution, by way 
of precedent to others, that, " with all possible 
ardour they would join in their defence." 
They even appointed an embassy of their own 
to accompany them to Lacedsmon, whose in- 
structions were, to second them in soliciting 
the Lacedaemonians " to declare open war at 
home against the Athenians, and to fit out an 
aid for the service of Sicily." 

At the time that these joint embassies arriv- 
ed at Lacedaemon from Corinth, Alcibiades 
was also there. He had no sooner made his 
escape, attended by his companions in exile, 
than in a trading-vessel he passed over from 
Thuria to Cyllene in Elea ; and from thence 
he repaired to Lacedaemon. But, as the 
Lacedaemonians had pressed to see him, he 
went thither under the protection of the public 
faith ; for he had with reason dreaded his re- 
ception there, since he had acted so large a part 
in the affair of Mantinea. 

It happened farther, that, when a public 
assembly was convened at Sparta, the Corin- 
thians, and the Syracusans, and Alcibiades, all 
urged the same request, and were successful. 
Nay, though the college of ephori, and those 
who presided at the helm of the state, had 
dressed up a plan, in pursuance of which they 
were only to send their ambassadors to Syra- 
cuse, to hinder all accommodations with the 
Athenians, and were quite averse to the sup- 
plying them with real succours. — yet Alcibia- 
des, standing up, inflamed the Lacedaemonian 
fury, and wrought them to his purpose by the 
following harangue : 

" I lie under a necessity, in the beginning of 
my discourse, to vindicate myself from the 
calumny which hath been charged against me, 
lest a jealousy of me might divert your atten- 
tion from those points which equally affect the 



252 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book n. 



comraon cause. My ancestors, therefore, hav- 
ing, upon some reasonable grounds of com- 
plaint, renounced the privilege of being the 
public hosts of your embassies at Athens, I 
am the man who again re-established this hos- 
pitable intercourse ; who in many other respects 
endeavoured with great assiduity to oblige you, 
and particularly in the calamity which fell to 
your share at Pylus. I cheerfully persevered 
in these my favourable inclinations towards 
you, till you yourselves, bent on accommodat- 
ing your differences with the Athenians, em- 
ployed my adversaries to negotiate your affairs ; 
and as thereby you invested them with autho- 
rity, you of course reflected disgrace on me. 
With reason, therefore, after such provocations, 
you were afterwards thwarted by me, when I 
supported the interest of the Mantineans and 
the Argives, and introduced new measures into 
the state, in opposition to you. Let therefore 
such of your number as, chagrined at what they 
suffered then, continue unjustly their resent- 
ments against me, weigh now the force of those 
reasons on which I acted, and return to better 
temper. If again I suffer in the opinion of 
any man, because I have ever manifested an 
attachment to the interest of the people, let 
him also learn that his enmity to me on that 
account is not to be defended. We have borne, 
from time immemorial, a steadfast unrelenting 
aversion to tyrants : now the whole of opposi- 
tion to the despotic power of one is expressed 
by this word, the people ; and on this principle 
alone our firm and constant adherence to the 
multitude hath been hitherto carried on and 
supported. Besides, as the state of which I 
was a member was purely democratical, I lay 
ander a necessity, in many respects, of con- 
forming my conduct to the established model ; 
and yet I endeavoured to give the public 
measures a greater share of moderation than 
the franctic humour of the Athenians was 
judged capable of brooking. But incendiaries 
started up ; such as, not only in earlier times, 
but even in our own, have driven the people to 
more furious measures, and have at length 
effected — the exile of Alcibiades. But, so 
long as the state was in my own management, 
I thought myself justified, could I preserve it 
in that height of grandeur and freedom, and on 
the same model of government, in which I 
found it. Not but that the judicious part of 
our community arc sensible what sort of a 



government a democracy is, — and I myself no 
less than others, who have such abundant 
occasion to reproach and curse it : — but, for 
madness open and avowed, new terms of ab- 
horrence cannot be invented ; though totally to 
subvert it we could in no wise deem a measure 
of security, whilst you had declared yourselves 
our foes, and were in the field against us. 
And all those proceedings of mine, which have 
proved most offensive to you, are to be charged 
entirely to such principles as these. 

" And now, in relation to these points on 
which you are here assembled to deliberate, 
(and I also with you,) and about which if I 
am able to give you a greater light, I am bound 
to do it, — attend to what I am going to declare. 
Our principal view in the expedition to Sicily 
was, if possible, to reduce the Sicilians to our 
yoke. After them, we intended to do the 
same by the Italians. We should next have 
attempted the dominions of the Carthaginians; 
nay, Carthage itself. Had these our views 
been successful, cither in the whole or the 
greater part, we should soon have given the 
attack to Peloponnesus : assembling for that 
purpose the whole Grecian force, which the 
countries thus subdued must have added to 
our own ; taking also into our pay large 
bodies of Barbarians and Iberians, and other 
soldiers of those nations which by general con- 
sent are famed for the most warlike of all 
Barbarians. We should have built also great 
numbers of triremes for the enlargement of our 
navy, as Italy would plentifully have supplied 
us with timber ; with which blocking up Pelo- 
ponnesus on all sides, and with our land-forces 
at the same time invading it by land, (after carry- 
ing your cities, some by storm, and some by the 
regular siege,) we hoped without obstruction to 
have warred you down, and in pursuance of 
that, to have seized the empire of universal 
Greece. With money and all needful stores 
adequate to this extensive plan, the cities to be 
conquered in those remoter parts would with 
all proper expedition have supplied us, without 
any demands on our own domestic revenues. 
Such were to be the achievements of that grand 
armament which is now abroad ; such, you maj 
rest assured upon the evidence of a person who 
was privy to every step, was its orii;inal plan ; 
and the generals who are left in the command 
will yet, if they are able, carry it into execu- 
tion. And I must farther beg leave to tell 



YEAR XVII.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



253 



you, that, if with timely succours you do not 
interpose, nothing in those parts will be able to 
stand before them. 

" The Sicilians are a people unexperienced 
in war ; and yet, would they unite and combine 
together in their mutual defence, they might 
possibly even now be too hard for the Atheni- 
ans. But then the Syracusans, abandoned as 
they are by the rest, and we already have seen 
their whole force defeated in battle, and who 
are blocked up in their own harbours by the 
enemy's fleet, will be unable long to resist the 
great force of the Athenians which is already 
there. If, therefore, Syracuse be taken, all 
Sicily is vanquished at a stroke, and Italy be- 
comcth instantly their prey ; and then the 
storm, which, as I intimated before, was to be 
directed against you from that quarter, will in 
a short time gather and come pouring down 
upon you. 

" Let no one therefore imagine that the end 
of your present deliberation is the safety of 
Sicily, when Peloponnesus itself will be en- 
dangered, unless some measures of prevention 
be executed with speed ; — unless you send out 
a naval force, for the preservation of Sicily, so 
dexterously appointed, that the hands who man 
the ships and ply the oar, may, on the instant 
of their landing, become a body of heavy- 
armed ; and, what in my judgment is better 
than an army, a citizen of Sparta to take upon 
him the command, that those who are ready he 
may discipline to service, and for such to join 
as on choice would refuse their concurrence : 
for, by such a step, those who are already your 
friends will be animated with higher degrees of 
resolution, and those who fluctuate at present 
will join you with a smaller sense of fear. 

" It behoves you also to make war upon the 
Athenians at home in a more declared and ex- 
plicit manner ; that the Syracusans, convinced 
that you have their welfare at heart, may make 
a more obstinate resistance, and the Athenians 
be rendered less able to send reinforcements to 
their troops in Sicily. 

" It behoves you farther to raise fortifica- 
tions at Decelea in Attica ; a step which the 
Athenians have ever most terribly apprehend- 
ed, and think that in that point alone you have 
not put their resolution to its utmost trial in 
the present war; and that assuredly must be 
pronounced the most effectual method of dis- 
tressing an enemy, to discover what he dreads 
most, and then know how to afflict hira in his 



most tender part : for it is a reasonable con- 
clusion, that they will tremble most at in- 
cidents which, should they take place, they 
are inwardly convinced must most sensibly 
affect them. As to the benefits which you 
yourselves shall reap by fortifying Decelea, 
and of what they shall be debarred, I shall pass 
over many, and only concisely point out the 
most important. — By this, all the natural com- 
modities of the country will fall into your 
hands ; some by way of booty, the rest by vo- 
luntary contributions. They will instantly be 
deprived of the profits of the silver mines at 
Laurium, as well as of the rents of their estates 
and the fees of their courts. The tributes 
from their dependents will also be paid with 
less punctuality ; since the latter shall no soon- 
er perceive that you are earnestly bent on war, 
than they will show an open disregard for 
Athens. 

" That these or any of these points be exe- 
cuted with despatch and vigour, dependeth, ye 
Lacedaemonians, on yourselves alone. I can 
confidently aver that all are feasible, and I 
think I shall not prove mistaken in my senti- 
ments. I ought not to suflfer in the opinion of 
any Lacedaemonian, though once accounted tho 
warmest of her patriots, I now strenuously 
join the most inveterate foes of my country ; 
nor ought my sincerity to be suspected by any, 
as if I suited my words to the sharp resent- 
ments of an exile. I am driven from my coun- 
try, through the malice of men, who have pre- 
vailed against me : but not from your service, 
if you hearken to my counsels. Your enmity 
is sooner to be forgiven; who have hurt you 
enemies alone, than theirs, who by cruel treat- 
ment compel friends to be foes. My patriot- 
ism is far from thriving under the injustice I 
have suffered ; it was merely an effect of grati- 
tude for that protection I once enjoyed from 
my country. Nor have I reason at present to 
imagine, that against my country I am now go- 
ing to march, so much as to recover some 
country to myself, when at present I have none 
at all. And I judge the person to be a true 
lover of his country, — not him who, exiled 
from it, abandons himself without a struggle to 
his own iniquitous fate, but — who, from a fond- 
ness for it, leaves no project unattempted to 
recover it again. 

" As these are my sentiments, I may fairly, 
ye Lacedaemonians, insist upon your acceptance 
of my service without diffidence or fear, what 



254 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book VI. 



ever dangers or whatever miseries may here- 
after result. You vvrell know the maxim, 
which universal consent will evince to he good, 
— that if, when an enemy, I hurt you much, 
when I am now become your friend, I can help 
you more. Nay, for the latter I am better 
qualilicd on this very account, that I am per- 
fectly acquainted with the state of Athens ; 
whereas I was only able to conjecture at yours. 
And, as you are now met together to form re- 
solutions on points of the highest importance, 
I conjure you without hesitation to carry your 
arms at once into Sicily and Attica ; to the 
end that, in the former, by the presence of a 
small part of your forces, you may work out 
signal preservations, and at home pull down 
the present and even the future growth of the 
Athenians ; that, for ages to come, yourselves 
may reap security and peace, and preside at the 
helm of united Greece, which will cheerfully 
acquiesce under your guidance, and pay you a 
free, uncompelled obedience." 

To this purpose Alcibiades spoke. And the 
LacediEmonians, who had before some sort of 
intention to take the field against Athens, 
though hitherto they protracted its execution, 
were now more than ever animated to it, when 
Alcibiades had given them such a detail of af- 
fairs, whom they judged to have the clearest 
insight in them. Thereupon they turned their 
attention immediately on fortifying Decelea, 
and sending out a body of succour for the pre- 
sent service of Sicily. They also appointed 
Gylippus, the son of Cleandridas, to go and 
take upon him the command at Syracuse ; with 
orders, by concerting measures with the Syra- 
cusans and Corinthians, to draw up a plan for 
the most effectual and most ready conveyance 
of succours thither. 

Gylippus accordingly issued out his orders 
to the Corinthians, to attend him, without loss 
of time at Asine, with two ships ; and also to 
expedite the equipment of the fleet which they 
designed for this service, and to keep them in 
readiness to sail when opportunity should re- 
quire. Having so far concerted measures, the 
ambassadors departed from Lacedajmon. 

The Athenian trireme, also, despatched from 
Sicily by the generals on that post, to demand 
supplies of money and a body of horse, was by 
this time arrived at Athens. And the Athe- 
nians, on hearing their demands, drew up a de- 
cree, to send away supplies to that armament, 
and a body of horsemen. 



And here the winter ended ; and the seven- 
teenth year of this war, of which Thucydidcs 
hath compiled the history, came also to an end. 



TEAU XVIII. 



On the earliest approach of the spring which 
led on the following summer, the Athenians in 
Sicily, hoisting from Catana, showed them- 
selves on the coast of Megara, in Sicily, of 
which the Syracusans having dispossessed the 
inhabitants in the time of Gelon the tyrant, 
(as I have already related,) continued masters 
of the soil. Having landed here, they ravaged 
the country ; till, approaching a fortress be- 
longing to the Syracusans, and attempting it 
without success, they retired, some by land and 
the rest on board the fleet, into the river Te- 
reas ; from whence going again on shore, they 
ravaged the plains and set fire to the growing 
corn. They also fell in with a small party of 
Syracusans, some of whom they slew ; and 
then, erecting a trophy, went again on board. 
They next returned to Catana ; and, after vic- 
tualling there, proceeded from thence, with 
their whole force, to the attack of Centoripa, 
a strong fort belonging to the Siculi ; and, hav- 
ing made themselves masters of it by a capitu- 
lation, they stood away, burning down in their 
passage the corn of the Inesseans and Hyble- 
ans. Upon returning to Catana, they find 
there two hundred and fift}' horsemen arrived 
from Athens, though without horses, yet with 
all the proper furniture, as if they could be 
better supplied with the former in Sicily ; as 
also thirty archers, mounted, and three hun- 
dred talents^ in silver. 

In the same spring, the Lacedemonians also 
took the field against Argos, and advanced as 
far as Cleona; ; but the shock of an earthquake 
being felt there, they again retired. And after 
this, the Argives, making an irruption into the 
Thyreatis, which borders upon themselves, took 
a vast booty from the Lacedemonians, which 
sold for no less than twenty-five talents.' 

And not long after, in the same spring, the 
popular party at Thespia; assaulted those in 
power, but without success. And, though the 
Athenians marched away to their succour, some 
of them were apprehended, and others were 
obliged to take refuge at Athens. 



• Before Christ, 41-1. a 58,1.^3/. • -l.SJS/. 15# 



YEAR XVIII.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



255 



In the same summer, the Syracusans had no 
sooner received intelligence of the arrival of a 
body of horsemen amongst the Athenians, and 
the design of advancing immediately to assault 
them, than it occurred to their reflections, that, 
" in case the Athenians could not possess 
themselves of Epipolae, (a spot of ground 
which is only one continued crag, and lies di- 
rectly above the city of Syracuse,) it vpould be 
difficult to enclose them completely round with 
works of circumvallation, even though they 
should be defeated in open battle." They ap- 
plied themselves therefore to the guard of all 
the approaches, to Epipolae, that the enemy 
might not on a sudden gain the eminence ; 
for by other methods it was impossible for 
them to carry that post. Excepting those ap- 
proaches, the rest of the tract is an impractica- 
ble steep, inclining gradually quite down to 
the city, and commanding the view of every 
thing within it. Hence, therefore, because it 
riseth with a continual ascent, it was called by 
the Syracusans Epipolae. 

As Hermocrates and his colleagues had 
now formally taken upon him the command, 
the whole force of Syracuse marched out, by 
break of day, into a meadow, on the banks of 
the Anapus, to pass under review ; where the 
first thing they did was to select seven hundred 
of the choicest men amongst the heavy-armed, 
to be commanded by Diolimus, an exile from 
Andrus. These were appointed for the guard 
of Epipolae, and to be ready for service, as 
they were always to keep in a body, on any 
sudden emergence. But the Athenians, who 
had mustered their forces on the preceding day, 
had stood away from Catana, and were come 
in the night undiscovered to the spot called 
Leon, which is distant six or seven stadia' 
from Epipolae, where they disbarked their land- 
forces, and then sent their ships to lie in the sta- 
tion of Thapsus Thapsus is a peninsula, join- 
ed to the main-land by a narrow isthmus, and jut- 
ting out into the sea, at no great distance from 
the city of Syracuse either by land or water. The 
naval force of the Athenians, having secured 
their station by a palisade across the isthmus, lay 
quiet in their posts ; but the land-army, without 
loss of time, made a running march towards 
Epipolae ; and mounted by the pass of Euryalus, 
before the Syracusans, who were yet in the 

m ' — — 

1 Above half a mile. 



meadow busied in their review, discovered or 
were able to advance to prevent them. And 
now their whole force was in motion to dislodge 
them ; each man with all possible alacrity, and 
more particularly the seven hundred command- 
ed by Diomilus ; but, from the meadow to the 
nearest spot where they could come up with 
the enemy, was a march of no less than twenty- 
five stadia.'^ To this it was owing that the 
Syracusans came to the charge in a disorderly 
manner ; and, being plainly repulsed in battle 
at Epipolae, were forced to retire within the 
city. Diomilus also and about three hundred 
more lose their lives in this engagement. 

In pursuance of this, the Athenians, having 
erected a trophy, and given up the bodies of 
the slain under truce to the Syracusans, march- 
ed down the next day in order of battle to the 
very gates of the city ; but as the Syracusans 
refrained from sallying out against them, they 
then drew off, and raised a fort at Labdalum, 
on the very steepest edge of Epipolae, looking 
towards Megara, which they intended as a re- 
pository for their baggage and money, whilst 
themselves might be called off, either to fight 
or to carry on the works of a siege. 

Soon after this they were joined by a body 
of three hundred Egestean horse, and one hun- 
dred more consisting of Siculi and Naxians, 
and some others in their alliance. The Athe- 
nian cavalry was in all two hundred and fifty ; 
they had procured some horses from the Eges- 
teans and Cataneans, and had purchased the 
rest ; so that now they had got together a body 
of horse amounting in all to six hundred and 
fifty. 

A garrison was no sooner settled in the fort 
of Labdalum, than the Athenians approached 
to Tyche ; where taking post they built a wall 
in circle with great expedition, and by the ra- 
pidity of their work struck consternation into 
the Syracusans. Upon this they sallied out 
with the fixed design of hazarding an engage- 
ment, as they saw the danger of dallying any 
longer. The armies on both sides were now 
beginning to face each other ; but the Syra- 
cusan generals, observing that their own army 
was in disarray, and could not easily be formed 
in proper order, made them all wheel off 
figain into the city, except a party of their 
horse : these, keeping the field, prevented the 

^ Two miles and a half. 



256 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book VI. 



Athenians from carrying stones and straggling 
to any distance from their posts. But, at 
length, one Athenian band of heavy-armed, 
supported by the whole body of their cavalry, 
attacked and put to flight these Syracusan horse- 
men. They made some slaughter amongst 
them, and erected a trophy for this piece of 
success against the enemy's cavalry. 

On the day following, some of the Athe- 
nians began to raise a wall along the northen 
side of the circle ; whilst others were em- 
ployed in carrying stones and timber, which 
they laid down in heaps all along the place 
called Trogilus, near to the line marked out 
for the circumvallation, which was to reach, by 
the shortest compass, from the great harbour 
on one side to the sea on the other. But the 
Syracusans, who were principally guided by 
the advice of Hermocrates, gave up all thoughts 
of sallying out for the future, with the whole 
strength of the city, to give battle to the Athe- 
nians. It was judged more advisable to run 
along a wall in length, which would cut the 
line in which the Athenian works were de- 
signed to pass, and which, could they effect it 
in time, must entirely exclude the enemy from 
perfecting their circumvallation. Nay farther, 
in case the enemy should come up in a body to 
interrupt the work, they might give them full 
employ with one division of their force, whilst 
another party might raise pallisades to secure 
the approaches; at least, as the whole of the 
Athenian force must be drawn out to oppose 
them, they would be obliged to discontinue 
their own works. To raise, therefore, the 
projected work, they issued out of the city ; 
and beginning at the foot of the city-wall from 
below the Athenian circle, they carried on 
from thence a transverse wall, cutting down 
the olive-trees in the sacred grove, of which 
they built wooden turrets to cover their work. 
The Athenian shipping was not yet come 
round from Thapsus into the great harbour. 
But the Syracusans continued masters of all 
the posts upon the sea, and consequently the 
Athenians were obliged to fetch up all neces- 
sary stores from Thapsus across the land. 

When it appeared to the Syracusans that all 
their palisades and the transverse wall were 
sufficiently completed, in which the Athenians 
had given them no manner of interruption, as 
they were under apprehensions that, should 
they divide their force, they might be exposed 
to a defeat, and at the same time were ardently 



intent on perfecting their own circumvallation 
— the Syracusans drew off again into the city, 
leaving only one band of heavy-armed for the 
guard of their counter-wall. 

In the next place, the Athenians cut off the 
pipes, which by subterraneous ducts conveyed 
the drinking-water into the city : and having 
farther observed that the Syracusans kept 
within their tents during the heat of the day, 
but that some had straggled into the town, 
whilst those posted at the palisades kept but a 
negligent guard ; they picked out three hun- 
dred of their heavy-armed, and strengthening 
them with a choice party of their light-armed 
soldiers, ordered them to march with all pos- 
sible speed and attack the counter work. The 
rest of their force was to march another wa}"^, 
since, headed by one of the generals, it ad- 
vanced towards the city, to employ the Syra- 
cusans in case they sallied ; whilst the other 
detachment, headed by the other general, at- 
tacked the palisade which covered the sally- 
port. Accordingly, the three hundred assault 
and carry the palisade, which those who were 
posted for its guard abandoned, and fled for 
shelter behind the works which inclosed Te- 
menites. The pursuers however entered with 
them ; but were no sooner got in than they 
were again forcibly driven out by the Syracu- 
sans. And here some of the Argives and a 
small number of Athenians were slain. 

But now the whole army, wheeling about, 
demolished the counter-work, and pulled up 
the palisade. The piles, of which it was com- 
posed, they carried off in triumph, and erected 
a trophy. 

The next morning the Athenians resumed 
their work of circumvallation, and continued it 
across the crag which is above the marsh, and 
lies on the quarter of Epipolse that looks to- 
wards the great harbour. This was the short- 
est cut for their circumvallation downwards, 
across the plain and the marsh, till it reached 
the harbour. Upon this, the Syracusans, issu- 
ing again, raised another palisade, beginning 
from the city, and stretching quite across the 
marsh. They also drew up an entrenchment 
along the palisade, entirely to prevent the 
Athenian^ from continuing their works quite 
down to the sea. The latter, when they had 
perfected their work along the crag, are bent 
on demolishing the new palisade and entrench- 
ment of the Syracusans. For this purpose, 
they had ordered their shipping to come about 



YEAR XVIII.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



257 



from Thapsus into the great harbour of Syra- 
cuse. They themselves, at the morning's 
dawn, marched down from Epipolae into the 
plain ; and then, crossing the marsh, where 
the mud was hardest and best able to bear, by 
the help of boards and planks which they laid 
upon the surface, they carry almost the whole 
length of the palisade and entrenchment early 
in the morning, and were soon after masters of 
the whole. This was not affected without a 
battle, in which the Athenians were again vic- 
torious. The routed Syracusans fled different 
ways ; those who had composed their right, 
towards the city ; and those who had composed 
their left, towards the river. But with a view 
of intercepting the passage of the latter, the 
three hundred chosen Athenians marched with 
all speed to seize the bridge. The Syracusans, 
alarmed at this step, as the body consisted of 
the bulk of their horse, face about on the three 
hundred, and put them to flight, and then break 
in upon the right wing of the Athenians. By 
so unexpected a shock the first band in that 
wing was thrown into disorder. Lamachus, 
observing it, advanced to their support from 
the left, with a small party of archers that 
happened to be near him, and the whole body 
of the Argives. Having crossed a ditch that 
lay between, seconded only by a few, whilst 
the bulk of his party made a full stop, he is 
instantly slain ;' as were also five or six of 
those by whom he was accompanied. The 
Syracusans caught up their bodies with all 
possible expedition, and bore them off to a 
place of security on the other side of the river. 
They were in great measure obliged to make a 
precipitate retreat, since the rest of the Athe- 
nian army was now coming up to attack them. 
But now, such of the Syracusans as had fled 
at first towards the city, having gained leisure 
to observe such turns in their favour, caught 
fresh courage from the sight ; and, forming 
again into order, stood their. ground against 
that body of Athenians which faced them. 
They also send a detachment to attempt the 



1 Plutarch, in the life of Nicias cirrumstantiafes the 
manner in which the old general lost his life in cha- 
racter. Callirrates, a good soldier, hut of great im- 
petuosity, rode at the head of the Syrnrusan horse. 
Beiiiz rhaPen'/ed out by Callicrates, Lamarlms alone 
engaged personally with him. Lamachus received the 
first wound : he then returned the hlow, and dropped. 
His aiitagonist fell at the same time, and they both ex- 
pired tOL'ether 
40 



circle on Epipola;, concluding it to be un- 
manned for the present, and might at once be 
taken. This detachment in fact made itself 
master of the outwork, and demolished it for 
about ten plethres in length ; but the circle 
itself was defended by Nicias from all their 
attempts. Nicias, being much out of order, 
had been left to repose himself within the cir- 
cle. He therefore issued orders to his servants 
to set fire to all the machines and the timber 
which were lying before the wall ; for he was 
convinced that thus alone, in such a total want 
of hands for their defence, any safety could bo 
earned. The event answered his expectation ; 
for when the flames began to mount, the Syra- 
cusans durst not any longer come near, but 
thought proper to desist and march away. 

For now the Athenians, who by this time 
had chased the enemy from off the plain, were 
remounting the ascent to defend their circle ; 
and, at the same instant of time, their fleet, 
conformable to the orders they had received, 
was standing into the great harbour. The 
Syracusans upon the high ground beheld the 
sight ; which occasioned them and the whole 
Syracusan army to retire precipitately into the 
city ; concluding themselves no longer able, 
without an augmentation of their present 
strength, to hinder the completion of the 
Athenian works quite down to the sea. 

After this, the Athenians erected a trophy, 
and, in pursuance of a truce, delivered up their 
slain to the Syracusans, and received in ex- 
change the body of Lamachus, and of those 
who fell with him. 

The junction of their whole armament, both 
of their land and naval force, being now com- 
pleted, they began again, from Epipolse and 
the crag, to invest the Syracusans with a 
double wall, which they were to continue quite 
down to the sea. The necessary provisions to 
supply their army were brought in from all the 
coasts of Italy. Many also of the Siculi, who 
had hitherto stood aloof, declared now for the 
Athenians, and came into their alliance, who 
were farther joined by three vessels with fifty 
oars from Hetruria. 

All other points equally contributed to ele- 
vate their hopes. For the Syracusans had 
begun to despair of being able to sustain the 
siege, as they had no glimpse of any ap- 
proaching succour from Peloponnesus. They 
were tossing to and fro amongst themselves 
some proposals for an accommodation, and had 
2D 



258 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book VI. 



cpcn sounded Nicias upon that head, who, by 
the death of Lamachus, was left invested with 
the sole command. Nothing definitive was 
however concluded, though (as might reason- 
ably be expected from men in high perplexity, 
and more straitly besieged than ever) many 
proposals were made to him, and many more 
were agitated within the city. The distresses, 
also, which environed them at present, struck 
into them mutual suspicions of one another: 
nay, they even divested of their charge the 
generals who were in authority when these dis- 
tresses came upon them, as if all was owing to 
their misconduct or treachery, and chose in 
their stead Heraclides, and Eucles, and Tel- 
lias. 

In the meantime, Gylippus, the Lacedaemo- 
nian, and the ships from Corinth, were come 
up to Leucas, designing with the utmost ex- 
pedition to pass over from thence to Sicily. 
But terrible accounts came thick upon them 
here, and all agreed in broaching the same un- 
truth, that " Syracuse was completely invested 
on all sides." Gylippus upon this gave up all 
hopes of saving Sicily ; but, having the preser- 
vation of Italy still at heart, he and Pythen 
the Corinthian, with the small squadron at 
hand, consisting only of two Laconic and two 
Corinthian vessels, crossed over the Ionian 
gulf with all possible despatch to Tarentum. 
The Corinthians, besides their own ten now 
fitting out, were to man two belonging to the 
Leucadeans, and three more belonging to the 
Ambraciots, and follow them as soon as pos- 
sible. 

The first step of Gylippus, now arrived at 
Tarentum, was to go in quality of ambassador 
to Thuria, claiming privilege for it, as his 
father had been a denizen of that state ; but, 
finding himself unable to gain their concur- 
rence, he weighed from thence and stood along 
the coast of Italy. But in the Terinean gulf 
he met with a hard gale of wind, which in his 
gulf, vvhon in a northerly point, blows generally 
with great and lasting violence, and now drove 



him from his course, and blew him out into the 
open sea, where he stood again the rebuff of 
another violent storm, but at length reached 
Tarentum. He there laid his vessels on 
ground, which had been damaged in the foul 
weather, and refitted them for service. 

When Nicias found that he was on his pas- 
sage, he betrayed an open contempt of so 
trifling a squadron, as the Thurians had al- 
ready done before him. It appeared to him, 
that so petty a squadron could only be fitted out 
for piratical cruizes, and therefore he sent out 
no detachments to hinder his approach. 

About the same time of this summer, the 
Lacedaemonians, with their own domestic forces 
augmented by the junction of their allies, made 
an irruption into Argos, and ravaged great part 
of that territory, The Athenians put out to 
sea with thirty sail to succour the Argives, 
which procedure was, beyond all denial, the 
clearest violation of the treaties between them 
and the Lacedaemonians. Hitherto they had 
only exercised robberies upon them from Py- 
lus ; and, making descents rather on any other 
coast of Peloponnesus than Laconia itself, had 
left it to the Argives and Mantineans to make 
war against them. Nay, though the Argives 
had frequently pressed them, that with an 
armed force they would barely land on the 
Laconic coast, and, after committing never 
so small ravage in their company, immediately 
to retire, they had positively refused. But 
now, under the command of Pythodorus, and 
Lacspodias, and Demaratus, they made a de- 
scent at Epidaurus-Limera and Prasia, com- 
mitted large devastation on the adjacent coun- 
try, and afforded the Lacedaemonians a most 
specious and justifiable pretext to act offensively 
against Athens. 

When the Athenian fleet was sailed home- 
wards from Argos, and the Lacedaemonians 
also were withdrawn, the Argives broke into 
Phliasia, where they laid waste part of the La- 
cedaemonian territory, and made some slaughter 
of the people, and then returned to Argos. 



THE 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



BOOK VII. 



The sic^re of Syracuse is carried on so vigorously by Nicias, that the Syracusans think of a surrender. At this 
crisis arrive the Peloponnesian succours and Gylippus tlie Spartan, which giveth a new turn to Ihe siege. A 
counterwork is raised, to stop tlie Athenian circumvallation ; engagements ensue. Nicias is now in a bad situ- 
ation. He sendetli home a succinct detail of affairs by letter. A reinforcement is ordered him from Athens, 
under the command of Demosthenes. The Lacedafmonians resolve to renew the war at home. — Year XIX. At- 
tica invaded, and Decelea fortified. A naval engagement in the harbour of Syracuse, in which the Athenians 
are superior. In the meantime Athens is sadly distressed by the enemy. A massacre at Mycalesus. A sea-fight 
on the coast of Achaia. A second engagement in the harbour of Syracuse, to the advantage of the Syracusans. 
The reinforcement arriveth from Athens. Demosthenes attempts Epipolae without success. Debates about 
raising the siege, which at length is resolved. The instant they are embarking the moon is eclipsed , upon 
which superstition defaineth them. The Syracusans attack them both by land and water. The Atl;enians are 
worsted in every engagement ; at length lose all their shipping. They retreat by land, are pursued, sadly dis- 
tressed, and totally subdued. Nicias and Demosthenes are taken prisoners and put to death. 



Gtlippus and Pythen, when they had refitted 
their ships, stood along the coast from Taren- 
tum to Locri Epizephyrii. Here they received 
more certain information, that Syracuse was 
not yet completely invested, and that a succour 
of force might be thrown into the town by the 
way of Epipolse. They went next to consulta- 
tion, — whether, " keeping Sicily on the right, 
they should endeavour at all hazards to enter 
Syracuse by sea ; or, with Sicily on their left, 
should steer first to Himera ; from whence, 
attended by the forces of that state and what- 
ever additional strength they could persuade to 
join them, they should march thither over- 
land." It was determined to go first to Hime- 
ra, especially as the four Athenian vessels 
were not yet arrived at Rhegium, which Nicias 
at last, itpon the certain intelligence that they 
were now at Locri, had detached to observe 
them. To be beforehand, therefore, with this 
detachment, they pass through the straits, and, 
having touched only at Rhegium and Messene, 
arrive at Himera ; whilst, in the latter place, 
they prevailed upon the Himereans to concur 
with them in the war, and not only to intrust 



their troops under their command, but even to 
supply with arms such of the mariners as had 
navigated the vessels, and were therefore un- 
provided ; for their shipping they had drawn 
ashore, and laid up at Himera. The Selinun- 
tians also, by a messenger despatched on pur- 
pose, they had summoned to meet them, with 
all their united strength, at a determined place 
upon their route. The Geloans also, and 
some of the Siculi, promised to attend with a 
party, though by no means considerable. The 
latter of these wer6 disposed better than ever 
to the service, since Archonides was lately 
dead, (who, reigning over some of the Siculi 
seated in these parts, and having a great influ- 
ence over them, had declared for the Atheni- 
ans,) and since Gylippus appeared to them to 
be sent from Lacedsemon with a full purpose to 
do them service. 

And now Gylippus, — having assembled an 
army, which consisted of about seven hundred 
of those who navigated or came on board his 
vessels, and for whom he had provided arms ; 
of heavy-armed and light-armed Himereans, 
amounting together to a thousand men and one 

259 



260 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book VII. 



hundred horsemen ; of some light-armed Seli- 
nuntians ; a small party of Geloan horse ; and 
a body of Siculi, in all a thousand, — began his 
march for Syracuse. 

The Corinthians in the meantime were send- 
ing out the other ships, as fast as they could 
equip them for the service, to follow with all 
possible expedition from Leucas : and Gongy- 
plus, one of the Corinthian commanders, who 
with a single ship set out last from Leucas, is 
the first who arrives at Syracuse ; and that 
but a small space of time before the approach 
of Gylippus. Finding therefore, upon his ar- 
rival, that the Syracusans were going forth- 
with to hold a public assembly, in which the 
terms of putting an end to the war were de- 
signed to be adjusted, he dissuaded them from 
60 precipitate a step, and animated their droop- 
ing resolutions by strong assurances, that 
" other ships would instantly arrive ;" and that 
*' Gylippus, the son of Cleandridas, was sent 
thither by the Lacedaemonians to take upon 
him the command." The Syracusans accord- 
ingly resumed their spirits, and immediately 
marched out of the town, with the whole of 
their strength, in order to meet Gylippus ; for 
by this time they had received intelligence that 
he was actually approaching. 

Gylippus, upon his route, had made himself 
master of legas, a fortress belonging to the 
Siculi ; and now at the head of his army, 
drawn up in order of battle, he comes up to 
Epipolse. Having mounted by the pass of 
Euryalus, as the Athenians had done on their 
first approach, he marched, in conjunction 
with the Syracusans, toward the Athenian 
circumvallation. He happened to arrive at 
that critical juncture, when the Athenians had 
completely finished seven or eight stadia' of 
the double wall extending to the great harbour, 
when, in consequence, but a very small part 
remained incomplete ; and on which they were 
labouring with their highest application. On 
the other side of their circle, towards Trogilus, 
the stones for completing their work had been 
laid ready in heaps almost down to the beach, 
and some parts of their work on that side stood 
but half completed, though others had received 
the finishing hand. To such extremity of dan- 
ger were the Syracusans now reduced. 

Gylippus and the Syracusans coming thus 



* About three-quarters of a mile. 



suddenly upon them, the Athenians at first 
were struck with consternation : but formed, 
however, in order of battle, to give them a re- 
ception. But Gylippus, having ordered his 
forces to halt, despatchcth a herald to the Athe- 
nians, proclaiming that, " in case they would 
evacuate Sicily within the space of five days, 
with their arms and baggage, he would readily 
grant them a truce." Such offers they received 
in a contemptuous manner;^ and, disdaining 
to return an answer, ordered the herald to 
move oir. And now both sides were busy 
in marshalling and disposing their men for 
battle. 

But Gylippus, who had made an observation 
that the Syracusans were in great confusion, 
and could not easily be formed into proper 
order, made his army fall back into more open 
ground. Nicias gave them no disturbance 
whilst they were making this motion ; but, 
without advancing, stood close under his works : 
and, when Gylippus found that the enemy 
would not move forwards to attack him, he 
made his forces wheel off, to the high ground 
called Temenites, where they reposed them- 
selves for the night. , 

The next morning he drew up the greatest 
part of his army before the works of the 
Athenians, to prevent their sending out suc- 
cours to more distant posts: for he had de- 
tached a party to attack the fort of Labdalum, 
which he carried by storm, and put all the gar- 
rison found within it to the sword. Lab- 
dalum was so situated, in regard to the Athe- 
nian posts,' that they could have no view of what 
was transacting there. The same day also an 
Athenian trireme, as it was entering the har- 
bour, is taken by the Syracusans. 

After so much success, the Syracusans and 
allies set about raising a counterwork along 
Epipolse. Beginning at the city, they carried 
it upwards towards the single wall which had 
an oblique inclination ; and intended that, in 
case the Athenians could not stop its comple- 
tion, it should entirely exclude them from per- 



«Nlcin8(snyB Plutarch) disdained to return nn an- 
swer. But some of liis soldiers liuiglicd oufriclif, nnd 
asked "if, at the arrival of n mantle and staT from 
Pparta, the Syrarusans were beronie so full of spirits as 
to despise tlie Athenians; wim had lately piven up to 
the litiredipinonians three hundred of their rountrynien 
who had I een their prisoners, all of thorn belter soldiers, 
and who combed their hair, too, much better than Gy- 
lippus." 



VfiAR XVIII J 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



261 



fecting their circumvallation. The Athenians, 
having perfected their works to the sea, had 
now remounted the eminence; and, as some parts 
of their work were but weak, Gylippus drew 
out his army by night, and was marching to 
■demolish those : but the Athenians, who pass- 
ed the night without their works, were no 
sooner aware of it, than they also marched 
away to defend them. Upon which, Gylip- 
pus, finding them alarmed, desisted, and made 
his army retreat to their former posts. This, 
however, occasioned the Athenians to raise 
those parts of their wall to a greater height, 
and to take the guard of it upon themselves, as 
amongst the body of their confederates they 
had divided the guard of the rest of their 
works, allotting a proper charge to each. 

Nicias also judged it expedient to fortify 
the spot called Plemmyrium. Plemmyriura 
is a point of land over against Syracuse, which 
jutting out before the great harbour, renders 
the mouth of it very narrow. " If this were 
fortified," he thought, " the importation of ne- 
cessaries for the army would be better secured ; 
because then, from a smaller distance, they 
could at any time command the harbour where 
the Syracusaa shipping lay ; and, should it be 
their ill fortune to be straitened by sea, might 
easier fetch in supplies than in the present sta- 
tion of their fleet at the bottom of the great har- 
bour." Now also hebegan, with greater attention 
than before, to study how to distress them by 
sea ; convinced, since the arrival of Gylippus, 
how little room he had to hope for success by 
land. To this spot therefore he ordered his fleet, 
and drew his land-forces down, and immediately 
erected three forts. In these the greatest part 
of the baggage was laid up ; and the transports 
and tight ships were immediately stationed 
there. To this project, however, the havoc 
that afterwards ensued am.ongst the seamen is 
principally to be ascribed ; for, as they suffered 
in this station under scarcity of water, and the 
mariners were frequently 'obliged to fetch both 
water and wood from a distance, since near at 
hand they were not to be had, the Syracusan 
horse, who were masters of the country slaugh- 
tered them in abundance. The Syracusans had 
posted a third part of their cavalry at their for- 
tress of Olympiaeum, to bridle the marauding 
excursions of the enemy at Plemmyrium. 

Now also Nicias received intelligence that 
the other Corinthian ships were in their pass- 
age. To watch their approach, he therefore 



detached twenty sail, who were appointed to 
cruize about Locri, and Rhegium, and the 
capes of Sicily, in order to intercept them. 

Gylippus in the meantime was employed 
in building the counter-wall along Epipolse, 
making use of the stones which the Athenians 
had laid ready in heaps for the continuation of 
their own work. It was also his daily custom to 
draw up the Syracusans and allies in order of 
battle, and lead them out beyond the point of 
the counter-wall ; which obHged the Athenians 
to draw up likewise, to observe their motions. 
And, when Gylippus judged he could attack 
them with advantage, he instantly advanced; 
and, the charge being given and received, a bat- 
tle ensued in the space between their respec- 
tive works; but so narrow, that no use could 
be made of the Syracusan and confederate 
horse. The Syracusans and allies were ac- 
cordingly defeated. They fetched off their 
slain by truce ; and the Athenians erected a 
trophy. But Gylippus, having assembled the 
army round him, thought proper to make this 
declaration in the presence of them all :- — that 
" the defeat was not to be charged on their 
want of bravery, but on his own indiscretion ; 
he had deprived them of the service of their 
own cavalry and dai-ters, by ranging his battle 
in too confined a spot between the works ; 
that he would now again lead them out in a 
more judicious manner." He exhorted them, 
therefore " to imprint it strong on their remem 
brance, that as in real strength they were not 
inferior, it would be intolerably disgraceful, if 
they, who to a man were Peloponnesians and 
Dorians, should not manifest themselves so re- 
solutely brave, as to conquer and drive out of 
their country a pai^cel of lonians and islanders, 
and a promiscuous rabble of hungry adven- 
turers." Having addresed them thus, he lay 
on the watch to seize a proper opportunity ; 
and as soon as he had gained it, led them on 
again to the charge. 

It was the opinion of Nicias, and in gener- 
al of all the Athenians, that " though it was 
not their own interest to bring on an engage- 
ment, yet it highly concerned them to put a stop 
to the counter-work which the enemy was 
raising to hinder their progress ;" for, by 
this time the wall of the Syracusans had 
only not over-reached the extreme point to 
which the Athenians had brought their circum- 
vallation, "and, should it be extended farther it 
would give the enemy this double advantage ; 
2d2 



262 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book VII. 



— a certainty of conquest whenever they thought 
proper to fight, and a discretionary power not 
to fight at all." Determined by these consider- 
ations, they drew out in order to give the Syra- 
cusans battle. 

Gylippus soon began the engagement. He 
had now drawn up his heavy-armed without the 
works, and at a greater distance from them 
than before. He had posted the cavalry and 
the darters on a wide and open spot, yet unoc- 
cupied by the works on either side, and posted 
them so that they flanked the Athenians. In 
the ardour of the engagement, the cavalry broke 
in upon the left wing of the Athenians, which 
was ranged against them, and entirely routed 
them. In consequence of which, the remain- 
der of the army was soon defeated by the 
Syracusans, and in the greatest disorder retired 
for shelter behind their works. And night no 
sooner came on, than the Syracusans, without 
loss of time, began to carry forwards their own 
works, which they soon extended beyond the 
Athenian circumvallation ; by which they gain- 
ed this great point, that they could no longer 
be invested on all sides by the Athenians ; and 
the latter, though masters in the field, were 
henceforwards effectually stopped from perfect- 
ing their circumvallation. 

After this, twelve ships of the Corinthians, 
and Ambraciots, and Leucadians, the remain- 
der of the squadron designed for this service, 
having given the Athenian guard-ships the slip, 
came into the harbour of Syracuse : they were 
commanded by Herasinides, a Corinthian. By 
these the Syracusans were now assisted in 
carrying on their work, till it was completely 
joined to the traverse wall. 

Gylippus now made a circuit over Sicily in 
order to promote the common cause ; and to 
procure additional forces for the services both 
of land and sea ; and to solicit the concurrence 
of such states as hitherto had manifested, either 
no great inclination, or an open repugnance, to 
join in the present war. Other ambassadors 
also were despatched, by the Syracusans and 
Corinthians, to Laceda;mon and Corinth, in- 
structed to solicit a speedy reinforcement, to 
be transported into Sicily either in trading ves- 
sels, or in boats, or by any oth^r expeditious 
methods, since the Athenians had also sent for 
reinforcements from Athens. The Syracusans 
also assigned coinphMncnts of men to their 
shipping, and sedulously trained them to the 
service of the sea, as designing on this element 



I also to try their fortune ; nay, they laboured 
with alacrity and application to increase theii 
strength in all respects. 

Nicias, being sensible of this, and conscious 
that the strength of the enemy and his own 
inability became daily greater, despatched his 
messengers also to Athens, a custom he had 
ever observed, and upon all occasions, to report 
the particulars of his proceedings. But in his 
present situation it was more requisite than 
ever ; since now he was convinced that he was 
environed with dangers ; and unless, with the 
utmost expedition, they recalled their troops, or 
sent them another, and that a strong, reinforce- 
ment, no hopes of preservation remained. Ap- 
prehensive, farther, that the persons he should 
send, either through want of proper address, or 
through defect of courage, or a passion to soothe 
the populace, might suppress the truth, he sent 
a true account of things in a letter wrote with 
his own hand. By this method he concluded 
that his own sentiments of things could not be 
concealed or invalidated by messengers ; that 
the Athenians would be informed of the truth, 
and might accordingly adjust their resolutions. 
These messengers therefore departed, instruct- 
ed to deliver the letter which he intrusted to 
their care, and what farther they were to add 
by word of mouth. Nicias in the mean time 
kept within the limits of his camp, more anxious 
to guard his shattered forces from annoyance, 
than to plunge into fresh and spontaneous dan- 
gers. 

In the close of this summer, Euetion, an 
Athenian general, marched, in conjunction 
with Perdiccas and a large body of Thracians, 
against Amphipolis ; yet could not render him- 
self master of that city. But then, setting out 
from Imereum, he brought his triremes abou 
into the Strymon, and blocked it up on the 
side of the river. And here this summer ended. 

In the beginning of winter the n)essengers 
from Nicias arrived at Athens; \\here they 
gave such accounts of things as he had charged 
them to give, and resolved such questions as 
were asked them. They also delivered his let- 
ter ; which the clerk of the state stood up and 
read aloud to the Athenians. The contents 
were these : 

" Athenians, 

" The many letters from time to time re- 
ceived from me have given you all proper in- 
formation, so far as relates to past transactions; 



YEAR XVIII.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



263 



and it is now high time you should be made 
acquainted with our present situation, that 
your counsels may be adjusted in a proper 
manner. 

" After, therefore, we had defeated, in 
several engagements, the Syracusans, against 
whom you sent us out, and when we had thrown 
up those works before their city within which 
we are at this moment lying, Gylippus the La- 
cedaemonian came upon us, at the head of an 
army, brought from Peloponnesus, and aug- 
mented by the troops of some Sicilian states. 
In the first battle he is routed by us ; but in 
the last, pressed hard by their numerous cavalry 
and darters, we have been forced to retire 
within our intrenchments. Being therefore 
obliged, by the superior numbers of the enemy, 
to discontinue our circumvallation, we are this 
moment lying upon the defensive. Nor indeed 
are we able to draw out our whole force for 
action, as detachments of our heavy-armed are 
remotely employed in the guard of our works. 
They have farther run up a single wall to cut 
our lines ; so that ther6 remains no longer a pos- 
sibility for us to complete the circumvallation, 
unless, reinforced by a numerous body of troops, 
we are enabled to assault and demolish the 
counterwork. And, in consequence of this, 
we, who designed to besiege others, may with 
much more propriety be said to suffer a siege 
ourselves, at least by land : for we dare not 
make any distant excursions into the adjacent 
country, for fear of the horse. 

" What is more ; they have sent ambassadors 
to Peloponnesus, to solicit reinforcements. 
Gylippus also is making the tour of the Sicilian 
states, with a view to obtain the concurrence of 
surh as are at present neutral, and to prevail with 
the rest to intrust their additional levies for the 
service both of land and sea under his com- 
mand : and, according to my present intelli- 
gence, they are fully bent to attack, at one and 
the same time, our intrenchments, with their 
land-forces by land, and with their ships by 
sea. And though I say, by sea, let not the 
sound be too terrible in your ears : for they 
know very well the present state of our navy ; 
which, though at first a most complete equip- 
ment, for the cleanness of the ships and the 
health and vigour of the seamen, yet at present 
hath scarce a ship which is not leaky ; so long 
have they been necessitated to keep the sea, 
whilst their hands have daily been mouldering 
away : for in fact, we have no opportunity to 



lay them dry and careen them ; as we are under 
continual apprehensions of being attacked by 
the ships of the enemy, equal, nay superior, in 
number to our own. That they will attempt 
it, we have most certain ground to believe ; but 
the seasons of doing it are entirely in their own 
option ; which also enables them to preserve 
their vessels ever fit for service, as they are 
not necessitated to be continually in action to 
strike awe into others : nay, we should hardly 
be able to do the like, though the number of 
our shipping were much larger than it is, or 
though we were exempted from the necessity 
we now lie under of keeping guard with them 
all. For, in case we make the least abatement 
of our vigilance, we should be distressed for 
want of necessaries, which even now we fetch 
in with difficulty in the very teeth of the 
enemy. To this must be ascribed the great 
waste of our seamen which hath already been 
made, and whose number lessens from day to 
day ; since, obliged to fetch wood, and water, 
and forage, from remote places, they are in- 
tercepted by the enemy's horse. Even our 
servants, who have nothing to dread from our 
ruinated condition, desert us daily. And such 
foreigners, as were forced on board our fleet, 
depart with impunity to their own cities ; whilst 
others, who were allured to the service by the 
greatness of our pay, and imagined they were 
rather come to plunder than to fight, when^ 
contrary to their hopes, they behold the enemy 
possessed of a numerous fleet, and making a 
brave resistance in every quarter, some catch 
at the least pretext to go over to the enemy, 
and others make shift to skulk away, — never 
again to be retrieved in so wide a country as 
Sicily. Nay, some of those, who, having attend- 
ed us hither from Athens, and since prevailed 
with the captains of triremes to accept of the 
service of Hyccarian slaves in redemption of 
their own, have by this means subverted our 
naval discipline. 

" I am writing to men well enlightened in 
naval affairs, and perfectly convinced, that the 
flower of an equipment is but of short duration, 
and how few of those on board are skilled at 
steering the vessel or managing the oar. But 
what gives me the most acute vexation is this, 
— that, though commander-in-chief, I am utterly 
unable to put a stop to these disorders ; since 
your tempers, Athenians, are hard to be man- 
aged ; and am quite at a loss from whence to 
repair the waste that hath been made of our 



264 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book vn. 



seamen. The enemy have abundant resources ' 
everywhere at hand, whereas necessity points 
not only one to us, — that place from whence 
we had who now remain, and who are for ever 
lost : for Naxus and Catana, the cities which \ 
still persevere in our alliance, are unable to 
recruit us. And, should the enemy get one 
circumstance more in their favour, — that the | 
towns of Italy, which at present supply us | 
with food, deterred by the discovery of our '■ 
low condition and the non-appearance of a re- 
inforcement from Athens, go over to the Syra- 1 
cusans, — the war will be finished to their hands 
without costing them a blow, and we shall be ' 
left to the mercy of the enemy. 

" I could have sent you much more pleasing 
accounts of things, but none so proper to give 
you a clear idea of the posture of your alfairs 
here, and such as you ought to have before you 
proceed to deliberate upon them ; and at the 
same time, — as I am by no means a stranger 
to Athenian tempers, since I know you to be 
fond of hearing what will give you pleasure, 
but are afterwards inflamed with anger if any 
article in event drops short of your expectation, 
— I thought it highly concerned my own safety 
to tell you nothing but the truth. And let me 
here conjure you, to entertain no resentment 
either against private soldiers or commanders ; 
since, in labouring those points which are the 
principal ends of the expedition, they have 
fully done their duty. 

" But, since all Sicily is in arms against us, 
and since our enemies expect a reinforcement 
from Peloponnesus, resolve, without loss of 
time, that, as your forces are not sufficient to 
keep the enemy in play, they must either be 
recalled, or be reinforced with a body not in- 
ferior to the first equipment, with both a land 
and a naval force, and a large pecxmiary supply. 
For myself, I must insist that a successor be 
sent me ; since I am quite disabled, by a 
nephritic disorder, from continuing in the com- 
mand : and I think I have just title to expect 
my dismission from you ; since, in the vigour 
of my life, I have been intrusted by you with 
several commands, in which I did you some 
signal services. 

** Whatever you determine, put it in execu- 
tion on the first approach of spring ; and, above 
all things, keep clear of delays: for the ready 
supplies given the enemy in Sicily, will soon 
enable them to act; and those expected from 
Peloponnesus, though thev must be longer in 



coming up, yet, depend upon it, that, unless 
you exert your utmost vigilance, some of them 
will steal hither, as before, through all your 
guards, and some will infallibly be here before 
you." Such were the advices brought them 
by the letter of Nicias. The Athenians, 
however, when they had heard it read, would 
not so far comply with the request of Nicias 
as to give him his dismission ; but that, aflSicted 
as he was in body, the whole burden of aflaira 
might not lie too heavily upon him, they ap- 
pointed two persons, already in Sicily, Menan- 
der and Euthydcmus, to assist him in the com- 
mand, till those, who by the public vote should 
be joined with him in the commission, can 
arrive. They also decreed him a reinforce- 
ment, consisting both of a land and naval force, 
to be levied amongst the Athenians upon the 
roll and their dependents ; and, for colleagues 
to share in the command, Demosthenes the 
son of Alcistenes, and Eurymedon the son of 
Thucles. Eurymedon, by order, began hia 
passage for Sicily about the winter solstice, at 
the head of ten sail of ships, and with a supply 
of twenty talents of silver ;' empowered, farther, 
to assure them, that " a large reinforcement 
will soon come up, as the state had seriously 
interested itself in their welfare." Demos- 
thenes staid behind to forward the equipment, 
and was intending to set out on the first ap- 
proach of spring. He was busied in assem- 
bling together their contingents from the depen- 
dent states, and in levying amongst them both 
money, and shipping, and soldiers. 

The Athenians farther sent out twenty sail, 
to cruize on the coasts of Peloponnesus, and 
to take care that no one passed over from 
Corinth and Peloponnesus into Sicily. For 
the Corinthians, upon the arrival of the ambas- 
sadors, and the advice they brought, that " the 
fiice of affairs was much altered for the better,'* 
(priding themselves in the reflection that their 
former equipment had arrived in time to con- 
tribute to this turn,) became now more alert 
than ever, and got transports in readiness to 
carry over a body of their own heavy-armed 
into Sicily, whilst the Lacedaemonians were 
intent on doing the same from other parts of 
Peloponnesus. The Corinthians, farther man- 
ned out five and twenty sail ; designing to ha- 
zard an engagement with the guard-ships sta- 
tioned at Naupactus, or to disable the A the 

« 3,875/. sterling. 



YEAR XTX.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



2G5 



nians who lay there from giving their transports 
the least molestation, by keeping their own 
triremes ready ranged in order of battle in the 
very face of that squadron. 

The Lacedaemonians also were preparing for 
an invasion of Attica, in pursuance of a former 
resolution, and in compliance farther with the 
pressing instances of both Syracusans and Co- 
rinthians. They had no sooner heard of the 
reinforcement intended to be sent by the Athe- 
nians to Sicily, than, by making a diversion, 
they designed to stop its execution. Alcibia- 
des also continued warmly importuning them 
to execute his plan of fortifying Decelea, and 
to proceed briskly with the war. But the 
motives which at this present juncture ani- 
mated the Lacedaemonians most, were, that the 
Athenians, if engaged in a double war both 
against themselves and against the Sicilians, 
must become a much more expeditious con- 
quest ; and, farther, the Athenians were the 
first aggressors in violating treaties. In the 
former war they were well convinced the first 
oftence was chargeable on their own heads, 
because the Thebans had surprised Plataea 
whilst treaties were in fact subsisting. Nay, 
contrary to an express stipulation in a preced- 
ing treaty, that " arms should never be taken 
up against the party which was willing to abide 
by a judicial determination," they themselves 
had refused to submit to a trial, though claimed 
by the Athenians. To a conduct so ungene- 
rous they concluded that their ill success in 
the war ought fairly to be imputed ; and re- 
flected, with self-accusations, not only on the 
calamity they had suffered at Pylus, but on all 
their other losses in every quarter of the war. 
But now, since the Athenians, with an equip- 
ment of thirty sail, had committed devastations 
at Epidaurus, at Prasiae, and at other places, 
and continued to infest their dominions by 
robberies from Pylus ; nay, as often as dis- 
putes had intervened about the intent of articles 
in the last treaty, in which the Lacedaemonians 
appealed to a judicial determination, the others 
had haughtily refused it ; concluding hence, 
that, the Athenians were become as guilty ag- 
gressors now as themselves had been on the 
former occasion ; with cheerful presages of 
success, they determined for war. In order to 
it, they demanded this winter, from their allies, 
their contingents of iron, and got all the need- 
ful materials in readiness to execute their plan 
of fortification. Resolved at the same time to 
41 



transport an aid to Sicily in vessels of burden, 
they began to levy it at home, and exacted the 
quotas of augmentation from their confederates. 
And thus the winter ended ; and the eighteenth 
year of this war, of which Thucydides hath 
compiled the history, came also to an end. 

YEAK XIX.' 

The following spring no sooner approached, 
than, at an earlier date than on any former oc- 
casion, the Lacedaemonians and allies invaded 
Attica ; and Agis, the son of Archidamus, 
king of the Lacedaemonians, had the command 
of the army. At first they ravaged the country, 
particularly the plains ; and this being done, 
having allotted out the work in portions to the 
several states, they set out about fortifying 
Decelea. Now, Decelea is distant at most 
but one hundred and twenty stadia^ from the 
city of Athens, and lies at the same distance, 
or very little more, from Boeotia : but in the 
plain, and on the finest spot of ground, from 
whence efi:ectually to annoy them, was their 
fortress raised ; and might be seen from the 
very walls of Athens. 

In this manner the Peloponnesians and 
allies erected a fortress within Attica itself; 
whilst, in the same portion of time, their friends 
in Peloponnesus embarked a body of heavy- 
armed on board their transports, and sent them 
off for Sicily. For this service the Lacedae- 
monians picked out from the very best of the 
Helots, and of those citizens of Sparta who 
were newly enfranchised, from both together, 
six hundred heavy-armed, and appointed Hec- 
critus, a Spartan, to command them. And 
the BcEOtians sent three hundred heavy-armed, 
commanded by Xeno and Nicon of Thebes, 
and Hegesander of Thespiae. These were 
first embarked at Taenarus in Laconia, and 
thence put out to sea. 

Soon after these, the Corinthians sent away 
five hundred heavy-armed ; some from Corinth 
itself, others hired from the Arcadians ; and 
appointed Alexarchus, a Corinthian, to com- 
mand them. The Sicyonians also sent two 
hundred heavy-armed along with the Corinthi- 
ans, and at their head Sargeus, a Sicyonian. 

But the five and twenty sail of Corinthians, 
which launched out to sea in the depth of win- 
ter, lay ranged in an opposite station to the 



» Before Christ 413. 



a About twelve miles. 



266 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book vn. 



twenty Attic at Naupactus, to give leisure for 
the embarkation of the heavy-armed on board 
the transports from Peloponnesus. On this 
account, principally, they were manned and 
fitted out to sea, that they might divert the 
attention of the Athenians from the transport- 
fleet that was now putting out, and fasten it 
wholly upon the hostile appearance of these 
triremes. 

In the meantime, the Athenians, even during 
the fortifications in hand at Decelea, and at the 
earliest approach of spring, sent out thirty sail 
to cruize on the coasts of Peloponnesus, under 
the command of Charicles, the son of ApoUo- 
dorus. His instructions were, farther, to touch 
at Argos, and to summon them, in conformity 
to the treaty of alliance, to embark a body of 
heavy-armed on board the fleet. 

Demosthenes, also, according to promise, 
they sent away for Sicily, with a numerous 
fleet, consisting of sixty ships of Athens and 
five of Chios, on board of which were twelve 
hundred enrolled Athenians, and as large a 
number of islanders as with the utmost indus- 
try they had been able to draw together. They 
had also amassed, from their other confederates 
subject to Athens, all manner of supplies they 
were able to furnish for carrying on the war 
with vigour. But Demosthenes was farther 
instructed to sail at first in company with 
Charicles, and assist him in the cruize on the 
coasts of Laconia. Demosthenes, therefore, 
having stood over to .^gina, continued there 
till the remainder of his force, which was yet 
behind, had completely joined him, and Chari- 
cles had taken on board the Argive auxiliaries. 

About the same time in this spring Gylippus 
also returned to Syracuse, at the head of as 
large a force as he had been able to collect 
from the several states, with whom his persua- 
sions had been effectual ; and, having convened 
the Syracusans, he told them that — " they 
ought to man out as large a number of shipping 
as they possibly could, and try their fortune in 
a naval engagement : such a step, he had reason 
to hope, might be attended with consequences 
which would amply compensate the danger, and 
invigorate the war." 

These instances of Gylippus were well se- 
conded by Hermocrates, who took uncommon 
pains to encourage his countrymen to attack 
the Athenians by sea. — " The latter, he told 
them, were far from enjoying their naval skill 
as an hereditary right, or a privilege from time 



immemorial exclusively their own. In fact, 
they were by nature landmen much more than 
the Syracusans ; and necessity alone, in the 
Medish invasion, had forced them to try their 
fortune at sea : by enterprising men, as the 
Athenians were, such as were most daring in 
opposing them must needs be regarded as the 
most formidable enemies. True — they had 
been used to intimidate their neighbours, not 
by a real superiority of strength, but by their 
daring enterprising genius ; and now, by the 
same methods, themselves might become for- 
midable even to Athenians." He assured 
them, '< for his own part, he was perfectly 
convinced that the Syracusans, if by an effort 
of bold resolution they would on a sudden 
attack the Athenian fleet, might reap more 
benefit from the terror which such a step would 
strike upon the foe, than could accrue to the 
Athenians from their superior skill when com- 
pared with Syracusan inexperience." He press- 
ed them therefore " to try their fortune by sea, 
and bid adieu to fear." 

Thus animated by Gylippus, and by Her- 
mocrates, and by others, the Syracusans were 
eagerly bent on action by sea, and manned out 
their fleet. And, when the whole was ready 
for service, Gylippus, by favour of the night, 
at the head of his land-army, marched down to 
the forts at Plemmyrium, intending to assault 
them on the land-side. The triremes of the 
Syracusans, at the same instant of time, as 
had been concerted beforehand, to the number 
of thirty-five, are sailing up out of the great 
harbour, whilst forty-five were going about out 
of the lesser harboiu: where their dock lay. 
The latter went round, designing to complete 
their junction with the other squadron, and 
then in a body to stand against Plemmyrium, 
that the Athenians on both sides might be 
thrown into confusion. The Athenians lost 
no time, but instantly manned out sixty vessels. 
With twenty-five of the number they engaged 
the thirty-five Syracusan in the great harbour ; 
with the rest they went to meet the other squa- 
dron, that was coming about from the dock. 
A smart engagement immediately ensued, in 
the mouth of the great harbour. The dispute 
was a long time obstinately maintained ; one 
side exerting themselves to clear the passage, 
but the other to obstruct it 

In the meantime, Gylippus, — as the Athe- 
nians posted at Plemmyrium had flocked down 
to the sea-side, and with their utmost atten- 



YEAR XTX.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



267 



tion were looking at the battle on the water, — 
Gylippus seizeth the opportunity ; and no 
sooner had the morning dawned, than, to the 
great surprise of the enemy, he attacks the 
forts. He first makes himself master of the 
largest of the three, and afterwards carries the 
two lesser, the defendants of which, seeing the 
largest so easily taken, had abandoned their 
posts ; nay, on the surprisal of the first, those 
who had manned it, throwing themselves on 
board the boats and a transport that lay at 
hand, found no small difficulty in getting away 
to the camp ; for, as the Syracusans had now 
the better of the engagement with their squad- 
ron in the great harbour, they detached one of 
their nimblest triremes to pursue the fliers. 
But, at the time the other two forts were car- 
ried, the Syracusans were plainly vanquished, 
which gave them who abandoned the last an 
opportunity to sail away without obstruction. 
For that Syracusan squadron, that was engaged 
before the harbour's mouth, having forced their 
way through the Athenian fleet, by sailing for- 
wards in a disorderly manner and continually 
running foul one upon another, gave the Athe- 
nians an opportunity to regain the day. For 
this squadron they soon routed, and afterwards 
that, within the harbour, by which they had 
been vanquished. They also sunk eleven ships 
of the enemy, and made a slaughter of all their 
crews, those of three ships excepted, to whom 
they granted quarter ; and all this with the loss 
only of three ships on their own side. Having 
afterwards drawn ashore the shatters of the 
Syracusan fleet, and piled them into a trophy 
on the little isle before Plemmyrium, they re- 
tired to their main encampment. 

Thus unsuccessful were the Syracusans in 
their naval engagement. They had carried, 
however, the forts at Plemmyrium; and, to 
signalize each of their acqusitions, they erected 
three several trophies. One, also, of the two 
forts that were taken last they levelled with the 
ground, but the other two they repaired and 
garrisoned. 

In this surprisal of the forts, many were 
slain, and many were made prisoners, and a 
great stock of wealth reposited there became 
the prize of the enemy. For, as the Athenians 
had made use of these forts by way of maga- 
zine, much wealth belonging to merchants, and 
corn in abundance, were found within ; much 
also of the stores belonging to the captains of 
the ships of war, inasmuch as forty masts for 



triremes, and other materials of refitment, had 
been laid up there ; and three triremes were 
hauled ashore to be careened. Nay, this 
surprisal of Plemmyrium was one of the chief, 
if not the greatest source of all the distress 
which the Athenian army sufTered in the 
sequel ; for no longer was the sea open to them 
for the secure importation of necessary sup- 
plies. From this time the Syracusans rushed 
upon them from thence, and awed all their 
motions. The convoys could no more get in 
without fighting their way. Besides that, in 
all other respects, it struck a great consterna- 
tion, and even a dejection of mind amongst the 
troops. 

The next step taken by the Syracusans was 
to send out to sea a squadron of twelve ships, 
under the command of Agatharcus, a Syracu- 
san. One of these ships was to proceed to 
Peloponnesus, and land an embassy there, 
which had instructions, " to notify a present 
hopeful posture of affairs, and to press the 
prosecution of the war in Greece with all pos- 
sible vigour." The other eleven stood over to 
the Italian coast, having received intelligence, 
that a number of small vessels, laden with 
stores for the Athenians, were coming up. 
They intercepted and entirely destroyed most 
of these ; and the timber on board them, which 
was ready wrought for the Athenians to frame 
together into ships, they burnt to ashes on the 
shore of Caulonia. This done, they stood 
away for Locri ; and, whilst they lay in that 
road, one of the transports from Peloponnesus, 
having on board the heavy-armed from Thespiee, 
came in. The Syracusans removed those 
heavy-armed into their own ships, and returned 
with them to Syracuse. 

The Athenians with twenty sail were sta- 
tioned at Megara, in order to intercept their 
return ; where one ship alone, with all the 
crew, fell into their hands. They were not 
able to come up with the rest ; since, eluding 
all pursuit, they recover with security their own 
harbours. 

There happened also a skirmish, in the har- 
bour of Syracuse, about the piles which the 
Syracusans had drove down in the sea before 
their old docks, that their vessels might ride 
in safety behind them, the Athenians be un- 
able to stand in amongst them and do any 
damage to their shipping. Close up to those 
piles the Athenians had towed a raft of prodi- 
gious size, on which turrets and parapets to 



268 



PELOPONxNESIAN WAR. 



[rook VII. 



cover the defendants were erected, whilst others 
in long boats were fastening cables round the 
piles, and, by the help of a machine convenient 
for the purpose, craning them up ; and such as ' 
they broke, a set of divers sawed off close at the 
bottom. The Syracusans in the meantime 
were pouring their missive weapons upon them 
from the docks, which were plentifully returned 
by those posted on the raft. In short, the 
Athenians plucked up most of the pile's , but 
one part of the staccade was exceeding difficult 
to be demolished, as it lay out of sight ; for 
they had driven down some of the piles in such 
a manner, that their heads emerged not above 
the surface of the water. This rendered all 
access exceeding dangerous; since, ignorant 
where they lay, a pilot would be apt to bulge 
his vessel as if it were upon a shelve. But 
even these, the divers, for a pecuniary reward, 
searched out and sawed away. And yet, as 
fast as this was done, the Syracusans drove 
down a fresh set of piles. The contrivances 
both of annoyance and prevention were strenu- 
ously exerted on both sides, as might justly be 
expected from two hostile bodies posted so 
near one another ; the skirmishings were often 
renewed, and every artifice of war was succes- 
sively practised. 

The Syracusans, farther, had despatched 
embassies, composed of Corinthians, and Lace- 
daemonians, and Ambraciots, to the cities of 
Sicily, " to notify the surprisal of Plemmyri- 
um, and to give a just representation of the 
naval engagement in which they had been de- 
feated, not so much by the strength of the 
enemy as by their own confusion ; in other 
respects to assure them, that their hopes of 
success were high, and that they firmly depend- 
ed on receiving soon an aid from them, compo- 
sed both of a land and naval force : since the 
Athenians were also in expectation of a rein- 
forcement from Athens, the approach of which, 
would their friends anticipate, the Athenians 
at present there must be totally destroyed, and 
the war brought at once to an end." Such 
schemes were now in agitation in Sicily. 

But Demosthenes, when he had assembled 
the whole of the armament with which he was 
to pass over to the relief of those in Sicily, 
weighing from JEg'ina., and standing over to 
Peloponnesus, he completes his junction with 
Charicles and the squadron of thirty sail of 
Athenians under his command ; and, as a body 
of heavy-armed had been taken on board the 



latter from Argos, they steered together for the 
coast of Laconia. And here first they ravaged 
in part Epidaurus Limera ; and proceeding 
from thence to that part of Laconia which lies 
over-against Cythera, and where stands the 
temple of Apollo, having ravaged part of the 
adjacent country, ihcy enclosed and fortified a 
neck of land which might serve as a receptacle 
to such of the Helots as deserted the Lacedae- 
monians ; from thence, banditti-like, as was 
done from Pylus, to infest the country. This 
convenient spot was no sooner taken in than 
Demosthenes stood away for Corcyra, that he 
might take on board the auxiliaries there, and 
make the best of his way to Sicily. But 
Charicles staid till he had put the place into a 
state of secure defence, and fixed a garrison in 
it. This being done, he carried back his 
squadron of thirty sail to Athens; and the 
Argives at the same time received their dismis- 
sion. 

This summer there arrived at Athens thir- 
teen hundred Thracian targeteers, of those 
called Machaerophori, and who are originally 
Dians. This body was intended to have been 
sent with Demosthenes into Sicily ; but, as 
they arrived not till after his departure, the 
Athenians had resolved to send them back 
again to their own homes in Thrace. To re- 
tain them merely for the sake of the war waged 
against them from Decelea, they thought 
would plunge them in too large an expense, 
since the pay of every soldier was a drachma' 
a day. For now, since Decelea, which 
had been fortified this spring by the joint 
labours of the whole united army, continued 
to be garrisoned by detachments from the 
several states, which at certain intervals of 
time relieved one another in a regular suc- 
cession, it gave terrible annoyance to the 
Athenians, and caused amongst them such 
havoc of their effects, and such a destruction 
of their men as threw them into great dis- 
tress. All preceding incursions of the enemy, " 
having been only transient, had left them 
in the peaceable enjoyment of their lands 
for the rest of the year; but now, as they 
awed the country by one continued blockade, 
and as by intervals tliey received considerable 
augmentations to enable them to give greater 
annoyance, as even the regular garrison was 
periodically obliged to scour the country and 

»7Jrf. 



TEAR XIX.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



IG9 



plunder for their own subsistence, and as Agis, 
king of the Lacedaemonians, who with the ut- 
most diligence prosecuted the war, in person 
directed all the operations, — The Athenians 
were sorely pressed : for they were debarred 
the whole produce of their own lands ; more 
than twenty thousand of their slaves had de- 
serted to the enemy, and a large part of these 
were mechanics of the city ; their whole stock 
of sheep and labouring cattle was lost beyond 
retrieve ; their horses, — as the horsemen were 
obliged every day to mount, either to ride to- 
wards Decelea, to awe the excursions of that 
garrison, or to guard some important posts in 
the country, — their horses were either lamed by 
running incessantly over hard or rugged ground, 
or by wounds were disabled for service ; the con- 
stant supplies of provisions for the city, which 
used to be fetched from Euboea to Oropus, 
and to be brought in from thence through De- 
celea as the shortest passage, were now forced 
to go round the cape of Sunium by sea, which 
considerably enchanced their price. For want 
also of foreign commodities the city was equal- 
ly distressed ; and Athens was now reduced 
to be merely a place of arms. To keep guard 
on the battlements by day, the citizens were 
obliged successively to relieve one another ; 
but the whole body of the city, except the 
horsemen, mounted guard by night. The latter 
ever under arms without, the rest on the con- 
stant guard of the city-walls, and this for a 
summer and winter without any intermission, 
were reduced to a very low condition. But 
the point which pressed hardest upon them 
was, having two wars at once upon their hand : 
and yet their obstinacy had rose to so high a 
pitch, as, had it not been visible to all the 
world, the bare mention of its possibility would 
have been quite incredible ; for who would 
have believed, that this people, so closely block- 
ed up at home by the Peloponnesians, should 
scorn to give up Sicily 1 nay, should persevere 
with unabating zeal, to carry on the siege of 
Syracuse, a city in no respect inferior even to 
^thens itself 1 that they should exhibit such an 
astonishing proof of their strength and their 
courage to the eyes of Greece ; where upon the 
first breaking out of the war, some people had 
imagined, that in case the Peloponnesians in- 
vaded Attica, they could not hold out above 
one year entire, though others had allowed 
them two, and others three, but nobody a 
longer space 1 and that, in the seventeenth year 



after the first invasion of this kind, they should 
attempt the conquest of Sicily ; and, when 
deeply gashed in every part, by one war already 
upon their hands, should wilfully plunge into 
another, as formidable in all respects as that 
waged against them from Peloponnesus ] But 
now, when, besides what they had suffered al- 
ready, they were terribly annoyed from Decelea, 
and other incidents had exacted from them 
very large disbursements, their finaces were 
reduced to a very low ebb. At this period, 
therefore, instead of the tribute paid them by 
their dependents, they exacted a twentieth of 
the value of all commodities imported and ex- 
ported, which they thought would replenish 
their coffers faster than the former method; 
for their disbursements were not as they had 
been in preceding times, but had been inflamed 
in the same proportion as the scenes of war had 
been enlarged, whilst their annual revenue was 
constantly decreasing. 

Unwilling, tlierefore, in the present ebb of 
their treasures, to defray the charge of this 
body of Thracians, who came too late for De- 
mosthenes, they sent them back to their own 
country with all possible haste. Diitrephcs 
was the person pitched upon to conduct them 
home ; and was instructed, that, " In the pass- 
age (for they were to go through the Euri- 
pus) he should employ them, if opportunity 
offered, against the enemy." He landed there- 
fore near Tanagra, and in a hurrying manner 
carried off a booty from thence. About the 
shut of evening he also crossed the Euripus 
from Chalcis of Eubcea ; and, having landed his 
Thracians in Boeotia, led them against Myca- 
lessus. His design was not discovered that 
night, though he halted at the temple of Mer- 
cury, which is distant from Mycalessus but 
sixteen' stadia at most. But early the next 
morning he assaulted this city, which is of large 
extent ; he carries it on the first attack, as there 
was no guard to resist him, and the inhabitants 
could never have imagined that a maritime body 
would have marched so far into the country to 
make attempts upon them. The wall, besides, 
was weak : in some places it was fallen, and 
the remaining part of it was low ; and the gates, 
from too great a confidence of security, had 
been left open. No sooner were the Thracians 
broke into Mycalessus, than they gutted both 



» More than a mile and a half. 



2E 



270 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book VII. 



houses and temples ; they massacred the inha- 
bitants, showing no regard to either old age or 
youth, but venting their fury on all that came 
in their way ; they butchered even the women 
and the children ; nay, all the labouring cattle, 
and every creature that had life which came be- 
fore their eyes ; for the Thracians, when once 
their fury is inflamed, are as insatiable of blood 
as any other the greatest savages in the barba- 
rian world. On this occasion the confusion 
was terrible, and every ghastly method of 
destruction was exemplified in act ; they even 
fell upon the public school, -which was a very 
large one, when the youth of the town were 
but just got in, and hacked all the children to 
pieces. And thus this whole city was involved 
in a calamity, a greater than which no city had 
ever felt ; nay, a calamity unexpected and dread- 
ful indeed ! 

The Thebans had no sooner intelligence of it, 
than they marched to their assistance; but 
came not up with the Thracians till they were 
retired to some distance from the town, where 
they recovered from them their booty, and, 
having put them to flight, continued the chase 
down to the Euripus and the sea, where the 
vessels which had brought them lay at anchor. 
Here they make a slaughter of most of those 
who endeavoured to get on board, but could 
not swim ; since the persons left in the vessels, 
when they saw what passed on the shore, 
put them off beyond their reach. But, in the 
other parts of the retreat, the Thracians be- 
haved with some gallantry against the Theban 
horse, which attacked them first ; since, sally- 
ing frequently out on the pursuers, and rally- 
ing again after the discipline of their country, 
they made good their retreat ; and thus few of 
this body were destroyed. A number, farther, 
who staid behind in the city to plunder, were 
found there and put to the sword. The whole 
number of the slain amongst this body of thir- 
teen hundred Thracians amounted to two hun- 
dred and fifty men; though, in return, they killed, 
of Thebans, and others who accompanied by 
way of aid, of horse and heavy-armed together, 
about twenty, and Skirphondas of Thebes, one 
of the rulers of Bceotia ; the lives of some more 
Mycalcssians were also lost in their company. 
Such was the calamity which fell to the unhap- 
by lot of Mycalessus ; and which, for excess of 
horror, is more to be deplored than any other 
of the tragical events of this war. 

Demosthenes, who, after marking out the 



fortification, had stood away from Laconia to 
Corcyra, surprising a transport vessel which 
rode at anchor in the road of Phia of the Elcans, 
' on board of which a number of heavy-armed 
! Corinthians were to pass over into Sicily, sinks 
that vessel. But the mariners, having saved 
themselves by flight, found afterwards another 
vessel, and proceeded in the voyage. 

From hence Demosthenes came up to Za- 
cynthus and Cephallene ; where he took their 
heavy-armed on board, and sent for those of 
the Messenians from Naupactus. He also 
crossed over to the opposite continent of Acar- 
nania, to Alyzia and Anactorium, both belong- 
ing to the Athenians. Thus employed as he 
was in augmenting his force, Eurymedon, re- 
turning from Sicily, whither he had been sent 
in the winter to carry a supply of money for 
the army, meets him ; and, amongst other in- 
telligence, relates, that " he had heard, since he 
was upon his return, that Plemmyrium had 
been taken by the Syracusans." Conon, also, 
who commanded at Naupactus, came to them 
with advice, that " the five and twenty sail 
of Corinthians which lay over-against their 
squadron had not quitted that station, and even 
threatened them with an engagement." He 
exhorted, therefore, these commanders to de- 
tach some vessels thither, since their squadron 
at Naupactus, consisting only of eighteen ships, 
was not a match for the enemy, whose squadron 
amounted to twenty five. Upon this, Demos- 
thenes and Eurymedon detach ten of the prime 
sailers, amongst those under their own com- 
mand, to follow Conon for the reinforcement 
of the squadron at Naupactus. 

The two former continued to assemble forces 
for the grand expedition. Eurymedon, for this 
purpose, sailed to Corcyra, commanded them 
to man out fifteen ships, and selected himself 
the heavy-armed for the service ; for, as he was 
returned from carrying the stores, he joined 
himself with Demosthenes in the command, in 
pursuance of the prior nomination. Demos- 
thenes was collecting a body of slingers and 
darters from the towns of Acarnania. • 

The ambassadors from Syracuse, who were 
sent round to the Sicilian cities after the sur- 
prisal of Plemmyrium, had succeeded in their 
negotiations ; and having assembled a large 
body of succours, were intent on bringing them 
up. Nicias, who had gained an early intelli- 
gence of their motion, sends to such of the 
Siculi, as lay upon their route and were in 



YEAR XIX.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



271 



his alliance, (namely, the Centoripes and Haly- 
cyaeans and others,) " by no means to yield a 
free passage to the enemy, but to assemble in 
a body and obstruct their march." It was im- 
possible for them to reach Syracuse by any 
other route; for the Agrigentines had refused 
them a passage through their territories. Now, 
therefore, the Sicilians being on their march, 
the Siculi, in compliance with the request of 
the Athenianb, had placed three different am- 
buscades in their way. From these rushing 
suddenly upon them, as they were advancing 
in a careless manner, they destroyed about 
eight hundred men, and all the ambassadors, 
excepting one Corinthian. And this Corinthi- 
an brought up afterwards to Syracuse all those 
who escaped by flight, the number of whom 
amounted to fifteen hundred. 

About the same time the Camarineans also 
send up a body of succours, consisting of five 
hundred heavy-armed, three hundred darters, 
and three hundred archers. The Geloans also 
sent them a squadron of about five sail, beside 
four hundred darters and two hundred horse- 
men. 

Now almost all Sicily, except the Agrigen- 
tines, (for these still adhered to their neutra- 
lity,) all the rest of the island, I say, who 
hitherto had stood aloof to observe events, 
united themselves against the Athenians, in be- 
half of Syracuse : though the Syracusans, after 
the blow they had just received from the Siculi, 
thought it not proper to attack the Athenians 
again upon a sudden. 

But Demosthenes and Eurymedon, having 
ROW completed their embarkations at Corcyra 
and on the continent, at the head of this united 
and powerful armament, crossed over the 
Ionian to cape lapygia ; and, standing away 
from thence, reach the Chaerades, islands of 
lapygia. Here they take on board their fleet 
a party of lapygian darters, to the number of 
fifty, and one hundred more of the Messapian 
nation ; and, after they had renewed a friend- 
■*hip of ancient date with Artas, (who, being 
lord of these islands, supplied them with the 
darters,) they proceed to Metapontium in 
Italy. Upon the plea of an alliance subsisting 
between them, they prevail upon the Metapon- 
tians to furnish them out three hundred more, 
and two triremes, with which augmentation 
they stood along the coast to Thuria ; where, 
on their arrival, they find that the party, who 
had acted against the Athenian interest, had in 



a late sedition been driven out of the city. De- 
sirous here to take a view of the whole arma- 
ment, and to know whether any part had strag- 
gled and was left behind ; hoping, farther, to 
prevail upon the Thurians to join them with 
their forces in the most cordial manner, and, 
since their welfare was connected with that of 
Athens, to declare the friends and foes of the 
Athenians to be equally their own ; they staid 
some time at Thuria, and completed their de- 
signs. 

To return to the Peloponnesians. About 
the same portion of time, their squadron of 
five and twenty sail, which, to favour the pass- 
age of the transports to Sicily, lay ranged in 
opposition to the fleet at Naupactus, having 
now made all things ready for an engagement, 
and equipped out some additional vessels, which 
had almost equalized their number to that of 
the Athenian ships, take their station in Rhy- 
pica, near Erinus of Achaia. As the place in 
which they rode was bent in the form of a cres- 
cent, the land force of the Corinthians and the 
adjacent confederates, who marched to their 
assistance, was posted upon each wing of the 
squadron, on the jutting necks of land, whilst 
the ships drawn up close together composed 
the centre of their arrangement, and Polyan- 
thes the Corinthian commanded the fleet. 

The Athenians, with three and thirty sail, 
under the command of Diphilus, weighed from 
Naupactus and stood in against them. At 
first, the Corinthians lay still without motion ; 
but, so soon as it was judged necessary for them 
to act, and the signal flag was accordingly hoist- 
ed, they advanced to charge the Athenians, and 
an engagement ensued. The contention was 
maintained a long time on both sides. Three 
of the Corinthian vessels are destroyed, whilst 
not a single ship on the Athenian side was sunk, 
though seven were disabled for service by blows 
they had received from the enemies' beaks, by 
which their forecastles had been shattered by 
the Corinthian ships, made firm and compact for 
this very purpose by stays on each side of the 
beak. The event of the engagement remain- 
ing doubtful, from whence both sides took 
occasion to claim the victory, the Athenians 
however being masters of all the shatters of 
the enemy's fleet, which the wind drove 
right into the sea, and which the Corinthi- 
ans made no efforts to recover, they drop- 
ped away from each other. Yet no kind 
of pursuit was attempted, and no prisoners 



272 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book vn. 



were taken by cither : for the Corinthians and 
Pcloponncsians, who fought close under the 
shore, were by that enabled to make an easy 
escape ; but, on the Athenian side, not even a 
single ship was sunk. And, yet, when the 
Athenians were sailed back to Naupactus, the 
Corinthians immediately set up a trophy, as if 
the victory was their own, because they had 
disabled a larger number of the enemy. They 
farther looked upon themselves as not defeated, 
because their enemies were not clearly victori- 
ous : for it is the way with the Corinthians to 
pronounce themselves victors if they are not 
sadly beaten ; whereas, the Athenians esteem 
themselves defeated if they have not made a 
signal conquest. But, farther, when the Pelo- 
ponnesians were retired from their station, and 
the land army was dismissed, the Athenians 
erected a trophy. The spot they chose, where- 
on to place this token of their victory, was 
distant about 'twenty stadia from Erineus, the 
station in which the Corinthians rode. Such 
was the event of this naval engagement. 

Demosthenes and Eurymedon, so soon as 
the Thurians had got in readiness seven hun- 
dred heavy-armed, with three hundred darters, 
to attend them in the expedition, ordered the 
fleet to coast along the shore towards the Cro- 
toniatis ; whilst themselves, after having taken 
a review of all their land army upon the banks 
of the Sybaris, marched them over land through 
the Thuriatis. But when they were advanced 
to the river Hylias, they were met by a mes- 
sage from the Crotoniatse, intimating to them, 
that " their consent should never be given for 
the passage of this army through their domi- 
nions ;" upon which they wheeled off down- 
wards towards the sea and the mouth of the 
Hylias, where they halted a night, and were 
joined by the whole body of the fleet. 

The next morning they re-embarked and 
proceeded along the coast, touching at every 
city, except Locri, till they arrived at Petra in 
the district of Rhegium. 

But during this interval, the Syracusans, 
who had received advice of the approach of the 
reinforcement; determined to made another at- 
tempt with their fleet and the whole augmented 
body of their land army, which they had assem- 
bled together for this very design of attacking 
the Athenians again before the reinforcement 
arrived. But, like men who in the former 

» About two miles. 



action had clearly perceived what would give 
them advantages over the enemy, they had 
made some alteration in the structure of their 
vessels : having shortened the heads of their 
ships, they made them more firm and compact, 
and fastened very substantial stays to each side 
of the beak ; they strengthened these again by 
rafters of six cubits in length, which were laid 
along the ribs both within and without, in the 
same manner as the Corinthians had strength- 
ened the whole prow of their ships for the 
last naval engagement against the squadron at 
Naupactus. By these means the Syracusans 
concluded they should gain an advantage over 
the ships of the Athenians, which were of a 
different structure, as in the prow they were 
but weak, because of their usual practice, in an 
engagement, not to charge a-head, but by tack- 
ing about to strike upon the sides : — that, far- 
ther, should the battle be fought in the great 
harbour, where sea-room would be small and 
the ships be crowded, this must be also an 
advantage in their favour ; since, darting them- 
selves a-head, they must needs shatter the 
prows of the enemy, when with compact and 
solid beaks they struck against such as were 
hollow and weak: — that again, for want of 
sea-room, the Athenians would be too much 
straitened to make their tacks, or to run 
through their lines, which were points of art 
on which they chiefly relied ; they were deter- 
mined to the utmost of their power to check 
all attempts of the latter sort, and the narrow 
space in which they must engage would of 
itself prevent the former ; and now they in- 
tended with dexterity to turn to their own 
advantage the method of striking ahead, which 
on the former occasion appeared to be an error 
in the masters ; that hence infallibly the day 
must be their own ; for the Athenians, if once 
repulsed, would not have room to go round and 
return to the charge, since thus they must di- 
rectly be forced on the shore, which lay but a 
small distance from their camp, and would 
sadly cramp them up; that they themselves 
must be masters of the rest of the harbour, 
whilst the enemy, crowded together, in case 
they should be forced to give way, must be 
driven into narrow compass, and even falling 
foul on one another, a total confusion and dis- 
order must certainly follow ; for, what hurt the 
Athenians most, in all their naval engagements, 
was their inability to make use of the whole 
harbour for tacking about or returning to the 



YEAR XIX.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



273 



charge, in the same manner as the Syracusans : 
— that, finally, the Athenians, could not possi- 
bly get out into wider sea, as the entrance of 
the harbour and the space behind the lines of 
battle were in their own command ; nay, other 
obstacles would co-operate, such as Plemmy- 
rium, which would now oppose any attempt of 
this kind, and the very nature of the harbour's 
mouth, which was exceeding narrow. 

By such a project the Syracusans had given 
an increase to their former skill and strength ; 
and animated more than ever by the thought of 
having improved from their errors in the for- 
mer engagement, they sallied out to encounter 
the enemy both with their land and naval force. 
Gylippus showed himself, a small portion of 
time before the rest, at the head of the infan- 
try ; whom, sallying out of the city, he drew 
up near the Athenian entrenchment, in that 
quarter where it faced the city. Then the 
garrison of Olympiaeum, to a man, as well 
heavy-armed as horsemen, with all the light- 
armed parties of the Syracusans, came and 
■drew up on the other quarters ; and, immedi- 
ately after, the ships of the Syracusans and 
their allies came sailing forwards. 

The Athenians at first imagined that at 
present they were threatened only with an as- 
sault by land ; but when, on a sudden, they 
saw the fleet bearing down against them, they 
were struck with confusion. Some of them 
were taking post upon and without the en- 
trenchments, to make head against the as- 
sailants ; others were sallied forth to encoun- 
ter th-e troops from Olympiaeum, and those 
from remoter parts coming on with full speed, 
a numerous body of horsemen and darters. 
The rest were hurrying on board to man the 
ships, or to give what assistance they could 
upon the beach : and no sooner were the pro- 
per complements on board, than seventy-five 
ships stood out to meet the enemy ; but then 
the number of the enemy's vessels was about 
eighty. 

Great part of this day was spent in advanc- 
ing towards, and retiring from, one another, 
and in reciprocal endeavours to seize advan- 
tages: but neither side was able to execute 
any remarkable piece of service, excepting that 
the Syracusans sunk one or two of the Atheni- 
an ships ; upon which they parted, and at the 
same time the land army drew off from the 
entrenchments. 

The day following the Syracusans lay quiet, 
42 



affording the enemy no room to guess at their 
future designs. 

But Nicias, conscious to himself that hither- 
to no advantages had been gained by sea, and 
fully expecting that the enemy would repeat 
their attempt, obliged the captains of the tri- 
remes to repair their ships if anywise damaged, 
and stationed the transports before the piles, 
which they had driven down in the sea, to se- 
cure the ships, and lock up as it were that 
space in which they lay. The transports he 
ranged in a line, at the distance of the breadth 
of two plethra' from one another ; that, in 
case a ship was repulsed, it might run in hither 
as a place of security, and might again stand 
out without any molestation. In perfecting 
these dispositions the Athenians were all this 
day employed from morning to night. 

The next day, the Syracusans, earlier in the 
morning than before, and with the same parade 
of their land and naval force, came out to at- 
tack the Athenians. Now again, facing each 
other in the lines of the engagement, they 
spent great part of the day in the same endea- 
vours as before to over-reach and surprise one 
another ; till at length Aristo, the son of Pyr- 
ricus, a Corinthian, and the most expert sea- 
man in the fleet of Syracuse, persuades the 
commanders of that fleet to despatch their 
orders to the magistrates within the city, — 
" with all expedition to bring the provisions 
which were for sale down to the beach of the 
sea, and hold the market there ; nay, farther, 
to compel all those who had any meat to sell 
to offer it instantly on the beach, that the ma- 
riners might come ashore and dine under the 
sides of their vessels ; so that, after a short 
repast, they might this same day unexpectedly 
fall upon the Athenians." This counsel being 
approved, the necessary orders were despatched 
away, and the market was furnished out. Then 
suddenly the Syracusan fleet fell back, and 
stood away towards the city ; where, disem- 
barking with all possible haste, they took their 
repast. 

But the Athenians, who ascribed this drop- 
ping off of the enemy to a consciousness of 
their own inferiority, quitting their own ships 
as if there was nothing farther to be done, 
diverted their attention to their own affairs, 
and especially to prepare a refreshing meal for 

« A plethron is said by some to contain 1,414, by oth 
ers, 1000 square feet. 
2e2 



274 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book vn. 



themselves, confident there would be no en- 
gagement on this day. But, on a sudden, the 
Syracusans, repairing on board, stood out a 
second time to give them battle. Then the 
Athenians, in much hurry and confusion, and 
most of them still fasting, re-embarking with- 
out any regularity or order, with great difficulty, 
after a considerable interval, stood out to re- 
ceive them. For a certain space, each stood 
upon their guard, and declined the charge. At 
length it occurred to the Athenians, that it was 
imprudent to dally so long, and exhaust their 
spirits by the mere labour of the oar, which 
ought rather to be exerted on an expeditious 
attack. Upon which animating one another 
with a shout, they darted upon the enemy, and 
the engagement began. 

The Syracusans received the shock without 
giving way, and, keeping the heads of their 
vessels right against the enemy, executed their 
project, and with their strengthened beaks 
shattered the forecastles of the Athenian ships ; 
whilst their darters, who were ranged along the 
decks, galled the Athenians sorely with their 
missive weapons ; though not near so much as 
did the crews of some light Syracusan boats, 
which scoured about the enemy's fleet ; some- 
times getting under their wards and gliding along 
the sides of their vessels, and from these close 
positions aiming their darts at the mariners. 
In fine, the Syracusans, persevering in this 
manner to gall their foes, were masters of the 
day ; whilst the Athenians, being put to flight, 
were obliged to retire, through the intervals of 
the line of transports, into their own station. 
The Syracusan ships pursued as far as to this 
line of transports ; but were obliged to stop 
there, for fear of the machines' which hung 
upon the yards of the transports to bar all ap- 
proach. Two ships, indeed, of the Syracu- 
sans, elevated with success, approached too 
near, and were sunk; and another, with all 
her crew, was taken by the enemy. And now 
the Syracusans, who in the action had sunk 
seven ships of the enemy, had damaged many, 
had taken many prisoners, and made great 
slaughter, judged it proper to retire. They 
then erected trophies as victorious in two 
engagements, and plumed themselves in the 
assurance, that by sea, they had the superi- 



« Called dolphins, from tlieir form. Tliey were maa- 
Hy, mndc of Jead nrid luiits upon tlie sail yards by rords 
and pulleys; and, when thrown into the enemy'sships, 
eilbor burat or sunk them. 



ority over the enemy ; presuming, at the samo 
time, that they must soon be victorious also by 
land : upon which they got every thing in 
readiness to attack them once more on both 
elements. 

But, at this crisis, Demosthenes and Eury- 
medon arrive, at the head of the reinforcement 
from Athens ; which consisted of seventy- 
three sail of ships, including foreigners ; of 
about five thousand heavy-armed of their own 
and their confederate troops ; beside a con- 
siderable number of darters, as well Barbarian 
as Grecian, and slingers, and archers, and a 
complete supply of all military stores. The first 
appearance of this grand reinforcement struck 
the Syracusans and their allies with no small 
consternation. It looked as if the war must 
be endless, and themselves exposed to dangers 
that knew no bounds. They saw that, in spite 
of the annoyance which Decelea, now forti- 
fied, gave them, the Athenians were arrived 
before Syracuse with another armament as 
great and as formidable as the former; and 
that, in every view, the strength of Athens 
must be quite insurmountable. And now also 
the Athenians, who remained of the former 
armament, respired from that dejection of 
spirit into which a series of misfortunes had 
plunged them. 

Demosthenes, after taking a view of the 
present posture of affairs, thought it absolutely 
necessary to avoid delays, and keep clear of 
those errors which had done so much prejudice 
to Nicias : for Nicias, at his first appearance, 
struck an universal consternation ; and yet, by 
declining the immediate attack of Syracuse, 
and loitering a whole winter away at Catana, 
he became an object of contempt; and Gylip-. 
pus had time to land a succour from Pelopon- 
nesus, which disconcerted all his measures. 
That succour, however, the Syracusans could 
never have sent for, had Nicias assaulted them 
on his first approach ; for, deluding themselves 
with the thought that they were a match for 
their foes, they would have found, by sad ex- 
perience, that they had indulged a cruel mis- 
take, and must the same moment have been 
invested on all sides : and, in such a state, 
though they had invited those succours, yet no 
effectual relief could have been obtained from 
them. 

Demosthenes, therefore, reflecting on these 
past mistakes, and sensible that he himself 
this very moment, on the first day of his ar 



YEAR XIX.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



275 



rival appeared most terrible in the eyes of the 
enemy, resolved without loss of time to im- 
prove the present consternation which his re- 
inforcement had struck amongst them. He 
farther took notice, the counterwork of the Sy- 
racusans, by which the Athenians had been ex- 
cluded from perfecting their circumvallation, 
consisted only of a single wall ; and, in case 
the heights of Epipolae could again be regained, 
with the camp which at first had been occupied 
there, that work might easily be carried, since 
the defendants could not now be able to with- 
stand the Athenian strength ; — he determined 
therefore to put this project in execution ; 
judging that, in case it succeeded, it would be 
a means of bringing the war to a speedy con- 
clusion : for, if the scheme took place, the sur- 
render of Syracuse must soon follow ; at worst 
he would draw off the army, and not waste the 
lives of those Athenians who were employed 
in this service, and the strength of the whole 
state, to no manner of purpose. 

Now, therefore, the Athenians began to act 
offensively ; and, in the first place, sallying out 
from their camp, they ravaged the country along 
the banks of the Anapus, and were now. again, 
as on the first approach, masters without con- 
trol both by land and sea; for in neither 
element durst the Syracusans any longer come 
out to check their motions, abating what 
small resistance was made by the cavalry and 
darters from Olympiseum. 

In the next place, Demosthenes thought 
proper to try what could be done against the 
works of the enemy by the help of machines. 
But, when, upon applying them, those ma- 
chines were fired by the Syracusans, who from 
the top of their works made a gallant defence ; 
and, though the army attacked in several 
quarters at once, they were every where re- 
pulsed ; he determined to waste no longer time 
upon the trial ; but, having prevailed with 
Nicias and his other colleagues in command 
to assent to the scheme he had formed to re- 
cover Epipolae, he proceeded to put it in exe- 
cution. Yet, by daylight, it was judged im- 
possible for them either to march or to mount 
the ascent without being discovered. Upon 
this, having issued out his orders, that every 
man should take with him subsistence for five 
days, and that all masons and carpenters should 
attend the march, with proper store of missive 
weapons, and all needful materials for rais- 
ing new works in case the attempt was suc- 



cessful, he put himself, about the first sleep, at 
the head of the whole army, and, assisted by 
Eurymedon and Menander, marched towards 
Epipolae. But Nicias was left behind in the 
intrenchments. 

When now they were advanced to the pass 
of Euryalus, by which the first army gained 
formerly the ascent, they are yet undiscovered 
by the Syracusan guards ; and, mounting the 
heights, surprise the fort which was there man- 
ned by the Syracusans, and slaughter some of 
the defendants. But the majority flying amain 
towards the camps, of which there were three 
among the advanced intrenchments of Epipolae, 
(one of Syracusans, a second of other Sicilians, 
and a third of the confederates,) they spread 
the alarm, and also notified the enemy's ap- 
proach to the six hundred Syracusans, who at 
first were selected for the guard of this quarter 
of Epipolae. These sallied out instantly to stop 
their progress ; and Demosthenes, with his 
Athenians, falling in with them, put them to 
flight, after they had made a gallant stand. 
Upon this success, they immediately pushed 
forwards, that they might improve the present 
ardour of the soldiers to the immediate comple- 
tion of those points for which they had made 
this bold attempt. Another party, which had 
been advancing all along without a check, sur- 
prised the counterwork of the Syracusans ; of 
which, since abandoned by its defendants, they 
were throwing down the battlements. 

But now the Syracusans, and their confede- 
rates, and Gylippus with the body under his 
command, marched out of their intrench- 
ments : yet, having been attacked in so daring 
a manner amidst the darkness of the night, 
they had not recovered their surprise when 
they fell in with the Athenians ; and thus, not 
able to stand the first shock, they were obliged 
to give way for a time. But, as the, Athenians 
pushed forwards with great irregularity, as if 
the victory was quite their own ; eager, farther, 
to make themselves masters of all the tract 
not yet cleared of the enemy, for fear lest, 
should they slacken in their ardour, the ene- 
my might have time to rally in a body, 
— the Boeotians first put a stop to their ca- 
reer ; and, rushing boldly upon them, rout- 
ed and put them to flight. By this turn the 
Athenians were thrown into so much disorder 
and confusion, that the particulars which fol- 
lowed cannot easily be gathered, neither from 
themselves nor their antagonists: for, even 



276 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book vn. 



in daylight, when objects are clearest to the 
sight, men present in a battle are not able to 
see all that passcth ; each single combatant 
can barely relate what happened about his own 
person. When, therefore, armies engage amidst 
the darkness of the night (though this is the 
only instance of it between powerful armies 
in the present war,) how is it possible to come 
at the knowledge of the several incidents 1 
The moon indeed shone at this time ; but 
then they only saw one another as objects ap- 
pear by moon-light, so as to discern the appear- 
ance of human bodies, but not to distinguish 
between friends and enemies. The heavy- 
armed, farther, numerous on both sides, were 
too much crowded for want of room. One party 
of the Athenians was already clearly defeated ; 
another, unbroken by the first attack upon 
them, was pushing forwards. Of the remain- 
der of their army, a great part had already 
mounted the ascent; yet some were still 
busied in mounting up ; but none of these, 
when they were got upon the eminence, knew 
which way to advance : for, before them (as 
the rout was begun) there was one grand 
medley of confusion, and the tumult was so loud 
that no sounds could be distinctly heard. The 
Syracusans and their confederates were ani- 
mating one another with loud exultations (for 
the season of the night made all signals useless) 
to complete the blow, and were clearing before 
them all that came in their way : but the Athe- 
nians were prying about for one another, and 
regarded every thing they met, even though 
they fell in with their own friends, as the flight 
was now begun, for an assured enemy. Ob- 
liged, farther, by frequent iterations, to demand 
the word, as the only method to distinguish 
one another, (all calling out aloud for it at the 
same instant of time,) they heightened the 
general distraction, and clearly discovered their 
own word to the enemy. But then they had 
tiot equal opportunities to discover that of the 
enemy ; because, as the latter were now the 
victors and kept more in bodies, it was less 
liable to detection. Hence it came to pass, 
that, though a stronger party of the Athenians 
fell in with a weaker party of their foes, yet 
thoy judged it best to fly ; because they were 
sensible that their own word was divulged ; 
and, as they could not return the word of the 
Syracusans, they must unavoidably be cut to 
pieces. But what had the greatest cflTect, and 
did most hurt to the Athenians, was the sing- 



ing the pjcan ; since that used on both sides, 
being nearly the same, raised the utmost con- 
fusion. And, when the Argivcs and Corcy- 
reans, and all others of Doric descent, who were 
with the Athenians, began from time to time 
their paian, it struck the same alarm into the 
Athenians as when the enemy themselves sang 
it : so that, in short, falling in amongst one 
another in diflerent quarters of the army, when 
once the confusion was rose to a height, (friends 
against friends, and citizens against fellow- 
citizens,) they not only impress a reciprocal 
terror, but proceed to blows with so much 
fury that they could not easily be parted. 
The pursuit was briskly followed ; in which 
many of them, plunging headlong down the 
precipices, were dashed in pieces, because the 
pass downwards from EpipoliB was too narrow 
for their numbers. But, of those who from 
the heights got down into the plain, many, 
and all in general who came in the first arma- 
ment, since better experienced in the country^ 
escaped in safety to the camp : whereas, of 
the last comers, some, straggling into by-ways, 
were bewildered in a country to which they 
were utter strangers, and at break of day were 
cut to pieces by the Syracusan horse, who 
scoured the plains. 

On the day following, the Syracusans erected 
two trophies on Epipolae ; one on the summit 
of the pass, and the other where the Boeotians 
first stopped the enemy's progress. The Athe- 
nians also obtained a truce, to fetch off their 
dead ; the number of which was large,' both 
in their own troops and those of their allies ; 
and yet more arms were taken by the enemy 
than bore proportion to the slain : for, of the 
number of light-armed who were pushed to 
the brink of the precipices, and, throwing 
away their shields, were obliged to leap down, 
though some perished by the fall, yet others 
escaped with life. 

But, after this, the Syracusans, highly ani- 
mated again with this fresh unexpected turn 
in their favour, sent out Sicanus, at the head 
of fifteen sail, to Agrigentum, now embroiled 
in a sedition, with orders to exert the utmost 
of his power to reduce it to their obedience, 
Gylippus also made once more the tour of 
Sicily, to levy another army ; confident that, 
with such a reinforcement, he could carry the 



> Plutarch puts it at two thouiiand ; but Diodorus Si- 
culus says it was two titousand Ave hundred. 



YEAR XIX.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



277 



very intrenchments of the enemy by storm, 
since affairs had taken such a favourable turn 
on Epipolae. 

In the meantime, the Athenian generals 
were employed in the needful consultations 
since the last misfortune and the present uni- 
versal dejection of their troops. They saw 
that all their attempts were blasted by ill suc- 
cess and that the soldiers were chagrined at 
the.fontinuance of so fruitless a service : for a 
sickness spread amongst their people from a 
double cause ; from the present season of the 
year, in which the human body is most subject 
to disorders, and the marshy unwholesome 
ground on which they were encamped ; besides 
that, in every respect, their situation appeared 
desperate and quite beyond the power of re- 
dress. 

The opinion of Demosthenes was therefore 
totally repugnant to a longer continuance be- 
fore Syracuse. He urged " the immediate 
execution of the scheme he had formed before 
he made the late dangerous attempt upon 
Epipolae ; which since it had miscarried 
they should no longer protract their departure, 
whilst yet the season of the year was proper 
for their voyage homewards, and they had 
strength enough in the last reinforcement to 
force their passage in spite of the enemy." 
He affirmed, <' It would be more conducive 
to the public welfare to turn their arms 
against those who were erecting fortifications 
within Attica itself, than against the Syracusans, 
whose reduction now was almost impractica- 
ble ; and that it was madness to persist any 
longer in a siege which dissipated the wealth 
of the state in fruitless vain expenses." In 
this manner Demosthenes declared his senti- 
ments. 

As for Nicias, though convinced within him- 
self that their affairs were in a bad situation, yet 
he was unwilling with his own mouth to confess 
their low condition, or that a departure should 
be fixed by the general votes of a public council, 
where all that passed must be reported to 
the enemy ; because, should the determina- 
tion be formed in this manner, the execution 
could not go forwards without the enemy's 
privity. Besides, as he knew the state of the 
enemy somewhat more perfectly than others, 
he imagined there were grounds to hope that 
the state of the latter would soon become worse 
than their own, would they only continue to 
press the siege. A want of supplies must 



soon reduce them to great straits ; and this the 
sooner, as, by the accession of the last squa- 
dron, themselves were now again masters of 
the sea. And, what is more, in Syracuse itself 
there was a party which wished to see the city 
fall into their hands. These had despatched 
their agents to Nicias, and insisted he should 
not quit the siege. Yet, thus enlightened as 
he was, in reality he knew not how to act, ^s 
his mind was balanced between two measures, 
which equally required mature deliberation- 
But, for the present, he openly declared him 
self in council against drawing off the army 
He told them, '< he was perfectly well assured 
that the Athenians would never forgive him, 
should he carry their troops from Sicily with- 
out peremptory orders ; that the affair would 
not then lie under the cognizance of such as 
here advised it, and with their own eyes were 
convinced of the necessity of such a step ; but 
of men who would form their judgments upon 
the spiteful calumniations of others, and the 
influence some malicious demagogues would 
have over their understandings, by which their 
fate would be determined." He farther repre- 
sented, that " many, nay, the greater part of 
the soldiers, who now formed the troops, and 
make such tragical outcries about the perils that 
environ them at present, would change their 
notes so soon as they were landed again at 
Athens, and ascribe their return to the treach- 
ery and corruption of their commanders." For 
such reasons, he declared, " as he was well 
acquainted with Athenian tempers, he would 
choose, rather than be undone at Athens by 
base criminations and an unjust sentence, to 
hazard the last extremity, and perish, if so it 
must be, under the violence of the enemy." 
He maintained, however, that " the state of 
the Syracusans was worse than their own. 
The demand upon them for the pay of foreign- 
ers was large ; their expenses in securing the 
outworks of Syracuse were high ; they had now 
supported a large navy for the space of an en- 
tire year ; want therefore must soon come 
upon them, and they must shortly be totally 
distressed ; because the sum o^ two thousand 
talents' they had already expended of their own 
stock, and had even contracted a large debt 
beside. And, in case they abate of their pre- 
sent punctuality or making good the appoint- 
ments of the forces they have on foot, their 



1 387,500/. sterling. 



278 



PELOPOXNESIAN WAR. 



[book vii. 



strength must moulder away ; since it consisted, 
not like the Athenians, of troops which must 
serve, but of such as were only discretionary 
aids." He concluded with " the necessity they 
lay under, from the ties of duty, to continue 
the siege with vigour, and by no means expose 
a superior strength to ruin, through a false 
presumption that they were inferior in point of 
supplies." 

IVicias expressed himself on this occasion 
with an air of neat confidence, as a person per- 
fectly well acquainted with the state of Syra- 
cuse and the failure of money there, and be- 
cause there was a party within the city which 
acted in favour of the Athenians, and had 
advised him, by their agents, '• by no means to 
raise the siege." And, what is more, he placed 
a stronger dependence now upon the fleet than 
ever he had done before the late unsuccessful 
engagement. 

As to the proposal of continuing the siege, 
Demosthenes would not yield the least degree 
of attention to it : " If the army must not eva- 
cuate Sicily without a peremptory order from 
Athens, but must persist in this destructive 
service, he judged it would be better to draw 
them off to Thapsus or to Cat&na, where they 
might find opportunity enough to make incur- 
sions with the land army upon the territories 
of the enemy, and, by committing devastations, 
might highly distress them. Their fleet might 
then engage in the open sea; not in a space 
confined and straitened, which was the greatest 
advantage to the enemy, but in sufliicient sea- 
room, where all their superior skill might 
fairly be exerted, where they would be able to 
make their attacks, and bear down again upon 
the foe with greater agility, and more violent 
shocks, than could be done in the limitary space 
of a close pent-up harbour. Upon the whole, 
he affirmed, that his consent should never be 
given to a longer continuance in their present 
posts, but he was for moving off with all possi- 
ble expedition, and they had not a moment to 
lavish upon delay." 

Eurymedon then declared that his sense of 
things coincided with that of Demosthenes ; 
and, Nicias persisting in the contrary opinion, 
a fit of languor and suspense ensued, attended 
with the secret imagination that the positive- 
ness of Nicias resulted from some stronger 
hopes of success he had conceived above his 
colleagues. And in this manner the Atheni- 



ans fell into dilatory measures, and continued 
in their camp before Syracuse. 

But in this interval Gylippus and Sicanus 
returned to Syracuse : Sicanus, truly disap- 
pointed of Agrigentum, for he was advanced 
no farther than Gela when the sedition in fa- 
vour of the Syracusans was brought to an ami- 
cable period ; but then Gylippus was returned 
at the head of a numerous body, consisting of 
levies made in Sicily, and the heavy-;.. ^ned 
troops from Peloponnesus, who in the spring 
had put to sea on board the transport, but came 
i over last from Africa to Selinus ; for into 
I Africa they had been driven by contrary' winds; 
and, having there been furiiished by the Cyre- 
neans with two triremes and a set of pilots, as 
they coasted along the African shore, they re- 
lieved the Evesperitae, then blocked up by the 
Libyans. The latter they defeated in a set 
battle ; and, proceeding from thence along the 
shore, they reached Neapolis, a Carthaginian 
mart, from whence lies the shortest cut to 
Sicily, being only a passage of two days and a 
night. Hence therefore they stood across, and 
landed at Selinus. 

With this accession of strength, the Syracu- 
sans instantly prepared to attack the Athe- 
nians again both by land and sea. But the 
Athenian generals, — finding they had received 
so large an augmentation, and that the posture 
of their own aflfairs was so far from being 
changed for the better, that day after day it 
grew worse in every respect, and, what was 
worst of all, that their troops were quite ex- 
hausted with fatigue and sickness, — they re- 
pented now in earnest that they had not drawn 
off in time ; and, as Nicias now no longer op- 
posed that step with the same vehemence as he 
had done before, but merely endeavoured that 
it should not be determined in public council, 
they issued out orders, with the utmost secre- 
cy, that the whole armament should hold them- 
selves in readiness to put to sea upon a signal 
given. But, all things now ready, the very 
moment they arc going to embark, the moon is 
eclipsed, for it was now the time of the full. 
The bulk of the army, struck with the awful 
appearance, call out upon the generals to halt ; 
and Nicias, always addicted too much to super- 
stition and such vulgar scruples, positively de- 
clared, that " it should no more be debated 
whether they should remove or not, till the 
three times nine days were past which the 



YEAR XIX.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



279 



soothsayers prescribe on such occasions." So, 
for this reason, a longer stay was forced upon 
the Athenians who had been too dilatory al- 
ready.' 

The Syracusans, who had soon an intelli- 
gence of their designs, were now more animated 
than ever to press briskly on the Athenians, as on 
men who had given proof of their own inward 
conviction that they were no longer a match 

» That tlip bulk of an army or a fleet sliould be fright- 
ened at such appearances, is no wonder at all : they are 
ever ignorant ; and the most daring of them in other 
respects have been much addicted to superstition. But 
one cannot help being surprised at the ignorance and 
superstition of Nicias; one cannot lielp pitying and de- 
ploring the foible of a man who had so good a heart. 
Plutarch expatiates largely on this occasion. "Even 
the vulgar," says he, " at this time were well apprised 
that an eclipse of the sun was often occasioned, about 
the time of the change, by an interposition of the moon: 
but, as to the moon, by the interposition of what body, 
and how on a sudden, at the full, its light fades away or 
emits variety of colour, was not easy for them to con- 
ceive. They thought it a strange occurrence, and sent 
from God as a prognostic of great calamities. The first 
person who wrote a clear and bold solution of the en- 
lightening and obscuration of the moon, was Anaxago- 
ras, who now had not been long dead ; nor was his ac- 
count in every body's hands, but concealed, imparted 
only to a few, and that with caution and assurances of 
secrecy. The world could not bear that naturalists and 
meteormongers, as they were then styled, should seem 
to restrain the divine power by quaint argumentations, 
invisible operations, and necessary consequences. For 
such attempts Protagoras was banished ; and Pericles, 
with much ado, procured the release of Anaxagoras 
when thrown into prison. Nay, Socrates, who never 
meddled with any of these points, was however put to 
death upon the charge of philosophizing. It was not 
till late that the glory of Plato shone abroad ; who, by 
his irreproachable life, and subjecting natural necessi 
ties to a divine and sovereign power, cleared away all 
bad imputations from studies of this kind, and, by a ma- 
thematical beginning, opened a field to other sciences. 
And thus his friend Dion, at what time he was setting 
sail from Zacynthus against Dionysius, was not at all 
disheartened by an eclipse of the moon, but landed safe 
at Syracuse, and ejected the tyrant. It was the misfor- 
tune of Nicias, at this juncture, not to have even a skil- 
ful soothsayer with him; for his intimate, Stilbides, who 
had cured much of his superstition, had died a little be- 
fore; since this portent, as Philochorus says, was not 
a bad one, but an excellent good one, for a flying army ; 
since actsj which are accompanied with fear stand in 
need of concealment, and light is ever an adversary to 
them. Besides, after eclipses of the sun or moon, it was 
the usual custom, as Autoclides hath informed us, to 
hold only a three days' cessation from business. But 
Nicias persuaded himself that a comlpete revolution of 
the moon ought to bo waited for ; as if with his own 
eyes he had not seen her shine bright again, when she 
had passed the shadow and the earth's interposition. 
Yet, throwing up all attention to other points, he mind- 
ed nothing but sacrificing, till his enemies attacked 
him." — Life of J^iciaa. 



for their foes either by sea or on land ; since, 
with other thoughts, they never could have pro- 
jected a re-embarkation. Apprehensive, at 
the same time, that, should they remove to any 
other quarter of Sicily, they would become 
more difficult of reduction, they saw the ne- 
cessity of engaging them by sea without a mo- 
ment's loss, whilst yet they had an advantage 
in compelling them to fight. Upon this, they 
ordered the complements of men on board 
their ships, and exercised their crews as many 
days as was judged sufficient. But, when op- 
portunity offered of acting with advantage, on 
the first day they assaulted the Athenian in- 
trenchments ; and, a party of heavy-armed and 
horsemen, though not numerous, sallying out 
at some of the ports to beat them off, they cut 
off some of the heavy-armed from the rest of 
that party, and, having put them to flight, fol- 
low the pursuit. As the spot, farther, on 
which the assault is made, was narrow, the 
Athenians lose seventy horses and a small 
number of their heav^-^-armed. Nothing more 
happened on this day, as the army of the Syra- 
cusans now made their retreat. 

But, on the day following, they stand out 
with their fleet,^ to the number of seventy-six 
ships ; and, at the same time, the land army 
marched up to the intrenchments. The Athe- 
nians launched out, with fourscore and six, to 
give them a reception ; and thus, charging one 
another, an engagement ensued. Eurymedon 
commanded the right wing of the Athenian 
fleet, and endeavoured to over-reach and sur- 
round the ships of the enemy. For this pur- 
pose, he opened his line, and stood along too 
close to the land ; which gave the Syracusans 
and their allies, who had now defeated the 
centre of the Athenians, an opportunity to in- 
tercept him in the bottom and recess of the 
harbour, where they slay Eurymedon himself, 
and destroy the ships which had separated in 
his company : and, this done, they gave chase 
to the whole Athenian fleet, and drove them 
ashore. 

a Plutarch adds, that, "on thisoccasion, the very lads 
came out in fishing-boats and skifts, taunting and in- 
sulting the Athenians. One of these lads, Heraclides, 
of a no')le family, who had advanced too near, was in 
great danger of being intercepted by an Athenian vessel. 
But Pollichus, the uncle of the lad, alarmed for his safe- 
ty, charged instantly with the ten triremes he had un- 
der his command. The rest of the Syracusan fleet, now 
alarmed for Pollichus, ran in at once, and brought on a 
general engagement." — Life nf Jficias. 



280 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book vn. 



Gylippus now, perceiving that the ships of 
the enemy were defeated and drove aground 
quite wide of the piles and their camp, formed 
instantly a design to make slaughter of the 
men as they were leaping on shore, and of giv- 
ing the Syracusans an opportunity easily to 
draw off all the ships from land of which they 
were entire masters. At the head, therefore, 
of one division of the laud-force, he marched 
down to the pier to second the fleet. The 
Tyrrhenes happened to have been posted near- 
est by the Athenians ; who, seeing a body of 
the enemy running down thither in a disorderly 
manner, advanced eargerly to meet them ; and, 
charged briskly on the van, put them to flight 
and drive them into the lake of Lysimelia. 
But, soon after, a reinforcement of Syracusans 
and their allies coming up, the Athenians also 
advanced with speed to succour their friends, 
and, trembling for their ships, soon came to an 
engagement with them, and, after routing, pur- 
sued them amain. They slaughtered now a 
great number of the heavy-armed ; and, what 
was more, preserved the far greater part of their 
fleet, and towed again to their former moorings 
all their ships, except eighteen, which the Sy- 
racusans and their allies made prizes, and put 
all the men on board them to the sword. With 
a view, farther, to destroy the rest by setting 
them on fire, they filled an old transport ship 
with facines and combustible matter, and, as 
the wind blew right upon the Athenians, set 
her on fire, and let her drive in amongst them. 
The Athenians, trembling for the ships, put 
all their engines instantly at work to ex- 
tinguish the flames ; which having at length 
effectuated, and kept this fire-ship clear of 
their own vessels, they were delivered from 
this imminent danger. 

After this the Syracusans erected a trophy 
for their victorious engagement on the water, 
and for the interception of the party of the 
heavy-armed before the intrenchmcnts, where 
they had taken so many horses. The Athe- 
nians also did the same, for the repulse given 
by the Tyrrhenes to the land-forces of the ene- 
my, and their being chased into the lake, and 
the larger success they afterwards obtained 
with the rest of their array. 

But now, when, beyond the reach of doubt, 
the Syracusans, though at first alarmed at the 
large reinforcement of shipping brought against 
them by Demosthenes, had gained a signal 
victory by sea, the Athenians were plunged 



into a total dejection of spirit: they were 
thunder-struck by the reverse of misfortunes so 
little expected ; and began to repent, with 
much more bitterness of thought, that they had 
ever engaged in so fatal an expedition. They 
had invaded states, whose polity was already 
of a piece with their own, whose form of 
government was popular, like that of Athens, 
and which flourished in shipping, in horses, 
and each article of power : and yet, finding 
themselves unable to give any measure of 
success to their projects by introducing dissen- 
sions amongst them through political embroil- 
ments, nor even by a powerful force, superior 
to that of their foes, able to ward off the many 
blows they had received, they had fallen before- 
hand into great anxieties ; -and now, sadly 
beaten as they were at sea, one thought of 
which they never could hitherto have conceived, 
their despondency became more violent than 
ever. 

From this time the Syracusans scoured the 
whole harbour without having any thing to fear. 
They had also formed a scheme of barring up 
its mouth ; that the Athenians, though never 
so intent upon it, might for the future not have 
it in their power to steal away. Their care 
and diligence were no longer employed on the 
view alone of their own preservation, but on the 
larger view of ruining the Athenians. They 
concluded, and justly too, that the latter turns 
in their favour had given them the ascendant 
over these invaders : and, could they but com- 
pass the total overthrow of this body of Athe- 
nians and their allies, the grand achievement 
would strike all Greece with admiration. Nay 
more, all other Grecians must reap the fruits of 
such success ; of whom some would in an in- 
stant recover freedom, and others be delivered 
from the fear of losing it ; for the remaining 
strength of Athens would never be able to 
stand against that weight of war with which 
she must be soon encompassed about. And 
thus, could they (Syracusans) be the glorious 
authors of such desirable events, they must 
infallibly become objects of wonder not only to 
all the present age, but to latest posterity. 
And of a truth, considered in such a light, it 
was great and glorious ambition, to aim at the 
conquest, not only of the Athenians, but also 
of their whole extensive and combined alliance ; 
and this, not merely to earn laurels for them- 
selves, but for the auxiliaries also who had 
engaged in their cause, since, exposed in tlio 



YEAR XIX.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR 



281 



front of the war with the Lacedemonians 
and Corinthians, they had subjected their own 
state to the fury of a storm which threatened 
them all, and, by their own personal valour in 
naval engagements, had contributed most to 
such a height of success. 

The various people, now got together at 
this one city of Syracuse, were so very numer- 
ous, as to be exceeded only by the comprehen- 
sive roll of those who, in the series of the 
present war, sided either with the states of 
Athens or Sparta. The catalogue is subjoined 
of those, who mustered in the offensive and de- 
fensive armies at Syracuse ; who fought against 
or in behalf of Sicily ; who joined for the re- 
duction or preservation of this island, not so 
much from just and lawful motives, or a con- 
currence resulting from the ties of blood, as 
from policy, or interest, or direct compulsion. 

The Athenians, truly, in quality of lonians, 
had voluntarily come hither against the Syra- 
cusans, who were Dorians ; attended by those 
who spoke the same dialect and used the same 
institutions with themselves, the Lemnians, 
and Imbrians, and those -^ginetae who were 
the present possessors of -^gina. The Hes- 
tiasans, farther, now inhabiting Hestiaea in 
Euboea, as an Athenian colony, had joined in 
the expedition. Of the remaining numbers, 
some came along with them because they were 
dependents : some, though independent, be- 
cause they were confederates ; and some there 
were who attended merely for their pay. The 
dependents and tributaries were the Eretrians, 
and Chalcideans, and St3^rensians, and Carys- 
tians, from Euboea ; from the islands, the 
Ceans, and Andrians, and Teians ; from Ionia, 
the Milesians, and Samians, and Chians ; of 
these the Chians, being not subjected to a 
tribute, but only to furnish a quota of shipping, 
though independent at home, yet followed their 
arms. And all these hitherto recited were 
lonians and Athenian colonies, excepting the 
Carystians, for these last are Dryopes ; but, as 
subjected to Athens, not so much from choice 
as lonians, as by mere compulsion, they now 
followed their masters against Dorians. To 
these were added JSolians ; the Methymneans, 
for instance, who were to furnish shipping, but 
were exempted from tribute ; the Tcnedians, 
farther, and -^nians, who were tributaries ; 
but these, being Cohans, were now compelled 
to fight against other u3^olians ; namely, their 
own founders, the Boeotians, who adhered to 
43 



the Syracusans. The Platieans did the same, 
and were the only Boeotians that acted iagainst 
Boeotians upon the justifiable pretext of lasting 
enmity. The Rhodians, farther, and Cythe- 
rians attended, though both of Doric descent: the 
Cytherians, truly, who are a Lacedaemonian colo- 
ny, bore arms at this juncture on the Athenian 
side, against the Lacedaemonians under the 
command of Gylippus ; and the Rhodians, 
Argives by descent, were obliged to turn their 
arms against the Doric Syracusans; nay, against 
the Geloans, a colony of their own, now acting 
in concert with the Syracusans. Of the people 
of the isles on the coast of Peleponnesus came 
the Cephallenians and Zacynthians ; indepen- 
dent, in fact, but through their situation, con- 
trolled in some measure by the Athenians, who 
are masters of the sea. The Corcyreans, far- 
ther, who were not only of Doric, but, what is 
more, were even of Corinthian original, as 
being a colony of the latter, and by blood allied 
to the former, from compulsion, as they gave 
out for a colour, though in truth from deliberate 
malice, since opposing the Corinthians, whom 
they hated, followed the Athenians with an 
ardour inferior to none. The Messenians also, 
now styled Messenians of Naupactus, and those 
from Pylus, which was still held by the Athe- 
nians, were brought along to the war ; to whom 
must be added a small party of Megarean 
exiles, who by a sad reverse of fortune now 
took part against the Selinuntians, who were 
also Megarean. The residue of the confede- 
rates were engaged rather upon free and spon- 
taneous choice. The Argives, for instance, 
not more from obligations of subsisting treaties, 
than the rancour they bore the Lacedaemonians, 
and the gratification of private spleen, though 
Doric, yet followed the Ionic Athenians against 
their Doric kindred. But the Mantineans and 
the rest of the Arcadians, who were mercenaries, 
and eternally habituated to act against any foe 
pointed out to them, were now so far influenced 
by gain as to regard those Arcadians as their 
enemies, who came over on this occasion in 
company with the Corinthians. The Cretans 
also and .^tolians were there, allured by an 
advantageous pay ; and thus it happened that 
the Cretans, who, in concert with the Rhodi- 
ans, had founded Gela, readily took part, for 
the sake of gain, not with but against a colony 
which themselves had planted. There was 
also a body of Acarnanian auxiliaries, partly 
induced to join by the pay they received, but 
2F 



282 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book VII. 



principall}' by theif personal regard for De- 
mosthenes and their attachment to the Athe- 
nians. And thus have we run them over to 
the utmost boundary of the Ionian gulf. Of 
the Italic nations, the Thurians, and those 
Metapontians whom intestine feuds had reduced | 
to the necessity of fighting for subsistence, ! 
joined their arms; and, of the Sicilian, the 
Naxians, and Cataneans ; of barbarian, the 
^gesteans, who were the first movers of this 
grand contention, and the major part of the 
Siculi ; and, out of Sicily, some of the Tyr- 
rhenes, from enmity to the Syracusans, and the 
mercenary lapygians. So many nations were 
assembled together at present under the com- 
mand of the Athenians. 

The auxiliaries, on the side of the Syracu- 
sans, were the Camarineans, who bordered 
close upon them, and the Geloans, who are 
situated next the Camarineans. To proceed 
regularly : as the Agrigentines were neutral, 
the Selinuntians next occur, who are seated 
beyond the Agrigentines, since they inhabit 
that tract of the island which faceth Afric. 
Then the Himereans, the only Grecian people 
who inhabit that part of the island which lies 
off the Tyrrhene sea, and were the only body 
which came from thence to the aid of Syracuse. 
The several nations of Greek descent settled 
in Sicily, being all Doric, and independent, 
acted together in concert. Of the barbarous 
people they had those Siculi alone who did not 
openly revolt to the Athenians ; but, out of 
Sicily, the Lacedsemonians sent them a citizen 
of Sparta to command, and a body of Neoda- 
mades and Helots. By a Neodamas is meant a 
citizen newly enfranchised. The Corinthians 
alone aided them both with shipping and a 
land force, in conjunction with the Leucadians 
and Ambraciots, by blood allied to Syra- 
cuse. From Arcadia also came a body of 
mercenaries, sent by the Corinthians ; and the 
Sicyonians, who acted on compulsion ; and 
of those who dwell without the Peloponnesus 
were the Boeotians. But, beside these fo- 
reign aids, the Sicilians, as possessed of great 
and powerful cities, furnished out in all re- 
spects a much greater and well-appointed force ; 
for by them a numerous body of heavy-armed, 
of ships, and horses, and other kinds of mili- 
tary force, in an amazing abundance, were 
raised and brought to Syracuse. And yet it 
must be said, that the domestic force of the 
Syracusans was more to be considered than all 



the rest, from the greatness of their state and 
the immediate urgency of those perils with 
which they were environed. 

These were the aids, the numerous aids, as- 
sembled together by the contending parties; 
and at this juncture all these were present on 
each side of the contest; and from this crisis 
neither party received any accession. 

The Syracusans therefore and their confe- 
derates thought, since the signal victory they 
had gained upon the water, it would be a brave 
exploit, and highly for their glory, to make the 
whole extensive camp of the Athenians theii 
prize, and cut off their retreat on both elements, 
both by land and sea. With this project, they 
immediately barred up the great harbour, the 
mouth of which is about eight stadia' over, 
with a line of triremes placed side by side, and 
other vessels and boats moored fast together by 
anchors ; and got every thing besides in readi- 
ness, in case the Athenians should venture on 
another engagement. Their every view was 
now become large and aspiring. 

When the Athenians saw the harbour thus 
barred up, and perceived, farther, the whole of 
the enemy's designs, it was judged high time 
to go to consultation. The commanders of 
the different bodies were called to council, with 
the generals ; in which, — upon representations 
made " of the great distress to which they 
were reduced, and that they had not a stock of 
provisions ample enough for their immediate 
subsistence, (for, bent on sailing away, they 
had sent already to Catana to countermand any 
fresh convoys,) and, unless they could recover 
their mastery at sea, it would be impracticable 
for the future to obtain a supply," — they came 
to a final resolution, " To quit their intrench- 
ments on the higher ground, and before the 
station of their shipping to raise a circular 
work, of as little compass as possible, but suf- 
ficient to serve for a magazine and hospital, 
and to this only to assign a guard ; as for the 
rest of the land army, they were to oblige every 
soldier to go on board, that all the ships, which 
yet were undamaged, or had been laid up for 
want of hands, might be completely manned ; 
and thus they must fight their passage out of 
the harbour ; and, if it succeeded, make di- 
rectly for Catana ; but, if repulsed, they would 
burn their shipping, and, moving off in one 
body by land, would endeavour, by the mosi 

> Near a mile. 



YEAR XIX.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



283 



expeditious marches, to reach the nearest place 
that would receive them, whether Barbarian or 
Grecian." 

Such was the plan resolved on, and which 
they began immediately to execute ; for now, 
abandoning their upper intrenchments, they 
drew down to the beach, and manned the whole 
of their shipping, on board of which they forced, 
without exception, all such as had youth and 
vigour enough to be of service there. The 
whole number of ships, they were by this means 
enabled to man, amounted to a hundred and 
ten. They also placed on board the fleet a 
large number of archers, the darters of the 
Acarnanians, and other foreign auxiliaries; and 
provided in all other respects for action, as 
well as their condition would permit or the 
nature of the project required. 

When things were thus in great forwardness, 
Nicias, taking notice that the soldiery was 
much dejected by the great defeats, which, 
contrary to their wonted custom, they had re- 
ceived by sea, and yet desirous to hazard an- 
other engagement as soon as possible, because 
pinched for want of necessary subsistence, he 
gathered them all round about himself, and en- 
deavoured to raise their drooping spirits by the 
following exhortation, the first of the kind he 
had ever made : 

" My fellow-soldiers, whether of the Athe- 
nian or the confederate troops ! the bold at- 
tempt we are now going to make is of equal 
concern to each individual amongst us ; since, 
not more for victory over our foes than for the 
preservation of ourselves and our country, we 
are now to fight ; and, if our naval efforts be 
crowned with victory, each of us may again be 
blessed with the sight of his own native city. 
Away, therefore, with these faces of despair, 
this painful dejection, fit only for a raw unex- 
perienced multitude, who, unsuccessful in their 
first attempts, for ever after bid adieu to hope, 
and by unmanly fears anticipate misfortunes ! 

"As for you, Athenians, who form so con- 
siderable a part of this assembly, experienced 
as you are in such variety of warfare ! — and 
you also, our allies, who have ever fought un- 
der our banners ! — recall to your reflection the 
unexpected turns of war ; encourage the hope 
that fortune may at length declare for us, and 
determine once more to engage the foe with a 
spirit, worthy of that numerous strength of 
which by ocular demonstration you see your- 
selves this moment possessed. Those points. 



of which we perceive we may avail ourselves 
against the narrowness of the harbour's mouth, 
against such a multitude of vessels as will be 
crowded together, and against that particular 
disposition of soldiers on their decks, from 
which on the former occasion we suffered so 
much, — all these, I must tell you, are as well 
adjusted as our present condition will permit, 
by the united care of us your generals and your 
own masters : for many archers and darters 
shall now line your decks, and that crowd of 
soldiers, which, when we engage in the open 
sea, we never can use, because the vessels 
would be too heavily laden to allow the proper 
exertion of our skill ; that crowd, I say, in this 
pent-up contracted space, shall give to our 
naval battle the strength and stability of a land 
engagement. We have also devised the proper 
means to compensate the inferior structure of 
our ships; and, in return for the consolidated 
beaks of our enemy, have provided the ships 
with grappling irons, which will hold fast a 
vessel that hath run against you from getting 
clear, provided those on board will perform 
their duty ; because, as necessity enforceth us 
now to fight a mere land battle from our decks, 
it highly concerns us neither to be beat off 
ourselves, nor to suffer them to get clear from 
our grapple ; especially when all the ambient 
shore, excepting the small tract now occupied 
by our own army, is hostile in regard to us. 
Mindful of these things, it behoves you to fight 
it out so long as strength and vigour shall en- 
able you, and never suffer yourselves to be 
driven on»such a shore; but, when once your 
ship hath grappled with a foe, never once to 
think of losing your hold, till you have cleared 
the enemy's decks of all the defendants. But 
these points I give in charge to the heavy- 
armed, not less than to the seamen ; since this 
method of engagement is more particularly 
your province, and since it still remains within 
your power to ea^n a glorious victory, by put- 
ting your land method into practice. But the 
seamen I exhort, and with my exhortations 
mingle my entreaties, not to shrink too much 
under the sensibility of past defeats, as your 
decks are now better armed in all respects than 
they were before, and as the number of the 
shipping is enlarged. Recall the idea of that 
heart-delighting privilege, of which you are 
now to secure the continuance : — to you I 
speak, who, though not of Athenian extrac- 
tion, have hitherto been regarded and honoured 



284 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[nooK VII. 



as Athenians ; and, for speaking well our lan- 
guage, and appropriaiing our manners, have 
been admired through the whole extent of 
Greece, have participated the benefits of our 
large-extended empire, not less than ourselves 
in point of profit, and much more than our- 
selves in striking awe into your vassals, and 
being exempted from the attacks of injustice. 
Since, therefore, you alone have freely shared 
our empire with us, you are bound by all the 
ties of honour, by no means to desert its present 
vindication. Then, in open despite of those 
Corinthians whom you have so often conquer- 
ed, and of those Sicilians not one of whom 
durst look us in the face so long as the vigour of 
our fleet was unimpaired, drive your foes before 
you, and strike into them the plain conviction 
— that your military skill, though strug- 
gling with weakness and misfortunes, is yet 
far superior to all their strength and luck 
united. 

'• But to the native citizens of Athens 
amongst you, I must once more suggest, that 
you have now no longer in your docks such 
another fleet as this, nor have left behind you 
such another body of heavy-armed. If, there- 
fore, your immediate fate be any thing less than 
victory, your enemies will sail and be directly 
at Athens ; and the remainder of our forces 
there will no longer be able to repulse the 
united assaults of their domestic foes and such 
foreign invaders. Nay, the infallible result 
must be, that you at once put on the chains of 
Syracusans, against whom you are conscious 
with what intentions you at first came here, 
whilst your country must be forced to submit 
to a Lacedaemonian bondage. Now, therefore, 
summon all your courage, to earn the day in 
which your own liberty and that of Athens is 
to be the victor's prize : and let each individual 
amongst you, invigorate himself with the 
thought ; nay, let it throw spirit and life into 
the whole army, — that those who are now to 
engage on board this present fleet are the whole 
of the laud and naval force of your country ; 
are the surviving supports of the state, and the 
great name of Athens. In so momentous a 
conflict, whoever amongst you excels in mili- 
tary skill or inward bravery, that person had 
never so fine an opportunity to give demonstra- 
tion of his Rupeiior worth, or to perform a 
great service for himself or for the welfare of 
his country." 

Nicias, after he had finished this earnest ex- 



hortation, ordered them to repair directly to 
their posts on board the fleet. 

As all this hurry of preparation lay within 
their view, Gylippus and the Syracusans could 
not escape the conviction that the Athenians 
were bent on another engagement. They had, 
moreover, received intelligence of the new 
project of the grappling irons. As, therefore, 
they had provided against every thing besides, 
they also made provision to counterwork that 
project. For this purpose, they had covered 
the prows and almost the whole gunnel of their 
ships with hides ; that, when the grapp4ing 
iron was thrown, it might slip off and catch no 
hold. And no sooner were all their preparations 
completed, than the Syracusan generals, in cort- 
cert with Gylippus, animated their men to en- 
gage with resolution, by the following harangue: 

" That your past achievements have been glo- 
rious indeed, and for the acquisition of greater 
honour and glory that you are now on the 
brink of engaging, the generality of you, ye 
Syracusans and confederates, are well cort- 
vinced, and need not at present to be informed ; 
for otherwise you could never have persisted 
so far in this warm career of bravery and suc- 
cess : but, if there be a man amongst you 
whose sense of things drops short of their real 
position, we shall now throw upon it the need- 
ful illustration. 

" This land, our property, the Athenians ha%"e 
invaded ; aiming, in the first place, at enslav- 
ing Sicily ; and, had this design succeeded, at 
inflicting an equal fate on Peloponnesus and 
the rest of Greece. And yet these very 
Athenians, who enjoy already the largest tract 
of empire that any ancient or modern state of 
Greece hath at any time enjoyed, yon are the 
first who have bravely resisted; and of that 
navy, on which they erected their encroaching 
pile of power, are plainly the victors in several 
engagements ; as again, in that which now ap- 
proacheth, you will assuredly beat them. For 
men who have received such severe checks in 
a point for which they so highly plumed then>- 
selves, will for the future have a much worse 
opinion of their own merit than if thoy had 
never conceived so high a value of it ; and 
when all their towering pretensions are so un- 
expectedly blasted, their subsequent efforts 
must of course drop short of their real 
strength : and this, you may rest assured, is 
the present state of yonder Athenians. And 
by parity, in regard to ourselves, that propof- 



YFAR XIX.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



285 



tion of strengtli we enjoyed at first, with 
which, though far inferior in skill, we boldly 
and successfully presumed to withstand them, 
must now be suitably enlarged ; and, with the 
farther accession of this inward assurance, that 
we are really the best, since we have beat the 
best seamen in the world, our hopes of success 
are in every light redoubled ; and then human 
experience teacheth us, that, in every competi- 
tion, the warmest hope is ever accompanied 
with the greatest resolution. 

<' But farther, those late alterations which 
they have introduced among their shipping, in 
order to equalize and balance ours, have been 
a long time familiar to our own practice ; and 
each of their new preparations we shall dex- 
terously improve to our own advantage : for 
when, contrary to the long and inveterate dis- 
cipline of their fleet, there are crowded together 
upon their decks a numerous body of heavy- 
armed, as well as another numerous body of 
mere terra firma darters, as they may properly 
be styled, — when thus Acarnanians and other 
landmen are forced on board, who even sitting 
would be unable to poise and direct their wea- 
pons, — how can they avoid endangering their 
vessels ? or, jumbled confusedly together, and 
tottering under motions to which they are not 
inured, how can they escape a total disorder 1 

" What still makes more against them, the 
multitude of their shipping will only serve the 
more to embarrass them ; and let this dispel 
the fears of those who may be afraid of en- 
gaging against their superior numbers ; for a 
multitude of ships in a contracted space will 
be more slow in executing orders, and are at 
the same time most easily exposed to the 
annoyance which our preparations are contrived 
to give them. And now attend to the true 
and real situation of the foe, as from good in- 
telligence we are enabled clearly to declare it to 
you. 

" Environed on all sides with misfortunes, 
and distressed in a present want of the neces- 
saries of life, they are become quite desperate : 
and hence, though they have resigned all confi- 
dence in their real strength, yet in the fury of 
despair they are throwing themselves upon the 
decision of fortune ; that either, if the passage 
can be forced, they may launch out to sea ; or, 
that project failing, may attempt a retreat by 
land ; — as if to a worse condition than their 
present it were not in the power of fortune to 
reduce them. Warned, therefore, with brave 



resentments, let us also try the encounter 
against such wild confusion, and against the 
fortune of our inveterate foes now treacher- 
ously bent to finish their destruction. Let us 
charge with the full conviction, that on an 
enemy, who would justify their invasion on 
the principle of redressing wrongs, it is most 
fair and equitable to satiate all the fury of re- 
venge ; nay more, that vengeance on a foe is 
an appetite of nature, and commonly said to be 
the sweetest of all human enjoyments. But 
that those men yonder are our foes, our most 
bitter unrelenting foes, you need no farther 
proofs ; since, bent on enslaving this our 
country, they first made the voyage ; and, had 
this their odious project been successful, on 
our citizens they had inflicted the most cruel 
torments, on our wives and children the most 
indecent enormities, and on Syracuse the most 
ignominious appellation. In a work of so just 
retaliation, to indulge a tenderness of mind, or 
to think it gain to let them depart without ad- 
ditional revenge, will be a matter of just re- 
proach ; for the latter is all they will be able 
to effect, even though at length they may be 
victors. But to us, could we execute the fair 
and equitable wishes of our hearts, by inflicting 
upon them the punishment they well deserve, 
and in setting the liberty of all Sicily, as it 
hath been ever enjoyed by us, beyond the reach 
of any future insults, how glorious must such 
achievements be ! for such critical moments of 
adventure are most rarely to be met with ; 
which, if unsuccessful, can do the least disser- 
vice ; but, if successful, draw after them the 
most valuable acquisitions." 

When the Syracusan generals, seconded by 
Gylippus, had finished this their exhortation 
to their own soldiers, they also, in their turn, 
repaired immediately on board their fleet, as 
they found was already done by the Athenians. 

But Nicias, whose mind was surcharged with 
present cares, sensible how extreme the danger, 
and how nearly approaching, since this very 
moment they were only not in motion ; and once 
more reflecting, that, as generally happens in 
affairs of such prodigious moment, some points 
might yet be left imperfect, something of en- 
ergy, and weight, and influence, be yet left un- 
said; he called out again upon every single 
captain of the fleet, addressing himself sepa- 
rately to them, with the honourable mention 
of their fathers, themselves, and their tribe ; 
and conjuring each, by his own distinguisbinrg 



286 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book VII. 



splendour, whatever it was, « not now to be- 
tray it, nor tarnish those hereditary virtues on 
which their ancestors had founded their glory ;" 
reminding them earnestly of the uninterrupted 
freedom of their country, and the privilege 
they had ever enjoyed of living in it quite 
free and uncontrolled ; asserting other argu- 
ments, such as with men who had their all so 
much at stake, might have influence and 
weight ; no matter now how trite or hackneyed 
by frequent repetitions, or how equally appli- 
cable to every case, as fetched from the endear- 
ments of their wives, and their offspring, and 
their paternal gods ; such as from every topic, 
in a plunge of horror and distress, are rung in 
the ears of men, as likely to animate and per- 
suade. And thus at last, though fearful that 
not even yet he had said enough, but all that 
the time would permit, he parted from them ; 
and placing himself at the head of the land- 
army, marched down to the beach ; where he 
drew them up in as large a line as they could 
possibly form, that their appearance might 
have the greater effect in emboldening those on 
board the fleet. 

And now Demosthenes, and Menander, and 
Euthydemus, (for these went on board to com- 
mand the fleet,) getting clear from their moor- 
ings, stood away directly towards the barricade 
of the harbour, and that interval of its mouth 
not yet completely barred, in order to clear the 
passage. The Syracusans also and their allies 
had now launched forth against them with their 
usual number of ships. A detachment of these 
were so stationed as to guard the passage ; the 
rest were spread circularly quite round the har- 
bour, that on all sides at once they might at- 
tack the Athenians, and their land army on the 
beach might second them on approaches to the 
shore. The Syracusan fleet was commanded 
by Sicanus and Agatharcus, who were respec- 
tively stationed in each of the wings, whilst Py- 
ihcn and the Corinthians composed the centre. 

When the Athenians were come up to the 
barricade, they ran boldly at it ; and by the 
violence of the first shock they beat off the 
vessels ranged about it, and were intent on 
clearing away the whole barricade. But here, 
the Syracusans and allies falling in amongst 
them from every quarter, a general engagement 
ensued, not only at the barricade, but in every 
part of the harbour. Obstinate it really proved, 
and such a battle as they had never fought 
before. Great, in truth, was the ardour of the 



seamen on both sides, in running upon the 
enemy, whenever the word was given ; and 
great was the art exerted by the officers, in 
attack, and defence, and reciprocal contention. 
The soldiers on board exerted all their efforts, 
that, when ship came close with ship, no 
stretch of military skill should be omitted on 
the hatches. Every individual, abiding firmly 
in his post, strained all his diligence to signalize 
his own behaviour. But, as numerous ships 
were falling in together amongst one another 
in little sea-room, and so large a number never 
fought before in so small a space, (since the 
amount of both fleets fell little short of two 
hundred,) the direct incursions with the beak 
were few, because room was wanting for tacks 
and passages ; but boardings were frequent, as 
the vessels were continually running foul on 
one another, or in sheering off met with others 
which were coming on. And, so long as a 
vessel was in her approach, those on the 
hatches poured plentifully against her whole 
showers of javelins, and arrows, and stones; 
but, when they were once come to grappling, 
the soldiers, closing in firm battalion, endea- 
voured by force to board one another. Nay, 
it most frequently happened, through the strait- 
ness of sea-room, that, the very moment one 
party boarded the enemy, the very same mo- 
ment they were also boarded themselves, as 
two vessels lay often along side of an enemy ; 
nay, sometimes more, by necessity mingled and 
squeezed fast together. In the meantime, the 
care of the officers was not confined to one 
single point, but distracted on all sides by a 
whole round of perils : they were here intent 
on their own defence, and there on the annoy- 
ance of the enemy. And, farther, the prodi- 
gious crash that was made by such a number 
of ships, running at the same instant upon one 
another, struck such dismay and loss of hear- 
ing, that the voices of those who issued out 
orders could no longer be distinguished. Loud, 
besides, were the exhortations and shouts of 
the oflliccrs on both sides, partly in conformity 
to rule, though swelled at present by the ardour 
of contention. Amongst the Athenians it 
was shouted amain — " to force the passage, 
and now or never to exert their utmost stretch 
of bravery to earn a safe return to their native 
country :" — amongst the Syracusans and their 
allies — '< how glorious it would be to hinder 
their escape, and by present victory for every 
one amongst them to increase the growing 



YEAK XIX.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



287 



honours of his country !" The commanders 
also, on both sides, if they saw a vessel drop- 
ping off before it was overpowered by the 
enemy, called out aloud by name on the captain, 
demanding on the Athenian side, " did they 
retire on the wild presumption that yonder 
most hostile shore would prove more friendly 
to them than the open sea, which by long pre- 
scription they had claimed as their own pro- 
vince ?" — But on the Syracusan — " would they, 
who were perfectly assured that the Athenians 
wanted nothing so much as to escape, would 
they fly first from those who were flying ?" 
The land-army, farther, of each party upon 
the beach, whilst yet the battle was alternately 
fluctuating on the water, felt the utmost anxiety 
and the most painful conflict of mind ; earnestly 
bent, as the one domestic party was, " on 
gaining accumulated honours ;" but fearful, as 
the other invading party was become, that 
« their condition might soon become v/orse 
than it was already :" for the whole hope of 
the Athenians centering at present in that fleet, 
their anguish for the event was more acute 
than ever they had felt, and was aggravated by 
their own position on the beach, which gave 
them a clear uninterrupted prospect of all* that 
passed in the battle upon the water. The 
scene was but at a trifling distance from their 
eyes ; and, as the looks of all of them were 
not at the same instant fastened upon the same 
spectacle, if any saw their own party prevailing, 
they grew at once exalted, and immediately 
began an invocation to the gods, that the efforts 
of their friends might be crowned with success ; 
whilst another party, beholding those who were 
vanquished, uttered a loud shriek which ended 
in a groan ; and, by the sight of such aflecting 
turns, were more subdued inspirit than those who 
were actually engaged in this medley of horror. 
Others, farther, who were intent upon a quar- 
ter of the engagement where the event was yet 
in suspense, and no judgment amidst such con- 
fusion could be formed, adjusted the contortions 
of their bodies to their inward fears, and passed 
that interval in extremity of anguish ; for, each 
single moment, they were within a little of 
escaping or being sunk. And thus, in one and 
the same army of Athenians, so long as the 
event was under decision, a whole medley of 
noises was heard together ; — shrieking — shout- 
ing — victory ! — undone! — undone ! — and all 
other sounds, of various import, which, in such 



extremity of danger, a numerous body of men 
may be forced to utter. 

Those, farther, on board, were equally sen- 
sible of all the quick alternatives of passion ; 
till at last, after the battle had for a long time 
been obstinately maintained, the Syracusans 
and allies put the Athenians to open flight ; 
and, plying briskly in the chase, with obstre- 
perous clamour and loud exultations, drove 
them upon the beach. And here, the land-sol- 
diers which had served on board, excepting such 
as had been taken in the deeper water, leap- 
ing in all parts, as they severally could, on the 
shore, run in great confusion for shelter to the 
camp. The army on the beach, with passions 
no longer diversified, but with one and the 
same uniform vehemence, having expressed 
their resentment of the horrible conclusion by 
a loud shriek and a hearty groan, some hurried 
along the beach to succour the shipping ; others 
to defend what yet remained of their intrench- 
ments ; whilst a third party, and the bulk of 
the army, confined their whole care to them- 
selves, and were solely intent on their own 
personal preservation. The horrid consterna- 
tion, in which this moment they were univer- 
sally plunged, was greater than Athenians had 
ever felt before. They suffered now what on 
a former occasion they had made others 
suffer at Pylus. There the Lacedaemonians, 
having first lost their fleet, had the farther 
mortification to see all their gallant Spartans 
in the island undone. And now the desperate 
condition of the Athenians offered no glimmer- 
ing of safety on the land, unless some miracu- 
lous contingency should take place in their 
favour. 

After an engagement so hardy and well 
disputed, after the sinking of a large number 
of ships and the death of numbers on both 
sides, the Syracusans and their allies, who 
were masters of the day, took up the shatters 
and the dead. This being done, they sailed in 
triumph to the city, and erected a trophy. 

But the Athenians, quite sunk with the 
weight of their present misfortunes, never so 
much as once entertained the thought of re- 
covering their shattered vessels or their dead, 
but were contriving how to decamp by favour 
of the approaching night. Demosthenes, upon 
this, repairing to Nicias, declared it as his own 
opinion, that, " manning at once the whole 
number of their vessels, they should exert 



!8S 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book vu. 



their utmost efTorts to force their passage out 
of the harbour early the next dawn ;" affirming 
that " they had still a larger number of shipping 
fit for service than the enemy:" for the Athe- 
nians had yet about sixty left, whereas, those 
of the enemy were under fifty. IVicias came 
into the proposal , but when both joined in 
issuing proper orders for the execution, the 
seamen flatly refused to go on board. Dispi- 
rited as they were by the last great blow, they 
had resigned all hope of ever beating these 
enemies again. No measure now remained 
but a retreat by land, on which the universal 
attention was henceforth employed. 

Hermocrates, the Syracusan, had conceived 
a suspicion that such a step would be taken by 
them ; and, foreseeing what difficulties might 
arise if so large an army should march across 
the country, and, posting themselves afresh 
on Sicilian ground, should again resume their 
spirits and renew the war against Syracuse, he 
waited upon those in authority, and suggested 
to them, that, " they ought not, by any rules 
of policy, to let the enemy steal off by night ; 
(inserting here his own sentiments of the af- 
fair ;) but that all the Syracusans and their 
allies, sallying out in a body, should pre- 
occupy and secure the roads, and in good time 
beset and put strong guards in all the passes." 
The magistrates were sensible, as much as 
he who gave this advice, how reasonable it 
■was, and declared themselves for its execu- 
tion : but then, " the men, who now, indulg- 
ing their joy for the late victory, were intent 
on recreations, and as besides it was a festi- 
val-time, for this very day they were per- 
forming the anniversary sacrifice to Hercules, 
in all probability would refuse to march ; 
because, transported as they were with suc- 
cess, the generality no doubt were celebrating 
the festival with good cheer and wine ; and 
any thing might sooner be hoped from them 
than obedience to an order for taking up their 
arms and sallying forth at a minute's notice." 
As the magistrates were convinced that things 
■would so turn out, the scheme was judged im- 
practicable, and Hermocrates could in no wise 
prevail. But he thought of an artifice to play 
off against the foe : afraid lest the Athenians, 
dislodging quietly by night, might possess them- 
selves of the most difficult passes before any 
opposition could reach them, he dcspatchcth 
some of his most trusty friends, under an escort 
of horse, to the Athenian camp so soon as it 



was dark ; who, riding up so near to the in- 
trenchments that their words might be distinct- 
ly heard, and calling out aloud on some persons 
to come forth, since they were a party sent 
from his friends in Syracuse to bring Nicias 
some intelligence, charged them to carry word 
immediately to Nicias, " by no means to draw 
off the army by night, because the Syracusans 
had beset the roads ; but to defer his march till 
day-light, when he had leisure to make the 
proper dispositions." And after delivering this 
message they rode off, whilst those who re- 
ceived it went and reported it faithfully to the 
Athenian generals. 

Wrought upon by this piece of intelligence, 
in which they were far from suspecting any 
fraud, they continued all night in their posts ; 
and then, as they had not dislodged at once in a 
hurry, they thought it advisable to stay there but 
one day longer, that the soldiers might pack up 
and carry away with them as large a part as 
was possible of their necessary stores. The 
rest of the baggage it was agreed should be 
abandoned to the enemy ; they were only to 
carry off, each person for himself, what was ab- 
solutely necessary for food and raiment. 

Bjut, in this interval, the Syracusans and 
Gylippus, by sallying out with the land-forces, 
had gained a march before them, had blocked up 
the roads along the country by which it was 
judged the Athenians would march, and had 
posted strong guards upon all the fords of brooks 
and rivers ; nay, their detachments stood ready 
drawn up in battalia to beat off the enemy from 
the most convenient passes. Standing out 
farther into the harbour with their fleet, they 
dragged from the shore the Athenian shipping. 
Some few of these they burnt, as the Athe- 
nians had designed to do ; but the residue at 
their leisure, from the spot where each lay 
stranded, they took in tow and carried away to 
the city. And, this being done, when Nicias 
and Demosthenes judged that they had com- 
pleted such preparations for their march as were 
absolutely needful, the dislodgment of the 
whole army was put in execution on the third 
day from the naval engagement. 

Terrible indeed it was, not only when viewed 
in one particular light, as that they retreated 
because they had lost the whole of their fleet, 
and all their mighty hopes had terminated in 
such personal danger to themselves, and such 
as even boded the ruin of Athens ; but the 
very abandoning of the camp presented to their 



YEAR XIX.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



289 



sight the most cutting spectacles, and struck 
each soul amongst them with heart-piercing 
anguish ; for, as the dead lay uninterred upon 
the surface of the earth, when the remains of 
an old acquaintance, thus miserably laid out, 
arrested the eyes of a soldier, he was instantly 
seized with regret and horror. But the living, 
who on account of wounds and sickness were 
left behind, were causes of much greater afflic- 
tion to the sound than were even the dead, and 
in truth were much more to be deplored than 
those who had no longer a being ; for, bursting 
out into prayers and lamentations, they occasion- 
ed a wild irresolution of thought ; earnestly en- 
treating that they might not be left behind, and 
screaming out aloud on each by name, as they 
saw a friend or an acquaintance, or an old 
comrade, moving off; throwing their arms about 
their necks, and so dragged along whilst they 
could keep their hold ; but, when strength and 
bodily vigour failed and left them destitute of 
resource, they gave them the last adieu, not with- 
out a shower of curses and a hideous howl. By 
such cutting incidents the whole army was 
filled with tears and a wild irresolution ; so that 
they could not depart without the highest re- 
gret, though from a spot so hostile, where they 
had suffered more than tears could alleviate ; 
and the dread of more, which yet might be im- 
pending, was inexpressible. Dejection of the 
head and self-accusation were general through 
all the troops ; and they resembled nothing less 
than a large subjugated city, whose numerous 
inhabitants were escaping from the fury of a 
sack ; for the amount of those who were now 
marching off together, was not less than forty 
thousand men. 

Of these,the generality carried ofFmerely what 
necessary subsistence they had scraped together; 
but the heavy-armed and horsemen, contrary to 
custom, were now obliged to carry their own 
sustenance themselves beneath their armour; 
some, because they had none, others, because 
they durst not trust their servants. The de- 
sertions had for a long time been large, but of 
late in greater numbers than ever. Neither 
were they thus provided with sufficient stores ; 
for there was no longer any corn to be found 
in the camp. Nay, truly, the general calamity 
and equability of misfortunes which, in many 
cases alleviate the pain as numbers are involv- 
ed, were unable to render the present evils in 
any degree supportable ; especially when the 
thought occurred, from what a height of splen- 
44 



dour and preceding glory, to what a plunge and 
miserable state they were now reduced ! for a 
most cruel turn of fortune this really proved to 
a Grecian army ; who, coming hither to en- 
slave others, were departing now with the sad 
alternative of fearing to be made slaves them- 
selves ; and, instead of the prayers and pagans 
with which they first began the voyage, were 
now dislodging with omens that portended no- 
thing but misery : those, farther, who came 
hither as lords of the ocean, were now stealing • 
away by land, from henceforth to be saved, not 
by naval skill, but the perseverance of a land- 
army. However, all these reflections put their 
patience nothing on the stretch, in comparison 
of that weight of misery which this very instant 
was hovering over their heads. 

Nicias, perceiving the whole army to be 
overwhelmed in despair,and sunk in this plunge 
of distress, addressed himself severally to the 
troops, exhorted, and comforted, by every to- 
pic which occurred, each single party, whom 
he visited by turns, elevating his voice far be- 
yond the ordinary pitch, to suit the earnestness 
of his heart, in hope that, the louder he spoke, 
the more extensive effect it might have upon 
the hearers. 

« Even yet, and in the present low ebb of 
our fortune, my dear countrymen and confede- 
rates, we ought to encourage hope. Instances 
may be given of armies who have been rescued 
from a deeper plunge of dangers than that which 
is now our portion. Nor ought you to torture 
yourselves with too painful regret at what you 
suffer, or at the unmerited miseries which this 
moment environ you about. Even I myself, 
who have much less room to boast of a consti- 
tution superior to hardships than the meanest 
soldier in your ranks, (for your own eyes can 
witness to how low a state my bodily infirmi- 
ties have reduced me,) who, however, in the 
continued happiness of my former course of 
life, or in any other regard, am inferior to none 
amongst you, — yet am buffeted now, by the 
storms and outrages of fortune, as cruelly as 
ever were the vilest and most abject of my fel- 
low-creatures. It is true, I have ever habitu- 
ally worshipped the gods, with a consciencious 
deference to established laws ; and have made 
justice and beneficence to man the constant 
practice of my life. Upon the strength of this, 
when I looked forwards to the future, my mind 
is enlivened with invigorating hope ; though I 
own these misfortunes, so far undeserved. 



290 



PELOPOxNNESIAN WAR. 



[book vn. 



strike no little terror on my thoughts. But 
better times, perhaps, may be approaching ; for 
sure our enemies have been blessed with an 
ample measure of success ; and, though some 
deity may have frowned at first on this our ex- 
pedition, yet by this time his wrath must be 
fully wreaked upon us. We are not the first 
instance of a people who have wantonly inva- 
ded the possessions of another ; many such of- 
fences have taken their rise from the impulse 
•of human passions, and have been punished 
with such a measure of vengeance as human 
nature was able to endure. Good reason, 
therefore, have we now to hope for a milder 
fate from the offended deity ; who, depressed 
as we are, seem objects of compassion more 
than of resentment. Cast, therefore, your 
eyes on the fine bodies of heavy-armed, and 
the goodly numbers, which even now compose 
your retreat ; and let the sight revive and cheer 
your drooping spirits. Conclude that, wher- 
ever you choose to halt, you are of yourselves 
that instant a mighty community ; such as no 
other Sicilian people can presume to stand be- 
fore, should you attack ; nor to dispossess, 
wherever you think proper to settle. But, 
that your march be orderly and safe, be that 
the care of each individual amongst your ranks, 
made warm and earnest by the thought, — that, 
on whatever spot you may be compelled to 
fight, on that, if crowned with victory, you re- 
gain a country and a bulwark of your own. 
But then, our march must be continued both 
day and night, with unabating speed, because 
our stock of provision is but scanty ; and, can 
we but reach some friendly territory belonging 
to the Siculi, who, from their excessive dread I 
of the Syracusaus, will ever preserve their at- 
tachment to us, conclude yourselves that mo- j 
ment to be beyond the reach of danger : send, ' 
therefore, your messengers beforehand to them, 
with orders to meet us on our route and bring t 
us the needful supplies of food. On the whole, ; 
my fellow-soldiers, rest assured that the last 
necessity enjoins you to be resolutely brave ; 
since to cowardice now no place of shelter is 
any longer open ; and only if you stem the ef- 
forts of your foes — can you again be happy in 
the enjoyment of those scenes your eyes so 
fondly regret; and can Athenians re-erect the 
extensive power of the Athenian state, how 
low soever it may be fallen at present : for they 
are men who make a state, not walls nor ships 
by men abandoned." 



With these words of encouragement, Nicias 
ran regularly through all the ranks of the whole 
army ; careful at the same time, if he saw any 
parties straggling from the main body, and 
quitting the order of the march, to fetch them 
up and replace them. Demosthenes exerted 
himself as diligently in his own department, 
encouraging his troops with the same energy 
and ardour of address. The body under Ni- 
cias, drawn up in a square, led the van of the 
march ; that under Demosthenes brought up 
the rear : whilst the baggage-men, and the nu- 
merous crowd that attended the camp, marched 
within the centre of the heavy-armed. 

When they were advanced to the place of 
fording the Anapus, they find a body of Syra- 
cusaus and allies drawn up in battalia there to 
oppose the passage. But, putting these to 
flight, they gained the passage of that river, and 
advanced into the country beyond ; though their 
march was terribly harassed by the incursions 
of the Syracusan horse, and by the missive 
weapons which the light-armed of the enemy 
poured in from time to time amongst them. 
And yet in this day's march, the Athenians 
wrought about forty stadia,' and halted for the 
night upon an eminence. 

On the ensuing day, by early dawn, they 
were again in motion, and advanced about 
twenty stadia ;^ when, descending into a cer- 
tain plain, they halted and formed an encamp- 
ment. Their design in this was to fetch in 
some provisions, for the adjacent country was 
inhabited, and to get a proper supply of water 
to carry along with them ; for in the country 
beyond, through which their route was fixed, 
no springs were to be met with for the length 
of several stadia. But, during this halt, the 
Syracusans advancing beyond them, throw up 
a work across their route to stop their farther 
progress. The spot chosen for this was a 
strong eminence, flanked on both sides by an 
inaccessible crag, and known by the name of 
Acrseum-Lepas. 

On the day following the Athenians resum- 
ed their march ; but the horse and numerous 
darters of the Syracusans and allies stopped 
their advance, the latter pouring in their wea- 
pons upon, and the former riding up and dis- 
ordering their ranks. For a long time, it is 
true, the Athenians maintained the skirmishes 
against them ; but at length they retreated 



> About four miles. 



• Two miles. 



YEAR XIX.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



291 



again to their last encampment. And now all 
farther supplies of provisions were totally cut 
off; it being no longer possible to fetch in any, 
for fear of the horse. 

But, decamping early in the morning, they 
continued their march, and forced their pro- 
gress to the eminence which was fortified by 
the new work. Here they found the Syracu- 
san infantry drawn up before them in firm and 
deep battalia, posted also on the strong emi- 
nence they had occupied on purpose ; for the 
pass was very narrow. The Athenians march- 
ed up and assaulted the work ; but, being pelted 
by showers of darts from the eminence, which 
was very steep, and so gave those upon it a 
great advantage in throwing their weapons 
home, and finding themselves unable to force 
it, they again drew off, and attempted it no far- 
ther. It happened, at the same time, that 
some claps of thunder were heard, accompanied 
with rain, effects not unusual in this season, as 
the year was now in autumn; and yet these 
accidents contributed still more to dispirit the 
Athenians, who concluded that every thing 
now acted in combination for their destruction. 
During this interval of inaction, Gylippus and 
the Syracusans send off a detachment of their 
forces to throw up a work in their rear, where 
the enemy had already passed. But the Athe- 
nians sent also a detachment of their own body, 
which prevented its execution ; and, after this, 
wheeling off with their whole body more into 
the plains, they halted there for the night. 

The next morning they began to move for- 
wards again. And now the Syracusans, beset- 
ting them quite round in a circle, poured volleys 
of darts and arrows amongst them, and wound- 
ed numbers. If, indeed, the Athenians sallied 
out against them, they retreated; but when 
the Athenians drew back, they then pressed 
upon their retreat ; and, falling in chiefly 
amongst their rear, if at any time they put 
small parties to flight, they struck a consterna- 
tion into the whole army. But, for a long time, 
in such a train of skirmishings, the Athenians 
made good their ground ; and advancing after- 
wards the length of five or six stadia,' they 
halted in a plain. Here also the Syracusans 
no longer molested them, but withdrew to their 
own camp, 

This night it was determined by Nicias and 
Demosthenes, that, — since the army was re- 

* About half a mile. 



duced to so low a condition, and began already 
to be pressed with a total failure of provisions ; 
since, farther, large numbers had been wounded 
in the many incidental assaults of the enemy ; 
— they should first kindle a great number of 
fires, and then march the whole army off, no 
longer by the route which they had first pro- 
jected, but by another towards the sea, quite 
contrary to that which the Syracusans had al- 
ready pre-occupied and guarded. The residue 
of the march was no longer pointed towards 
Catana, but to the other coast of Sicily, to- 
wards Camarina, and Gela, and the cities in 
that quarter, both Grecian and Barbarian. In 
pursuance of this, a large number fires be- 
ing kindled, they dislodged in the dead of 
night. 

This part of their retreat (as is the general 
fate of armies, but especially of the greatest, ev- 
er subject to fears and panics, particularly when 
moving in the night and on hostile ground, and 
conscious, farther, that the enemy is close at 
their heels) was made in a sad and disorderly 
manner. The column, indeed, under Nicias, 
which composed the van, kept firm together in 
a body, and quite out-matched the rest of the 
army : but that under Demosthenes, being one 
half, at least, if not the major part, of the 
whole force, was separated from the van, and 
came on in great confusion and disorder. How- 
ever, by the dawn of day, they reached the 
coast; and, gaining the great road which is 
called the Helorine, took their route along it, 
that, after they had reached the river Cacyparis 
they might pierce upwards along the course of 
that river into the heart of the country ; for 
thus they hoped to meet with the Siculi, whom 
they had summoned to be ready on their route. 
But, when they had gained the sight of that 
river, they found its banks already occupied by 
a Syracusan guard, busy in throwing up a ram- 
part and palisado to defend its passage. This 
party they soon dispersed, and passed the river, 
and from thence advanced towards another 
river, the Erineus ; for thus their guides had 
planned their route. 

In the meantime the Syracusans and allies, 
when the day was clearly broke, and they knew 
the Athenians were stole off, began in general 
to throw heavy imputations on Gylippus, as if 
the Athenians had made their escape through 
his connivance. Yet, beginning the pursuit 
with all possible expedition, (and it was easily 
discoverable what route they had taken,) they 



292 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



FbOOK VII. 



come up with them about the hour of repast : I 
and, as thoy fell in first with the column under 
the orders of Demosthenes, which composed 
the rear, and had moved in a more slow and dis- | 
orderly manner than the van, because the dark- 
ness of the night had so highly incommoded 
and confounded their march, they immediately I 
charged them and fought. The Syracusan 
cavalry beset them quite round, (the more 
easily, indeed, as they were separated from the 
van,) and drove them into one crowded heap. 
But the column under Nicias was now fifty 
stadia' before them ; for Nicias led them for- 
wards with great celerity, concluding that their 
safety consisted, not in lingering voluntarily at 
so critical a period, or exposing themselves to an 
engagement, but in pushing forwards with their 
utmost speed, and fighting only when by abso- 
lute necessity they were compelled to fight. 
But then Demosthenes was involved in a much 
more laborious and continued toil ; because, as 
he filed off last, the enemies were left upon 
his rear; and, soon convinced that they had 
begun the pursuit, he was obliged, not so much 
to move forward, as to draw up his troops in 
the order of battle, till by such necessitated 
lingering he is environed by them, and himself 
and the body of Athenians under him are 
thrown into high tumult and confusion. For 
now, hemmed in as they were on a certain 
spot, surrounded quite round by walls, and 
whence the issues both on one side and the 
other were full of olive-trees, they were ter- 
ribly galled on their flanks by the darts of the 
enemy. This kind of annoyance the Syracusans 
wisely chose to give them, and to decline all 
close engagement; because, to hazard the lat- 
ter against enemies now become quite desper- 
ate, they judged would make more for the 
advantage of the Athenians than of them- 
selves : though, at the same time, a kind of 
frugality, inspired by the great career of suc- 
cess they had already obtained, taught them not 
to exhaust their strength on superfluous en- 
counters, and persuaded them that thus they 
might effectually subdue and make this great 
army their prisoners. When, therefore, for 
the whole remainder of the day, they had 
galled them on all sides with missive weapons, 
and now perceived that the Athenians and 
their allies were reduced to a miserable plight, 
by the wounds which they had received and 

' About flvo mllcB. 



the other calamities which lay hard upon them, 
Gylippus, in concert with the Syracusans and 
allies, causeth a herald to proclaim ; — first, 
that " such inhabitants of the isles as would 
come over to them should rest in the secure 
enjoyment of their liberty :" — upon which, 
some cities, though not many, went over to 
them : — and, in the next place, after some time, 
a surrender is agreed on of the whole body of 
troops commanded by Demosthenes, on the 
terms, that " they should deliver up their arms, 
and no one should suffer death, either by public 
execution, or the miseries of a prison, or the 
want of necessary subsistence." Thus this 
whole body, to the number of six thousand 
men, surrendered themselves prisoners, and 
produced all the silver they had about them, 
which they were commanded to throw into the 
hollows of shields, four of which in this man- 
ner were filled full with spoil ; and these 
prisoners the victors immediately led away to 
Syracuse. 

But Nicias and the column under his com- 
mand arrived the same day on the banks of the 
Erineus ; and having passed that river, halted 
on an eminence. The day following the Sy- 
racusans, coming up to his post, notified to 
Nicias, that <' those under Demosthenes had 
surrendered,'* and summoned him to follow 
their example. Incredulous of the fact, he 
begs leave to send out a horseman to discover 
the truth ; who upon his return affirming that 
" they had actually surrendered," Nicias sends 
an intimation to Gylippus and the Syracusans, 
that he was ready to stipulate, in the name of 
the Athenians, that " whatever sums the Sy- 
racusans had expended in this war should be 
fairly reimbursed, on condition the forces under 
his command might have free departure ; but, 
till the money could be paid, he would leave 
with them a number of Athenians as hostages 
for performance, a man for a talent." 

Gylippus and the Syracusans refused the 
offer ; and, resuming offensive measures, ranged 
their parties quite round the eminence, and 
poured in their missive weapons upon them till 
the evening. This body of troops was also 
sadly distressed for want of bread and necessary 
subsistence. Watching, however, for the dead 
and silent hours of the night, they were then 
determined to continue their march. They 
accordingly take up their arms ; the Syracu- 
sans perceive it, and sing the ptean of alarm. 
The Athenians were thus convinced that tlwv 



YEAR XIX.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



293 



could not dislodge without being discovered, and 
so grounded their arms again, all but one party 
of three hundred men ; for these having forced 
themselves a passage through the guards, 
made off in the night as fast as it was possible. 
So soon as the day appeared, Nicias at the 
head of his troops led them forwards. But 
the Syracusans and allies pressed upon him on 
all sides in the usual manner, pouring in volleys 
of darts and javelins. The Athenians made 
the best of their way to reach the river Asina- 
rus ; not only because, annoyed on all sides by 
the irruption of the numerous cavalry and 
skirmishing parties, they concluded they should 
be eased of these could they once pass that 
river, but also through bodily fatigue and a 
vehement desire to extinguish their thirst. 
When, therefore, they are upon the bank, they 
rush into the river; no longer observant of 
order, but each single soldier intent on passing 
the first of the army. And the enemy, who 
now pressed hard upon them, had rendered the 
passage already a business of toil : for, obliged 
as they were to go down in confused heaps, 
they fell and trampled upon one another; 
some embarrassed by their spears and luggage, 
met with instant destruction ; others, entang- 
led in the crowd, were carried away by the 
current. The hither bank of the river was 
now filled with Syracusans ; and, it being 
naturally steep, they poured down their darts 
upon the Athenians, numbers of whom were 
drinking greedily of the stream, confusedly 
hampered together in the hollow of the 
channel. The Peloponnesians, plunging in 
after them, made a great slaughter of those 
who were in the river. The water was im- 
mediately discoloured with blood : but the 
stream, polluted with mud and gore, deterred 
them not from drinking it greedily, nor many 
of them from fighting desperately for a draught 
of it. But, in short, when the carcases of 
the dead began to lie heaped one upon another 
in the river, and the whole army was become 
a continued carnage ; ' of some in the river ; 
of those who were making off from the banks, 
by the horsemen of the foe ; Nicias surrenders 
himself prisoner to Gylippus, into whose power 
be chose to fall sooner than into that of the 
Syracusans. He told him, that *< he himself 
and the Lacedaemonians might decide his fate 



» Accordin<][ to Diodorus Siculns, the number of the 
e!aia ainotintcd to eighteen thousand men. 



as best pleased themselves ; but entreated that 
a stop might be put to the slaughter of his 
soldiers." Upon this, Gylippus issued out 
orders to give quarter ; and thus they carried 
off the remnants of this body as prisoners of 
war, such excepted as were secreted by their 
captors, the number of which was large. Hav- 
ing, farther, detached a party in pursuit of the 
three hundred, who in the night had broke 
through the guard, they also made them pri- 
soners. The whole number now collected 
together as the public prize was not large ; 
but very numerous were they who were clan- 
destinely secreted. Not a town in Sicily but 
was crowded with them, since these had not 
surrendered upon terms like those under De- 
mosthenes. A considerable number had also 
perished ; for this was a terrible slaughter ; 
nay, there was no one greater in the course of 
the Sicilian war ; and in the preceding skir- 
mishes, which had happened very frequently 
during the march, not a few had been slain. 
Yet, notwithstanding all this, many made their 
escape ; some from the scenes of action, and 
others from their prisons, from whence, they 
afterwards gained an opportunity to run away. 
These repaired to Catana, as a safe resort. 

And now the Syracusans and allies in one 
grand collective body, having amassed to- 
gether as large a number of prisoners as they 
possibly could, and all the spoils, returned in 
triumph to Syracuse. The bulk of prisoners, 
whether of the Athenians or their confede- 
rates, whom they had taken, they thrust down 
into the quarries, concluding that from such 
a confinement they could not possibly make 
escapes ; but Nicias and Demosthenes, in spite 
of all the remonstrances of Gylippus, they 
butchered : for Gylippus imagined, that the 
finishing of this war would invest himself with 
pre-eminent degrees of glory, if, besides the 
rest of his achievments, he could carry home 
to the Lacedaemonians the generals of the ene- 
my. It had, farther, so happened, that one of 
these, that is Demosthenes, was regarded as 
their most inveterate enemy, because of his 
exploits against them in the island Sphacteria 
and Pylus ; and the other, Nicias, as their 
most sincere well-wisher, from his behaviour 
on those very incidents. For Nicias had 
strenuously exerted himself in behalf of those 
Lacedaemonians who were made prisoners in 
the island. It was he who prevailed with the 
Athenians to sign the treaty, in pursuance of 
2G 



294 



PELOPONNESIAN \yAR. 



[book vn. 



which they were released. For such services 
done them, the LacedjEmonians had a kindness 
for him; and it had been chiefly owing to his 
assurance of this that he surrendered himself 
prisoner to Gylippus. But a party of the 
Syracusans, as was generally reported, fearful, 
because they had kept up a correspondence 
with him, lest, if put to the torture, he might 
now, amidst the general prosperity, involve 
them in trouble ; others also, and, not least of 
all, the Corinthians, lest, as he was rich he 
might purchase the connivance of his keepers 
to get his liberty, and then again might have 
influence enough to foment fresh stirs to their 
prejudice ; obtained the concurrence of their 
allies, and put him to death. For these, or 
reasons most nearly neighbouring to these, was 
Nicias doomed to destruction ; though the 
man, of all the Grecians in the present age, 
who least deserved so wretched a catastrophe, 
since his whole life was one uniform series of 
piety towards the Deity.' 

As for those who were doomed to the quar- 
ries, the Syracusans treated them at first with 
outrageous severity. As great numbers were 
crowded together in this hollow dungeon, 
the beams of the sun, in the first place, and 
then the suffocating air, annoyed them in a 
more terrible manner, because the aperture 
was left uncovered ; and each succeeding night, 
the reverse of the preceding day, autumnal 
and nipping, through such vicissitudes, threw 
them into strange disorders. Thus straitened 
as they were for room, they did whatever 
they had to do on one and the same spot ; 
and the carcases of those who died lay heaped 
up promiscuously together, as some expired of 
their wounds, and others perished through the 
vicissitudes of air they suffered, or some other 
such deadly cause. At length the stench be- 
came intolerably noisome ; and they were far- 
ther oppressed with hunger and thirst : for, 
during the space of eight months, the allow- 
ance to each was only a cotyl ^ of water and 
two cotyls^ of bread a-day. Nay, whatever 
species of misery numbers cooped up in so 
close a confinement might be liable to suffer, 
not one of these but pressed cruelly upon them. 
They were all thus thronged and dieted-:to- 

1 Mr. IIobbcB, in his translation, has omitted this last 
comma, 
tt Little more than half a pint. 
» About 32 solid inches. 



gether for seventy days : but, after this term, 
all but the Athenians, and such of the Sici- 
lians and Italians as had joined with them in 
the invasion, were sold out for slaves.* 

What the whole number of prisoners was, it 
is hard exactly to relate ; but, however, they 
could not be fewer than seven thousand. And 
this proved to be the greatest Grecian exploit 
of all that happened in the course of this war ; 
and, in my opinion, of all that occur in the 
whole history of Greece ; since the event to 
the victors was most glorious, and to the van- 
quished most calamitous ; for in every respect 
they were totally overpowered, and their mi- 
series in no respect had any mitigation ; in 
short, root and branch, as is commonly said, 
their land-army and their shipping were now 
ruined ; nay, nothing belonging to them was 
exempted from destruction ; and few out of 
all their numbers, had the good fortune to 
revisit their native country. 

Such were the transactions in Sicily.^ 



« " The decent and engaging behaviour of the Athe- 
nians was of great service to them ; for by it they 
either soon obtained their liberty, or were highly 
esteemed and caressed by their masters. Some of them 
were indebted for their freedom to Euripides. The 
Sicilians, it seems, were fonder of the muse of Euri- 
pides than were even the people who lived in Greece 
itself. If the strangers, who were often resorting to 
Sicily, brought them any specimens or morsels of his 
poetry, they learned them by heart, and with high de- 
light communicated tliem to their friends. It is said, 
that several, who by this means earned their liberty, 
went afterwards to wait upon Euripides, in token of 
their gratitude ; assuring him, some of them, that they 
had been released from slavery for teaching their mas- 
ters what pieces of his writings they were able to re- 
peat ; and others, that, when vagabonds after the 
defeat, they had been supplied with meat and drink 
for singing some of his lines. This is not to be won- 
dered at: since even a Caunian ve«sel, which, being 
hard chased by pirates, and endeavouring to get for 
refuge into a Sicilian harbour, was however kept off 
by force ; till at length, being asked whether they could 
repeat any of Euripides's verses, they answered in the 
affirmative ; upon which they obtained immediate re- 
ception and refuge." Plutarch in the life of J^icias. 

» Some Iambic verses of an unknown autlior are 
found at the end of this book in the later Greek r^li- 
tions ; and I beg the reader to accept the following 
translation of them : 

The pride of glnrj, the exalted height, 
The frequent trophic* on the land and se«, 
The long career of well-de»erved succeat, 
Od which their great forefathers lower'd aloft, 
Whilit Pertia trembled at the Athenian name, 
Mow droop'd at once ! — A chaos soon tucceedi, 
Of anarchy, deilruction, and distress : 
Low cbb'd the state, as high it erst had dowM. 



THE 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR, 



BOOK VIII. 



The news of the overthrow in Sicily causeth a great consternation at Athens. All Greece is in combination 
against them; and their dependents are meditating revolts. — Year XX. Revolt of the Chians. An alliance 
between Darius Nothus and the Lacedaemonians. The war transferred to Ionia. Battle of Miletus. A second 
alliance between Darius and the liacedaemonians. Proceedings at Chios. Revolt of Rhodes, The politic con- 
duct of Alcibiades : his intrigues. A sedition among the Athenians at Samos in favour of an oligarchy. Phry- 
nichus counterplots Alcibiades. A third alliance between Darius and the Lacedaemonians. — Year XXI. Pro- 
ceedings at Chios. The democracy overturned in several places of the Athenian jurisdiction ; and at Athens, 
by the influence of Antipho, Phrynichus, and Theramenes, A council of four hundred take upon them the 
government. The army at Samos declares for the democracy, recalls Alcibiades, and elects him general. 
Athens full of factions. Phrynichus stabhed. A tumult; in the midst of which the fleet of the enemy ap- 
pears in sight. Battle of Eretria ; and revolt of Eubcba. The four hundred are deposed ; and a new form of 
government settled at Athens. The banishment of Alcibiades repealed. Battle of Cynos-Sema. 



YEAR XIX. 

When the news was reported at Athens, 
no belief for a long time was given, — even 
though the most creditable part of the soldiery, 
who had made their escape from this disastrous 
business, proved it by a circumstantial, relation, 
— that so total a destruction was become their 
lot.^ But no sooner were they convinced of 
its reality, than their resentments bust forth 



» Plutarch, from report, tells an odd story on this oc- 
casion. — " A stranger, who (it seems) had come ashore 
at the Piraeus, and had set him down in a barber's shop, 
began to talk about the overthrow in Sicily, as a ))oint 
well known at Athens. The barber, hearing it before 
any other person had the news, ran with all speed up in- 
to the city ; and, having first, informed the magistrates 
of it, spread the report in an instant all over the forum. 
Consternation and tumult at once ensued. The magis- 
trates convened an assembly of the people, and produc- 
ed the barber before them. He was called upon to tell 
from whom he had the news ; and when he could not 
nametlie person, being looked upon as an idle fellow and 
a disturber of the public peace, he was immediately tied 
upon the wheel, and a long time whirled round upon it, 
till several persons arrived who gave a minute and cir- 
cumstantial account of the whole." Life of J^Ticias. 



against those of the orators who had advised 
and recommended the expedition, as if their 
own suffrages had never concurred to its exe- 
cution. They farther vented their gall against 
those retailers of oracles and foretellers of fu- 
ture events, against all in general, who, pretend- 
ing privity to the will of heaven, had elevated 
their hopes with the certain conquest of Sicily. 
On all sides now all manner of disasters envi- 
roned them about ; and never had Athens been 
thrown into so great a consternation and dejec- 
tion as at the present juncture : for now, be- 
side what each private family suffered, as the 
public at the same time had lost the bulk of its 
heavy-armed and horsemen, and that flower of 
its youth which they saw it impossible to re- 
place, they were sorely dejected. Conscious, 
farther, that they had not shipping sufficient in 
their docks for a fresh equipment, nor money 
in the public treasury, nor even hands to man 
what vessels they had left, they gave up all 
hope of deliverance in the present plunge. 
Their enemies from Sicily, they imagined, 
would soon enter the Piraeus with a powerful 

295 



290 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book VIII. 



navy, especially as they were flushed with such 
a career of success ; and their enemies nearer 
Home, would now, for a certainty, redouble 
their preparations, and with the utmost re- 
solution fall upon them at once both by sea and 
land, and be further strengthened by the 
revolt of their own temporising confederates. 
At last, however, they agreed it was their 
duty to do what might yet be done ; not basely 
to abandon their own preservation, but to 
fit out a navy, by collecting from all pos- 
sible resources both timber and money ; — 
and timely to secure their own dependent 
states, above all Euboea — and to reduce the 
expenses of the civil administration with all 
possible economy ; — and to lodge the sove- 
reignty in the hands of a select body of old ex- 
perienced statesmen, whose maturer counsels 
might, if possible, yet extricate the state from 
its present misfortunes. Such an effect had 
the general consternation now upon them, an 
effect not unusual with a people, that they be- 
came heartily disposed to order their govern- 
ment aright. And, as to such resolutions they 
came to, they proceeded, farther, to put them 
in execution : and the summer ended. 

In the beginning of the ensuing winter, ani- 
mated by the terrible blow the Athenians had 
received in Sicily, the whole body of Greece 
was alert against them. Even such as had 
hitherto observed a strict neutrality, without so 
much as waiting for a formal invitation to 
accede, thought it incumbent upon themselves 
no longer to be absent from the war, but vo- 
luntary to enter the lists against the Athenians. 
Not a state but reasoned thus, — that " them- 
selves also these Athenians, had they succeeded 
in Sicily, would undoubtedly have attacked ;" 
and then concluded, — that, " as the war for 
certainty was very nearly finished, it would be 
glorious for them to have a hand in its com- 
pletion." But the old confederates of the 
Laeedjemonians, as their desires were greater, 
so they exerted themselves now with higher 
alacrity than ever to procure a speedy relaxa- 
tion of their heavy burdens. Yet, in a most 
remarkable manner, such states as were depen- 
dent upon Athens manifested their readiness 
to revolt, even beyond the bounds of caution ; 
since now they formed their judgments in all 
the warmth of indignation, and could discern no 
probable method by wliich the Athenians could 
retard their ruin for another summer. 

All these circumstances coinciding, the Lace- 



daemonian state became prodigiously alert ; and, 
above all, with the expectation, that their con- 
federates of Sicily, with a powerful reinforce- 
ment, as their natives must now of necessity 
act in concert, would be with them, in all pro- 
bability, very early in the spring. In every 
view their hopes were gallant and elate. They 
determined to go on with the war without any 
delay ; concluding that, if once brought well to 
a conclusion, they should ever for the future 
be released from such dangers as had lately 
threatened from Athens, in case Sicily had 
been reduced ; and, should they now demolish 
their competitors, must remain for the future 
supreme leaders of Greece, without fear of a 
reverse. 

Instantly, therefore, Agis their king, though 
in the depth of winter, sallying forth with a 
body of troops from Decelea, marched round 
the confederacy, levying sums of money for 
the service of the marine. Turning his route 
to the Melian gulf, he took a large booty from 
the CEtaeans, against whom their enmity had 
been of long duration, which he converted into 
money. He also compelled those Achseans 
who were seated in the Pthiotis, and other 
states in this quarter dependent on Thessaly, 
spite of all the complaints and murmurs of the 
Thessalians, to give him some hostages for 
their good behaviour, and to furnish him with 
money. He disposed of these hostages into 
safe custody at Corinth, and spared no pains 
to get them over into the alliance. 

The Lacedaemonians, farther, circulated an 
order among the states, for the building of one 
hundred sail of ships. They taxed themselves 
and the Boeotians to furnish, respectively, 
twenty-five ; the Phocians and Locrians fif- 
teen ; the Corinthians fifteen ; the Arcadians, 
and Pellenians, and Sicyonians, ten ; the Me- 
gareans, and Troezenians, and Epidaurians, 
and Hcrmionians, ten. They went to work 
with all other needful preparations, that they 
might prosecute the war briskly upon the first 
approach of spring. 

The Athenians, on the other hand, were not 
remiss in preparing for their own defence ; 
since, in pursuance of the plan they had form- 
ed, they were busy during all the winter in 
building of ships, having collected proper quan- 
tities of timber; and in fortifying Sunium, that 
the navigation of their victuallers round that 
capo might be preserved from molestation. 
They also evacuated the fortress in La- 



YEAR XIX.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



297 



conia which they had raised in the voyage to 
Sicily ; and in all respects, where they j udged 
themselves involved in any less needful expense, 
they contracted their disbursements with the 
utmost frugality. But their principal care was, 
keeping a close eye upon their dependents, that 
they might not revolt. 

Amidst these employments of both parties, 
which were nothing less than most earnest pre- 
parations on all sides, as if war was just in its 
commencement, the Euboeans took the lead, 
and sent ambassadors this winter to treat with 
Agis, about a revolt from the Athenians. 
Agis accepted what terms they proposed ; and 
sends for Alcamenes, the son of Sthenelaidas, 
and Melanthus, from Lacedsemon, to pass over 
as commanders into Euboea. Accordingly 
they arrived, with, a body of citizens newly en- 
franchised,* to the number of about three hun- 
dred; and Agis was preparing for their trans- 
portation. But in this interval the Lesbians 
arrived, with declarations of their readiness to 
revolt ; and, as they were seconded by the re- 
commendations of the Boeotians, Agis is per- 
suaded to put otr for a time the affair of 
Euboea, and began to expedite the revolt of the 
Lesbians, having assigned them Alcamenes 
for their governor, who was to have passed 
over to Euboea. The Boeotians promised to 
send them ten ships, and Agis ten. These 
points were transacted without the privity of 
the Lacedaemonian state : for Agis, so long as 
he continued at Decelea, having under his com- 
mand the army of the state, was invested with 
a power of sending detachments whithersoever 
he thought proper, and to levy men and money 
at his own discretion : and it may with truth 
be affirmed, that the confederates, during this 
period, paid a much greater deference to him 
than to the state of Lacedaemon ; for, having a 
powerful force under his own orders, he was 
formidable in his every motion. And thus 
he arbitrarily settled the negotiation of the 
Lesbians. 

But then the Chians and the Erythrseans, 
who were also desirous to revolt, addressed 
themselves, not to Agis, but at Lacedaemon. 
In their company also went thither an ambas- 
sador from Tissaphernes, who was lieutenant 
for Darius, the son of Artaxerxes, in the 
maritime provinces of Asia. Even Tissapher- 



* Neodamodcs. 



45 



nes concerned himself now to inflame the Pelo- 
ponnesian ardour, and promise them large 
supplies. For lately he had been summoned by 
the king to make returns of the revenue of his 
government ; which not being able to exact 
from the Grecian cities, because of the Athe- 
nians, he was run into a large arrear. He 
concluded, therefore, that could he demolish 
the Athenians, he then with great ease might 
levy the tributes ; what is more, might make 
the Lacedaemonians confederates to the king ; 
and might at length convey to him, cither alive 
or dead, Amorges, the bastard son of Pissuth- 
nes, who had revolted in Caria, as the king 
had expressly commanded. The Chians, 
therefore, and Tissaphernes, were now nego- 
tiating this point in concert. 

Calligitus, the son of Laophon, a Megarean, 
and Timagoras, the son of Athenagoras, a Cyzi- 
cene, both exiles from their native places, and 
refuged with Pharnabazus, the son of Pharna- 
bazus, arrive at Lacedaemon about the same 
point of time, commissioned by Pharnabazus 
to procure an aid of shipping for the Helles- 
pont, by which he might be enabled (the very 
same thing as Tissaphernes desired) to work 
the revolt of the cities within his district from 
the Athenian obedience, because of the tributes, 
and expeditiously to gain for himself the credit 
of having procured for his master the alliance 
of the Lacedaemonians. As the agents of 
Pharnabazus and those also of Tissaphernes 
were negotiating the same point, though apart 
from each other, a great debate arose among 
the statesmen at Lacedaemon ; one party insist- 
ing, with vehemence, that an aid of shipping 
and a land force should be sent to Ionia and 
Chios ; another party, that they should be sent 
first to Hellespont. The Lacedaemonians, 
however, complied by far the soonest with the 
demands of the Chians and Tissaphernes. 
Alcibiades, indeed, espoused the cause of the 
latter, from an extraordinary zeal to mark 
hereditary friendship to Endius, who at this 
juncture presided in the college of ephori. 
On this account it was, that the family of Al- 
cibiades, in compliment to this friendship, had 
taken a Lacedasmonian name ; for this Endius 
was the son of an Alcibiades. Yet, previously, 
the Lacedaemonians despatched Phrynis, a per- 
son born and educated in those parts, to 
Chios, to inspect the state of affairs there, 
and report, whether they had so large a number 
of shipping as they pretended, and their silua- 
2u3 



298 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book VIII, 



tion in other respects equalized the fine account 
they hiU given of it. Accordingly, when 
Phrynis had reported, " that all the accounts 
they had heard were true," the Chians and 
Erythrseans were instantly admitted allies. 
They voted, farther, to send them forty sail of 
shipping, as there were already assembled at 
Chios not fewer than sixty from places which 
the Chians named. Ten of these they design- 
ed to despatch, as soon as possible, under the 
command of Melanchridas, who was appointed 
admiral. But afterwards, the shock of an 
earthquake being felt, instead of Melanchridas 
they sent Chalcideus ; and, instead of ten, 
equipped in Laconia only five ships for their 
service. 

Here the winter ended ; and the nineteenth 
year of this war came also to an end, of which 
Thucydides hath compiled the history. 



TEAR XX.' 

Summer now coming on, as the Chians were 
most earnestly soliciting the despatch of the 
ships, and also afraid lest the Athenians should 
get notice of their transactions, — for the whole 
of the negotiation had been carried on without 
the knowledge of the latter, — the Lacedaemo- 
nians send to Corinth three citizens of Sparta, 
to prevail with that state for the transportation 
of their ships with all possible expedition across 
the isthmus, from the other sea into that which 
lies towards Athens, that all in a body might 
stand away for Chios ; as well those which 
Agis had destined for the service of Lesbos as 
the rest. The whole number of shipping 
belonging to the alliance, now assembled to- 
gether there, amounted to thirty-nine. 

But Calligitus, truly, and Timagoras refused, 
in the name of Pharnabazus, to have any par- 
ticipation in the expedition to Chios ; nor 
would part with the money they had brought 
with them, which was five and twenty talents,^ 
to disburse this equipment. They intended to 
get another fitted out, which should sail away 
under their own orders. 

As for Agis, when now he perceived that 
the Lacedsemonians were determined to go first 
to Chios, he no longer suffered his own projects 
to clash with those of the state ; but the con- 
federates now assembling at Corinth proceeded 
to draw up a plan of operations. It was ac- 



1 Before Christ, 412. 



«4843/. 15*. sterling 



cordingly agreed, that they should go first to 
Chios, under the command of Chalcideus, who 
fitted out the five ships in Laconia ; from 
thence to Lesbos, under the command of Al- 
camenes, whom Agis had destined for that 
service ; in the last place they should proceed 
to Hellespont, and in this service it was agreed 
■beforehand, that Clearchus, the son of Ram- 
phias, should take upon him the command. 
But the first step should be the transportation 
of a moiety of their shipping across the isth- 
mus, which were immediately to stand out to 
sea, that the attention of the Athenians might 
be less engaged upon such as were already in 
their course than on those which were to fol- 
low : for now they determined to cross the sea 
in an open insulting manner, as they contemn- 
ed the present impotence of the Athenians, be- 
cause they had no considerable force anywhere 
at sea. 

When these resolutions were formally com- 
pleted, they immediately transported one and 
twenty ships. Expeditious sailing was ear- 
nestly solicited ; but the Corinthians declared 
a reluctancy to go the voyage till they had cele- 
brated the Isthmian games, which were at 
hand. To remove this obstacle, Agis declared 
himself ready to have the whole procedure 
charged to his own account, that they might be 
cleared from a breach of the Isthmian cessation. 
The Corinthians not complying with this pro- 
posal, and delay necessarily resulting from it, 
the Athenians gained by this an earlier discov- 
ery of the negotiation of the Chians ; and, 
despatching Aristocrates, one of their generals, 
charged them openly with the guilt of such a 
procedure. The Chians as strenuously deny- 
ing the charge, they commanded them to send 
away their shipping forthwith to Athens by way 
of pledge for their safety. 

The Chians accordingly sent seven. But 
the detachment of these was entirely owing to 
the popular party of that island, who had been 
kept in utter ignorance of the late negotiation. 
The few who were privy to it, had no mind 
to incur the popular resentment before they 
were enabled to stem its fury; especially as 
now they had resigned all hope of the arrival 
of the Peloponnesians, whose motions were ex- 
ceeding dilatory. 

In the meantime the Isthmian games were 
solemnized; and at these the Athenians, who 
had the regular invitation sent them, assisted 
in form. The practices of the Chians became 



YEAR XX.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



599 



here more apparent to them than ever. No 
sooner, therefore, were they returned to Athens, 
than they put all the needful expedients in 
readiness, to prevent the squadron which was 
to sail from Cenchrese, from passing undisco- 
covered. 

When the festival was over, the latter, with 
one and twenty sail, under the command of 
Alcameues, stood out to sea in order for Chios. 
And the Athenians, advancing against them, 
at first with an equal number of ships, stood 
off again into open sea ; but, when the Pelo- 
ponnesians would not follow them far, but 
stood into the land, the Athenians disappeared ; 
for, having amongst their number the seven 
ships of the Chians, they thought it not safe 
to trust them. But, having afterwards manned 
out others, to the amount of thirty seven, they 
drive the enemy along the coast into Piraeus of 
the Corinthians : this is a desert harbour, and 
the last upon the confines of Epidauria. One 
ship, indeed, which the enemy came up with at 
sea, the Peloponnesians lost ; but all the rest 
they drew together to a station within the har- 
bour. Here the Athenians attacked them, on 
the water with their ships, and by land with a 
party sent purposely on shore. The attack 
was attended with great confusion, and carried 
on in a disorderly manner. The party of the 
Athenians which attacked from the land, dis- 
able the bulk of the squadron, and kill the 
commander, Alcamenes ; some also of their 
own people perished in the action. But when 
the dispute was ended, they posted a sufficient 
number of their ships to lie facing those of the 
enemy ; and with the remainder anchor near a 
little isle, on which, as it lay at a small distance, 
they form an encampment, and send away to 
Athens for a reinforcement. 

In favour of the Peloponnesians came up, 
on the day following, not only the Corinthians, 
but soon after a number also of others, from 
the adjacent country, in aid of the squadron ; 
who, perceiving that the preservation of it 
would be a work of laborious toil on so desert 
a coast, were sadly perplexed. Some argued 
vehemently for setting the ships on fire ; but 
at length it was concluded to draw them ashore, 
and, encamping with their land forces round 
them, to guard them from the enemy till some 
convenient opportunity should ofler of getting 
them away. Agis, also, when informed of 
their situation, sent to them Thermo, a citizen 
of Sparta. 



To the Lacedaemonians the first advice that 
had been sent was this, — that " the squadron 
had set sail from the isthmus ;" for orders had 
been given Alcamenes by the ephori, that, 
when this point was executed, he should des- 
patch a horseman to them. And immediately 
then they had determined to despatch away the 
commander Chalcideus, accompanied by Alci- 
biades, with the five ships of their own equip- 
ment ; but, at the instant they were ready to 
move off, the news arrived, — that « the squad- 
ron had been drove into Piraeus." Dejected 
by this unexpected event, because they had 
stumbled in the very first entrance on an Ionian 
war, they no longer persisted in the design of 
sending away their own ships, but even thought 
of recalling some of those which were already 
at sea. But, as this was discovered by Alci- 
biades, he again persuades Endius, and the 
other ephori, by no means entirely to give up 
the expedition ; assuring them, that " by a 
timely despatch they yet might make that 
island, before any information of the disaster 
which had befallen the squadron could reach 
the Chians ; and of himself, were he once in 
Ionia, he could easily effectuate the revolt of 
the cities, by opening their eyes in respect to 
the weakness of the Athenians and the hearty 
and vigourous interposition of the Lacedaemo- 
nians, since on these topics he should be heard 
with greater deference than any other person 
whatever." He also privately encouraged En- 
dius with the prospect of " great glory to him- 
self, if through him Ionia could be brought to 
revolt, and the king be made confederate to 
Lacedsemon, whilst Agis had no hand in these 
masterly strokes of policy ;" for he happened 
now to be at variance with Agis.' By such 

1 Nc^reasons are here assigned for the variance be- 
tween Alcihiades and Agis. Numbers of probable ones 
might occur from the different tempers and manners of 
the persons ; but we learn, from Plutarch, that Alcihia- 
des had been intriguing with Timica, the wife of Agis, 
and had had a son by her who was called Leotychides. 
disowned afterwards by Agis and incapacitated f;om 
succeeding to the throne. Alcibiades was always dis- 
solute; and yet this (it seems) was merely to gratify 
his pride, since he declared his intention in this intrigu", 
to have been that his descendants might reign at Sparta. 
This fine gentlemnn from Athens was exceeding agree- 
able in the eyes of her Si)artan majesty ; even though 
his deportment at Sparta was such, as if he had lieen 
trained from his birth in the severe discipline of Ly- 
curgus. He was a thorough Spartan — shaved close, 
plunged into cold water, could make a meal on dry 
bread, and feast on black broth. One would think, 
says Plutarch, he had never kept a cook in his life, 



V 



300 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book viir. 



insinuations Alcibiades prevailed upon the 
Ephori and Endius, and sailed away with the 
five ships, in company with Chakideus, the La- 
cedaemonian ; and the voyage they performed 
with all possible expedition. 

About the same time, the sixteen ships 
which had been at the war of Sicily under the 
orders of Gylippus, regained in safety the Pclo- 
ponnesian ports. They had been intercepted 
near Leucadia, and terribly harassed by twenty- 
seven sail of Athenians, commanded by Hippo- 
cles, the son of Menippus, who was stationed 
there to watch the return of the fleet from Si- 
cily. Yet only a single ship was lost. The 
rest, escaping the Athenian chase, arrived safe 
in the harbour of Corinth. 

But Chalcideus and Alcibiades, who were 
now upon their voyage, stopped and detained 
whatever they met, that their course might not 
be divulged : and, touching first at Corycus on 
the main, and there setting at liberty such as 
they had detained, and gaining a conference 
with some of the Chians who were privy to 
their designs, by whom being advised to make 
directly for the harbour of Chios, without any 
formal notification, they arrive there, entirely 
unexpected by the Chians. By this, the many 
were thrown at once into astonishment and 
terror ; but the few had so conducted matters, 
that the council was that moment sitting ; in 
which Chalcideus and Alcibiades being admit- 
ted to speech it — that " many other ships are 
coming up," — but suppressing all mention of 
the squadron blocked up at Piraeus, the Chians 
declare a revolt from the Athenians ; and the 
Erythraeans soon follow their example. 

So far successful, they passed on with 
three ships to Clazoraense, and cause that city 
also to revolt. Instantly upon this, the Clazo- 
menians crossed over into the continent, and 
fortified Polichne, to be a place of safe resort 
for themselves, in case obliged to quit the isle 
they occupied at present. All the revolters, 
in short, were warmly employed in fortifying 
their towns, and making preparations for war. 

At Athens soon the news arrives of the 
revolt of Chios. They were now convinced 
that horrid and apparent dangers already en- 
vironed them about, and that the rest of their 
dependents would not long be quiet, when the 
most powerful state amongst them had thrown 



never seen a performer nor ever worn a Milesian robe. 
Life of AlcibiadcM. 



off the yoke. Now, therefore, the thousand 
talents,' which through all the course of the 
war they had religiously refrained from touch- 
ing, the penalties being discharged which the 
law inflicted upon him who should move, or 
whoever should vote it, amidst their present 
consternation, they decreed " should be em- 
ployed in the public service, and that a large 
number of ships should by this means he 
equipped ; — that, farther, from the squadron 
which blocked up Piraeus, eight ships should 
immediately be detached ;" which, accordingly, 
quitting the blockade, pursued the squadron 
under Chalcideus, but, being unable to come 
up with them, returned again. This detach- 
ment was commanded by Strombichides ; the 
son of Diotimus — that " soon after twelve 
others, under the orders of Thrasycles, should 
repair to Chios, there also to be detached fronj 
the same blockade." Having, moreover, fetch- 
ed off the seven vessels belonging to the Chians, 
which assisted in forming the blockade at Pi- 
raeus, they set at liberty the slaves who were 
on board them, and threw all the freemen into 
prison. But, to replace the whole number 
detached from the blockade of the Pelopon- 
nesians, they lost no time in fitting out other 
vessels and sending them to that post. They 
had also a scheme for the expeditious equip- 
ment of thirty more. Great, indeed, was their 
ardour ; and nothing of small importance was 
taken in hand, as the point in agitation was no 
less than the recovery of Chios. 

In the mean time, Strombichides, with the 
eight sail of ships, arrived at Samos ; and 
taking with him one Samian vessel, stood on- 
wards to Teos, and required of them « to 
have no participation in the present com- 
motions." From Chios, also, Chalcideus was 
now coming over to Teos, with a fleet of 
three and twenty sail ; and the land force of 
the Clazomenians, and also of the Erythraeans, 
attending his motions, was marching thither 
by land : but Strombichides, having timely no- 
tice of their approach, put out again before 
their arrival. Standing out aloof into open sea, 
he had a view of this numerous fleet in their 
course from Chios ; upon which he fled amain 
to Samos. But the enemy followed in pur- 
suit. 

The Teians, who at first refused admittance 
to the land forces, when now the Athenians 

» 193,750;. sterling. 



TEAR XX.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



301 



plainly fled, thought proper to open their gates. 
Here the bulk of them were inactive for a 
time, attending the return of Chalcideus from 
the pursuit. But, when time wore on without 
his appearing, they demolished of their own 
accord the wall which the Athenians had built 
on the side of Teos facing the continent. In 
this they were also assisted by a small party of 
Barbarians, who in this interval had joined 
them, and were commanded by Tages, the dep- 
uty of Tissaphernes. 

But Chalcideus and Alcibiades, when they 
had chased Stronibichides into Samos, having 
furnished the mariners of the Peloponnesian 
vessels with proper arms, leave them as a gar- 
rison in Chios. Having manned their vessels 
afresh at Chios, with an addition of twenty 
others, they stood away for Miletus, as medi- 
tating its revolt. This was owing to Alci- 
biades ; who, having an interest in persons of 
the first rank among the Milesians, made it a 
point to effectuate their accession before the 
fleet should come up from Peloponnesus, and 
to secure the whole honour to the Chians and 
himself, and Chalcideus and Endius who had 
sent him, in pursuance of his engagements to 
work the revolt of the cities with the sole 
power of the Chians and with Chalcideus. 
Having therefore performed the greatest part of 
their voyage thither without being discovered, 
and prevented by a small portion of time 
Strombichides, and also Thrasycles, who was 
lately come up from Athens with twelve ships, 
and in junction with the former followed after 
them, they caused Miletus to revolt. The 
Athenians, indeed, with nineteen sail, arrived 
upon their heels ; but, as the Milesians denied 
them a reception, they took their station at 
Lade, an adjacent isle. 

The first alliance between the king and the 
Lacedaemonians was made immediately after 
the revolt of Miletus, by Tissaphernes and 
Chalcideus, as foUoweth : 

" On these terms the Lacedaemonians and 
confederates make an alliance with the king and 
Tissaphernes — 

" Whatever region or cities the king possess- 
eth and the ancestors of the king possessed, be 
those the king's. 

" And, out of those cities, whatever sums 
of money or any other supply went to the 
Athenians, let the king and the Lacedaemonians 
and confederates jointly stop, that the Athe- 



nians may no longer receive those sums of 
money, nor any other such supply. 

"And the war against the Athenians let the 
king and the Laccdiemonians and confederates 
jointly carry on. 

" And be it unlawful to put an end to the 
war against the Athenians without the consent 
of both the contracting parties ; of the king on 
one side, of the Lacedaemonians and confede- 
rates on the other. 

" If, farther, any revolt from the king, be 
they declared enemies to the Lacedcemonians 
and confederates. 

" And, if any revolt from the Lacedaemonians 
and confederates, be they declared enemies, in 
the same manner, to the king." 

This alliance was now formally concluded. 

Immediately after this, the Chians, who Lad 
manned out ten additional ships, stood away to 
Anaea, being desirous to pick up some infor- 
mation of what was doing at Miletus, and at 
the same time to cause the revolt of the cities. 
Here, being reached by an order from Chalci- 
deus to return back to Chios, with an intima- 
tion that Amorges with a land army would 
soon be upon them, they sailed away to the 
temple of Jupiter. From hence they descry 
sixteen ships, which Diomedon was bringing 
up from Athens, from whence he had sailed 
somewhat later than Thrasycles. Upon this 
discovery they fled amain with a single ship to 
Ephesus, but with the rest of their fleet to Teos. 
Four indeed of the number, which their crews 
had abandoned, the Athenians take ; yet all the 
hands escaped on shore ; but the remainder 
reach in safety the city of the Teians. After this, 
the Athenians stood away into Samos. But 
the Chians, putting again to sea with the re- 
sidue of their ships, and attended by a land 
force, caused Lebedos to revolt, and also Erse. 
And, these points carried, both the land force 
and the squadron returned respectively to their 
own homes. 

About the same time, the twenty sail of 
Peloponnesians, which had been chased into 
Piraeus, and lay blocked up there by an equal 
number of Athenians, having made an unex- 
pected sally upon the enemy, and got the 
better in a naval engagement, take four of the 
Athenian ships : and sailing away for Cen- 
chreaj, were again fitting out for the voyage 
to Chios and Ionia. Astyochus also came 
down thither from Lacedaemon as admiral, in 



302 



PELOPONx\ESIAN WAR. 



[book vin. 



whose hands the whole command at sea was 
now lodged. 

When the land army had quitted Teos, Tis- 
saphernes in person came thither with a body, 
and, after completely demolishing those parts 
of the wall before Teos which were yet left 
standing, marched away. 

Not long after his departure, Diomedon, ar- 
riving there with ten sail of Athenians, in order 
to gain a reception, made a truce with the Te- 
ians. From thence he coasted along to Erae, 
and assaulted the place ; but, not being able to 
take it, he sailed away. 

Coinciding with this in point of time, an in- 
surrection was made at Samos by the people 
against the nobility. The Athenians, who 
with three ships were then lying at Samos, as- 
sisted the former. On this occasion the Sa- 
raian people massacred about two hundred per- 
sons, all of the nobihty. Four hundred others 
they condemned to exile ; and, having divided 
amongst themselves their lands and houses, and 
obtained from the Athenians a decree of being 
governed by their own constitutions, as men 
whose fidelity was no longer to be suspected, 
they assumed the whole civil administration, 
leaving no share of it in the hands of the landed 
gentry, and absolutely prohibiting to the people 
ail alliance for the future with them, so as nei- 
ther to give their daughters to them nor ever to 
marry theirs. 

After these transactions, during the same 
summer, the Chians, proceeding with unabat- 
ing ardour, left nothing undone to compass the 
revolt of the cities. Even without Pelopon- 
nesian aid they made them visits with their own 
single force ; and, desirous at the same time to 
involve as large a number as possible in their 
own dangers, they undertake a voyage with 
thirteen sail of ships to Lesbos. This squared 
exactly with the Lacedaemonian plan ; which 
was, to make the second attempt upon that is- 
land, and from thence to proceed to Helles- 
pont. The land force, at the same time, of 
such of the Peloponnesians as were at hand, 
and their adjacent allies, attended their mo- 
tions by the route of Clazomente and Cyme: 
these were commanded liy Eualas, a Spartan; 
but the fleet was under the orders of Dcixia- 
'las, a native of those parts. And those ships, 
Peering first towards and arriving at Methym- 
ne, cause its revolt.' * • • • 

' From what follows it looks as If some words were 



But Astyochus, the LacedaBmonian admiral 
in chief, putting to sea from Cenchreae, where 
he had taken upon him the command, with four 
sail of shipping, arrives at Chios. And, the 
third day after his arrival there, twenty-five 
sail of Athenians, commanded by Leon and 
Diomedon, reached the isle of Lesbos ; for 
Leon had been lately sent from Athens with 
a reinforcement of ten. On the very evening 
of that day, Astyochus put out again to sea, 
with the addition of one Chian ship, and stood 
away for Lesbos to give them all the assistance 
in his power. Accordingly he toucheth first at 
Pyrrha, proceeding from thence the day fol- 
lowing to Eressus, where information meets 
him that Mitylene had been taken by the 
Athenians at a shout; for the latter, as their 
arrival was entirely unexpected, standing boldly 
into the harbour, seized at once all the Chian 
vessels ; and then landing, and gaining a vic- 
tory over such as made head against them, be- 
came masters of the city. Astyochus, inform- 
ed of this event by the Eressians, and the 
Chian ships under the command of Eubulus 
from Methymne : — which, having been left in 
the harbour at that place, had fled at once when 
Mitylene was taken ; three of them came up 
safe to Astyochus, but one had fallen into 
the hands of the Athenians ; — Astj'ochus now 
desisted from proceeding to Mitylene. Hav- 
ing eflectuated the revolt of Eressus, and provi- 
ded the inhabitants with arms, he ordered the sol- 
diers from on board his own squadron to march 
by land, under the command of Eteonicus, 
towards Antissa and Methymne ; whilst him- 
self, with his own ships and the three Chian, 
advanced along the shore towards the same 
places. He hoped the Mcthymneans, upon 
the sight of this succour, would resume their 
spirits and abide by their revolt. But, when 
every thing in Lesbos seemed tc act in concert 
against his scheme, he took his landmen again 
on board, an«l made the best of fcis way back 
again to Chios. The forces, farther, that had 
attended the motions of his sQuadron, and 
which were to have proceeded with him to 
Hellespont, were dismissed to their respective 
cities. After this, they were joined at Chios 
by six ships, which were sent tliither by the 



wanting here. The Latin trnnslators have Gmloavoin'- 
ed to supply it, thus : — " And the Chinns. Icnvine four 
sliips here for the defence of the place, stood nwny with 
the rest to Mityleoc, and caused it to revolt." 



YEAR XX.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



303 



confederate fleet of Peloponnesians assembled 
at Cenchreae. 

The Athenians in the meantime were em- 
ployed in resettling the state of affairs in 
Lesbos. Standing across from thence, and 
demolishing Polichne, on the continent, lately 
fortified by the Clazomenians, they removed 
all the latter back again to their city in the isle, 
excepting such as were authors of the revolt ; 
for these had retired to Daphnus. And thus 
ClazoraenjB once more became subject to the 
Athenians. 

The same summer, the Athenians, who 
with twenty ships had stationed themselves at 
Lade to awe Miletus, having made a descent 
at Panormus in the Milesian territory, kill 
Chalcideus the Lacedaemonian, who with a 
handful of men endeavoured to repulse them. 
The third day after this action, they re-embark- 
ed ; but first erected a trophy ; which the 
Milesians thought proper to demolish, as not 
fixed on a spot which was the property of the 
victors. 

Leon, also, and Diomedon, at the head of the 
Athenian fleet on the station of Lesbos, assem- 
bling together what force they could from the 
Oinussae islands, which lie before Chios, and 
from Sidusa and Pteleum, fortresses of their 
own in Erythraea, stood away from Lesbos in 
a body, and carried on the war by sea against 
the Chians. The land soldiers on board them 
were some of the heavy-armed of the public 
roll of Athens, now pressed into this service. 
At Cardamyle they landed ; and at Bolissus, 
having routed in battle a body of Chians that 
made head against them, and done great execu- 
tion upon them, they reduced all the places in 
that quarter of the island. At Phanae also 
they fought a second time with great success ; 
and, a third time, at Leuconium. But as, 
after these repeated defeats, the Chians no 
longer showed themselves in the field to oppose 
them, the victors made cruel ravage on that 
rich and fertile country ; and which, from the 
invasion of the Medes to the present period of 
time, had been totally exempted from the 
miseries of war. For, next to the Lacedaemo- 
nians, the Chians are the only people who (as 
far as I have been able to observe) have en- 
joyed a series of public prosperity with a steady 
and uniform moderation, and, in proportion as 
their state increased in wealth and power, made 
suitable accessions to its domestic splendour 
and security. Nay, even their late revolt, if 



this should chance to be ascribed to a want of 
judicious and cautionary measures, they never 
ventured to declare, till they had fortified the 
hazardous step with numerous and gallant con- 
federates, and saw plainly that the Athenians, 
(as even the Athenians themselves could not 
possibly deny,) after the blow received in 
Sicily, were plunged into the lowest depth of 
impotence and distress. If, therefore, they 
proved mistaken, it was one of those cases 
inseparable from the constant mutability of 
human affairs, where numbers were involved in 
the same mistake with themselves, who yet in 
their judgment were perfectly convinced that 
the entire ruin of Athens was fast approaching. 

Now, therefore, blocked up as they were by 
sea, whilst their lands all around were ravaged 
by the enemy, a party amongst them were con- 
certing the method of delivering up the city 
into the hands of the Athenians. But those 
in the administration, getting wind of their 
design, refrained indeed from making a bustle 
about it in public ; but, fetching over Astyo- 
chus, the Lacedaemonian admiral in chief, with 
his four ships, from Erythrae, they consulted 
how to prevent the execution of the plot by 
the mildest and most gentle methods, either 
by taking hostages for the fidelity of the sus- 
pected, or some other such cautionary expe- 
dients. In this posture stood affairs at Chios. 

But, from Athens, in the close of the same 
summer, one thousand five hundred heavy- 
armed Athenians and a thousand Argives, (for 
five hundred Argives, who were but light- 
armed, the Athenians had equipped in tho 
manner more complete,) with the addition of a 
thousand confederates, in eight and forty sail 
of ships, including the transports of the heavy- 
armed, and put under the command of Phry- 
nichus and Onomacles and Skironidas, sailed 
away to Samos, and, thence stretching over to 
Miletus, encamped themselves before it. The 
Milesians marched out into the field, to the 
amount of eight hundred heavy-armed, assisted 
by the Peloponnesians who came over with 
Chalcideus and a body of foreign mercenaries 
furnished by Tissaphernes. Tissaphernes also 
assisted them in person with an aid of cavalry : 
and thus battle was joined against the Athe- 
nians and confederates. The Argives, of whom 
a whole wing was composed, advanced before 
the rest of the line ; and, contemning their 
enemy too much, as lonians, and unable to 
stand their shock, they charged in a disorderly 



304 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book 



vin. 



manner, are routed by the Milesians, and no 
less a number than three hundred of their body 
are destroyed. But the Athenians beat first 
the Peloponnesians, and then cleared the field 
of the Barbarians and all the rabble of the ene- 
my, yet came not at all to an engagement with 
the Milesians : for the latter, returning towards 
the city from the chase of the Argives, no 
sooner perceived that their own side was van- 
quished than they quitted the field of battle. 
The Athenians, therefore, as victors, posted 
themselves under the very walls of Miletus. 
It is observable, that, in this battle, the lonians 
had on both sides the better of the Dorians : 
for the Athenians beat those Peloponnesians 
who were ranged against them ; and the Mile- 
sians did the same by the Argives. But now, 
after erecting a trophy, as the town was seated 
on an isthmus, the Athenians were preparing 
to cut it oflf by a work of circumvallation ; con- 
cluding that, <' if they once could get possession 
of Miletus, they should easily complete the re- 
duction of the other states." 

It was now about the shut of evening, and 
advice is brought them that " five and fifty 
sail of ships from Peloponnesus and Sicily are 
only not at hand." For, from Sicily, where 
Hermocrates the Syracusan strenuously ad- 
vised to go on with what yet remained in re- 
gard to the total demolition of the Athenians, 
twenty sail of Syracusans and two of Selinum- 
tians came over. The Peloponnesian fleet, 
which had been fitting out, was now ready for 
service ; and both these were sent out in con- 
junction, under the orders of Theramenes the 
Lacedaemonian, who was to carry them to As- 
tyochus the admiral in chief. They arrived 
first at Eleus, an island before Miletus. Being 
there informed that the Athenians lay before 
Miletus, they departed thence ; and, steering 
first into the gulf of lasus, were desirous to 
pick up information how things went at Miletus. 
Alcibiades had now rode to Teichiussa in the 
Milesian ; in which quarter of the gulf the fleets 
had come to anchor for the night, and receive 
there a full account of the battle. Alcibiades 
had been present at it, and had given his assist- 
ance to the Milesians and Tissaphernes. He 
therefore earnestly pressed them, " unless they 
were desirous to see all Ionia lost, and all 
their great expectations blasted at once, to re- 
pair with all possible expedition to the succour 
of Miletus, and by no means to suffer it to be 
invested by a circumvallation." In pursuance 



of this it was resolved, that at the first dawn of 
day they would stand away to its succour. 

But Phrynichus, the Athenian commander, 
when advised from Lerus of the certain arrival 
of this united fleet, even though his colleagues 
declared openly for keeping their ground and 
hazarding an engagement by sea, protested 
boldly, that " such a step, for his own part, he 
could not take ; and, were he able to hinder it, 
that neither they nor any one should force him 
to it : for, since it would be afterwards in their 
power, when they had got better intelligence 
of the numbers of the enemy, and made what 
possible accessions they could to their own, 
and when they had prepared for action in an 
ample and leisurely manner, — since it would 
be still in their power to fight, the dread of a 
shameful or reproachful imputation should not 
bend him to risk an engagement against his 
judgment. It could be no matter of reproach 
to the Athenians to retire with their fleet 
when the exigencies of time required it ; but, 
in every respect, it would be highly reproach- 
ful to them should they fight and be vanquished. 
He would not, therefore, involve the state, 
not only in reproach, but in the greatest of 
dangers ; — the state which, but just now re- 
spiring from the terrible blows it had received, 
scarce thought it prudential with most ample 
preparation to choose voluntary hazards, or 
even, when the last necessity demanded, to 
strike first at the enemy, — why now, when 
no neccessity compelled, must it be thrown 
into wilful spontaneous dangers V He ex- 
horted them, therefore, " without loss of time 
to carry the wounded on board, to re-embark 
their troops, and, securing what baggage they 
had brought along with them, to leave behind 
what booty they had got from the enemy, that 
their ships might not be too deeply laden, and 
make the best of their way to Samos ; and from 
thence, after collecting together what additional 
force they could, to watch for and seize the 
seasons of advantage to attack their foes." 
The advice of Phrynichus, thus given, was 
prevailing, and accordingly wasput in execution. 
He was regarded, not only on the present but 
on future occasions, not only for this, but all 
the subsequent instances of his conduct, as a 
man of an excellent understanding. 

In pursuance of this, the Athenians, so soon 
as the evening was closed, made the best of 
their way from Miletus, and left the victory 
imperfect. And the Argives, without making 



YEAR XX.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



305 



the least stay, chagrined as they were at their 
late defeat, departed immediately from Samos 
to return to Argos. 

The Peloponnesians, early the next dawn, 
weighing from Teichiussa, stand into Miletus. 
After one day's stay in that harbour, on the 
next, having augmented their squadron with 
the Chian ships which had formerly been 
chased in company with Chalcideus, they de- 
termined to go back again to Teichiussa to 
fetch off what stores they had landed there. 
Accordingly, when they were thus returned, 
Tissaphernes, being come up with his land 
army, persuades them to stand directly against 
lasus, in which his enemy Amorges at that 
.iiastaut lay. Thus, falling on lasus by surprise, 
ithe inhabitants of which expected none but an 
Athenian squadron, they become masters of it. 
In this action the Syracusans were the persons 
who gained the greatest honour. Amorges, 
farther, the bastard son of Pissuthnes, who was 
a revolter from the king, was taken prisoner by 
the Peloponnesians. They delivered him up 
to Tissaphernes, that if he pleased he might 
isend him to the king, in obedience to his orders, 
lasus, farther, they put to the sack ; and the 
army made on this occasion, a very large booty, 
for this city had ever been remarkable for its 
wealth. They gave quarter to the auxiliaries 
in the service of Amorges: and, without com- 
mitting the least in&ult upon them, took them 
into their own troops, as the bulk of them 
were Peloponnesians. They delivered up the 
town into the hands of Tissaphernes, as like- 
wise all the prisoners, whether slaves or free- 
men, upon covenant to receive from him a 
Doric stater' for each. This being done, they 
again repaired to Miletus ; and from hence 
they detach Psedaritus, the son of Leon, whom 
the Lacedaemonians had sent expressly to be 
governor of Chios, to march over land to Ery- 
thrae, having under his command the auxiliaries 
who had served under Amorges ; and appoint 
Philippus to commmand at Miletus. And the 
-summer ended. 

The winter now succeeding, after Tissa- 
phernes had garrisoned and provided for the 
security of lasus, he repaired to Miletus, and 
distributed a month's subsistence, in pursuance 
of his engagements at Lacedaemon, to all the 
ships, at the rate of an Attic drachma^ to each 
mariner by the day ; but for the remainder of 



time he declared he would only pay at the rate 
of three oboli,^ till he had consulted the king's 
pleasure ; and, in case his master's orders were 
for it, he said, he would make it up a complete 
drachma. But as Hermocrates, the Syracu- 
san commander, remonstrated sharply against 
this usage, (for Theramenes, not regarding 
himself as admiral, since he was now at the 
head of the fleet merely to carry it up to Asty- 
ochus, was very indolent about the article of 
pay,) it was at length compromised, that except- 
ing the five supernumerary ships, the crews 
of the rest should receive more than three 
oboli a man : for to the five and fifty ships he 
paid three talents^ a month ; and, for the rest, 
as many as exceeded that number, pay was to 
be furnished at the rate of only three oboli a 
day. 

The same winter, the Athenians now lying 
at Samos had been reinforced by the arrival of 



» 1/. 12s, 2id. 



40 



t-ic 



3 Haifa drachma. 

* There is manifestly a fault here ; for t^ ly,, three, in 
the original, should be read rgiaxovrx, thirty, talents a 
month. Mr Hobhes hath taken the pains to compute, 
and finds that the Peioponnesian ships carried eighteen 
men a piece. What? only so small a crew as eighteen 
men for a ship of w^ar with three banks of oars? or, 
where the complement was perhaps two hundred, did 
Tissaphernes only pay a tenth part of that number? 
Xenophon, in the first book of his Greek history, ena- 
bles us to set all to rights. Lysander is negotiating 
with Cyrus for an increase of pay. Cyrus insists upon 
the former agreement made by Tissaphernes, that 
every ship should receive but thirty minae a month. 
The daily pay of each was of course one mina, or one 
hundred drachmas: whence it appears, that, at three 
oboli, or half a drachma, a man, the pay of sixty ships, 
each carrying two hundred men, would b€ just thirty 
talents. Thirty talents, therefore, paid to fifty-five 
ships for a month, were two talents and a half abovs 
three oboli a day. And hence it seems pretty clear, 
that the complement of a Peioponnesian ship of war 
was two hundred men. 

I have another proof at hand, which will confirm 
what hath already been said, and serve at the same 
time to ascertain the number of men on board a ship 
of war. In the sixth book Thucydides says, the Eges- 
teans brought to Athens sixty talents, as a month's pay 
for sixty ships. He snys also, that in the Sicilian expe- 
dition the daily pay of the Athenian seamen was raised 
to a drachma a man. Now a talent a month, reckon- 
ing thirty days to the month, is two minae a day ; and 
two minse are just two hundred drachmas. Hence, it 
is plain, the complement of an Athenian ship was two 
hundred men; and, according to the former computa- 
tion, that of a Peioponnesian ship was, as might rea- 
sonably be expected, exactly the same. This is a far- 
ther confirmation that there is a mistake in the printed 
copiesof the original, as was said above ; where, instead 
of three talents, which amount but to 581/. 5*. sterling, 
should have been read thirty talents, amounting in 
English money to 5812/. 10*. 
2H 



306 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book vm. 



five and thirty sail from Athens, under the 
command of Charminus, and Strombichides, 
and Euctemon ; and they had farther assem- 
bled all their ships from Chios, and others. A 
resolution was therefore taken, after assigning 
each his peculiar command by lot, to make up 
against it with a naval force, and awe Miletus; 
but to send against Chios both a naval and a 
land force ; and this accordingly they put in 
execution. For, in fact, Strombichides, and 
Onomacles, and Euctemon, with a squadron 
of thirty sail and a body of transports, which 
had on board a detachment from the thousand 
heavy-armed which came against Miletus, stood 
away for Chios, as this service had fallen to 
them by lot ; but the rest of the commanders 
who now remained at Samos, having under 
them seventy-four ships, were quite lords of 
the sea, and sailed boldly up to awe Miletus. 

Astyochus, who happened at this juncture 
to be in Chios, selecting hostages as a preven- 
tion against treachery, thought proper for the 
present to desist, when he heard of the arrival 
of the squadron under Theramenes, and that 
their engagements with Tissaphernes were 
much altered for the better. But, taking with 
him ,ten sail of Peloponnesians and ten of Chi- 
ans, he putteth to sea ; and, having made an 
attempt upon Pteleum, though without suc- 
cess, he crossed over to Clazomense. He 
there summoned such of the inhabitants as 
were attached to the Athenians to remove with 
their effects up to Daphnus, and leave him in 
possession of the place ; Tamus, farther, the 
subgovernor of Ionia, joined with him in the 
summons. But, when the inhabitants rejected 
this offer, he made an assault upon the city, 
which had no fortifications ; yet, miscarrying 
in the attempt, he put off again to sea in a hard 
gale of wind, and reached, with those ships 
that kept up with him, to Phocea and Cyme : 
but the rest of the squadron was by stress of 
weather forced over to the isles which lie near 
to Clazomena), — Marathusa, and Pele, and 
Drimussa ; and, yvhatever effects belonging to 
the Clazomenians had by way of security been 
deposited there, during eight days' continuance, 
which the stormy weather obliged them to 
stay, they partly plundered and partly destroy- 
ed ; and having secured their booty on board, 
got away to Phocea and CymQ, and joined ' 
Astyochus. But, whilst he was yet in this i 
station, ambassadors reach him from the Les- 
bians, imparting to him their desires to revolt. ; 



Him, indeed, they persuade ; but, when the 
Corinthians and the rest of the confederates 
declared their repugnance, because of the for- 
mer miscarriage, he weighed from thence and 
made sail for Chios. And now, a storm dis- 
persing his squadron, at last they all come in, 
though from different quarters to which they 
had been driven, and rejoined him at Chios. 

The next step to this was the junction of 
Paedaritus ; who, being now at Ervthrae, after 
marching by land from Miletus, passed over in 
person with the troops under his command to 
Chios. He had also with him about five hun- 
dred soldiers, taken out of the five ships under 
Chalcideus, who had been left behind with 
their arms. 

But now, the Lesbians notifying again their 
readiness to revolt, Astyochus, in a conference 
with Paedaritus and the Chians, " maintains 
the necessity of going thither with a squadron 
to support the revolt of Lesbos ; since, in con- 
sequence of it, they must either enlarge the 
number of their confederates, or, even though 
miscarrying in the design, must hurt the Athe- 
nians." But they were deaf to this remon- 
strance ; and Pa;daritus positively declared that 
he should not be attended by the ships of 
Chios. Upon this, taking with him five sail 
of Corinthians, a sixth ship belonging to Me- 
gara, and one more of Hcrmione, and all the 
Laconian which he himself brought thither, he 
stood away from thence to his station at Mile- 
tus, uttering grievous threats against the Chi- 
ans, that, " how low soever they might be re- 
duced, they should never receive any succour 
from him." Accordingly, touching first at 
Cor\-cus of Erythrse, he moored there for the 
night. The Athenians, who, from Samos, 
with a considerable strength, were now bound 
against Chios, were lying at the same instant 
of time on the other side of the cape, but so 
stationed that neither party knew of the near- 
ness of the other. At this juncture, a letter 
being delivered from Predaritus, that " a party 
of Erythrseans, who had been prisoners at Sa- 
mos and released from thence, are coming to 
Erythra? to betray that place," Astyochus puts 
out again immediately for Erythrre ; and thus 
narrowly, on this occasion, did he escape fall- 
ing into the hands of the Athenians. Paedari- 
tus, farther, had made the passage upon this 
affair ; and both having joined in making all 
necessary inquiries about those who were ac- 
cused of this piece of troachcry, when tliey 



YEAR XX.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



307 



found the whole to have been a plot of the 
prisoners at Samos merely to recover their 
liberty, they pronounced them innocent, and so 
departed ; the latter to Chios ; but the other, 
in pursuance of his first designation, made the 
best of his way to Miletus. 

In the mean time the armament of the Athe- 
nians, having sailed round from Corycus to 
Arginum, falls in with three long vessels of 
the Chians, and no sooner had descried than 
they gave them chase. And now a violent 
storm ariseth, and the vessels of the Chians 
with great ditficulty escape into harbour : but, 
of the Athenian squadron, three, which had 
most briskly followed the chace, are disabled 
and driven ashore at the city of the Chians : the 
crews of them were partly made prisoners, and 
partly put to the sword. The rest of the fleet 
got into a safe harbour which is known by the 
name of Phoenicus, under the Mimas. From 
hence they afterwards took their course to 
Lesbos, and got all in readiness to raise forti- 
fications. 

From Peloponnesus, the same winter, Hip- 
pocrates the Lacedaemonian, putting out to sea, 
with ten sail of Thurians commanded by Dori- 
cus, the son of Diagoras, and two colleagues, 
with one ship of Laconia, and one of Syracuse, 
arriveth at Cnidus. This place was now in 
revolt from Tissaphernes. Those of Miletus 
were no sooner advised of the arrival of this 
squadron, than they sent them orders, with 
one moiety of their ships to keep guard upon 
Cnidus, and with the other to post themselves 
at the Triopium, in order to take under their 
convoy the trading vessels, which were in their 
course from Egypt. The Triopium is a point 
in the territory of Cnidus, jutting out into the 
sea, and a temple of Apollo. But the Athe- 
nians, informed of their designs, and standing 
away from Samos, take six of the ships which 
were stationed at the Triopium : the crews, 
indeed, quit their ships, and reach the shore. 
This being done, the victors sailed directly to 
Cnidus ; and, making an assault upon that city 
which was quite unfortified, had very nearly 
taken it. On the next day they renewed 
the assault. Yet as the inhabitants had taken 
care to make it more secure by favour of the 
night, and the men, escaped from the vessels 
taken at Triopium, had thrown themselves into 
the place, they did less damage than on the 
preceding day. After scouring and laying 



waste the territory of Cnidus, they sailed back 
to Samos. 

About the same time, Astyochus having re- 
joined the fleet at Miletus, the Peloponncsians 
were still abounding in all the needful expedi- 
ents of war. Good pay was regularly advanced 
them, and the soldiers had store of money yet 
remaining of the rich booty they made at 
lasus. The Milesians, farther, sustained with 
alacrity the burden of the war. It was, how- 
ever, the opinion of the Peloponncsians, that 
the first treaty made with Tissaphernes by 
Chalcideus was in some articles defective and 
less advantageous to themselves. Upon this 
they drew up and ratified a second in the pre- 
sence of Theramenes. The articles of it are 
these : 

" Stipulated, by the Lacedsemonians and 
confederates, with king Darius and the sons of 
the king and Tissaphernes, that peace and 
amity subsist on the following conditions : 

" Whatever province or city soever belong- 
eth to king Darius, or did belong to his father 
or ancestors, against them in a hostile manner, 
not to march, and no injury to do, are bound 
both Lacedsemonians, and confederates of the 
Lacedaemonians. Not to exact tribute from 
any such places, are bound both Lacedaemoni- 
ans and confederates of the Lacedaemonians. 
Neither shall king Darius, nor any subject of 
the king, march in a hostile manner against, 
nor do any injury to, the Lacedaemonians and 
confederates. 

" But, in case the Lacedaemonians or confe- 
derates need any assistance whatever from the 
king ; or the king from the Lacedaemonians and 
confederates; whatever either party can con- 
vince the other to be right, let that be done. 

" Be the war against the Athenians and 
confederates carried on by both parties in strict 
conjunction. And, in case an accommodation 
be taken in hand, be it settled by both parties 
acting in conjunction. 

"But, whatever army be brought into, the 
territories of the king at the request and sum- 
mons of the king, the king to defray the ex- 
pense. 

" And, if any of the states, comprehended 
in this league with the king, invade the terri- 
tories of the king, the others to oppose and 
act with all their power in defence of the king. 

" And, if any province belonging to the 
king, or subject to his dominion, invade the 



30» 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book vin. 



territory of the Lacedxmonians or confede- 
rates ; the king to oppose, and with all his 
power to defend the party invaded." 

When the finishing hand was put to this 
treaty, Theramenes, after delivering up the 
fleet to Astyochus, puts to sea in a fly-boat, 
and entirely disappears. 

Eat the Athenians from Lesbos, having now 
made their passage and landed their forces in 
Chios, and being masters of the coast and sea, 
fortified Delphinium ; a place remarkably strong 
by nature towards the land, abounding, farther, 
with harbours, and seated at no considerable 
distance from the city of the Chians. And 
now the Chians, dispirited by the many defeats 
they had already received, and, what is worse, 
far from being actuated by general unanimity, 
(but, on the contrary, Tydeus the Ionian and 
his adherents having been lately put to death 
by Psedaritus for atticizing, and the rest of the 
citizens obliged by necessity to submit to the 
few, each individual amongst them suspecting 
his neighbour,) — the Chians now remained 
quite inactive. Thus, for the reasons above- 
mentioned*, they neither looked upon them- 
selves, nor the auxiliaries under Paedaritus, as 
a match for the enemy. Yet, as their last re- 
source, they send to Miletus, requesting As- 
tyochus to come over to their succour. But, 
as he was deaf to their entreaties, Paedaritus 
sends a letter to Lacedaemon about him, which 
accused him of injustice. And to this situa- 
tion were brought the Athenian aflTairs at 
Chios. 

Their squadron also at Samos made several 
visits to the squadron of the enemy at Miletus ; 
but, as the latter refused to come out to engage 
them, they returned again to Samos, without 
committing any hostilities. 

From Peloponnesus, in the same winter, 
twenty-seven sail of ships, equipped by the 
Lacedaemonians for Pharnabazus, at the in- 
stance of his agents, Calligitus the Megarean, 
and Timagoras the Cyzicene, put out to sea, 
aud made over to Ionia, about the solstice. 
Antisthenes the Spartan was on board as ad- 
miral. With him the Lacedaemonians sent also 
eleven Spartans, to be a council to Astyochus ; 
in the number of whom was Lichas, the son 
of Arcesilaus. To these an order was given, 
that, " when arrived at Miletus, they should 
in concert act in all respects as might be best 
for the service ; and this squadron, or one 
equal in strength, or larger or smaller, at their 



I own discretion, should proceed to Hellespont 
[ for the service of Pharnabazus, and be sent 
! away under the command of Clearchus the son 
of Ramphias, who accompanied them in the 
voyage ; and, in case it was judged expedient 
by the council of eleven, to dismiss Astyochus 
from the chief command, and substitute An- 
! tisthenes." On account of the letters of Paeda- 
ritus, they began to suspect the former. This 
' squadron, therefore, standing out to sea from 
I Melea, arrived first at Melos ; and, falling iij 
with ten sail of Athenians, they take and burn 
three of them, which their crews had aban- 
doned. But, apprehensive that those Athe- 
nian ships which had escaped might advertise 
the fleet at Samos of their approach, as was 
actually the case, they stretched away for Crete ; 
and, for better security, keeping a good look 
out, and taking more time, they made land first 
at Caunus of Asia. From thence, as being 
now beyond the reach of danger, they despatch 
a messenger to the fleet at Miletus, to attend 
and bring them up. 

But, about the same juncture of time, the 
Chians and Paedaritus, not bearing to acquiesce 
under the dilatory answers of Astyochus, press- 
ed him, by repeated messages, «' to come over 
with the whole of his force, and relieve them 
from the present blockade ; and by no means 
to look indolently about him, whilst the most 
important of the confederate states in Ionia was 
shut up by sea, and by land exposed to rapines." 
For, the domestics of the Chians, — being many 
in number, nay, the largest that any one com- 
mimity except the Lacedaemonians kept, and 
accustomed, because of their multitude, to be 
punished with extraordinary severity for their 
misdemeanors, — no sooner judged that the 
Athenian forces, by throwing up works, had 
gained a sure footing in the island, than large 
numbers of them at once deserted to the ene- 
my, and were afterwards the persons who, as 
perfectly well acquainted with the country, 
committed the heaviest depredations. The 
Chians, therefore, urged, that " the last neces- 
sity called upon him, whilst yet there was hope 
or a possibility of success remaining, (the 
works round Delphinium yet incomplete, and 
a larger circle even still to be taken in and for- 
tified for the security of the camp aud the 
fleet,) to undertake their relief." Upon this, 
Astyochus, who, to verify his throats, had 
never before thought seriously about it, being 
now convinced that the whole confederate 



YEAR XX.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



309 



body was bent on their preservation, deter- 
mined in person to go to their succour. 

But, just at this crisis, advice is brought 
iiim from Caunus, that " twenty-seven sail of 
«hips and the assistant-council of Lacedaemo- 
nians are arrived." Concluding, upon this, 
Ihat every other point ought to be postponed 
*o this large reinforcement, that his junction 
with it might be effected in order to invest 
them with the sovereignty of the sea, and that 
the Lacedismonians who came to inspect his 
own conduct might securely finish their voy- 
age ; throwing up immediately all concern for 
Chios, he mailed away for Caunus. But, 
having landed in his passage at Cos Meropidis, 
the inhabitants of which had refuged them- 
selves in the mountains, he rifled the city, 
which was quite unfortified, and had lately 
been tumbled into ruins by an earthquake, the 
greatest that had been felt there in the memory 
of us now living. By excursions, also, through 
all the country, he made prize of all he found, 
excepting seamen ; for such he dismissed un- 
hurt. 

From Cos advancing by night to Cnidus, he 
is dissuaded by the Cnidians from landing his 
men ; but, on the contrary, without loss of time 
to get out to sea, and make head against twenty 
sail of Athenians, which Charminus, one of 
the commanders from Samos, had under his 
orders, and with them was watching the ap- 
proach of the twenty-seven sail coming up from 
Peloponnesus, which Astyochus was now go- 
ing to join. For they at Samos had received 
from Miletus advice of their coming, and Char- 
minus was appointed to cruise for them about 
Cyme, and Chalce, and Rhodes, and the coast 
of Lycia ; and by this time he knew, for a cer- 
tainty, that they were laying at Caunus. 

Astyochus, therefore, without loss of time, 
stood away for Cyme, with a view to surprise 
the ships of the enemy at sea before they could 
get any advice of his approach. A heavy rain 
and thick cloudy weather occasioned the dis- 
persion of his vessels in the dark, and sadly 
disordered him. 

When morning broke, the fleet being widely 
separated and the left wing driven already 
within the view of the Athenians, the re- 
mainder yet driving in confusion about the 
island, Charminus and the Athenians launch 
out against them with all possible expedition, 
though with fewer than twenty sail, imagining 
this to be the squadron from Caunus whose 



approach they were to observe ; and, proceed- 
ing instantly to action, they sunk three and 
disabled others. They had by far the better 
in the action, till the numerous remainder of 
hostile ships appeared, to their great conster- 
nation, and encompassed them round on all 
sides. Then, taking to open flight, they lost 
six of their ships ; but with the remainder reach 
in safety the isle of Teuglussa, and from thence 
proceed to Halicarnassus. 

This being done, the Peloponnesians, put- 
ting back to Cnidus, and the twenty-seven sail 
from Caunus completing here their junction 
with them, they put out again to sea in one 
body ; and, after erecting a trophy at Cyme, 
returned again to their anchorings at Cnidus. 

The Athenians, on the other hand, had no 
sooner been informed of the engagements of 
the squadrons, than with the whole of their 
fleet they put out from Samos, and made the 
best of their way to Cyme. And yet against 
the fleet at Cnidus they made no sallies, as 
neither did the enemy against them ; but, after 
taking up the tackling of the vessels left at 
Cyme, and making an assault upon Lorima on 
the continent, they returned to Samos. 

The whole united fleet of the Peloponne- 
sians, now lying at Cnidus, was busy ijn re- 
fitting completely for service ; and the Lace- 
daemonian council of eleven had a conference 
with Tissaphernes, who was now come to 
them, in which they notified to him their dis- 
like of some things in past transactions ; and, 
in regard to the future operations of war, de- 
bated in what manner they might be carried on 
for their joint benefit and convenience. But 
Lichas was the person who scrutinized most 
closely into the past, and expressed a dissatis- 
faction with both treaties; afllirming, that 
" even the last settled by Theramenes was far 
from being good ; but that terrible it would be, 
should the king now claim, upon that pretext, 
the possession of that tract of country of which 
either he or his ancestors had formerly been 
masters : for thus he might be enabled once 
more to enslave all the islands, and Thessaly, 
and Locri, quite as far as Boeotia ; whilst the 
Lacedaemonians, instead of freeing, would be 
obliged to impose the Median subjection on, 
the Grecians. He insisted, therefore, that a 
better treaty should be made, or at least the 
former should be instantly disannulled ; for on 
terms like the present they would scorn to take 
pay from the king." Nettled at this, Tissa- 
2h2 



310 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book vni. 



phernps went from them in a ifit of choler, 
without bringing affairs to any kind of settle- 
ment. 

Ttie scheme now next in agitation was a 
voyage to Rhodes, which the most powerful 
persons there had by embassies solicited them 
to undertake. They were full of hopes to 
bring into their subjection an island by no 
means inconsiderable either for number of 
mariners or soldiers ; and at the same time 
judged themselves able, by their present allian- 
ces, to defray the expense of their fleet without 
requesting pay from Tissaphernes. Accord- 1 
ingly, this winter, with great despatch, they put 
to sea from Cnidus ; and, arriving first at 
Camirus, on the Rhodian coast, with ninety- 
four ships, they struck a consternation into the 
multitude, who knew nothing of past transac- 
tions, and were the sooner tempted to abandon 
their dwellings as the city was not guarded by 
the least fortification. The Lacedaemonians, 
afterwards, summoning to a conference these, 
and the Rhodians also from two other cities, 
Lindus and lelysus, persuaded them to revolt 
from the Athenians. Rhodes accordingly 
went over to the Peloponnesians. 

At the same juncture of time, the Atheni- 
ans, who had discovered their design, put out 
with their fleet from Samos, earnestly bent on 
preventing the scheme. They were seen in- 
deed out at sea by the enemy, but made their 
appearance a little too late. For the present, 
therefore, they put back to Chalce, and from 
thence to Samos ; and afterwards, making fre- 
quent trips from Chalce, and Cos, and Samos, 
they warred against Rhodes. 

The Peloponnesians exacted from the Rho- 
dians a sum amounting to about two and thirty 
talents ;' and having laid their ships aground, 
continued with them eighty days without sub- 
jecting them to any farther imposition. 

During this interval of time, nay, extended 
farther back, before they undertook this enter- 
prise against Rhodes, the following transaction 
happened : 

Alcibiadcs, after the death of Chalcideus 
and the battle of Miletus, falling under the 
suspicion of the Peloponnesians, and through 
them a letter having been sent from Laccdre- 
mon to Astyochus to put him to death, — for 
he was an enemy to Agis, and his treachery in 
other respects was become notorious, — Alci- 

* 6200Z. sterling. 



biades, I say, fearful of his life, withdraws 
himself first to Tissaphernes, and in the next 
place, did all in his power to undermine what 
ir^terest the Peloponnesians had in him. 
(irown at length his dictator in every affair, he 
abridged their pay ; that, instead of an Attic 
drachma,^ three oboli only should be given 
them, and that too with no punctuality. He 
advised Tissaphernes to remonstrate with 
them, that " the Athenians, who through a 
long tract of time had gained experience in 
naval affairs, paid only three oboli to their sea- 
men, — not so much through a principle of fru- 
gality, as to prevent their seamen from growing 
insolent through too much plenty ; some of 
them would otherwise render their bodies less 
fit for fatigue, by having wherewithal to pur- 
chase those pleasures by which weakness is 
occasioned ; and others would desert, and leave 
their arrears to balance their desertion." He 
instructed him farther, how, by seasonable 
gratuities to the commanders of ships and 
generals of the states, he might persuade them 
all to acquiesce in his proceedings, excepting 
the Syracusans ; for, amongst these, Hermo- 
crates alone made loud remonstrances in be- 
half of the whole alliance. Nay, Alcibiades 
himself took upon him to give the denial to 
such states as petitioned for money ; making 
answer himself, instead of Tissaphernes, that, 
for instance, the Chians were void of all 
shame ; who, though the most wealthy of the 
Grecians, and hitherto preserved by the 
auxiliary efforts of others, yet are ever requir- 
ing strangers to expose their lives and fortunes 
to keep them free." As for other states, he 
maintained " they acted basely, if, when 
subjected to vast expenses before they re- 
volted from the Athenians, they refused to 
lay out as much, nay, a great deal more, in 
their own defence." He was also dextrous at 
proving, that " Tissaphernes, since now he 
supported the war at his own private expense, 
was in the right to be frugal ; but assuredly, 
when returns were made him from the king, ho 
would make up the present abatement of pay, 
and do strict justice to every single state." He 
farther suggested to Tissaphernes, that " he 
should not be too much in a hurry to bring the 
war to a conclusion ; or entertain the wish, 
either by bringing up the Phoenician fleet which 
he had provided, or by taking into pay a larger 

• Six oboli, or 7}(f. sterling. 



\i3AR XX.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



311 



number of Grecians, to turn the superiority at 
land and sea infavourof the Lacedaemonians. He 
ought rather to leave both parties pretty nearly 
balanced in strength ; and so enable the king, 
when one of them became troublesome, to let 
the other party loose against them : whereas, 
should the dominion in both elements be given 
exclusively to either, he would then be distressed 
for want of sufficient power to pull down the 
triumphant state ; unless at a prodigious ex- 
pense, and through infinity of danger to himself, 
he should choose to enter the list in person 
and war them down. The risks incurred by 
the other method were far more eligible, be- 
cause attended with a smaller proportion of ex- 
pense ; and his master might lie by with per- 
fect security, whilst he was wearing out the 
Grecians by their own reciprocal embroil- 
ments." He moreover hinted to him, that 
« the Athenians were the best suited of the 
two to share the dominion with him ; because 
they were less desirous of power on the conti- 
nent, and by their peculiar turn of politics and 
military conduct were better adapted for this 
purpose. They would be glad, at the same 
time, to subdue the maritime parts to their own 
yoke, and to that of the king all Grecians 
whatever who live upon the continent. The 
Lacedaemonians, on the contrary, came thither 
with the sole passion to set them free ; nor in 
common prudence could it be judged likely, 
that men, who were this moment employed to 
deliver Grecians from the yoke of Grecians, 
would in that case be stopped by any thing but 
a superior force from delivering them also from 
the yoke of barbarians." He advised him, 
therefore, " in the first place, to wear out the 
strength of both ; and, after clipping as much 
as possible the wings of the Athenians, then 
instantly to drive the Peloponnesians from off 
his coast." 

The larger part of this advice Tissaphernes 
determined to follow, so far at least as may 
be gathered from his actions ; for, satisfied by 
this means with Alcibiades, as a person who 
on these points gave him sound advice, and re- 
signing himself up to his guidance, he paid but 
sorrily their subsistence to the Peloponnesians, 
and would not suffer them to engage at sea. 
By the constant pretext that the Phoenician 
fleet was coming up, and then with so great a 
superiority of strength the war might be brought 
to a clear decision, he ruined all operations of 
war ; he suflered the vigour of their fleet, which 



in fact was strong and mighty, insensibly to 
moulder away, and disconcerted them so open- 
ly, in other respects, that his motives in doing 
it were no longer to be concealed. 

Such was the advice which Alcibiades gave 
to Tissaphernes and the king, when he had 
opportunities, and which he really thought to 
be the best in policy ; but at the same time he 
had deep in his heart and in his study his own 
return to his country ; assured, within himself, 
that, if he preserved it from a total destruction, 
he might find a time to compass his own 
restoration : and nothing, he judged, could ex- 
pedite his purpose more, than if it appeared to 
the world that Tissaphernes was his friend ; 
which also was verified by fact. 

For, when the Athenian troops at Samoa 
perceived that he had so strong an interest 
with Tissaphernes, and Alcibiades had already 
paved the way by sending intimations before- 
hand to the men of influence and authority 
amongst them, how desirous he was " they 
should patronise his return with the consent of 
the persons of the greatest honour and worth 
in their company ; since only under an oligar- 
chy, but not under an iniquitous cabal or that 
democracy which had formerly banished him, 
could he even desire it ; — and, thus recalled, 
he would come and join his cares with theirs 
for the public welfare, and procure them farther 
the friendship of Tissaphernes ;" — when, more 
than this, the officers of those Athenians at 
Samos, and the men of highest authority 
amongst them, were voluntarily inclined to put 
an end to the democracy ; — the method of 
bringing it about began to be agitated first in 
the army, and from thence soon made a stir in 
Athens itself. 

Some persons passed over from Samos, to 
concert matters with Alcibiades ; who gave 
them room to hope that <' he could render first 
Tissaphernes, and in the next place the king, 
their friend, if they would dissolve the demo- 
cracy ; since, on this sole condition, could the 
king be assured of their sincerity." This con- 
tributed to enhance their sanguine expectations, 
that on this their affairs might take a new turn, 
in which men of first rank in the community, 
who in the present management were most 
depressed, might recover the administration, 
and gain the ascendant over their enemies. 
Returning, therefore, to Samos, they took in 
the most proper persons there to be assistants 
to the schema ; and to the many made public 



312 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book VIII. 



declarations, that " the king might be made 
their friend, and supply them with money, 
were Alcibiades recalled, and the democracy 
suspended." The effect of these declarations on 
the many was this, that, though for the present 
they were chagrined at the scheme in agitation, 
yet, soothed by the flattering hope of the royal 
subsidies, they refrained from ail manner of 
tumult. 

But the set which was caballing in favour of 
an oligarchy, after such open declarations to 
the multitude, reconsidered the promises of 
Alcibiades amongst themselves, and with a 
larger number of their associates. The scheme 
was judged by all the rest to be feasible and 
sure ; but Phrynichus, who was yet in the 
command, declared a total dislike of it. It ap- 
peared to him (which was really the case) that 
« Alcibiades cared as little for an oligarchical 
as a democratical government ; and that no 
other thought lay seriously at his heart than 
to throw the present government into some 
state of confusion, which his friends might so 
far improve as to carry his recallment. Of 
consequence, the first point themselves should 
guard against was, not to be thrown into sedi- 
tions for the benefit of the king. It was not 
probable, (he plainly told them,) when the 
Peloponnesians had gained a power by sea 
equal to their own, and were masters of cities 
not the most inconsiderable amidst the king's 
dominions, that the latter should turn the 
balance in favour of the Athenians, in whom 
he hath no confidence at all, whilst he might 
firmly depend upon the friendship of the Pelo- 
ponnesians, who had never done him any harm. 
As for confederate states, to whom they were 
to give a certain pledge of future oligarchy by 
setting up that government amongst themselves, 
he told them he was well assured that on that 
account neither such as had revolted would the 
sooner return, nor such as were at present 
their own would the longer continue in their 
duty ; since the point on which their wishes 
turned was, not to be enslaved by an oligarchy 
rather than a democracy, but to recover their 
liberty, indifferent equally to either form. As 
for those of their fellow-citizens to whom was 
given the appellation of worthy and good, even 
they would perplex the train of government as 
much as the people, when, by cajoling that 
people, and authoritatively leading them into a 
series of bad measures, they would ])rincipally 
regard their own private emoluments: and, 



should they be subjected to the caprice of such, 
to die by violence and without a trial must be 
the general fate ; whereas the people was a 
sure resource in seasons of extremity, and ever 
tempered the fury of the great. He was well 
convinced, the states, enlightened by a long 
tract of experience, judge of their government 
in the same light. Upon the whole, therefore, 
the negotiations of Alcibiades, and all at present 
upon the carpet, could in no wise be approved 
by him." 

The party, however, associated together in 
this design, abiding by their former determina- 
tions, resolved to proceed to their execution, 
and were preparing to send Pisander and others 
by way of deputation to Athens, to set on 
foot the negotiations concerning the return of 
Alcibiades, the dissolution of the popular govern- 
ment there, and the gaining over Tissaphernes 
to the Athenian friendship. 

Phrynichus, — now convinced that the return 
of Alcibiades would be brought upon the car- 
pet, and the Athenians assuredly grant it; 
apprehensive, farther, that, from the opposition 
he had given it at their consultations, he should 
then be exposed to his resentments, as one 
who had endeavoured to stop it, — hath recourse 
to the following project : He sends to Asty- 
ochus, admiral in chief of the Lacedaemonians, 
who yet continued in the station of Miletus, a 
secret hint, by letter, that Alcibiades is 
ruining their affairs, by endeavouring to gain 
over Tissaphernes to the Athenians;" and, 
after giving him a clear explanation of other 
matters, he pleaded " the candour of Astyochus 
in his own excuse, if he desired in this manner 
to ruin his mortal foe, though with some pre- 
judice to the welfare of his country." But 
Astyochus had given up all thoughts of putting 
Alcibiades to death, especially as now he never 
came within his reach ; yet, on this occasion, 
making a visit to him and Tissaphernes at 
Magnesia, he communicates to them the advices 
sent him from Samos, and becomes himself an 
informer. He is accused by report, not only 
on this but many other occasions, to have made 
court to Tissaphernes for his own private 
lucre ; and, for the same reason, when the pay 
was not fully rendered before, he suffered it 
much more pliantly than in duty he ought to 
have done. Alcibiades sends away immediate 
notice to the managing party at Samoa, that 
the treachery of Phrynichus was detected by 
his own letter, and insists upon it that he b« 



YEAR XX.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



113 



put to death. Phrynichus, terribly alarmed, 
and pushed to the very brink of destruction by 
such a discovery, sends again to Astyochus, 
claming his indiscretion on a former occasion 
in not keeping his secret, and assuring him 
that " now he was ready to deliver up to his 
fury the whole force of the Athenians at 
Samos," (distinctly reciting to him the partic- 
ulars by which, as Samos was unfortified, the 
whole scheme might be accomplished,) and 
that " undoubtedly he ought not to be censured 
if, when his unrelenting foes had reduced him 
to such extremity of danger, he chose to do 
this, or even more than this, rather than be 
destroyed by their rancour." But this proposal 
also Astyochus communicates to Alcibiades. 

Phrynichus, perceiving in time that Astyo- 
chus betrayed him, and that notice each mo- 
ment was only not arrived from Alcibiades 
about the contents of his last, anticipated the 
discovery, and becomes himself informer to 
the army, that " the enemy had resolved, as 
Samos was unfortified, and the whole of their 
fleet not securely stationed within the harbour, 
to endeavour a surprise : of this he had gained 
the most certain informations ; and therefore 
Samos ought necessarily to be put into a pos- 
ture of defence with the utmost expedition, 
and proper guards in every respect be appoint- 
ed." He himself commanded, and consequently 
was empowered to see this put in execution. 
All hands were instantly at work on the forti- 
fication ; and Samos, though otherwise intend- 
ed soon to be, was by this piece of artifice 
immediately secured. And, no long time 
after, came letters from Alcibiades, importing 
that "the army was betrayed by Phrynichus, 
and in pursuance of it the enemy was coming 
to surprise them." Their opinion of the good 
faith of Alcibiades was not in the least estab- 
lished by this : it was argued, that, as he was 
privy to the plans of the enemy, from a prin- 
ciple of enmity he had fastened upon Phryni- 
chus the charge of being their accomplice. 
By the last notification, therefore, he was so 
far from hurting him, that he only confirmed 
his evidence. 

Yet subsequent to this, Alcibiades continu- 
ed to make use of all his address and persua- 
sion with Tissaphernes to gain him over to the 
Athenians, who in fact stood most in terror of 
the Peloponnesians, because they had a larger 
fleet at hand than the Athenians ; but was 
inwardly inclined, were it any how feasible, to 
47 



comply with his suggestions; especially as, 
ever since the jar at Cnidus about the treaty 
of Theramenes, he had been exasperated against 
the Peloponnesians : for that jar had already 
happened at the time of their expedition to 
Rhodes ; and the suggestion of Alcibiades, 
formerly mentioned, that " the views of the 
LacedjEmonians were to set the cities free," 
was yet more verified by the behaviour of 
Lichas, who had affirmed, that "it was an 
article never to be suflered in treaty, that the 
king should have those cities of which either 
himself or his ancestors had at any time been 
possessed. And in truth Alcibiades, as one 
who had important concerns at stake, continued 
with much zeal and assiduity to ingratiate 
himself with Tissaphernes. 

The Athenian deputies, with Pisander at 
their head, who were sent from Samos, had no 
sooner reached Athens than they obtained an 
audience from the people ; where, after touch- 
ing in a summary manner upon many other 
advantages, they expatiated chiefly on this, 
that " by recalling Alcibiades, and making an 
alteration in the democratical form of govern- 
ment, they might gain the friendship of the 
king and a superiority over the Peloponnesians." 
Large was the number of those who would not 
hear the proposal against the democracy. The 
enemies, farther, of Alcibiades were loud in 
their clamours, that " shameful it would be 
if so enormous a transgressor of the laws 
were recalled ; one, to whose crimes, in 
point of the mysteries, the Eumolpidaj and 
Ceryces^ had borne solemn attestation, the 
consequence of which was his exile ; nay, had 
farther denounced a curse upon those who 
should restore him." Pisander, interposing to 
put a stop to this violent opposition and these 
tragical outcries, addressed himself apart to each 
of these opponents, and asked them singl}-, 
" Whether any hope they had left of saving 



» These were sacerdotal families at Athens, descend- 
ed from Eumolpns and Ceryx. The former of them 
instituted the Eleusinian mysteries ; and it was the 
grand privilege of his descendants to preside at and 
regulate those snored rites. Who <^eryx was, and 
what the particular privileaes of his descendants, any 
farther than that (according to Suidas) they were 
"holy and venerahle," is not agreed. All of them 
were commainded to pronounce the solemn curse on 
Alcihiades when he was outlawed. Yet one priestess, 
(as Plutarch relates.) Theano, the daughter of Jlenon, 
refused to obey; alleging, that "it was her duty to 
bless, and not to curse." 



314 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book vm. 



their country, now that the Peloponnesians 
had as many ships upon the sea as they had 
themselves, but a larger number of confe- 
derate states, besides supplies of money from 
the king and Tissaphernes, whilst themselves 
were quite exhausted, unless somebody could 
persuade the king to declare in their favour 1" 
And when those, to whom the demand was 
put, replied in the negative, he proceeded to 
make them this plain declaration — " And yet 
this turn in your favour can never take place, 
unless we temper our form of government with 
greater moderation, and intrust the administra- 
tion in the hands of the few, that the king may 
have room to place confidence in us : for we 
are at present to consult about the very being 
of the state, and not to litigate the forms of its 
administration. The sequel may again enable 
us to return to the primitive form, if we find 
it expedient ; and we shall recover Alcibiades, 
the only man alive who is able to accomplish 
the point." 

The people, in fact, upon the first mention 
of an oligarchy, were stung to the heart : yet 
afterwards, convinced by Pisander that no other 
resource was left, dispirited by fear, and encour- 
aged at the same time by a distant hope that 
another change might in the sequel be brought 
about, they yielded up the point to the neces- 
sity of the state. Accordingly they passed a 
decree, that " Pisander and the ten joined with 
him in the deputation should pass the sea, and 
negotiate the affair with Tissaphernes and Al- 
cibiades, in the method judged by them most 
conducive to the public service." At the 
same time, as Pisander had preferred a charge 
of maladministration against Phrynichus, they 
discharged him and his colleague Skirondas 
from their commands, and sent away Diomedon 
and Leon to take upon them the command of 
the fleet. The article, with which Pisander 
charged Phrynichus, was the betraying of las- 
us and Amorges. The truth is, he thought 
him by no means a proper person to be let into 
a share of their intrigues with Alcibiades. 

And thus Pisander — after visiting in order all 
the several juntos of the accomplices, already 
formed in the city with the view to thrust them- 
selves into the seats of judicature and the great 
offices of state ; and exhorting them severally 
to act with unanimity, and by general concur- 
rence to labour the demolition of the popular 
government; and, after adjusting all previous 



measures to guard best against dilatory proceed* 
ings — repasseth the sea to Tissaphernes, accom- 
panied by his ten associates in the deputation. 

In the same winter, Leon and Diomedon, 
being arrived at their post, at the head of the 
Athenian fleet, made an expedition against 
Rhodes ; and there they find the ships of the 
Peloponnesians hauled ashore. They made a 
descent upon the coast ; and, after defeating in 
battle such of the Rhodians as made head 
against them, they stood away for Chalce, and 
for the future carried on the war more from 
thence than from Cos ; for in that station they 
were better enabled to watch the motions of the 
Peloponnesian fleet. 

But at Rhodes arrived Xenophantidas, a 
Lacedemonian, despatched by Pa;daiitus from 
Chias, with advice that " the works of the 
Athenians were almost perfected ; and unless, 
with the whole of their shipping, they come 
over to relieve them, all is lost at Chios." A 
resolution accordingly was taken to endeavour 
their relief ; but, in the mean time, Paedaritus, 
at the head of his body of auxiliaries and the 
Chians, with all the force he could assemble 
together, sallied out against the rampart which 
the Athenians had raised around their ships, de- 
molished a part of it, and made himself master 
of those vessels which were hauled ashore. 
The Athenians ran from all quarters to their 
defence ; and, having first engaged and put • to 
flight the Chians, the rest of the forces under 
Paedaritus are also defeated. Pa?daritus is 
killed, as were numbers also of the Chians, and 
many arms were, taken. And, after this, the 
Chians were blocked up by sea and land more 
closely than ever, and a terrible famine raged 
amongst them. 

The Athenian deputation, headed by Pi- 
sander, having reached Tissaphernes, enter into 
conference about terms of accommodation. 
Alcibiades now, — as the conduct of Tissapher- 
nes was still dubious and wavering, since he 
stood in great awe of the Peloponnesians, and 
adhered to that rule of policy he had learned 
from him, " to war both sides out," — Alcibia- 
des now had resource to another piece of re- 
finement, causing Tissaphernes to insist upon 
such exorbitant terms that no accommodations 
could ensue. Tissaphernes, truly, seems to 
me to have proceeded in this manner from his 
own voluntary motives, because fear was pre- 
dominant in him ; but in Alcibiades it was 



YEAR XX.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



315 



purely art ; since, as he found the other would 
not agree upon any terms whatever, he affected 
to strike the conceit into the Athenians that it 
really was in his power to manage him at plea- 
sure, and that he was already wrought to their 
purpose and willing to come to terms, whereas 
the Athenians would not offer enough. For 
Alcibiades himself made such extravagant de- 
mands, (since, though Tissaphernes assisted at 
the conference, the other managed it,) that, 
though the Athenians had yielded to the far 
greater part, yet the breaking off the treaty 
would be thrown at their doors. It was in- 
sisted, beside other demands, that " all Ionia 
should be given up," and, what is more, " all 
the islands on the Ionian coast ;" and other 
points. The Athenians seeming to acquiesce 
in these, at length upon the third meeting, lest 
the smallness of his own influence should be 
plainly detected, he demanded leave " for the 
the king to build a fleet, and to sail along the 
Athenian coasts, wherever, and with whatever 
force he pleased." Here all accommodation 
was over : the Athenians, concluding these 
points insuperable, and that they were abused 
by Alcibiades, broke off in indignation and 
return to Samos. 

In the same winter, immediately after break- 
ing off the conference, Tissaphernes repairs to 
Caunus with intention to bring the Pelopon- 
nesians again to Miletus, and to form other 
compacts with them the best he should be able, 
to supply them farther with pay, and by all 
means to stave off an open rupture. He was 
in fact apprehensive, that, should so large a 
fleet be deprived of subsistence, or, necessitated 
to engage with the Athenians, should suffer a 
defeat, or should the mariners quit their ves- 
sels, the Athenians then would carry their 
point without thanks to him : but his greatest 
fear was this, lest for the sake of subsistence 
they should ravage the continent. Upon all 
these considerations, and the prudential motives 
arising from each, co-operating with his princi- 
pal maxim of balancing the Grecians against 
one another, he sent for the Peloponnesians, 
pays them their arrears of subsistence, and 
makes the following treaty, the third of the 
kind, with them : 

" In the thirteenth year of the reign of Da- 
rius, Alexippidas presiding in the college of 
Ephori at Lacedsemon, articles are signed, in 
the plain of Maeander, between the Lacedae- 
monians and confederates on one side ; and 



Tissaphernes, Hieramenes, and the sons of 
Pharnacus, on the other ; concerning the af- . 
fairs of the king and those of the Lacedaemoni- 
ans and confederates. 

" The whole of the king's dominions situate 
in Asia belong to the king ; and all his own 
dominions let the king govern as to him seemeth 
meet. 

« The Lacedaemonians and confederates are 
not to enter the dominions of the king to com- 
mit any act of hostility whatever ; nor he those 
of the contracting parties for any act of hostility 
whatever. 

" And in case any of the Lacedaemonians 
or confederates enter in a hostile manner the 
dominions of the king, the Lacedaemonians 
and confederates are bound to restrain them : 
and, in case any subjects of the king act in a 
hostile manner against the Lacedaemonians and 
confederates, be the king also bound to restrain 
them. 

" Tissaphernes shall pay subsistence to the 
ships now upon the station, according to the 
rates agreed on, till the king's fleet come up. 

<' But the Lacedaemonians and confederates, 
so soon as the king's fleet shall be come up, shall 
have it in their own option to maintain, if they 
please, their own fleet ; or, in case they 
choose to take subsistence from Tissapher- 
nes, he is bound to supply them. Yet the 
Lacedaemonians and confederates, at the ex- 
piration of the war, shall repay to Tissa- 
phernes whatever sums they may thus receive 
from him. 

" When the king's fleet cometh up, let the 
ships of the Lacedaemonians, and those of the 
confederates, and those of the king, carry on 
the war in concert, by the joint counsels of 
TissapherD** and of the Lacedaemonians and 
confederates. 

" And, whenever a peace with the Athenians 
be thought advisable, it shall be concluded by 
the joint consent of both parties." 

The treaty was made and ratified in these 
terms. And, after this, Tissaphernes em- 
ployed himself with diligence to bring up the 
Phoenician fleet, as hath been mentioned, and 
duly to perform all the branches whatever of 
his engagements. At least he was willing to 
convince the Peloponnesians, by the measures 
he took, that he was heartily in earnest. 

In the close of this winter the Boeotians got 
possession of Oropus by treachery, though an 
Athenian garrison was in it. The business 



316 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book vnr. 



was effectuated by the management of a party I 
of Eretrians, and those Oropians who were 
plotting the revolt of Euboea. For, as this 
town was situated over-against Eretria, it was 
impossible but, whilst in Athenian hands, it 
must terribly annoy both Eretria and the rest of 
EubcEa. Having therefore thus gained Oropus, ] 
the Eretrians repaired to Rhodes, inviting the 
Peloponnesians to come over to Euboea; but 
their inclinations were rather to relieve Chios, 
now sadly distressed. Putting therefore from ■ 
Rhodes with the whole of their fleet, they \ 
stood away to sea ; and having gained the j 
height of Triopium, they descry the Athenian 
squadron out at sea in a course from Chalce ; 
yet, neither making any motion to bear down 
upon the other, one fleet pursued their course 
to Samos, the other put into Miletus. They 
were now convinced, that, without fighting at 
sea, they could not possibly relieve Chios. 

Here this winter ended : and the twentieth 
year of this war expired, the history of which 
Thucydidcs hath compiled. 

tzah XXI.' 

In the ensuing summer, upon the first com- 
mencement of the spring, Dercylidas a Spartan, 
at the head of an army not considerable for 
numbers, was sent over-land to Hellespont to 
effectuate the revolt of Abydus : they are a co- 
lony of the Milesians. The Chians also, whilst 
Astyochus was perplexed about the method of 
relieving them, were necessitated, by the intol- 
erable closeness of the blockade, to hazard an 
engagement at sea. It happened, whilst As- 
tyochus was yet in Rhodes, that Leon, a 
Spartan, who came over with Antisthenes, 
though merely as a passenger, had arrived at 
Chios from Miletus, to act as governor after 
the death of Pajdaritus, with twelve sail of 
shipping draughted from the squadron stationed 
at Miletus; of these, five were Thurian, four 
Syracusan, one belonged to Ansa, another was 
Milesian, and one was Leon's own. Upon this 
the Chians having sallied out with all their 
force and carried a strong post from the enemy, 
and at the same time their fleet, consisting of 
six and thirty sail, launching f->rth against the 
thirty-two Athenian, an engagement followed ; 
and, after a battle hotly maintained on both 
sides, the Chians and allies, who had not the 



t Before Christ 411. 



worst of the dispute, sheered off again into 
harbour ; for by this time it began to grow 
dark. 

Instantly upon this, Dercylidas, having com- 
pleted his march from Miletus, Abydus in 
Hellespont revolts to Dercylidas and Pharna- 
bazus ; and two days after Lampsacus did the 
same. 

But intelligence of this having reached 
Strombichides at Chios, and he, with four and 
twenty sail of Athenians, including the trans- 
ports which carried the heavy-armed, stretch- 
ing thither with all possible expedition, the 
Lampsacenes sallied out to repulse him. He 
defeated them in battle ; and, having at a shout 
made himself master of Lampsacus, which was 
quite unfortified, he gave up all the effects and 
slaves for pillage to his men ; and, after re-es- 
tablishing such as were free in their old hab- 
itations, proceeded against Abydus. But, 
finding them deaf to all schemes of accommo- 
dation, and himself unable to reduce them by 
force, crossing over to the spot opposite to 
Abydus, he garrisons Sestus, a city in the 
Chersonese, which had formerly belonged to 
the Medes, and put it in a condition to guard 
the Hellespont. 

During this interval of time, the Chians had 
very much enlarged their room at sea : and 
those stationed at Miletus, and even Astyo- 
chus, upon receiving the particulars of the late 
engagement, and advice that Strombichides 
was drawn off with so many ships, began to be 
high in spirits. Astyochus, accordingly, arri- 
ving at Chios with only two ships, carrieth off 
along with him what shipping was there, and 
with the whole force is now at sea, in order to 
make an attempt upon Samos. But when 
the enemy there, because mutually embroiled 
in jealousies, came not out against him, he re- 
turned again to the station of Miletus ; for, 
about this time, or rather before, the democracy 
was overturned at Athens. 

The deputation, at the head of which was 
Pisandcr, were no sooner returned to Samos 
from Tissapherncs, than they fountj their 
schemes had gained a stronger footing in the 
army, and that the Samians had been encourag- 
ing the men of power amongst the Athenians 
to join their efforts with them for the ehection 
of an oligarchy, though a party was very busy 
in opposing them, with a view to quash the 
projected alteration. The Athenians, farther, 
at Samos, had in private conferences come to a 



YEAR XXT.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



317 



resolution — "to think no longer of Alcibiades, 
since he showed himself so averse to join them, 
and in fact was by no means a proper person 
to have a share in an oligarichical administra- 
tion : but, merely from a principle of self-pre- 
servation, as now they were environed with 
dangers, they should take all possible care that 
the project should not drop in the execution. 
— That, farther, they should prosecute the war 
with vigour, and contribute largely towards it 
from their own private purses, and answer 
every other exigence of service, since, no long- 
er for others, but their own sakes, they must 
continue the struggle." Determined, there- 
fore, to proceed in this manner, they despatch 
Pisander and half the former deputation once 
more to Athens, to manage the execution of 
the project there : to whom, farther, instruc- 
tions were given, at whatever places in their 
dependency they should touch upon the voyage, 
to set up the oligarchy. The other half they 
"" sent severally about to other of the dependent 
states. Diotrephes also, who was now at Chi- 
os, but appointed to take upon him the com- 
mand of the Thracian provinces, they ordered 
away immediately to his post. 

Diotrephes, upon his arrival at Thasus, dis- 
solved the popular government. And, in the 
secorid month at most after this, the Thasians 
fortified their city as men who no longer cared 
for an aristocracy under Athenian influence, 
but were in daily expectation of receiving lib- 
erty from the Lacedaemonians : for a number 
of their countrymen, driven out by the Athe- 
nians, were now refuged among the Pelopon- 
nesians. These were labouring the point with 
their correspondents in Thasus, to bring off 
their shipping, and declare a revolt. The pre- 
sent alteration, therefore, fell out exactly to 
their own wish ; their state was restored to its 
ancient form without any trouble ; and the peo- 
ple, who alone were able to disconcert them, 
were divested of their power. In Thasus, 
therefore, the event took an opposite turn to 
what those Athenians who laboured the oli- 
garchy had at heart ; and, in my judgment, the 
case was the same with many other of their 
dependent states : for, having now their eyes 
open to their own welfare, and being exempted 
from the dread of suffering for what others did, 
they ran into the scheme of a total independ- 
ence, which they preferred before the precari- 
ous situation of being well governed by the 
Athenians. 



Pisander and his colleagues in the course of 
their voyage observed their instructions, and 
dissolved the popular governments in the cities 
where they touched. From some of these 
they also procured parties of heavy-armed to 
aid them in the grand project, and so landed 
at Athens. Here they find affairs in great for- 
wardness, through the activity of their accom- 
plices : for, some of the younger sort having 
combined together in a plot against Androcles, 
who had the greatest sway amongst the people, 
and had also been deeply concerned in banish- 
ing Alcibiades, they secretly despatch him. 
On him, for a double reason, because of his 
influence with the people, and with the thought 
that it might oblige Alcibiades, whose recall- 
ment was now expected, and through his inter- 
est the friendship of Tissaphernes, they chose 
first to wreak their fury. Of some others also, 
whose tractability they doubted, they had rid 
themselves by the same practices. A specious 
harangue, had, farther, been dressed up for the 
purpose, that " none ought to receive the pub- 
lic money but such as served the state in war 
with their persons ; that affairs of state ought 
not to be communicated to more than five 
thousand, and those to be men who were best 
qualified, by their estates and personal bravery, 
to serve the public." 

This with the majority of the city had a fair 
outside, since such as should concur in the 
change bid fairest for a share in the adminis- 
tration. Yet still the assembly of the people 
and the council of the bean' continued their 
meetings ; but then they only passed such de- 
crees as were approved by the cabal. Nay, of 
this number were all who spoke, and who had 
previously considered together what should be 
said upon every occasion. No other person 
presumed at any time to oppose their motions, 
through dread of a cabal which they saw was 
large ; or, did any one venture to open his 
mouth, by some dextrous contrivance he was 
certainly put to death. Who were the agents 
in these murders, no inquiry at all ; and of who 
were suspected, no kind of justification. The 
people, on the contrary, looked on with stupid 
gaze, and such a fit of consternation as to think 
it clear gain not yet to have suffered violence, 
even though they held their tongues ; imagin- 
ing, besides, that the conspiracy had spread 
much farther than it really had, they were quite 



» The senate. 



21 



318 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book vin. 



dispirited. To discover any certainty of their 
numbers they were quite unable, because of the 
great extent of the city and their ignorance how 
far their neighbours might be concerned. On 
the same account it was also impossible for 
him who deeply resented his condition, to be- 
moan himself in the hearing of another, or to 
participate counsels for reciprocal defence ; he 
must either have opened his mind to one whom 
he did not know, or to an acquaintance in whom 
he dust not confide; for all the popular party 
regarded one another with jealous eyes, as in 
some measure involved in the present machi- 
nations. Some in fact were concerned who 
could never have been suspected of oligarchical 
principles ; and these men gave rise to the great 
diffidence which spread amongst the many, and 
drew after it the highest security to the schemes 
of the few, as it kept alive that mutual distrust 
which reigned among the people. 

Pisander , therefore, and his associates, ar- 
riving at this very juncture, gave the finishing 
stroke without delay. In the first place, hav- 
ing called an assembly of the people, they 
moved for a decree, — " that a committee of ten 
should be elected with full discretionary power. 
This committee of ten should draw up the 
form of a decree, to be reported to the people 
on a day prefixed, in what manner the state 
may be best administered." In the next place, 
when that day came, they summoned an as- 
sembly of the people at Colonus : this is a tem- 
ple of Neptune without the city, and distant 
from it about ten stadia.' And here the com- 
mittee reported no other proposal than this, — 
that it be lawful for any Athenian to deliver 
whatever opinion he himself thought proper. 
They then enacted heavy penalties against any 
man who hereafter should accuse the speaker 
of a breach of law, or should bring him into 
any trouble whatever. 

This being done, it was now, without the 
least reserve or ambiguity, moved, — that " no 
magistrate whatsoever should continue in his 
post upon the old establishment, nor receive a 
public salary ; but that five presidents^ be 
chosen, who should choose one hundred per- 
sons, and each of these hundred should name 
three persons for associates : that these persons 
should enter into the senate, be invested abso- 
lutely with the administration, and should far- 



> One English mile. 



• IlfOiJ'fOt, 



ther be empowered to convene the five thou- 
sand whenever they should deem it proper." 

Pisander was the person who made this pro- 
posal, and who also in other respects showed 
himself openly one of the most zealous to pull 
down the democracy. But he who contrived 
the whole of the plan, and by what steps the 
affair should be thus carried into execution, 
was Antipho, a man who in personal merit 
was second to no Athenian then alive, and the 
greatest genius of his time to devise with 
sagacity, and ingeniously to express what he 
had once devised. At the assemblies of the 
people, or any public debate, he never assisted, 
if he could possibly decline it, since the multi- 
I tude was jealous of the great reputation he had 
gained: yet, in the courts of judicature or ap- 
peals to the people, he was the only person 
who was able effectually to serve those clients 
who could get him for their patron. And this 
same Antipho, when in process of time the 
government of the four hundred was quite de- 
molished, and severely prosecuted by the peo- 
ple, is judged to have defended their conduct, 
and pleaded in a cause where his own life was 
at stake, the best of any person that down to 
this time was ever heard to speak. 

Phrynichus, also, was another who singularly 
distinguished himself in his zeal for the oligar- 
chy. He dreaded Alcibiades, as conscious 
that he was privy to the whole of the corres- 
pondence he had carried on with Astyochus. 
He proceeded thus, on the supposition that 
Alcibiades would never be restored by an oli- 
garchical government. And then he was a man 
in whose capacity and zeal, if once engaged, 
the greatest confidence might reasonably be 
placed. 

Theramenes, farther, the son of Agnon, 
a man who both in speaking and acting made 
no ordinary figure, had a principal share in the 
dissolution of the popular government : no won- 
der, therefore, as the business was managed by 
so many and so able agents, that, spite of every 
obstacle, it was brought to effect. Grievous, 
indeed, it was to the Athenian people to sub- 
mit to the loss of their liberty, a century after 
the expulsion of their tyrants, during which 
period they had not only been independent, but 
accustomed, for above half that space, to give 
law to others. 

To return. When, in the assembly of the 
people not a soul was heard to oppose the mo- 



YEAR XXI.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



319 



tion, it passed into a law, and the assembly 
was adjourned. They afterwards introduced 
the four hundred into the senate, in the follow- 
ing manner. 

The whole body of the citizens were daily 
under arms, either upon the walls or in the 
field, to bridle the excursions of the enemy 
from Decelea. Therefore, on the day appoint- 
ed, they suffered such as were jiot in the secret 
to repair to their posts as usual : but, to those 
in the plot, it had been privately notified, — " by 
no means to repair to their post, but to lag be- 
hind at a distance ; and, in case any one should 
strive to oppose what was now to. be agitated, 
they should take up arms and quell all opposi- 
tion." Those, to whom these orders were 
previously imparted, were the Andrians and 
Teians, three hundred of the Carysthians, and 
other persons now established in iEgina, whom 
the Athenians had sent thither by way of 
colony, but were now invited to repair to 
Athens^ with their arms to support the scheme. 
When these dispositions were formed, the four 
hundred (each carrying a concealed dagger, and 
guarded by one hundred and twenty youths of 
Greece, whose hands they had employed when 
assassination was the point) broke in upon the 
counsellors of the bean,' who were this mo- 
ment sitting in the senate-house, and called out 
to them " to quit the place and take their sala- 
ries." ^ Accordingly they had ready for them 
the full arrears due to them, which they paid 
to each as he went out of the house. In this 
manner the senate, without giving the least 
opposition, removed themselves tamely from 
their office ; and the rest of the citizens made 
no effort to check such proceedings, and re- 
frained from any the least tumult. 

The four hundred, having thus gained pos- 
session of the senate-house, proceeded immedi- 
ately to ballot for a set of presidents^ from 
amongst their own body ; and made use of all 
the solemn invocations of the deities and the 
sacrifices with which the presiding magistrates 
execute their office. By their subsequent 
proceedings they introduced considerable al- 
terations in the popular form of government ; 
excepting that, on account of Alcibiades, they 
refrained from recalling exiles ; but, in all 



» The senate of five hundred. 

a Tlie stated sahiry for a senator of Athens was a 
drachma, or sevenpence three farthings a day. 

3 ligVTXVUi, 



other respects, they ruled with all possible 
severity. Some persons, whose removal was 
deemed convenient, though few in number, 
they got assassinated ; some they threw into 
prison, and some they banished. To Agis, 
also, king of the Lacedaemonians, who was 
still at Decelea, they despatched a deputa- 
tion ; notifying " their readiness to accommo- 
date all disputes ; and that with greater con- 
fidence he might proceed to make up matters 
with them than with a democracy which was 
not to be trusted." 

Agis, full of the imagination that the city 
would not quietly submit to these changes, 
and that the people would not thus tamely 
part with their ancient liberty ; or, should 
they now behold his numerous army approach- 
ing, that public combustions ihust ensue 
amongst them ; unable to persuade himself that 
at the present juncture, they could possibly be 
kept from tumults, — Agis, I say, returned no 
proposal of terms to the deputation which 
came to him from the four hundred. But, 
having sent for a numerous reinforcement 
from Peloponnesus, he advanced soon after, 
with the garrison of Decelea, and the fresh 
reinforcements, up to the very walls of Athens. 
He took this step on the presumption that 
" thus either thrown into utter confusion, they 
might be mastered whenever he gave the word, 
or even at the first sight of his approach, through 
the great confusion which in all probability 
both must follow within and without ; since, to 
make himself master of the long walls, as there 
could not be hands at leisure for their defence, 
he could not fail." 

But when, upon his nearer approach, the 
Athenians within were thrown into no .stir or 
bustle at all ; when even they caused their 
cavalry, and detachments of their heavy-armed, 
light-armed and archers, to sally out into the 
field, who made a slaughter of such as were too 
far advanced, and became masters of their arms 
and dead bodies; — finding then he had proceeded 
upon wrong presumptions, he again drew off 
his army. After this, he himself, with the 
former garrison, continued in the post of De- 
celea ; but the late reinforcement, after some 
continuance in the country, was sent back to 
Peloponnesus. 

Yet, subsequent to this, the four hundred 
persisted in sending deputies to Agis with as 
much eagerness as ever ; and, he now receiving 
them in a better manner, with encouragements 



320 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book vin. 



to proceed, they even send an embassy to Lace- 
daemon to propose a treaty, being of all things 
desirous to obtain an accommodation. 

They also send to Samos a deputation of 
ten, in order to satisfy the army, and give them 
ample assurance that " the oligarchy was not 
set up for the prejudice either of the state or 
any individuals, but as the only expedient left to 
preserve the whole community ; — that the 
number of those, who now had the manage- 
ment, was five thousand and not barely four 
hundred ; and yet, on no occasion whatever, had 
the Athenians, partly through employs in their 
armies abroad or other foreign avocations, ever 
met together, to consult on affairs of state, in a 
number so large as five thousand." Having 
instructed them to insert some other alleviating 
pleas, they sent them, away upon the first in- 
stant of the change they had made ; apprehen- 
sive of what actually came to pass, that the 
bulk of their seamen would never quietly sub- 
mit to an oligarchical government, and an op- 
position beginning there, might overturn all that 
had hitherto been done. 

For at Samos some stirs had already arisen 
about the oligarchy, and that which is now to 
be recited happened exactly at the time that 
the four hundred seized the administration at 
Athens. 

The party which at this juncture was sub- 
sisting at Samos against the nobility, and were 
of the popular side, having now altered their 
schemes, and followed the suggestions of 
Pisander ever since his return from Athens, 
and gained the concurrence of Athenians at 
Samos, combined together by oath, to the 
number of about three hundred, and resolved 
to fall upon their antagonists, as factious on 
the side of the people. Accordingly, they 
murder one Hyperbolus,' an Athenian, a 



1 This was the persoc whom the ostracism made in 
some measure famous, and who made the ostracism 
quite infamous. Plutarch hath repeated the story 
thrice. The following extract is taken from the life 
of Nicias. 

" When the opposition was very hot at Athens he- 
tween Alcihiadesand Nicias, and the day for ostracizins 
was drawine on, — Which at certain intervals the people 
of Athens were used to enforce, and send away into a 
ten years' exile, some one citizen suspected of designs 
against tlicir liberty, or odious for being too illustrious 
or rich, — each of these grand competitors was under 
grievous apprcliens ons, and with reason too, that it 
might Ite liia own lot to be exiled on this occasion. 
Alcibiadcp was hated for his way of life, and for his 
bold and enterprising gcuius. Nicias was enviod on 



scurvy fellow, and banished by the ostracism, 
not from a dread of his influence or weight, 
but for the profligacy of his life, and his 
being a public disgrace to his country. In 
this they were countenanced by Charminus, 
one of the commanders and some of the Athe- 
nians, associated with them, to whom they gave 
this pledge of their fidelity. Some other acts of 
the same nature they committed by instructions 
from them, and had it in agitation to multiply 
their blows ; but those marked out for destruc- 
tion, getting wind of their design, communi- 
cate the whole to Leon and Diomedon, who 
thought of an oligarchy with high regret, be- 
cause their credit was high with the people ; to 
Thrasybulus^ also and Thrasylius, the former 



account of bis wealth ; his way of living was neither 
sociable nor popular ; as he avoided a crowd, and herded 
with a few intimates, he gave great distaste; besides, 
as he had often opposed the caprices of the people, and 
constrained them to pursue their real interest, he was 
deep in their displeasure. In short, the contest ran 
high between the young and military men on one side, 
and the old pacific Athenians on the other, whilst each 
were endeavouring to throw the ostracism upon the 
hated object. But, 

Parties ran high, aod scoundrels got reaowD. 

Such dissentions in the community gave scope to 
knaves and incendiaries. There was one Hyperbolus, 
of Perithadffi, very assuming, without the least reason 
to be so ; however, by dint of impudence working him- 
self into power, and the disgrace of his country so soon 
as he had made himself conspicuous in it. On this oc- 
casion Hyperbolus could have no suspicion of becoming 
himself the butt of an ostracism ; he bad a much better 
title to the gallows. Presuming, on the contrary, that, 
when either of these great men were exiled, he himself 
could easily make head against the other, he manifested 
great pleasure at the contest, and irritated the fury of 
the people against them both. Nicias and Alcibiades, 
perceiving his roguish intent, conferred privately to- 
gether ; and, getting their several factions to unite, se- 
cured one another, and threw the votes on Hyperbolus. 
Such a turn at first gave the Athenians much pleasure 
and diversion; yet soon after they were highly chagrin- 
ed, by reflecting that making such a scoundrel the ob- 
ject of it was shaming the ostracism for ever. There 
was dignity even in punishments: the ostracism was 
of such a nature as to suit a Thucydides, an Aristides, 
and men of such exalted characters. It was clear 
honour to Hyperliolus; and gave him room to boast, 
that, though a scoundrel, he had been distinguished 
like the greatest and best Athenians; as Plato, tlie 
comic poet, says of him. 

He always acted worlhy of biinseU, 

But quite unwor'hy of such hijh reproof: 

The shell tvas ne'er desif n'J to honour reonndreh. 

In a word, no person was ever banished by the ostracism 
after Hyperbolus; it was he who closed the list." 

» Thrasybulus, whose name now first occurs, acts a 
very high-spirited und uoblc part in the close of tbia 



TEAR XXI.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



321 



a captain of a trireme, and the latter of a band 
of heavy-armed ; and to such others as were 
judged most Ukely to stem the fury of the 
conspirators. These they conjured «not to 
look calmly on till their destruction should be 
completed, and Samos rent away from the 
Athenians, by which alone till now their em- 
pire had been preserved and supported." 
Listening, therefore, to these representations, 
they privately exhorted every single soldier not 
to suffer such proceedings, and more earnestly 
than others the Paralian, since all that sailed 
in that vessel were citizens of Athens, all free 
and enemies determined, from time immemo- 
rial, to an oligarchy, even when it had no ex- 
istence. Leon also and Diomedon never went 
out to sea without leaving them some ships for 
their guard ; insomuch that, when the three 
hundred made their attempt, as all these united 
in their obstruction, but most heartily of all 
the Paralians, the popular party at Samos was 
rescued from destruction. Thirty of those 
three hundred they even slaughtered, and three 
of the most factious amongst the survivors they 
doomed to banishment. Then, having pub- 
lished an indemnity for the rest, they continued 
to support the democracy at Samos. 

But the Samians and soldiery despatch the 
Paralus with all expedition to Athens, having 
on board her Chsereas, the son of Achestratus, 
an Athenian, who had borne a considerable share 
in the last turn of affairs, charged with a noti- 
fication of these last transactions; for yet it 
was not known at Samos that the four hundred 



liistory. "If virtue could be weighed merely by itself, 
without any regard to outward circumstance, I should 
not hesitate (says Cornelius Nepos) to prefer him be- 
fore all the great men in Greece. But I aver, that not 
one of tiiem ever surpassed him in integrity, in resolu- 
tion, in grandeur of soul, and true patriotism. — Yet, I 
know not how it is, though iio'iody excelled him in real 
iiwrit, many have outstripped him in point of fame. 
In the Peloponnesian war, (the part of it which now 
remains,) Thrasybulus did many things without Alci- 
tiades ; Alcibades did nothing without Thrnsybulus ; 
and yet the other, through a happiness peculiar to 
liimself, reaped the glory and benefit of all." So .says 
this elegant Roman writer. The reader will soon see 
some of Tlirasybulus's exploits, separately from and in 
concert with Alcibiades : but the glory of his life was 
ridding Athens some years after of thirty tyrants at a 
blow ; for which he was rewarded by a wreath of olive, 
the most honourable recompense his grateful countr)'- 
men could bestow upon him. Fie was ever a firm, in- 
trepid, disinterested patriot; and lost his life at last in 
the service of his country. 

48 



had seized the administration. No sooner, 
therefore, were they come to their moorings, 
than the four hundred caused two or three of 
the crew of the Paralus to be dragged away to 
prison ; the residue they turned over from that 
vessel into another ship of war, and ordered 
them away as a guard-ship for the station of 
Euboea. But Chsereas, sensible in what train 
affairs were going, had the good fortune to 
make his escape ; and, returning again to Sa- 
mos, related to the soldiery all that had been 
done in Athens, exaggerating every point with 
abundant severity. — That " every citizen was 
now kept in awe with whips and scourges, and 
that even their own wives and children daily 
felt the insolence of those tyrants ; nay, they 
have it now in agitation, that if any on duty at 
Samos shall presume to oppose their pleasure, 
immediately to arrest and imprison the whole 
of their kindred ; and in case the former will 
not submit, to put the latter to death." On 
many other points he also expatiated, all ag- 
gravated with falsehoods. 

His audience, in the first instant of their 
passion, were fully bent on the destruction of 
all those who had appeared most active for an 
oligarchy, and in short of all who had any hand 
in its promotion ; but, being stopped by the 
interposition of others more moderate, and lis- 
tening to the remonstrance, that " they ought 
not to accelerate the ruin of their country, 
now that a fleet of the enemy lay almost rang- 
ed against them for battle," they desisted. And, 
afterwards, those who had openly avowed the 
design of restoring the democratical form at 
Samos, namely, Thrasybulus the son of Lycus, 
and Thrasyllus, (for these had the principal 
agency in this new revolution,) caused every 
soldier to swear the most solemn oaths, more 
especially such as were for an oligarchy, that 
" they would submit to no form but the de- 
mocracy, and would act in this cause with ge- 
neral unanimity ; and, farther, would zealously 
prosecute the war against the Peloponnesians, 
that eternal enemies they would remain to the 
four hundred, and would enter into no treaty 
of accommodation with them." All the Sa- 
mians, farther, that were old enough to bear 
arms took the same oaths ; and henceforth the 
army communicated all their affairs to the 
Samians, and gave them an insight into all the 
dangers which might attend the sequel ; con- 
vinced that otherwise no safe resource remained 
2i2 



322 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR 



[book vin. 



for either ; but, if the four hundred or the ene- 
my at Miletus proved too hard for them, their 
ruin was unavoidable. 

Terrible were the present embroilments of 
the times, whilst those at Samos wore striving 
to re-establish the democracy at Athens, and 
those at Athens to force an oligarchical form 
upon the army. The soldiers, farther, im- 
mediately summoned a general assembly, in 
"which they deposed their former commanders, 
and all such captains of triremes as fell under 
their suspicions, and then chose others to fill 
up the vacancies, both captains of triremes and 
land-commanders, amongst whom were Thra- 
sybulus and Thrasyllus. The last rose up in 
the assembly and encouraged them by every 
topic of persuasion ; particularly, that " they 
had not the least reason to be dispirited, 
though Athens herself had revolted from 
them ; for this was merely the secession of 
a minority from men whose numbers were 
greater, and who were better furnished for 
every exigence; because the whole navy of 
Athens was their own, by which they could 
compel dependent states to pay in their former 
contingents of tribute as fully as if they sailed 
on such an errand from Athens itself. Even 
yet they were masters of a city at Samos, a 
city despicable in no respect, but which once in 
a former war had well nigh wrested the empire 
of the sea from the Athenians. The seat of 
war, in regard to their public enemies, would 
continue the same as it was before ; nay, by 
being masters of the fleet, they were better 
enabled to procure all the needful supplies 
than their opponents who were now at Athens. 
It was purely owing to their own peculiar situ- 
ation at Samos that the others had hitherto 
been masters of the entrance into the Piraius ; 
and they soon should be highly distressed if 
they refused to restore them their ancient 
polity, since these at Samos could more easily 
bar them the use of the sea than be barred up 
by them. What assistances Athens had hither- 
to given them against the enemy were but 
trifling, and of no real importance. Nothing 
could be lost from that quarter ; which was no 
longer able to supply them with money, since 
with that they had been supplied by the army ; 
nor to send them any valuable instructions, for 
the sake of which alone the troops abroad were 
submissive to the orders of the state at home. 
Nay, in some points those at Athens had most 
cgregiously olTcnded since they had overturned 



the laws of their country, which those here had 
preserved, and were exerting their efforts to 
compel others to the obser>'ance of them ; and 
therefore, in every method of valuation, the 
men who here provided well for the public 
welfare, were in no respect worse patriots than 
the men at Athens. Even Alcibiades, should 
they grant him an indemnity and a safe return, 
would readily procure them the king's alliance. 
And, what had the greatest weight, should 
they miscarry in every branch of their present 
designs, many places of refuge lay always open 
to men possessed of so considerable a fleet, in 
which they might find fresh cities and another 
country." 

After such occurrences in the assembly con- 
vened by the soldiery, and the conclusion of 
their mutual exhortations, they continued their 
preparations for war with unremitting diligence. 
But the deputation of ten, sent from the four 
hundred to Samos, being informed of these 
proceedings when they were advanced in their 
voyage so far as Delos, thought proper to pro- 
ceed no farther. 

About this very time, the Peloponnesianson 
board the fleet stationed at Miletus clamoured 
loudly amongst themselves, that " they are be- 
trayed by Astyochus and Tissaphernes ; as 
the former had already refused to engage, when 
themselves were hearty and in fine condition, 
and the fleet of the Athenians was small; nor 
would do so even now, when the latter are 
reported to be embroiled with intestine sedi- 
tions, and their own ships are daily impairing ; 
but, under pretext of a Phoenician fleet to be 
brought up by Tissaphernes, an aid merely 
nominal, and which would never join them, he 
was ruining all by dilatory measures. And as 
for Tissaphernes, it was never his intention to 
bring up that fleet ; but he was plainly under- 
mining the strength of theirs, by not supplying 
them constantly and fully with their pay. The 
time, therefore, they insisted, ought no longer 
to be thus idly wasted, but an engagement 
hazarded at once." Yet in such clamours 
those deepest concerned were the Syracusans. 

The confederates and Astyochus himself 
being affected with these clamours, and having 
declared in a council of war for engaging the 
enemy forthwith, as they had received un- 
doubted intelligence of the confusions at Sa- 
mos ; putting out to sea with the whole of 
their fleet, amounting to a hundred and twelve 
sail, and having ordered the Milesians to march 



YEAR XXI.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



323 



thither over-land, they stood away for Mycale. 
At GlaucjB of Mycale the Athenians were 
now lying, with eighty-two ships of the Sa- 
mian department : for in this quarter of My- 
cale Samos lies, but a small distance from the 
continent : but when they saw the fleet of the 
Peloponnesians approaching, they retired to 
Samos, judging their own strength insufficient 
for an engagement with the foe which might 
prove decisive. Besides, as they had dis- 
covered the intention of those at Miletus to 
venture an engagement, they expected Strom- 
bichides from the Hellespont, who was to 
bring to their assistance the ships on the station 
of Chios which had gone up to Abydus ; and 
a message had already been despatched to 
hasten him up. For these reasons they plied 
away to Samos. The Peloponnesians, arriv- 
ing at Mycale, encamped upon the shore, along 
with the land forces of the Milesians and those 
sent in by the bordering people. On the next 
day, when they were fully bent on standing 
directly against Samos, advice is brought them 
that " Strombichides is come up with the ships 
from the Hellespont;" upon which they made 
the best of their way back again to Miletus. 
And now the Athenians, having gained so 
large an accession of strength, show themselves 
immediately before Miletus, with a hundred 
and eight sail, desirous of coming to an en- 
gagement with the enemy. But, as nothing 
stirred out against them, they also returned to 
Samos. 

In the same summer, immediately after the 
former movements, the Peloponnesians — who 
had waived commg out to an engagement, since 
with the whole of their strength they thought 
themselves by no means a match for their ene- 
my, and were now reduced to great perplexities 
about the methods of procuring subsistence for 
so numerous a fleet, especially as Tissaphernes 
was so remiss in his payments — send away 
to Pharnabazus (pursuant to the prior instruc- 
tions from Peloponnesus) Clearchus the son 
of Ramphias, with a detachment of forty sail : 
for Pharnabazus had demanded such a force, 
and was ready to support the expenses of it ; 
and it had been farther notified to them in 
form that Byzantium was ripe for a revolt. 
And thus this detachment of Peloponnesians, 
having run out far to sea to get clear of the 
Athenians during the course, met with very 
tempestuous weather. The bulk of them, it 
is true, with Clearchus, rode it out to Delos, 



and from thence return again to Miletus. But 
Clearchus, setting out again, travelled over- 
land to Hellespont, and took upon him the 
command. Ten ships, however, of the de- 
tachment, under Elixus the JVIegarean, who 
was joined in the command, reached the Hel- 
lespont without damage, and efiectuate the 
revolt of Byzantium. The Athenians at Sa- 
mos, informed of these incidents, send away a 
detachment to the Hellespont, to support and 
guard the adjacent cities ; and a small engage- 
ment happens before Byzantium, between eight 
ships on a side. 

Those who were in the management at Sa- 
mos, and above all Thrasybulus, adhering still 
to the sentiments they had entertained ever 
since the last turn of affairs there, that Alci- 
biades must needs be recalled ; the latter at 
last obtained, in full assembly, the concurrence 
of the soldiery. Accordingly, when they had 
voted a return and an indemnity to Alcibiades, 
Thrasybulus repaired immediately to Tissa- 
phernes, and brought Alcibiades back with 
him to Samos ; convinced their last resource 
depended on his being able to alienate Tissa- 
phernes from the Peloponnesians. Hereupon 
an assembly being called Alcibiades at large 
expatiated upon and deplored the malignity of 
his fate, in having been exiled from nis coun- 
try : and then, having amply run over every 
topic relating to the present posture of affairs, 
he raised their expectations high in regard to 
the future. He magnified, with a mighty 
parade of words, his own interest in Tissa- 
phernes ; from the view, not only to intimi- 
date the patrons of the oligarchical government 
at Athens, and put a stop to their cabals but 
also to render himself more respectable to those 
at Samos, and to raise up their confidence in 
him as high as possible ; — to give the enemy, 
farther, as many handles as he was able to 
calumniate Tissaphernes, and to lower all their 
present sanguinary expectations. These were 
the schemes of Alcibiades, when, with all 
imaginable ostentation, he gave the strongest 
assurances to his audience, that " Tissapher- 
nes had pledged his word to him, that, could 
he once firmly depend upon the Athenians, 
they never should be distressed for want of sup- 
plies whilsc he had any thing left, nay, though 
at last he should be forced to turn into ready 
cash the very bed he lay on ; and the Phoeni- 
cian fleet, already come up to Aspendus, he 
would join with the Athenians but never with 



324 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book VIII. 



the Peloponnedans ; the only pledge of fidel- 
ity he required from the Athenians was, for 
Alcibiades to be recalled and pass his word for 
their future conduct. 

The army, delighted with these and many 
other soothing topics, proceed immediately to 
associate him with the rest of the commanders, 
and implicitly trusted every thing to their 
management. Not a man was any longer to 
be found amongst them who would have parted 
with his present confidence of certain security 
and revenge on the four hundred for all the 
treasure in the universe. Nay, they were 
ready this very moment, upon the strength of 
what Alcibkides had said, to slight the enemy 
now at hand, and steer directly for the Piraeus. 
But, though numbers with vehemence recom- 
mended the step, he stopped their ardour by 
remonstrances, that " they ought by no means 
to think of steering for the Piraeus, and leave 
their nearer enemies upon their backs ; but, in 
relation to the operations of war, since he was 
elected a general, (he said,) he would first go 
and confer with Tissaphernes, and would then 
proceed to action." Accordingly, the assem- 
bly was no sooner dissolved than he immediately 
departed, that he might appear in all respects to 
be perfectly united with Tissaphernes ; de- 
sirous also to raise himself in his esteem, and 
give him a sensible proof that he was appointed 
a general ; and, by virtue of this, enabled either 
to do him service or to do him harm. It was 
the peculiar fortune of Alcibiades to awe the 
Athenians by Tissaphernes, and Tissaphernes 
by the Athenians. 

The Peloponnesians at Miletus had no 
sooner heard of the recall of Alcibiades, than, 
as before they suspected treachery in Tissa- 
phernes, they now loudly vented invectives 
against him. What more inflamed them was, 
that, ever since the Athenians showed them- 
selves before Miletus and they had refused to 
put out to sea and engage them, Tissaphernes 
had slackened more than ever in his payments ; 
and thus, hated by them for that reason suffi- 
ciently before, he now became more odious on 
account of Alcibiades. The soldiers again, as 
on former occasions, ran together in parties, and 
enumerated their grievances. Nay, some of 
liigher rank, persons of real importance, and 
not merely the private men, were full of re- 
monstrances, that «« they had at no time re- 
ceived their full subsistence : his payments had 
been always scanty, and even those had nevei 



been regular ; in short, unless they were led 
directly against the enemy, or carried to some 
other station where they might be sure of sub- 
sistence, the crews would abandon their vessels. 
And the whole blame of all that befell, ought 
to be charged upon Astyochus, who for private 
lucre endured patiently the caprices of Tissa- 
phernes." Employed as they were in thus 
enumerating grievances, a tumult actually broke 
out against Astyochus : for the mariners be- 
longing to the Syracusan and Thurian vessels, 
by how much they enjoyed the greatest liberty 
of all others in the fleet, by so much the more 
heightened confidence did they flock about 
him and demand their pay. Upon this, As- 
tyochus returned an answer too full of spirit, 
threatening hard that Dorian,' who seconded 
and encouraged the demands of his men, and 
even lifting his staff and shaking it at him. 
This was no sooner perceived by the military 
crowd, than, seamen as they were, with a loud 
uproar, they rushed at Astyochus to knock him 
down ; but, aware of their design, he flies for 
refuge to an altar. He escaped, indeed, with- 
out any blows, and the fray was ended without 
any harm committed. 

The Milesians also made themselves masters, 
by surprise, of a fort erected by Tissaphernes, 
at Miletus, and obliged the garrison left in it to 
evacuate the place. These things pleased the 
rest of the allies, and not least of all the Syra- 
cusans. Lichas, however, was by no means 
satisfied with these proceedings. He insisted 
" the Milesians were obliged in duty to be 
submissive to Tissaphernes ; and that all 
others who lived in the dominions of the king 
lay under the same obligation, and were bound 
to pay due regard to his just authority, till 
such time as the war was handsomely com- 
pleted." This drew upon him the resentment 
of the Milesians ; and, because of these ex- 
pressions and some others of the same na- 
ture, when he afterwards died of a natural 
disease, they would not suffer him to be buried 
in a spot of ground which the Lacedaemonians 
who were amongst them had chose for his in- 
terment. 

Whilst affairs were thus sadly embroiled, 
between the soldiery on one side, and Astyo- 
chus and Tissaphernes on the other, Mindarus 
arrived from Lacedsemon, as successor to As- 



t HermocratM. 



TEAR XXI.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



325 



tyochus in the chief command of the fleet. 
Accordingly he takes the command upon him, 
and Astyochus sailed away for home. But 
with him, as ambassador, Tissaphernes sent 
one of his own creatures, by name Gaulites, a 
Carian, who spoke both languages, to accuse 
the Milesians about the seizure of the fort, and 
also to make apologies for his conduct. He 
knew that the Milesians were already set out 
with an outcry, chiefly against him : and that 
Hermocrates was gone with them, well armed 
with proofs that Tissaphernes, in concert with 
Alcibiades, baflied all the Peloponnesian 
schemes, and basely tampered with both the 
warring parties. But an enmity had always 
subsisted between these two about the pay- 
ments of subsistence. And at length, when 
Hermocrates was banished from Syracuse, and 
other JSyracusans came to Miletus to take upon 
them the command of the Syracusan vessels, 
(namely, Patamis, and Myscon, and Demar- 
chus,) Tissaphernes vented his choler more 
hitterly than ever against Hermocrates, now an 
exile ; and, amongst his other accusations of 
him, affirmed, that " he had demanded a sum 
of money, which being refused him, he had 
ever since declared himself his enemy." As- 
tyochus, therefore, and the Milesians, and 
Hermocrates, are now sailed for Lacedaemon. 

By this time also Alcibiades had repassed 
from Tissaphernes to Samos ; and from Delos j 
the deputation sent from the four hundred on 
the late revolution to soothe and gain the con- 
currence of those at Samos, arrive also whilst 
Alcibiades is there. Upon which, an assem- 
bly being ca led, they endeavoured to open the 
cause. The soldiers at first refused to hear 
them, and roared aloud for the murder of those 
who had overturned the popular government. 
At length, with great difficulty, being quieted, 
they gave them a hearing. 

The deputies remonstrated, " that not for 
the ruin of Athens was this new change intro- '. 
duced, but purely for its preservation — in no ' 
wise to betray it into the hands of the enemy ; ■ 
because that might have been done effectually , 
upon the late approach of its enemy to her ! 
walls, since they were in power. Every single ' 
person amongst the five thousand was intended ' 
to have a regular share in the administration, j 
Their friends and relations are not treated in 
an insolent manner, as Chaereashad maliciously 
suggested to them ; nay, were not in the least 



molested, but everywhere remained in the un- 
disturbed possession of their property." 

Though on these topics they amply enlarged, 
yet they were heard with no manner of com- 
placence, but with manifest indignation. Dif- 
ferent methods of proceeding were recommend- 
ed by different persons ; but the majority de- 
clared for sailing away at once for the Piraeus. 
On this occasion Alcibiades first showed him- 
self a true patriot ; nay, as much a patriot as 
ever Athenian had been ; for, when the Athen- 
ians at SamDs were hurried furiously along to 
invade their own selves, the plain consequence 
of which was giving up at once Ionia and 
Hellespont to their public foes, he mollified 
their fury ; and, at a crisis when no other man 
living could have been able to restrain the mul- 
titude, he persuaded them to desist from this 
strange invasion ; and, by reprimanding those 
whose private resentments burst out most 
violently against the deputies, prevented mis- 
chief. At length, he himself dismissed them 
with the following answer — That " the ad- 
ministration in the hands of five thousand he 
had no intention to oppose : but he ordered 
them to give an immediate discharge to the 
four hundred, and to restore the council of 
five hundred to their prior state. If, farther, 
from a principle of frugality, they had made 
retrenchments, in order that those who served 
in the armies of the state might be better sub- 
sisted, he praised them altogether. He then 
recommended to them a steady resistence, and 
by no means in any shape to give way to tha 
enemy ; for, could the state once be secured 
from its public foes, a reconciliation amongst 
its members might easily be hoped for ; but, 
should either party be once destroyed, either 
this at Samos, or theirs at Athens, none would 
soon be left to be reconciled at all." 

There were present at this audience am- 
bassadors from the Argives, who brought 
assurances of aid to the people of -A^ens al 
Samos. Alcibiades commended them for their 
zeal ; and then, exhorting them to hold them- 
selves in readiness to come upon a summons 
sent, he civilly dismissed them. These Argives 
came to Samos in company with the Para 
lians, who had been lately turned over by tho 
fcur hundred into a vessel of war, to cruizo 
round Euboea, and to carry to Lacedaemon the 
ambassadors, Laespodias, Aristophon, and Me- 
lesius, sent thither from the four hundred 



32G 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book vin. 



But, when advanced to the height of Argos, i 
they put the ambassadors under arrest, as chief 
agents in pulling down the democracy, and de- 
livered them up to the Argives. They had no I 
business now at Athens, and so came from ' 
Argos to Samos, convoying the Argive am- • 
bassadors in the trireme which they had j 
seized. I 

The same summer, Tissaphernes, — about ^ 
that juncture of time in which the Peloponne- 1 
sians were most furious against him, for the 
other reasons, and the recalment of Alcibiades, j 
as having now pulled off the mask and declared j 
for the Athenians, — desirous, as in truth it ap- j 
peared, to efface the bad impressions they had j 
entertained of him, got ready to go to Aspen- 
dus to the Phcsnician fleet, and prevailed with 
Lichas to bear him company, In regard to 
the Peloponnesians, he declared that he sub- 
stituted his own lieutenant, Tamas, to pay 
them their subsistence, whilst he himself should 
be absent. Various accounts are vented about 
this step ; nor can it certainly be known with 
what view he repaired to Aspendus, or why, 
when there, he did not bring up the fleet. 
That a Phcenician fleet, consisting of one hun- 
dred and forty-seven sail, was now come up to 
Aspendus, is allowed on all sides ; but, why 
they did not come forwards, is variously con- 
jectured. Some think he went out of sight 
merely to carry on his old scheme of wearing 
away the Peloponnesians; and, in consequence 
of this, Tamas paid in their subsistence which 
he was ordered to pay, not better but even 
■worse than Tissaphernes. Others say it was, 
that, since he had brought the Phcenicians to As- 
pendus, he might save large sums by dismissing 
them there, as he never had sincerely designed 
to make use of their service. Others, again, 
attribute it to a desire to quiet the clamours 
against him at Lacedaemon, and to get himself 
represented there as one abounding in good 
faith, #nd who is actually gone to bring up a 
fleet fairly and honestly fitted out for service. 

But, in my opinion, the true solution of the 
mystery is this : he would not bring them up, 
merely to wear out and to balance the strength 
of the Grecians, that, during his absence and 
this studied prolongation, the latter might be 
running into ruins ; and, farther, for the sake of 
balancing, to join with neither party, for fear 
of making them too strong ; for, had he once 
determined to join lieartily in the war, the con- 



sequence was certainly beyond a doubt. Had 
he brought them up to join the Lacedaemonians, 
he must in all probability have given them the 
victory, since already their naval strength was 
rather equal than inferior to that of their op- 
ponents. But, that their ruin alone was de- 
signed by him is plain from the excuse he made 
for not bringing up that fleet : he pretended 
they were fewer in number than the king had 
ordered to be assembled : yet, if this were so, 
he might have ingratiated himself more abun- 
dantly with the king, if he made a great saving 
of money for his master, and with less expense 
had accomplished his service. To Aspendus, 
however, whatever was his view, Tissaphernes 
repairs, and joins the Phoenicians ; nay, farther, 
at his own desire, the Peloponnesians sent 
Philippus, a noble Lacedaemonian, with two 
triremes, to take charge of this fleet. 

Alcibiades had no sooner received intelli- 
gence that Tissaphernes was at Aspendus, 
than, taking with him thirteen sail, he hastened 
thither after him, promising to those at Samos 
an assured and important piece of service : for, 
" he would either bring the Phoenician fleet to 
the Athenians, or at least prevent their junc- 
tion with the Peloponnesians." It is probable 
that from a long acquaintance, he was privy to 
the whole intention of Tissaphernes never to 
bring up this fleet ; and his project was now, 
to render Tissaphernes still more odious to the 
Peloponnesians for the regard he showed to 
himself and the Athenians, that so he might 
at last be necessitated to strike in with the lat- 
ter. He stood away therefore directly by 
Phaselis and Caunus, and held on his course 
upwards. 

The deputation, sent from the four hun- 
dred, being returned from Samos to Athens, 
reported the answer of Alcibiades ; — how " he 
encouraged them to hold out, and give way in 
no shape to the enemy : and that his confi- 
dence was great, he should be able thoroughly 
to reconcile them with the army, and give 
them victory over the Peloponnesians." By 
this report they very much revived the spirits 
of many of those who had a share in the oli- 
garchy, and yet would gladly extricate them- 
selves from the business upon assurances of 
indemnity. They had already begun to hold 
separate cabals, and show open discontent at 
the train of affairs. They were headed by 
some of principal authority even in the present 



YEAR XXI.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



327 



oligarchy, and who fiHed the great offices of 
state, namely, Theramenes,' the son of Ag- 
non, and Aristocrates, the son of Sicelius ; and 
others who were most deeply concerned in 
late transactions; and from a dread, as they 
gave out, of the army at Samos, and Alcibia- 
des had concurred in sending an embassy to 
Lacedaemon, lest by unseasonable dissents from 
the majority they might have done mischief to 
the public. Not that they hastened them- 
selves even now to put an utter end to the oli- 
garchical government, but to enforce the neces- 
sity of making use of the five thousand not 
merely in name, but in act, and to render the 
polity more equal. This was, it must be 
owned, the political scheme which they all pre- 
tended ; but, through private ambition, the 
majority had given into that course, by which 
an oligarchy, founded upon the ruins of a de- 
mocracy, is ripe for subversion : for it was the 
daily claim of each single person concerned, 
not to be equal with the rest, but to be pre- 
eminently the first ; whereas, when out of a 
democracy a preference is awarded, the distinc- 
tion is the more easily brooked, as if it were 
the real consequence of superior worth. But 
what of a certainty elevated them most, was 
the great influence of Alcibiades at Samos, and 
their own consciousness that this business 
of an oligarchy carried with it no prospect 
of firm or lasting continuance. A conten- 
tion, therefore, ensued among them, which 
of them should show the greatest zeal for the 
people. 

But such of the four hundred as made the 
greatest opposition to this new scheme, and 
were leaders of their party ; — namely, Phryni- 
chus, who formerly, during his employment 
as general at Samos, had embroiled himself 

i Tlieramenes was very expert at turning about and 
shifting his party. He got by it the nickname of 
Cothurnus, or the Buskin ; because the tragedian's 
buskin was made large enough for any foot to go into 
it. He was however a man of great abilities, and 
generally regarded as a lover of his country. His 
turns were dextrous, well-timed, and made with a 
view of public good. Cresar, when making Cicero a 
compliment, likened him to Theramenos. He was 
deeply concerned in all the subsequent revolutions at 
Athens, He put the finishing hand to the peace with 
the Lacedaemonians after the taking of Athens by 
Lysander, when they demolished their long walls, 
opehed their liarhours, and gave up their shipping. He 
was afterwards, nominally, one of the thirty tyrants: 
for lie soon began to oppose them ; first with modera- 
tion, then with vehemence ; which exasperated them 
60, that they put him to death. 



with Alcibiades ; and Aristarchus, one of the 
most violent and also most inveterate oppo- 
nents of the people ; and Pisander, and Anti- 
pho, and others of the greatest influence 
amongst them ; who formerly, upon establish- 
ing themselves first in the government, and 
ever since the army at Samos had dissented 
from them in favour of the democracy, had be- 
stirred themselves, in sending embassies to 
Lacedsemon, in more firmly establishing the 
oligarchy, and erecting a new fortification on 
the spot which is called Eetioneia ; — these, I 
say, exerted themselves with much greater ar- 
dour than ever, since the return of the deputies 
from Samos, as they plainly saw the inclina- 
tions of numbers, and some of their own body, 
on whose perseverance they had highly de- 
pended, were entirely changed. They even 
caused Antipho, and Phrynichus, and ten 
others, to set out with all expedition ; so ap- 
prehensive were they of fresh opposition both 
in Athens itself and from Samos ; and charged 
them with instructions to strike up an accom- 
modation with the Lacedaemonians upon any 
tolerable terms they could possibly procure. 
They also carried on with redoubled diligence 
the new works at Eetioneia. These works 
were intended, as was given out by Thera- 
menes and his party, not so much to keep out 
of the Piraeus those from Samos, should they 
endeavour to attempt it, as to enable them- 
selves, at their own discretion, to receive both 
the ships and land forces of the enemy ; for 
Eetioneia is the mole of the Piraeus, and the 
entrance into it opens at the end of this mole. 
The new work was therefore joined in such a 
manner to that which guarded it before on the 
side of the land, that a small party posted be- 
hind could command the entrance. For the 
extremities of it were continued down to the 
fort in the very mouth of the harbour, which 
was narrow ; and both the old wall, which was 
built on the land side, and this new .fortifica- 
tion within, reached down to the sea. They 
also enlarged and secured the great portico, 
which adjoined to the new work erected in the 
Piraeus, and kept it entirely in their own cus- 
tody. Here they obliged all the citizens to 
lodge what corn they already had, and all that 
should hereafter be imported, and here only to 
expose it to sale and to vend it. 

These proceedings had for a long time drawn 
sharp insinuations from Theramenes ; and, 
when the embassy returned from Lacedajmon 



328 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book vni. 



without bringing to any manner of issue a gen- 
eral accommodation for the whole of the state, 
he averred, that " by this new work the safety 
of the city was visibly endangered." For from 
Peloponnesus, at this instant of time, at the 
request of the Eubceans, no less than forty -two 
sail of ships were on the coast of Laconia ; some 
of which were Italian, from Tarentum and 
from Locri, and some Sicilian ; and all were 
now bound for Euboea. At the head of this 
equipment was Hegesandridas, a Spartan, the 
son of Hegcsander. Theramenes maintained, 
that " it was set out less for Eubcea than for 
those who were now fortifying at Eetioneia ; 
and, unless we stand upon our guard, they will 
surprise and complete the ruin of Athens." 
There was really something in the conduct of 
the men he accused, to countenance this charge, 
nor was it merely the outcry of slander. Those 
who now composed the oligarchy were princi- 
pally desirous to preserve in their hands the 
whole appendage of the republic ; if this were 
impracticable, to secure the shipping and walls, 
and subsist with independence ; but, should 
they be unable to campass this, rather than fall 
the first victims to the democracy re-establish- 
ed, to let in the enemy ; and, resigning their 
shipping and fortifications, to make any terms 
whatever for the state, provided they could ob- 
tain security for their own persons. They 
accelerated, therefore, this new work; which 
was so contrived as to have posterns, and sally- 
ports, and passages enough to let in the enemy ; 
and they proceed with all imaginable despatch, 
in order to outstrip prevention. 

Hitherto, indeed, this charge against them 
had only been whispered with an air of secrecy 
amongst a few. But, when Phrynichus, upon 
his return from the embassy to Lacedsemon, 
was treacherously stabbed by one of the patrole 
in the forum, at the hour of public resort, be- 
ing got but a few steps from the house where 
the council was sitting, and dropped down 
dead upon the spot; — when, farther, the as- 
sassin made his escape ; and a stranger from 
Argos, who assisted at the fact, being appre- 
hended and tortured by the four hundred, dis- 
covered not the name of any one person who 
set them on, nor made any farther confession 
than that " he knew large numbers met at the 
house of the officer who commanded the pa- 
trole, and at other places ;" — then, at length, 
as nothing could be made of this affair, Thera- 
menes and Aristocratcs, and as many cither of 



the four hundred or of others as were combined 
with them, proceeded to act in a more open 
and resoiute manner. For by this time the 
fleet was come round from Laconia ; and rid- 
ing before Epidaurus, had made ravages upon 
^gina. Theramenes therefore averred it im- 
probable, that " were they intended for Eu- 
baa, they would ever have put into ^^gina, 
and then go again and lie at Epidaurus, unless 
they had been sent out at the express invita- 
tion of those whom he had always accused of 
traitorous designs; and it was impossible to be 
passive any longer under such practices." In 
fine, after many speeches made to excite a tu- 
mult, and many suspicions disseminated abroad, 
they fell to work in earnest. For the heavy- 
armed, posted in the Pirseus to carry on the 
new works of Eetioneia, amongst whom Aris- 
tocratcs himself was employed at the head of 
his own band, lay under an arrest Alexicles, 
who commanded there for the oligarchy, and 
was a most vehement adversar)' to the opposite 
party ; and, carrying him into a house, put him 
under confinement. To this action they were 
also emboldened by the concurrence of others, 
as well as by Hermon, who commanded the 
patrole assigned for Munichia ; and, what was 
of most importance, it was openly countenanced 
by the whole body of the heavy-armed. The 
news of it was immediately carried to the four 
hundred, who were this moment assembled to- 
gether in council ; and all, excepting those dis- 
satisfied with their measures, were ready to 
run to arms, and vented terrible threats against 
Theramenes and his associates. 

But he, apologizing for himself, declared his 
readiness to take up arms along with them, 
and attend them to the rescue of Alexicles ; and, 
taking with him one of the generals who was 
in his secret, he hurried down to the Piraeus. 
Aristarchus also ran down to assist ; as did, 
farther, the young men belonging to the cavalry 
of the state. 

Great, in truth, was the tumult, and full of 
horror : for those who were left in the upper 
city imagined that the Pira;us was already 
seized, and that Alexicles was slain ; and they 
in the Piraius each moment expected an as- 
sault from those in the city. Not without 
difficulty could the men of years and experi- 
ence stop such as were wildly running up 
and down the streets, and rushing to arms. 
And Thucydides, the Pharsalian, public host 
of the state, who happened then to be at 



YEAR XXI.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



329 



Athens, threw himself with lively zeal in the j 
way of all who were flocking down ; conjuring 
them earnestly " not to finish the ruin of their 
country, when the enemy lay so near to strike 
the blow." But thus, at length, their fury 
abated, and the effusion of one another's blood 
was prevented. 

As for Theramenes, he was no sooner got 
down to the Pirseus, than, assuming authority, 
(for he himself was at this time a general,) he 
pretended to rate the heavy-armed for this 
piece of mutiny, at least so far as mere mak- 
ing a noise could do it : whilst Aristarchus 
and all the opposite faction were angry with 
them in earnest. But the bulk of the heavy- 
armed drew together in a body, and betray no 
sign of regret for what they had done. Nay, 
they demanded aloud from Theramenes, — " If, 
in his judgment, these new works were raised 
with a good design, or would not better be de- 
molished 1" His reply was this — That, "if 
they thought it expedient to demolish them, his 
opinion should concur with theirs." Hereupon, 
at a signal given, the heavy-armed and many 
others who belonged to the Pirseus rushed on 
in a moment, and pulled down all the new for- 
tification. 

The watch-word now published to the mul- 
titude was this — « Whosoever would have the 
administration lodged in the five thousand in- 
stead of the four hundred, let him join in the 
work." For even still they judged it politic to 
veil their design under the name of the five 
thousand, and not to say downright — " Whoso- 
ever would have the democracy restored," — lest 
possibly the former might have been actually in 
force, and a person speaking to any one of them 
might spoil all by some inadvertent expres- 
sions. And, on the same account, the four 
hundred would neither have the five thousand 
declared, nor yet have it known that they had 
never been appointed. To admit so large a 
number into a share of the government, they 
judged was in fact a mere democracy ; but that 
leaving the matter in suspense would strike a 
dread of his neighbour into every Athenian. 

The next morning, the four hundred, though 
highly disordered in their politics, assembled 
however in council. But those in the Piraeus, 
after enlarging Alexicles, whom they had put 
under confinement, and completing the demo- 
lition of the new works, marched to the theatre 
of Bacchus in Munichia, and there, all armed 
as they were, held a formal assembly ; and 
49 



then, in pursuance of what had been resolved, 
marched directly into the upper city, and posted 
themselves in the Anaceum. Here they were 
accosted by a select committee sent from the 
four hundred, who man to man reasoned calmly 
with them ; and, perceiving any to be tractable, 
plied them with persuasions to proceed in a 
gentle manner, and to restrain the fury of their 
associates ; giving them assurance, that " the 
five thousand would be declared ; and from 
them, by regular succession, at the pleasure of 
the five thousand, the four hundred should be 
appointed ; conjuring them, in the meantime, 
" not to forward, through impatience, the de- 
struction of the state, nor give it up for a prey 
to the public enemy." The whole multitude 
of the heavy-armed, attentive to these argu- 
ments, on which many expatiated at large and 
pressed home upon numbers, became more 
tractable than they were at first, and were most 
terribly alarmed at the mention of the total de- 
struction of their polity. It was at last con- 
cluded, that, on a set day, an assembly should 
be held in the temple of Bacchus, to devise an 
accommodation. 

But, when this assembly, to be held in the 
temple of Bacchus, came on, and all parties 
were only not completely met, comes in the 
news that " the two and forty sail and Hege- 
sandrides are coasting along from Megara to- 
wards Salamis." Not one of the heavy-armed 
this moment but pronounced it true, what be- 
fore was given out by Theramenes and his 
friends, that " to the new fortifications these 
ships are now bound ;" and it was judged that 
in the nick of time they had been levelled 
with the ground. But Hegesandrides, as 
perhaps had beforehand been concerted, only 
hovered about at Epidaurus or the adjacent 
coast. It is however probable, that, on ac- 
count of the present sedition amongst the 
Athenians, he lay for a time in this station, 
in hope to seize some fair opportunity to strike 
a blow. 

Be this as it will, the Athenians no sooner 
heard the news, than, to a man, they flocked 
down amain to the Piraeus ; less alarmed at 
their own domestic war, than at invasion from 
a public enemy, no longer remote, but at their 
very ports. Some of them threw themselves 
on board what shipping was ready ; others 
launched such as were aground ; and others 
posted themselves upon the walls and at the 
mouth of the harbour. 
2K 



330 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book \-m. 



But the Pcloponnesian fleet, having sailed 
by and doubled the cape of Sunium, comes to 
anchor between Thoricus and Phrasiae, and 
proceeds afterwards to Oropus. Hereupon 
the Athenians, in all imaginable hurry, man- 
ning out their ships with what hands could be 
got on this sudden emergency, as in a city dis- 
tracted with sedition, and yet eager to stave 
off the greatest danger that had ever threatened 
it, (for, as Attica was occupied by the enemy, 
Eubcea was now their all,) cause Thymocharis, 
a commander, to stand away with their fleet to 
Eretria. On their arrival there, and their 
junction with such as were already in Euboea, 
they amounted to six and thirty sail, and were 
immediately forced to engage : for Hegesan- 
dridas, after the hour of repast, came out in line 
of battle from Oropus. 

The distance of Oropus from the city of the 
Eretrians, across the sea, is about sixty stadia;' 
and therefore, upon his approach, the Athenians 
ordered their men on board, imagining the 
soldiers to be ready at hand to obey their or- 
ders ; whereas they happened not yet to be re- 
turned from the market, whither they had gone 
to buy provisions. For, through the manage- 
ment of the Eretrians, nothing could be got by 
way of sale, except in such houses as lay in the 
most remote quarters of the city ; with an in- 
tent that the enemy might attack the Athenians 
before they were all embarked, and oblige 
them in a hurrying and disorderly manner to be- 
gin the fight. Nay, a signal had even been 
held out to the enemy from Eretria towards 
Oropus, at what time they ought to come for- 
ward to the attack. 

Upon so short a notice, the Athenians, hav- 
ing formed their line as well as they were able, 
and engaging the enemy before the harbour 
of Eretria, made however a gallant resistance 
for a time. At length, being compelled to 
sheer off, they are pursued to land ; and as 
many of them as ran for safety to the city of 
the Eretrians suffered the most cruel treat- 
ment, in being murdered by the hands of men 
whom they supposed their friends. Such, in- 
deed, as could reach the fort of Eretria, which 
was garrisoned by Athenians, are safe ; as also 
the vessels which could make Chalcis. 

But the Peloponnesians, after making prizes 
of two and twenty Athenian vessels, and either 
butchering or making prisoners all on board 

* About six English miles. 



them, erected a trophy. And, no long time 
after, they caused all Eubcea to revolt, except- 
ing Oreus, which an Athenian garrison secur- 
ed, and then settled the state of that island at 
their own discretion. 

When advice of what was done at Euboea 
reached Athens, the greatest consternation 
ensued of all that had to this day been known. 
Not even the dreadful blow received in Sicily, 
though great concern, in truth, it gave them, 
nor any other public disaster, caused so terrible 
an alarm amongst them. For, at a time when 
their army at Samos was in open revolt, when 
they had no longer either shipping in store or 
mariners to go on board, when they were dis- 
tracted with intestine sedition, and ready each 
moment to tear one another to pieces ; — and 
on the neck of all these this great calamity 
supervened, in which they lost their fleet, and 
(what was more of consequence) Euboea, 
which had better supplied their necessities 
than Attica itself, — had they not ample reason 
not to fall into utter dejectionl But what 
alarmed them most was the proximity of ruin, 
in case the enemy, flushed with their late sue 
cess, should stand immediately into the PinEUS, 
now utterly destitute of ships. Not a moment 
passed but they imagined they were only not 
in the very harbour ; which, in truth, had they 
been a little more daring, they might easily 
have been. Nay, had they made this step and 
blocked up the city, they must infallibly have 
increased the seditions within it ; must have 
necessitated the fleet to come over from Ionia, 
though averse to the oligarchy, in order to pre- 
vent the ruin of their own relations and the 
total destruction of their country ; and, in the 
meantime, Hellespont, Ionia, the isles even 
up to Euboea, in a word, the whole empire of 
Athens, must have been their own. Yet, not 
in this instance only, but many others, the 
Lacedaemonians showed themselves most com- 
modious enemies for the Athenians to encoun- 
ter : for, as nothing differed more than their 
respective tempers ; the one being active, the 
other slow ; enterprising these, but timorous 
those, especially in naval competitions ; they 
gave them many advantages. The truth of this 
the Syracusans most plainly showed, who very 
nearly resembled the Athenians in disposition, 
and so warred against them with the highest 
spirit and success. 

Terrified, however, at these tidings, the Athe- 
nians made a shift to man out twenty vessels, 



YEAR XXI.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



331 



and convened an assembly of the people, on 
the first report of their loss, in the place which 
is called the Pnyx, and where generally that 
assembly was held. In this they put an end 
to the administration of the four hundred, and 
decreed "the supreme power to be vested in 
the five thousand, which number to consist of 
all such citizens as were enrolled for the heavy 
armour; and that no one should receive a 
salary for any public magistracy ; whoever 
offended in this point they declared a traitor." 
Other frequent assemblies were afterwards held, 
in which they appointed Nomothetse,' and filled 
up the other posts in the government. And 
now, at least, though for the first time in ray 
opinion, the Athenians seem to have modelled 
their government aright. A moderation, finely 
tempered between the few and the many, was 
now enforced. And, from the low situation 
in which their affairs were now plunged, this 
enabled Athens to re-erect her head. 

They decreed, farther, the recalment of Al- 
cibiades and his adherents ; and, despatching a 
deputation to him and the army at Samos, ex- 
horted them to exert their utmost efforts for 
the public service, 

In the first moments of this new revolution, 
Pisander and Alexicles, with their partizans, 
and in general all the great sticklers for the 
oligarchy, withdraw privately to Decelea. But 
Aristarchus, who was one of the generals of 
the state, took a different route from all the 
rest; and, carrying off a party of archers, though 
rank Barbarians, went off towards Oenoe : 
Oenoe was a fortress of the Athenians on the 
frontiers of Boeotia. But the Corinthians, on 
a provocation peculiar to themselves, having 
procured the concurrence of the Boeotians, 
held it now blocked up, because a party of their 
countn.-men, drawing off from Decelea, had 
been put to the sword by a sally of the garrison 
from Oenoe. Aristarchus, therefore, having 
in a conference settled matters with the be- 
siegers, deceives the garrison in Oenoe, by 
assuring them, that, " as their countrymen in 
Athens had made up all their quarrels with 

» The general course of .ippointin^ Nomotlietse was 
by lot. Their number in the wiiole wne a tliousnnd and 
one. Their tnisines.- was not, as t!ie mme seems to 
imply, to make new laws, since that helonsed to the 
supreme power lodged in the people : but to inspect 
such as were already made, to rei'onsider such as were 
thoimlit to be, or were complained of, as grievous, 
and regularly report such as ought to be continued or 
ought to be repealed. 



the Lacedaemonians, they also were bound to 
deliver up this place to the Boeotians ; and that 
this was an express provision in the treaty." 
Giving credit therefore to him as in pub- 
lic command, and ignorant of all the late 
transactions, because closely blocked up, they 
agree with the enemy and evacuate the for- 
tress. In this manner the Boeotians regained 
possession of abandoned Oenoe : and thus 
the oligarchy and sedition were suppressed 
at Athens. 

But, about the same space of time in the 
current summer, in regard to the Peloponne- 
sians at Miletus : — When none of those, who 
were substituted by Tissaphernes during his 
absence at Aspendus, made regular payments; 
and nothing could be seen either of Tissapher- 
nes or the Phoenician fleet, and Philippus, who 
accompanied him, sent advice to Mindarus, the 
admiral in chief; and Hippocrates, farther, a 
citizen of Sparta, who was then at Phaselis, 
advised him also, that, " this fleet would never 
join Lim, and in all respects they were shame- 
fully abused by Tissaphernes ;" — as Pharnaba- 
zus had made them an invitation, and declared 
himself ready, if aided by the confederate fleet, 
to engage as strongly as Tissaphernes for the 
revolt of what cities yet remained in subjection 
to the Athenians ; — Mindarus, hoping to find 
more punctuality in the latter, w-ith notable 
conduct, and by a sudden signal to the fleet, 
that his motions might not be discovered at 
Samos, weighs from Miletus with seventy- 
three sail, and bent his course to the Helles- 
pont. But, earlier this summer, sixteen ships 
had steered their course thither, and ravaged 
part of the Chersonesus. Mindarus met with 
tempestuous weather in his passage, which 
forced him to put into Icarus ; and, after 
staying there five or six days for want of 
weather to keep the sea, he arrives at Chios. 

Thrasyllus, so soon as informed of the depar- 
ture from Miletus, stood after him with five 
and fifty sail, making the best of his way lest 
the other should enter the Hellespont before 
he reached him. But, gaining intelligence that 
he was put into Chios, and concluding he de- 
signed to remain there, he fixed his scouts at 
Lesbos and the opposite continent ; that, if 
the Peloponnesian fleet put out, their motions 
might be descried. He himself, repairing to 
Methymne, ordered quantities of meal and 
other necessaries to be prepared, that in case 
he should be forced to stay in these parts, he 



332 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



[book VIII. 



might make frequent cruises from Lesbos 
against Chios. 

But, as Eressus in Lesbos had revolted, his 
design was farther to attempt its reduction, in 
case it were feasible. For some of the Methy- 
nean exiles, and those not the most inconsider- 
able of the number, having brought over from 
Cyme about fifty heavy-armed who were most 
firmly attached to their cause, and hired others 
from the continent, which increased their num- 
ber to about three hundred, Anaxarchus, the 
Theban, in respect of consanguinity, being 
chosen their leader, — assaulted first Methymne ; 
and, being repulsed in the attempt by the 
Athenian garrison which came up from Mity- 
lene, and then driven quite off by a battle fought 
in the field, they retired across the mountain, and 
make Eressus revolt. Thrasyllus, therefore, 
steering with his fleet against Eressus, project- 
ed an assault. But Thrasybulus, with five 
ships from Samos, arrived there before him, 
upon information received of the re-passage 
of the exiles ; yet, coming too late before 
Eressus to prevent a revolt, he lay at anchor 
before it. Two other ships, also, bound home- 
wards from the Hellespont, came in, and the 
Methymnean. All the ships in the fleet 
amounted now to sixty-seven, from which they 
draughted an army for the operations of land, 
as fully bent, if possible, to take Eressus by 
a bold assault, with engines and all the arts of 
attack. 

In the meantime, Mindarus and the Pelo- 
ponnesian fleet at Chios, after two whole days 
employment in taking in provisions, and receiv- 
ing from the Chians every man on board three 
Chian tesseracosts,' on the third day with 
urgent despatch launch out from Chios into 
the wide sea, that they might not be descried 
by the fleet before Eressus ; and leaving 
Lebos on the left, stood over to the con- 
tinent. There, putting into the harbour of 
Cratersei on the coast of Phocea, and taking 
their noon repast, they proceeded along the 
coast of Cyme, and supped at Arginusae 
of the continent, against Mitylene. From 
thence, at dead of night, they went forwards 
along the shore ; and, being arrived at Herma- 



» This, according to Spanlieim, was a inontli's pay, 
einre he explains it hy Ibrty-tliree Cliian" draclinins. 
But the words will not hear such a construction : a 
tesBcracost was, it is most prohal)Ie, a coin peculiar to 
the Chians ; hut of what value it is not known, nor is 
it of any great importance. 



tus which lies facing Methymne, and having 
eat their dinner there, they passed with the 
utmost speed by Lectus, and Larissa, and 
Amaxitus, and other adjacent places, and reach 
Rhaetium of the Hellespont before midnight. 
Not but that some ships of the fleet got up no 
farther than to Sigseum and some other adja- 
cent places on that coast. 

The Athenians, who were lying with 
eighteen sail at Sestus, when the lights were 
waved by their own friends for signals, and 
they beheld numerous fires kindled on a sud- 
den on the hostile coast, were well assured 
that the Peloponnesians are approaching. The 
same night, therefore, under favour of the dark, 
and with the utmost expedition, they crept 
along under the Chersonesus, and reached 
Eleus, desirous to put out to sea, and avoid 
the enemy ; and, for the sixteen ships at Aby- 
dus, they stole away unperceived of the Aby- 
dians, though notice had been sent them from 
their friends just arrived, to keep a good look- 
out, and not suffer them to steal off. Yet 
morning no sooner appeared, than, finding 
themselves in sight of the fleet under Minda- 
rus, and that they were actually chased, they 
could not all get off. The greater part, indeed, 
fled safe to the continent and Lemnos ; but 
four, that got last under sail, are overtaken by 
the enemy near Eleus ; one, also, that ran 
ashore at the temple of Protesilaus, they seize 
with all her hands ; and two more, the crews 
of which escaped. One, farther, but aban- 
doned, they burn atlmbrus. 

This done, the ships from Abydus having 
joined them, and the whole fleet being now 
increased to fourscore and six sail, they spent 
the rest of the day in investing Eleus ; but, 
as it would not surrender, they drew off to 
Abydus. 

The Athenians, who had been deceived by 
their scouts, and never imagined that so large a 
number of hostile ships could pass along un- 
descried,werevery coolly carrying on their siege; 
but yet were no sooner informed of the ene- 
my's motions, than, instantly quitting Eressus, 
they advanced with the utmost expedition to 
secure the Hellespont. They also pick up two 
ships of the Peloponnesians ; which, running 
out too boldly to sea in the late pursuit, fell in 
amongst them : and, coming up only one day 
after them, they anchor at Eleus. and re-as- 
semble from Imbrus the ships which had fled 
thither. Five whole days they spend here in 



YEAR XXT.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



333 



getting every thing in readiness for a general 
engagement : and after this respite they came 
to an action in the following manner. 

The Athenians, ranged in line of battle 
a-head, stood along shore towards Sestus. The 
Peloponnesians, aware of their design, stood 
out to sea from Abydus, to be ready to receive 
them. And, as both sides were determined to 
engage, they unfolded their lines to a greater 
length ; the Athenians, along the Chersonesus, 
reaching from Idacus to Arrhianse, in all sixty- 
eight sail ; and the Peloponnesians over-against 
them from Abydus to Dardanus, being eighty- 
six. The line of the Peloponnesians was thus 
formed : the Syracusans had the right ; and on 
the left was ranged Mindarus, and the ships most 
remarkable for being good sailers. Amongst 
the Athenians, Thracyllus had the left, and 
Thrasybulus the right : the rest of the com- 
manders were regularly posted according to 
their rank. The Peloponnesians, showing 
most eagerness to begin the engagement, en- 
deavoured with their left to over-reach the 
right of the Athenians, in order to exclude 
tKem, if possible, from stretching out into the 
main sea, and, by keeping them cramped up, to 
force their centre against the shore, which was 
not far distant. The Athenians, aware of the 
enemy's design to shut them up, plying up 
a-head, forced themselves an opening, and in 
velocity beat them all to nothing. 

By these motions, the left of their line be- 
came extended beyond the cape called Cynos- 
sema. The consequence of which was expos- 
ing their centre, composed only of the weakest 
ships, and those ranged at too great a distance 
from one another ; especially as in number of 
vessels they were quite inferior, and as the 
coast round the Cynos-sema was sharp, and in 
an acute angle runs out into the water, so that 
part of the line on one side was out of sight of 
the other. The Peloponnesians, therefore, 
charging the the centre, drove at once the ships 
of the Athenians upon the beach ; and, being 
so far manifestly victors, leaped boldly on shore 
to pursue them. But neither those under 
Thrasybulus could assist the centre from the 
right, because of the multitude of ships that 
stood in to awe them ; nor could those 
under Thrasyllus do it from the left, because 
the interposition of cape Cynos-sema hid from 
him the view of what had passed ; and at the 
same time the Syracusans and others, who, 



equal in strength, lay hard upon him, prevented 
his moving. At length, the Peloponnesians, 
presuming the victory their own, broke their 
order to give different chase to single ships, 
and in too heedless a manner threw confusion 
upon a part of their own line. And now those 
under Thrasybulus, finding the squadron op- 
posed to them began to slacken, stopped all far- 
ther extension of their line a-head ; and tack- 
ing upon them, resolutely engaged, and put 
them to flight. Charging next the dispersed 
ships of the Peloponnesians, which composed 
the squadron that presumed itself victorious, 
they made havoc ; and, by striking them with 
a panic, routed the greater part without resis- 
tance. Now also the Syracusans were begin- 
ning to give way before the squadron under 
Thrasyllus ; and seeing others in open flight, 
were more easily tempted to follow their ex- 
ample. The defeat now being manifestly 
given, and the Peloponnesians flying away for 
shelter, first towards the river Pydius, and 
afterwards to Abydus, the Athenians made 
prize of only an inconsiderable number of 
shipping ; for the Hellespont, being narrow, 
afforded short retreats to the enemy. How- 
ever they gained a victory by sea, most oppor- 
tune indeed in their present situation ; for 
hitherto, afraid of the naval strength of the 
Peloponnesians, because of the rebuffs they 
had lately received from it, and the calamitous 
event of the Sicilian expedition, from this 
moment they stopped all fruitless self-accusa- 
tions or groundless exaggerations of the ene- 
my's ability by sea. Some ships of the enemy 
in fact they take ; for instance, eight Chian, five 
Corinthian, two Ambraciot, two Boeotian ; but, 
of Leucadian, and Lacedaemonian, and Syracu- 
san, and Pellenean, a single one of each : but 
then they suffered the loss of fifteen ships of 
their own. 

After erecting a trophy upon the cape of 
Cynos-sema, and picking up the shatters of 
the fight, and giving up, under truce, their dead 
to the enemy, they despatched a trireme to 
Athens to notify the victory. On the arrival of 
this vessel, those at home, after hearing the news 
of this unhoped-for success, greatly resumed 
their spirits, which had been dejected by the 
recent misfortunes at Euboea and the sad effects 
of the sedition, and hoped the state might again 
resume its power if they cheerfully exerted 
their efforts in its behalf. 
2k2 * 



334 



PELOPOXNESIAN WAR. 



[book viil 



On the fourth day after the battle, the 
Athenians, having diligently refitted their 
fleet at Sestus, sailed against Cyzicus, which 
had revolted ; and, descrying eight ships from 
Byzantium riding at anchor under Harpagium 
and Priapus, they crowded sail towards them ; 
and, having in battle upon the shore defeated 
their crews, made prizes of them all. Repair- 
ing thence against Cyzicus, which was quite 
unfortified, they reduced it once more, and ex- 
acted large contributions from it. 

But, during this interval, the Peloponnesians 
made a trip from Abj'dus to Eleus, and brought 
off as many of their own ships which had been 
taken as were able to sail ; the residue the 
Eleusians burnt. They also despatched Hip- 
pocrates and Epicles to Euboea, to fetch up 
their fleet from thence. 

About the same space of time, Alcibiades 
also, at the head of his squadron of thirteen sail, 
returned from Caunus and Phaselis into the 
harbour of Samos, reporting that "by his 
management he had diverted the junction of 
the Phoenician fleet with the Peloponnesians, 
and made Tissaphernes a faster friend than 
ever to the Athenians." After enlarging his 
squadron by the addition of nine more just 
manned, he levied large contributions upon the 
Halicarnasseans, and fortified Cos. After 
these exploits, and putting the government of 
Cos into proper hands, he returned again, about 
autumn, to Samos.' 

» As the English reader is here to take his leave of 
Alcibiades, he may have the curiosity to know what 
became of him after. — Every thing succeeded so well, 
under him and his active colleagues, that the Lacedae- 
monians, having received several defeats both by land 
and sea, and lost two hundred ships, were again neces 
eitated to sue for peace. After such great services, 
Alcibiades returned triumphant to Athens. The whole 
city flocked down to the Piraeus to meet him. All 
strove to get a sight of Alcibiades : they caressed 
him, crowned him, cursed the authors of his exile, and 
hurried him away to an assembly of the people. There 
he harangued them for a time; then stopped and shed 
tears in almndance; then harangued them again. In 
short, they undid all they had ever done against him ; 
and Alcibiades for a time was all in all at .\tliens. 
Yet, in subsequent commands, he happened not to be 
successful ; a crime which his countrymen very seldom 
forgave. He became a second time an exile from Athens. 
His great abilities made him a continual terror both to j 
foreign and domestic enemies. Vet now he persevered ' 
to serve his country, by raballing in their favour, and ' 
advising them on critical occasions. Yet all in vain : I 
Lysnnder was soon master of the rira^U8 and of Athens. 
Alcibiades retired into Tbrygia, and was handsomely , 



From Aspendus also Tissaphernes rode back 
post haste into Ionia, so soon as advised of the 
departure of the Peloponnesian fleet from Mil- 
etus for the Hellespont. 

But, as the Peloponnesians were now in 
the Hellespont, the Antandrians, (who are 
of JEolic descent) having procured from 
Abydus a party of heavy-armed who marched 
across mount Ida, received them into their 
city, provoked to this step by the injurious 
conduct of Arsaces, a Persian lieutenant to 
Tissaphernes. This man, pretending he had 
enemies to cope with whom yet he never 
named, prevailed with the Delians settled in 
Adramittium. because they had been obliged 
by the Athenians to quit Delos in the affair 
of the expiation, to attend him in this secret 
expedition with the flower of their strength ; 
and, leading them forwards with all the show 
of friendship and alliance, watched the oppor- 
tunity when they were busy at their meal, 
surrounded them with a body of his own 
soldiers, and shot them to death with darts. 
Fearing him, therefore, because of this in- 
stance of a cruel temper, lest some such 
act of violence he might execute also upon 
them, as in other respects he had imposed 
some burdens upon them which they could 
not bear, the Antandrians eject his garrison 
out of their citadel. But Tissaphernes, per- 
ceiving how deeply the Peloponnesians were 
concerned in this affair, and esteeming him- 
self sadly injured also at Miletus and Cnidus 
(since in those places too his garrisons had 
been ejected ;) and fearing they would pro- 
ceed to other commissions of the same na- 
ture ; chagrined moreover that perhaps Phar- 
nabazus, in less time and with less expense, 
having obtained their concurrence, should 
make a greater progress against the Athenians ; 
— he determined in person to repair to Helles- 
pont, in order to expostulate with them about 



supported by the bounty of his friend Pharnabazus: 
who however was wrought upon nt last, by the joint 
solicitations of his enemies and the plea of its necessity 
for the service of the king, to undertake his destruc- 
tion. The agents of Pharnabazus durst not attempt 
him in an open manner, but set fire to his house by 
night. By throwin;; in clothes to damp the flames, 
he got out safe. The Barbarians soon spied him, 
shot him to death with arrows and darts, then cut 
otf his head, and carried it to Pharnabazus. I shall 
only add, that he was but forty years old when he was 
thus destroyed. 



YEAR XXI.] 



PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 



335 



their late proceedings at Antander, and to wipe 
off, as handsomely as he could, the aspersions 
thrown upon his own conduct in regard to the 
Phoenician fleet and other points. Arriving 
therefore first at Ephesus, he oflfered sacrifice 
to Diana ***** ».i 



When the winter following this summer 
shall be ended, the twenty -first year of the war 
will be also completed. 

» Here breaks off abruptly tlie history of the Pelopon- 
nesian war by Thucydides. The adjustment of time 
annexed seems plainly of another band. 



INDEX. 



Mronychus, 30. 

Acanthus, 187. 

Acarna,nians ; excellent slingerg, 83 — conquer tbe Am- 
braciots, 129 — make peace with them, 131 — enter into 
an alliance with the Athenians, 77. 

Ackamians, 61. 

Admetus, king of the Molossians, 45. 

JEantidas, tyrant of Lampsacus, 240. 

JEgineta, formerly of great power at sea, 6 — stir up the 
war against the Athenians, 21 — conquered by the 
Athenians at sea, 34 — how and why expelled ^Egina 
by the Athenians, 63 — are settled by the Lacednemo- 
nians at Thyrea, ib. — how used by the Athenians 
when they reduced Thyrea, 152. 

Egyptians, which of them most warlike, 35. 

JEneas, 173. 

JEnesias, 53. 

JEnians, 281. 

■Cohans, tributary to Athens, 281. 

JEsimides, 16. 

JEsoTu, 194. 

jEtheans^ 33. 

JEtolians, 3— invaded by the Athenians, 125 — defeat 
them, 126. 

Agamemnon, 4. 

Agatharchidas, 83. 

Agatharcus, 267. 

Agesander, 47. 

Agesippidas, 201. 

Agis, king of Sparta, 123, 133 — he commands against 
the Argives, 201 — lets them go without a battle, 202 — 
is accused for it at Sparta, 203 — marches a second 
time against them, ib. — gains the victory at Manii- 
nea, 207 — fortifies Decelea in Attica, 265 — makes an 
unsuccessful attempt on Athens, 319. 

Agnon, 88 — the son of Nicias, colleague to Pericles, 38 
— besiegeth Potidjea, 72 — the founder of Amphipolis, 
167, 183, 

Agrcsans, 130. 

Agrianians, 89. 

Agrigentines, neutral in the Sicilian war, 282. 

Alcteus, archon at Athens, 188. 

Alcamenes, 297, 299. 

Alcibiades, son of Clinias, 195 — his expedition into Pelo- 
ponnesus, 200 — and to Argos, 210 — named for one of 
the commanders in Sicily, 220 — his speech on that oc- 
cas'ion, 223 — is accused about the Mercuries, and for 
profaning the mysteries, 227,237— insists on a trial,228 
—sets out for Sicily,ib.— his opinion at a council of war, 
236 — is recalled to take his trial, 237 — flies and is out- 
lawed, 241 — takes refuge at Sparta, 25 1 — bis speech at 
Sparta, ib. — adviseth the Lacedemonians about prose- 
cuting the war, 297, 299— sent to Chios with Chalci- 
50 



deus, 300— his transactions at Miletus, 301— goes to 
Tissaphernes, and becomes a favourite, 310 — con- 
trives his own recalment to Athens, 311 — his quarrel 
with Phrynichus, 312— is recalled, 323, 331— his man- 
agement at Saraos, 323, 325— goes to Aspendus, 326. 

Alcidas, the Lacedemonian admiral, sent to Lestios, 98, 
101 — he flies, 102— returns to Peloponnesus, 117 — 
sails to Corcyra, 118- one of the three leaders of the 
colony to Heraclea, 124. 

Alcinidas, 187, 188, 

Alciphron, 202, 

AlcmcBon, 91, 

AlcmcBonidcB, 240. 

Alexarchus, 265. 

Alexicles, put under arrest, 328— flies to Decelea, 331. 

Alexippidas, 315. 

Ambraciots ,aid the Corinthians against the Corcyreans, 
9, 10 — make war on the Amphilochians, 77 — and the 
Acarnanians, 82 — make another expedition against 
both, 127— take Olpae, 128— are defeated, 129— make 
peace, 131 — send aid to the Syracusans, 282. 

Ameinias, 177. 

Ameiniades, 77. 

Aminocles, 5, 

Amorges, revolts from the king of Persia, 297 — is taken 
prisoner by the Pcloponnesians, and delivered to Tis- 
saphernes, 305, 

Ampelidas, 187. 

Amphias, 173. 

Amphilochians, 77, 130. 

Amp hiss ensians, 126. 

Amyntas, 88. 

Amyrtaus, 35, 

Anaxarchus, 332. 

Anaxilas, 219. 

Andocidcs, 18. 

Androcles, 317. 

Andromenes, 194. 

Androsthenes, 199. 

Andrians, 281. 

Anthippus, 187, 188. 

Anticles, 38, 

Antimenidas, 194. 

Antiochus, king of the Orestians, 82. 

Antiphemus, 218. 

Antipho, 318, 327. 

Antisthenes, 308, 316. 

Antitanians, 82, 

Apodoti, 124. 

Arcadians, furnished with ships by Agamemnon in the 
Trojan expedition, 4 — mercenaries, 281. 

Archedice, 240. 

Archelaus, 90, 

337 



338 



INDEX 



Arehestratu3, 19. 

Jlrclietimus, 10. 

Archias, of Caniarina, 141. 

Archas, the Corinthian, founder of Syracuse, 218. 

Arehidamus, king of Sparta, his speech about the war, 
26 — commands in the invasion of Attica, 56 — his 
speech, ib. — commands in another invasion, 69 — and 
against Plataea, 78. 

Archonides, 259. 

Argyllians, a colony of Andrians, 167 

Argives, have thirty-years' truces with the Lacedemo- 
nians, 184 — are irritated by the Corinthians against 
he Lacedemonians, 189 — aim at being a leading state, 
ib. — make war upon the Epidaurians, 200 — are sur- 
rounded by the Lacedemonians, but let go, 202 — are 
defeated at Mantinea,.'ind make peace, 207, 208. 

Arianthidas, 163. 

Aristagoras, 167. 

Aristarchus. 327,328, 331. 

Aristeus, son of Pellicas, 10. 

Aristeus, son of Adimantus, 19, 21, 77. 

Aristeus, the Lacedemonian, 177. 

Aristides, son of Lysimachus, 30. 

Aristides, son of Archippus, 150, 158. 

Aristocles, 185, 206. 

Aristocwtes, 187. 

Aristocrates, 188, 327, 328. 

Aristogiton, 7, 238. 

Aristo, 273. 

Aristonous, of Larisja, 62. 

Aristophon, 325. 

Aristotle, son of Timocrates, 128. 

Arrihaas, king of the Lyncestians, 160 — warred against 
by Brasidas and Perdiccas, ib. 174. 

Artabazus,4^. 

Artaphernes, 150. 

Artas, 271. 

Artaxerxes Longimanus , 33 — begins to reign, 46 — dies, 
—150. 

Asopius, son of Pbormio, his exploits and death, 94. 

Astymachus, 111. 

Astyochus, the Lacedemonian admiral, 301 — 306 — goes 
to Chios, 302— in great danger, 306— refuses to suc- 
cour the Chians, ib. — betrays Phrynichus, 312 — is 
mutinied against by his own seamen, and returns to 
Sparta, 324. 

Athenians, gave shelter at first to all who would settle 
amongst them, 2 — had war with the ^Eginetae, 21 — 
how they became a naval power,7-abandoned Athens 
and fought at Salamis, 24 — rebuilt their walls, 29 — 
made war against the king of Persia, under Pausanins, 
31 — sain a victory at Euryinedon, 32 — reduce the isle 
of Thasos, ib. — receive the Helots, and settle them at 
Naupactus, 33 — their war in Esypt, ih. 35 — with the 
Corinthians, ib. — and Epidaurians, and ^ginette,34 
— with the Lacedemonians, 35 — Bctotians, 36 — Sicyo- 
nians, ib. — Cyprians, ib. — recover Chierona, ih. — de- 
feated at Coronea, ih. — reduce Euhcta. 37 — make war 
tipon Samos, 38 — make alliance with the Corcyrcans, 
15 — assist them against the Corinthians, 16— their 
measures with the Potida'ans, 19 — make war upon 
Perdiccas, ib. — fight the Potidieans and Corinthians, 
20 — besiege Potidsa, 21 — deliberate about the Pelo- 
ponnesinn war, 47 — prepare for defence, 55 — send 
their fleet to cruise upon Peloponnesus, 62 — attack 
Methoiie, ib. — invade Lorris, 63^jert the /Eu'inctip 
from the isle of ^Egina. ib. — make an alliance with 
Sitalccs, lb. — take Solium and .Vstacus, C4 — invade 



the Megarifl, ib.— fortify Atulante, ib.— celebrate the 
public funeral, ib. — are afflicted with the plague, 69 — 
send their fleets to cruise on Peloponnesus, 72 — are 
angry with Pericles, 73 — take Potida-a, 78 — war upon 
the Chalcideans, 81 — fight the Peloponnesians at sea, 
83 — send a fleet to Lesbos, 93 — besiese Mitylene, 94 — 
reduce it, 101 — seize the island of Minoa, 110 — send 
a fleet to Sicily, 122 — their war in Acarnania, 124 — 
are defeated by the ^tolians, 126 — their proceedings 
in Sicily, 133 — they seize and fortify Pylus, 134 — 
fight between them and the Lacedemonians, 336 — 
fight the Syracusans, 140, 141 — invade the Corinth- 
ians, 147 — take Anactorium, 150 — conquer Cythera, 
151 — takeThyrea, 152 — surprise Nisiea, 156 — invade 
Bcbotia, and are defeated at Deliuni, 163, 165 — lose 
Amphipolis. 167 — make a truce with the Lacedemo- 
nians, 171— take Rlcnde, 176 — besiege Scione. 177— 
cjectthe Delians, 179 — are conquered by Brasidas at 
Amphipolis. 183— make a peace, 185 — take Scione, 
191 — want to break the peace, 195 — make an alliance 
with the Argives, 197— invade and reduce Melos,210 
— determine on the Sicilian expedition, 217 — their 
preparations, 227— they sail for Sicily, 228 — land at 
Syracuse, 242— fight, 243— solicit the alliance of Ca- 
marina, 246 — take Epipolae, 255 — hesiege Syracuse, 
256— fight withGylippus, 261— send a reinforcement 
to Syracuse, 265— fight the Corinthians at Erinetis, 
271 — defeated in the attack of Epipolae, 276 — are 
raising the siege, 278 — are stopped by an eclipse of the 
moon, ib.— fight the battle in the harl our, 286— march 
away, 288 — forced to surrender, 292, 293 — their con- 
sternation at Athens, 295 — their mcnsures, 296 — take 
Mitylene, 302— subdue the Clazomenians, 303— be- 
siege the Chians, ib. — defeat the Milesians, 304 — quit 
Miletus for fear of the Peloponnesians, ib. — fight and 
are defeated, 309— solicit the friendship of Tissa- 
phernes, 314— fight with the Chians, 316— lose their 
democracy, ib. — lose Euba-a, 330 — defeat the Pelo- 
ponnesians in the battle of Cynos-sema, 333. 

Athenaus, 173. 

Athenugoras, his speech at Syracuse, 232. 

Atreus,A. 

Autocles, 151, 173. 

B 

Battus, 148. 

Bxotians, ejected out of Arne, 5 — conquered by the 
Athenians at Oenophyla, 35 — become free, ?6 — win 
the battle of Delium, 165 — besie^'e Dclium, 166 — take 
Panactum, 180 — send aid to the Syracusans, '.65. 

Boeotian Rulers, eleven in number, 163, 193 — four 
councils, ib. 

Bomiensians, 125. 

Bottia-ans, 19,81, 90. 

Brasidas, saves Methone, and receives the puMic com- 
mendation at Sparta, 62, 63— is of the council to Alci- 
das, 118 — his gallant behaviour at Pylus, 1"6— saves 
Megara, 158 — marches to Thrace, 159 — his character, 
160 — marches against the Lyncestians, ili.-hitrangues 
the Acanthians, IKl — gets possession of Amphipolis, 
168 — is repulsed at Eion, 169 — marches into Acte, 170 
— takes Torone.ib. — and Lecytlius, 171 — crowned by 
the Scioneans, 173 — marches a second time asainstthe 
Lyncestians, 174 — his brave retreat, 175 — makes an 
unsuccessful attempt on Potidira, 178 — opposes Cleon 
at Ampliipolis, 181 — resolves to attack, 182 — ha- 
ran;.'ues, ib. — sallies, 183 — conquers and dies, ib. — his 
funeral, ib. 



INDEX. 



339 



Braures, 169. 

Byzantines, revolt from the Athenians, 37. 



Callias, son of Calliades, 20— killed, 21. 

Callicrates, 10. 

Calliensiaiis, 125. 

Camarineans, twice ejected, 219 — their conduct in the 
Sicilian war, 237, 250. 

Cambyses,6. 

Carcinus, 62. 

Carians, 2, 3. 

Carthaginians, 6, 231, 252. 

Carystians, 32, 281. 

Cataneans, dwell under mount iEtna, 132 — reduced by 
the Athenians 237, 282. 

Cecrops, king of Athens, 59. 

Ceryces, 313. 

Chcereas, 321,325. 

Chalcideus, the Lacedemonian admiral, 299 — his ex- 
ploits, 300, 301— killed by the Athenians, 303. 

Chalcideans of Eubcea, make war with the Eretrians, 
6 — sutiject to the Athenians, 281. 

Chalcideans of Thrace, revolt from the Athenians, 19 
— defeat them, 81 — enter into league with the Ar- 
gives, 191. 

Chaonians, 82. 

Charicles, 266, 268. 

Charminus, an Athenian commander, 306 — ^^defeated by 
the Peloponnesians, 309 — helps the oligarchial party 
at Samos, 320. 

Charceadas, son of Euphilitus, 122 — killed, 123. 

Chionis, 187, 188. 

Chians, suspected, 298 — ^revolt from the Athenians, 300 
—their war, 302. 

Chrysis, 53, 178. 

Cilicians, 36. 

Cimon, son of Miltiades, takes Eion, 32 — beats the Per- 
sians at Euryraedon, ib. — dies in the expedition to 
Cyprus, 36. 

Clearchus, 323. 

Clearidas, commands in Amphipolis, 177, 182 — con- 
quers Cleon with Brasidas, 183 — endeavours to break 
the peace, 187. 

Cleippides, 93. 

Cleobulus, 192. 

Cleomedes, 211. 

Cleomenes, 42. 

Cleon, his speech, 103 — command atPylus, 143, 144, 146 
— his command in Thrace, 179, 181 — conquered by 
Brasidas, and killed, 183. 

Cleopompus, 72. 

Cnemus, the Spartan, commands a squadron against Za- 
cynthus, 77 — sent into Acarnania, 82 — retires from 
Stratus, 83. 

Conon, 270. 

Copiensians, 164. 

Corcyreans, founders of Epidamnus, 8 — were them- 
selves a Corinthian colony, 9 — make war on Epidam- 
nus, ib. — beat the Corinthians at sea, 10 — beg the al- 
liance of Athens, 11 — their speech at Athens, 12 — 
their success, 15 — engage the Corinthians at sea, 16 — 
their sedition, 177, 149 — aid the Athenians in the war 
of Sicily, 281. 

Corinthians, first built ships of war, 5 — their quarrel 
with the Corcyreans about Epidamnus, 9 — their 



speech at Athens, 13 — continuation of their war with 
the Corcyreans, 16 — send aid to Potidaea, 20 — hate 
the Athenians, 21 — their first speech at Lacedemon, 
ibid. — their second, 39 — excite discontent in Pelo- 
ponnesus, 188, 189 — make alliances with the Ele- 
ans and Argives, 191 — aid the Syracusans, 254, 
264. 

Coroneans, 164. 

Cranians, 64. 

Cranonians , 62. 

Cratcemenes, 218. 

Crestonians, 170. 

Cretans, 281. 

Crasus, 6. 

Cyclops, 217. 

Cylon, the history of him, 41. 

Cynes, 91. 

Cyrus the elder, 6. 

Cyrus the younger, 33. 



Daithus, 187. 

Damagetus, 187. 

Damagon, 124. 

Damotimus, 173. 

Darius, king of Persia, succeeds Cambyses, 6— reduces 
the isles, ib. 

Darius, son of Artaxerxes, 297 — his leagues with the 
Lacedemonians, 301, 307, 315. 

Dascon, 219. 

Delians, removed out of Delos by the Athenians, 179 — 
brought thither again, 191. 

Demaratus, 258. 

Demarchus, 325. 

Demodtochus, 158. 

Demosthenes, 123 — his war in jEtolia, 125 — his seizure 
6f and exploits at Pylus, 134, 135 — his harangue, 136 
— his attempt on Megara, 155 — carries up a reinforce- 
ment against Syracuse, 265 — arrives at Syracuse, 274 
— repulsed at Epipolae, 275 — is for raising the siege, 
277 — decamps, 287 — surrenders with the troops un- 
der his command, 292 — is put to death, 293. 

Demoteles, 141. 

Dercylidas, 316. 

Derdas, 19. 

Dersmans, 90. 

Dians, 89. 

Dictideans, take Thyssus, 192 — dwell on mount Atbon, 
209— revolt from the Athenians, ib. 

Diemporus, 53. 

Diitriphes, 269. 

Diodotus, his speech, 106. 

Diomedon, besieges the Chians, 303 — favours the de- 
mocracy, 320. 

Diomilus, 16. 

Diotrephes, 317 

Diphilus, 271. 

Do lopes, 32. 

Dorcis, 31. 

Dorians, in Peloponnesus, 5 — founders of Lacedemon, 
34, 124 — bordering on the Carians, 56 — warred upon 
by the Phocians, 34 — perpetual enemies to loniana, 
248. 

Dorieus the Rhodian, 95. 

Dorieus the Thurian, 307. 

Droana of Thrace, 90. 



340 



INDEX. 



Edonian3,23,90, 170. 

Egesteans, at war with the Selinuntians, 219 — solicit 

aid of Athens, ib. — their trick, 235. 
Eleans, defeated by the Atlienians, 63 — an alliance 

with the Corinthians and Argives, 190 — with the 

Athenians, 197. 
Eleusinians, warred against Erectbeus, 59. 
Elymi,2]7. 
Empedias, 187, 188. 
Endius^ the Spartan, 297 — ambassador to Athens, 196 

— his enmity with Agis, 299. 
Entimus, the Cretan, founder of Gela, 218. 
Eordians, 90. 
Epidamnians, harassed with seditions, 9 — beg aid at 

Corey ra, ib. — at Corinth, ib. — besieged by the Corcy- 

reans, ib. — reduced, 10. 
Epitadas, 135, 146. 
Epitelidas, 177. 
Erectheus, 59. 
Eretrians, at war with the Cbalcideana, 6 — subject 

and tributary to Athens, 281. 
Erythraans, 300. 
Eteonicus, 302. 
Eualas, 302. 
Evarchus, tyrant of Astacus, 61 — another of the name, 

218. 
Eubulus, 302. 
Eucles the Athenian, 168. 
Eucles the Syracusan, 258. 
Euclides, founder of Himera, 219. 
Euctemon, 306. 
Evesperit(B, 278 
Eumachus, 64. 
EumoipidiB, 313. 
Eumolpus, 59. 
Euphamidas, 64, 173. 
Euphemus, his speech at Camarina, 248. 
Eurylochus, the Spartan, 126, 128, 129. 
Eurymachus, 53,55. 
Eurymedon, sent to Corcyra, 119 — to Sicily, 134 — is 

fined for returning, 155 — sent thither again, 264 — ar- 
rives at Syracuse, 274 — killed, 279. 
Eurystheus, king of Micena;, 4. 
Eurytanians, 126. 
Eustrophus, 194. 
Eutkydemus, 187, 188 — a commander at Syracuse, 

264 — unsuccessful in the last battle, 286. 



G 



Oelon, king of Syracuse, 218, 219. 

Oeloans, build Agrigentum, 218 — aid the Syracusans, 

282. 
OettEf 88. 
Olauco, 18. 
Ooaxis, 169. 

Oongylus, the Eretrian, 42. 
Oongylus, the Corinthian, 200. 
Orceana, 89. 
Orecians, account of the old, 2 — how they undertook 

the Trojan expedition, 4 — applied themselves to 

maritime affairs, 6, 7. 
Oylippua, sent to command at Syracuse, 254 — arrives 

there, 260— his battles, 261— takes Plemmyrium, 266 

— procures succours, 278 — fights the Athenians, 279 



— stops their decampment, 288 — takes Nicias prison- 
er, 293 — brings home the fleet from Sicily, 299. 
Oyrtoniana, 62. 



H 



Haliartians, 164. 

Harmodius, history of him, 238. 

Hegesander, 265. 

Hegesandridas, 328, 329. 

Hegesippidas, 200. - 

Helen, 4. 

Hellanicus, 32. 

Hellen, son of Deucalion, 2. 

Helots, their revolt from, and war with, the Lacede- 
monians, 32, 33 — are feared, and 2000 of them made 
away with, 160. 

Heracleuts, 199. 

Heraclidm, kill Eurystheus, 4. 

Heraclides, the Syracusan, 245, 258. 

Her cans, 205. 

HervKBondas, 94. 

Hermocrates , his speech to the Sicilians, 152 — to th** 
Syracusans, 230 — his character, 245 — encourages the 
Syracusans, ib. — made a commander, ib. — his speech 
at Camarina,246 — his stratagem, 288 — banished, 325. 

Herman, 328. 

Hesiod, 125. 

Hessians, 126. 

Hesticeans, 37, 281. 

Hestiodorus, 78. 

Hierensians, 124, 

Hierophon, 128. 

Hippagretes, 146. 

Hipparchus, history of him, 238. 

Hippias, the eldest son of Pisistratus, history of him, 
238. 

Hippias the Arcadian, 103. 

Hippoclus, tyrant of Lampsacus, 240. 

Hippoclus, son of Menippus, 299. 

Hippocrates the Athenian, 155 — his attempt on Me- 
gara, ib. — his harangue, 165 — killed at the battle of 
Delium, 167— tyrant of Gela, 219. 

Hippo lochidas, 159. 

Hipponicus, 123. 

Hipponoidas, 206. 

Homer, 2, 4, 127. 

Hyceans, 127. 

Hybleans, 254. ^ 

Hyblon, 218. \ 

I 



Hyperbolus, 320. 



i 



Iberians, 217, 252. 

Illyrians, 9, 175. 

Imbrians, 94, 281. 

Jnarus, an African king, revolts from the Persian mon* 
arch, 33— crucified, 35. 

lolcius, 187, 188. 

lonians, had a great fleet in the reign of Cyrus, and 
were masters at sea, 6 — subdued by Cyrus, ib. — re- 
volt, 31 — enemies to the Dorians, 248 — used to assem- 
ble at Delos, 127. 

Ippensians, 126. 

Isarchidas, 10. 

Ischagoras, 177, 187, 188 

J Socrates, 83. ' 



INDEX. 



341 



Jsocrates, 83. 
Jsthmiotiicus , 187, 188. 
Jtalus, 218. 
Jtamanes, 103. 
Jtonians, 182. 
Jtys, 63 



Lacedemonians, their power in Peloponnesus, 4 — their 
dress, 3 — were the first who stripped in the public 
games, 3 — demolished tyrants, 6— deluded by The- 
mistocles, 30 — accuse him, 45 — war against their 
Helots, 33 — at war with the Athenians, ib, — and the 
Dorians, ib. — beat the Atlienians at Tanagra, 35 — 
make a truce for five years, 36 — begin the holy war, 
ib. — make a thirty years' truce with the Athenians, 
37 — consult about the Peloponnesian war, 26 — deter- 
mine for it, 28, 29 — send embassies to Athens to spin 
out time, 41— invade Attica, 56 — assign Thyrea to the 
iEginetae, 63 — invade Attica, 69— make war on Za- 
cynthus, 77 — march to Plataea, and besiege it, 78 — in- 
vade Acarnania, 82 — fight at sea, 83— their project 
to seize the Piraeus, 87 — invade Attica, 97— resolve 
to succour the Mityleneans, ib. — become masters of 
Plataea, 110 — put the Platseans to death, 116— beat the 
Corcyreans at sea, 119 — send a colony to Heraclea, 
123 — their expedition against the Amphilochians, 128 
— invade Attica, 133 — their endeavours to recover 
Fylus, 134 — send an embassy to Athens to solicit a 
peace, 137 — vanquished in Sphacteria, 146 — make 
away with 2000 Helots, 160— take Amphipolis, 168 
— make peace witli the Athenians, 172 — march into 
Arcadia, 191 — forbid to assist at the Olympic games, 
199 — succour the Epidaurians, 20! — gain a victory at 
Mantinea, 206 — determine to succour the Syracusans, 
254— fortify Decelea, 265— succour the Chians, 299 — 
enter into league with the Persian monarch, 301, 
307, 315— take lasns, 305— fight with and beat the 
Athenians, 308 — seize Rhodes, 310 — are beat at the 
sea-figbt of Cynos-sema, 333. 

Laced emonius, son of Cimon, 16. 

Laches, commander of the Athenian fleet in Sicily, 122, 
187, 188 — makes war on Mylae, 123 — defeats the Lo- 
crians, 127. 

Loco, 111. 

Lcespodias, 258, 325 

LcRstrigons. 217. 

Lamachus, loseth a squadron, 158 — one of the three 
commanders in Sicily, 220 — his opinion at a council 
of war, 236— killed, 257 

Lamis, 218. 

Lampkilus, 187, 188. 

Lavipo, 187, 188. 

Leeeans, 89. 

Learchus, 77. 

Lemnians, 94, 182 — accompany the Athenians to Sici- 
ly, 281. 

Leocrates, 34. 

Leon the Lacedemonian, 124. 

Leon the Athenian, 302, 303, 314. 

Leontines, 141 — at war with the Syracusans, 122 — in 
sedition, 180. 

Leotychides, 29. 

Lesbians, 94. 

Leucadians, aid the Corinthians against the Corcyre- 
ans, 9— join the Ambraciots, 82. 



Lichas, an Olympic victor, bat scourged, 190— bis em- 
bassies, 187, 208 — public host of the Argives, ib. — his 
dispute with Tissaphernes. 309, 324— his death, ib. 

Locrians, Oiolian, 3 — lose Naupactus, 33 — confede- 
rate with the Athenians, 125. 

Locrians, Epizephyrian, 259. 

Lycophron, 84, 148. 

Lyncestians, 90, 160, 174. 

Lysicles, 99. 

LysistratuSf 170. 



M 



Macarius, 126, 129. 

Machon, 83. 

Mantineans, 129, 130 — war with the Tegeatae, 178 — 
make alliance with the Argives, 189 — at war with 
the Lacedemonians, 191 — renew the peace with them, 
209 — mercenaries, 281 

Megabetes, 42. 

Megabazus the Persian, 35 — son of Zopyrus, ib. 

Megareans, aid the Corinthians against Corcyra, 10 — 
prohibited the harbours and markets of Athens, 21, 
47 — scheme to betray their city to the Athenians, 155 
— demolish their long walls, 169. 

JUeleans, 181. 

Melanchridas, 298. 

Melantkus, 297. 

J\Seleas, 94 

Melesander. 78. 

Melians, their conference with the Athenians, 211 — 
besieged, 215 — reduced, ib. 

Meliensians, 124 — fight with the Heracleots, 199. 

Menander, an Athenian commander in Sicily, 264, 
286. 

Menus, 187, 188. 

Mendeans, 174. 

Menecolus, 219. 

Menecrates, 173. 

Menon, 62. 

Messenians of Peloponnesus, ejected by the Lacedemo- 
nians, 33 — settled by the Athenians at Naupactus, ib. 
— take Phia, 63 — replaced at Pylus, 147. 

Messenians of Sicily, at war with the Naxians, 141. 

Metagenes, 187, 188. 

Mefapontians, 281. 

Methymneans, 98, 281. 

Miciades, 16. 

Milesians, their war with the Samians, 37 — beat the 
Argives, 304 — demolish the fort built by Tissapher- 
nes, "24. 

Mindarus, the Lacedemonian admiral, 324, 331 — de- 
feated, 333. 

Minos, liis naval power. 2, 3. 

Mityleneans, revolt from the Athenians, 93 — their 
speech at Olympia, 95 — reduced, 101 — ordered to be 
massacred, 103. 

Molossiaiis^ 82. 

Mijcalessians, massacred, 269. 

Myonensians, 126. 

Mi/rcivians, 181. 

Mijronides, 34, 35, 165, 

Murrhine, 2:^8. 

M'irtilus, 187, 188. 

My scon, 325. 

2L 



342 



INDEX. 



N 



^auelides, 53. 

M'azians, favour the Athenians, 237, 281 — vanquish the 
Messenians, 142. 

M'icanor, 82. 

Ificias, son of Niceratus, 110, 142, 147. 151, 174— his 
epeechee, 220, 225, 243, 283, 289— takes Minoa, 110— 
attacks Melos, 123 — invades the Corinthians, 147 — 
takes Cythera, 151 — and Mende, 175 — besieges Sci- 
one. ib. — author of the peace, 185, 197 — named for 
the command in Sicily, 220 — his opinion at a council 
of war, 236 — defeats the Syracusans, 244, 262 — his 
stratagem, 257 — left in the sole command, 258 — his 
letter to the Athenians, "262 — refuseth to raise the 
siege of Syracuse, 277 — raiseth the siege, 288 — sur- 
renders to Gylippiis, 293 — put to death, ib. 

Jficias, the Cretan of Gortyna, 84. 

M'icolaus, 77. 

^icomachus, 163. 

^icomedes, 34. 

J^icon, 265. 

^iconidas, 159. 

^icostratus , aids the popular faction at Corcyra, 118 — 
takes Cythera, 151 — takes Mende, 175 — besieges Sci- 
one, ib.— 203, 

J^ymphodorus, 63. 



Odomantians, 90, 181. 
Odrysians, 89. 
Oeanthians, 127. 

Oeniada, 83, 131 — invaded by the Athenians, 95 — re- 
ceived into their alliance, 159. 
Oetatans, 124, 296. 
Olynthians, 193. 
Onasimus, 173. 
Onomacles, 306. 
Ophionians, 125. 
Opicians, 218. 
Orestes, 35. 
Orestians, 82. 
Oroedus, 82. 
Oropians, 63. 



Paehes, sent by the Athenians to reduce Mitylene, 98 
—takes it, 101— and Notium, 103 — and Pyrrha and 
Eressus, ih. 

Padaritus, or Pedaritus, 305, 306, 308— killed, 314. 

Pteonians, 89. 

Pagondas, his harangues to the Boeotians, 163 — wins 
the battle of Delium, 165. 

Palirensians, 64. 

Pammilus,2\8. 

Panteans, 90. 

Pandion, 63. 

Paralians, 124. 

Parav(Bans, 82. 

Parians, 168. 

Pausanias, captain-general of Greece, 31 — subdues Cy- 
prus, ib. — besieges Byzantium, ib. — grows a tyrant, 



ib. — recalled and tried at Sparta, ib. — returns to HeK 
lespont, 42 — hia letter to Xerxes, ib. — driven from 
Byzantium, 43 — betrayed, 44 — starved to death, ib. 

Pausanias, son of Pleistionaz, 101. 

Pelops, 4. 

Peloponnesians, their colonics, 5 — their character, 48 
—originally Dorians, 248— their war with the Athe- 
nians: see Athenians and Lacedemonians. 

PeriBbians, 159. 

Perdiccas, king of Macedonia, his political turns, 19, 20, 
63, 88 — invaded by Sitalces, 88 — in conjunction with 
Brasidas, invades Arribsus, 160, 177 — quarrels with 
Brasidas, 177 — makes peace with the Athenians, ib. 
— is again their enemy, 210. 

Pericles, commands the Athenians, 36 — conquers Eu- 
bcta, ib — and Samos, 37 — his speech for war, 47 — 
makes the funeral oration, 65 — his speech in defence 
of himself, 73 — his death and character, 75, 76. 

Perieres, 218. 

Persians, at Thermopylae, 146 — their noble custom, 89. 

Phteacians, 9 

Phaaz, 180 

Phadimus, 195. 

Pheeinis, priestess of Juno, 178. 

Phanomachris, 78. 

Pharnabazus, 297, 308. ^ 

Phamaces, 77. 

Pharsalians, 62. 

Phermans, 62. 

Philippus, the Lacedemonian, 305, 331. 

Philocharidas, 173, 187,188, 196. 

Philocrates, 215. 

Philoctetes, 4. 

Phliasians, 10. 

Phoeeans, built Marseilles, 6 — ^beat the Carthaginians 
at sea, ib. 

Pkocians, at war with tho Dorians, 34 — recover the 
temple of Delphi, 36. 

Phanicians, exercised piracy, 3 — inhabited the isles, ib 
— had settlements in Sicily, 218. 

Pharmio, an Athenian commander, 21, 38 — commands 
their fleet at Naupactus, 78 — beats the Peloponne- 
sians at sea, 84 — prepares for a second engagement, 
ib. — his harangue, 85 — beats them again, 87. 

Photius, 82. 

Phrynicus, 303 — his intrigue against Alcibiades, 312 — 
deprived of the command, 314 — is of the oligarchical 
faction, 318, 327— is assassinated, 328. 

Pierians, 90. 

Pisander, overturns the democracy at Athens, 313, 316, 
327— flies to Decelea, 331. 

Pisistratus, the tyrant, 127, 238— purifies Deles, 127 — 
dies an old man, 238. 

Pisistratus, the son of Hippias, 238 — dedicated al- 
tars, ib. 

Pissuthnes, 37, 103. 

Pittacus, 169, 

Plataans. confederate with Athens, 54 — besieged, 78 — a 
body of them make their escape, 100 — surrender, 110 
— their speech to the Lacedemonians, ib. — are put to 
death, 116. 

Pleistionaz, king of Sparta, 34, 37 — banished, 61 — re- 
stored, 185, 188, 191. 

Pleistolas, 187, 188. 

Pleistarchus, 43. 

Polis, 77. 

Polles, 181. 

Polyantkes, 271 



INDEX. 



343 



Polycrates, tyrant of Samos, powerful at sea, 6 — con- 
secrates Rhenea to the Delian Apollo, ib. 127. 

Polydamidas, 174, 177. 

Polymedes, 62. 

Potidceans, originally from Corinth, 19 — defeated by 
the Athenians, 21 — besieged, ib. 73 — surrender, 78. 

Protodemus, 77. 

Procles, 123, 187, 188. 

Procne, 63. 

Proteas, 16, 62. 

Proxenus, 127. 

Ptaodorus, 158. 

PystiUus, 219. 

Pythen, 258, 259. 

Pythias. 117 

Pythodorus, the archon at Athens, 53— the son of Iso- 
lochus, in the command, 131, 187, 188, 258 — banish- 
ed, 155. 



R 



Ramphias, 47, 184. 

Rhegians, 122 — attacked by the Locrians, 133, 140 — 

neutral in the Sicilian war, 235. 
Rhodians, Doric by descent, 281. 



Sdbylinthus, 82. 

Sacon, 219. 

Sadocas, son of Sitalces, 64 — made a citizen of Atli* 
ens, ib. 

Salathus, sent to Mitylene, 101 — taken prisoner and 
put to death by the Athenians, 103. 

Salynthius, king of the Agraeans, 131. 

Samians, conquered by the Athenians, 37 — their insur- 
rection, 302. 

Sargeus , 267. 

Scioneans, o( the Pelene, originally from Peloponnesus, 
173 — revolt, ib, — crown Brasidas, ib. — reduced and 
severely treated by the Athenians, 191. 

Scirondas, 314. 

Scythians, 89. 

Selinuntians , 281 — at war with the Egesteans, 219. 

Sermylians, 186. 

Seuthes, 89, 167 — succeeds Sitalces in the kingdom of 
Odrysae, 89 — marries the sister of Perdiccas, 91. 

Sicaniaiis, 217. 

Sicilians, 152, 154. 

Siculi, 218,251,257. 

Siey onions, 35, 36, 167. 

Simonides, 134. 

Simus, 219. 

Singeans, 186L 

Simians, 89. 

Sitalces, king of Thrace, 63, 77— ally to the Athenians, 
64 — invades the Macedonians, 88 — his power, 89 — 
conquered by the Tribaliians, 167. 

Socrates, son of Antigenes, 62. 

Sophocles, son of Sostratides, 131 — sent to Sicily, 133 
— his acts at Corcyra, 149 — banished from Athens, 
155. 

Stesagoras, 38. 

Sthenelaidas , his speech, 28. 

Stratonice, 91. 

Stratians, conquer the Cliaonians, 82. 

Strombichides, 300— his exploits, 306, 323. 



Styphon, 146. 

Styrensians, 281. 

Syracusans, at war with the Leontines, 122— are de- 
feated by the Athenians, 140 — draw up against the 
Athenians, 243 — prepare for battle, ib. — are defeated, 
244— fortify their city, 245 — send ambassadors to Ca- 
marina, 246— to Corinth and Sparta, 251— engage and 
are defeated by the Athenians, 255, 257— raise their 
counter-works, 256— are about treating with Nicias, 
257— prepare their fleet, 266— attack the Athenians 
by land and sea.ib — erect two trophies, 276 — prepare 
again for an engagement, 279— defeat them again, ib. 
—prepare for the last battle, 282— engage, 286— are 
victorious, 287— stop the Athenians by a stratagem, 
288— pursue them and take them all prisoners, 290— 
send aid to the Peloponnesians, 304, 333. 



Tages, 299. 

Tamus, 306. 

Tantalus, a Lacedemonian commander, 152. 

Taurus, 173. 

TegeatcB, fight with the Mantineans, 178. 

Telles, 187, 188. 

Tellias, 258. 

Temenid(r, 90. 

Tenedians, 93. 281. 

Teians, 102, 281, 300. 

Teres, father of Sitalces, 63 — how he got the kingdom 
of Odrysse, ib. — enlarged it, ib. 

Teutiaplus, 102 — his advice to Alcidas and the Pelo- 
ponnesians, ib. 

Tharyps, king of the Molossians, 82. 

Thasians, revolt from Athens, 32 — defeated, ib. — beg 
aid from the Lacedemonians, ib. — surrender, 33. 

Theanetus, 99. 

Theagenes, 41. 

Thebans, surprize Platjea, 53 — their speech to the La 
cedemonians against the Platoeans, 113 — demolish 
the walls of Thespia, 177. 

Themistoeles, 24, 45, 47 — by his advice the battle was 
fought in the strait of Salamis,84 — is sent ambassa- 
dor to Sparta, 29 — deludes the Lacedemonians, ib.-— 
gets the Long-walls and Piraeus secured, 30 — banish- 
ed Athens by the Ostracism, 45 — resides at Argos, ib. 
— accused by the Lacedemonians, ib. — flies to Corcy- 
ra, ib. — to Admetus, ib. — the danger he escaped, ib.— 
his letter to the king of Persia, 46 — his character, ib. 

Theramenes, the Athenian, 318 — one of those who 
overturned the democracy, ib. — turns to the other 
side, 327. 
Theramenes, the Lacedemonian, carries tbe fleet to 

Asia, 304. 
Thermo, 299. 

Theseus, 59. 

Thessalians, drive the Boeotians from Arne, 5— confe- 
derate with the Athenians, 33 — send them aids, 34, 
62 — their form of government, 159. 
Theucles, founder of Naxus, 218. 

Thracians, overthrow the Athenians 32, 167 — are free, 
63 — their sordid custom, 89 — flght with the Thebans 
after the massacre at Mycalessus, 270. 
Thrasybulus, 32 1 — su pports the democracy, ib — made a 
commander, 322 — brings back Alcibiades, 323 — beats 
the Peloponnesians at sea, 333. 
Thrasycles, 187, 188. 



344 



INDEX. 



ThrasylluSylhc Arrive, 202. 

Thrasijllus, the Athenian, 320, 322, 331. 

Thrasijmelidas, 136. 

Thucles, see Theucles. 

Thucydides, son of Olorus, why he wrote the history 
of tiie war, 1, 7, 8, 18«— had the plague, 69— his gold 
mines, and great credit in Thrace, 168 — commands in 
Thrice, il». — arrives too late to save Amphipolis, ib. 
— secures Eion, ib. — was an exile for twenty years, 
189. 

Thucydtdes, the colleague of Agnon and Pbormio, 38. 

Thucydides, the Pharsalian, 229. 

Thymocharis, 330. 

T Hat (Bans, 89. 

Timagoras of Cyzicus, 297, 298. 

Timagoras of Tegea, 77. 

Timanor, 10 

Timocrates, 84 — kills himself, 87. 

Tisamenus. 124. 

Tisander, 126. 

Tisias, 211. 

Tissaphemes, lieutenant of Darius, SJ87, 303 — his com- 
pacts and leagues with the Peloponnesians, 301, 305, 
307, 309, 314, 315— is conquered at Miletus by the 
Athenians, 304 — fortifies lasus, 305 — pays the Lace- 
demonian ships, ib. — lessens their pay by the advice 
of Alcibiades, 310 — wants to be reconciled to the 
Lacedemonians, 314 — inveighed against by the mari- 
ners, 322, 324 — why he did not bring up the Phenician 
fleet, 326. 

Tlepolemus, 38. 

Tolmidas, son of Tolmaeus, 35, 36. 



TolophonianSy 126. 

Trachinians, 124. 

Trerians, 89. 

Triballians, conquer Sitalces, king of the Odrysiang, 

167. 
TrittBcnsians, 126 
Trojans, how enabled to resist the Greeks for ten years, 

5— some of them settled in Sicily after the taking of 

Troy, 217. 
Tydeus, 308. 
Tyndarus, 4. 
Tyrrhenes, 280, 282. 



Ulysses, 140. 



u 



X 



Xenarea, Ephorus at Sparta, 192. 

Xenares, commander of the Heracleots, killed, 199. 

Xenoclides, 16, 131. 

Xeno, 265. 

Xenop hantidas , 314. 

Xenophon, son of Euripides, 78, 81. 

Xerxes, 12, 38 — his letter to Pausanias, 43. 



Zacynthians, a colony of Achaeans, 77— aid the Athc* 

nians in the Sicilian war, 281 
Zeuzidas, 187, 188. 



THE END. 



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